

**NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
IN A GLOBALISED WORLD, 1993-2013**

BY

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B.Sc.(Hons.) (B.U.K,Kano), M.A. (LASU, Lagos), M.Sc (UNILAG, Lagos),PGDE(LASU, Lagos)

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SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the Thesis:

**NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN A
GLOBALISED WORLD, 1993-2013**

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By:

RAJI, ADESINA FATAI

In the Department of Political Science

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my parents, late Alhaji Akanmu and Alhaja Sikirat Raji; my darling wife, Mrs Sekinat Folake Abdulfattah; and my beloved children: Nusaybah, Sumayyah and Safiyyah who stood solidly by me to make this dream come true.

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ABSTRACT

Nigerian leaders since independence in 1960 have proclaimed adherence to the universal convention of predicating the foreign policy of the country on the domestic policies which should emphasize citizens' welfare and good governance. With the inception of globalization that has integrated the various countries of the world reducing their distinctiveness over the last three decades, Nigeria's foreign policy has transformed but this has not been sufficiently addressed by scholarly works. This study therefore examines Nigeria's foreign policy in the new context stretching through both the military and civilian administrations by investigating the place of national interest in addition to identifying and discussing the new challenges as well as the role of non-state actors in the formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy. The study adopts three theories. The first is the Plural Society Theory which claim relevance to the Third World experience in the sense that its analytical focus is on the highly differentiated nature of the Third World. Second, the Marxist Theory of the State explains why the state in a capitalist society ultimately represents the interest of the capitalist class. Third, Globalisation Theory, explores the growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and global engagements such that the impact of distant events is magnified while even the most local developments may have enormous global consequences. In addition to extensive literature review, the study uses the indepth interview method which involves extracting authoritative information from key stakeholders – foreign policy scholars, experts and diplomats. The study also uses semi-structured interview guide and impromptu questions derived from some of the respondents' assertions. The study finds out that the Cold War was a defining character of the international system at the time of Nigeria's independence in 1960, her non-alignment posture notwithstanding. It further reveals that inconsistent definition of Nigeria's national interest, misplaced priorities, insincerity of the foreign policy makers, lack of consultation among the diverse stakeholders in the country, poor coordination of policy formulation and implementation processes and Nigeria's political leaders' lack of dynamism to effectively and adequately respond to and appropriately benefit from the changes occasioned by the phenomenon of globalisation which eventually robbed the country of the expected respect from other African countries. It concludes that Nigeria, no doubt, possesses the necessary potentials as well as institutional structures needed to formulate a vibrant foreign policy. It recommends that in addition to commitment responding to demands, pressures and influences from the external environment, the makers and executors of Nigeria's foreign policy need to equally respond appropriately to domestic pressures and demands.

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The world has become mutually interdependent as a result of mainly the revolution in the areas of transport and communication. The nations of the world are, therefore, linked together and have become interrelated and interdependent. Since no nation can exist in isolation of others, it becomes imperative that nations of the world should come together and derive mutual benefits from one another. It is the bid to come together and derive such mutual benefits that led to the interdependence of states.

In an interdependent world, foreign policy is seen as that segment of the public policy of a state that is concerned with relations to other states and international organizations as well as the changes in the international environment (Dauda, 2002:1). It is a dynamic process of interaction between the changing domestic demands and supports and the changing external environments (Frankel, 1975:9). This shows that foreign policy is ever changing and dynamic based on the dynamism in the external and international environments. Foreign policy, therefore, responds to the dynamic and ever evolving international system.

Nigeria, a country located in the West African sub-region, got her political independence on October 1, 1960. As a colonized polity, the country was networked largely into the British orbit and programmed to conceive and interpret global outcomes within the perceptive prism of western capitalist ideals, values and preferences (Okolie, 2011:137). While underscoring the above axiom, Ogunsanwo (1986:90) remarked that “the value orientation of the political leadership at independence was steeped in British tradition and they were therefore bound to look at the external environment with a tainted prism”.

This was equally the case with the infrastructure for foreign policy-making in post-colonial Nigeria. Thus, colonial proclivities basically produced Nigerians in blood and colour but thoroughly British in taste, fashion, lifestyle, behaviour, culture and psychological disposition.

Nigeria as one of the nations of the world is not exceptional in this interaction among countries of the world. Nigeria interacts with other nations in political, economic and socio-cultural fields. For the interactions to be more extensive and effective, and adequately felt,

Nigeria had established Embassies, High Commissions and Consulates abroad while other nations reciprocate this gesture by having theirs in Nigeria as well.

The primary task of the interactions is to influence the policies and actions of other nations and other actors in the international system. This is simply done through the instrument of foreign policy. Foreign policy, therefore, has to do with the actions of a country towards the external environment or the actions such a country takes in its relationship with other nations in the international political and economic spheres. In other words, foreign policy remains a reflection of domestic policy.

The field of foreign policy studies has derived its importance from the overall benefit of inter-state relations. Borne out of the recognition that no state can ever be an island unto itself, nation-states have been compelled by the overriding advantage of foreign policy to engage in the business of inter-state relations. The relationship between and among nation-states can take different forms and is motivated by a variety of objectives which are best conducted through the instrumentality of foreign policies (Saliu, 2010). Across all ages and times, foreign policy has always been motivated by welfare which means security and prosperity for all the citizens of the state (Saliu, 2006). Unfortunately, the beneficial aspects of foreign policy are always lost on the people, including some officials who conduct it. This has led to the complaints on the barrenness of foreign policy because its seeds or fruits are not always visible for people to appreciate (Gambari, 1989).

According to Nweke (1985:1), the foreign policy of a country, above all, is a function of the strength, cohesion and resilience of its economy, society and polity. Ogunsanwo (1986:8) underscores the need for a strong domestic economy in the pursuit of the national interest when he states that: "Bold foreign policy positions and stance are hardly sustainable for a considerable period without the domestic infrastructural underpinnings which form the solid foundation for such policies."

However defined, the foreign policy of a country towards any issue or particular region is defined by its national interest. Most scholarly works on foreign policy and international relations tend to rely on the idealist and realist framework. Other theories that have made contributions towards explaining the phenomenon of foreign policy and international relations include: the decision-making theory, strategic and defence theory, behavioural theory and utopian theory. Most contemporary writings on foreign policy anchor their

analyses on the realist framework (Akinyemi, 1974; Nweke, 1985). The realists perceive the international system as a hierarchical order characterized by zero-sum game relationships. They underscore power as the central goal which states seek to maximize above others. They see nation-states as the principal units of analysis and present a picture of homogeneity and rationality on the part of states (Morgenthau, 1967; Carr, 1939).

In the design of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, external affairs or “the conduct of international relations” are on the exclusive list, thus, giving the central government exclusive power over matters on this list (Akinyemi, et al, 1979:36; Akindele, 2003:93). The framers of the Independence Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1960 and the Republican Constitution of 1963 recognized the need to have a united position on external issues by allocating legislative and executive responsibilities for the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign and defence matters exclusively to the Federal Government (Bolarinwa, 2010: 341).

Nigeria’s foreign policy does have some planks which were announced to the world by the then Prime Minister, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, in 1960. Although the country is almost fifty-five years old, the essentials of its foreign policy, as announced in 1960, have largely remained the same (Olusanya & Akindele, 1986).

Since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the country has conscientiously and continuously articulated a number of foreign policy objectives. While the protection of Nigeria’s natural interests has remained permanent in Nigeria’s foreign policy, the strategy for such protection has varied from one regime to another.

The formulation and execution of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence in 1960 have been carried out under different governments. The twelve governments are: Balewa administration (1960 – 1966); Ironsi regime (January 1966 – July 1966); Gowon regime (1966 – 1975); Murtala/Obasanjo regime (1975 – 1979); Shagari administration (1979 – 1983); Buhari/Idiagbon regime (1983 – 1985); Babangida regime (1985 – 1993); Abacha regime (1993 – 1998); Abubakar regime (1998 – 1999); Obasanjo administration (1999 – 2007); Yar’Adua administration (2007 – 2011); and finally, Jonathan administration (2011 – 2015).

All the governments in Nigeria, from Balewa administration to that of Jonathan have pursued the same interest. The prevailing domestic and international environments have, however,

combined in determining the posture and freedom of their actions in the country's international relations.

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Nations have the dual obligations of grappling with both the domestic relations within their borders and foreign relations outside its border. While they develop policies to attend to the welfare and good governance of their people and their states, they equally have an obligation to design policies towards projecting their nation's strengths and interests as well as work in tandem with other nations towards the attainment of global peace and security. Contemporary realist accounts of international relations describe an international system which is dominated by egocentric states, each pursuing its own self-defined interests under conditions of anarchy. In this "self-help" system, there are no effective international norms; international law exists solely for the convenience of powerful states; periods of peace in the international system are temporary and unstable; and international cooperation, where it exists, is equally fragile (Keohane, 1986). Thus, domestic and foreign policies constitute the two essential blocks in building a nation's diplomatic relationship. Oyeboode (2013: 67) alludes much to this fact when he asserts that:

one of the axioms of international relations is that the foreign policy of a state is, more often than not, contingent on its domestic policies. If foreign policy hinges on the domestic situation of a country, it should be asserted with equal timbre that as far as policies go, perception can actually be more critical than reality. The way a country is perceived by others can be most critical and impactful on the effectiveness of its postures at the international plane, hence the effort exerted by many countries to look good, win friends and influence people generally within the international community.

Shortly before Nigeria's independence in October 1960, the country's leaders began to design a framework to guide the conduct of the external relations of the newly emerging state. The outcome of the efforts ultimately became the foundation of Nigeria's foreign policy. However, Aworawo (2003: 386) points out that:

...though the policy has remained fairly stable in the last five decades, the implementation has differed markedly from one administration to the other, depending on the character of the leaders or their perception of what the place of Nigeria should be in the international system.

The foreign policy of a country occupies that ever-shifting and unpredictable terrain in which countries not only pursue and maximize their national interests but also collectively promote

peace and security, friendship, solidarity and development. According to Adetula (2013), there have been commendable efforts in the past to articulate Nigeria's national interest. Such include the official initiatives of the early 1960s that were aimed at formulating Nigeria's national interest, and also the 1976 Adedeji Panel on the Review of Nigerian Foreign Policy. In the recent time, there has been increased concern about Nigeria's national interest and how to address the new global realities. The *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria* (1999) is a written set of laws that state the basic purposes of the Nigerian government among other things. It is plausible to argue that, in principle, the national interests of Nigeria are associated with the constitutional provisions of 'fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy', which are contained in Chapter Two of Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). While Article 14 (1-2) presents the philosophical or ideological justification of the Nigerian state, Article 19 states the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria to be:

- i. Promotion and protection of the national interest;
- ii. Promotion of African integration and support for African unity;
- iii. Promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among nations and elimination of discrimination in all ramifications;
- iv. Respect for international law and treaty obligations, as well as seeking settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication; and
- v. Promotion of a just world economic order.

For long, many have debated the extent to which the above stated foreign policy objectives are realizable in view of the capacity of the Nigerian state. Also, there is a section of the Nigeria foreign policy elites that is advocating for a more Nigeria – centred national interest rather than the present seemingly outward foreign policy. However, some feel that some of these concerns have been addressed with the application of the 'three concentric circles' framework in the conceptualization of Nigeria's national interest and diplomacy. This framework prioritized Nigeria's interest and emphasised the Africa region in the conduct of Nigeria's foreign relations (Adetula, 2013: 208).

These components of the objective of Nigeria foreign policy reflect the perception, by the foreign policy elite, of Nigeria's position as the most populous black state in the world and her role as a regional power, in fact, the most powerful and influential state in black Africa

(Olusanya & Akindele, 1986). Critics, however, maintain that Nigeria's domestic ecology does not support her foreign policy posture of giant of Africa (John, 2011). However, one noticeable flaw in the 1999 constitution is its failure to spell out the actual content or direction of Nigeria's foreign policy (Fawole, 2004:9). This is evident in the preamble of the constitution where it is stated:

We the people of Nigeria firmly and solemnly resolved to promote
Inter-African Solidarity, World Peace and Inter-national Cooperation
and Understanding.

Given this rather generalized conception of foreign policy in the 1999 constitution, the leadership of the country is thus called on to determine the shape and specific direction which Nigeria's foreign policy should follow. It has often been argued that 'apart from the meaning and content of the national interest that are left to the imagination of discerning minds, and consequently, three out of the five succeeding objectives as stated above are merely grand, idealistic, altruistic and largely unrealizable foreign policy objectives (Fawole, 2000: 281).

Although these objectives are laudable, a look at practical realities reveal that the promotion of African integration and support of African unity (the 2nd objective) may be beyond the country's capacity owing to factors such as resources, the goodwill of others, the need to surmount the peculiar colonial legacies of each country and above all, Nigeria's domestic realities. On the other hand, the promotion of a just world economic order has been made more remote if not outright impossible by the phenomenon of globalization which became more prominent especially in the period under study. As established by Zabadi (2012: 343-4):

Nigeria seemed destined to play a significant and influential role in world affairs on attaining her independence in 1960... (due to) her size, population, resources and her journey to becoming the largest democracy in the continent... However, her performance seemed not to have matched her natural endowments which invariably has led to her dwindling importance and significance first on the continent and then on the global scale.

It would appear that following the 1970s and 1980s, an era usually referred to as the 'golden era' of Nigeria's foreign policy and diplomacy, the dynamism of Nigeria's foreign policy implementation asphyxiated. For a country once referred to as a frontline state in African affairs and consulted on virtually all matters relating to the continent, Nigeria's influence and significance took a nose dive and the country became a pariah state that was being harassed and isolated by big powers, and disdainfully treated even by countries which erstwhile were shepherded and protected by the benevolence of Nigeria's diplomacy. That Africa was the

centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy was attested to by her foremost role in the struggle against, and the ending of apartheid in white-minority dominated South Africa as well as the liberation of the remaining parts of the continent from the shackles of colonialism. This was obvious under the Murtala/Obasanjo administration (1975-1979) when Nigeria rebuffed the United States' President Gerald Ford over Angola and recognised the popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against U.S. desires as well as nationalised Barclays (now Union Bank) and the assets of the British Petroleum (BP) during Zimbabwe's (formerly Rhodesia's) struggle for independence (Adeyemo, 2002:37-38).

In contrast with the above, and especially from the 90s, Nigeria's image and standing among the comity of nations plummeted. Nigerians in the Diaspora were treated with hostility especially on the African continent by way of deportation and sometimes extra judicial killings. The country has been refused vital appointments as head of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations Organisation (UNO) and the Africa Development Bank (ADB). For instance, former Nigerian Military Head of State, General Obasanjo (whose personal role in Africa is almost unrivalled) was rejected in favour of an Egyptian Boutros Boutros-Ghali for the post of the Secretary General of the UNO, when an African was to be considered for the job. This trend perhaps informed the shift in the foreign policy focus of the country to what was called 'citizenship diplomacy' under a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ojo Madueke. Though this was a lofty proclamation, it left much to be desired as the underlying factors behind the drift have not been addressed. For instance, how has Nigeria's foreign policy implementation promoted her 'national interest' on the international scene? A carefully planned and well thought out foreign policy would (and must) be consistent in placing frontally, its national interest at the core of its policies adapting same to changing internal and external circumstances (Adeyemo, 2002:38).

Again, the internal contingencies of any nation are a huge factor both in giving the foreign policy formulation and implementation in the appropriate orientation and direction, and in influencing the perception of that country by other nations. On the other hand, globalization has turned the world into a global village where countries have found it in their interest to form economic clusters, e. g. Group of Eight Industrialized Countries (G8), Group of Twenty Developed and Developing Countries (G20), Asia – Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICs), etc. That no such initiative has come out of Africa may not be unconnected, partly though, with the inertia of Nigeria as a driver of events on the continent. What then are the factors (fettters) preventing Nigeria from fully

asserting her role as a continental power? Is it an incoherent foreign policy formulation and implementation; an internal dysfunction; an overarching international structural arrangement through the phenomenon of globalization; or a combination of all these? Certainly, whatever the factors behind Nigeria's loss of importance and significance especially on the African continent, deserves a critical study. As Obiozor (1994) points out:

Nigeria is a nation born in hope and optimism but has lived in anxiety for most of its years as an independent and sovereign nation. The reason for this disgusting paradox lies in the inability of the country to evolve the thorough-going and selfless leaders that are ready to play down their narrow interests for the purpose of the collective interest.

In clear terms, Nigerian foreign policy, after the end of the Cold war, has disappointed many Nigerians than meeting their expectations. Virtually on a daily basis, Nigerians in other countries are being exposed to dangers with the country's foreign policy officials keeping mum, without appreciable response. Obviously, the era of globalisation necessitated a reformulation of the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria in those terms to cope with the potential challenges. Perhaps, this informed Akinboye's (2013) perception to have submits that " - - it is only through a well articulated, cohesive foreign policy plank that Nigeria can obviate its perennial, incoherent foreign policy".

However, since the dawn of a new democratic era in 1999, a major trend is clearly discernible in Nigeria's foreign policy. This is the desire to establish and maintain friendships with countries that have historically shaped global diplomacy while forging new alliances with emerging powers in the global economy. This trend reflects the country's overall objectives as envisioned in its vision 20-2020 document. To this end, six major determinants have underlined Nigeria's foreign policy since 1999. These include:

- (i) removing the near-pariah status that the country attained during the last phases of military rule;
- (ii) remaining a key player in regional or continental politics, particularly in light of the increasing importance of the Gulf of Guinea;
- (iii) ensuring that external relations assist in domestic economic development, especially through strategic cooperation with traditional and emerging global economic actors;
- (iv) bringing about debt relief;
- (v) obtaining assistance to consolidate democracy; and

- (vi) improving the image of the country affected by negative press on the illegal activities of its nationals abroad (Alao, 2011:6).

This citizen diplomacy strategy has also had a parallel domestic policy of ensuring an agenda to make the nation proud. The variety of diplomatic strategy that has consistently been adopted to achieve this has not realistically resolved the debacle in a fundamental sense. Hence, the achievement of dynamic, virile and robust foreign policy as an instrument of obliterating Nigeria from the docile and fragile foreign policy implementation, constitutes a critical issue that the research intends to investigate.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Interestingly, the environment of international relations and foreign policy has been changing with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the new phase of globalization and the increasingly diffusion of state autonomy. The international system has been hitherto largely state centric but now in the age of globalization, there is a growing influence of Non-State Actors (NSAs) and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) in international relations (Ariel, 2000:76). Globalization is fast eroding state boundaries and at the same time eating away at state sovereignty thus dramatically changing the whole notion of the environment of foreign policy and international relations (Alli, 2010: 223). Though, Nigeria's foreign policy has since independence been guided by the same principles and objectives. However, the emphasis that has been persistently laid on them by successive regimes in the country differs depending on the domestic context within which decisions are made, the external environment and the attitudinal posture of the foreign policy – makers at a given time (Alli, 2013: 142).

Analysts cannot resist the temptation of referring to the speeches of the Prime Minister Balewa to the UN on 7th October 1960 shortly after the attainment of Nigeria's independence and the National Assembly of Nigeria in December 1960. Both speeches have remained the cornerstones of the country's foreign policy. In the speeches, the features and concerns of Nigerian foreign policy were outlined. As customary of foreign policies, Nigerian foreign policy, right from its inception, gave an indication on issues of concern to the country both in the short and long run. About six principles were announced as those to propel Nigerian foreign policy into action and guide the achievement of the foreign policy objectives of the country. Prominent among the principles are the principles of African centre- piece, non-

interference in the internal affairs of other states, legal equality of states, non-alignment, preference for peaceful means in resolving international conflicts and multilateralism (Olusanya & Akindele, 1986, Saliu, 1999, Gambari, 2008). However, it is difficult to identify Nigeria's conception of national interest since 1960 to date. As Agreen aptly puts it:

- - - While, it is difficult to define the national interest of Nigeria, it is even more difficult to redefine it because of the variegated diplomatic permutations and ideologies Nigeria adopted over the years. Some foreign policy experts believe that Nigeria has no clear cut political ideology and national interest part of the policy facilitations is attributable to the fact that foreign policy is inextricably linked to its domestic policy.

Similarly, this indicate that generally, trends in Nigeria's foreign policy indicating its national interest have not been very stable over time, nevertheless it has always assumed the minimal core elements of national interest - protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the security of the country. It is in this context that the mutations of Nigeria's conception of national interest should be understood (Eze, 2010: 81).

Apparently, at the domestic level, there is the problem of constitutional ambiguity in terms of what is the focus of Nigeria's foreign policy. As provided in the 1999 constitution, the objectives of foreign policy are quite difficult to distinguish from the principles under lying Nigeria's foreign policy. In actual fact, there are a lot of contradictions in the Nigeria's foreign policy. As argued by Gambari (1989: 31):

Nigeria's foreign policy has never been directly related to the needs of the masses of the people, rather it is formulated, articulated and implemented in highly elitist circles. Hence, the country's foreign relations have reflected the needs and aspirations of a national super elite of business, bureaucratic, military and traditional ruling group - - -

Given the variety and the uncertainty of the internal and the external ingredients that go into the making of foreign policy, Oche (2005) argues that:

Foreign policy-making has to be a dynamic process. A foreign policy once established does not then become static and fixed for all times. While being consistent, it must, nevertheless, take account of changes at both the global and at the national levels, failing which it risks irrelevance, obsolescence and jeopardy of national interest.

Can it be said that Nigeria's foreign policy formulation and implementation have been dynamic and responsive to changes in the international arena? For instance, since her first proclamation, which had Africa as the centrepiece of her foreign policy, the international system has changed drastically: colonialism has been abolished, the Cold war has ended and

a new phenomenon of globalization (which had the twin pursuit of opening up economies of the world to free market and a political dispensation that preached multi-party democracy) has come upstream. Has Nigeria's foreign policy taken account of all these and adapted appropriately or was it just receptive of the consequences of these changes? More importantly than this is the question of what constitutes her 'national interest'; are they tangible goals or just lofty ideals?

As a representation of the clusters of interests, values, aims and objectives that are likely to foster the well-being of the state and its population, the national interest should involve the basic values of freedom, security and prosperity which are derived from the experiences and aspirations of the state. It is against this background that in defining foreign policy, Frankel (1970:15) posits that, 'the government, as the principal instrument of state in its relations with the outside world, is expected to be guided by the real and perceived national interest of the state (1970:15). It appears the contents of what could be regarded as Nigeria's national interest has been hollow, vague and devoid of tangible goals as Aluko (1981) points out that Nigeria's national interest' since 1960 seems to point to the fact that they are directed at the pursuit and attainment of some ideals rather than the possession of tangible goals in international politics. Little wonder, then, that many of the country's laudable foreign policy goals and objectives remained unrealizable despite the high monetary and material resources devoted to their pursuit. In fact, some scholars have argued that most of these interests are grand collectively and goals which are objectively beyond Nigeria's capacity to pursue and attain. Akinyemi (1980: 106) seemed to buttress this point when he described them as preference for adoration-value rather than respect-value.

However, even the most powerful among them –including the most powerful states – do not remain unaffected by the changing conditions and processes of the many different forms of regional and global entrenchment (Held & McGrew, 2007:4). Nigeria as an actor in the international system exhibits the character of a state that aspire to dominate others. It has maintained from inception the principle of sovereignty and nationalism which are decisive in the making of any nation's foreign policy. There is every tendency to believe that Nigeria's foreign policy is generally consistent with realist principles because most of its actions are still designed to preserve Nigeria's predominance in the West African region and African continent as a whole. The challenges posed by globalization therefore, are the integration of the economic systems of nation states into the 'global economy', the primacy and supremacy of international competitiveness, and the phenomenal rise in the internationalization of

labour, capital and portfolio investment (Gibson, 2007:163). The argument is that given the nature and character of the Nigerian state with its inherent weak domestic base, globalization has its adverse implications for the nation's economy and in the conduct of its external relations.

Regarding Africa as the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy, Professor Gambari argued it needs to be:

- - -reformulated to reflect a new scale of priorities for our foreign policy endeavours growing from inside pre-occupations and projected externally to our immediate neighbours, the West African sub-region, the African continent and the world as a whole (Akinterinwa, 2012: 440).

However, it could still be boldly argue that 'Africa as a centre piece' of Nigeria's foreign policy is still quite relevant. In this globalized world, one important component of globalization is regionalism, which is generally encouraged as a means of promoting economic prosperity through cooperation and integration, as well as a means of maintaining peace and security. In view of this, the Nigeria's foreign policy objectives need to be well defined within the context of contemporary reality. In this regard, the pre-occupation with 'manifest destiny' and being 'the giant of Africa' or 'the leading black nation in the world' and 'power projection in West Africa and elsewhere' as key goals of foreign policy should be discarded because they do not satisfy the national critical need which is the achievement of socio – economic and political development (Alli, 2013: 143).

Put differently, there is the need for policy re-orientation essentially because there have been non-articulation of concepts and discontinuity in the application of such concept. For instance, Africa as 'corner stone' of Nigeria's foreign policy was adopted at the time of Nigeria's independence. The main rationale for this was geo-cultural and was far from being driven by articulated interest *per se*. As explained by the then Foreign Minister, Dr. Jaja Wachukwu, Nigeria was an African state and a member of the African community and therefore, Nigeria should be 'very closely and very intimately connected with all things pertaining to the african continent - - - charity begins at home and therefore any Nigerian foreign policy that does not take into consideration the peculiar position of Africa is unrealistic' (Hansard, 1961: 2782-83). If we are to admit that this geo-cultural consideration constitutes an interest *per se*, it is still at best not articulated (Akinterinwa, 2012:435).

However, considering Nigeria's prevalent economic resources and the prevailing security challenges it presently faces at home, it is illogical and unreasonable to continue with much of the externally – oriented and costly intervention in Africa. Although within the realms of public opinion, some analysts will argue that foreign policy gains are not usually measured in monetary or actual terms. But, the fact is that, foreign policy is not a charity, more often than not, it is always seen as an instrument of negotiation. Unfortunately, in most cases, Nigerian leaders lack the ideological focus and clarity in the pursuance of the Nigerian foreign policy.

Now, globalization has turned the world into a global village wherein countries have found it in their interest to form economic clusters. The trend has led to a greater regionalism and the formation of economic groupings such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC), G8, G20, Asia Pacific Economic Commission (APEC), among many others. Greater economic development has also led to the emergence of multiple power centres across the world. Globalisation makes it imperative that Nigeria's foreign policy should be:

- Knowledge and technology driven;
- Sensitive to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA);
- Sensitive to the energy crisis; and
- Sensitive to the environment and bio – technology.

It should also:

- Take cognizance of International Financial Institutions;
- Take cognizance of migration and global citizenship;
- Take cognizance of international governance regimes;
- Pursue a just and equitable economic system;
- Fashion creative means to attract FDI;
- Pursue a diversification of source of external earnings beyond oil, and
- Take cognizance of concerted international Campaign against corruption, including the use of United Nations Convention Againsts Corruption (UNCAC) (National Planning Commission, 2012).

In practical terms, in this era of globalization, Nigeria's foreign policy should be more organised to protect the interest of the nation from the onslaught of the New Scramble for the nation's resources and market, and primed to enhance national productive capacity on the

basis of a national strategic vision and appropriate institutional framework. Importantly, there is need for a critical paradigm shift (Alli, 2013:142).

The theorization of Nigeria's foreign policy in concentric circles with Nigeria in the centre, followed by other circles in order of priority, is still valid. What is additionally required is the necessity that, in a globalizing world, national interest should be articulated in each geographical zone and simultaneously pursued in a manner to ensure that zonal implementations complement one another to avoid the apparent contradictions which sequential pursuit often gives. Such a new direction does not imply a mercantilist approach to foreign policy whereby all interventions must produce instant discernible gain to the country. Rather, it implies that the pursuit of peace and security, on the one hand, and the challenge of development on the other have to be confronted *pari passu*. Both require simultaneous engagement with Nigeria's neighbours, Africa as a whole and the wider world at large, including regional and international organisations, such as the European Union and the United Nations. Such simultaneous engagement will at once facilitate the playing by Nigeria of its leadership role and strengthen the national base requirements (Adeniji, 2012:421).

Be that as it may, there is no problem with globalisation as center piece of Nigeria's foreign policy *per se*. The yet-to-be addressed problem however, is the non-articulation of the interests being pursued. For instance, Lt. General Aliyu Muhammed (rtd) (2001), the former National Security Adviser, had it that:

The current thrust of Nigeria's foreign policy is to regain respectability and relevance in the international community..... the grand strategy seeks the conversion of foreign policy activities into concrete achievements which are of direct benefit to Nigeria. The main objective is peace, security and prosperity through friendship. The goals to be achieved are so follows: economic integration of ECOWAS; responsibilities in multilateral organisations (UN, AU, Commonwealth, OPEC, NAM and G. 77); cooperation with the far East; promotion of foreign investments and trade; and debt reduction.

Additionally, Alhaji Sule Lamido (2000: 2) also told a joint forum of the Congress of South Africa Trade Union (COSATU) and the Nigeria Labour Congress in Abuja in 2000 that Nigeria's foreign policy would henceforth be:

circumscribed by events in the world and other dominant global issues as necessary conditions for the policy's nuances and trajectory" and that "the instrumentalist focus of foreign policy effectively shifts the thrust to a

question of strategies of land mass, etc towards enhanced share of the benefits of globalisation for our economy.

The variety of diplomatic strategy that has consistently been adopted to achieve this and has not realistically resolved the debacle in a fundamental sense. Hence, the achievement of dynamic, virile and robust foreign policy as an instrument of obliterating Nigeria from the docile and fragile foreign policy implementation constitute a critical issue that the research intends to investigate. Thus, examining the ways and manners Nigeria has pursued its foreign policy objectives through an extensive network of multilateral relations and the impact of external factors in its foreign policy formulation is a critical dimension in the study of Nigeria's foreign policy implementation in a globalized world.

1.3 AIM OF THE RESEARCH

It is obvious that globalization as a phenomenon is all pervading even as it keeps unfolding in different manifestations across different facets of nations' lives, Nigeria not being an exception. To underestimate the measure of influence that such a phenomenon may register on the foreign policy of a Third World country like Nigeria may therefore amount to being scholarly simplistic. In this regard therefore, the aim of the study is to examine Nigeria's foreign policy within the context of globalization by investigating the place of national interests in international relations as well as identifying new challenges and exploring the role of non-state actors in shaping Nigeria's foreign policy.

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- 1) examine the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy within the context of an increasingly globalised world on national interests.
- 2) identify and clarify the factors militating against the implementation of a robust foreign policy in Nigeria.
- 3) understudy why Nigeria, the erstwhile giant and hope of Africa, has failed to realise its manifest destiny, as espoused by the founding fathers.
- 4) Identify specific policies that have been formulated and implemented in responding to the changes of the globalized world.
- 5) examine the impact of globalization on the Nigeria's foreign policy, implementation and responses on Nigeria's national development

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- 1) How has the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy within the context of an increasingly globalised world impacted positively on the national interests?
- 2) What are the factors militating against the implementation of a robust foreign policy in Nigeria?
- 3) Why Nigeria, the erstwhile giant and hope of Africa, has failed to realise its manifest destiny, as espoused by the founding fathers?
- 4) What specific policies have been formulated and implemented in responding to the dynamism of the globalized world?
- 5) To what extent has Nigeria's foreign policy is responding to the impact of globalization that determines her national development?

1.6 SCOPE AND DELIMITATION OF STUDY

The period between 1960 and 1993 represents the "golden era" of Nigeria's foreign policy because it marked the announcement of Nigeria as a key player in Africa by virtue of the successes recorded at that particular point in time. Prominent among these achievements were its contribution to the birth(s) of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, the attainment of independence by Angola and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) in 1975 and 1980 respectively and in the eventual demise of apartheid in Namibia in 1988 and later in South Africa in 1994 among others. At the sub-regional level, Nigeria has undoubtedly played an unparalleled role in finding solutions to the plethora of conflicts that have occurred within its sub-region as evidenced in the interventions in Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Sao – Tome and Principe and in Mali (Rugumamu, 2004:11).

The scope of the study covers the period 1993-2013. This is in order to analyze the trajectory of the decline in Nigeria's fortune with regard to her foreign policy formulation and implementation. This period brought changes on the international scene which affected Nigeria internally. The aim is to examine whether there has been any corresponding response/change in the orientation of the country's foreign policy that reflects the changing character of the international system in the period under review and which coincided with the end of the Cold War, and the ascending phenomenon of globalization as an instrument of

global re-ordering. Hence the analysis shall extend to the analysis of the international system since then including the major events, actors and issues.

Again looking at the period under review it coincided with a very tumultuous period internally for Nigeria, which became a pariah state among the comity of nations. These periods witnessed economic downturn, political unrest occasioned by the annulment of the June 12 1993 Elections, which was adjudged the freest and fairest in the country, resistance against a sitting military junta, and increasing social malaise. Thus, the research work also explicates on internal contingencies that influenced the way the country has come to be perceived.

Notably, the research critically examines the issues and development in Nigeria's foreign policy since the dawn of a new democratic era in 1999, particularly, the desire to establish and maintain friendships with countries that have historically shaped global diplomacy while forging new alliances with emerging powers in the global economic arena.

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The research is quite significant in its pragmatic attempt to critically examine how the foreign policy of any nation is, undoubtedly, a reflection of its domestic reality. It focuses on how the national interest becomes the principal consideration in the formulation and execution of national policies, both at the domestic and international levels.

From the view of Asobie (2010: 5), the diplomatic phase (1993-1998) was the Dark Age in Nigeria's history in several senses. First, Nigeria became a diplomatic pariah: isolated, despised and ridiculed in the international community. Second, she became primarily an object, rather than a subject, of international diplomacy. Third, some of the most prominent of her own citizens rejected and abandoned her, sought refuge in other lands and put pressure on the international community to place sanctions on her. Fourth, her leadership was tried in the court of international public opinion, found guilty and sanctioned for international bad behavior. The response of the Nigerian leadership at this time was simply bizarre. It was a singular period in Nigeria's diplomacy when national interest was recklessly sacrificed on the altar of the selfish ambition of a few.

Nigeria's foreign policy is fifty – five years old, having begun with the country's attainment of independence in 1960. The time is ripe enough to take a critical look at its whole gamut,

especially within the context of the cloud that has tended to descend on it as a result of global development.

The analysis of foreign policy in the context of global development is witnessing either diversion or low level of engagement due to the general climate of low returns from efforts. Hence, scholars and practitioners are more concern about their survival. The cry is that there should be a regime of reduced external visibility; an increased attention should be focused on improving the material existence of the citizens.

Nigerian foreign policy which was the toast of the African continent because of its profound Afro-focused which was fairly adequate in responding to the cold war and African interest in it, has suddenly been faced with less activism and lethargy. Major events are taking place in the world with the name of Nigeria missing in action. This development is worrisome, indeed.

In view of the global development, there is a compelling need to align the foundational objectives of foreign policy in Nigeria to the global overall objective of sustainable development as well as the new thinking in radical transformation.

1.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework is eclectic as it relies on a number of theories. Academics are of the view that the country's foreign policy is guided by dominant schools of international relations, namely the Realist and the Idealist Schools. Both schools of thought opine that the country as an autonomous body has a role to play in determining international issues, i.e. within the world political economy. To the realist, Nigeria's power and influence as well as her national interest are some of the factors that have elevated her to that exalted position of influence. Thus, to this school of thought, the national interest is seen as the guiding principle and by implication, the basis of Nigeria's foreign policy (Akinyemi, 1978, 1984; Aluko, 1981). To the Idealist, the focus is on the level and scale of Nigeria's diplomatic activities, stressing on the international legal rights and obligations as well as focusing heavily on contemporary events rather than on underlying trends.

According to analysts, both the Realist school and the Idealist thinking can be broadly categorized from traditional perspective; this is based on the consideration that both share a common ground in terms of analysis and methodological framework; that is, both are

considered as state – centric, largely static and historical in their approach to issues concerning foreign policy. From studies carried out by scholars among who are Morgenthau (1978), Spykman (1942) and Knorr (1970), Rosenau (1963), Synder, *et al* (1963), Kelman (1965) and Frankel (1963), these traditional perspectives have been influenced greatly by dominant western theoretical formulations on foreign policy, which tends to focus or concentrate more on the political (Sani, 2012: 65-66).

Within this context, the major theories that can be considered relevant to the Nigerian experience, although with varying degrees of significance and impact, are called Plural Society Theory, the Marxist Theory of the State and Globalization Theory. These theories are more relevant based on the consideration that they are relatively more powerful in their capacity to explain, at a more fundamental level, social and political issues. Each of these perspectives claims to provide conceptual and analytical tools capable of explaining the complex unfolding realities. Thus, a comparative assessment of these three rival theories is necessary if we are to understand the extent to which each applies to the Nigerian experience and is capable of generating insights into the shapes and dynamics of Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

Plural Society Theory

Pluralism has been one of the most dominant frameworks for understanding politics in mainstream political science. It has influenced much of the thinking on the nature of the relationship between the government and civil society from the late nineteenth century until the present day (Smith, 2006: 21). Pluralism is conceptualized in numerous ways across the fields of political science, international relations and political theory. As Nichols (1975:1) points out: “The principal cause of confusion has been the fact that the term has been used by separate groups of thinkers who have rarely attempted to relate their particular use of the term to its other usages”. Ironically, the basis of pluralist theory is a critique of the state. However, pluralism in most manifestations, has a benign view of both the existing state in democratic society and the future potential of the state as a mechanism for political organization (Smith, 2006:21). In other words, Pluralism is a normative theory concerned with how society should be organized in order to achieve a just and liberal socialist society (Hirst, 1989; Nichols, 1994). Fundamental to all pluralists and pluralist thought is the notion that diversity is a

social good that prevents the dominance of one particular idea. Thus, power should be dispersed and not allowed to accumulate in the society.

The pluralism theory takes as starting point Weberian ideas about the multi-dimensionality of power and 'geopolitical' conceptions of politics (which focus on the state at the intersection of national and international conditions and pressures). A variety of pluralist theories have been expounded but focus shall be on what may be regarded as the 'classical version' of pluralism developed in the writings of Lasswell, Truman and Dahl, among others (Truman, 1951; Dahl, 1956). This version had a pervasive influence in the 1950s and 1960s. Relatively few political and social theorists would accept it in unmodified form today, though many politicians, journalists and others in the mass media still appear to do so. Dahl and his colleague deployed Weberian ideas as part of their effort to challenge fundamental Marxian axioms about class as the central structural determinant of the state and political outcomes. In the process, they totally recast the connections between state, bureaucratic organizations and classes, and shifted the attention of political sociology and political science to those institutional arrangements designed to ensure responsiveness by political leaders to citizens – in particular, the competition for electoral support and the activities of social groups or organized interests in relation to government (Held, 1984:40).

The pluralist view dominated early post-war accounts of interest group activity. Pluralism sees politics as a competition between a multitudes of freely – organized interest groups. These compete for influence over a government which is willing to listen to all the voices it can distinguish in the political din. Under pluralism, society dominates the state which becomes little more than an arena for competition between interest groups. The argument of pluralists goes to the heart of a central question in policies: the relationship between society and the state. Pluralists see society dominating the state. Because many people belong to more than one interest, the temperature of political conflicts remains low. Most groups restrict themselves to a single sector so there is healthy fragmentation across the range of government activity. Indeed, the central tenet of pluralism is that there is no single dominant elite. So pluralism depicts a wholesome group that ensures government policies reflect the diversity of modern society (Harrop & Braslin, 1998:124 - 125).

Plural society theory claims relevance to the third world experience in the sense that its analytical focus is on the highly differentiated nature of the Third World universe, characterized by the coexistence of people with diverse cultures, whose roots are not

necessarily connected with the particular geographic region within which they exist (Furnivall, 1948; Smith, 1965). Their primary claim to belonging to a single society is the fact that they interact 'as cultivators and nothing more' within the same political unit. The major consequences of these polyglot societies are, according to Furnivall (1948), a division of labour in the economic sphere along strict ethnic or racial lines and basic instability as a result of ethnic conflicts. Furnivall's ideas were significantly extended by Smith (1965) to embrace other Third World peoples and political units beyond Southeast Asia, in particular the Caribbean and some parts of Africa. Smith's essential contributions to the plural society theory are the observance by each distinct group of basically incompatible cultural – institutional practices, the necessary, political dominance of a single cultural section over the rest, and inevitable ethnic and political violence, particularly during times of political crises. Smith's contribution is significant; therefore, from the point of view that it elicits a peculiar explanation of political and social change. The peculiarity of Smith's conception of change, as both implied and expressed in his model of Caribbean and Third World social structure is its drastic restrictions on the range of alternative choices; change is either catastrophe, violent and cyclical, or it is highly improbable, if not altogether impossible (Martin & Kandal, 1989:375).

Dahl (1993: 706), while summarizing the strengths of pluralism, suggested that groups served to educate citizens in political life, strengthened them in their relations with the state, helped to ensure that no single interest would regularly prevail on all important decisions and by providing information, discussion, negotiation and even helped to make public decisions more rational and more acceptable.

The pluralist theory is relevant in this context because it promotes the idea that democratic nations act in the interests of its citizens, who by and large accept the legitimate authority of their leaders. Pluralists do, however, recognize sectional interests and the idea that different aspects of an individual's background and experience will produce a variety of responses to political events.

The Theory of the State

Marxist debates on the state are essentially attempts to show why the state is not neutral in its dealing with different social classes in society. In other words, its essential task is to explain why the state in capitalist society ultimately represents the interest of the capitalist class. Marx and Engels (1964:9) wrote in 1846 that the capitalist state is "nothing more than the

form of organization which the bourgeoisie necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interest”.

The instrumentalist view regards the state as an instrument that is manipulated by dominant classes. This occurs “either directly through the manipulation of state policies or indirectly through the exercise of power on the state (Gold *et al*; 1975: 34), which in turn reflects close social ties between state managers and the capitalist class operating outside the state (Miliband, 1969; 1983). Poulantzas (1978) on the other hand, offered a less agency – based and more structuralist account, which argued that the capitalist state’s form and function are necessarily determined by the wider totality of capitalist social relations. In this way, the state is closer to what Engels (1978: 338) had described as an ideal collective capitalist in which the state acts for the general interest of capital, rather than the particular interests of specific capital (Altvater, 1973: 97).

Therefore, as in all nations polarized into two opposing classes, the state in Nigeria is an exploiter instrument. During the colonial period, the British created the colonial state apparatus to exploit the resources of the nation to advance the economic interest of Britain and its bourgeoisie dominant in the colony (William, 1980; Goulbourne, 1979). The exploiter character of the colonial state did not change at independence. Today, the dominant interest in the economy, the feudalist and capitalist forces, constitutes the political authority. The state is organized by them for the protection of their interest (Onyekpe, 1996). The dependent status of the economy and the capitalist orientation ensure that private interest, foreign and local, are richer than the state or government. Thus, the state is unable to meet the needs of the civil society and the people, in basic matters of food and shelter, in the social sector generally - education, health services, transportation e.t.c. The popular demands of improvement in these areas have not elicited positive response from the state. Of course, welfare programmes and social policies are progressive only where the state can afford them (Onyekpe, 2000).

The theory of the state is relevant to this research because the state is seen by many scholars as the organized aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of governance. Thus, the character of the state in any particular country is determined by the pattern of organization of these institutions at specific points in time. Also, the nature, form and role of the state at any historical period reflect more or less directly the nature and relative strengths and weaknesses of the existing social classes. Hence, the relevance of this theory to this discourse could be

linked to Alavi's argument underlying state autonomy which lies in the 'over developed' character of a state apparatus which has been inherited from the colonial period. His point here is that metropolitan bourgeoisie, in imposing colonial rule needed not only to establish a bourgeois state structure on the model of the state in the metropolitan economy itself, but in addition to ensure that this state apparatus was powerful enough to suppress all the colony's indigenous social classes. The colonial state was in this sense 'overdeveloped' in relation to the social structure in the colony. It is this state apparatus, centre upon the bureaucracy and military, which the newly independent ex-colony inherits (Randall & Theobald, 1998: 175).

It is quite disturbing that, since independence, Nigerian leaders struggled for power but there has not been any radical change in the affairs of Nigerians. The reflection is nothing but the agitation of the theory of the state. The scramble for power is simply to protect the interest of the elite.

Globalisation Theory

The concept of globalisation implies, first and foremost, a stretching of social, political and economic activities across frontiers such that events, decisions and activities in one region of the world can come to have significance for individuals and communities in distant regions of the globe. In this sense, globalisation embodies trans-regional interconnectedness, the widening reach of networks of social activity power and the possibility of action at a far distance. Beyond this, globalisation implies that connections across frontiers are not just occasional or random, but are regularised such that there is a detectable intensification or growing magnitude of interconnectedness, patterns of interconnection and flows which transcend the constituent societies and states of the world order.

Furthermore, growing extensity and intensity of global interconnectedness may also imply a speeding up of global interactions and processes as the development of worldwide systems of transport and communication increases the potential velocity of the global diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital and people. And the growing extensity, intensity and velocity of global interactions may also be associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and global engagements such that the impact of distant events is magnified while even the most local developments may come to have enormous global consequences (Held, *et al*, 1999:15).

The actual study of globalisation revolves primarily around two main classes of phenomenon that have become increasingly significant in the last few decades. These are, first, the emergence of a global economy based on new systems of production, finance and consumption driven by globalising transnational corporations (TNCs) (Dunning, 1997; Dicken, 1998). The second is the idea of global culture focused on transformations in the global scope of particular types of TNCs, namely: those who own and control the mass media notably television channels and the transnational advertising agencies (Herman & McChesney, 1997). This is often connected with the spread of particular patterns of consumption and a culture and ideology of consumerism at the global level.

The relevance of this theory lies in the fact that social scientists have adopted in an attempt to study globalisation, offering a critique and laying the foundations for the argument. However, it is theoretically coherent and empirically convincing to view it within the context of other theories earlier discussed. Given the relative novelty of globalisation as a problem area in social science, it has not really been solidified into a commonly agreed set of propositions or attained an institutionalised form.

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CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER

It is a striking fact at the start of the twenty-first century the nature of the world order- in terms of the way that global power is exercised is essentially the same as it was at the beginning of the last century. That is to say that the world is under the effective hegemony of the industrialized nations of North America and Europe (with Japan also having an associate role) which also broadly represent the interests of the world's most powerful private entities, financial, commercial and industrial. This dominance has endured; it may be noted, in the face of cataclysmic upheavals during the intervening hundred years, including the two most destructive wars in history and the subsequent dissolution of the mainly European colonial empire which previously covered half of the globe. Yet arguably the only major difference in the disposition of global power compared with a hundred years ago is that the United States has replaced Great Britain as the pre-eminent world power and indeed is at least superficially, in a far more unchallenged position of supremacy than Britain was in 1900 (Harry, 2001:6).

Modern theory of international relations is uncompromisingly western in its historical origins and ideological assumptions. It rests on the territorial basis of statehood and operates through the notion of 'sovereignty'. That states are 'autonomous' within their own boundaries and possess 'inalienable rights' to enact and enforce any kind of legislation are today accepted as the cardinal principles of 'international law'. Interstate disputes in as much as these are subject to judicial arbitration, are thus resolved on the basis of the almost sacrosanct tenet of state sovereignty. One does not however, have to be a cynic to notice that, in actual practice, might is right legitimizes a state's claim to sovereignty and it alone suffices as the basis of the international "order". Rather, an international order reflects, to an extent, the distribution of power among the international actors. And those states which have more of it would not concede any part of others, and would not concede any part to others, and would, in fact, find means of perpetuating that privileged position as they pretend to maintain the order.

When the Berlin wall fell in 1989, Symbolically marking the end of the cold war, there was a wide spread surge of optimism in the world, as people looked forward to the prospect of freedom from the threat of world war and nuclear holocaust. This belief in the possibility of a 'new world order' was reinforced by the seeming outbreak of peace over the next few years

in a number of long standing regional conflicts. Moreover, the hope that turning swords into ploughshares could also herald a new era of global prosperity was strengthened in the eyes of many by the perception that the whole world could not benefit from adopting the market economy model in place of the failed system of Soviet central planning. Even without the benefit of hindsight, however, it is possible to recognize that such optimism was always misplaced and that it ignored the existence of some growing global problems, which even then should have given world leaders for alarm. These included the crumbling of civil order in parts of the developing world and the former soviet union, the searing numbers of people seeking asylum in Western Europe and the US, and the emergence of a growing 'underclass' in many parts of the developed world arising from chronic high unemployment and rising poverty (Harryshut, 2001:1).

The New World Order is a product, and. consequential to the end of a protracted 'cold war' which persisted not until some years back between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. after the shameful collapse of the latter alongside her ideological component. In recent world history, there have been two non-violent transitions to a new world order. The first is the transition to bi-polar world following the loss of European colonies in Africa and in Asia. The development reinforced the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union as the only super powers from 1960 onwards. Of course, this view is not universally accepted. The second transition to a new world order, which is not disputable, is the transformation of the world from a bi-polar world from 1990, confirming the emergence of the United States as the only super-power with military cum economic global capability (Owoeye, 1995:43). Following the eventual disintegration of communist community in its main bastion, U.S. edged out as the only super-power. Therefore, to consolidate her position, her economy and political ideology is subsumed in what is called 'New World Order'.

Thus, at a time when' the most sophisticated and fearful weapons left over from the cold war era were being used to massacre human beings in the middle East and the world, and with all that power on displayed the end of the old system based on the cold war, George Bush was speaking at the U.S. congress about the start of a new chapter and era in the history of the world. On September 11, 1991, the U.S. congress and the world were being told that: "The Persian Gulf crisis is an unparalleled and extra-ordinary moment in world history and it is necessary that all the countries should collectively join hands to prevent aggressive acts." Stressing on this point, George Bush predicted that "from this arduous period" a "new world order" will appear a world in which all the countries will officially recognize their joint

responsibility for preservation of freedom and justice, and in which the powerful will respect the rights of the weak (Social Political Journal, 1991:22).

To George Bush, he affirmed that in order to establish new world order, the invading Iraqis must be flushed out of Kuwait. In furtherance of that objective, he declared:

We stand today, at a unique and extra-ordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move towards a historic period of co-operation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective is a new world order can emerge: a new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. Today the new world order is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we have known; a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle; a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice; a world where the strong respect the right of the weak. We are now in sight of a U.N. that performs as envisaged by its founders (Momah, 1994:114).

Again, during the G-7 summit in London, in July 1991, president Bush agreed with other G-7 leaders, to make the U.N. stronger, more efficient and more effective in order to protect human rights, maintaining peace and security for all and to deter aggression. A former Japanese prime minister, Toshiki Kaifu, concurred with Bush, but was more explicit when soon afterwards he asserted that:

The new international order we seek is the one where peace and security are ensured, where freedom and democracy are respected, and where world prosperity is guaranteed through open market economies. In addition, it is an order which preserves an environment in which all people can lead rewarding lives and where stable interactional relations are created on the basis of dialogue and co-operation (Momah, 1994:115).

However, the new world order signifies a mechanism for the establishment of law and order in the modern history in conformity with the U.S. interest. Of course, this development makes the liberal thinkers and intellectuals to view George Bush's statement with doubt. Now that the Gulf War has been fought and won, many, particularly in the South, are asking where the promised new world order is. Many complain of seeing nothing but a 'new world disorder'. In reacting to this, Bush attempted answering his critics when, at a speech in Montgomery, Alabama, in April 1991, he emphasized that the projected new world order seeks to establish a new, just order that permits fair competition and protection of the weak from the strong. In the new order, different countries will be attracted to each other in a joint undertaking of realizing the aspiration of mankind; peace and security, freedom and rule of law. In specific

terms, he thus outlined the four principles of the New World order:

- ✓ Peaceful settlement of disputes
- ✓ Solidarity against aggression
- ✓ Reduced and controlled arsenals
- ✓ Just treatment of all peoples... (Momah, 1994:114).

Nevertheless, one- of the most fundamental developments which furthered the consolidation of the new world order was the event of August 1991 in Soviet Union, and the consequences which followed, bringing to an end the Soviet order, at least in that country, and the breaking of the once awe-inspiring Soviet Union.

Also, the failure of the coup against Gorbachev in an attempt to stop the slide brought by his reform speeded the process of dismemberment and irrelevance of Soviet Union. With the dissolution of the communist party, independence of the Socialist Republic; resignation of Gorbachev as the Soviet President, and with the earlier retraction from playing the role of defender of the socialist order by presiding over the disbanding of the WARSAW PACT Soviet Union belatedly accepted the new reality. Necessarily, of course, it had no choice, and in fact, it even hoped that it would be for its own good. Thus, Gorbachev recaptured all this when he went to the seven-nation summit in London in July 1991 to present his agenda for the vetting of the new king. His agenda of *Glasnost* (openness) and *Perestroika* (restructuring), to change the political and economic structure of the Soviet Union have a serious implication for the country. Being futuristically aware of this implication, the U.S. more than ever before, influenced the Russian Aborigines against their government by having them exposed to materialistic life with a view to disintegrating and discrediting socialism. This the U.S.S.R. indigenes saw as a source of motivation towards disentangling themselves from a confined way of life in their country.

Consequently, it led to the final disintegration of the Soviet Union, and afforded them to tend towards the western capitalist state. President Bill Clinton, in a classical Wilsonian style, envisioned the new world order as entailing the replacement of the cold war strategy of 'containment' with that of 'Enlarging Democracy'. This approach, of course, would include the neutralizing and renunciation of the highly combustible residue of communism. In furtherance of this strategy; he asserted on 27th September, 1993, during his address to the

U.N. General Assembly, as follows:

In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies. During the cold war, we sought to contain a threat to survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that are under those free institutions, for our dream is of a day when the opinions and energies of every person in the world will be given full expression in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with each other and live in peace." The fact is that for better or for worse, the history of the world has been a manifestation of European political; economic, cultural and population expansion throughout the world (Owoeye, 1994:114).

Therefore, the new world order is expected by people as an order which will not despair their hope, and which will forever rid the world of domineering policies based on the use of force applied by those who wield power. Such a hope for order will guarantee the rights of all countries to take part in solving world differences through negotiation and exchange of view. Mutual respect for sovereignty and the territorial integrity of all the countries has, as an old aspiration of all nations. If in the formulation of new order, the rights of all human beings and countries are equally respected and the use of force in international relations is forever abandoned, then the world's people would be more optimistic.

2.2 THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND CHANGES IN WORLD POLITICS

The end of the cold war and of the bipolar world order that shaped international relations over the past 50 years is forcing the government of the U.S. to make dramatic policy changes-that affect all parts of the globe (Volman, 1993:1). And, the cyclical transformation of the international system between periods of cold war and detente has had its impact on the character of the African sub-system, its role within the larger global system, expectations, gains and losses (Owoeye, 1993:227). Thus, the new world order is simply a hegemonic order. It is not an alliance. It is not a concert. It is not even collective security. It is one-nation rule whereby all others are coined to obedience. The obedience is riot out of willingness but out of compulsion, which will be forced on all nations, this is because the success of the new world order could only be guaranteed through the serious and active participation of all members of the international community. In truth, no any international order remains without significant qualitative and quantitative changes. The fact is that, circumstances bordering on the interactions of the international actors which are responsible for the 'new world order' do

change, and as they do so, slight or tremendous adjustments are experienced. This is as such the framework within which to look at the changes in the world politics vis-a-vis the present new world order, which had 'been entrenched and turned out to be a 'fleeting' reality in the international political scene.

Obviously, the last decade of the twentieth century marked the reduction in Political legitimacy of the world. This reduction not only affected the balance of power, but equally changed the nature of world politics. The world politics which had been afore time dictated by- two different opponents (i.e. Western and. Eastern bloc), changed drastically to be controlled and manipulated by a single nation under US hegemony. And with the collapse of the Eastern bloc in the equation, the Western bloc, despite all 'its shortcomings and defects now sees no rival as it seeks to set up a unipolar world. In plainer words, the U.S., being the custodian of the new world order, would want to punish any regime in the world which acts outside the rules and regulations of the said order in the international environment. Thus, in 1991, the US. Congress, in a strange and unprecedented step, passed a law on the basis of which the executive branch of the government is given permission to arrest anyone at any place in the world, who may be accused of damaging U.S. interests, and try and punish him inside American territory (Socio-Political Journal, 1992:17). The truism of this could be seen in the pressure on Libya and various sanctions imposed, the interference in Nicaragua's elections, the arrest of the head of Panamanian regime, military threats against Haiti and efforts to overthrow the Cuban regime among the actions of the U.S. in its new world order.

Also, the imposed new world order is to further protect the U.S. interest, and on the middle East, in an effort to save its illegal interests in the region, and more than that, to protect and expand the illegal entity of Zionist Israel. In fact, under the banner of this so-called new world order, US wants to destroy any act of fundamentalism in the middle East. Without hesitation, Israel has been displaying intransigent behaviour and has even been creating alibi situations as the so-called violence of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the confrontation waged sometimes ago along the Lebanese border. As a matter of fact, the international policeman is ready to condone this attitude of Israel and has even been warning 'the Palestinian and Arab states to give room for concessions. To the West, the Islamic-fundamentalism has its deepest roots in political frustration and social alienation, manifested in a rejection of Western ideas and values. Unlike other political ideologies, which attract mainly the intellectuals, it appeals to commercial, professional, and academicians as well as urban workers (Owoeye, 1993:226). Given this fact, the West considered Islamic

fundamentalism as an impediment to the establishment of the new world order.

Therefore, in the sacred order, the religion is to be relegated to the background. Moreover, to show that the international scene is more complicated and inherently ambiguous, the US being an ambitious global cop, in order to consolidate and sustain the new order has focused on certain strategies. One of the most controversial of which is the acceleration of Western democracy. The liberal democracy of west gained victory in the cold war by showing a persistence and a courage that many did not expect and by delivering a prosperity that few could have imagined a half century ago. Shortly after the demise of communism in former USSR the need for all countries to be democratized became the order of the day, as the US championed the campaign for democracy in the world. But in the case of Algeria, the triumph of democracy in this country is not required because the wrong party won the election. The Islamic party that won the election was regarded as a party of fundamentalism, which invariably is antithesis to the new world order espionage to secure U.S. interest in any part of the world.

Under the banner of the new world order, the U.S. wants to control the military capability of any region which may challenge her hegemony in the nearest future. Unlike what is operating in the bipolar-system where every nation is free to acquire any military equipment, however sophisticated. The new order does not give any room for this, and no nation of the world should have in its possession any deadly or destructive weapons. 'Controlling the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and the technology to produce them has been an international concern for years but acquired new , urgency after the Persian Gulf war in early 1991 (Owoeye, 1993:134). This, of course, prompted the deliberate war inflicted on Saddam Hussein of Iraq, simply to reduce the destructive weapons in her possession. Also, the punishment of Late Muammar Gaddafi of Libya is as a result of his non-compromise policy and particularly of his suspicion of production of nuclear weapon.

Furthermore, in the new world order, every nation has to go condescendingly to Washington to be told on how it should determine its fate. That lofty ideas of the official order entrenched in the United Nations charter and various other declarations goes specifically to the developing nations. 'Thus, the policy of any government should not in any way go contrary to 'the U.S. interest. And, whenever any government who is consolidating America's interest is committing an offence, the attention is not often there. It is, therefore, not surprising when Zaire was boiling, Mobutu was only called to make some concessions which will make his

people quite appreciative, though he should deal with all those undesirable radicals who want to turn the table against the West. The policeman of the new international 'order is a cop that has focused on destruction of any region which may challenge America's hegemony in the nearest future. To achieve this, there is among others, an intense propaganda on birth control. This is particularly well packed and cheaply exported to the third world countries. This is an attempt to reduce the demographic power endowed with these countries of the South, not minding the set-up of their society. To appreciate this fact, the money being spent in the propaganda and the importation of drugs could have been quite useful for any developmental programmes in the third world countries or even could have been used in taking proper care of the children yet unborn. That is to say the objective is not out of fear of poverty but increase in population, which is likely to challenge America's superiority.

Sequel to the attitude of America government in the new world order, it could be asserted that, it aimed at the incorporation of world economy into the capitalist system of production undeniably, capitalism sees it better to preserve a kind of democracy so that the nations would not fall apart, hence capitalism would also preserve some of its right to plunder. Though freedom is not a capitalist favour and that is why it is associated with intense bureaucracy, suppression and totalitarianism. And in the west, capitalism is decorated with democracy, by which it survives. Capitalism never has been more dynamic. Capitalism produces change which is occurring more rapidly. Intense global competition is the major cause of the faster pace of capitalism. Managerial and technological innovations are happening more frequently, competitors are emerging in newly industrializing countries.

Many companies are responding successfully to the challenge of dynamic market capitalism, business planners and managers are learning that to survive and prosper in the world, they must adapt rapidly to the changes in the global market place (Polestsky, 1991:63). Besides, from America's point of view, the United Nations, as an official and international legal organization, should play a tangible and basic role in establishing the new world order and perfecting U.S. domination over the world (Social Political Journal, 1992:16). In a way, this is achieved in the aspect of human rights to facilitate democracy. Though it has never been part of the charter of the United Nations to accelerate democracy in the world, but it is part of the charter to protect human rights. Therefore, the protection of those that desire or uphold the cause of democratic system comes under the pretext of United Nations charter. Thereby, the U.N. has continuously warned those governments in any countries that violate the human rights principles by torturing, killing, imprisoning and harassing those who clamour for

democracy in any part of the world.

Clearly, the new world order which is under the guardianship of U.S. is as such not only challengeable but also adjustable. Thus, besides the changing diplomatic map of the world, the new world order is characterized by new regional economic groupings of unprecedented magnitude. Such groupings may be autarchic to a considerable degree. From the 'new scenario it would appear that international economic relation would be multilateral, conducted through' such new regional organization rather than the current bilateral arrangements. It is a new world of monopoly capitalism and liberal capitalist democracy, such a world which preponderates the tenets of liberal capitalist democracy may further marginalize those on the periphery of the world such as Africa (Gboyega, & Osaghae, 1992:413).

For some, order has sinister connotations. In the view of natives or nationalist groups such as that led by Pat Robertson in the United States, or by Jean Marie Le Pen in France, "new world order" suggests a conspiracy among financial and political elites to dominate the world. In this view, multinational corporations, in league with the financial markets of Wall Street, London, and Tokyo, enrich themselves at the expense of the rest. In the view of certain Islamic fundamentalists, a New World Order is a purely Western concept designed to dominate the non-Western world. These differing conceptions of order mean that the "new world order" is tricky to define. None of these schools of thought are adequate by themselves in understanding the causes of conflict in the current world. The realist emphasis on the balance of power is necessary but not sufficient when long-term societal changes are eroding the norms of state sovereignty. The view that peace has broken out among the major liberal democracies is accurate, but it is not a panacea when many states, including some great powers, are not liberal democracies. The old, bipolar Cold War order provided a stability of sorts. The Cold War exacerbated a number of Third World conflicts, but economic conflicts among the United States, Europe, and Japan were dampened by common concerns about the Soviet' military threat; and bitter ethnic divisions were kept under the tight lid of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. With the passing of that bipolar order, conflict has not ended. It does, however, have different sources.

As historians and political observers since Thucydides have noted, rapid power transitions are one of the leading causes of great power conflict. Such power transitions were a deep structural cause of historically recent great power conflicts, including Germany's rise before

each world war and the relative rise and resulting rivalry of the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. There is a strong consensus that the period after the Cold War was one of rapid power transitions with the rise of the United States and China and the decline of Soviet Russia. There is considerable debate over the description and magnitude of the transitions, however, and these debates are indicative of the unpredictability that makes such transitions a potential source of conflict. One alternative is multi polarity. If the term multi polarity implies an historical analogy with the nineteenth century, it is highly misleading. That order rested on a balance of power between roughly five equal powers, whereas the great powers after the Cold War are far from equal. Russia has declined faster and farther since 1990 than almost anyone expected, though it retains an immense nuclear arsenal. China has risen faster than most anticipated, with a long period of double-digit economic growth. Japan and Germany have not become the full-fledged superpowers that some incorrectly predicted in 1990. The United States is the only true superpower, with global assets in all dimensions of power.

This leads some to posit that the world is now ordered by unipolar hegemony. Some observers believe the Gulf War marked the beginning of a Pax Americana in which the world will acquiesce in a benign American hegemony. While the United States may be the only superpower, the hegemonic conclusion does not follow. There are many important security, economic, and political goals that the United States cannot achieve by itself. Military power is largely unipolar, with the United States the only country possessing both intercontinental nuclear weapons and large modern air, naval, and ground forces capable of deploying around the globe. But "economic power is tripolar, with the United States, Japan, and Europe representing of the world's powers, China's growth may make economic power quadripolar early in the twenty-first century. At the level of transnational relations that cross borders outside the control of governments which includes actors as diverse as bankers and terrorists, power is widely dispersed. To take a few examples other than terrorism, private actors in global capital markets constrain the way interest rates can be used to manage the American economy; the transnational spread of technology increases the destructive capabilities of otherwise poor and weak states; and a number of issues on the interactional agenda—drug trade, AIDS, migration, global warming—have deep societal roots in more than one country and flow across borders largely outside of governmental control. Since neither military nor traditional economic means are very effective in coping with such problems, no great power will be able to solve them alone. Others posit that the world will be organized around three

economic blocs Europe Asia, and North America. Yet, even here, global technological changes and the increase of non-bloc, non-state actors such as multinational corporations and ethnic groups will resist the capacity of these three blocs to constrain their activities.

Thus, the current distribution of power represents a combination of these different configurations into multilevel interdependence. No single hierarchy adequately describes a world politics that is like a three-dimensional chess game. Power on the military board is largely unipolar, with the United States being the strongest. The economic middle board has a tripolar distribution of power (the United States, Europe and Japan) while the bottom board of transnational interdependence shows a diffusion of power. None of this complexity would matter if military power were as fungible as money and could determine the outcomes in all areas. But military prowess is a poor predictor of the outcomes on the economic and transnational playing boards of current world politics. The United States is better placed with a more diversified portfolio of power resources than any other country, but the current world order is not an era of American hegemony. The world's only superpower cannot afford to go it alone Globalization is putting issues on the international agenda which not even the most powerful country can deal with on its own-witness international finance stability, global climate change, the spread of infectious diseases, transnational drug, crime and terrorists networks.

It is necessary to distinguish the Gramscian notion of hegemony from that of (neo) realism. In the neorealist framework states are understood to be the principal actors in the international realm. Given a context of “anarchy” that is, an absence of a central authority with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force states compete with one another in an on-going struggle for power. The distribution of capabilities (power) across the units (states) is the key variable in explaining outcomes in the international system. Accordingly, in neorealist terms, international orders may be understood as hegemonic or non-hegemonic. They are hegemonic to the degree that a preponderance of power on the part of one state (the hegemon) allows it to dominate other states, thereby serving as a rough approximation of a central authority. Hegemonic international orders in this sense have been seen as the necessary precondition for a liberal international economy embodying the norms of openness and non – discrimination (Keohane, 1989).

In contrast, the Gramscian notion of hegemony assumes a capitalist world economy in which relations between classes is a key explanatory variable (Gill, 1993). The role and activities of

social structures, from firms to states and international organisations, are understood in terms of class relations. As in the case of neorealism, hegemony can be applied to an analysis of the international realm. In this case, however, hegemony is understood to involve not dominance of one state by another, but rather the institution and maintenance of a world order which serves the interests of the dominant class of the dominant state while at the same time it serves the interest of the dominant classes of other states as well (Cox, 1993: 61). As such, a hegemonic order is characterized by the fact that the dominant power presents that order as consistent with the common interest. As Cox (1989: 829) notes: in a hegemonic world order, a leading nation's conception of the world becomes universalized to the point where its own leaders stand by the universalized principles when they conflict with particularist domestic interest.

Thus, in contrast to the neorealist approach the Gramscian notion of hegemony allows us to conceptualise not two but three distinct categories of world order: a hegemonic world order, defined by a duly recognized leader whose actions are understood to serve the 'common interest' (i.e. those of the dominant social classes at home as well as associated elements in other states); two, a non-hegemonic order in which a single state dominates other actors in pursuit of its own 'national' interests; and three, a non- hegemonic order in which power is sufficiently diffused so that no single state dominates all others. The Gramscian – derived notion of hegemony is not limited to the level of the international order, however, In terms of core states, at least, hegemony at the international level has its parallel in hegemony at the domestic level, where dominant classes make real concessions (always within limits) to subordinate classes to achieve broad societal consent for their leadership. A hegemonic world order, then, implies relations of hegemony in the international/interstate realm coupled with hegemonic relations at the level of civil society in core states. Such an order moreover has important consequences in terms of the understanding of the behavioural norms and institutions established to regulate the world order, whether it is a question of inter-state conflict or forces of civil society acting across borders. Significantly, these norms and institutions are not identified with the narrow interests of specific states or social classes, but rather take on a semblance of universality and, therewith, an aura of legitimacy (Cox, 1989: 829).

As Hanreider notes: "Nationalism is alive and well. Far from being secondary or obsolete, the nation-state, nationalism and the idea of national interest are central elements in contemporary world politics" (Harreider, 1978: 1277). While pursuing their national interest

through cooperation and collaboration, states also empower themselves. As Keohane (1984) and Gilpin (1987) argue 'the creation of international regimes and institutions of cooperation does not in any sense weaken the nation-state' (Keohane, 1984, Gilpin 1987). On the contrary, in many cases, international cooperation, as opposed to unilateral action, allows states simultaneously to pursue their national interests and to achieve more effective control over their national destiny. Within the context of a global economy, international coordination of exchange rates (for instance, the European Exchange Rate Mechanism) can enhance it through collective action, greater security and benefits than any corresponding attempts at unilateral action. To suggest that globalisation necessarily undermines state autonomy is therefore to ignore the ways in which states empower themselves against the vagaries of global forces through collective action. According to Gordon 'the role of the state has grown substantially since the early 1970s' state policies have become increasingly decisive on the front, not more futile and small consolation though it may be everyone including transnational which corporations has become increasingly dependent upon coordinated state intervention for restructuring and resolution of the underlying dynamics of the (economic) crisis (Gordon, 1988:63). Indeed, a number of writers question whether globalization is really creating a more 'interdependent' world or convergence among state policies. Care must be taken here to distinguish between the concepts of interconnectedness and interdependence: interdependence should not be elided with notions of interconnectedness (or globalization). Interdependence implies a condition of *mutual* vulnerability to external events, whereas dependence implies a condition of asymmetrical vulnerability. While processes of globalization may generate interdependence between national communities, equally they can generate relationships of dependence and reinforce existing inequalities in the world system.

Moreover, globalization often involves little more than interconnectedness, which implies a *sensitivity*, as opposed to a *vulnerability*, to external events or actions. Accordingly, globalization embraces both interconnectedness, and interdependence, but these are radically different outcomes of the same process. Both Krasner and Gordon, coming from radically opposing analytical positions, conclude that, although it may be more *interconnected*, the world is less interdependence today than it was before World War I (Krasner, 1991; Gordon, 1988). Similarly, Scharpf (1991) argues convincingly that states do matter by demonstrating that, despite global constraints, state strategies of socio- economic management in the 1980s, have not converged as much as the declinist's view suggest (Scharpf, 1991). As Gilpin (1981) claimed, the primary focus in the global states system remains the prevention of war and the

maintenance of peace. States, through their monopoly over the means of violence, and their attention to the balance of power, are therefore critical agents in maintaining global order. While military power may appear of less utility in the modern context, this, as Waltz argues, is a tribute to its vital role in sustaining the peace: “possession of power should not be identified with the use of force, and the usefulness of force should not be confused with its usability, power maintains an order: the use of force signals its breakdown” (Waltz, 1979:185). Thus, the fact that military force is used infrequently to sustain the global order is not an indictment of the declining relevance of military power (and by implication the nation – state), but, on the contrary, can be seen as evidence of its centrality to the contemporary global order. Thus, for Bull, the state retains a “positive role”, in the modern world primarily because its monopoly of military power provides its citizens with relative security in a highly dangerous world (Bull, 1979).

Although these different perspectives offer quite different visions of the global predicament, they do share some common ground. In particular, while each posits a quite different kind of global social architecture arising from globalisation, they all share a belief that modern societies can only be understood within a global setting. Additionally, each raises the question of whether the nation state is any longer the most appropriate political unit for organising human affairs in a more interconnected world system. Even Gilpin, a staunch champion of realism, acknowledges that the intensification of economic autonomy, and that it is unclear what the implications of ‘*contemporary military and economy developments will be on the scale of political organisation*’ (Gilpin, 1981:229). As the end of the century draws near, globalization is forcing us to rethink the nature of the ‘political community’, the basic unit of human affairs. Indeed, globalization appears to be challenging the modern orthodoxy that the nation state defines the ‘good community’ (Modelski, 1972:56).

Globalization has rearranged the architecture of the world order. Economic, social and power relations have been recast to resemble not a pyramid but a three tier structure of concentric circles. All three circles cut across national and regional boundaries. In the core circle, we find the elites of all continents and nations, albeit in different proportions in relation to their respective geographic hinterlands (Hoogvelt 2000:355). The world order does not seem to be impending; a global security community is unlikely soon to come into existence. The key problem of world order now is to devise institutional arrangements that are consistent both with key creatures of international relations and the new shape of domestic politics in key countries. It will be very difficult to construct such institutions. They must be built not only

by government but by international civil society under conditions of globalization. They must be constructed not by a single hegemonic power but by several countries whose interest conflict in multiple ways (Keohane, 2000:119).

2.3. GLOBALIZATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Globalization is a highly contested term, the frequent usage of which has tended to obscure the lack of consensus with regards to what it entails explanations of how it operates and the directions in which it is heading. From a basic point of views, globalization refers to an extensive network of economic, social, cultural and political inter connections and processes which routinely transcend national boundaries. Globalization is a multifaceted set of processes which include not only changes which have flowed from the new information technologies and opening up of markets, but also new shrinking time, and disappearing borders which now link people's lives more deeply, intensely, and more immediately than ever. As Walden Bello (1994:7) has pointed out:

In the three decades after 1950, the South's rate of economic growth was not only higher than the North's during the same period; it was also higher than the rate for the developed countries in their early stages of development.

As a concept, globalization refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole (Robertson, 1993:8). This simply connotes that the "world is rapidly being moulded into a shared social space by economic and technological forces and that development in one region of the world can have profound consequences for the life chances of individuals communities on the other side of the globe" (Held, 1999:71). Simply put, globalization refers to the growing integration of the global economy, which is being brought about by incessant flows of goods and services, capital, technology and information across national borders. In a wider sense, globalization is "the acceleration and intensification of interaction and integration among the peoples, companies, and governments of different nations" (Rothenberg, 2003). It deals with the "increasing breakdown of trade barriers and the increasing integration of world market" (Fafowora, 1998:5).

As historian Immanuel Wallerstein has pointed out, the processes that we identify as globalization – the creation of a global capitalist market and an interstate system regulated by international law – began a little over five hundred years ago (Wallenstein,2000). Powered by

the twin engines of colonialism and capitalism, globalization took on a distinctly European flavour after 1500. European nations colonized the America, Africa and Asia; the gold and silver of the New World. Slaves from Africa and the spices of Asia all contributed to bankrolling the rise of finance and manufacturing in Europe. Asian countries, which might have challenged the emergence of a Europe-centred global capitalist market, retreated into relative isolation (Frank, 1998), and the Islamic World that contributed to the intellectual undermining of the European renaissance fell victim to internal strife and decline. During this period of expansion and consolidation, European countries to a greater or lesser extent became modern: building powerful capitalist economies establishing political bureaucracies, standardizing languages and educational systems, constructing national cultures, raising new factories and new cities, revolutionizing science and technology and inventing new weapons of destruction (Feffer, 2002:3).

However, underlying most perspectives of globalization are the perception that it is a multi-dimensional phenomenon (Mittleman, 1996:77) and that indeed, we may not have one globalization but many globalizations. Based on this, Tandon gives us some insight into the historical moorings of globalization. He basically equates globalization in its broadest sense with the movement of history. According to him, throughout history people have moved from food-deficit to food-surplus regions taking with them their families and flocks, sometimes conquering the areas to which they move, sometimes getting absorbed in them and losing their separate identities. This larger movement of history he considers as the movement of civilization itself, which comes with both negative and positive effects. He sees a positive side to globalization in the spread of cultural pluralism, the development of technology and productive forces, the global awareness of the underlying unity of humankind and more recently the partial return to nature as an inherent part of life in all its many forms. Meanwhile, Bertelson (2002) identified three dimensions of globalization. Firstly, it is an “intensified transference or exchange of things” (labour, skills, capital, goods) across boundaries. Secondly, it is a “process of transformation that occurs at the systems level economy, polity and society”. And thirdly, globalization is viewed as transcendence, beyond the conceptualization of society into sectors.

Giddens (1998:28) refers to it as being “largely a myth... or is at most a continuation of long-established trends”. But, Waters (1995:3) defines globalization as “a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding”. Fukuyama (1992:8) defines globalization

as a “centrifugal force, pushing towards unification of the world, at the expense of national sovereignty... the development of a homogenous state where all human needs are satisfied and activity is primarily economics. Hence, a resignation to the idea that the impact of globalization is a ‘signal of death of the nation-states’”. On the other hand, globalization has been defined as “the contemporary tendency for persons, corporations and institutions to expand out of the confines of a nation... towards participation in and identification with world community”(Pandleton, 1999:205).

Globalization, it has been observed, is one of five interlinked processes that have caused an upheaval in the patterns of people’s lives in contemporary times. The others are individualization, the gender revolution, underemployment and global risks (Ulrich, 1999:12). Ali Mazrui (1998), a reputable scholar, carefully looks at globalization from the viewpoint of power within an historical context: he places the basis of his analysis on four main forces; religion, technology, economy and the role of empire. He suggests that the combination of all these four categories have created a globalization process, which he sees as ultimately leading to a homogenized as well as a culturally hegemonised world. He argues that the outcome of globalization has been homogenized with a disproportionate share of power in the hands of some few countries which have total control of the hegemonic centre. He sees the cause of all this change as emanating from the liberation of the market economy as enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

What Mazrui (1998:41) was trying to say from an economic point of view is nothing new. Samir Amir (1997), has said much the same thing and in a clearer way. For him, the inequalities of the present global system are, in fact, the outcome of unequal development of capitalism and the consolidation and continuation of five monopolies. Firstly, the technological monopoly, he argued is in the hands of a few wealthy western nations which can afford to spend enormous amounts of money on military research and technologies of mass destruction. Secondly, the determining factor of finance in the stock markets of New York, London, Frankfurt and Tokyo, which control the global market. Thirdly, global elite has created a system of monopolistic access and strict control of the planet’s natural resources. At present, capitalism is not concerned with questions of ecology – exploitation and short-term profit are the primary goals. Fourthly, the major component of the market economy and global capitalism is media and communication monopolies. The fifth and final monopoly in Samir Amir’s view is the monopoly over weapons of mass destruction. He believes that the foundation of globalization is based on these five monopolies. However, he fails to see, like

Mazrui, the extraordinary innovations that communication technologies have provided in the last three decades in facilitating this rapid global shift and transformation of the world economy.

The United Nations has also expressed some dissatisfaction with the process of globalization. It argues that “geographic barriers may have fallen for communications, but a new barrier has emerged, an invisible barrier that is linked by a world- wide web, embracing the connected, and silently – almost imperceptibly- excluding the rest”. It further argues that “markets can go too far and squeeze the non-market activities so vital for human development. Fiscal squeezes are constraining the provision of social services. A time squeeze is reducing the supply and quality of caring labour. And an incentive squeeze is harming the environment. Globalization is also increasing human insecurity as the spread of global, crime, disease and financial volatility outpaces actions to tackle them”. Brown (UNDP, 1999:141) the former head of the UNDP supports the arguments of his institution by revealing that: Sixty countries have been getting steadily poorer since 1980. The losers from globalization are both a huge human and political waste and the sources of disappointment and often tragedy for themselves and the families that depend upon them. These arguments are also shared by Kirn who writes: “It (globalization) has a sinister ring, like a euphemism from the same technocrats who gave us “downsizing” during the Reagan years and ‘pacification’ during Vietnam (Time, 2000).

Robert Samuelson (2000) rightly states that “globalization is a double edge sword – it is a powerful vehicle for economic growth, and at the same time, is an assault on national sovereignty that easily erodes local cultures and threatens social stability. The most pressing question facing the nation state at the dawn of the twenty – first century is the question of control; the multinational or the nation state. Today, nation-state is at the mercy of multinational corporations. These corporations go for the best deal they can get from the states around the world. Their motive is “profit” rather than national loyalty or human concern. Thus, unfortunately, the main focus is not on ecological issues, droughts, famines, global warming or basic human rights, rather it is profit and greed which dominates global affairs. This situation creates several problems in the world and promotes further deprivation. In fact, it is a vicious circle in which various factors are mutually supportive to worsen the global situation.

Many (although by no means all) theorists describe globalization as a process by which geographic distance becomes less of a factor in economic, political, and socio-cultural relations due to the existence of new technologies, new business formations, and the existence of supranational political and economic institutions. There is general agreement that the last few decades have witnessed a shift in the regime of accumulation from one with rigid labour processes, labour markets, methods of production and patterns of consumption, to one where these processes are marked by much greater fluidity. This new era is also characterized by the emergence of new sectors of production, new means of providing financial services, new markets, and greatly intensified rates of commercial, technology and organizational innovation. In particular, the 'newness' of globalization is typified by the increasing significance of financial markets, which is both the most major driving force behind the pressure for globalization and the lead cause of instability in national economies, particularly in the developing world. As Giddens (1990) indicates:

Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of world – wide social relationships which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice – versa.

'Globalization' is one of the most used, but also one of the most abused and confusing words around today. It is virtually everywhere. Hardly a day goes by without its being invoked by politicians, by academics, by business or labour union leaders and by journalists. In fact, there is an interesting geography of the awareness of, and attitudes towards globalization (ILO, 2004:12). In the last 25 years or so, it has entered the popular imagination in a big way, although it is a concept whose roots at least can be traced back to the nineteenth century notably in the ideas of Karl Marx. The pervasive feeling that something fundamental is happening in the world, that there are lots of 'big issues that are somehow interconnected under the broad umbrella term 'globalization' (Peter, 2007:3).

During the 1980s, the concept of globalization began to permeate a diverse body of literature within the social science. This intellectual fascination with globalization and its consequences was stimulated in part by a concern to understand the nature of the socio-economic changes which appeared to be enveloping all advanced capitalist societies. In fact, the fascination was also associated with a perception that the fates of individual national communities were increasingly bound together; a perception underlined by the global economic recession of the early 1980s, the renewed threat of nuclear Armageddon following the intensification of

Soviet-American rivalry, and the impending eco-crisis. These and other events, became significant reference points in a growing literature which sought to analyse the ways in which daily existence within most countries was becoming increasingly enmeshed in global processes and structures. This expanded awareness of global inter-connectedness was reinforced by the electronic media, which were capable of bringing to their audiences immediate attention of distant events, so creating a sense of a globally shared community. Today, 'globalization' has become a widely used term within media, business, financial, and intellectual circles, reflecting a fairly widespread perception that modern communications technology has shrunk the globe. However, popular use of the term and its many definitions within the social sciences have imbued the concept with multiple meaning (McGrew, 1995:470).

Globalization, in fact, has become a convenient catch-term, used by many to bundle together virtually all the 'good' and 'bad' facing contemporary societies. Not surprisingly then, it generates heated and polarized argument across the entire political and ideological spectrum. Most dramatic of all, since the turn of the millennium, has been the proliferation of global protest movements: the explosion of street demonstrations at major international political meetings. These have involved a remarkable *melange* of pressure groups, ranging from long-established civil society organization (CSOs) to totally new groups with either very specific, or very general, together with anarchist and revolutionary elements with a good broad anti-capitalist agenda. First, coming to real prominence at the meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in November 1999, the global protest movements immediately became a permanent feature of every subsequent international meeting of governmental organizations. In some cases, they have manifested themselves in such globally generated events as the 'Live 8' concerts in 2005 organised to coincide with the meeting of the world's largest economics (G8) and the 'Make Poverty History' campaign. At the end other political extreme, the leaders of big business have their own 'tribal' meetings, most notably the World Economic Forum held every year at Davos in Switzerland (Peter, 2007:4-5).

In a simple and logical manner, Globalization refers to the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that transcend the nation- state (and by implication the societies) which make up the modern world system. It defines a process through which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe. Nowadays, goods, capital, people, knowledge, image, communications, crime, culture, pollutants, drugs, fashions, and belief all

readily flow across territories and boundaries. Transactional networks social movements and relationships are extensive in virtually all areas of human activity from the academic to the sexual. Moreover, the existence of global systems of trade, finance, and production binds together in very communities and nations across the globe. Territorial boundaries are therefore increasing insignificantly in so far as social activity and relations no longer stop if they ever did at the water's edge. It is thus largely irrelevant to continue to make distinctions between the internal and the external, the foreign and the domestic spheres of socio-economic activity, when globalization has resulted in 'stretching' of social relations across national territorial boundaries (Giddens, 1990:14).

In his exploration of the 'post-modern condition', Harvey, too conceives of globalization as an expression of our changing experience of time and space. What he labels 'time-space compression'. And by using this term, he highlights dramatically, the sense in which under the pressures of technological and economic change space and time have been continually collapsed such that '...today we have to learn how to cope with an overwhelming sense of compression of our spatial and temporal worlds' (Harvey, 1989:240). What is distinctive about Harvey's analysis of globalization is the emphasis placed on the 'speeding up' or Intensity of time-space compression. For Harvey, today's 'global village' is not the product of some compression, but rather results from a more discontinuous historical process, a process punctuated by discontinues historical process, a process punctuated by discrete phase or bursts of intense time-space compression. This phase, he argues, are associated with the periodic crises and restructuring of capitalism, which involve a 'speeding up' of economic and social process. We are all aware from our own experiences of the way in which, particularly in the current era, the quickening pace of change seems to have become a 'normal' feature of social life virtually as they are launched, new fashions, new products, even major historical events, seem to become redundant 'history'. One of the consequences of this speeding up of social – economic change is an intensification of time – space compression, and with this comes an acceleration in the pace of globalization (Harvey, 1989:241).

In clear contrast with all other historical societies, the contemporary world society is global. The process by which a number of historical world societies were brought together into one global system might be referred to as globalization. The nature and the shape assumed as a result of that process remain even today one of the basic factors of world politics. Throughout recorded history, a trend can be observed toward the enlargement of the geographical scope

of human communities; it has been one aspect of the increasing scale of social organization. Six thousand years ago, when a Great Society began to take form among the city states of Mesopotamia, the effective radius of its thousand years ago, when the Roman Empire dominated the Mediterranean basin, the radius of its control may have been one thousand miles or more enlargement of areas of civilization were at the same time occurring in the Chinese and Indian realms and so much so that what McNeill calls the 'closure of the Eurasian ecumene', occurred between 500BC and 200C.E. Some two millennia ago (McNeill, 1963:623).

Within that time span, Hellenic culture reached India, while the Han Empire established a degree of contact of the Roman Empire. The epidemics that swept the first practical consequence of the establishment of some pattern of interaction in the Old World. Generally, these interactions remained for a long time, intermittent, indirect, non-political and not yet truly global. At the opening of the period of globalization, at about 100C.E, the nearest approximation to a worldwide political order was the Muslim World. Its origins lay in the Arab conquests of the seventh century, and its binding force was Islam. At that time, it ranged from Spain, and Morocco, through Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad, to Persia and the North of India; in the centuries that followed, it reached as far as the Indonesia Islands, and central and East Africa. Even by comparison with medieval Europe, it was a prosperous, productive and culturally rich world. Its cities, Baghdad and Cairo, were cosmopolitan and populous (Cairo had more than one million inhabitants during the medieval period) as well as being centres of artistry and literary creation. Its scholars and scientists were the true successors of Greek learning, while its universities predated Europe's by at least a century (George, 2000:49).

For several hundred years, the Muslim World was the true seat of civilization. In relation to its medieval Europe who, was for a long time not only politically on the defensive, but also economically and culturally inferior. Indeed, by occupying a central position in the Eurasian-African Landmass, and using it for their far-flung trade, the Muslim had already brought together the major centres of world civilization. Only the New World eluded them. After 1500, the Muslim world was strategically outflanked by European naval operations, and its vitality continues to decline. While Islam continued to gain adherents in Asia and Africa, the brilliance of the medieval period did not return. The work of political unification of the world now falls to Europe. In one sense, the drive that produced it was a response to the prosperity of the Islam world and the threat that was perceived to emanate from it. Leading that drive

were the Portuguese and Spaniards, who had learned to respect and fear the Muslim during the centuries of the *Reconquista*. It was a genuine explosion of energy and vitality, of a breadth and scope after Copernicus reordered the heavens, men not only circumnavigated the globe, but followed up this feat with the establishment and maintenance of a permanent network of worldwide contacts (George, 2000:50).

The process of globalization was set in motion by people who lived in a small corner of the earth, not in the centres of world civilization. For the five hundred years that followed, it was they who determined the speed and the character of globalization; they also thereby shaped the structure of world politics. By 1500, the characteristic features of modern world politics could already be discerned in embryo around Europe and in the course of globalization these features become characteristics of the entire global system. While accepting some of the central arguments of globalist, Giddens and Brck (1999) hold that the present era of globalization has to be understood as embodying much more than simply a capitalist logic. The driving forces of globalization are to be found in the dynamics of technology, communication, international relations, and the global diffusion of risks – from the ecological to the financial. Rather than globalization defining a new postmodern age, in which the local is superseded by the global, they point to the growing tensions between a world still primarily organized by the ‘modern container’ of social life-nation state and new patterns of socio economic organization which transcend them. Such tensions produce an on-going dialectic of change and uncertainty- a global risk society in which the global and the local intersect in complex ways, reshaping the conditions of contemporary social life with many unintended consequences. Globalization, in this view, defines a process of global social change but one which is still anchored in the institutions of the modern era.

Globalization can be located on a continuum with the local, national and regional. At the one end of the continuum lie social and economic relations and networks which are organized on a local and/or national basis, at the other end lie social and economic relations and networks which crystallize on the wider scale of regional and global interactions. Globalization can be taken to refer to those spatiotemporal processes of change which underpin a transformation together and expanding human activity across region and continents. Without reference to such expansive spatial connections, there can be no clear concept of globalization which implies, first, a *stretching* of social, political and economic activities across frontiers, such that events, decision and activities in one region of the world can come to have significance for individuals and communities in distant regions of the globe. In this sense, it embodies

trans-regional interconnectedness, the widening reach of networks of social activity and power, and the possibility of action at a distance. Beyond this, globalization implies that connections across frontiers are not just occasional or random, but rather are regularized such that there is a detectable intensification or growing magnitude, of inter-connectedness patterns of interaction and flows which transcend the constituent societies and states of the world order (David, *et al* 2000:54).

Clarifying the meaning of globalization invites consideration of how it has been theorized within the literature. There is considerable debate concerning both the main driving force(s) behind globalization and how exactly it is reconstituting the world into a single social space. A review of the literature on globalization highlights one fundamental axis of theoretical disagreement. As David Held (1991) accounts of modernity divide into two camps: those which stress a single causal logic and those which emphasize a complex multi-causal logic. Similarly, in discussions of globalization, it is possible to distinguish between those accounts when we give primacy to a single caused dynamic, such as technology or the economy, and others which rely on a multi-causal logic. Obviously, this is a somewhat crude typology of theoretical approaches, and no single account fits snugly within either category. Turning initially to those accounts which stress the primacy of one particular logic, the three key scholars are Peter Wallerstein, Rosenau James and Robert Gilpin. Wallerstein has introduced the concept of the world system into the social sciences and has stressed the centrality of capitalism to the process of globalization (both past and present). Rosenau and Gilpin, in comparison are located within the discipline of international relations and have exploited some of its orthodoxies in accounting for globalization. Thus, Rosenau associates globalization with technological progress while Gilpin consider it to be expression of politico-military factors (power politics). Accordingly, each of these three scholars located the causal logic of globalization in a specific institutional domain; the economic, the technological, and the political respectively (McGrew 1995:473).

From a twentieth-century point of view, globalization is a combination of several phenomenon occurring simultaneously. It refers to trade as well as financial capital. Global mobility, fluidity, speed of growth, circulation and outreach capabilities. Globalization also implies the weakening of national policies as well as the increasing role played by technological innovations and value-added information. Globalization refers as well to knowledge generation, processing, storage, and accumulation, above all, to a central drive for the conquest of markets and the commercialization of a greater variety of products and

services. Globalization has reversed the meaning and concept of power. The volume of financial growth has become more important than that of productive output. This research has led to various positions according to the source of the analysis, and some view this as dangerous for economic and social development, which could lead to anarchic financial behaviour, deflationist tendencies, and recession. Other sources describe this financial dominance as healthy and necessary to prepare for the ultimate success of capitalism (Kally,*et al*, 2001).

In his pioneering studies of the emergence of 'one world' Wallerstein (1983:18) focuses primarily on the dynamics of historical capitalism, "...that concrete, time-bounded, space-bounded integrated locale of productive activities within which the endless accumulation of capital has been the economic objective or "law" that has governed or prevailed". For Wallerstein, the logic of historical capitalism is necessarily global in reach. From its origins in sixteenth century Europe, capitalism has acquired a truly global reach inasmuch as, nowadays, "...the entire globe is operating within the framework of this singular social division of labour we are calling the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, 1984:18). Wallerstein considers this capitalist world economy to be historically unique, in that, while it has gradually created a universal economic space, humanity remains fragmented into discrete nation – state, each with its own centre of sovereign political rule. Moreover, the world economy is conceived of as having a distinctive, unequal structural arrangement with core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral areas-each of which has a specific functional role in sustaining the overall integrity of the system.

If Wallenstein gives primacy to capitalism as a globalizing imperative, has written extensively on the growth, (1989, 1990). In his attempt to make sense of the intensification of global interconnectedness, he attaches enormous significance to technology:

It is technology... that has so greatly diminished geographic and social distances through the jet-powered airliner, the computer, the orbiting satellite, and the many other innovations that now move people, ideas and goods more rapidly and surely across space and time than ever before. It is technology that has profoundly altered the scale on which human affairs take place. It is technology, in short, that has fostered the interdependence of local, national and international communities that is far greater than any previously experienced (Rosenau, 1990:17).

In comparison with Rosenau, Gilpin's account of globalization, issues very much from within the orthodox approach to the study of international relations. Highly sceptical of any claim

that globalization is transforming the world in which we live, Gilpin nonetheless acknowledges that nation states are now profoundly inter connected in many different ways (Gilpin, 1987a). But, unlike Rosenau and Wallerstein, he argues that the process of globalization is a product of political factors, in particular the existence of a ‘permissive’ global order – a political order which generates the stability and security necessary to sustain and foster expanding linkages between nation-states. In a global states system, where sovereign nations recognize no authority above their own, the creation of such a permissive political order can only arise from the exercise of power. For Gilpin, globalization is therefore a historically contingent process; contingent in the sense that it relies on the hegemonic (i.e. dominant, most powerful) state(s) in the international system to impose a form of world order which fosters interaction, openness, cooperation, and interdependence (Gilpin, 1981, 1987a).

While Robertson disagrees with important aspects of Gilpin’s analysis, he too is highly critical of the fact that ‘in the present climate of ‘globality’ there is a strong temptation for some to insist that the single world of our day can be accounted for interns of one particular process or factor...’ (Robertson, 1990:22). Stressing that ‘in the contemporary period, a major task for sociological theory is to account for the trajectories of globalization in a multidimensional fashion’ (Robertson & Lechner, 1985:113). Robertson advocates a theoretical approach which goes beyond simple models of ‘world polity’ or a ‘world economy’ by pointing to the independent dynamics of global culture... to cultural aspects of globalization’ (Robertson and Lechner, 1985:103). This requires a theory of globalization which involves:

.....the analytical separation of the factor which have facilitated the shift towards a single world – e.g. the spread of capitalism, western, imperialism and the development of a global media system from the general and global agency – structure (and/or culture) theme (Robertson, 1990:23).

Although he does not fully develop a systematic account of the interrelationship between the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of globalization, it is abundantly evident from Robertson’s work that each is understood to have a distinctive logic (Robertson, 1990; 1991a; 1991b).

However, Howard Permuter (1991:897) delivers a powerful argument for viewing globalization as the harbinger of the first truly global civilization. It is account of where globalization is leading in representative of a substantial and progressive body of literature

which discerns in the growing intensification of global interconnectedness and emerging infrastructure of a 'world society' Rather than conceiving of humanity as organized vertically into discrete nation state entities, this "world society" perspectives considers humanity as a single, universe 'community of fate'. Perlmutter (1991:898) writes:

“By the first global civilization we mean a world order, with shared value processes, and structures: one, whereby nations and cultures become more open to influence by each other: Two, whereby there is recognition of the identities and diversities of peoples in various groups, and ethnic and religious and value both cooperate and complete but no ideology prevails over all the others. Three, where the global civilization becomes unique in a holistic sense while still being pluralist, and heterogeneous in its character. And Four, where there as singly these values are perceived as shared despite varying interpretations, such as we currently see for the value of openness human rights, freedom, and democracy.

Interestingly, Perlmutter does not equate globalization with westernization. Rather, he considers globalization to be a complex process, for he points to the transformation within western societies (in medicine, cuisine, lifestyles, ethnic division, etc.) brought about by the widespread appropriation and global diffusion of non-western values and social practices. Indeed, he believes globalization is responsible for creating a world civilization in which there is a dynamic form of global 'syncretisation' He defines syncretisation as "...the attempted reconciliation or union of different or opposing principles, practices, or parties as in philosophy or religion" (Perlmutter, 1991:911). For Perlmutter, world society is a much more pluralistic de-centred construct than our traditional 'models' of the hierarchical, ordered nature of domestic (national) society which can no longer be conceived of as a highly integrated, highly structured social space (Bauman, 1992:350). Accordingly, Perlmutter who implies that in a post – modern world of cultural fragmentation and the de-centring of power, globalization is re-articulating on a global scale the pluralism, syncretism, and diversity of contemporary domestic society. Thus, the first 'global civilization' may be a post –modern one.

Neo – Marxists would consider Perlmutter's account somewhat naïve, since it fails to recognize the global power structures created by processes of globalization. With the integration of the former command economic of Eastern Europe and the former society union into the world –economy, the global grip of capitalism now appears firmer than ever. Thus, rather than representing the present epoch as the dawning of a 'global civilization' it might be more accurate to describe it as the final consolidation of a 'capitalist world society' for one

factor alone has a crucial bearing on the material well – being – and thus the fate of the bulk of the world’s population: namely, the dynamics of the capitalist world economy. To argue as Wallerstein (1984) does, that there is a single capitalist world economy which to acknowledge that the prospects of the constituent parts of that economy (the states, peoples, communities, and households) are intimately bound up with the functioning of the whole. Despite the appearance of fragmentation, the nature of global markets and the global mobility of capital ensure that few states or peoples can opt out of the logic of this capitalist world political economy.

According to Harvey and Jameson, in the last thirty years, capital has extended its reach and because of new technologies of communication and control has become ever more mobile (Harvey: 1989, Jameson: 1991). Furthermore they argue that this increasingly global form of capitalism is associated with a profound transformation in the nature of the existing world capitalist order. A new form of global capitalism (‘late capitalism’, ‘disorganized capitalism’ or ‘traditional capitalism’) has extended and deepened its reach across the globe. With this has come an increasing penetration and consolidation of capital social relations on a global scale. However, those excluded from or resisting this transformation have become ever more marginalized. Thus, within this world capitalist society there exist simultaneous processes of transnational integration and national disintegration, as some community are incorporated into the system and other organized out. So, within the same state, community and street, will be those whose lives are deeply implicated in and tied to this new ‘transnational capitalism’ and many others who are either its victims or exist on its margins. Perhaps, the most visible ‘agent’ of this new form of global capitalist order is the transnational corporation (TNC). However, Modelski (1972:227) observes today’s extensive patterns of global interaction and global awareness, combined with the deepening of universal values (e.g. environmentalism, human rights survival, etc.) point to the ‘reality of world society’. The complex web of transnational ties, which connects communities, households, and individuals across national boundaries, undermines the image of humanity as imprisoned within bounded national societies, and instead supports a rather different view point. Image in which humanity is pictured as being organized horizontally into multiple, overlapping, and permeable communities or systems of society suggests that the “.....boundaries of state would be hidden from view” (Burton, 1972:43).

Noticeably, each of the scholars identified globalization with quite different trajectories of change. Each explains from different perspectives about where globalization is leading and

what form of globalization is leading and what form of global society appears to be emerging. Indeed, there is little common ground between these positions, in the sense that each delivers its own distinctive response to the critical issue of the consequences of globalization for the social architecture of modernity. By their very nature, none of these positions can be judged to be wholly right or wrong, true or false, since each is essentially attempting little more than claiming to represent the most judicious assessment of where contemporary trends are leading. Moreover, the intellectual debate on these great matters remains extremely fluid while, as Rosenau suggests, the world of experience remain highly turbulent. As the ‘jury’ is likely to remain out for some time, the issue becomes one of which account(s) appears to be more or less convincing (Rosenau, 1990).

In comparison with previous historical epochs the modern era has supported a progressive globalization of human affairs. The primary institutions of western modernity – industrialism, capitalism, and the nation state have acquired, throughout the twentieth century a truly global reach. “But this has not been achieved without enormous human cost, since western globalization has been fuelled by a tremendous “arrogance and violence (Modelski: 1972:49). While early phases of globalization brought about the physical unification of the world, more recent phases have remade the world more recent phases have remade the world into a single global system in which previously distinct historical societies or civilizations have been thrust together. This should not be taken to imply that globalization involves global cultural homogenization or global political integration. Rather, it defines a far more complex condition, one in which patterns of human interactions, interconnectedness, and an awareness are reconstituting the world as a single social space.

2.4 GLOBALIZATION: CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

In recent years ‘globalization’ has become a catchword among economists, sociologists and political scientists trying to explain the dramatic retreat of autonomous space all over the world. Defined as a coalescence of varied transnational processes and domestic structures, allowing the economy, politics, culture and ideology of one country to penetrate another (Mittleman, 1994) globalization portends as yet largely uncharted trajectories for nation states and civil society. Globalization received a massive boost in the 1980s. During those years, the transformations that have accompanied globalization, arguably to some extent intentional, have exhibited six consistent trends that continue to have a tremendous impact on global,

national, and local social and institutional structures. These are the spread of liberal democracy, the dominance of market forces, the integration of the global economy, the transformation of production systems and labour markets, the high speed of technological change, and the media revolution (Okoye & Okoye 2004: 162).

Globalization has evolved over the years but its rapidity intensified after the end of the Cold War. Though, its pace slowed down during the Cold War as a result of protectionist policies applied to defend ideological interests by the major protagonists. With the end of the ideological polarization of the world, increasing emphasis has been placed on openness and liberalization of national economic prosperity and democratization as the only political reality of the world, devoid of any cultural or religious sensitivity. A conceptual and intellectual discourse on the concept of globalization is so enormous that of recent, it is in danger of losing its focus. This new concern focus on globalization arises from the developments that have taken place since the collapse of the Soviet Union, thus introducing a new world order. In fact, as Lubbers pointed out, in 1998 alone, over 2822 academic papers were presented at different occasions and 589 new books were published on the subject of globalization. (Lubbars, 2001:37) As many as these writings on globalization are, so are the various views on it.

But irrespective of attempts to present globalization as a natural and inexorable course of human history which is turning the world into a “global village”, its class character and links with those who control the world market cannot be obfuscated (Sawyer, 1998).

Responses to the pertinent questions, of whose globalization, and what ultimate objectives, therefore become clear because:

What now passes as globalization is a specific type of internationalization of capital, labour, and knowledge, characterized by an unrestrained and regulated search for profits and greatly enhanced by the public policies initiated by the governments of President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher (Navarro, 1998).

Globalization is a concept riddled with ambiguities and contradictions. It is not a homogeneous process. It has both negative and positive dimensions, and both economic and humanistic facets to it. It has led to new problems while at the same time provoking a quest for solutions to these problems (Gimode, 2004:293). According to Malcolm Waters, globalization is a Western and westernizing project. It entails the expansion of European culture across the globe, and is tied up to capitalist expansion (Waters, 1995: 2).

Globalization can be described in several ways. It could refer to the rapid integration of economies and markets world-wide, intensified financial flows, the information revolution, and cross-cultural currents. Scholars like Ghai, Robertson, Featherstone and Ake see globalization as the restructuring of global capitalism, characterised by the increased profile of international financial institution, corporations and information technology. In the sociological and cultural realm it is possible to see elements of an emerging 'global culture' which Tade Akin Aina argues have combined to create new conditions of proximity, intensity, and even almost intimacy with what used to be external far away worlds. According to Samir Amin, the globalization process has led to a trend in which information, events and ideas, corporations and commodities, identities and life styles move with such rapidity today, that time and space have become compressed, tastes and consumption homogenized creating a different world, but one still characterized by the inequalities, unevenness, social exclusion and polarization. Others have viewed it as a process of universalization or modernization, all pointing to the spread of 'global' human rights, culture and democracy (Akpotar, 1988:41).

In whatever consideration or examination, globalization is one of the most used and contested terms today. Marshall McLuhan states that globalization was the 'concept of the 1990s by virtue of its widespread use during the last decade of the 20th century. In the 21st century, it has seen an even greater use to encompass almost everything from political, economic, cultural, geographical and social elements of our lives. Globalization is simply a term used to describe or characterize the process of increasing "multidirectional economic, cultural, socio-political global connections (Adam, 1999:4). In a bid to shed light on the phenomenon, David Held looks at the contending debates on globalization and classifies globalization scholars into 'globalists', 'traditionalists' and the 'transformationalists'. Held goes further than Slevin in his work and enunciates the different schools of thought held by scholars of globalization. He captures positive, 'globalists' who have a positive perception of globalization as well as the 'Pessimist globalist', who perceive the process pessimistically, seeing nothing positive in it contrary to the positive globalist. The impact of globalization on the developing Southern countries, however, does not feature much in Held's compelling reading, save for few statistics enlightening readers as to how globalization has impacted on the socio-political and cultural aspects of the developing southern countries (Michael, 1999:26).

As a central concept in the present day international scenario, globalization is hard to define. Still, scholars have made attempts to provide a basic understanding of the concept. The concept has got inextricably linked with the process of transformation touching upon every

aspect of social, political and economic development around the globe. It can be seen as a process by which the population of the world is increasingly bounded into a single society. In the social front, globalization signifies closer interaction of people and homogenization of culture and values and the world being transformed into a 'global village' politically, it refers to the complex networks of a global governance and shared political value resulting in the development of a trend towards homogenization of global political culture. Economically, it is manifested in the form of liberalization tendencies, privatization deregulation leading to a free market regime. On a greater plane, globalization has posed challenges to the *raison d'être* of the states – the dominant actors in international relations (Ghosh, 2011:311). According to Heywood, the phenomenon of globalization has completely altered our understanding of politics and nature of political interaction. (Heywood A. 2005:125). This is because globalization weakened and destroyed distinction between domestic and foreign that culminate in the emergence of world society. But, Kar Deutch called it 'symmetrical interdependence' in which changes in one part tend to lead to changes in the other parts since no sovereign state can exist in isolation or be unmindful of the adverse or positive effects of its international policy on other members of the international system (Akpotor, 1998:242).

In Iyayi's view, while there is no doubt that globalization represents a culture, there is, however, the need to acknowledge that every culture embodies and is embodied in a mode of production, thus globalization is first and foremost an economic rather than political because what is globalized is an economic category and practices. Hence, globalization is a process of expanding capitalist economic practice to all corners of the globe on terms and conditions arranged by country favourable to leading capitalist countries, organizations, institutions and individual capitalist (Iyayi, 2005:6). Writing in the Financial Times in 1997, Martin Wolf observed that "globalization is the real economic event of our era (Wolf, 2000:9). While few would agree with this observation, there is widespread disagreement on how to define globalization and judge its consequences. The international monetary fund defines globalization as "the growing economic interdependence of country worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of cross border transactions in goods and services and of international capital flows, and also though the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology" (O'meara, *et al*, 2000:47).

Perhaps the most succinct definition of globalization is offered by Malcolm Water in his short but fascinating book on the subject. As a sociologist, Water is more interested in the

relationships inherent in global shifts. He defines globalization as a “social process in which the constraint of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding (Waters, 1995:3). Waters believes globalization has always been taking place, proceeding through the fits and starts of various ancient imperial expansions, pillaging and trading oceanic exploration and the spread of religions ideas. Others such as the renowned Canadian international political economist, Robert Coxn, argue that the analysis of ‘globalization thrust’ must ultimately begin with an understanding of the internationalization of production. The critical factor in information on how most profitably to combine components in that production process. Producing unit take advantage of abundant, cheap and malleable labour, where it is to be found, and of robotization, where it is not (Cox; 1991: 335). While Waters’ explanation rests more on the spread of ideas, Cox relies more on materialist explanation (stressing the political implications of economic forces) (O’meara, *et al*2000:47).

The origin of globalization is contested by scholars. Malcolm Waters traces three different interpretations of the origins of the phenomenon. The first one stipulates that globalization has been in process since the dawn of history and that the effects as a result of the process have increased with recent times, marked by sudden and recent acceleration. Another interpretation states that globalization, is co-temporal (sic) with modernization and development of capitalism. The second interpretation equally outlines that globalization has intensified in recent times. The last interpretation differs from the first two. It stipulates that globalization is new. The recent socio-economic and political processes such as ‘post-industrialization, post modernization or the disorganization of capitation are the hallmarks of globalization. Indeed, many of the scholars who have undertaken a study of the concept of globalization have often examined it as a product of modernity. Roland Robertson who has been studying the phenomenon since the 1960s argues that, ‘globalization is intimately related to modernity and modernization as well as to post modernity and ‘post modernization’ while Anthony Giddens posits that ‘modernity is inherently globalising’, and he defined globalization as,

‘the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse directive from the instantiated reactions that shape them (Robertson, 1997:43).

Similarly, browsing through some literature on globalization and paying attention to the three essential dimensions: the economic, political and cultural, one comes out with the following impressions. Globalization even though it has undergone a long historical process, is an unprecedented new phenomenon. The process of globalization is sweeping across the whole world, turning it into a 'global village'. Although it is consciously being engineered by capitalist economic ideology, its political and cultural dimensions are self-propelling. The forces of globalization are such that individual cultures will be unable to resist them (Giddens, 1997:19). Against this view, some Third World scholars and their sympathizers argued that globalization is not as value-free as it is being portrayed in the West. Globalization is only the latest stage of European economic and cultural domination of the rest of the world and which started with colonialism went through imperialism and has now arrived at globalization stage. Thus, Wilfred could assert that:

present-day globalization is but a continuation of a long tradition of over five hundred years, the tradition of imperialism. Globalization is only the latest phase and expression of this uninterrupted history of domination and subjugation of peoples, nations and cultures through the conquistadors and colonisers. It is a tradition of political, economic and cultural domination of some nations over others (Maduagwu, 2003:51).

Again, Alvin (1997:12) has equally offered a definition of globalization as the pressure for a uniform economic, and political system in the world that is primarily capitalistic and market centred in the pattern that is favourable, first and foremost to western and westernized nations spearheaded by the U.S.A, all of who see it as the key to human progress and development. By its dynamism and pervasiveness, globalization has put itself up as the new world order with the promise of promoting economic growth and development and facilitating democratization in the under developed Third World nations. But, Goshit expresses that the term globalization tends to be more popular in the economic sphere. The European Commission defines globalization in terms of its economic benefits as follows:

Globalization can be defined as the process by which markets and production in different countries are becoming increasingly inter-dependent due to the dynamics of trade in goods and services and flows of capital and technology. It is not a new phenomenon but the continuation of developments that have been in train for some consideration time (Kanu, 1997:45).

In the same vein, Taylor said: "But economic globalization in fact describes a specific phenomenon: the growth in flows of trade and financial capital across national borders. It implies that the world is a single market or nearly so". In a fully globalization economy

goods and investments would flow across national borders with no more difficulty than that encountered by accompany from California selling its products or taking out loan from New York (European Economic Commission, 1997:45).

According to Babangida, (1998:10), he asserts that:

when we talk of globalization, we are referring to the liberalization and the intensification of international linkages in trade, finance, markets, production, research, transportation, energy, medicine, education, politics and cultures that are accelerated by discoveries in micro-electronics, information processing, communications and biotechnology. These forms of cooperation and linkages have created mutual inter-dependency in the global system.

The implication of this definition is that almost every aspect of human life in our present world is affected by globalization, in which the world is effectively linked. Viewed differently, Solomon narrows the definition to mainly economic and financial linkages among the countries of the world-often referred to as growing interdependence. Implicit in both definitions are two key words: linkages and interdependence. Linkages refer to increase in contacts through various means including information flows and travels. Interdependence refers to the growth in exchanges/borrowings of products and ideas. Interdependence, however, is a controversial concept. Ordinarily, it connotes the existence of symbolic and balanced exchanges between and among countries of the world based on differences in natural endowments and in comparative cost advantages in production. But in reality, the industrialized countries still enjoy relative advantages in international trade (Taylor, 2002:47).

In Usman's (2007) perception, globalization is mere media and academic celebration and advertisements of advances made in computer and communication technology during the 1980s and 1990s. Usman's views here reflects the significance of the revolution in computer and information and communication technology, the main agents of globalization. But Roland Robertson in his article, 'Mapping the Global Condition', has tabulated the temporal historical paths to the present circumstances of globalization into five phases: (i) 'The germinal phase', lasting in Europe from the early fifteenth century until the mid-eighteenth century; (ii) 'the incipient phase', lasting mainly in Europe from the mid-eighteenth until the 1870s; (iii) the 'take off phase' beginning from the 1870s until the mid-1920s; (iv)'the struggle for hegemony phase' lasting from the mid-1920s until the late 1960s; (v)'the uncertainty phase' beginning in the late 1960s and displaying crisis tendencies in the early

1990s. Each of the development phases had great transitional impact on the course of history’.

To Mike Kwanashie (1999:17-18), globalization is a process of increased integration of national economies with the rest of the world to create a more coherent global economy. It is a process of integrating economic decision making such as the consumption, investment, and saving process all across the world. It is a process of creating a global market place in which free markets, investment flows, trade and information are integrated. It is a process of heightening the level of interconnections between nation-states. It is a process of shifting autonomous economies into the global market, the systematic integration of autonomous economies into a global system of production and distribution of key elements of this process are: the inter connection of sovereign nations through trade and capital flows, harmonization of the economic rules that govern relationships between, these sovereign nations, creating structure to support and facilitate dependence and interconnection and creation of a global market place.

In Giddens' (1990:63) approach, globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa. This is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very distant relations that shape them. Local transformation is as much a part of globalization as connections across time and space. Thus, whoever studies cities today, in any part of the world, is aware that what happens in a local neighbourhood is likely to be influenced by factors-such as world money and commodity markets-operating at an indefinite distance away from that neighbourhood itself. The outcome is not necessarily, or even usually, a generalized set of changes acting in a uniform direction, but consists in mutually opposed tendencies. The increasing prosperity of an urban area in Singapore might be causally related, via a complicated network of global economic ties, to the impoverishment of a neighbourhood in Pittsburgh whose local products are uncompetitive in world market.

Hannerz addresses the assumption common to much global discourse, as did theories of cultural and media imperialism before it, that globalization and its culture moves outwards from the ‘centre’ (modern North and West) towards the periphery in largely one -way flow . He argues that centre - periphery relations are much more complex; cultural flows move in multiple directions, and thus the outcomes are opposite tendencies, both toward what he call

Saturation and maturation, toward homogenization and heterogenization. (Harvey, 1989:27) For Shaw, the central question is whether a global society is possible. He argues that such development would be more than just the sum of its parts (global economic relations, global political institutions, a shared globalized culture), it would be based around new forms of identification. By uncoupling the national from the state, he is able to show that 'nations' in fact cross state boundaries, and that newer pattern of identification may have quite historical roots. Such a global civil society challenges the state - centric premise of much current social -theory, especially of course, in international relations (Shaw, 1994:7). Sklair (1995:10) analyses various approaches. Unlike some of the theorizing which is very abstract, often flying way above social reality rather than grounded in it, these approaches are founded on varying kinds of empirical data and, Sklair is not satisfied with any of them because all remain very state-centric and this obscure some key dimensions of the world system, such as the capitalist economy which transcends national boundaries, and potential actors on the world stage, like social movements.

According to Hart, globalization has occurred at two levels. The first is the process of inclusionary expansion through the collapse of the non- market economics and the emergence-for the first time in the post -war period - of a global political economy. By contrast, during the Cold War period, economic exchange between the two blocs was limited. As westerns institution -the GATT for instance - had approximately 90 members countries at the end of the 1980 successor -the World Trade organization, which was established in 1995, has a membership base of 130 in the late 1990s with another 30 countries, including Russia and China, in the process of obtaining membership. With the inclusion of new members, the WTO will cover virtually all of world trade and investment. At the second, more complex level, globalization means the rapid transformation of economic activity and the emergence of a single global market alongside strategies of global production. It is the latter form of globalization, defined as the internationalization of product, distribution and marketing of goods and services, or as the emergence of a single, undifferentiated, global market, that has been identified as the key to understanding contemporary international political economy (Maswood, 2000:89).

In Asobie's (2001:37) perception, globalization is essentially the universalization of capitalism. Viewed from the perspective of the North, globalization refers to increasing integration of the activities and practices of human societies around the world. It is presented as that process of both vertical and horizontal integration involving increasing volume and

variety of transnational transactions, in goods and services, international capital flows, human migration and through a rapid and wide-spread diffusion of technology. The primary mechanisms of globalization are said to include open policies with respect to international trade, removal of obstacles to international capital flow or international market integration, and international spread of knowledge. Thus, globalization may also be defined simply as “openness to trade, factor flows, ideas and information.

Tomlinson (1997:170) views globalization in its most general and uncontroversial sense. It refers to it as the rapidly developing process of complex interconnections between societies, cultures, institutions and individuals world-wide. It is a process which involves a compression of time and space, shrinking distance through a dramatic reduction in the time taken - either physically or representationally - to cross them, so making the world seem smaller and in a certain sense bringing human beings ‘closer’ to one another. But it is also a process which ‘stretches’ social relations, removing the relationships which govern our everyday lives from local contexts to global nest. Thus, at its highest level of generality, globalization can be understood as simply ‘action at distance’ But no matter how general a description is given to it, globalization remains a difficult process to get a grip with, either theoretically or empirically.

The social scientist, however, perceives globalization as processes. As Castell’s (1998:367) points out, three of such processes are essential, independent, but coincide. These are information technology revolution, the restructuring arising from the economic crises of capitalism and statism and, finally, the upsurge of social movement like feminism, human rights etc. He describes what constitutes the key components of the globalization process as follows: the emergence of time-space compressed interdependent world; the emergence of time space compressed interdependent world; the emergence of a new world, i.e. a shift from bipolar to unipolar world; the emergence of a new international division of labour in the context of the polarized global economy seeking to integrate all local economies through trade liberalization and deregulation, etc.; the emergence of new flow of persons, cultures, ideas and funds (finances), the emergence and spread of new technologies particularly IT and their transnationalization and integrative capacities on markets etc. And the increasing significance of knowledge and information for production, culture and the economy. It is thus clear that globalization is essentially a process of transformation or the remarking of the world (a constructionist notion) at various levels: political, economic, military labour orders etc. through flows that enhance interdependencies.

Furthermore, Moran (1998:58) explains that there seem to be as many definitions of globalization as there are countries in the world, but despite this, globalization rests on the argument that we are experiencing a quantitatively and qualitatively different and heightened level of international integration in the world economy in the area of finance and production. In the realm of finance, it is argued that unprecedented international expansion and linkages - global financial deepening - are overriding the possibilities for national financial economic management: The transnationalization of finance however has taken on a more widespread and structurally complex form in the late twentieth century. States have lost the power to use a range of financial controls and policy instruments to shape and promote economic development. International finance in a range of highly significant ways is actually in the ascendancy over the real economy. In the field of trade, it is held that states must - and are actively focusing their policies outward, adopting strategies for global competition involving support for industries at the cutting edge of the world economy - an approach embodied in strategic trade doctrine. Similarly, production has become globally integrated across all continents driven by rootless MNCs in search of high profit rates. The motors of change in the world economy are now global, proactively affecting states whose national economics are no longer important variables in the global economy.

In Ojo and Obaseki's (1998:416) views, globalization is the integration of national economies through trade and financial transactions, process that has tended to reduce the ability of domestic economic policy to achieve its objectives without due consideration of the counterailing effects of competing policies adopted by other nations. Thus, globalization has reduced the world economics into a global 'village' where decisions by one impact others through trade links, as well as investment and capital transmission across national boundaries to take advantage of emerging opportunities. It is, therefore, clear that no one nation can survive on its own in this era of rapid globalization of the world economy. On the other hand, to corroborate this, Kwanashie (1999:341) defines globalization as a process of integrating economic decision making such as the consumption, investment, and saving process all across the world. It is a process of creating a global market place in which, increasingly, all nations are forced to participate. Key elements of this process are; the interconnection of sovereign nations through trade and capital flows, harmonization of the economic rules that govern relationships between these sovereign nations, creating structures to support and facilitate dependence and interconnection and creation of a global market place. Yet another perspective of globalization goes beyond the economic sphere. The opening which the

information technology has created, impact on almost all aspect of human life (culture, religion and values are all affected as people all over the world are exposed, more than ever before, to different and alternative views). Some would add the harmonization of political systems and the enthronement of a western style common culture. The fear of cultural imperialism underscores a point that globalization could also be seen as a process of harmonization of different cultures and believes. The more immediate and concrete impact of the technological advancement in communication has been the creation of a global market place in which countries are increasingly being forced to participate. Countries operating in separate, sovereign, autonomous environments take decisions which have bearing on others. With the creation of a common global market place, these autonomous units are increasingly sucked in.

To Tahir Beg (2007:71), globalization or global 'integration' may be defined as globally integrated system of knowledge, production, exchange, and governance that is fundamentally different from the one obtained under 'international integration'. Under international integration, the nation states serve as principal entities and actors in the process of integration. Still, nations become more and more interdependent through increasing trade and investment flows. Compared to international integration, global integration is a stage higher. Under this stage of integration the 'international market' tends to become autonomous and socially disembedded as the transnational corporations increasingly liberate themselves from national constraints and design their production and marketing strategies in view of economic locations spread throughout the globe. Global integration is centred on the global market wherein ethnic, lingual, cultural or geographical, and territorial frontiers are rendered obsolete. This is not a system of markets defined within and under the territorial jurisdiction of states rather, it is an autonomous or self-governing market system defined in a borderless world and accepting political jurisdiction of, or accountability to no state.

Muhammad al-Bashir (2002:9) views it differently. To him, globalization is generally defined as a free flow of trade, investment and funds across borders. It is also one of the trios of the new economic order besides liberalization and deregulation. It is a challenge as well as an opportunity. It is an opportunity when it emphasises that development should not be limited to economic growth but must also encompass elimination of poverty, improvement of quality of life, enhancement of health and education and more importantly good governance. However, although these variables are in line with Islamic economic principles, it should be based on justice in order to give their fruits. Unfortunately, this is not the real practice of the

major players of globalization such as the industrialized countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the World Bank. They do not practice what they preach but their policies are on protectionism and self-interest and thus, globalization is a challenge.

Globalization, for Claude Ake (1999:19) is a process. In his words:

The process of globalization is many things of course. It is about structural differentiation and functional specialization in the world economy. It is about incremental interdependence, the growing spread and intensity of interactions among nations and about the nation state coming under pressure from transnational phenomenon, and so on. The process is complex, ambiguous and contradictory.

Economic factors appear to have influenced the views just expressed by Ake. Of course, is necessary to note that globalization is not just about economies although economies constitute the major part of its hardcore. Similarly, writing on the concept of globalization, Kanter and Pittinsky (1996:41) describe globalization as the economies that are increasingly integrated as a function of rising cross- border economic activity. Cross border exchanges include material transfers of people and things and nearly instantaneous communication enabled by emerging information technology. From this definition, it is implied that globalization is a world wide spread or the universalization of certain economic practices, identities and structures.

To Elizabeth Anyakoha (2003:1) globalization is a phenomenon that evolved over time but has suddenly accelerated in the last quarter century, by revolutionary developments in technology. Globalization represents the emerging worldwide interdependence of individuals and countries, which is characterized by various economic, political, cultural and social relatives. This phenomenon is responding to an unprecedented contraction of space and time occasioned by the development of new means of communication and information technologies across the planet. The greatest innovation of the twentieth century is in the realm of information technology. This has created a new order of electronic telecommunication network, covering the world through cable and satellite information super highways. There are new global networks, which has dismantled national boundaries and barriers. These has created a global village where one can access information from any part of the universe by mere touch of a button. But, Nwankwo (2003:1) defines globalization as the current and fundamental phenomenon shaping the global market place. With the current wave of globalization, hitherto independent economies are being interlaced, physical natural

boundaries are becoming irrelevant, and geographical limitations for economic activities, capital movements, technology and goods are disappearing. On the other hand, liberalization, privatization and technical change have become the order of the day. In a nutshell the world has become a global village.

According to Osuji, in economic terms, globalization refers to ‘the rapid integration of economy worldwide through trade, financial flows, technological spillovers, information networks and cross-cultural currents’. This globalization has given rise to a global market anchored on an international financial system. The principle of contagion now explains how ripples in the economy of any part of the world can have instant repercussions in other parts organisations operating in this environment, therefore, make decisions based on global considerations rather on country-specific interest. The whole globe is treated as a market place rather than any specific country. This is the underlying basis for what has been termed the new economic order, and the aim is to carry out economic activities on a global scale, without undue regard for geographical or political borders... (The Sun, August 25, 2003:7) As many nations, with different languages and cultures become globalized into one supranational culture, and eventually one would therefore suspect, into one supranational language, Creole or pidgin. Calvocoressi (2001:42) introduces globalization with the following comment: (Globalization) is a term coined to describe a revolution of cooperation magnitude. This revolution stems from the impact of technology on space and time as experienced by human beings; it affects what men and women know and think about each other, how they do business with one another and what institutions they need to regulate their affairs... (It) has reached a critical phase. What was begun by the electric telegraph and the internal combustion engine (now) assumes a new significance, different not (only) in degree but in kind, when modern technology enabled people and ideas and knowledge material and money to move from one place to another with astonishing speed, in unprecedented volume.

Thomas Friedman (2002:7-8) defined globalization as “the inexorable integration of markets; nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before, enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world faster, farther, deeper and cheaper. Connolly (1999:2-3) vividly adumbrates this spiritual rupture: The end of the Cold War had accelerated economic globalization, population migration, tourism, and cross-national cultural communication combine to increase the sense of insecurity among numerous constituencies. People conceive ideas, faiths, identities, foods, skin tones, music, sexual practices, and languages that disrupt presumptions to universality.... And the nation so

recently the site of calls to overcome corruption, division, and fragmentation, now seems too small to overwhelm those insecurities.

As Rosow (2001:27) views it, the most prominent and consistent notion in the globalization contest is that globalization denotes simply a resurgence of capitalism, capital ascendancy, the second coming of the wave of capitalism or the capitalist reconfiguration of the world at the end of the cold war. Globalization did not arise primarily as an academic discourse. It emerged as a technical discourse of multinational business which reorganized capital flows and corporate structures in order to take advantage of emerging markets, and sought to hedge losses in one national market with investment in others. This view of globalization is of particular interest when it is realized that the complex process of acquisition, use and movement of capital, and the social relations these create has been the most visible form of the new order. This has even led to the idea that the expression of economic globalization captures the entire essence of the globalization process. Whereas, Kennedy (2009:6) sees no trace of capitalist ascendancy in the contemporary socio-economic process in the world. For him, the evidence all over the world points to the fact that capitalism is rather decaying. In this situation, globalization represents a last ditch effort to prop-up the decaying edifice of global capitalism. Therefore, such contemporary evidence of structural decay as increasing levels of poverty and social exclusion, squalor, social degradation and human rights abuse in both the developing and the developed nations point to the erosion of the validity of renewed faith in capitalism.

Van Binsbergen (1997:14) argues that the spatiality essence of globalization remains a distinguishing characteristic. In this sense, globalization implies the drastic reduction and near elimination of spatial differences between nations of the world that has been engendered mainly by new technologies. Globalization, then emphasises a critical departure from the hitherto prevalent conceptualization that, of spatial reality in the world. To this end, globalization implies a new order in the process of global interaction that remains significantly and qualitatively different. In relation to this, Sivinandan (1997:38) argues that globalization represents an epochal shift in capitalism that is marked by significant and qualitative changes in the deployment of the force of production thus, such things as the disaggregation consequent impact of this on the social relations of production and the of industrial workers, deskilling and recomposition of the labour force among others are core manifestations of this new process of development. However, Ihonvbere's (1996:345) perception is that: globalization implies a greater integration of national economies

characterized by increased cross-border flows of trade, investment and financial capital. It involves the purchase of more foreign goods by consumers, the growth in number of firms that operate across national boundaries and increased investment by the owners of capital in far-flung places. In other words, globalization meant the rapid disappearance of geographical limitations for economic activities, capital movement, technology any goods. Although it is assumed that globalization has come with new alliances that are purely economic and not ideological, we know that the force that control the globalization process are capitalist who have the agenda of not only promoting economic liberalism and capitalist competition but also enthroning on the world stage, the capitalist ideology as the global ideology. After all, at the political level, we are faced with the ascendancy of a unipolar world dominated by an all-powerful capitalist country-the United States of America.

Samir Amin (1999) regards globalization as the manifestation of contemporary capitalism's chaos, which "is visible in all regions of the world and in all facets of the political, social and ideological crisis". This crisis comes after the collapse of the post war regime of accumulation (1945-90), which, in turn, succeeded the age of industrial capitalism and colonialism (1800-1945), itself an outgrowth of mercantilism that lasted from the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries and was fashioned by the hegemony of merchant capital in the dominant Atlantic centres and by the creation of peripheral zones in the Americas, to which Africa supplied slave labour. Capitalism has a long history of expansion and uneven development. The era of global disorder since 1990, which is called globalization is "responsible for the erosion of the three sub systems that formed the basis of post-war growth (the national welfare state in the West), the national bourgeois project of Bandung in the Third world, and Sovietism in the Eastern bloc. Further, as the renowned Nigerian political economist Claude Ake (1999:19) reminds us "it is not an abstract universal that is magically emerging everywhere; it is concrete particulars that are being globalized. What is globalized is not Yoruba but English, not Turkish pop culture but American, not Senegalese technology but Japanese and German". It has always been the insufferable arrogance of the North, to conflate "its own model of society with the ideal state of being". Contemporary globalization, he predicts, will not survive "without solving the problem of uneven development and the poverty of much of the world's population. The North would do well to resist the temptation that it can appropriate at will and pay no heed to even development and the rule of law in global governance. The ghetto is too large and the haven it inhabits is small and shrinking. A

policy of policing the status quo is feasible, but only in circumstances that effectively repudiate civilization”.

In addition, the argument that African intellectuals should beware of Northern discourses of globalization is stated unequivocally by Tade Aina (1997:68) ‘Backed by the very global power being studied, these discourses succeed in imposing on the rest of the world, particularly the South, their outline of the visions and imaginations of the globe’. While the bulk of ‘the west-centred analyses emphasise the “time -space compression’, ‘shrinking world’ new technologies, integrated markets, global interdependence and global flows albeit within a framework implicitly underwritten by western dominance, non-west knowledge struggle with two related sets of elements’ namely ‘the question of inequality, unevenness and injustice embodied in the. New World Order... Related to this and concretely illustrated by the economic restructuring process embodied in the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) is the question of what globalization means for economic development and whether this is still a possibility for African economies.

Apart from the above nature of globalization, very critical to an explanation of the role of globalization in the developing world is the fact that the new pattern of international interaction has acquired a compelling force of its own, powered by the principal institution driving it, and leaves weaker nations in the world with little or no option, or resistance. Suffice it to say that the developing nations especially in Africa are willy-nilly coerced into joining and continuing in the globalization process. As it could be seen, globalization attracts virtually the attention of scholars and political analysts. Though different interpretations have been given to it by different people based on their own perception. While some view it from political perspective, others view it from economic angle. Astonishingly, the interpretation given to it by its proponent is really ambiguous and of course full of contradictions. This is for the simple fact that democracy, human rights and trade liberalism are generally defined within the context of American interest. And it applies to anybody that violates the interest of American, the self-acclaimed police of the world.

Some African scholars see globalization as a form of neo-colonization, with Africa becoming a market for western goods while Africa herself has nothing to offer. Others see it as globalization of the capitalist ideology of the west. The western world wants to globalize its capitalist ideology through its financial institutions, such as World Bank and IMF, which these scholars see as the vehicles of globalization. Western technology, they argue, enslaves

African countries, because they are too poor to acquire them. They therefore have to take loans from western countries to be able to acquire their technology. This leads to a heavy debt burden. Instead of using their meagre earnings to improve the standard of life of their people, African countries spend a considerable part of their earning to pay their debts. This further impoverishes them, and worsens the already bad condition of life of their people. These scholars see liberalization, privatization and deregulation as economic methodologies of globalization. Through these means, the economy of African, countries is being transferred from the hands of African to the hands of the nations of western countries through multinational companies who are rich enough to buy over these assets from the government of Africa countries (Omoregba, 2007:150).

In a way, conceptualizing globalization has its difficulties, since globalization is such a hydra-headed phenomenon. It is hard to determine a specific moments when globalization started. Periodization is always imprecise and contentious, largely because change and continuity are invariably intertwined. History shows no obvious and exact watersheds on which everyone will agree. Researchers have variously dated the onset of globalisation from the dawn of human civilization, start of the modern era, middle of the nineteenth century, and from the 1970s. Of course, their respective views and opinions expressed majorly shaped by their perception, in-depth knowledge and reality of issues in the international system. While some of them viewed globalization from a positive angle, others did from a negative angle.

2.5 FACTORS BEHIND GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is the policy paradigm symbolizing the post-Cold War era of global capitalism. It is the term some use to describe the growing worldwide interdependence of people and countries. This process has accelerated dramatically in the past decades or so, largely because of huge advantages in technology, communication and transportation. This growing worldwide integration has produced a whole series of consequences such as global economic, political, cultural and environmental. Unfortunately, some of these consequences can be negative. Yet, globalisation has been a burning topic of interest for social scientists and the general public for the last two decades. The real challenge to humanity today is the hedonistic nature of the emerging global culture that glorifies pleasure and excess: excessive wealth, excessive sexual gratification, excessive violence, excessive poverty, excessive use of natural resources and excessive consumptions in general. ‘Consumerism’ is gradually becoming a world religion, and multinational corporations are doing their best to preach this new culture

and religion. Individuals and groups who challenge it risk being reduced to the categories of fanaticism, extremism and radicalism (Watch Tower Bible & Track Society, 2003:3).

The advancement in information technology (now communication) and transport are undoubtedly very important factors that precipitated the globalization phenomenon. By means of these two, man has been able to conquer and demystify time and space. In other words, geographical distance and differences in time have been emasculated. Supersonic transportation and the information super highway certainly have compressed the world into one single small entity. They are therefore, very central to the phenomenon of globalization. Viewed in all its ramifications, the two factors above may only be reduced to tools by means of which globalization as a process and also a phenomenon is being executed. Thus, scholars identified several other factors which have long ranging historical, economical, socio-cultural and economic underpinnings. Ali Mazrui, (2000:47) for example, proffered four factors that are responsible for globalization. These he calls, the engines of globalization, viz: religion, technology, economy and empire. These according to him have not necessarily acted separately, but have often reinforced each other.

Others see the factors behind globalization in completely different perspectives. In what can be described as motley of a number of socio-economic developments, each with some peculiar historical experience and bearing. Thurow, as cited in Siddiqui(1998:47) identifies five factors: the end of communism, the technological shifts from manufacturing to brainpower industries, demographic changes never seen before; the global economy; and the absence of a dominant economic, political or military power. On this issue, the arguments put forward by Maduagwu on the much more complex factor behind globalization is that: globalization has shifted emphasis from sovereignty of the nation state to sovereignty of the individual. Those who are aware of the social implications of globalization and have prepared themselves through acquisition of the proper knowledge will be the true international citizens of the world in the sense that wherever they are, they will possess the capability to move across borders without restrictions because of their global impact in their chosen fields of study or business transactions. Their mastery of the nature of cultural flows in a globalized world economy will aid them in discovering cultural riches that they can fit into and make positive contributions in collaboration with like-minded fellows around the globe (Maduagwu, 2002:17).

Apparently, globalization is susceptible to a variety of explanations. For example, some accounts have cited technological advances and dynamic entrepreneurship as the driving forces behind globalization. Others have highlighted the role of regulatory frameworks in first enabling and then steering globalization. For their part, Marxists have regarded capitalism as the engine of globalization, while other explanations have found the primary causes in the realm of knowledge structures and cultural politics. However, each by itself gives an unduly limited understanding. A fuller account of globalization would combine elements from the different approaches. True, the resultant multifaceted explanation is rather messy. Many readers may prefer a more concise formula, where the dynamics of globalization are reduced to a single driving force. Yet excessive parsimony produces simplistic answers, and simplistic understanding may in turn generate flawed policies. In the case of globalization, as with other major historical trends, social relations involve complex interconnections that cannot be reduced to one sole primary cause like the state, technology, capitalism or cultural imperialism (Scholte, 1992:90).

It can be safely argued that globalization represent the following: one, the spread of rationalism as a dominant knowledge framework; two, certain turns in capitalist development; three, technological innovations in communications and data processing; and four, the construction of enabling regulatory frameworks. Certain further circumstances have also promoted the creation of global spaces. For example, non-territorial bonds of collective identity and solidarity between women, ruling elites, youths and others have facilitated the growth of many transworld networks. Moreover, other forces like the contemporary power of neo-liberal discourse have shaped the particular course that globalization has taken at a particular time. However, the four above named causes have constituted the principal necessary conditions for the rise of supraterritoriality. None of these four main causes of globalization has held primacy over the others. The developments in rationalism, capitalism, technology and regulation have been inextricably interrelated. We cannot measure their causal impacts separately so as to conclude that, for example, rationalism has contributed 40 per cent of the cause of globalization, capitalism 30 per cent, technology 20 per cent, regulation 7 per cent and other factors 3 per cent. The explanation advanced here has a systemic character, where each of the primary forces is understood simultaneously to cause and be caused by the others. Thus all four conditions have been necessary to launch and subsequently to accelerate the rise of supraterritoriality (Scholte, 1992:91).

Today, the infrastructure of a global consciousness is fast growing by the media events and a pop culture orchestrated by such transnational networks as CNN, BCC, World TV, MTV, the Internet and non-governmental organizations (NGOS). While the first five are largely one way, top down channels, the last two provide interactive, bottom-up, international communication channels. The media events of the last few decades have brought about a new global consciousness of the common human destiny. Since 1985, the steady growth of CNN into the world's first global news has provided the elites in most parts of the world with a stream of live broadcasts in English, Spanish, Japanese, Polish and soon French and German. In 1987, to counter the Western bias of its news, CNN started airing the CNN World Report, providing uncensored and unedited news reports from local broadcasters all over the world. By 1992 10,000 local news items had been aired on the world Report, originating from a total of 185 news organizations representing 130 countries. CNN's internationally distributed satellite signal is within reach of 98% of the world's population. CNN has thus become more than a news medium. It is also serving as a channel of traditional diplomacy (Ali, 1997:159).

Internet is another fast growing transnational network that connects an estimated thirty million people around the world via over one million mainframe computers in a global network of networks. Towards the end of 1990s, one million new users are estimated to be joining the network each month. At that rate, the network had about 100 million users by the year 2000. If we count the members of such major commercial online services as prodigy, America online, Delphi, Dialogue and CompuServe logging into the internet that figure will be probably soon surpassed. In 1992, the 'Whole Internet Users' Guide and Catalogue sold 125,000 copies. A dozen other guides currently compete for the market, including Zen and the Art of Internet. It is no wonder that marketers are viewing the network as a potential electronic goldmine. However, attempts at commercializing the network have faced resistance by the current users. The new network Nations consists of computer literate professionals from all continents and all field, united in the fine arts of chatting, gossiping, exchanging information and collaborating in a variety of projects from scientific research to lifestyles preference, dating, financial transactions and social movements. The National Science Foundation {NSF} which subsidizes the network has no control over a number of other data lines that are also part of the web (Nyang, 2009:129).

However, the problem of the phenomenon of globalization is that it is a contemporary and rapidly unfolding process. It has been noted that the global changes that have led to the intense internationalization of business are being driven by technological changes particularly

information technology, but this is not the whole story. The changes are highly interesting and in some cases, causes and affects become difficult to separate. Indeed, Nyang (2009:129) has made a very articulate illustration of the manifestations of globalization. In the first place, Nyang maintains that it is manifested in the shortening of geographical distances and the ease of human travel via faster means of locomotion, such as supersonic planes, nuclear powered ships, high speed cars, and bullet train. These have combined to create a New World Order for humanity. The second manner in which globalization manifests according to Nyang, is through the traversing of physical distances through effective manipulation of the electron in the service of humanity. Increasing sophistication in information and communication technology has enabled people bow to cross-vast distances by telephone, fax, telex, e-mail and the internet.

The third manifestation says Nyang (2009:129) can be seen in the emergence of a world culture driven by some universalizing factors such as: the growing impact of English as a common Lingua Franca. France indeed, had cause to be jittery about this development. About 95% of the information circulated and communications taking place in the internet are in English, while only 2% take place in French. The fourth manifestation is the homogenization of human societies, a trend that has been facilitated by the universal adoption of the West's scientific and technological concepts and vocabulary. So, what was once an exclusive possession of the West has now become the collective inheritance of the world. Finally, Nyang (2009:129) identifies the fifth manifestation of globalization in the realm of military science and human warfare. Here, he argues that “prior to the twentieth century, rulers lacked the capability to will the extinction of humanity. Today, the dangers of war have made it quite clear that there will be no victors in a nuclear war. This global fear of extinction has become a thread of unity among those working energetically for peace in human communities around the world.

Of all the five parts of the manifestations of globalization identified by Nyang, the fourth one seems to create particular interest, and in some way, raises also some controversial questions. Bearing in mind the fact that the tools of globalization (information and communication) are controlled and dominated by a particular section of the world, the West. Then, one wonders what form of homogeneity the world shall be ushered into. For now, the third world is at the receiving end. The west is imposing all its values: political, socio-cultural, economic, educational etc. upon the rest of the world. So, as Mazrui (2009:7) illustrates, the demarcating line between homogenization and hegemonization is hardly discernible. This calls for

question of the real essence, intent, and purpose of globalization. To a large extent, globalization has magnified the problems that already existed in our imperfect world. Rather than offering a solution to the world's difficulties, it has become part of the problem. Social divisions have become greater and frustration has mounted. Really, what we have seen in recent years falls far short of ideal. Human rights and social equity have lagged far behind technical and material progress. The principal problem is that economic globalization is driven by the desire to make money. The profit motive rarely takes into account the poor and the disadvantaged or the long-term needs of the planet. Korten (2002:4) argues: "An unregulated global economy dominated by corporations that recognise money as their only value is inherently unstable...and is impoverishing humanity in real terms".

Globalization is seen as an opportunity and poverty, as well as a challenge. The ways people live and work are changing both positively and negatively as a result of globalization. Wolfensohn (2001:71) observed that globalization is about:

.....an increasingly inter-connected and interdependent world, international trade, investment and finance that have been growing faster than national incomes; technologies that have transformed people's abilities to communicate in ways that would have been unimaginable a few years ago; global environment, communicable diseases, crime, violence and terrorism; new opportunities for workers in all countries to develop their potentials and to support their families through jobs created by greater economic integration; workers in developed countries that fear losing their jobs to lower-cost countries with limited labour rights; workers in developing countries who worry about decisions affecting their lives that are made in faraway head offices of international corporations.

While acknowledging the merits of globalization, Kofi Annan (1997:22) also identified the challenges, which include *inter alia*: changed nature of threats to peace and security faced by the world's people today; technologies of mass destruction that circulate in a network of illicit markets and terrorism that casts shadows on stable rule. Globalization also constraints the ability of industrialized countries to cushion the adverse domestic effects of further market opening. The developing countries on the other hand had never enjoyed that privilege to begin with. As a result the public in both countries now feels exposed and insecure. Globalization has in addition, created new vulnerabilities to old threats. Criminal networks take advantage of the most advanced technologies to traffic around the world in drugs arms, precious metals and stones, even people.

Janet Staiger (2002:235) in her article titled, 'A Neo-Marxist Approach: World Film Trade and Global Culture Flows', has noted the merging realities of globalization to include 'deterritorialization', 'delocalization', 'hypermobility' and 'hyperflexibility' in labour as well as products on the emergent globalized world film trade. According to her, this emerging reality favour creative decentralization in world film trade and the design of products for niche markets. She has equally found Arjun Appadorai's model for the understanding of the phenomenon of globalization very useful. She explains the essential aspects of Appadorai's model as follows: The first three are a reconfiguration of the traditional 'base' of classical Marxism; the other two replace the 'superstructure'. Scape N1 is the **ethnoscape**: 'the landscapes of persons who constitute the shifting world', the people who are the work force of the world. The world labour force is now mobile, partially from necessity. Immigrants, exiles, tourists, and refugees are a fact of the modern work force as we witness the changing demographics in France, the United States, and many others Euro-U.S Nations. Scape N2 is the **technoscape**: "the flow of information and mechanical equipment" across former boundaries. Scape N3 is the **financescape**: the flows of money. Beyond these three are two more scapes, both in the realm of ideology. **Mediascape** is Scape N4: the dispersion of abilities to produce information and images. Scape N5 is the **ideoscape** which relates to those images directly related to political agendas.

Of course, there are more glaring evidences in the literature to suggest a structural relationship between poverty and globalization. Through the process of globalization, individuals, groups and human societies have become increasingly interdependent. This interdependence burgeoned as a result of the phenomenal technological advancement of the last decade leading to improved communication; the virtual disappearance of the Cold War; the weakening of trade barriers; the integration of the world's foremost financial markets, etc. The sum effect of this is significant increase in capital accumulation and wealth of nations and individuals. But the globalization process is not all rosy. The new and massive opportunities occasioned by globalization introduced a novel dimension to good and bad (Marsh, 1996:78).

Although, the benefits of globalization have yet to reach all, the current external environment offers greater opportunity for integration, but countries need to take them. Increased participation in the world economy yields important benefits which include the following: One, it improves resource allocation, towards areas of comparative advantage. Two, it enhances efficiency by increasing competition among firms, and induces learning and

technology. As a result, the nation's wealth is increased. In a more open and integrated world economy, there are many reasons to expect greater income convergence, with poor countries enjoying faster per capita income growth than the rich countries. Poor countries benefit from technology spill over with open trade and liberal financial markets. This could happen by means of imported capital goods, and in view of the very wide technological gaps that exist, the potential for technological catch up is great. Also, because the capital to labour ratio are low in developing countries, returns to capital are higher and tend to attract inflows, leading to increased productivity and growth (Nzekwu, 2008:31).

Globalization has become the testament of the days. It has generated a lot of hopes for the whole world. At the same time, it created certain types of agonies and dangers too. Many problems and disputes emerged due to it. So it has to face different challenges for the sake of welfare of humanity. Today many of the problems as well as their solutions are of global level and global nature. The nature of citizenship is being weakened due to it. People are known (identified) more as consumers than citizens, or even persons. The main challenge emerges due to the danger endangering the developing world. This danger may be focused in the facts that in one hand it is spreading the gap of poor and rich person (the gap between poverty and plenty within the country itself) and in another hand, it witnessed such gap between poor (backward or developing) and rich (developed) countries which had never happened before. Now, this disparity (of poverty and plenty) has been widening more rapidly day by day.

Therefore, as the world becomes more interconnected, flows of people across national borders have increased. Though there remain some challenges to ease labour bottlenecks and the transfer managerial know-how. The largest flows are between developing countries, but flows from developing to industrial countries have accelerated over the past two decades. In the future, one can expect pressure for increased migration from developing countries, whereas developed countries will lower that demand for immigrant labour. Globalization has meant that countries are becoming polarized into high and low income clusters. Over the past thirty years, the vast majority of non-oil developing countries – 84 out of 108 – have either stayed in the lowest income quintile or fallen into that quintile from a relatively higher position. There are now fewer middle income developing countries, and upward mobility of countries into higher income categories has become less frequent over time, particularly since the early 1980s. However, the World Economic Outlook (1998) argues that although most developing countries are not converging towards the income levels of advanced economies,

there are cases where growth conditions and policies are favourable, and where progress toward convergence has been achieved in a relatively short time (Nzekwu, 2008:34).

Another strong manifestation of globalization is the general acceptance of democratic system of governance and their associated concepts and institutions - like separation of powers, strong policing and judicial systems, a free press, transparency accountability, patriotism, etc. Democracy, even though varied in form, has become widely accepted globally as the form of governance through which the wishes and aspirations of the majority of the populace are best realized. This is buttressed by the failure of many of the erstwhile military and civilian dictatorships throughout the world, and the collapse of the communist system that allowed a small clique of bureaucrats to usurp the almost supreme power of knowing and deciding what was good for everybody else in the economy. That democracy has become a global force is also attested to by the way in which any other non-democratic systems (military and civilian dictatorships, kingdoms, etc.) are being rejected and isolated internationally. Of course, as in economic liberalization there is wide diversity in democratic forms and institutions around the globe. Worse, there is even considerable hypocrisy on the issue in, for example, the way that non-democratic rule is tolerated in places like Saudi Arabia and China, and not in other places. Yet no one can deny the fact that democracy is a growing, forceful phenomenon that will soon engulf even the most hardy dictatorship regimes (Usman, 2008:54).

More so, globalization brings about increased specialization and efficiency, better quality products at reduced prices, economies of scale in production, competitiveness and increased output, technological improvement and increased managerial capabilities. The increased in world trade and output made possible through globalization ensures that consumers derive the best satisfaction since the best standards of quality are maintained through specialization and competition. The volume of goods and services increases and the welfare of individuals is enhanced across countries. The increased in FDI flows facilitates growth in world trade and global output by increasing the international mobility of capital and ensuring efficient use of technological and other resources in the production process. Through investment and trade, firms specialize in production with trade facilitating the process through specialization. In addition, FDI facilitates the process through technological innovation and efficient deployment of resources to achieve lower unit cost of production. These processes help to increase global wealth, enhance living standards, ensure poverty reduction and improved welfare for the individual. Thus, globalization is crucial for worldwide economic growth and development (Obaseki, 2008:74).

In addition, the favourable impact of globalization on the world economy has been attributed to the slow growth in inflation, reduced fiscal imbalances with improved real interest rates and good prospects for investment and structural reforms, especially in the transition economies and heavily debt distressed economies applying adjustment programmes. Current account and capital account liberalization across the globe have also helped the rapid integration of the world economy. National macroeconomic policies, including financial policies, have to give due consideration to the sustainability of rapid capital flows that tend to narrow the yield across national borders on various assets. The narrowing of the yield spread, predicated on high interest rates, easily result in volatility especially in a fully saturated system where the capital importing country may be saddled with increased burden of repayment and rapid outflow on account of default. Fragile and over exposed banking system with inadequate prudential regulations also accentuates reverse capital flows at periods of crisis and turbulence (Obaseki, 2008:75).

In every continent, in almost every major nation, and in almost every walk of life, the overriding political reality today is that of increasing social separation and fragmentation, a sometimes violent splintering of humanity by ethnic group, race or religion. While the causes of this phenomenon are as yet imperfectly understood, its implications could hardly be more far reaching. After two decades of imposed intellectually stifling neo-liberal dogmas, and in the aftermath of socially, environmentally, economically and politically damaging globalization agenda, especially in the Muslim countries, probing analysis and fundamental debates are gaining ground at last. The advocate of globalization argues that it is logical and inevitable culmination of contemporary international democratic capitalism, leading to an improved world for all mankind as universal wealth and freedom will abound. These optimists would imagine a more uniform and homogenous world, with a global culture uniting all mankind into a single universal community, unfettered by war, ethnic conflict and inequality quality, a virtual utopia. In opposition, critics of globalization argue that such a world is not a panacea, a foregone conclusion or a natural culmination of force. Even, of it is attainable; such a world would be blandly homogenous anyway and possibly pave the way for autocratic governance.

2.6 GLOBALIZATION: A NEW WAVE OF WESTERNIZATION

The present world is still characterized by an immense variety of peoples, societies, beliefs, traditions languages and cultures. Globalization is threatening to annex them into a Western technological and economic monoculture. This threat is very real indeed, because the technologically modern channels of cultural communication – the media advanced educational systems and information networks are increasingly and commercially financed through bring a uniform message, based on a western materialist lifestyle. In so far as it lures people into new dependencies by imposing cultural uniformity, the result is colonization of people rather than liberation. It would be a great pity if globalization were to have this effect. It would not only be the opposite of progress, but would also breed dissent and resistance, not so much from those who feel excluded by globalization but by those who feel over whelmed by it. A cultural backlash against this form of proselytism is sure to follow. It will be very hard to counter the dislocation and degeneration of society that results (Pronk, 2000:51).

It is evident that the nature of contemporary globalization did not emerge as a ‘natural’ development but rather as a created entity driven by the major global players through agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the global media. The obvious objective of all these organisations and their activities is to control the entire world, particularly the third world, economically, politically, culturally, ideologically and militarily (Pronk, 2002:142). In the 90s of the last century, a number of forces political, economic and technological – acted and reacted upon each other and ushered in globalization into an astonished world. The circumstances were so dramatic that many a nation was left wondering whether it was a boon or bane (Selvam, 2010:229). Globalization was buzz, word in the 20th century. It is almost two decades since the controversies regarding whether it meant westernization, new form of colonization, whether it preached economic exclusion or inclusion, whether it sold the culture-ideology of consumerism that started raging and after gaining gale force in the mid-nineties, they persisted till the beginning of the of the new millennium and then gradually played out as their spent force could hardly impact the enthusiasm of the world economics to embrace globalization continued unabated and possibly increased. Today, globalization is a fait accompli and accepted all over the world as having profound influence on the lives of people of almost all nations of the world. Of course, globalisation has undeniably spread the plus and minus points of western way of life on the hapless third world countries, has given tremendous impetus to ‘consumerism’ as practiced and propagated all over the world. The

question is still wide open as to whether globalization moves towards economic exclusion or inclusion.

Apparently, Globalization is the latest stage of neo-colonization; it is the culmination of the success of the capitalist project worldwide. It is an attempt to justify the spread of Western culture and of capitalist society. The global triumph of democracy was to be the glorious climax of the American century. But democracy may not be the system that will best serve the world-or even the one that will prevail in places that now consider themselves bastions of freedom. Globalization has developed after, and as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, the debates about globalization and its dynamism have stimulated, indeed require, inter-disciplinary dialogue across the social sciences to a much greater extent than in the recent past. Scholars from a broad range of fields have provided conceptual framework for thinking about globalization and offer ways to analyse and interpret the increasing connection between international relations and the processes and experience of globalization. Virtually, every facet of human life can be contextualized under globalization. But it is not to assume that all the discussion are well informed, nor are they all situated in a rigorous theoretical context.

Malcolm Waters (1995:149) may be taken as a typical representative of the Western view of globalization. He is, however, not unaware of what he calls the ideological suspicion of globalization. The concept of globalization, as it is generally being propagated in the West, namely, as “[invisible] forces operating beyond human control that are transforming the world,’ is deceitful. Propagated in this form, globalization might be an attempt ‘to justify the spread of Western culture and of capitalist society’ He admits: globalization is the direct consequence of the expansion of European culture across the planet via settlement, colonization and cultural nemesis. It also bound up intrinsically with the pattern of capitalist development as it has ramified through political and cultural arenas. Water argues, however, that the goal of globalization (perhaps unlike that of colonialism, one may add) is not that all the world would become westernized and capitalist. The implication is rather that western culture has become the standard by which all other cultures must be measured, or as he puts it, “every set of social arrangements must establish its position in relation to the capitalist West”.

Implicit in the concept of globalization, from cultural perspective, is the belief that the whole world is tending towards a homogenous culture. This is particularly so with regard to political

culture. It is argued that national societies of the world are moving towards a political culture of liberal democracy. The essential contents of the political culture are encapsulated in the Western concept of human rights which emphasises political and social rights as against the economic and cultural rights. Underpinning the liberal democracy is commitment to market capitalism because, it is argued, this guarantees individual rights in the economic sphere. The protagonists maintain, however, that it is the culture rather than practice of liberal democracy that is crucial. Thus, Fukuyama (1992:45) could assert: *What is emerging victorious... is not so much liberal practice, as liberal idea.* That is to say, for a very large part of the world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy.

The forces of globalization and regionalization are thus homogenizing the markets and styles of life at an accelerating rate. At the same time, however, the rapid diffusion and miniaturization of communication technologies are providing the vehicle for the expression of nationalist and localist voices that are threatened to be obliterated. As Robertson and others have argued, globalization seems to be dominant feature of the postmodern world. Indeed, the processes of globalization can be viewed as the same time as processes of localization. The global market is adapting to the local conditions while it employs them to gain competitive advantage. The global communication network is globalizing the local issues (e.g. Bosnia, Tajikistan, and Kurdistan) at the same pace that it localizes the global issues such as the environment human rights and population control. Global forces valorise local traits and faces in the dissemination of such consumer items as food, tourism, modelling, and arts and crafts. The top-down processes of globalization are thus working concurrently with the bottom-up processes of localization. Globalization thus appears to be the wave of the future (Ali, 1997:148).

Nevertheless, the argument that links cultural globalization to cultural imperialism goes roughly like this globalization is either just the latest term for, or the latest stage in, a process with a long history, a history more or less co-extensive with the history of Western imperialism. It is simply the global working through of a process of domination in which the West (or America, or transnational capitalism) draws all cultures into its ambit. As Friedman (1994:174) says:

.....the discourse of cultural imperialism tended to set the scene for the initial reception of globalization, casting the process as, “an aspect of the hierarchical nature of imperialism that is the increasing hegemony of particular

central cultures, the diffusion of American values, consumer goods and lifestyles. What the cultural imperialism argument does is to bring the globalization process into an immediate critical focus. But it is easy to see why this perspective is so attractive cultural imperialism is itself a very general and elastic concept, gathering in notions of domination in terms of both general hegemonic cultural formations (the West, Western modernity, consumer culture) and of particular national cultures (America) and accommodating this critique alongside a critique of political economy.

Essentially, the end of the Cold War has come to project a unipolar superpower in America. Ostensibly, the 'Yankees' have increasingly held sway the directions and patterns of all United Nations resolutions, decisions and activities. In many respects, it is lording it over the rest of the world. This is what Fukuyama (1992:78) describes as:

.....the triumph of the West", and of the "Western Idea", that is liberalism, which marks the end point of mankind's ideological evolution, and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

Undoubtedly therefore, American values are simply another side of the same coin of Western civilization. Put in another way, America today, and whatever it represents is the epitome of Western civilization. If globalization is equated with Americanization it is as good as saying that it is essentially a new form of Westernization. This assertion is made by many writers. Even, the recent manifestation of globalization, in view of many Third World intellectuals, is a triumphant Americanization that has advocated a new kind of cultural and economic model. Further, driving this point home, besides being an economic system, globalization is an ideology that serves this system. Americanization and globalization are highly intertwined.

But it must be stated, at this juncture, that not only the Third World thinkers view globalization as a new wave of Westernization and Americanization. Friedman (2000:7), for example, asserts that:

Globalization is basically a Western agenda on its own terms and that the West is its biggest beneficiary." Globalization is happening within the context of unprecedented American military and economic power. Seductively packaged with all the good things that come with it, globalization has been sold to the Third World and showcased to the entire global population, that, it is to form the next global economic, cultural, political and social order of the America's hegemony. Indeed it is doing just that. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), have in concert been doing whatever they can to consciously redefine the way international trade is conducted, financial transactions are made, who benefits and who loses in the new order of capitalism. Crucially, it has been the world's poorest, the less industrialized countries and the marginalised that

have lost or seems to be losing. The Third World largely falls into this category. The economic and ecological forces of globalization demand uniformity and the highest level of integration so as to provide an enabling environment for the MTV, the McDonalds, the Macintosh, the Coca-Cola, the Disney, the CNN and a host of western based or head-quartered trans-nationals products to be sold to Third World.

Yet, this process, with it, certainly, come homogenization, hegemonization and westoxication that can easily imperil the other cultures, mainly the Third World. It is against this background that one should understand the concern of not only the Third World but also the global population about the perils of globalization. Indeed, the consequences of Globalization in the area of culture are the most widespread and damaging. They negate all the ideals of cultural relativity and cultural pluralism such that today, most Third World countries suffers from a crisis of identity through impregnation with foreign values, the main channels of which are Western media in a world of information order dominated by Europe and America. From the colonization of the world, we have arrived at the canonization of the world. American values, politics and business are being powerfully transmitted across nations. Western, especially American values of democracy, human rights, sound market economy and lifestyle are being disseminated around the globe as models (Elaigwu, 1995:9).

Clearly, the entertainment industry has also been globalized with attendant negative consequences. For instance, the Western satellite networks through their news, films and music promote the culture of violence, pornography, sexual perversion (homosexuality and lesbianism), vulgar language, drug addiction and alcoholism. All these behaviour traits negate the values of the ancient religions and the continents of Africa and Asia. This extends to the Information Super Highway. On the whole, the globalization of the media has not led to the globalization of its content. Hence, instead of cultural exchange, there is a one way proposition and this subverts the values and cultures of the Third World countries. The Western media are used as propaganda tools to carry out their foreign policies through setting the political agenda and influencing foreign thinking in the rest of the world. Note that the Voice of America (VOA) is owned by the American government as an arm of the State Department and authorized to broadcast only to outside the United States of America. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is “independent” but funded by the British government (Maida, 1996:27).

One of the unique features of globalization is its culture of Americanization. This derives from a basic assumption that not only political and economic but also the socio-cultural

conditions are the same in all parts of the world so that what led to development in the western parts of the world would produce the same effects everywhere else, including Nigeria, at any time in history. There is however a multiplicity of cultures in the world which, even within one country such as Nigeria cannot simply be wished away or ignored. Because culture is embedded in all the institutions, namely, the political, economic and social, of Nigeria, as of every nation, it stands on the way of any attempt, such as that represented by globalization, to bring about changes in the way of life of peoples of Nigeria (Lawrence, & Huntington, 2000:27). The most obvious reason is that there is a wealth of evidence that Western Cultural tastes and practices are becoming global ones. Take any index from clothes to food to music to film and television to architecture (the list is only limited by what one wants to include as “culture” and there is no ignoring the sheer massive presence of Western cultural goods, practices and styles in every inhabited area of the world. And one could be more specific. Isn't global mass culture as Stuart Hall argues actually predominantly American culture? Certainly, if the process has to be tied to one national culture, there really isn't much competition. And if we agree with Hall is seeing the global cultural sphere as ‘dominated by the visual and graphic arts... dominated by television and by film, and by the image, imagery, and styles of mass advertising, then the case for seeing cultural globalization as ‘Americanization’ is a persuasive one, endorsed as each new Hollywood blockbuster out grosses the previous one world box office receipts, or every time the CNN logo appears on our screens superimposed over the latest, most “immediate” global news footage (Hall, 1992:19).

From all indications, globalization is not a new phenomenon. Being a consequence of capitalist industrial technology, it has been an inevitable feature of Western capitalism ever since the 1860s. What is new is the massive unleashing of its forces in the wake of the demise of communism. In many respects, it is a paradoxical phenomenon. It engenders on the one, hand, uniformity and homogenization, and on the other, facilitates the re-invention and revival of ethnic identity. Globalization certainly has reinforced Western grip of the control of world affairs. The rest of the world, particularly the Third World, has come to be more vulnerable to Western manipulations. And the point of concern is the real devastation visited on the Third World in almost all spheres of life. In the economic sphere, the West is known to be mercilessly devouring. Unlike colonialism, globalization widens in the swiftest form, the gap between haves and the have-nots. And having engendered a new pattern of division of labour, globalization is fast rendering thousands or even millions of people jobless.

Glaringly, globalization has come to reinforce global capitalism. Economic exploitation has thus assumed a monumental global level. In place of the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) the preoccupation now is with the establishment of transnational business corporations and outfits. The international financial institutions (IMF and World Bank) with which the West expropriates the resources of the weaker nations are now having a tighter grip on them and are plundering their respective economies in the fastest way possible. The economic divide between the North and the South is further being widened. Perhaps, one area that would pose greater challenges and generate concern to the Third World is in the area of socio-cultural and ethical globalization. The West has reached the highest peak of moral debasement. This is attested to by Fukuyama, and many other Western writers. Some expressed this concern, even decades before him. All sorts of vulgar attitudes: homosexuality, pornography, lewdness etc. In fact, they are the Western way of life today. With globalization, these decadent attitudes and tendencies are now being disseminated to the whole world. In the internet, these are not brought under any censorship or control. Humanity, if care is not taken, shall soon be consumed by Western insurance and perversion.

The United Nations publication on Human Development Report 1999 explained: “people’s lives around the globe are linked more deeply, more intensely, more immediate than ever before. This opens many opportunities, giving new power to good and bad”. Like many human achievements, globalization has both an upside and a downside. Unfortunately, tools of trade and commerce can easily be converted into tools of crime. Drug cartels have found a host of new opportunities to launder their billion dollar profits. The elimination of many customs controls and the increasing movement of people also make it much easier for the cartels to transport illegal drugs from one country or continent to another. Interestingly, during the 1990’s cocaine production doubled and opium production tripled. International Mafia groups have also developed a lucrative business in prostitution. Every year, they ship some 500,000 women and girls to Western Europe for this purpose the majority against their will (Hall, 1992:19).

Another area of concern involves clashes of cultures and the spread of materialistic values. The interchange of ideas is an important feature of globalization and nothing symbolizes this phenomenon more than the internet. Unfortunately, the internet is not merely used to spread beneficial information culture and commerce. But Websites promote pornography, racism, or

gambling. A few even give specific instructions on how to make homemade bombs. As Friedman (2000) points out: “On the Internet, trouble is just a few mouse clicks away. You can wander into a virtual neo-Nazi beer hall or pornographer's library, and no one is there to stop or direct you”. Television and films also have an enormous influence on how people think. The message on the world's screen often comes out of Hollywood, the world's principal factory of make-believe. The values that this vast entertainment industry reflects often promote materialism, violence, or immorality. They may be totally alien to the local culture of many countries of the world. Nevertheless, governments, educators, and parents invariably find it impossible to hold back the tide. Thus, the opponents of globalization seem to be more vehement than the proponents. They argue that globalization is the offensive and oppressive march of international capitalism destroying all the cherished values in its wake, everywhere. It represents cultural subjugation and ideological conquest. These opponents believe that globalization is increasing world poverty and lowering living standards of workers, and is increasing the gaps between the rich and the poor countries. Available report indicates that while global wealth has undoubtedly increased, it has become concentrated in fewer hands and fewer countries (Awake!, 2002:4).

The net worth of the 200 richest people on earth now exceeds the combined income of 41 per cent of the people who live on the planet – some 2.4 billion people! While wages continue to rise in wealthy countries, the impoverished countries have actually seen a decline in average income over the past ten years. Daisin Edukugho asserted: for the developing world, globalization is tantamount to neo-colonialism if not reinvented slavery. It is the worst setback that could happen to their industrialization aspirations, in so far as the world economy is structured on specialization comparative advantage, competition and narrow national interests. It ensures that the producers of raw materials would remain as such for all time, deprived of the liberty to determine prices of their products and the direction of their trades. In addition to the pressure of competition mounted on economies by globalization, it also poses serious concerns for families in various ways. For instance, Rau noted:

Never have so many workers worried that their company might become the object of a foreign takeover and what would become of them then... People are realizing that: the permanent mobility repeatedly demanded of employees has concrete repercussions for families, friends... People are not as mobile or free as capital ... We need family ties, friends, acquaintances and strong social network. People need warmth and a sense of security. Anyone who regards all this as old-fashioned is mistaken (Awake!,2002:10).

At any rate, the greatest consequence of globalization is that, like colonialism, it is going to spell the doom of weak indigenous cultures. Already African traditional religions and rituals have virtually disappeared due to the onslaught of Islam and Christianity. The same is true of its languages most of which have been completely rendered ineffective in the sense that they cannot be used for scientific work. African languages have been reduced to mere ethnic or cultural artistic performances. But perhaps, Africans need not for ever bemoan this unfortunate experience. If globalization succeeds, the world may eventually become monolingual. Sooner or later, perhaps in another millennium, there may be just only one world language the English language. Other languages may be reduced to vernacular status. This trend has already been observed to be likely consequence of the globalization of mass media. A specific consequence is that, in so far as much of the hardware is American owned and much of the programming is American in origin, English is becoming the lingua franca of the global communications system. This has proved a particular problem for the territorially small nations of Europe but the failure of Euro news, a multilingual satellite news channel, to dent the market shares of CNN and Sky News that broadcast exclusively in English, indicates that English may well become the common public language of the globalized system and that vernaculars may be restricted to localized and domestic contexts (Rav, 2002:29).

Globalization, a phenomenon brought about by technological revolutions, is an increasingly important dimension of international economic relations in terms of its implications for trade, productive investment and finance. In both the mainstream media and corporate boardrooms, globalization is presented as the only avenue that will bring unprecedented world prosperity and freedom in the post-cold war era (Barnet, R & Cavanagh, 1994). Other, however, characterize globalisation as the greatest threat to potential human development. They point out that as the remote forces of globalisation hobble governments and disintegrate the bonds of social solidarity, anger is growing among those whose existence is being threatened. Despite these divergent points of view, the long term implications of globalization remain unclear. Furthermore, whether it is possible to build a strong transnational civil society movement to curtail the growth of the structural power of capital remains to be seen.

However, the processes of globalization, though claimed to be emanating from the west and spreading outward to other parts of the world, has been argued to be one sided and ignores details, both historical and social. While it is the case that certain of these processes, particularly those dealing with politics, economic, science and technology, are deeply

entrenched in historical processes that can be traced to the west, there are others that flows from non-western societies. Some scholars have insisted that 'Africa appears to be part of the half of the world that is not globalized (Cooper, 2001:207). Paul Gifford (1998:127) for example, claims that 'afro-pessimism' is the dominant mood for Africans, who have lost 'self-confidence' in the current global arrangement. Similarly, Castells (2003:127) believes that Africa is no longer a 'third world', but a 'fourth world considering its marginalization from the information economy. Thus, in Samuel Huntington's reckoning, for example, African heritage does not amount to a distinctive civilization comparable to 'Asian civilisation' or 'European civilisation'. If indeed the contemporary global situation will be shaped by interactions and conflicts 'along the cultural fault lines separating civilizations'. Then Africa may deserve the marginal status accorded it.

From the point of view of its advocates, globalization benefits everyone economically and helps spread democracy. It does this by opening up or liberalizing markets and integrating markets worldwide. To the anti-globalization movement, globalization equals Americanization and is about power. It means a new colonization in which Western countries support those who support them. From this point of view, although globalization suggests that it will produce inclusion in the world economy, it in fact produces exclusion from the world economy (Sergent, 2009:49).

Contrarily, one fundamental dreadful aspect of globalization is the continuous increase level of poverty among developing countries that are supposedly co-actors in the global theatre. The reality of today does not lend support to this claim. What obtains is rather a situation of deepening squalor in the midst of global wealth. The enormous wealth generated by globalization is not fairly distributed. The gains are lopsided and skewed in favour of the developed industrial societies to the detriment of the less developed third world countries. In fact, in the context of globalization, the rich-countries, individuals or groups get richer while the poor-countries, groups or individuals within the society-get poorer. Thus, we find some people eat more nutritious meals, wear better clothing, have better shelter etc., while the reverse is the case in other countries whose level of income are below the poverty line.

Given the contradictory forces at work, what will be the" shape of the world order in the early decades of the twenty-first century? The end of the Cold War certainly altered the international system, but claims of the dawning of a 'New World Order' were undermined by the profoundly different ways people interpret the word order. Realists argue that wars arise

from the effort of states to acquire power and security in an anarchic world, or one in which there is no ultimate arbiter of order other than self-help and the force of arms. In this view, order refers primarily to the structure and distribution of power among states. Liberals and constructivists argue that conflicts and their prevention are determined not only by the balance of power, but by the domestic structure of states, their values, identities, and cultures, and by international institutions for conflict resolution. In contrast to realists, liberals argue that institutions such as the United Nations can help prevent conflict and establish order by stabilizing expectations, thereby creating a sense of continuity and a feeling that current cooperation will be reciprocated in the future. Order for liberals, then, is tied to values such as democracy and human rights, as well as to institutions; Finally, constructivists remind us that any order is contested by various parties' values thus is never a value-neutral term.

2.7 PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN POLICY

The end of the Cold War challenged the claim that the internal attributes of states are irrelevant to their external policies. Domestic sources of foreign policy have assumed renewed significance in post-Cold War international relations theory, and the hypothesis that democracies do not fight wars with each other takes pride of place in the new scholarship. In retrospect, it can be seen that domestic forces were always crucial determinants of foreign policy international alliances in the cold war period. This may have been glued together as much by a shared acceptance of liberal democratic norms as they were by international power balancing (Maoz & Russett, 1993:624).

No nation exists in isolation of others. Nations consciously and cautiously interact with one another with the aim of advancing their national interests. No nation expects to waste its resources in its interactions or relations with others. A major purpose is the promotion of interests and influence over others to support her national objectives. This necessitates the formulation of foreign policy as a guide to such pursuits. Scholars and statesmen among others have severally attempted, through definitions and illustrations, to prevent a vivid perception of foreign policy (Zimako, 2009:149). From Akinyemi's (2002a:213) experience, foreign policy is the assemblage of propagated ideas and the actions taken by a state which have some impacts on its territorial boundaries. Thompson and Macridis (1962:304) capture foreign policy as the legislative aspect of managing foreign relations. While Northedge (1968:108) defines foreign policy as "...an interplay between the outside and the inside".

Macpherson (1996:34) describes it as “...a coordinated strategy by which institutionally designated decision makers in a country seek to manipulate the international government in order to achieve national objectives.”

Understanding foreign policy and explaining global issues in the reality of contemporary development have been the focus of the field of international relations. The end of world war II, the creation of the United Nations Organization (UNO) the emergence of the cold war, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, which consequently shaped the New world order provided severe tests for the application of idealist/realist ideas about foreign policy. Morgenthau (1952) deals with the concept of national interest both as an explanation of foreign policy and as a basis for the conduct of foreign affairs. Both Morgenthau’s (1952) essay and his book, *In Defence of the National Interest*, cogently present the case for basing foreign policy on the national interest, although with his typical acumen, he recognizes the potential problems posed by the ambiguity of the concept. In a series of articles later collected in *Discord and Collaboration*, Arnold Wolfers (1952) elucidates and often reformulates some of the fundamental assumptions and concepts of realism. Ironically his analysis eventually led most political scientist to abandon the concept just at the time when Morgenthau’s analysis provided the intellectual rationale for policy makers to embrace it. While scholars have developed other concepts to explain foreign policy, no other concept that can be used to make and evaluate foreign policy has gained wide acceptance.

Although no subfield in political science is completely self-contained, foreign policy analysis is somewhat unusual in that it deals with both the domestic and the international political arenas, jumping from individual to state and to systemic levels of analysis, and attempts to integrate all of these aspects into a coherent whole. Rosenau (1987:1) has called foreign policy a “Bridging discipline” one with “limitless boundaries of the distinction between domestic and foreign issues, between the socio-political and economic process that unfold at home and those that transpire abroad. The centre focus of foreign policy is on the intentions, statements and actions of an actor; generally a state that are directed toward the external world and the responses to these intentions, statements, and actions, but unpacking what this focus actually means is a complex task. Foreign policy can be descriptive, attempting to establish the actual facts regarding foreign policy decision made, policies declared publicly by actors, and the relationships among state and non-state internal actors (Gerner, 1991).

Reduced to its most fundamental ingredients, foreign policy consists of two elements: national objectives to be achieved and the means for achieving them. The interaction between them is the perennial subject of policy of all nations either great and small. To say that foreign policy consists essentially of ends and means, however, is a statement that misleads by its very simplicity. Its breadth does not reveal the obvious differences in national goals and the methods used by various countries for attaining them (Cecil, 1972). Many of the goals be it political, social, economic etc. which states try to pursue in the international system cannot be achieved within the territorial confines of the national state. At times, states need to achieve cooperation, even assistance of other states in the system to achieve their national objectives. Because of this, a state necessarily has to be in communication with its external environment. It is the totality of this communication that is commonly referred to as foreign policy (Olusola & Amadu 1988:76). But, according to Joseph Frankel (1967:1), it “consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent, relations between one state and others”.

Generally, the foreign policy of any state is conditioned by two determinants: domestic and foreign. The domestic determinants include the geographical location, size, nature of territory, natural resources, the political culture and process, the political leadership and the state of economy. Further, among the domestic determinants of foreign policy are three main categories; the highly stable-geographical location, size, population composition; the moderately stable-political unstable, such as the economy and in African states, the frequently changing governments. Among the foreign determinants is the nature of the international system, including the distribution of power, the perception of the state by other states, including the distribution of power, the perception of the state by other states and the developments within the multilateral system (Ogwu & Agbu, 2010:273). Basically, the business of foreign policy is to protect the national interest of a sovereign state within the international system. National interest, in Frankel’s viewpoint implies the amounts to the sum total of all of the word both pertaining to the nation and state (Solomon & Ferdinand, 2007:116). In a classical meaning, national interest serves as a convenient base to encompass all the strategies employed in the interactions of states to ensure the preservation of the stated goals of a society (Ogwu & Agbu, 2010:275).

Foreign policy can also be conceptualized as a set of principles that defines the objective a given state pursues in the international arena in the process of its interactions with other international actors (Akinboye & Ottoh, 2007:116). In addition, the concept denotes the

authoritative action, which governments take or committed to take in order to either preserve the desirable aspects of the international environment or to alter its undesirable aspects (Ogwu & Agbu, 2010:274).

According to Frankel (1967) foreign policy is defined as those decisions and actions which involve to an appreciable extent, relations between one state and others, either positive or negative. To corroborate this, Professor Northedge (1968) describes it as the interplay between the outside and the inside. It is the actions and reactions of states to the events of the international system. Others see it as simply the making and implementation of policies with the aim of achieving the intent of a state in the international system. Prince Metternich of Austria, one of the greatest practitioners of diplomacy, states that “foreign policy is a contraction of domestic policies which, to all intents and purposes, enables any nation’s relevance and participation in the international system” (Adeniji, 2005:23).

Also, to borrow a simple definition from Osuntokun, (2012) it is the policy of whosoever is in the government at a particular time. It represents the range of actions taken by various sections of the government of a state in its relations with other bodies or states acting on the international scene in order to advance the national interest of that particular state. To Reynolds (1982:51), foreign policy consists of the external actions taken by decision makers with the intention of achieving long range goals and short-term objectives. Action is constrained by the perceived circumstances of the state on behalf of which the decision-makers are acting – its geography, its economy, its demography, its political structure, its culture and tradition, as well as military-strategic situation. This I propose to call the *domestic environment of decision makers*. But action is taken with reference to other bodies similarly acting on the international stage, and is likewise constrained by their action. This may be called the *international environment of decision-makers*. Elements within environments interact with each other, and interactions takes place between environments as various means are available to policy-makers in their endeavours to achieve goals. Within the constraints of the decision-makers’ domestic and international environments, who the decision-makers are in particular questions will much affect the selection made among the means available. The choice will also be affected by the procedures and process through which selections are made.

Idang, (1973:5) defines foreign policy as a coordinated strategy with which a country’s decision makers seek to manipulate the international environment in order to achieve certain

national objectives. This definition suggests that there is a close relationship between a state and the international political systems. Moreover, the foreign policies of a state are made and implemented by certain public officials and institutions designated by a state for that purpose.

Nevertheless, two approaches to foreign policy have vied with each other in Western thought at least since the days of the French revolution. One is the *ideological* approach, according to which the policies of states vis-a-vis the rest of the world are merely expressions of prevailing political, social, and religious beliefs. In this approach, foreign policies are classified as democratic or totalitarian, libertarian or socialist, and peace loving or aggressive.

The second approach to foreign policy is *analytical*. At the heart of this viewpoint is the proposition that policy rests on multiple determinants, including the state's historic tradition, geographical location, national interest, and purposes and security need. To understand foreign policy, the observer must take into account and analyse a host of factors (Kenneth & Roy, 1967:49). The leading assumption, Bernard Cohen (1968:530) thus noted some years ago, is that foreign policy is 'more important' than other policy areas because it concerns national interest, rather than special interests, and more fundamental values." A further consequence of this doctrine of the "Primacy of foreign policy" was of course, that being distinct in this manner, political elites demanded that it be treated differently from all other areas of public policy, that is, beyond democratic control and public scrutiny (Walter, 2010:332).

At the structural level, three aims in analytic alternatives present themselves – the "Marxist", "World society" and "structural – realist" perspectives. The Marxist perspective stresses the way in which the exigencies of the international capitalist system constrain the decision choices of national government and seeks to establish why (in the view of its protagonists) certain "fractions" of the capitalist class have benefited most. In a not – dissimilar vein, the world society view foreign policy behaviour primarily as a response to transnational processes and structures, placing particular emphasis on the extent to which the increasing inter dependence of the contemporary world economy has eroded national decision making autonomy. Finally, Realism as structural theory seeks to analyse changes in foreign policy strategy as the consequence of the shifting material and security interests of the state,

concentrating particularly on the extent to which different states' interests tend to converge or diverge over time (David, 1990:11-12).

During much of the twentieth century, most policy makers and academics had a common understanding of the concept of security as the basis for foreign policy. It was generally assumed that the study of security had to do with the ways in which the use of force, or threats to use force, was employed to ensure the physical safety of a country's citizens and the protection of that country's core values. Thus, security was closely associated with the state's role in providing 'national security'. In this traditional formulation, the nature of threat was primarily associated with military threats posed by other states, or in some cases threats posed by non-state actors such as terrorist groups. As policy makers and analysts assessed the changes taking place in the post-cold war international order, there was growing dissatisfaction with the traditional concept of national security than many began to question the definition of security itself. Analysts argued that we should move beyond some abstract notion of the state and 'national interest' and focus on 'security' as it affects the well-being of individual human beings and groups where they actually live (Mark, 2002:88).

2.8 NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: A BRIEF HISTORICAL APPRAISAL

According to Mark W. Delancey (1983: 164), observers divide the history of Nigeria's foreign policy into two major periods, with the civil war years as an interlude. The policy of the period of civilian rule from 1960 until the coups is described as 'conservative' and 'caution' After the civil war, petroleum money poured in, and Nigerian foreign policy became more 'active' and somehow bold. The content of the policy included predominantly non-alignment and Afrocentricity. Post – war Nigeria thus became actively involved in the international politics of Africa.

However, four main sources have been identifies as vital in explaining Nigeria Foreign Policy making, these sources include the role played by institutions such as the Nigerian constitution, the presidency, the body responsible for the day – to – day running of the domestic and foreign affairs of the state; the National Assembly, which is constitutionally empowered to make laws for the country; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all other agencies of government whose roles and duties are not expressly stated in the constitution.

Although the roles of these ministries may not have been expressly defined by the constitution, their activities at various times could be tangential to it (Fawole, 2004: 8-9).

Generally, perspectives on understanding Nigeria's foreign policy can be classified into two main strands: the super – structural perspective and the sub – structural perspective. The super –structural perspective is characterized by its focus on regime changes as a “framework” for explaining changes in foreign policy orientation, and its methods are fundamentally chronological (Agbu, 2011:24). As Shaw (1983) puts it ‘the prevailing super structural perspective on Nigeria's foreign relations is basically a periodization of its degree of assertiveness and Afro – centricity according to regime changes’. Further, the super – structural perspectives dwells on the constrains affecting Nigeria's effectiveness and influence and the identification of the limitations to Nigeria's leadership role in West Africa and beyond. In other words, this view is concerned with role analysis. Often, the discussion about Nigeria's role is cast largely in terms of ‘scope of the national interest’.

Furthermore, the central problematique addressed by the super – structural perspective is Nigeria's relative power potentials and capabilities. We could for example, ask the question – where, when and how does Nigeria exercise power in relation to the other countries? The view generally from this school, is that Nigeria should be categorized as a middle power, with little influence at the global level, but significant influence in Africa (Agbu, 2011:24).

The sub-structural perspective, which is obviously a radical departure from the super – structural view, sees Nigeria not as ‘Africa great power’ that mediates between, Africa and the world, but rather perceives Nigeria as an *intermediary* between the “centre and periphery”, that is a part of the semi-periphery. And rather than focus on relative power or national capabilities of Nigeria, it focuses on the character of Nigeria's political economy in determining the strength of its foreign policy. It proceeds from the assumption that Nigeria's economy is a dependent economy, controlled by the triple alliance of transnational capital, local private capital and state capital. The sub – structural or radical perspective is characterized by its focus on class relations and the impact of class struggles in Nigeria, both in terms of domestic politics and its extension to foreign policy (Agbu, 2011:25).

The history of Nigerian foreign policy can be said to have begun in 1958 when the first batch of Nigerian Foreign Service personnel were recruited in preparation for the eventual transfer of political power to Nigerians. The character of the personnel, whose number was swollen with the decision to recruit the second batch in 1959, was essentially British in outlook and orientation. This should not be surprising. The personnel received their diplomatic orientation in British embassies across the world which literally meant that they were brainwashed with the British diplomatic ethos and practice. The onus later fell on the pioneer Foreign Service personnel to train other batches of Nigerian diplomats to make the country adequate in terms of global representation and significantly, to fulfill Nigeria's leadership role in Africa (Saliu, 1999:122).

Reflective of the colonial legacies in Nigeria, foreign policy, even after the attainment of independence, was still being coordinated by the office of the Prime Minister with a senior white officer serving as an adviser to the Prime Minister on foreign policy. If anyone was still in doubt on the character of Nigeria's foreign policy after independence, the name of the Ministry which included commonwealth relations and its location still in the office of the Prime Minister should give an added strength to the claim that the British had a big influence in its formulation and conduct. In 1961, Chief Jaja Nwachukwu, a substantive Minister of Foreign Affairs was, however, appointed from the coalition partner, National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). What may be considered as the contours of Nigerian foreign policy were given in the speeches to the United Nations on 7th October, 1960 and to the National Assembly in December 1960 by the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Saliu, 2010:169-170).

The study of Nigeria's foreign policy leaves a lot to be desired. In quantitative terms, the volume of writings on Nigeria's foreign policy, which dates back to the earliest days of the country's independence, is very high. Indeed, writing on Nigeria's foreign policy has become a veritable and productive industry. But it is an industry with neither backward nor forward linkages. Writings on Nigeria's foreign policy are hardly based on systematic empirical research. And the few efforts at research are not guided by conscious and explicit use of foreign policy or international relations theories, models or paradigms. The mills of researchers on Nigeria's foreign policy have been fed neither by the fruits of the so-called scientific or behavioural revolution which swept through the United States of America, and to a less extent, Europe in the 1950s and 1960s nor by the products of the dependency school which held sway in Latin America, Africa and Asia in the 1970s. Rather, the balance of

power model, the billiard-ball approach to the analysis of international relations which dominated the field in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s has continued to provide the inexplicit paradigm which underpins the writings on Nigeria's foreign policy (Asobie, 1990:3).

Moreover, the prolific factors of studies on Nigeria's foreign policy have, by and large, failed so far, in creating an impetus for the advancement of propositions of sufficiently high level of generalization, internal consistency and logical rigour to form the basis for either testing existing theories or fresh theories on foreign policy. The studies on Nigeria's foreign policy have been isolationist and idiosyncratic nature: each writer or researcher on foreign policy pursues his own theme and proceed generally as if no previous work had been done before on the theme. The studies are not cumulative, with one researcher or writer building on the works of his colleague, each drawing from, and advancing existing knowledge on a given subject of inquiry. Related to this, as a conscious and deliberate form of activity, data-making is hardly part of the result of research efforts on Nigeria's foreign policy. The gathering of evidence is done in a haphazard, non-methodological manner; it is not directed towards validating some testable hypotheses or the solving of clearly posed practical and theoretical problems. Meanwhile, writers on Nigeria's foreign policy have not, on the whole, shown an appreciation of the need to place emphasis on precision of thought and language, and upon a distinction between that which is assumed and that which is empirically verifiable. In the vast literature on Nigeria's foreign policy, there are perhaps one or two exceptions to these generalizations. But, all in all, the picture painted above reflects correctly the present status of studies on Nigeria's foreign policy (Asobie, 1990:4).

A frequent commentator on Nigeria's foreign policy, Shaw, has classified writings and writers on the subject into two broad categories: the super-structural perspective and the sub-structural perspective. With the super-structural perspective, he identifies two models of analyses: the dominant 'realist' position and the minority 'idealist' response. The 'prevailing super-structural perspective' is, according to Shaw, characterized by the following features. First, its focus is on regime changes as a "framework" for "explaining" changes in foreign policy orientation; and its method has been 'chronological'. As Shaw (1983:395) puts it, 'the prevailing super-structural perspective on Nigeria's (foreign) relations is ... a periodization of its degree of assertiveness and afro-centricity according to regime changes'. Secondly, the super-structural perspective dwells on 'the constraints of (Nigeria's) national effectiveness and influence on the identification of the limitations to Nigeria's effective role in West Africa, and the world'. In other words, it is concerned with role analysis. And that discussion

about Nigeria's role is cast largely in term of 'scope of the national interest' (Shaw, 1983:298). The point is not to explain the nature and bases of Nigeria's national interest but to delineate its scope. Third, the central problematic being addressed by the super-structural perspective is Nigeria's relative power or capabilities. The central question asked is: where does Nigeria exert power and under what conditions and guises? Generally, Nigeria is, from this perspective seen as a middle power which has little influence at the global level, much influence in Africa, and mediates between Africa and the world (Shaw, 1983).

Unlike the super-structural perspective, the sub-structural or radical perspective views Nigeria not as 'Africa's great power' which mediates between Africa and the world. Rather, the sub-structural perspective sees Nigeria as an intermediary between 'centre' and 'periphery', that is, as part of the semi-periphery. And rather than focus on the relative power or national capabilities of Nigeria, it looks at the character of Nigeria's political economy. It proceeds from the assumption that the Nigerian economy is controlled by a coalition, a 'triple alliance', composed of international capital, local (private) capital and state capital, with the first ally, 'transnational capita', occupying a dominant position. It holds that this stricture of Nigeria's political economy has far-reaching implications for Nigeria's foreign policy. In other words, the sub-structural or radical perspective is distinguished by its emphasis on the nature of the Nigerian class structure and its impact on both class struggles in Nigeria (i.e. domestic politics) and Nigeria's foreign policy. This is also concerned with explaining the nature and bases of Nigeria's national interest, not in delineating its scope (Shaw, 1983:398-399).

Another frequent writer on Nigeria's foreign policy, Nweke, has attempted to provide an alternative taxonomy of studies on Nigeria's foreign policy. In doing so, he sought to remedy some of the deficiencies in the classification provided by Shaw. Nweke describes Shaw's classification as 'inappropriate and misleading', arguing that Shaw's taxonomy 'not only fails to fit the writings of these authors into their common nationalist descriptive approach to foreign policy, but also seems to gloss over the core antithesis between 'realist' and idealism' as foreign policy theories and phraseology (sic) (Olusanya, et al, 1988:40). Nweke then proceeds to offer a new classification. He identifies four classes or categories of theories which have informed writings or studies on Nigerian foreign policy. These are: first, the 'behavioural theory' found in the early work of David MacDonald Gray (1965); second, the 'decision making model' which formed the basis of the analysis of Nigeria's foreign policy by Asobie (1977 and 1980); third, 'strategic and defence theories' which are to be seen in the

works of Vogt (1986), Akinyemi (1986), Gambari (work not specified), Nweke (1985); and fourth, utopian and realist theories, dimly discernible, in the works of Aluko and the 'Ife school' of international relations, as well as Akinyemi's 'numerous writings' (Olusanya, *et al* 1988: 46-47). Nweke (1986) has pointed out that a thread that runs through all of these studies is the shortcomings. One of them was the issue of preference given to institutional forces with less consideration given to the impacts of socio-economic structure and social classes.

However, Nigeria's foreign policy has generated a lot of discourse in recent time. This is because of the serious attention and commitment Nigeria has engaged herself in tackling intractable conflicts and issues on the continent of Africa and the world at large. The foundation of this was rooted on the principle of Africa as the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy, which has been in practice since independence and was only solidified during the Murtala-Obasanjo regime. The concept, which was spelt out in the Adedeji Report on Nigeria's Foreign Policy, attempts to refocus the architecture of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence. It is believed that Nigeria's foreign policy had no focus, but was only pursued on the maniac quest for liberating Africa from colonial rule in a poorly articulated manner. The Murtala-Obasanjo military administration pursued the principle with vigour in the 1970s. This principle ran up to the early 1980s during the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. However, when the military junta led by Major-General Muhammadu Buhari took over power on the 31st December, 1983 it dismissed Shagari's administration and became less enthusiastic in formulating and pursuing foreign policy on the basis of Africa as a centre piece of Nigerian foreign policy (Yoroms, 2004:301).

According to Saliu (2010:188) Nigeria's foreign policy, in the last forty-nine years, has revealed certain signposts which must be understood to properly appreciate the twists and turns of the foreign policy. At independence, the country subscribed to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Nigeria as a matter of principle would always accord recognition to this principle in conducting her inter-state relations. This principle became attractive to the Nigerian state at independence apparently because of the prospects it held for safeguarding the country's independence. This is because interference in the affairs of Nigeria by the big states in the international system at the time of her independence could make her hard-won independence to be meaningless. At another level, the need to allay the fears of the country's neighbours which were then being afraid of Nigeria's size was a major consideration in the adoption of the principle. Till date, Nigeria has somewhat lived by this principle. Despite the provocations, she did not attack Cameroon

and other neighbouring countries which had indeed taken aggressive steps against her. However, the military type of involvements in Liberia, Chad and Sierra-Leone negated Nigeria's long-standing principle of non-interference. Some analysts have tended to endorse the actions of the country, citing the dubious legal frameworks that had compelled the military engagements.

Accordingly, Africa has been variously described as cornerstone or centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy. Africa remains an important issue in Nigeria's foreign policy and implementation. Akinyemi (1970) conducted a dissection examination of the nature and character of the administrative structure in the foreign policy process when subjected to other 'pressures' of domestic variables, particularly political parties and attitudes of political elites. As argued by Akinyemi, if Nigeria is to have any meaningful role to play in the world, six complementary conditions must exist simultaneously:

- A stable Nigeria;
- A prosperous Nigeria, that is, an industrialized and agriculturally surplus Nigeria;
- A secure Nigeria;
- A politically stable West Africa and Africa;
- An economically prosperous West Africa and Africa; and
- A secure West Africa and Africa (Akinterinwa, 2012:12).

In other words, Akinyemi has identified a sort of umbilical cord between Nigeria and West Africa, on the one hand, and between Nigeria and Africa on the other. The umbilical cord or the linkage is explained by three pillars on which foreign policy can be strongly built: political stability, economic prosperity, and security of the polity, all of which must exist, not only in Nigeria but also in the whole of Africa (Akinyemi, 2009:16). But perhaps most importantly, Akinyemi wants to inform that:

- - - until Nigeria becomes an industrialized and agriculturally surplus nation, a solid foundation for an active foreign policy cannot be laid. To that extent, policies designed to step up industrialization is dependent on the use of our own raw materials and should be seen as furthering Nigeria's national interest (Akinyemi, 2009:10).

Aluko (1976) on his part embarked on the imperative to resolve the impact of colonial heritage and the formative experience of the leadership. Other studies have focused on the evolution of Nigerian foreign policy by demonstrating how 'internal pressures' both administrative structure and of the society as well as organisations really affect foreign policy

formulation. Aluko (1981) analyzes Nigeria's foreign policy under three main parts, namely: (i) policy towards her immediate neighbours, (ii) general African policy and (iii) the policy of non-alignment. He, however, points out that since independence, the three main component parts have undergone some changes, though some elements of continuity have persisted in certain aspects. Besides, he grouped the major factors influencing (or affecting) Nigeria's foreign policy into four namely: colonial legacy, machinery for policy formulation, the Nigerian civil war and the Nigerian economy. According to him, Nigeria's policy towards her immediate neighbours has since independence, been based largely on four major principles:

- (i) The sovereign equality of all African states
- (ii) Respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every African state.
- (iii) The commitment of functional co-operation as a means of promoting African Unity and economic development and
- (iv) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other African states (Aluko, 1981).

Concerning item (iv) listed above, Nigeria has interfered in the internal affairs of Liberia (1989-1997) and Sierra-Leone (May 1997 to February 1999). The federal government however, has justified Nigeria's intervention in both countries on grounds of national interest and political stability in West-African sub-region.

From a broader perspective, Ogwu (1986:31) examines among other things, Nigeria's domestic environment, that is, domestic factors influencing Nigeria's foreign policy, and these include political factors, the constitution, bureaucracy, economic variables, military consideration, interest (or pressure) groups and idiosyncratic factors. Apart from domestic factors, Ogwu focuses on Nigeria's external relations, Nigeria's extra-African multilateral relations and Nigeria's relations with the great powers. In discussing economic factors, Ogwu asserted that two major factors affect the capability of a state to pursue its foreign policy goals and they include (i) the ability of its productive forces and (ii) the degree of external dependence of the economy. In Ogwu's view, the sudden change in world economic conditions occasioned by the enormous increase in oil prices in the early 1970's went a long way in giving Nigeria a new kind of independence. In her words: "The improved state of Nigeria's economy bestowed on it a leverage which it did not possess in the first decade of independence. More significantly, perhaps was the government's ability to determine its own policies independent of external influences" (Ogwu, 1986:33).

Again, in an article titled: 'Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy: The Nigerian Experience, 1960-1975', Asobie (1980) attempts to apply the bureaucratic politics model as developed by Halperin in the analysis of the impact of the bureaucratic structure and intra-bureaucratic rivalry on Nigeria's foreign policy process and output. Gambari (1980) has also argued that the domestic political structure and process are of great impact on the nature and character of Nigerian foreign policy because they serve as the channel for internalization of the international environment and events, thus making them intelligible and of value to the participants in domestic political roles. But, from a very critical point of view, Gambari (1986:74) highlighted the major concepts in Nigerian foreign policy and these include: national consensus, dynamism in foreign policy, Africa as the centre-piece of Nigerian foreign policy, Nigeria's economy and Nigeria's national security. These concepts/terms are vague; poorly articulated and lacking vigour as well as direction. Besides, in their co-edited book, Olusanya and Akindele (1990) enumerate the component parts of Nigeria's national interest as follows:

- (a) The defence of the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity,
- (b) The restoration of human dignity to black men and women all over the world, particularly the eradication of colonialism and white minority rule from the face of Africa,
- (c) The creation of the relevant political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which will not only facilitate the preservation of the territorial integrity and security of all African countries but also foster national self-reliance of African countries,
- (d) The promotion and improvement of the economic well-being of Nigerian citizens and
- (e) The promotion of world peace and justice.

Idang (1966) provides an insightful analysis of Balewa's foreign policy while Garba (1977) focuses on Nigeria's foreign policy under the military government of General Olusegun Obasanjo. Unlike Garba, Gambari (1979) investigates the interplay of domestic issues and foreign policy-making in Nigeria from independence to the end of the civil war in January, 1970. While Ogunbadejo (1976) assesses Nigerian relations with the Western powers, the Soviet Union (now Russia) and China. He also reviews the new non-alignment policy. Sesay and Owoeye (1993) focuses on issue areas such as the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recruitment to the Foreign Service, posting of Foreign Service Officers, their

promotion, discipline and morale during the Second Republic (October 1, 1979 – December 31, 1983). In addition, they discussed intelligently on Nigeria's foreign missions and conference diplomacy, funding of foreign missions and conclude that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already been politicized and that politics would always impinge on appointments, promotion and discipline in Nigeria's Foreign Service, especially at the middle and higher echelons and its parent body – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In clear terms, Nigeria's foreign policy makers, after the end of the cold war, have disappointed many Nigerians rather than meeting their expectations. Virtually on a daily basis, Nigerians in other countries are being exposed to danger with the country's foreign policy officials keeping mum without appreciable response to their neglects. This development, however, calls for a sober reflection. By the standard of other countries, the rights of all citizens should be protected irrespective of the offences of its nationals in other countries, the foreign policy of a country must protect the rights of its citizens under threat. America can and is still prepared to go to war over the rights of its citizens that may have been violated by other countries. Nigerian foreign policy, especially judging by current happenings, has not been adequate in responding to distress calls of Nigerians living outside the country. In most cases, the response is often belated (Saliu, 2010: 187-188).

The crux of the matter is that, there is no concrete understanding and approach to Nigeria's foreign policy. Each regime comes with what it deems best and administrable. What Nigeria has been experiencing are alternating and constantly changing foreign policy. It can therefore be said that this can be largely described crisis decision rather than being a dynamic, programmed policy. As Otubanjo clearly noted: This change in the scope of Nigeria's relations with the world was, to be sure, a matter of circumstance rather than of will. It was not the result of any calculated decision or deliberate act of the Nigerian government. Rather, Nigeria was lucky to be at the confluence of events in the international system (Otubanjo, 1989).

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CHAPTER THREE

NIGERIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

3.1 NIGERIA: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The name Nigeria was a 20th century coinage but the Nigerian culture area was home for state systems, some of which have pre-dated the modern Nigerian state by century. In fact, no part of Nigeria, or a community in Nigeria of some size, that had not experienced organized governance for at least 100 years before the imposition of colonialism on Nigeria at the beginning of the 20th century. These systems, some of them few thousands in population size, but many of them hundreds of thousands, if not millions, had learnt to live under common hegemony, even if “tribe and tongue” can differ (Tijani, 2010 : 192). For instance, it is with this reality in mind that Graff had said:

--- the territory of present Nigeria was defined, not, on the basis of its peoples shared historical, economic or social experienced, but merely by arbitrary amalgamation of number of disparate ethno cultural units which happened to occupy contiguous land areas that were then under British colonial administration (Quoted by Badru :4).

Nigeria is well endowed with immense diversity. There are well over 400 ethnic groups in the country with different social, economic and political backgrounds. An examination of the historical development of these groups, however, reveals that despite these differences, the people of what later became Nigeria shared a lot of things in common before the advent of life of Nigerian people. One of such similarities was the system of political administration among them. Scholars have observed two main distinct system of administration in the Nigerian area during the pre-colonial period. These are the identified as centralized and non-centralised political systems (Falola, *et al.*1993).

However, in modern Nigeria, as a state, wholly a British product, no single person played a greater part in deciding the form of its unity than Frederick Lugard. He it was who wedged together and amalgamated the disparate people to forge a new country called Nigeria. Amalgamation ordinarily is a dry word but, as planned and carried out by him, it became an all-embracing design incised upon the region with a deep-cut mark of his personality with its limitations as well as its merits. But these words ‘Nigeria’, ‘Unity’ and ‘Federation’ may make us forget how the name Nigeria came about. Here comes the name Flora Shaw by whose remarkable resourcefulness the name ‘Nigeria’ came into being. What should the new

protectorate, made up of three regions, be called? It is on record that Frederick Lugard had wanted the appellation 'Niger Sudan', but that suggestion was rejected on the basis of the fact that the name 'Sudan' will lead to confusing the area with French territory and with Nile Basin. The answer, however, came on 8 January 1897 from the colonial correspondent of the times, a young lady named Flora Shaw. In her leading article titled 'What is in a name', she argued convincingly that of all the various names being used for the area, 'Nigeria' was the most suitable. Although, Lord Scarbrough chaffed Flora Shaw about her choice of the name, she prevailed, probably due to her dalliance with Lord Lugard, whom she married in 1902. It was in the letter of appointment of Frederick Lugard, that the name 'Nigeria' appears to have been first officially used by the Crown (Ajayi; 2009:1).

Previously administered by the Royal Niger Company, the Charter of the Royal Niger Company was revoked in 1899 and all the territory which it had administered was taken over by the Crown. This led to the division of the territory known as Nigeria into three distinct entities, the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos, the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, each administered by an administrator who was directly responsible to the United Kingdom. However, in 1906, the administrator of the protectorate of Southern Nigeria became, in addition, the administrator of Lagos (Price, 1968: 26). That same year, the Colony of Lagos was merged with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria under the name, Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. This left the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria intact until January 1914 when Lord Lugard amalgamated the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria into what was henceforth called the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Lord Lugard himself became the first Governor of the Protectorate (Akpan, 2003:39). Thus, Nigeria had been administered as one political entity since 1914.

Following the spate of nationalist agitations spearheaded by the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), National Council for Nigeria and Cameroon, the Action Group, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and other nationalist groups, the British colonial power was compelled to grant independence to the territory on October 1, 1960 (Balewa, 2007:15-16). Though, it is often taunted that the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates by Lord Frederick Lugard was a mistake or a grand error of a sort which needs to be revisited (Oladesu, 2002:14). This is because the 1914 amalgamation generated suspicion and distrust particularly between southerners and northerners. As much as it is really not correct to talk about Southerners or Northerners in Nigeria, the colonial authorities

helped to institutionalize separate bureaucracies that made it possible for them to adopt different official languages for the amalgamating units. However, within southern Nigeria, there are various ethnic nationalities with divergent cultures, history and customs. The same is also true of Northern Nigeria. But with Lugard's project of unifying Nigeria, the North which through the Jihad of 1804 had large administrative units with strong Islamic bias, was forced to move out at the same pace with the South which had considerable dosage of Western education through the missionaries.

Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the first Premier of the Western Region and a front runner in the struggle for Nigeria's independence, had expressed his reservation about the name Nigeria in 1947 that:

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no 'Nigerians' in the same sense as there are English 'Welsh' or 'French'. The word 'Nigerian' is merely a destructive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.

In the same vein, in 1948, Sir Tafawa Balewa, the First Prime Minister of Nigeria at independence did not hide his views on the amalgamation project. He asserted that:

Since 1914, the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their background, their religious belief and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite...Nigeria is only a British intention for the country(West African Review, 1948: 320).

To corroborate this assertion, the Nigerian Press which had its origin in Abeokuta with heavy presence in Lagos did not spare Lugard. In a document titled: "Lugard and the Amalgamation of Nigeria" compiled by A.H.M Kirk – Greene, the apprehension of Southerners was apparent. *The Times* of Nigeria bluntly alleged that the unification project had a 'hidden meaning' and that it was synonymous with a sell out of the South whereby Southern Nigeria will be conquered and subjugated by Northern Nigeria (Kirk-Greene, 1986:24).

Amazingly, even the Northerners accused of being the beneficiaries of the amalgamation, were not at home with Lugard's assignment of unification. In 1953, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the first Premier of Northern Region and one who bestrode the region like a colossus led other Northerners to Ibadan for a conference on composition of Legislative House where he demanded that unless representation from the North was equal to that from the South (Western and Eastern Regions) the North would pull out of Nigeria. In his words 'The mistake of 1914 has come to light' (1962:133).

The British Colonial authorities were either deliberately insensitive to these potent dangers in the amalgamation project or they were completely guided by economic advantages accruable to Britain from this exercise. To underscore the importance attached to it, Sir Frederick Lugard had to be redeployed from Hong Kong where he served as High Commissioner because in Britain's opinion he was best suited for the assignment. He was further granted concession to stay in London three months out of every twelve calendar months, if he accepted the offer, provided he attended to mails sent from Nigeria. Ironically, while colonial Government and European authors gave credit to Lugard for a job well done, the Nigerians (North and South) lampooned him as a huge failure. When Reuters Cable was received in early 1919 announcing Lugard's decision to retire, *The Weekly Record* wrote him off as a failure saying his only achievement was to have transformed a model colony into a hot bed of disaffection (Kirk-Greene, 1968:24).

The disaffection was not limited to Northern and Southern Nigeria. Within each half, there existed (or still exists) considerable disunity and distrust. The term "minorities" refer to other ethnic nationalities whose dreams in almost all cases were different from those who call themselves majorities. The minorities were always at the constant threat of victimization and oppression. To guide against this, before Nigeria's independence, a four man commission of inquiry headed by Sir Henry Willink, a former British Cabinet Minister was appointed "to ascertain the facts about the fears of the minorities in any part of Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears whether well or ill founded" in 1957. The Commission recommended the entrenchment of constitutional safeguards in the constitution for the protection of the minorities (Report, 1958). The fears of the minorities had since been proved to be well founded with little hope of a remedy. Pre-independence political parties and up till the second attempt at democracy, were formed along very strong ethnic lines with negligible ideological agreement among the members of the same party. Where ethnicity was not the basis, then the fear of domination formed the kernel for party formation.

Effectively therefore, even at birth in 1914, Nigeria inherited the viruses of discontentment, mutual suspicion, ethnic bigotry and lack of uniform ideals for nation building (Kennedy, 2004). The problems that often ignite the prevalent and persistent crises often range from the real to the superficial, depending on the ethnic divide one belongs to. But as a matter of fact, issues that boarder on marginalization, resource control and allocation, religious and ethnic sentiments, political rivalry and domination, misrule or abuse of power have always had violent consequences of cataclysmic proportions (Adedimeji, 2005:121).

By and large, Nigeria was granted full independence on October 1, 1960 under a constitution that provided for a parliamentary administration with substantial measures of self-government for the country's three regions. From 1959 to 1960, Jaja Wachuku as the first black Speaker of the Nigerian Parliament (also called House of Representatives), replaced Sir Fredrick Metcalfe of Great Britain. Notably, as first Speaker of the House, Jaja Wachuku received Nigeria's instrument of independence (also known as Freedom Charter), on October 1, 1960 from Princess Alexandra of Kent, Her Royal Majesty – The Queen of United Kingdom's representative at the Nigerian Independence ceremonies (Ohwofasa, 2007:15).

3.2 NIGERIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Any meaningful attempt to examine Nigeria's foreign relations must necessarily begin with an analysis and understanding of Nigerian situation within the context of the international system. In the International system such an analysis, however brief, should help us locate some of the major problems that have bedevilled and frustrated Nigeria's development in their proper context since the attainment of political Independence in October 1, 1960. Some writers and scholars such as John Okumu and Dennis Austin assert bluntly that the foreign relations of any African State are a function of its colonial heritage and history (Aluko, 1977: 7). To a considerable extent, this view is correct. When independence was granted to Nigeria on October 1, 1960, the British left behind them a number of tangible and intangible links that have continued to have profound influence on the country's external behavior (Adeyemo, 2002: 68). Although the principalities and political entities that constitute today's Nigeria were brought together in various phrases by the British between 1886 and 1914. They did not assume the control of their external relations until when the country gained her political independence in 1960 (Akinyeye, 2003:116).

Nigeria is large in territory, has the largest population in Africa and blessed with enormous human and natural resources. There are a lot of scholarly works on Nigeria's external diplomacy in general, and more importantly, on the country's role in international Institutions. This is understandable as successive regimes in the country continue to attach overbearing importance to multilateralism by seeking prompt membership of and visible involvement in International Institutions of varying scope, membership, legal framework and interests. More often than not, Nigeria continues to strive, with qualified successes, to use its membership of the UN family, the Commonwealth, IMF, IBRD, OPEC and regional-based AU and ECOWAS, among others, to attain its foreign policy goals and objectives in the international

arena (Owoeye, 1993:11).

Foreign relations refers to the policies, actions and interactions between one nation and another; usually winged on foreign policies, diplomatic service, trade, sports and others. Nigeria had struggled as an entity under British rule to become independent. The struggle for and process of becoming independent were replete with patriotism and a strong desire for sovereignty. While Nigeria was under British rule, Britain had the imperial power to conduct Nigeria's external relations under the auspices of the British Foreign Office. Britain proposed that Nigeria should maintain the closest relations with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth nations after independence. Britain took further steps to practical diplomacy by attaching Nigerians to the British Foreign Office in London and sending others to leading British universities for training. Apart from this, some other selected Nigerians were posted to British Missions in other capitals for the purpose of practical training (Zimako, 2009:181).

Before Nigerian's independence, the Governor-General of Nigeria and his Chief Secretary specifically had overall responsibility for Nigeria's external relations. The principal pre-independence overseas missions were London, Washington, Khartoum, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. In 1956, however, the first government policy on the training of diplomats was published. As it turned out, the government was determined to hold down its financial investment in the training of diplomats and to utilize fully the facilities provided by Britain and the Commonwealth in any future conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy (Zimako, 2009:182). Shortly before Nigeria's independence in October 1960, the country's leaders began to design a framework to guide the conduct of the external relations of the newly-emerging state. The outcome of the efforts ultimately became the foundation of Nigerian foreign policy (Aworawo, 2003:386).

Out of the shadow of British rule or colonialism which lasted for a period of about one hundred years (1861-1960), Nigeria which attained independence in 1960 became an independent and a sovereign state within the international system (Adeyemo, 2002:1). Born into an already complex and interdependent international system, Nigeria had no option than to fashion out her own appropriate foreign policy that would guide her interactions with other actors within the international system and promote her interests accordingly. This was necessarily relevant for her foreign policy to adjust in context and in tune with prevailing realities within the international system (Njoku, *et al* 1996:56-57).

Nigeria's attainment of political independence as a sovereign nation in 1960 conferred on her

the authority and right to chart a course in independent external relations. The country had the capacity to define her own foreign policy, and in view of the circumstances prevalent at the time, her rising population and concern for Africa, she formulated an Africa-centred policy. Since independence, therefore, Nigeria's guiding principle in her external relations is focused on an enduring African unity and the pursuit of peace (Zimako, 2009:120-121). This has been emphasised by successive governments in Nigeria. Nigeria's Pan-Africanist posture was at its height during the leadership of Murtala/Obasanjo, considered as Nigeria's most purposeful and dynamic foreign policy era (Moyosore, 1990:35).

However, with to regards foreign relations, the pillars of the foreign policy statement given to the House of Representatives on 20th August, 1960 by Alhaji (Sir) Abubakar Tafawa Balewa categorically stated thus:

.....very particular attention will be devoted to adopting clean and practical policies as regards Africa. It will be our aim to assist any African country to find a solution to its problems and to foster the growth of a common understanding among all the nations and especially among the new nations of the continent. We are determined to encourage the development of common ties between all states. The difficulties which will comfort us in promoting the friendly association of independent countries in Africa are fully appreciated but we believe that they can be overcome if a start is made by emphasising and building upon the cultural and economic links which already exist" (Chibundu, 2009:85).

This statement was further developed in a speech made during the 16th regular session of the United Nations General Assembly by late Hon. (Dr.) Jaja Wachukwu, the then Minister of Foreign and Commonwealth Relations on 10th October, 1961, thus:

Our Foreign Policy is based on three basic pillars: the concept that Nigeria is in Africa, and therefore it is so completely involved in anything that pertains to the continent, that it cannot be neutral and must never be considered as a neutralist country. I say this because there have been misnomers and misrepresentations, and countries have been called neutralists. Nigeria is not a neutralist country. We are independent in everything but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of Africa. The moment Africa is affected, we are involved. We want to make this absolutely clear, Nigeria finds itself involved in anything affecting the African Continent anywhere in any square inch of African territory-we are involved. We cannot be neutral, so that neutralization used in a broad sense, should exclude our country when it comes to African affairs. And being a member of the African community and feeling ourselves completely bound to its destiny and accepting our involvement in everything that pertains to it, obviously all questions pertaining to Africa must be considered as questions pertaining to Nigeria. The peace of Africa is the peace

of Nigeria. Its tribulations are our tribulations and we cannot be indifferent to its future (Chibundu, 2009:86).

Therefore, it is quite apparent why Africa has been projected as the centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy in her foreign relations since independence. In spite of the basic constraints and limitations of its socio-economic and political system, Nigeria at independence assumed the profile of an active participant in the international system. Fuelled by African nationalism, Nigeria's diplomacy and participation in numerous international organizations was in turn heavily conditioned by a desire to ascending to a better position in the international arena, to further its own interests and larger African interests. Although Nigeria may have had an exaggeration of its national capabilities, it was still able to use its self-perception to project itself as a candidate for prominent world status and to advance its interests. Because of its size and population of over a quarter of Africa, its rich natural resources and economic potential, it was considerably easy for Nigeria to thrust itself into a prestigious position and be accepted as a rising power in the multilateral sphere. Indeed, aspirations and views of itself was made by the then Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa in January 1960 when he affirmed that: "Nigeria will have a wonderful opportunity to speak for the continent of Africa" (Ogwu, 1986:101).

Given its perception of its leadership role, Nigeria attempted to assist itself politically by giving a considerable degree of attention to multilateral diplomacy. The major interest areas were the United Nations and its specialised agencies, the Non-aligned Movement and the Commonwealth. With regard to its political objectives, Nigeria sought to utilize multilateral for to advance the goals of pan-Africanism, concern for black people, decolonization and elimination of apartheid. Again, a scanning of the speeches of Nigerian leaders reveals Nigeria's early attempts to use a multilateral forum (the Commonwealth for example) to effect the withdrawal of South Africa from the association. Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that Nigeria played a key role in ousting South Africa from the Commonwealth. Nigeria's active participation in multilateral organizations heightened both the international deference to Nigeria and its traditional aspiration and self-perception as a major international actor. Relative to most developing nations in both Africa and Latin America, Nigeria has been successful in the political and to a lesser extent, the economic realm and appears to utilize its successes as an instrument of influence in its multilateral and bilateral relations (Ogwu, 1986:102).

In spite of the basic constraints and limitations of its socio-economic and political system,

Nigeria at independence assumed the profile of an active participant in the international system. Fuelled by African nationalism, Nigeria's diplomacy and participation in numerous international organizations was in turn heavily conditioned by a desire to achieve ascendancy to a better position in the international arena. Although Nigeria may have had an exaggeration of its national capabilities, it was still able to use it. However, at Independence, Nigeria found herself in a conflictual and hostile nature of International environment. Specifically, it was during the intense hostility between the two contending world power - the United States of America and the disintegrated USSR- that she attained her independence. Thus, during this particular period, what followed the attainment of independence was a quest for development. With this yearning and aspirations' Nigeria started to identify her position in the International system. Significantly, what most determined the position of Nigeria in the International system was the fact that, Nigeria is a product of colonialism, and colonialism is said to be an institution used-by the western imperialist to institute and consolidate capitalism. And because of the bitter experience of colonialism, Nigeria decided then, to maintain a position of neutrality, that is, not to align to any power bloc. Despite this, with the intense' competition between the two blocs (i.e. USA and former USSR) Nigeria was said to be manipulated. But then, in order to be neutral and to forcefully pursue a policy which is neither pro-West nor pro-Eas. Nigeria adopted a mixed-economy system. Ironically, the economic nature of Nigerians were essentially situated on capitalism, and political system also quite well suggested capitalistic in nature because it was an attempt to consolidate capitalism. However, Nigeria projected in her foreign policy to have maintained a neutral position between the conflicting blocs in the International system. Much later, the issue of 'Non-Alignment policy' gained the hall-mark in the third world countries, which clearly defined the position of the third world as being neutral in the cold war between the USA and the former USSR.

Apparently, the international system has gradually and finally undergone 'the radical and tremendous changes the world has waited for since the fall of the Soviet Union, and specifically the collapse of socialist bloc. With this occurrence, capitalism gains primacy in the world politics. Thus, the interest of capital is essentially protected throughout the world. To consolidate it, there must be an agitation for democratic set up, hence, it has become the order of the day for championing democracy, particularly by the custodian of the New World Order - USA, under the auspices of the United Nations. Therefore with this fundamental development in the International system, the system shifted from bipolar to' unipolar.

Profoundly, unipolar system specifically, intend to incorporate' the whole world into International capitalist network and to further consolidate it. By this, any country that resists this must definitely incur the wrath of United States, and face the severe consequences. Undoubtedly, this is presently the reality in. the whole world, to protect the interest of capitalism is now order of the day' in the international system.

All present, the unique problem of Nigeria in the International system, which the new world order poses for the country's political economy does not derive from the fact of its existence. After all, the new world order is the sinews of International economic and political relations. The problem is two-fold that is, the dependency nature of Nigerian economy and the degree of dominance of the economy by multi-national corporations. Nowadays, at present democratic government has found itself in a situation that was hardly experienced by earlier administration. Its attention is as such focused on, more unfriendly, the pressure that has set, credit has to be given to the administration for its doggedness in understanding the various attempts to isolate it by international community and perhaps because of this, it has not been able to pursue a foreign policy free from the deficiencies of the past (The Triumph, Tuesday, October 1, 1996:13). Strictly speaking, Nigeria with the changes in pattern of international system to unipolarity, under the guardianship of the United States, is still confronted with an International environment hardly conducive to the pursuit of her interest. This is because, the emergent new world order in the International system is not structured to favour any under-developed countries which Nigeria is among. With this, Nigeria is still at the crossroads in world history. Despite her being endowed with abundant human and natural resources, the expectation is nothing but rather to adjust to the dictate of Western capitalist interest in tune with the trend of globalization.

Pathetically however, Nigeria sometimes suffers humiliation and ridicule within the international system which divided in part from the crisis of leadership and legitimacy plaguing the Nigerian state itself. This is largely typified in the inability of the country to deliver security and provide requisite infrastructural facilities and social services to its citizens as a result of whom large number of Nigerians have emigrated or are emigrating out of the country to seek greener pastures abroad. Now and then, a number of these emigrants are caught on the wrong side of the law and they end up giving the country a very bad name and image. It is rather unfortunate that no matter how hard the country may try to launder its image, the negative impact of the criminal activities of this small number of miscreants continue to manifest itself in many shapes with a cumulative debilitating effect on foreign

policy engagements, as Nigeria is perceived as a country of criminals and fraudsters (Eyinla, 2012:102).

Thus, Nigeria's relations with other actors in the international system, as well as its strategy in defence and security, have been profoundly affected by the country's national interests. The issue of what constitutes a matter of intense disagreement among scholars and decision makers alike. Nevertheless, the framework provided by Aluko (1981), Olusanya and Akindele (1986), and Nweke (1986), gives a fairly adequate guideline on aspects that seem to be beyond argument in Nigeria's national interest. Aluko lists three issues which he refers to as "*vital*" elements of Nigeria's national interest. These are self-preservation of the country; the defence and maintenance of the country's independence; and the economic and social well-being of the people. In addition to these are other issues which Aluko describes as not constituting "*core*" or "*vital*" interest. These are: defence, preservation and promotion of the ways of life of Nigeria, especially standing in the comity of the nations, especially in Africa; and the promotion of the world peace (Aluko, 1981:265).

According to Olusanya and Akindele (1982:2), Nigeria's national interests are: (i) the defence of the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, (ii) the restoration of human dignity to black men and women all over the world, (iii) the creation of the relevant political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world, (iv) the promotion and improvement of the economic well-being of the Nigerian citizens and (v) the promotion of world peace and justice.

3.3 NIGERIA: BACKGROUND TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Before the British arrival and occupation of Nigeria, the area as a whole did not have a common political leader. Even at independence in 1960, Nigeria did not start its political history from a void. It had already had six years experience as a federal state, this witnessing the practice of self-government with the existence of political parties in the regions. With 68 million of hectares of arable land, 960 kilometres of coastline, rich ecological diversity, abundance of mineral resources, vast natural gas and petroleum resources, and a population of 140million, Nigeria's potential in international affairs is generally acknowledged (Zimako, 2009:117).The idea of democracy is not new to Nigeria. The African experience reveals a tendency towards democratic order – democracy not so much in terms of selecting or electing leaders, but in the sense of communal accountability. This dates back to the pre-colonial era.

The evolution of the Nigerian state and of democracy therein has gone through certain historical phases. The major phases include: one, the pre-colonial period; two, the imposition and aftermath of British colonialism; three, the period of alternation of civil and military rule in the post-independence period from 1960 to 1999; and four, the period of the Fourth Republic since May 1999 (IDEA, 2001:4). The Nigerian experience demonstrates that countries cannot take democracy for granted. Only through vigilant struggles can a country secure, anchor and deepen democracy.

The emergence of a political entity called Nigeria on 1st October, 1960 was as a result of a series of both domestic and international historical developments and processes (Abia, V, 2002:15). When Nigeria became independent after nearly a century of colonial rule, she inherited the Westminster parliamentary system of government from Britain. After independence in 1960, there was a spirited effort by the new Government to fulfil the social compact forged during the national mobilization against civilian rule. Of course, politics in Nigeria started with the first ever Federal elections which were held in 1954, during which the Northern People's Congress (NPC) won in the Northern Region, capturing eighty-four out of ninety-two seats allocated to the region. In the Western region, the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) won twenty-three seats against Action Group's (AG), eighteen and the Commoners liberal party won one seat. In the Eastern Region, NCNC won thirty seats and the AG in alliance with United National Independent Party (UNIP) won seven seats and the others five seats. During the 1959 federal elections, three political parties, namely the AG, NCNC and NPC dominated the political scene, each of which drew its main support from one of the constituent regions of the country. The AG was associated with the West, the NCNC with the East and the NPC with the North. As a result, the voting pattern that emerged was tribal or ethnic or regional although both AG and NCNC made considerable effort through alliances to win seats outside their main bases. Altogether, over twenty political parties, tribal all Union and independent candidates contested the 1959 federal elections (Weekly Trust, 2003:7).

Two big political alliances contested the 1964 Federal elections. These were the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) made up of the NCNC and AG with splinter groups from the North, the Northern Progressive Front. The UPGA was led by Dr M. I. Okpara premier of the Eastern Region. The Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) on the other hand was made up of the NNDP, which had been formed by the same dissidents of the AG, and the NPC led by Sardauna of Sokoto, Premier of Northern Nigeria. Stripped of their ideological

Pretences, the formation of the alliances set the stage for a political battle between the North and South, making the campaign for the 1964 elections bitter and violent. The campaigns for the election were characterized in all the regions with thuggery, violence, arrests and imprisonment of political opponents by agencies of regional government and denial of permits to hold public meetings or processions. Other negative acts were the placing of obstacles against assembly, expression of the free speech and conduct of violence, free election campaign and canvassing for votes (Weekly Trust. 2003:7).

Thereafter, the offices of the Federal Electoral Commission, as well as that of the Ceremonial President of Nigeria, were flooded with catalogues of complaints of harassment, citing medication, violence, etc. against political opponents. Nonetheless, the commission went ahead and fixed December 30 1964 as the date of the poll. Nominations of candidates closed on December, 19 1964 and by that time, it had become known that 66 NNA and 15 UPGA candidates had been returned unopposed created by no contests in 81 federal consistencies out of 312. The large number of candidates returned served acted as an alarm signed to UPGA leaders of their impending electoral defeat. On their part, it was felt that the 'irregularities' that produced such 'victories' provided sufficient and valid reason for the postponement or boycott of the election. The Prime Minister Alhaji (Sir) Abubakar Tafawa Balewa could not agree with the President, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe on this point and ordered that the elections should proceed on December 30 as planned. Two members of the Federal Electoral Commission representing the East and Mid-West Region resigned their appointment. Voting was not countrywide. In the East, the boycott of the election was total and nearly so in Lagos, but voting was done in some parts of the Western Region and the Mid-West Region. In the North, voting went ahead, the only evident of boycott being in two Northern progressive fronts strongholds: Kano and Jos (Weekly Trust. 2003:7).

However, in the ethnic and regionally – based power politics that developed, the First Republic sank into a spiral of violence, vote-rigging, nepotism, corruption and mismanagement. Barely two years into the First Republic, these different problems arose, some of which became intractable and developed into deep crises. The escalation of these problems and the emergence of new ones from 1964 which the governments at different levels failed to tackle decisively and resolve, eventually led to the termination of the First Republic by a military coup on 15 January 1966. Indeed, the coup of January 1966 and the counter-coup that took place in July of that year reflected the deep-seated political turmoil that had gripped the Government of Lieutenant General Yakubu Gowon who was

immediately confronted with the urgent problem of finding a solution to the question of national unity and the need to return to civilian rule. But an aftermath by the Eastern Region to secede from the federation, following the systematic killing of Ibos (Igbo) in Northern Nigeria, led to the Civil war that ran till 1970 and cost about a million lives (IDEA, 2002:47). At the end of the civil war in 1970, Gowon extended his six months transition to civil rule programme to six years, announcing 1976 as his new hand over date. The reasons as rationalised in his nine point transition programme were to have sufficient time for the implementation of the National Development plan, and the repair of the damage and neglect of the war, eradication of corruption in national life, organisation of genuine political parties, among others (Momoh, 1997:47).

On October 1, 1974, Gowon informed the nation in a broadcast that his 1976 hand over date was no longer realistic, thereby postponing it indefinitely. From January 1970, when the civil war ended to July 1975 when he was eventually overthrown in a palace coup, General Gowon made no concrete arrangements to restructure the economy, eradicate corruption and actualise a genuine democracy as he often vaunted. On the contrary, his regime took advantage of the huge oil boom economy of the time to expand the capital accumulation of the top bureaucrats and military officers whose power base was excessively enhanced in Gowon's desperate quest for credibility. The regime's so-called nine point transition programme was, to say the least, vague and its implementation was hypocritical and perfunctory (Dare, 1991:16). It was in the face of this inconsistency and militarisation of the civil society that General Yakubu Gowon was overthrown by General Murtala Muhammed in 1975. In his maiden broadcast, General Murtala, who was assassinated six months after in an abortive coup and replaced by his second in command, General Olusegun Obasanjo, indicated Gowon's administration in the following terms: "After the civil war, the affairs of state, hitherto a collective responsibility, became characterised by lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline and even neglect, the public at large became disillusioned and disappointed by these developments. This trend was clearly incompatible with the philosophy and image of a corrective regime (Owolabi, 1992). Poised to demonstrate the image of a real corrective regime, the Murtala/Obasanjo regime promulgated a 4 year transition time-table aimed at returning power to civilians by October 1979.

Although the Murtala/Obasanjo regime kept faith to her transition to civilian rule government on October 1, 1979, it is pertinent to point out that the regime did not bequeath to its successors a political culture conducive to democracy. Instead, the transition to civilian rule

programme pursued by the regime was contradicted by her politics of macadamia and democratisation (Omeje, 2000:23). Yet, Democratic rule was restored in 1979. But the Second Republic was short-lived. Most Nigerians welcomed the military's re-emergency in governance in 1983, after only four years of democratic rule. This was because the economic and political dividend they were expecting to harvest from the democratic system was not forthcoming. Corruption promoted the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the massive electoral fraud that characterised the 1983 general election, and the economic collapse of the second Republic further conditioned Nigerian's to welcome the military back onto the political terrain. Nigerian politicians have not been famous for keeping their electoral promises to the voters. The second Republic politicians were no different. Instead of working for the welfare of the people, the politicians began to amass wealth for themselves. The regime was rocked by various financial scandals such as the rice armada issue, which was fraught with all manner of corruption from part demurrage to commission agency (IDEA, 2001:48).

With the level of corruption in the Second Republic it was not surprising that the economy went into serious crisis, three years after the Government came to power. President Shagari's Government in October 1979 inherited about US\$5.5 billion in foreign reserves from the military. This rose to US\$8.2 billion by July 1980. The interest owed foreign creditors over US\$7 billion. The interest on this debt has since grown to between US\$28-30billion. Its dismal performance notwithstanding, the ruling NPN was determined to retain power at the centre, and if possible, capture more states from the opposition. This resulted in the use of money, vote rigging, thuggery and private militias to fight the elections. The NPN, which in 1979 won power at the centre through a controversial court verdict known as the Twelve – Two – Third, boasted that it was not only going to win the 1983election with a landside, but with a moonslide. And it did so with unprecedented rigging. It must be stated that rigging in the 1983 election was not exclusive to the NPN. All the parties were involved in rigging where they were pronounced in areas where the incumbent was the victim (IDEA, 2001:48).

It is therefore not surprising that the Alhaji Shehu Shagari civilian administration which resulted from the General Obasanjo transition project was epileptic and short-lived. To be sure, the ill-fated Shagari administration merely dramatized and exacerbated the structural contradictions inherited from its predecessor, especially in terms of the political culture of extravagant patronage and intolerance of dissension, which is the strongest banalization of democracy. Hence, General Muhammadu Buhari regime that ousted the second civilian

republic, among other things, justified their coup on the grounds that the Alhaji Shehu Shagari administration was '*an inept and corrupt leadership*' (New Times, 1986:3). As a result of this ugly development, the military intervened into Nigeria politics. On 31 December 1983 General Buhari/Idiagbon military's insurgence into politics truncated the Second Republic. After the welcome bestowed on the Buhari/Idiagbon Junta, it did not take long before Nigerians became disenchanted with the regime. In his very first press interview, General Muhammadu Buhari, boldly stated that he was going to temper with the freedom of the press – and he did. From this point, the military governments became more despotic and reckless, treating Nigeria as their private property. The Buhari regime is best remembered for the draconian decrees it promulgated, especially the infamous decrees of 1984. Under Decree 2, Nigerians were detained for up to three months without trial. The detention was renewable after the first three months. Under the Public Officers' Protection Against False Accusation Decree, journalists were jailed for publishing anything that embarrassed a public officer, even if it was true (IDEA, 2001:50).

This and the oppressive climate led to the palace coup initiated by General Ibrahim Babangida, the Chief of Army Staff of the regime. General Ibrahim Babangida rode into power on the crest of the unpopularity of the Buhari/Idiagbon regime. His style was remarkably different and popular with Nigerians. The regime adopted a human rights posture, abrogated some of the repressive decrees, such as Decree Four (Although Decree Two was retained), some detained politicians and other civilians were released, and the sentences of others reviewed. The regime reversed policy and later became just as dictatorial as its predecessor. The Armed Forces Ruling Council, the highest military ruling body, was dissolved and reconstituted at will end the exit date of the regime from governance was shifted from October 1990 to October 1992. This shifting of exit dates became a feature of General Babangida's transition programme until the ignominiously "stepped aside" on 26th August, 1993. The lowest point in the Babangida regime was his annulment of the 12th June, 1993 Presidential election, adjudged by Nigerians and international observers as the freest and fairest in Nigeria's history (IDEA, 2001:50-51).

The suspension of the election of June 12 by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) on the orders of an Abuja High Court on June 16, 1993 was followed by the repeal of all the enabling laws under which the election had been conducted on June 23, 1993, and subsequently, the inauguration of a National Interim Government on 27th August, 1993 headed by Chief Earnest Shonekan. Chief Shonekan was to assume the responsibilities of

state office until an acceptable election was conducted. The Interim National Government introduced another aspect of the crisis of June 12. The reception given to the Interim Government by some of late Chief Abiola's supporters, particularly from the South-West of Nigeria aggravated the crisis. On November 16, 1993, Chief Shonekan resigned as Head of the Interim National Government, leaving an immense political vacuum at the helm of the ship to state. Thus, on November, 17, 1993, General Sani Abacha, the Secretary for Defence in the Interim National Government took over the Headship of the Government of the federation, to save the Nation from anarchy (Federal Ministry of Information & Culture).

Like other military leaders before him, Abacha came with the poise of a corrective regime but probably surpassed all the previous military dictatorships in repression and corruption during his five years reign. He totally militarised the political landscape using a formidable network of security operatives (State Security Services – SSS, Directorate of Military Intelligence – DMI, the Presidential Military Police – PMP, and the Presidential Task Force on Financial Crime and Terrorism). These security operatives were used by the regime to harass, arrest, torture and detain for long periods without charge or trial many pro-democracy activists and labour leaders. The refusal of Abacha to re-visit the annulled June 12, 1993 Presidential election and the detention of the presumed winner of the election, Chief M.K.O. Abiola, provoked an unprecedented struggle, which the military junta matched with a severe crackdown on the civil society. Perhaps, the most destructive effect of Abacha's personal rule agenda on Nigeria's political culture is the institutionalization of political demagogues and sycophancy. Abacha recruited and deployed several demagogues and sycophants who capitalising on their volubility and the vulnerability of the populace orchestrated nation-wide campaigns aimed at transmuting the Commander-in-Chief as a civilian President. Crowds were rented to attend campaign rallies in support of Abacha's candidacy. The Abuja two million man march spearheaded by the notorious Youth Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) marked the climax of this idiotic propaganda. Quite dismally, some prominent traditional rulers and all the five political parties registered under the transition programme unanimously endorsed Abacha's plan of self-succession (Omeje, 2000:28).

On December 21, 1997, the government arrested General Oladipo Diya, (Abacha's second-in-command) ten other officers, and eight civilians on charges of coup plotting. The accused were tried before a military tribunal in which Diya and eight others were sentenced to death. Abacha's reign of terror was enforced through a security network characterised by several human security network characterised by several human rights abuses, including

infringements on freedom of speech, assembly, association, free movement and violence against women. Abacha died allegedly of heart failure on June 8, 1998. His death gave a temporary relief to Nigerians against international hostility and harassment (Ohwofasa, 2007:20). It ushered in General Abdulsalami Abubakar who piloted and ruled over the nation until he eventually handed over to democratically elected government of President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was ceremoniously sworn-in on the 29th May, 1999. General Abdulsalami Abubakar, who assumed the mantle of leadership, was confronted with a lot of challenges, especially the legitimacy of his regime. The regime embarked on a fence mending mission with major world leaders. Toured and sensitized military establishments on the needs to return to their professional callings; entered into dialogue with various stakeholders, and put in place a one-year transition programme which was successfully executed to its logical end, with the inauguration of a democratically elected government on May 29, 1999 (Anifowose & Babawale, 2007:244). In fact, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was ceremoniously sworn-in as the fourth Republic President of Nigeria.

Nigeria returned to civilian government in 1999 after elections that ended 16 years of military rule. The First and Second Republics (1960 to 1966 and 1979 to 1983) had both been ousted by fresh coups. The Third Republic is established under a written constitution, the Fourth since the country's independence in 1960. The 1999 constitution provides for government to be structured in three tiers: federal, state and local. There are 36 states and 774 local governments, six of them located in the Federal Capital Territory. The country operates under a presidential system of government, featuring the principles of federalism and separation of powers. The executive powers of the federation are vested in the president, assisted by a vice-president and ministers. A governor heads at the state level, and a chairman at the local government level. The vice-president and deputy governors are elected directly on the same ticket with their principal (Akingbulu, 2010:1). Federal legislative powers are vested in an elected bi-cameral National Assembly consisting of a senate and a House of Representatives. The senate has a membership of 109, based on a quota formula of three members per states and one from the federal capital territory. A total of 36 members sit in the House of Representatives with the number of constituencies determined by the size of the population of each state. The state and local governments each have a unicameral legislature. The constitution splits responsibility for different thematic areas between the federal and state levels of government: the federal government has wider and stronger powers for legislative and control purposes than the states. In general, the executive branch of government

dominates and constrains the legislature across the three tiers, preventing appropriate institutional expression of legislative power (Akingbulu, 2010:2).

Nigeria is a multi-party state. The Constitution provides for the holding of elections every four years at the same time for federal-and state-level elected officials and representatives. It establishes three types of election management bodies: the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which registers political parties and conducts national and state elections, along with other functions, the State Independent Electoral Commission (SIEC) set up by each state and in charge of the conduct of local government elections; the Election Tribunals which adjudicate disputes arising from elections. The INEC is appointed by the president subject to confirmation by each State's House of Assembly. The president of the Court of Appeal appoints Election Tribunals, in consultation with the Chief Judge of a state, the Grand Kadi of the *Shar'iah* court of Appeal of the State, as the case may be. Only political parties can sponsor candidates for elections. As a condition for registration parties are required to have national spread in membership and structures, and cut across ethnic and religious boundaries. As a multi-party state, 3 political parties participated in the 1999 elections, 27 more were registered for 2003 and a total of 50 for the 2007 elections (Akingbulu, 2010:2).

Nevertheless, the central concern of all succeeding governments in the country has been to build a strong, united and powerful political entity that would both overcome the crisis of nationhood, engineered by the colonial past and serves as a fulcrum around which politics of then nations shall revolve. Thus, in a broad assessment, the massive transformation of Nigeria into independent state typically failed to combine democracy and development. Unimaginably, since independence, there has been several prevailing crises, particularly political instability and violence, and since no place in the world is prosperous without political stability, the atmosphere of crises began to have strange effects on local politics. There were polarized political conflicts and violence and volatile problem of ethnicity, which strains and weakened democratic political machines, diminished the evolvment of true nationhood, and have eaten deep into old breed special – interest coalitions. The politicians engaged in a sterile struggle to grab political power not because of their consideration for welfare of the masses but for their selfish interest, inordinate ambition and inelastic desire. Hence they go to any extent to achieve the goal not minding the political tension and violence it could generate.

However, from 1966 to 1996; it has been a tragic celebration of violence. The coups and counter coups have brought nothing but tension, agony, pain, fear, and death to the people. Military intervention in politics legitimized the use of violence as an instrument of government. This has itself become a major source of instability in Nigeria's political development. And, of all the fifty-three years of Nigeria existence as an independent nation, more than twenty-five years have been dominated by the military. Needless to say, at the end of it, the military has little or nothing to show for it. The catalogue of failures being recorded in every sector of our socio-political and economy life speaks volumes about the incompetence and managerial inability of the military regimes. The retreat of the military and the re-entry of democratically elected politicians into the arena of governance on May 29, 1999, therefore, raised a lot of hope. However, democratic governance has thrown up its own challenges for the polity. These tendencies occurred at all levels of governance in Nigeria, and were accentuated by the incidence of military rule as the dominant mode of governance in most of Nigeria's post-colonial existence (Roberts, 2004:13).

Looking back at the history of political events in Nigeria, it is obvious that it has always been besieged by not only rabble rousers but also trouble makers who were ever always prepared to lay down their lives to fight a cause that may eventually be the nail in their coffin. At such times, good propagandists and manipulators are employed to trade in deceit. Some ignoramuses are usually brainwashed at such instances and a lot of them, as a result of their gullibility became desperate of the consideration for their future. In furtherance to this, and more worrisome such people seem comfortable with killing and maiming people in the name of garnering support for their candidate(s) while eliminating every opponent or opposition by hook or crook. Truly, Nigerians welcomed the return of civil rule with much excitement and expectation in 1999. Today, however, it appears that not much has changed. Accountability and transparency in governance have still not gained a firm foothold. There have been many incidents of corruption at all levels of government over the past decade. Part – building, and institution-building in general, have received limited attention from political players. Parties in government dominate political life and office holders seek to hold on to their jobs and powers. The executive branch of government dominates and constrains the legislative across the three tiers, preventing appropriate institutional expression of legislative power (Akingbulu).

Nigerians feel short changed. And many civil institutions have been studying this situation. A series of four Afrobarometer Survey in Nigeria conducted in 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2005 has

provided a summary on the changing Nigerian attitudes since the 1999 return of civilian governments as follows:

Nigerians are broadly discouraged by the performance of their political system, and do not generally believe that they have reaped the “dividends” of democracy. Nonetheless, a large majority of Nigerians continue to prefer democratic government overall other options, and many Nigerians remain patient about the anticipated benefits of the democracy system. Further, Nigerians are most critical of the government of the day, and relatively less discouraged by the performance of the general regime of democracy. These popular attitudes suggest that Nigeria’s new democracy remains fragile, and suffers a growing deficit of popular confidence. However, Nigerians are not ready to abandon the democratic system for non-democratic alternatives such as military rule or a domineering presidency (Lewis, 2006:2).

3.4 THE MILITARY POLITICAL TRANSITIONS

Clearly, democratic rule was restored in 1979, but the Second Republic was short-lived, after only four years of democratic rule. At that point in time, the economic and political dividends Nigerians expected to harvest from the democratic system was not forthcoming. Corruption was promoted by the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the massive electoral fraud that characterized the 1983 general election, and the economic collapse of the Second Republic further conditioned Nigerians to welcome the Military back into the political terrain in 1983. When the result were announced and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) had won, the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) urged the electoral body Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) to annul the result. It was later joined by the UPN and GNPP. At the end, the military junta terminated it in 1983. Since then, transition to the Third Republic took several years; the end result was a transition to another dreaded military dictatorship. General Ibrahim Babangida created two political parties: Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republic Convention (NRC) but equally led to another military overlordship. General Sani Abacha that took over tried to democratize the Nigerian Politics in line with his selfish interest. During his transition, five political parties were formed and amazingly, all of them adopted him as the sole candidate to contest the presidential elections.

Interestingly, Transition programmes were put in place by the Babangida administration which was worried by the danger posed to Nigeria’s unity and collective existence. This administration moved to break the ethnic cleavages by registering only two political parties, the national Republican convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and these parties contested elections into local government Councils, State and national Assemblies,

state executives or governors between 1991 and 1992. Really, these political parties had national outlook and this was a plus, but, there was also a big minus. The parties were not people-Oriented because they were created in the image of the military. Notwithstanding, the elected officials were sworn in and were functioning when presidential election was conducted on June 12, 1993. The administration managed to conduct a free fair presidential election won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola after eight years of political experimentation and incessant policy summersaults. The military could not manage the achievement. Partial results of the election were announced before it was annulled by the military regime. The regime could however not perpetuate itself in power after the election; and following a monumental civil unrest vacated the seat to an Interim National Government.

However, the Interim National Government headed by Mr Shonekan was toppled by General Sani Abacha, then Chief of Defence Staff and Minister of Defence on November 17, 1993. All the structures established during Babangida's transition programme were scrapped and the elected officials sacked. Another tortuous political transition programme was put in place by Abacha who also tried to perpetuate himself in power but his inordinate ambition was scuttled by his sudden death on June 8, 1998. There and then, General Abdul Salam Abubakar took over as head of state and organized a short transition programme that lasted for less than a year. Elections were conducted between 1998 and 1999 at the end of which elected civilians were sworn into office on May 29, 1999 under the provision of a new constitution. Regarding this development, it is worth noting that, the years ending with 9 witnessed peaceful transfer of power from one set of rulers to another. For instance, a; 1959 Federal elections, while marked transfer of power from the British colonialist to Nigerians; b, 1979 Transfer of power from the military to the civilians; and c, 1999 Transfer of power from military to civilians.

Suffice it to say, the political event in the year 1993 were so very explicit. In fact, very young people, as *eight years*, were conversant with the facts of the matter. It was then an additional cause for worry. The country was peaceful before and on 12 June when the election was held. He campaigns were clean. Nigerians had looked forward to the election which took seven years to prepare and roughly N30billion to organize. Hundreds of thousands of Nigerians acted as agents, umpires, officials. Scores of foreigners were present including members of the House of Commons, top officials of non-governmental organizations, agents of foreign governments, dignitaries of all kings. The government set up its own monitoring group, an independent body.

The country went to all these lengths for one principal reason; to ensure that the election was free, fair and orderly and that everyone qualified to vote was given the opportunity. Clearly, it was the most transparent election ever held in Nigerian. Nigeria was at peace during and after the elections. Indeed, the results were announced publicly at polling stations and collation centres at ward, local government and state levels were already known. Suddenly, on 23, June a date that will go down as one of the most tragic dates in Nigeria history, the junta announced the suspension of the results of the peaceful election ever held. It was finally cancelled four days after, not for any tenable reason(s) but for lame duck excuses: the presidential candidates had spent N2.1 billion corrupting the voters; suspended to check the selfish ambitions of few; election was unacceptable to members of the armed forces; Abiola was well connected in foreign countries; Abiola had business dealings with the Nigerian government; and so on and on.

Interestingly, it did not matter that Abiola won 90 per cent of all the votes cast in all the military barracks across the country. It did not matter that for the military to express disloyalty to an elected president amounted to high treason. It was a time that tried men's souls; a time that brought forth the best and worst in men. The country was fortunate that unlike previous crises, the dispute was neither ethnic nor religious. The tragedy, however, was that the politicians who should show leadership and adopt principles stand seemed to have reduced the issue to Roman drama – when the praetorian guards put up the Empire for sale. Without doubt, the politicians let the vital opportunity to slip. They sold the birth right of the country for a mess of potage.

Pathetically, the country was plunged into another political crisis resulting in an Interim National Government (I N G) and the exit from power of the Military President General Ibrahim Babangida headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan. Yet, the call for the revalidation of the celebrated election largely assumed an ethnic dimension. The government propaganda machinery exploited the mistrust and division in the polity which the election had hitherto diffused and agitation for the reversal of the criminal annulment suddenly became a Yoruba problem, although the presidential candidate garnered votes from all the nooks and crannies of the country. Thus, this unfortunate incidence bred turbulent situation and shattered the country's peace. This, of course, inevitably prompted the decision of General Sani Abacha, to put an end to the Interim National Government and form his government with a new transition time-table.

Quite obviously, the military paraded the corridors of powers marks with draconian decrees, intimidation, arrest, humiliation and detention, unprecedented fraud and unfulfilled promises of handing over to civilian regime. The Nigerian state was almost heading towards disintegration at the time of General Sani Abacha's death in June 1998. Thus, the General Abdul salaam Abubakar regime drew its inspiration from the mood of Nigerians. The people jumped on to the street to celebrate Abacha's death and equally mourned the sudden death of Chief M.K.O. Abiola, a month after. These outpouring of emotion plus the determined opposition to Abacha's dictatorship, persuaded General Abdul Salam that the military must relinquish power. Even when transferring political power, the regime itself was not an uninterested actor in the process, and sought to manage carefully the disengagement agenda. The political context of the disengagement also ensured that a particular geo-political zone was a beneficiary of political power at the centre. The regime singular objective was thus to return Nigeria to Democratic rule.

Determined to install its own candidate against all odds, the military schemed Obasanjo's victory over democrats like Dr Alex Ekwueme at the party's primaries at Jos, Plateau State and humbled Chief Olu Falae, presidential candidate of AD and APP coalition in the 1999 general polls. It was actually gathered that General Abdul Salami Abubakar had in the Council of State meeting attended by former Heads of state and their deputies early in 1999, asked Dr Ekwueme to step down for General Olusegun Obasanjo with the promise of Senate Presidency as compensation. Though Ekwueme refused to accept this arrangement, the Jos convention quickly put him behind the presidential election picture as he was controversially defeated by the machineries mounted by the writers of the transition script. Also, the shoddy manner which the Abdulsalami Abubakar's administration handled the suit filed by Chief Olu Falae to contest the outcome of the election clearly showed that the ruling military class had already made up their minds about the Obasanjo presidency (The Guardian, 2003:45).

3.5 THE OBASANJO REGIME

According to some analysts, Nigeria, which was seen before 1999 as a non-conformist and a threat to efforts at globalization, democratization, and maintenance of world peace and security (Akinterinwa, 2005:360) suddenly became another centre of attraction with the enthronement of democratic rule in May 1999. The new administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was confronted with the tasks of rebranding, repackaging, reinventing and

rebuilding a new Nigeria. Most importantly, the task of laying a new foundation for attitudinal change by Nigerians both within and outside, and for proper disposition towards the international community became the major concern of the new civilian government. This attitudinal change will crystallize into a new foreign policy orientation (Anifowose & Babawale, 2007:245).

On assumption of office, General Obasanjo (rtd), as the newly elected President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria established the Office of Inter-party Relation (OIPR) and appointed Senator Mahmud Waziri- the immediate past National Chairman of the then All People's Party (APP) as a pioneer Special Adviser in June 1999 to the government. The effect of the OIPR was to serve as Think Tank to and advise the president on political parties and desirable strategy for stable and harmonious inter-Party relations in the interest of sustainable democracy. A tour of five selected countries to get acquainted with the democratic procedures and practice at comparable and non-comparable stages of democracy was conducted: USA, Britain, India, South Africa and Ghana (The Comet, 2003:13).

At that time, Nigerians were full of hope. They wanted their standard of living improved. They desired a better life for themselves and better future for their children. Today, that hope has been dashed and replaced with despair, misery and deprivation. At the moment, Nigerians live in a very uncertain time. There is hardship in most homes. Insecurity of life and property has brought fear to most Nigerians- people no longer sleep with ease in their homes. Prices of goods keep rising thereby making it impossible for most Nigerians to meet their basic needs. The Naira continues to lose its value day after day. The youths are jobless. All the promises by the government to create jobs went into the wind. Instead of new jobs, those already employed lost theirs either through retrenchment or outright closure of factories and businesses across the country. Even the old who gave their best to their youth for their fatherland have had very sad experience. Their pensions and retirement benefit were not paid promptly, and many of them have been subjected to very harsh condition by not getting paid entitlements to them. This, in fact, is the most crisis of human psychological torture.

The PDP, one would recall is an assemblage of numerous political groups across the country weaved into loose framework by its founding 'investors', sustained by the reluctant military class even as the diverse interest groups continue. The party eventually became a rallying platform for power negotiators between the political class and the military constituency led by the then Head of State, General Abdulsalami Abubakar: The emergency of President

Olusegun Obasanjo as the presidential candidate of the PDP in 1999 was actually a product of that negotiation and that was after it became obvious that the military class was not ready to relinquish power to any block that would not protect its interest. This however, justifies the assertion of the critics that the initial swelling of the population of PDP members at inception would not be too far from the fact that they saw it as the party endorsed by the incumbent government to take over the realm of affairs in the country. Belonging to another party obviously was seen by many politicians as a political waste of time. Those who did believe this initially soon realized their mistake after the president election in 1999 and joined the party not necessarily because they bought the ideals of the party nor did they identify with the personalities that became its major proponents but because it became obvious that it was the shortest route to political exploit in the immediate post military Nigeria.

The trend with Obasanjo presidency has been the emergency of what Robert Fatton refers to as 'Presidential monarchism'. According to Fatton, presidential monarchs often dominate their political environment. He described it in these telling terms:

The centrality of the presidential monarch is continuously emphasized by the ideological apparatuses of the state. In an effort to legitimize his rule, these apparatus incessantly nurture the cult of his personality, imparting to it supernatural power and unlimited knowledge... the presidential monarch has an encompassing sphere of competence. His Presence is felt everywhere; he is the father of the nation to whom filial respect is always due (The Comet, 2003:16).

The point being underscored here is that the presidency in the current democratic conjuncture has assumed enormous powers and the entire political system tends to revolve around the personality of the president. The executive in order to have leverage in the National Assembly has involved itself in the politics of the legislature overtly interested in who leads the two Houses of National Assembly and who does not. Evans Enwerem was the first Senate President. The politics leading to the removal of Chuba Okadigbo as Senate President in August 2000 and the subsequent ascendance of Pius Anyim as his successor was not unconnected with the Presidency. The seeming "tug of war" between the Presidency and the leadership of the House of Representatives has not been based on principles, but the issue of power and control. Executive meddling in the politics of the legislature has left the National Assembly weak and less independent. (The Comet, 2003:16).

The second instance of *presidential monarchism* is on the issue of controversial Electoral Act 2001. After the electoral bill had been passed by the two Houses of Assembly and sent to the

president for his approval, the presidency was alleged to have illegally amended section of the Electoral Act without recourse to the National Assembly. The Amendment was targeted at new political parties seeking registration. That those parties would have to win at least 10% of councillorship and Chairmanship positions in the general elections. This meant technically that new parties could not participate in 2003 general elections as the local government elections which were to be basis of their registration was scheduled to be contested last after the presidential, National Houses of Assembly, Governorship and State Houses of Assembly elections. This issue generated National critique and condemnation, yet the presidency was unrepentant about it. At the end and a Supreme Court judgment nullify the Electoral Act, and cleared the way for the registration of more political parties.

Following the collapse of his Third Term ambition, Obasanjo had encouraged many of the then Second-term Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) governors into the race for the party's presidential nomination. At the end, apparently mindful of party position on zoning, Obasanjo settled for Yar'Adua by asking Peter Odili, who was the clear favourite to win, to withdraw from the contest. His plan to make Odili running mate to Yar'Adua, however, collapsed in the face of strong opposition from the then Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Chairman, Mr Nuhu Ribadu. In his bid to stop Vice-president Atiku Abubakar (who had taken the presidential ticket of another party, the Action Congress) from succeeding him, Obasanjo had unwillingly sown the seeds for the irregularities that would mar the entire process (Adeniyi, 2011: XXVII). Eventually, Obasanjo, after governing for the constitutionally stipulated maximum of two terms of eight years, handed over to Umaru Yar'Adua, a Muslim Northerner from Katsina State in May 2007. Muhammadu Buhari, a fellow northerner and former military Head of State, had contested the election as the presidential candidate of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). While the conduct of the election was condemned by local and international observers as deeply flawed and marked by widespread ballot rigging in favour of the ruling Democratic People's Party, ordinary Nigerians accepted the results and there was no post-election violence in any part of the country.

Although a change of political leadership style was noticed in Umaru Yar' Adua people general expectations remained largely high. That the Yar'Adua – led government is criticized for being slow to respond to the expectations of Nigerians is all too obvious, but credit is given for the cautious steps by which the administration approached certain issues (Zimako, 2009:38). Musa Yar'Adua, the President Obasanjo's preferred successor came into office

unfurling the banner of rule of law and zero tolerance for corruption encapsulated in a so-called seven-point agenda encompassing issues such as rule of law, energy, natural security infrastructure, education, Niger Delta and Corruption (Oyebode, 2010 1:52).

Trouble however started following the sudden death of President Yar'Adua in 2010 after only three years in power. Prominent members of the Northern Elders Forum and Arewa Consultative Forum, another Northern – based political organization, urged Dr Goodluck Jonathan, now President not to put himself forward for re-election in 2011; that another northerner should be drafted to contest as Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) presidential candidate and complete the North's term of eight years. Goodluck's supporters, mainly drawn from the south and his Niger Delta region in particular, however insisted that the President had the constitutional right to contest. The Northern Political Leaders Forum (NPLD), a new political pressure group led by Adamu Ciroma, a former minister in the Obasanjo administration, quickly emerged and began to mobilize northern opinion against a possible Jonathan candidature during the 2011 elections. The NPLF was successful in getting leading northerners, including General Ibrahim Babangida, who wanted to contest against Jonathan to step down for Atiku Abubakar, former vice President during Obasanjo's tenure (Okonta, 2012:7).

The PDP Presidential primary was held on January 13th, 2011 amidst great tension. Political opinion was sharply divided, with northern politicians rooting for Atiku Abubakar and insisting that it was only fair that he win the ticket and go on to become president. Politicians and ordinary people in the south gave their support to Goodluck Jonathan. Jonathan, deploying the power of incumbency and the enormous resources of the Federal Government, however won the primary. A breakdown of the results showed that he defeated Atiku in all six geo-political regions of the country – 615 to 9 in the president's native South-South region; 383 to 24 in the South West 423 to 23 in the South East; 380 to 172 in the North Central; 301 to 155 in the former vice-presidents home North East; and 422 to 365 in the North West. (The Nation, 19 January, 2011).

Indeed, the general expectation in the north following Jonathan's crushing victory over Atiku, was that the region would rely on its population, far more than the Southern States combined going by official census figures, to give victory to Muhammadu Buhari who had established the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), a new political party on which platform he was running for president against Jonathan. Buhari's relationship with mainstream northern

politicians, who accuse him of leading the military coup that ended the northern-led Second Republic in 1983, has always been difficult. But there is no doubt that he enjoys the overwhelming support of ordinary northerners, particularly the young and poor who have come to see his brief stint as head of state in the mid-1980s as emblematic of the honesty and patriotism they say is lacking in the Fourth Republic led by the PDP. Buhari and CPC instantly became the symbol of northern hopes; the vehicle through which they would reclaim the leadership of the country from President Jonathan who was now regarded all over the region as an impostor (Okonta, 2012:8).

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CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

4.1 THE FORMULATION OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

At Independence in 1960, one of the first preoccupations of the new nation was to define its position in the world. Already, in 1956, a contingency plan had been made for the basic training of Nigerians in overseas missions. The plan envisaged that Britain would continue to represent Nigeria in some foreign countries where it was not feasible for Nigeria to be directly represented. The government decided upon a policy of non-alignment. This broad policy, in the view of the Prime Minister, meant that Nigeria would not 'be prepared to associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs' (Idang, 1973:15). The Cold War was the major defining character of the international system at the time of Nigerian's Independence in 1960, but there were other important factors which influenced the development of the country's foreign policy. Many countries in Africa Asia and Latin America were also emerging as independent states. The principle of self-determination for colonized peoples and nations had become internationally respectable and widely accepted. Liberation movements sprouted everywhere and wars of Independence were raging in many territories, especially in Africa. There were also the indignities of the racist apartheid system in South Africa and the struggle and this diabolical socio-economic experiment (Adefuye, 1992:24).

Nigeria was created in 1914, but became an independent sovereign state on October 1, 1960. On that day, the former British colony joined the group of sovereign nations pursuing their interests in the international arena. Foreign relations and defence were the last functions handed over to the Federal Government led by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa. The nature and conduct influenced by a variety of factors, the most prominent of which were the nature of the country's ethnic composition, the colonial heritage, internal political situation, the attitudes and perceptions of Nigeria's foreign elite, and the attitudes which the government set for itself. These among others dictated the extent to which culture was allowed to be a factor policy and implementation. As aptly remarked by Olaiyan (1988: 98), "*foreign policy refers to that aspect of a country's life which deals with its external environment*". Hence, he observed that measures directed to other countries or which have an impact on them fall within the meaning of foreign policy. Indeed, foreign policy-making shares all the attributes of domestic political decision-making and in addition faces some constraints which have their

sources within and outside the country. Such constraints include: difficulty of collecting information and the reliability value of such information, the attribute of other governments, international organizations, and the direction of world opinion (Ajibola, 1978:2).

As a corollary of the above, foreign policy formulations and / or processes are not singly determined by domestic choices preferences and isolated perspectives (Okolie, 2001:191). It is largely a product of complex and diversifying interrelationship involving both external stimuli (Nweke, 1988; Idang, 1973; Akinyemi, 1974; Aluko, 1981; Ogunsanwo, 1986). Thus, foreign policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by the given state and its ruling class in its relations with other states, and the methods and the means used by it for the achievement and defense of these purposes and interest (Levin, 1996). Northedge (1968 : 15) argues that foreign policy is the interplay between the outside and inside. States formulate their foreign policy in response to external environment as dictated by the internal factors. In doing this, every state keeps her eyes on national interest. Therefore, foreign policy is not just made for the fun of it, it is designed to:

Promote, protect and defend a nation's national interest such as preservation of national sovereignty, the defense of territorial integrity, the promotion of economic military strategic and diplomatic interests, the increase and maintenance of power and prestige so as to influence international events; to communicate ones (sic) capability to both potential and actual allies and adversaries (Alkali, 1996: 62).

The guidelines of Nigeria's foreign policy were first articulated at Independence by the then Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. In his first address to the Fifteenth Regular session of the United Nations General Assembly on October 7, 1960 when Nigeria became then 99th member of that body and have remained the bedrock of Nigeria's foreign policy since then. On that occasion, he stated thus:

First, it is the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all the nations and to participate actively in the work of the United Nations Organization. Secondly, Nigeria, a large and populous country, has absolutely no territorial or expansionist ambitions. Thirdly, we are committed to uphold the principles upon which the United Nations is founded. Fourthly, Nigeria hopes to work with other Africa Countries for the progress of African and assist in bringing all African Countries to a state of independence (Lamido, 2000:XIII).

These principles were further developed a year later in the speech made to the Sixteenth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly by Dr. Jaja Wachukwu, then Nigerian Minister of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, on 1st October, 1961 when he said:

Our foreign policy is based on three basic pillars; the concept that Nigeria is an African nation; it is part and parcel of that continent of Africa and therefore it is so completely involved in anything that pertains to that continent that it cannot be neutral and must never be considered as a neutralist country. I say this because there have been misnomers and misrepresentation, and countries have been called neutralist. Nigeria is not a neutralist country. We are independent in everything. But neutral in nothing that affects the destroy of Africa. The moment Africa is affected we are involved. We want to make this absolutely clear: Nigeria finds itself involved in anything affecting the African continent anywhere, any square inch of African territory – we are involved. We cannot be neutral, so that neutralism, used in a broad sense, should exclude our country when it comes to African affairs. And being a member of the African community and feeling ourselves completely bound to its destiny and accepting our involvement in everything that pertains to it, obviously all questions pertaining to Africa must be considered as questions pertaining to Nigeria. The peace of Africa is the peace of Nigeria. Its tribulations are our tribulations and we cannot be indifferent to its future (Balewa, 1963:18).

However, it was from the historic pronouncement, referred to as the ‘Balewa Doctrine’, that the following objectives and principles which have guided Nigeria’s foreign policy were derived:

The protection of the sovereign and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state; The promotion of the economic and social well-being of Nigerians; The enhancement of Nigeria’s image and status in the world at large; The promotion of unity as well as the total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Nigeria and Africa; The promotion of the rights of black people and others under colonial dominations; The promotion of international co-operation; conducive to the consolidation of world peace and security, mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states; Redressing the imbalance in the international power structures which has tended to frustrate the legitimate aspiration of developing countries; Respect for the sovereignty, Independence and territorial integrity of all nations; and the promotion of world peace based on the principles of freedom, mutual respect and equality of all persons of the world. These fundamental objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy have remained unchanged since Independence and have been pursued by successive administrations with varying degrees of emphasis and focus. In this process, Nigeria’s foreign policy has had to take into account the changing realities in the international system and focused on the identification and pursuit of these options that would ensure effective maximization of Nigeria’s interest as a confident and self-reliant nation (Lamido, 2000:1).

Although it is evident from the above that the national interest was not clearly expressed in specific terms, the fundamental aims appeared to serve as guidelines for Nigeria's foreign policy actions. Despite changes in government, the administrations of General Ironsi and Gowon pursued essentially the same objectives based on their world view and perception of

the hierarchy of Nigeria's interests. Both emphasized Nigeria's active role in the African continent as a pre-requisite to attaining its aspiration of greatness. As stated by Ironsi: In the whole sphere of Nigeria's external relations, the Government attaches the greatest importance to our African policy. We are aware that because of our population and potentials, the majority of opinion in the civilized world looks up to us to provide responsible leadership in Africa; and we realize that we shall be judged, to a very great extent, by the degree of success or failure with which we face up to the challenge which this expectation throws on us (Ogwu, 1986:9).

General Yakubu Gowon advocated morality in the treatment of black people under the banner of respect for "human dignity". General Olusegun Obasanjo's accession to leadership in 1976 witnessed a reappraisal of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives. For the first time, a top level elaboration of the components of Nigeria's national interest was made. The elements of the national interest as enunciated by General Obasanjo include:

(a) the defence of our sovereignty, Independence and territorial integrity; (b) the creation of necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which will facilitate the defence of the Independence and territorial integrity of all African countries while at the same time fostering national self-reliance and rapid economic development; (c) the promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world; (d) the promotion and defence of justice and respect for human dignity, especially the dignity of the black man; (e) the defence and promotion of world peace. While these objectives described Nigeria's national interests, they failed to indicate which of the interests were vital to the national well-being (Ogwu, 1986:9).

One principle therefore, which runs through Nigeria's conduct in her consideration of the pursuits of peace and enduring unity in Africa as purely a function of a historical role conferred on her by virtue of the fact that she has the largest concentration of black people in the world. Nigeria's foreign relations in general has therefore, been actively guided by her focus on African issues and blacks in diaspora. The reason or reasons for this perceived mission in Africa was clearly spelt out by Ex-President Shehu Shagari in one of his presidential addresses:

The size, the population and the economic potential of this country has imposed on us a special duty to respond responsibly to international issues and problems. When it is realized that Nigeria's population makes every fifth African, as well as every sixth black person in the world a Nigerian, it becomes doubly incumbent upon us in formulating our policies, to bear in mind our historical responsibilities to Africa and the black diaspora (Shagari, 1982:871).

However, this self – imposed mission has been questioned severally. For instance, to what extent is Nigeria able to project her interests in Africa which is the supposedly the centre – piece of her foreign policy? Critics answer to this by maintaining that this policy is politically unsustainable beyond rhetorics, and that it is casting a role for the country far beyond its capability. The end result of this posture accordingly is failure and frustration (Akpan, 1989: 100).

From its independence in 1960, Nigeria, seen as the “giant of Africa”, defined its foreign policy as Africa focused. Specifically, Africa was seen as the centre – piece of its foreign policy with the liberation of Africa’s remaining colonial territories from colonialism and apartheid as the main instrument. Later, the centre – piece notion was given an intellectual definition in the theory of concentric circles. The concept placed Nigeria as the epi – central area of the circle with the immediate neighborhood and Africa as a while coming closely thereafter. In the reality of implementation, the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid focus dominated all considerations including, as some critics implied, even Nigeria’s own interest, especially economic (Adeniji, 2012:423). Notwithstanding the conceptual construct that puts Africa at the centre piece of Nigeria’s foreign policy, there have been some attempts at re-conceptualizing Nigeria’s foreign policy relations since the mid-1980s. During this period, Africa was almost at the end of the decolonization of the continent and also at the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa which made it imperative for Nigeria to shift its foreign policy focus from the politics of the liberation struggle to issues of economic development at home and enhancing Nigeria’s potentials as a regional power (Adetula, 2012:64).

Thus, in analysing the structure of foreign policy of Nigeria, the questions that, therefore, arise are: how have the changes in the international system in the last fifty years been perceived and interpreted by the policy makers? How has Nigeria’s “national interest” been defined, in the context of those changes? What specific policies have been formulated and implemented to respond to the changes? What has been the impact of the charges and Nigeria’s responses on Nigeria’s national development? (Asobie, 2010:2) Since her independence, Nigeria’s national interest has been defined or determined mostly by the executive arm of the state. The executive arm in Nigeria is dominated by the middle class of the petit-bourgeoisie, with its trade mark of high premium on political stability and peace as dominant values and characteristic antipathy for radical change. Its strategic doctrine derives from its strong belief in neutrality as the best strategy for dealing with contending parties.

More specifically, Nigeria's foreign policy and national interest were determined and defined mainly by the Prime Minister or President, usually on the advice of the federal bureaucracy.

However, on a few occasions, principally in 1961 and 1986, efforts were made by government to involve non-state actors, massively, in defining Nigeria's national interest and charting the direction of Nigeria's foreign policy. In this respect, the outcome of the debate in the All Nigeria's People's Conference on foreign policy was taken very seriously in 1961. In 1986, the product of the conference was not made known to the public. In contrast, in 1961, the resolutions of the conference were published and efforts were made to implement them. Also, through the process of reviewing old and making new constitutions, debates were conducted on Nigeria's foreign policy and national interests in 1966, 1977-78, 1986-87, and 1998. The result was the inclusion of foreign policy objectives in the constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1979, 1989, 1995 (draft) and 1999 (Asobie, 2010:8).

Interestingly, it is instructive to note that Nigerian government-neither civilian nor military has since deviated from these cardinal principles (laid down by Balewa in parliament in August, 1960). Indeed, Nigeria has a record of achievements and continuity comparable with those of countries with longer history of conducting their own foreign policy (Gambari, 2008:3). Though, Nigeria's foreign policy has never been directly related to the needs of the masses of its people, rather, this policy has been --- reflecting the needs and aspirations of national elite (Gambari, 2008:60). In other words, in dealing with Nigeria's basic foreign policy objectives as articulated by Sir, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa over fifty years ago, what all his successors have done, is essentially changes in style, intensity of personal involvement selection of new priorities and not agenda in the past fifty years (Obiozor, 1992: XXXII).

Though, the Civil War has left a tremendous impact on the manner of the conduct of Nigeria's domestic and foreign policy. Arising from what the government perceived as having been responsible for the war and the unexpectedly long resistance of the Biafra's, a number of lessons and conclusions were drawn. One is that the country's survival as a sovereign independent state can no longer be taken for granted. The control and deployment of the country's police and army units must therefore remain with the Federal Government. The value of publicity in the conduct of external relations Biafra's success in presenting the war as one of the hostilities of particular consequence to the conduct of Nigerian foreign policy is the realization that it is dangerous to depend on one power bloc or group of countries and to rely on this one source for the supply of arms required to maintain internal

security. The unwillingness of the Western powers to sell arms to Nigeria brought home to the leaders that the previous attitudes to the West needed urgent review. But for the tenuous link with the USSR which made it possible to arrange the arms deal quickly in August 1967, the succession would have succeeded. The need to be truly non-aligned became clear (Adefuye, 1992:61).

By and large, it is perhaps axiomatic to assert that no other corporate group or national institution in Nigeria has influenced the country's foreign policy to the same extent and in the same manner that the Nigerian military has done in the past four decades. This is not unconnected with their domination of the political landscape and monopoly of power and governance for so long. From their first incursion into national politics and governance on the morning of January 15, 1966 till May 1999 when they handed over power to a democratically elected civilian government, a period that spanned 33 years, officers of the Nigerian armed forces ruled the country for a total of 29 years, allowing the civilians only a brief four-year interregnum called the Second Republic, 1979-1983. In the years when the military held sway, foreign policy went through the character of the personal idiosyncrasies of the different leaders. Policy to suit their own whims and fancies and thus left significant imprints on the conduct of external relations. They also influenced the choices that the country made, and the strategies and methodologies adopted for accomplishing their set objectives.

Therefore, from 1966 to 1999, Nigeria went from being merely the most populous black and African nation right to the pinnacle of influence and glory. In actual fact, it became the richest African country and by extension, the most influential in African affairs. The praise for this is partly due to two main factors, namely, the unexpected oil boom of the 1970s which spelt unprecedented national prosperity, as well as the military characteristics and preferences of some of the military rulers of the period (Fawole, 2000:1). But, since the last decade of the last century and of the millennium, the world has witnessed an unparalleled interconnectedness between societies and among states following the end of Cold War. This has brought about a fundamental shift in international relations as nations have become tied together ever more closely; through communications, trade, financial flows, socio-cultural fusion, political linkage and, above all, a technological explosion that has shrunk distances among nations and people/of this revolution, which began in the 1990s, has given renewed meaning and significance to the assertion of John Donne, an English Poet who wrote in 1623 that "no man is an island, entire to itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main" (Adedeji, 2008:xviii).

In a specific and critical term, to what extent has Nigeria's foreign policy been transformed by these defining global changes? How much rethinking has taken place in the corridor of power and among policy analysts? These global changes, far-reaching as they have been, are also marked by five paradoxes. First is a tide of fierce nationalism and ethnicism with the cohesion of states being threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social, economic, cultural and linguistic divides. Thus, in spite of the sweeping changes brought about by the institutionalization of the twin processes of globalization of universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism – centrifugal forces have been unleashed. Second is the re-emergence of regionalism, which has further compounded the already complicated global situation. Multilateralism, having been considerably weakened by globalization, regionalism has been revived in the hope that it might constitute the basis for an improved multilateral system. Little wonder that Naisbit has urged that the New Age mantra should be “think locally, act globally. Think tribally, act universally”. The shift in the focus of foreign policy from multilateral negotiations on development issues to a focus on the interference in the domestic policies and actions of developing countries-is the third fundamental change brought about by globalization. The fourth paradox is a fundamental shift in aid policy. Aid resources have become focused primarily on addressing cross-border problems that are of direct concern to the donor countries, rather than for financing purely national projects and programmes in developing countries. Finally, democracy has become universalized and mandatory for the legitimacy of every state and in order to qualify for donor support. The institution of multi-political party systems and the holding of periodic elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage now constitute democracy-and-good-governance conditionality. This was how democracy in Africa came to be categorized as ‘donor democracy’: Just enough fair voting and respect for human rights to satisfy the donor community (Adedeji, 2008:xix).

Nigeria's foreign policy operates at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Nigeria in the future will continue to strengthen bilateral ties with our traditional trading partners in the West, noticeably, the United States, Europe and the Americans as a whole as well as with Japan. Opportunities presenting themselves in the Middle East and Asia world also be readily exploited, but for the foreseeable future, our strong economic ties with the West will continue to predominate. Bilateral ties with African countries would continue to take prior position in our foreign policy. In this regard, we must develop strong ties with southern Africa and the Republic of South Africa in particular. Egypt, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo

(Zaire) and Morocco must be specially cultivated because these countries are important centres of power on the African continent. If Africa must take its pride of place Nigeria must work in concert with these medium income countries which in their own right are leaders in their sub-regions (Osuntokun, 1997:355).

Without doubt, Nigeria needs most urgently a new foreign policy architecture, both for intra-African as well as for global relations, which will enable it to face the challenges posed by these five paradoxes of globalization. Such architecture must, of course, be based on the country's national interest. Nigeria has the human and physical resources system in necessary to influence the international system in its own national interest. By the end of the first decade-and-a-half of the country's Independence between 1960 and 1975, Nigeria was showing clear signs of political stability, increasing wealth at home and growing influence abroad (Gambari, 1975:155). Two major elements of power were responsible for the country's increasing strength; population size and oil. Nigeria, with a population currently estimated at 140 million, has the largest population in Africa. About one out of every five Africans and one in every two West Africans is a Nigeria, while the next most populous country in the continent, Egypt, has less than half as many inhabitants as Nigeria. Second, Nigeria is the sixth-largest oil producing country in the world and a leading member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Nigeria produces over two million barrels of oil a day, and supplies twelve per cent of America's domestic fuel needs.

In general, Nigeria's foreign policy since Independence has been characterized more by continuity than by change. This may be explained by three main factors. First, there has been broad national consensus among Nigeria's elite concerning the basic goals and objectives of the country's external relations, especially on anti-colonial efforts; the struggle against apartheid vigorous pan-Africanism; and the defence of the country's territorial integrity; sovereignty and independence. Second, prolonged military rule in the country has promoted a high degree of centralization of power, which contributed to the significant reduction of the regional pressures prominent during the early years of independence. Third, foreign policy issues-or divisive debates about them-have hardly featured in national electoral processes in the 1960s.

In Nigeria, one major problem that has been militating against cohesive national development is policy inconsistency. Every successive government has a development agenda that takes a little or account of what had been done before it. Consequently, whenever a government is

ousted or voted out of power, its policies and agenda are also ignored. In the area of foreign policy making and implementation, the situation is not all that different. There is the need for policy re-orientation essentially because there have been non-articulation of concepts and discontinuity in the application of such concepts. For instance, Africa as ‘cornerstone’ of Nigeria’s foreign policy was adopted at the time of Nigeria’s independence. The main rationale for this was geo-cultural and was far from being driven by articulated interests *per se*. As explained by the then foreign minister, Dr. Jaja Wachukwu (1961: 282-283) Nigeria was an African state and a member of the African community and therefore, Nigeria should be

very closely and very intimately connected with all things pertaining to the African continent.... charity begins at home and therefore any Nigerian foreign policy that does not take into consideration the peculiar position of Africa is unrealistic

Nonetheless, there have been differences in emphasis on the approach to, as well as resources allocated to foreign policy pursuits during the country’s different administrations since independence. In this regard, the personality of the nation’s economy; and the capacity as well as influence of the foreign ministry vis-à-vis other centres of influence policy, are all critical elements in the country’s eventual policy output. The ultimate challenge for Nigeria’s foreign policy in the post Cold War era is how to forge and retain domestic consensus in the pursuit of an activist foreign that is anchored on a sound academic and development base (Ibrahim Gambari, 2008:78).

4.2 NATIONAL INTEREST OBJECTIVES IN NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

In Nigeria, foreign policy – making and implementation are coterminous with the country national interest. By national interest, we refer both to the common good of national society and the discrete objects of value over which states bargain in world politics (Smith & Little, 1991:48). Thus, they maintain that national interest refers to the overall common good of an entire society. In what appears a comprehensive analysis of the concept, Nweke (1985) posits that national interest embodies the sovereignty of the state; the inviolability of its territorial boundaries, and the right to individual and collective self – defense against internal and external threats.

It is undeniable that the idea of national interest continues to play a prominent role in the foreign policies of sovereign states. It is equally clear that there is no global consensus as to what constitutes the national interest, hence, analysts have not been able to establish with any degree of precision and/or certainty a definition of the term. This lack of a single central definition makes the concept pregnant with intriguing dimensions. In its classical meaning, the term 'national interest' serves as a convenient base to encompass all the strategies employed in the international interactions of states to ensure the preservation of the stated goals of society (Ogwu, 1986:7). Suffice it to say that a country's foreign policy is oftentimes determined by what it considers to be in her national interest. Though, a problematic concept the National Interest of a country could be determined by the relative bargaining power of the interest groups of a particular country. The bottom-line, however, remains that the security, welfare and well – being of one's people should be the ultimate goal of any foreign policy or act. Indeed, National Interest should be distilled both from the human security angle, as well as national security dimensions. Ex – president Ibrahim Babangida for example, defined Nigeria's national interest, in the context of national security and economic diplomacy. Within the ambit of this definition lay issues pertaining to the political, social, cultural, economic, military and security interests, with each interwoven and reinforcing each other (Obiozor, 1992: xi).

Broadly conceived, the term may either be regarded as a goal or a method of reaching a goal; it may also imply a means to an end (Dyke, 1972). But these goals cannot be formulated without a clear perception of the core values of the society. In his book on contemporary theory and behaviour of states, Frankel (1967:76) discusses the central role that values play in defining the national interest. As he notes, '*values describe the inner element brought to bear by the decision makers upon the process of making decisions*'. While it is recognised that the promotion of basic national values remain the principal consideration of decision makers in the formulation of policies, Frankel (1967:77) observes that it is often empirically impossible to determine whether the values found in the formulation of a specific interest had been found in the formulation of a specific interest had been internalised by the decision-makers or introduced only in response to environmental pressure, generally domestic but sometimes also international'.

The liberal thesis on national interest is anchored in an earliest interpretation of history. It has been noted that "while the concern of politics with interest is perennial, the connection

between interest and the national state is a product of history and as such destined to yield in time to different modes of political organization. As long as the world is politically organised into nations, the national interest is indeed the last word in politics” (Morgenthau, 1952). Even so, confusions persist on the subject of national interest because of the elusiveness of the concept and its varying interpretation. To avoid this, analysts have provided alternative schemes for classifying the policy goals of national interest of critical relevance in this respect is *residual interest*. Holsti (1974:137) argues that core values and interests can be described as those kind of goals for which most people are willing to make ultimate sacrifices; articles of faith that a society accepts uncritically.

It is a well-recognised fact that the contemporary international political system is characterized by two fundamental conditions – quasi – sovereignty of its various units and interdependence among them. The implications of these two conditions are inescapable. Quasi – sovereignty means that each state must ultimately depend on and act for itself in the continual effort to insure its own survival. At the same time, interdependence means that the activities of other states will necessarily impinge on that effort. Thus, all states, regardless of size, level of development, ideological orientation or domestic politics, are obliged to respond in some measure to the actions of others. Some may ignore much international activity, but cases of genuine, self – imposed isolation are, in fact, few some may perhaps fail to respond adequately when confronted with a threat to their own survival, but even submission is a form of response. The foreign policy officials of most states, however, keep a watchful eye on developments abroad and regularly respond to activity directed toward them (Munton Don 1998). On a less theoretical level, there are various practical reasons for this phenomenon. First the very fact that these events have occurred, and may be of importance, gives them precedence over problems and opportunities that remain potential rather than actual. Attending to the dispute that arose yesterday will virtually always take precedence on the foreign policy agenda over planning for the dispute that may arise tomorrow. Given the number and variety of events that do occur, it is not surprising that the operation of a foreign ministry more closely resembles that of an overburdened fire hall, than of a leisurely academic seminar. Moreover, when the problems and opportunities do arise, they are often unexpected or, more accurately, they often assume unexpected forms (Robertson, 1971: 502-503).

However, much behaviour is influenced by external stimuli, it might be argued that it is equally if not more influenced by *previous* behaviour. States, like the people who act for

them, are creatures of habit. The more their relations with other countries are regularised, the less their actions will be subject to marked, short-term shifts. To be sure, foreign policy does not become merely an incessant repetition of one type of activity. It does come to have a considerable continuity. When it undergoes change, foreign policy tends to change gradually, each action being only a slight modification of the previous action it ought to be emphasised that many prominent foreign policy analysis have made the same assertion in one form or another. Rosenau (1968:328) for one has observed that foreign policy behaviour demonstrates the inertia of habit as well as the continuities to which habitual behaviour give rise. It exposes the universality of resistance to change and, correspondingly, the large extent to which change can be introduced only in small increments at the margins of organized life. Explaining a country's foreign policy, Rosenau (1987) has suggested, requires one to be exceedingly 'venture some', for the foreign policy analyst must take into account not only what happens at the international level, but also be familiar with the pattern and context of domestic politics, and with the nature structure, and process of government.

4.3 THE STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR ERA

Foreign policy is not considered dynamic if it merely initiates events and does so only after other actors have set in motion the changes in attitude, values and alignments required within the international system. Foreign policy is formulated and implemented essentially for the international system as popularized by both Bertalanffy and Easton (1980:67). A significantly potent component of any foreign policy is national interest without which foreign policy is void. This is because one of the major objectives of states in external relations is to promote and protect their interests from whatever perspective they may deem necessary. Although national interests supersede the interests of any national or citizen, they are diverse, depending on the character of the nation and that of its leadership (Zimako, 2009:161).

Relationships between states that affect the national security or general welfare of each are the core of international relations. The foreign policies of a nation are the courses of action a nation uses to achieve its international objectives. As a rule, the nation's primary purposes are to increase its own security and its own general economic welfare. Sometimes, however, a foreign policy may further the interests of some politically powerful pressure group rather than those of the nation as a whole. When this is so, those who support it usually attempt to

convince the majority that it benefits the entire nation. Generally speaking, the foreign policies of a state are designed to serve the national interests as these are conceived by the public or by those in direct control. Security and prosperity are always major objectives, the objectives may include the spread of an ideology such as the expansion of national power and prestige. Unfortunately, there is no simple formula guaranteeing that the right foreign policy decisions will always be made. Debate is, therefore, inevitable (Hunt, & Colander, 2002:405).

For the first time, foreign policy has become global. In the past, the various continents conducted their foreign policy essentially in isolation. Throughout much of history, the foreign policy of Europe was scarcely affected by events in Asia. When, in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the European powers were extending their influence throughout the world, the effective decisions continued to be made in only a few great European capitals. Today, statesmen face the unprecedented problem of formulating policy for well over a hundred countries. Every nation, no matter how insignificant, participates in international affairs. Ideas are transmitted almost instantaneously. What used to be considered domestic events can now have world-wide consequences (Kissinger, 1974:53). The revolutionary character of our age can be summed up in three general statements: (a) the number of participants in the international order has increased and their nature has altered; (b) their technical ability to affect each other has vastly grown; (c) the scope of their purposes has expanded. Whenever the participants in the international system change, a period of profound dislocation is inevitable. They can change because new states enter the political system, or because there is a change in values as to what constitutes legitimate rule, or, finally, because of the reduction in influence of some traditional units. In our period, all of these factors have combined. Since the end of the Second World War, several score of new states have come into being. In the nineteenth century, the emergence of even a few new nations produced decades of adjustment, and after the First World War, the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were never assimilated. Our age has yet to find a structure which matches the responsibilities of the new nations to their aspirations. As the number of participants has increased, technology has multiplied the resources available for the conduct of foreign policy. A scientific revolution has, for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy. It has magnified insecurities because it has made survival seem to depend on the accidents of a technological breakthrough (Kissinger, 1974:54).

This trend has been compounded by the nature of contemporary domestic structures. As long as the states' ability to mobilize resources was limited, the severity of their conflicts had

definite bounds. In the eighteenth century, custom restricted the demands rulers by "divine right" could make upon their subjects; a philosophy of minimum government performed the same role through much of the nineteenth century. Our period has seen the culmination of a process started by the French Revolution: the basing of governmental legitimacy on popular support. Even totalitarian regimes are aberrations of a democratic legitimacy; they depend on popular consensus even when they manufacture it through propaganda and pressure. In such a situation, the consensus is decisive; limitations of tradition are essentially irrelevant. It is an ironic result of the democratization of politics that it has enabled states to marshal ever more resources for their competition (Kissinger, 1974:55).

Foreign policy embraces the goals that nation's officials seek to attain abroad, the values that give rise to those objectives, and the means or instruments used to pursue them. Although, statesmen and scholars differ as to the implications of national self-interest, almost all agree that in theory and practice the states maintain relations with other nations to serve its own interests. The means use to advance those interests constitute their foreign policy. Since national self-interest motivates the foreign policies of all nations, foreign policy in its general objectives does not differ markedly from those of other countries' various national interests. One of the continually chanted Nigerian slogans since Independence was, and is, 'Neither East nor West' but a balanced foreign policy. The clamour has been protracted in several quarters for the overhaul of the foreign policy of Nigeria in order to accommodate the views and/or interest of the world power. This slogan clearly outlines the Nigerian foreign policy. The negation of any domination or influence either from East or the West, in the political, economic or cultural fields is the basic and fundamental principles of Nigerian foreign policy. At the same time, helping the other deprived African nations and co-operating with the liberation movements in their struggle for freedom are equally of paramount in the structure and conduct of Nigerian foreign policy.

Foreign policy making, is a modality of political decision making. Normally, we connect with the notion of decision making and some objective functions which are to be maximized. And to talk of maximization is to suggest that we may have to assume that policy – makers are rational. This is to say, an individual decision – maker responds to an event 'on the basis of a cool, clear – headed, means – end calculation. He uses the best information available, and also uses from the universe of possible responses the one likely to maximize his goals' (Rosenau, 1969:219). However, to press this too far may be to oversimplify the decision-making process. A neat means – end construct can be a partial description of actual

behaviour, for to accept it unqualifiedly would be to ignore the personality variables and other constraints which often play a part in the process of making decisions. To elucidate the nature of these constraints which often play a part in the process of making decisions and to bring them out more clearly with specific characteristics of foreign policy decision making it might be useful to contrast foreign policy making with economic and political-decision making considered generically. In the field of economics, there is usually the notion of an economic man who, assuming that all things are equal, if he had a certain stimulus, would behave in certain predictable ways.

However, there are more uncertainties deriving from the nature of political activities which constitute serious constraints on the realization of any objective function than in economics. In politics, for example, the designation of the ways by which such a function can be arrived at, if not the definition of such a function per se, is always subject to various ideological beliefs of decision-makers. Secondly, politics has not reached the level of analytical sophistication made possible in economics by the availability of relatively more quantifiable variables. It is not also easy to order consistently political outcomes because there are always countervailing pressures at work from the environment (Ajibola, 1979:1-2).

In the field of foreign affairs, the objective function to be maximized is the promotion and the protection of national interest of the state, where 'national interest' is taken to mean the protection of the territorial integrity of a nation from physical and cultural incursions. This simply means that governments take all measures that would best achieve the maintenance of the geographical boundaries of a state; make sure that the culture of the people is not adversely affected by external influences in a way that a dissonance is created between the existing political structures and the political culture; and promote the state's economic values at home and in other countries. Foreign policies should be designed in such a way that, given the state's relationship with other similarly organized human collectivities, the economic base of the society continues to be maximized.

Foreign policy making shares all the attributes of domestic political decision making. In addition, it faces some constraints which have their sources within and without each country. From the domestic environment, policy making may be constrained by the nature of the political institutional structure in the country, public opinion (which may be generated by mass media, pressure groups and parliament), the nature of the country's economic structure, etc (Ajibola, 1979:2). On the other hand, constraints from the external environment include

the difficulty of collecting information and the reliability value of such information the attitude of other governments, international organizations and the direction of 'world opinion', etc. The salience of each type of constraint will vary from one type of political system to another or even among systems that may be categorized as being similar. For example, the salience of 'public opinion' on the decision-makers may be different not only between America and the former Soviet Union but also between America and Britain. Also, information becomes a constraint partly because decision makers are dealing with representatives of other 'sovereign' states; they usually are not in possession of reliable data. For example, suppose state A at time T_1 has Q_2 amount of resources which it needs to maximize its power position relative to State B which is assumed to have Q_2 of the same resources at the same period. At time T_2 , state A may still evaluate their relative strength to be Q_3 each, but B might in fact possess Q_4 of the resources. It is a consequence of this type of faulty information and difficulty in controlling the international environment which forces decision makers to treat foreign affairs as a special field of government (Ajibola, 1979:3).

Other constraints on foreign policy decision-makers on the international scene may be referred to as 'international norms' and 'world opinion'. Though difficult to quantify, norms are defined as unwritten 'rules according to which behaviour ought to be shaped. Since these are not translated into laws, their enforcement is a matter of 'conscience' on the part of the decision-makers. It is argued that these norms prescribe the propriety of action so that the people who accept them can always know whether or not to take certain decisions. Ideally, such norms will become part of the social and psychological environment of the decision-makers, so that interests and goals incompatible with them would never be allowed to reach any stage of realization (Johnson, 1945:67). On the other hand, it is argued that these norms and world opinion do not constitute constraints on foreign policy-makers because the interests at stake relate to material needs which necessitate behaviour designed to satisfy them, behaviour which is of a non-ethical nature (Morgenthau, 1966:172).

The argument about international or 'world opinion' introduces an element into the decision-making model which states that, apart from the citizens of a given country, the opinions of citizens of other countries are also relevant. Every nation's foreign policy is or should be in the service of its national interest. While foreign policy can be said to define the basis on which one state engages another or other subjects of international law, such as international organizations, the idea of national interest does not seem to lend itself to such easy generalization. There is contention depending on which school of thought one belong to.

Whatever school of thought one adheres to, there are elements of national interest that appear constant, while others may be contextual or remain in the realm of ideals to be attained in the future. It can be said, however, as a matter of historical analysis, that Nigeria's national interest, within the framework of its foreign policy, has gone through different phases of mutation from the immediate post-colonial period to date, even when the core elements have remained largely the same (Eze, 2000:79). Thus, at independence in 1960, Nigeria adopted the principle of non-alignment as one of the principles of her foreign policy being cognizance and appreciation of the existing international environment. The reason for this consideration was the fact that two super powers subjected the third world countries which Nigeria is a prominent member to a protracted torture through their discord and harmony, this structure of the external environment lasted for about two decades and half after independence. Then, with the demise of the Cold War and the subsequent disintegration of the union of Soviet Socialist Republic between 1985 and 1990, many questions have risen as to what the new international environment has in stock for the globe and its impact on Nigeria.

Up till 1960, the year of independence, the foreign policy of colonial Nigeria was made and implemented by the British government. Prior to her independence, Nigeria had its domestic economy dominated not only by the British government but also by a small group of oligopolistically organized foreign firms, largely British owned but with sizeable participation of other western European nations such as France and Netherlands. Among these firms were the UAC, John Holt, PZ, UTC and the Nigeria Tobacco Company (NTC). These companies handled exports and imports for Nigeria (Olusanya & Akindele, 1986:72). Nigeria had little or no contact with the Soviet Union before independence. Though, Nigeria had some historical links with the united states, arising partly from the slave trade and partly from the fact that both countries had at different period the same colonial master –Britain (with all the implications that held in official language, concept of government, law and education). Despite this, there was very little interaction between the two countries before Nigeria became independence (Olajide, 18981:71). But Nigeria operated a kind of traditionally exclusive bilateral focus on the United Kingdom up till the period of independence.

However, the issue of bloc politics in the international system was a good omen for the Independence struggle. The eastern bloc accused the western bloc of exploitation associating colonization with the evils of capitalism, which the United States clamoured for self-

determination of the colonized people. although, Nigeria's choice of the United States , at independence, to introduce her at the United Nations General Assembly as a new member nation of the world body contrasted with the practice of other newly independent English-Speaking countries of Africa where either Ghana or Britain was invited to perform the role, she still want forth to establish closer ties with the United States .thus in 1961,President J.F Kennedy of the United States announced an offer of \$ 2225 million as a long term developments aid to Nigeria (Olusanya & Akindele, 1986:233) portraying a new era of Nigeria- United States relations.

Furthermore, the implementation of the American aid within the framework of the first development plan marked the start of Nigeria's strategy to multi-lateralize its external economic and political dependency on the western bloc. Thus, as a result of this dependency, Nigeria's ruling strata were compelled to identify and comply with western policy positions with regards to Africa, thereby jeopardizing the national as well as collective Africa interests. This of course portrays the fact that due to the structure of bilateral or multilateral relationship with the western bloc, Nigeria leaders could not conceive; much less sustain an autonomous foreign policy directed at serving the state's best interests. Instances have included Nigeria's rejection of aid from the communist bloc as well as her role in the Congo crisis in early 1960s.

To some scholars, the Nigeria Leadership immediately after Independence were confronted with the problem of initiating a development strategy to redress the issue of Nigeria's underdevelopment, and later discovered that for massive development it must involve former colonizers and their allies such a programme, it was acknowledge will depend on a steady inflow of further external capital with the same economic force from whom Independence was sought. The first regime that emerged in 1960 had no alternative than to co-operate with the west since they were the source of Nigeria's external aids and grants and also dominated economy. Apart from \$225 million America development aid given to Nigeria in 1961, more than 90% of Nigerians export to America and the western European countries. However, the revenue accruing from oil in 1966 was just ₦24.4 million (roughly 7.6 % of total revenue) (Olusanya & Akindele, 1986:200).

Apparently, Nigeria's source of funding between 1960 and 1966 was basically through external loans and grants. According to Basseyy Ate, 'at the inception of the first development plan, its total cost was projected to be \$1,892,800.00. It was then estimated that 50% of the

planned expenditure would be raised through foreign loans and grants: 50% of which will be from United States while the rest will come from International Financial institutions, Britain and other western bloc nations'. This dependency made Nigeria to be sympathetic to the west till the 1970s when revenue accruing to the oil sector increased tremendously and the issue of foreign grants and loans began to fade. With this enormous wealth, Nigeria discovered the economic capability towards pursuing a more articulate and dynamic foreign policy and thus was placed at an available position in the community of nations. However this never detached Nigeria from the western bloc economics as the neo- colonial political economy encouraged capitalist development in Nigeria to consolidate western economic domination (Gavin, 1976:47).

Although, during the 1970's Nigeria's economy improved tremendously: Nigeria's national revenue accruing from oil rose from \$ 1.4 billion in 1970 to \$ 9 billion in 1975. Nigeria was still tied to the United States being the major consumer of the country's crude oil. Other records showed within the earlier years of independence, the United States government and its related agencies constituted the dominant source of foreign aid to Nigeria. In the area of foreign trade in the same period, about 80% of Nigeria's exports were sent mainly to Britain and the U.S.A as well as other western bloc nations. 70% of imports into Nigeria came in from the same source. By 1966, the United States and Britain represented the two largest individual sources of foreign investment in the country, controlling about 69% of the total. In terms of technical assistance, the United States and Britain contributed 52% and 37% of the technical assistance personnel respectively (Olusanya & Akindele, 1986:241).

In actual fact, Nigeria's diplomatic ties within this period correspond with the economic relations. Her diplomatic attention was towards the United States till the outbreak of the Civil War in 1967. during the civil war, the United States and Britain initially refused to intervene. But the former U.S.S.R, who had been searching for an opportunity for an ideological victory in Nigeria, used the ugly occurrence of the Civil War period to penetrate and established relations with Nigeria. Before the independence, the Soviet Union and the rest of eastern established relations bloc that had zero or minimal relationship with Nigeria, having not been involved in the colonial drive. Besides, the ideology of the Russian people had kept the former U.S.SR far from Africa.

According to Robert Legvold, the entire black Africa did not become serious concern of Soviet foreign policy until late in 1950s. For the forty years of Soviet history, this area stood

on the outermost edge of Soviet consciousness. Never during the critical period of Cold War did black Africa receive more than fleeting notice (Robert, 1970:3). Of course, there were obvious reasons for this development. At independence, Nigeria's adoption of the British parliamentary system and exclusive dealings with the western bloc future kept the Soviet apart. Even, in terms of trade, the Soviet had more percentage of the total trade in Nigeria. And loans with a paltry 2.5 % interest rate offered to Nigeria by the then Soviet government in 1960 were rejected. As the United States was determined to ensure that Nigeria remained in the free world as a show piece for western style democracy for the promotion of her economic interests. The Soviet was interested in building a socialist in Nigeria from the west in the 1960, Russia offered discreet and clandestine financial and moral assistance to some radical elements in Nigeria (Olajide, 1981:99). They had also tried to educate Nigerians on the evils of importation of communist literature into Nigeria and the opening of embassies in the eastern bloc countries was delayed till 1961, while those of the western bloc countries were opened immediately after independence. Within the period, the Nigeria government also rejected the overtures from three socialist states that offered specific aid Figures viz: Czechoslovakia (\$14 million), Yugoslavia (\$9 million) and Poland (\$32 million) (Olusanya, & Akindele, 1986:254). The philosophy being to avoid the Eastern bloc even when it was obvious that Nigeria was to gain from the relationship economically.

However, the Civil War brought fundamental improvement on the Nigeria- Soviet economic relation. The former Soviet Union was awarded the contract to construct the first iron and steel complex in Nigeria at a cost of over a billion naira. Agreement was also reached on the establishment and initial manning of a petroleum technology. The number of Nigeria student going to institution of higher learning also increased tremendously. The new romance with the then Soviet was as a result of the help that she offered the Federal Military Government during the Nigeria civil war. Construction companies from Bulgaria and Poland were also awarded contract by the Nigerian government to participate in the implementation of a number of project, most notable of which is the National Arts Theatre in Lagos built by a Bulgarian Firm (Ogunsanwo, 1986:35). Clearly, Nigeria's relations with the Soviet countries at a lower rate without any fundamental shift despite the expectation that she will become an African Cuba because of her improved relations with former Soviet Union and the rest if the communist bloc, on the other hand Nigeria- United States relations returned to its pre-Civil War level of cordiality. American investment in Nigeria rose from about \$ 250 million in 1966 to over \$1,000 million in 1974 becoming the second largest investor after Britain

(\$1,250 million). American financial aid within this period also rose substantially to \$ 201,255,000 against of the society which stood at \$ 933, 000 by 1973 (Olajide, 1981:101).

Nevertheless, the ambition of Nigeria to establish herself as a regional power through afro-centric foreign policy strained the Nigeria- US relations from the mid-1970s to 1980, it never went deep as Nigeria adopted the American presidential system of government in her transition to civil democracy in 1979. Amazingly, till 1985 when Michael Gorbachev came into the leadership of the former U.S.S.R, Nigeria was more attached to the Western world than to the Eastern bloc; and American, Britain, France had established sound economic bases in Nigeria more than the soviets, promoting the capitalist mode of production. They also penetrated into all countries of laissez faire capitalism and liberal democracy. Nigeria has often been described as a local hegemony ‘Giant of Africa’ on account of its population of 140 million, geographical size, and relatively large economic and human resources. The country is the world's sixth largest oil producer and exporter of over 12 per cent of American oil by 2007; it possesses gas reserves that could supply Western Europe for a decade; it accounts for 75 per cent of West Africa's economic strength; and has about 60 per cent of its population. The aspiration to continental leadership, manifest since Independence in 1960, is central to understanding some principal features of Nigeria's foreign policy, such as the breaking of diplomatic relations with France in 1961 over the issue of nuclear testing in the Sahara; the creation of ECOWAS in 1975; membership of the ‘frontline states’ of southern Africa in the struggle against then-Rhodesia and apartheid south Africa in the 1980s; the country's long-term chairmanship of the UN's leadership of peacekeeping missions in Chad (1979-1982), Liberia (1990-98 and 2003) and Sierra Leone (1997 – 2000) (Adekeye, 2008:74).

It is difficult to identify Nigeria's conception of national interest since 1960 to date. As Green (2000:81) aptly puts it:

While it is difficult to define the national interest of Nigeria, it is even more difficult to redefine it because of the variegated diplomatic permutations and ideologies Nigeria adopted over the years. Some foreign policy experts believe that Nigeria has no clear cut political ideology and national interest. Part of the policy facilitations is attributable to the fact that foreign policy is inextricably linked to its domestic policy. Similarly, one can indicate that generally, trends in Nigeria's foreign policy indicating its national interest have not been very stable over time; nevertheless it has always assumed the minimal core elements of national interest – protection of sovereignty and

territorial integrity and the security of the country. It is in this context that the mutations of Nigeria's conception of national interest should be understood.

Nigeria's foreign policy decision makers took into consideration the structure of the states. They based the principles and objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy on her national interests. This is the fundamental, since national interests is the basic of states action and reactions in international relations: The National interests of Nigeria revolve around the areas of economic development, political reforms and, peace and security (Daily Time, 1997:13). Thus, she has the same interest with other states like the United States, definite USSR, Britain, France, China etc. who can attempts to promote theirs, have tried to either maintain or create a world order favourable to them. The principal objective of all foreign policies, that of Nigeria inclusive, is to promote and protect the country's national interest in her relationship with actors in the international system.

Thus, the objective of Nigeria's foreign policy have been broadened enough to contain that entire state struggle for international relations. Nation-state in realistic consideration of the basic indices of power such as size and population, economic and industrial base, political system and leadership, and military capability determine the principles of their foreign policy. Nigeria has not been an exception; she has since independence adopted foreign policy principles and in realistic consideration of these and other notable factors in the international system. Nigeria between 1960 and 1990 when the bipolar wall collapsed, had join Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) and she is a committed member in the course of her foreign relations. The first principle of non-alignment is a policy that rejected formal military alliance and routine political support for either sides of the Cold War bipolar structure.

Commenting on Nigeria's position on the alignment or non-alignment, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1963:37) stated in an unambiguous terms that:

Nigeria's position has been that with proper objectivity, the policy for each occasion should be selected in Nigeria's national interest and that of world peace "our policy is to follow the path of truth as we conceive it, and consequently consider it wrong for us to associate ourselves as a matter of routine with any of the power blocs.

Needless to say, this principle of non-alignment was not adhered to at the same level by the various governments. The pre-Civil War administration especially that of Balewa had a lot of sympathy for the western bloc. The regime among others signed the Nigeria-Anglo defence pact under which Nigeria granted the United Kingdom unrestricted access over flying and air

staging facilities in the federation and agreed to make available at Kano and Lagos air field for holding of tropicalisation trial of aircraft in turn for assistance for the training and development of the armed forces of the federation and landing fee for civil air fields in the federation. Nigeria also boycotted the Belgrade conference of non-aligned movement in 1961 due to what she considered to be anti-west propaganda by the organizers. Nigeria within this period exhibited a lot discriminatory attitude towards the Eastern bloc and this was not relaxed until Civil War years (1967-1970).

Hence, the non-alignment principle of Nigeria foreign policy started in earnest after the civil war. Thus, since the earlier 1970s, Nigeria has adhered to the principle, confronting the western bloc where and when necessary despite her international economics mileage with the west. An instance is the de-colonization exercise in Southern Africa where Nigeria used both financial and diplomatic assistance to counter the western efforts to perpetrate apartheid, racism and continued colonization of Africa. The second principle is the legal equality of states under which Nigerian's foreign policy elite realistically believed that a well ordered and peaceful communities at both the universal and the regional levels required mutual and reciprocal respect for the few and interest of all national actors (Philips, 2007:304).

This principle has guided the Nigerian foreign policy matters up till date. In spite of her comparative advantage of size, population and resources over many countries in Africa, particularly in West Africa, she has continued to play just a leadership role in regional and sub-regional leadership in Africa; shouldering a disproportional large financial burden of the Economics community of West Africa states and spending more than N50 of West Africa. She has never sought to dominate or carry out any act of aggression against a smaller state. rather, she has continued to play just a leadership role in regional and sub-regional Africa; shouldering a disproportionately large financial burden of the annual budget of the economic community of black Africa state and spending more than N50 million to fund the than OAU peace keeping in Chad. That also related to the principle of equality of state is that of non-interference in the domestic affair of other state. This is similar to the United Nations principle of sovereignty of state. It has to some length however, undermined Nigerians territorial integrity because other states domestic crisis and conflict has posed security problem to Nigeria and she could not respond to them because she has been chained by the principle. Instances are Equatorial Guinea crisis and Chadian civil war.

In relation to the promotion of world peace, the Nigerian foreign policy makers adopted the principle of multi-literalism, which explains Nigeria's search for membership of international organization at both the global and regional levels. The principle was adopted with the belief that it would provide opportunities for multilateral negotiations and collaboration among states in the international system. At the same time, it could be used to monitor types of political exchange between individual states seeking to influence the formulation of community values in the image of specific national preference. Nigeria has in this regard become a member of the United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth of Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nigeria, in this vein has committed her energy and resources in aiding various activities of these organizations. Despite the principle of multi-literalism, however, Nigeria has continued bilateral relations with numerous countries of the world from both the Eastern and Western blocs.

In addition to that, there is the principle of African centeredness, since Independence Africa has been made to claim first attention in Nigeria's external relations and per-occupation, a principle extended to the entire black world. This issue of Africans however started with the common desire of black people all over the world to emancipate themselves from oppression and also their collective and concerted efforts to restore their cultural heritage. These were the principle and aims of Pan Africanism in the pre-Independence era. Thus, Nigeria after Independence became the biggest black nation in history and by this virtue, the symbol of black race, which dawns on her the need for a leading role, not only in Africa but also among Africans in Diaspora. She hence had the need of incorporating this into her national interests. Suffice to say, Nigeria's national interest can cut across territorial boundaries, a very good example can be seen in the Laissez faire capitalist system which she has been promoting to influence other states in international system; other similar examples of Nigeria's Africa interest is the Jewish question by Israeli; promotion of socialist/communist system by the Soviet union; and the Vatican's city protection over the Catholics. Thus, the policy of Africaness was formulated as a result of the practical conception of Nigeria's national interests, for she shares common destiny with blacks all over the world (Imoegbe, 1983:125).

However, despite this view, the implementation of Africa-centred Nigerian foreign policy was not affected until the 1970s with the help of the oil boom from Gowon's administration, Nigeria has held on to this principle even till today. Its peak was the Murtala/Obasanjo

regime in the mid-1970s when Nigeria intensified her effort in aiding the Liberation struggle of the African states still under colonial rule. Instances are Nigeria's role in South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The previous world class orders, which Europe dominated with her policy of colonization, created the phenomenon of dependency on the western capitalist system. During this period, therefore, Africans were not involved in the foreign policy formulation of their states, rather policies emanated from the colonizers. Then, under the bipolar world order, African nations gained their political Independence but were, during this time, under the influence of two leviathans, the United States and the defunct U.S.S.R. Hence, the principles and objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy stated above rested on the influence of the international environment, that is, the Bipolar System.

The bipolar order, to a large extent did not fail to influence, if not determine the direction of the above- stated principles and objective during the period under study. The principle of non-alignment was adopted after Independence in response to the bipolar structure of the international environment. It was for the country to take decision on international events with proper objectivity rather than taking sides with any of the two leviathans; the United States of America and the union of Soviet socialist republic. Meanwhile, the implementation of the principle of non-alignment met many upheavals among which were that Nigeria had been initially indoctrinated into global Capitalism by the previous order. And, hence, cannot easily detach herself from western international economic relations. Coupled with this, the United States continued to grant Nigeria aid, it embark on development programmes although, economic alignment does not deter political non-alignment, it never the less has a lot of influence on political actions of any state.

Furthermore, the nature of East/West ideology confrontation in the struggle for sphere of influence in Africa created a lot of problem for Africa State in general in the application of principle of non-alignment. With their military and economic capabilities, they made the non-alignment principle feeble, realigning its wheels in the Africa continents. The principle of equality of state which was adopted by Nigerian foreign policy makers to help in maintenance of world peace was also influenced by the activities of the superpowers who used their economic and military capabilities to determine future of other state in the international system. Although, Nigeria kept to these principles both in paper and practice up-to-date, the bipolar structure, which posited two leviathans to determine the nature of world politics, undermines this principle as they use their enormous political, economic and military

power to veto any issue in international organization, even when it does not concern them directly.

The principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other state although has been respected by Nigeria suffered neglect from the super powers who considered Africa and Asia as penumbral zones, treating issues concerning them without their consent and using them as battle ground Via internal conflict in Africa promote their ideologies. Instances are the Congo crisis of 1960, Angola's liberation struggle, among others. Within the period of Cold War, crucial issues for the international system were centred around the United States and the defunct Soviet Union. Then, role and status in the international system was only seen in term of America vs Soviet interest and issues which occur along the periphery were viewed through this prism.

The principle of multilateralism which was formulated to aid Nigeria's membership of international organization was much affected by the bipolar structure of the international system as the superpower through various nefarious activities tried to establish ideological bases in most state of the world bloc politics, infiltrated all international organization; the united nation basically was spited into two; the Western Bloc and Eastern Bloc, then North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact nations. The leviathans also infiltrated other organization like the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) and Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) to influence the member states for their national interest. These infiltrations also affected the establishment of bilateral relation with some countries like Ghana, Guinea, and Benin who were once committed countries and this affected their relationship with Nigeria both multilaterally and bilaterally. Thus, the promotion of the principle of Africa can tiredness of Nigeria's foreign policy had the most turbulent encounter.

The super powers having considered Africa problem as a penumbral zone dealt with African as if they were simply extension of their relation with the colonial powers. In the case of the Soviet who had little or no business at all in Africa, they tried to use any available opportunity to embarrass the West making Africa the battle ground for their ideological warfare. This made Nigeria to walk through the mine field of East/West interest to reach an essential level of contentious unity and solidarity in the process of implementations were also misinterpreted by the leviathans in the United States who supported the FNLA and UNITA as a shift to the Communist part simply because the former Soviet Union was on the side of the

MPLA. Thus, the interest of the super powers was not any other thing than the curtail act of the excesses of each other (Imobigbe, 1983:45). Indeed, through the Cold War Era, Nigeria's foreign policy faced a turbulent time trying to implement its policies based on her principle and objectives. Nigerian leaders lamented the constraints occasioned by the ideological conflict of the super powers within and beyond the African continent (Garba, 1987:147).

Therefore, the core aspects of Nigeria's foreign policy for a new millennium should be the articulation and defence of its national interest, which is based on the promotion of peace and security, as well as on development and democratization at home and abroad. In this regard, Nigeria must establish, both in principle and in practice, an approach that recognizes that it is no longer enough to seek what the country can do for others, but what it can do together with other nations in the pursuit of common interests. Hence, the principle and practice of 'burden-sharing' and 'shared responsibilities' should govern even those external endeavours that are in Nigeria's national interest. A good example of this was the subsuming of about 3,500 Nigerian peace keepers into a UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) after the withdrawal of 8,500 Nigerian troops by the year 2000. The UN thus took over the financial costs of the peacekeepers from Nigeria and provided some of the logistical equipment that Nigeria lacked (Gambari, 2008:74).

4.4 NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EMERGENT NEW WORLD ORDER

The formulation of foreign policy of any country depends largely on a number of factors with different variables becoming critical at different times. That is to say, no nation can pursue a meaningful and successful foreign policy which is removed from its actual status, be it political, economic, social or, a combination of these factors. Nigeria, by virtue of her large physical size, huge population and rich natural endowments has always been expected to play a leading role in international and African politics. Consequently, successive administrations believed that Nigeria is endowed with a manifest destiny to be the leading voice and actor in African and international politics (Otubanjo, 1989:3). At independence, Nigeria found herself in a conflicting and hostile nature of international environment. Specifically, it was during the intense hostility between the two contending world powers – the United States of America and the disintegrated U.S.S.R; that Nigeria attained her independence. Thus, during this particular period, what followed the attainment of Independence was a quest for

development. With this yearning and aspirations, Nigeria started to identify her position in the international environment. But in order to be neutral and to forcefully pursue a policy which is neither pro-West nor pro-East, Nigeria adopted a Mixed-Economy System. Ironically, the economic nature of the Nigerian State was essentially situated on capitalism, even the political system pointed directly on the western structure.

Few events symbolized the significant changes which took place in the last decade of the twentieth century more than the dismantling of the Berlin Wall. Going by the tense and frightening circumstances that led to the building of the wall in the early years of the Cold War, its destruction seemed to confirm that a fundamental shift in modern human history had taken place. For some observers, this event marked the beginning of a new era of greater peace and stability in international politics, and in which war would no longer serve as a useful instrument of foreign policy. Mueller (1989) shares this optimistic interpretation of recent trends. According to him, "We have reached the stage in history when the notion that war can be used to resolve conflicts has been discredited and abandoned". This optimism does not stem just from a reading of events relating to the end of cold war. Instead, Mueller takes a longer historical perspective, arguing that war was already becoming obsolete by the First World War. Since then, the horrors of the Second World War and the tension of the Cold War have served only to reinforce earlier lessons about the horrendous cost of modern warfare.

However: roughly fifty-five years after independence, Nigeria has had thirteen different governments that were being led by different individuals in both temperament and idiosyncratic values. Nevertheless; the same guiding principles have been upheld by the different Heads of government in actualizing these foreign policy objectives. Essentially, the Nigeria foreign policy was formulated by late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa's regime, 1960-1966. More significantly, since then, in dealing with Nigeria's foreign policy, the substance has changed, but rather what has been modified is the style and selection of the new' priorities. Therefore, given the development in the international system, it is evident that the emergent New World order reveals that there is need to invariably re-define Nigeria's, foreign policy in conformity with the interest of - advanced capitalist countries. Of course, Nigeria's background of history and experience should be equally examined critically in this re-definition of foreign policy. Consequently, it is this development that prompted General Babangida to re-define Nigeria's foreign policy during his own tenure. According to the former Military President, General Ibrahim Babangida (1993:27):

Nigeria's foreign policy has been characterized by inconsistency and incoherence, it has lacked the clarity to make us know where we stood in matters of international concern, to enable other countries relate to us with seriousness our relations conducted by policy of retaliatory reactions.

This, of course projected the policies and actions of President Babangida's administration in the Nigeria relations' with the external world, which was guided by strategic factors, economic consideration, political realities and a special concern for the African condition. Similarly, in a speech delivered at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, President Babangida declared that Nigeria is in interdependent world although nations often pursue narrow selfish interest.' There is no gainsaying the fact that what affects any part of the system ultimately reflects on the rest. That is why, we have, of recent, imbued our foreign policy with a new economic trust. To this end, steps have been taken to build an alignment between our internal economic problems and our concerted efforts to resolve them on the one hand and our foreign policy pursuits, on the other (Babangida, 1993:27). Thus, during this time, to complement the foreign policy, President Babangida called for the creation of the appropriate international economic environment that can adequately recognize interdependence in the global economy and the needs of the developing nations like Nigeria.

Furthermore, the establishment of the Technical Aids Corps Scheme by President Babangida administration represents a new and effective approach to Nigeria's foreign aid policy. The scheme is designed to ensure that Nigeria's aid reach the intended target while foreign policy is a discernible pattern and objective. The scheme has come to stay. 'Indeed, we have received requests from a number of countries, and I wish to assure them that in spite of the present economic conditions, we shall endeavour to meet their demands. This administration sees the scheme as one of the ways of demonstrating our commitment to south-south co-operation. In giving practical demonstration to the improvement of Nigeria's relations with Africans in Diaspora and expressing by extension, the global dimension of our foreign policy, my administration has consistently explored possible avenues of developing the cultural, political and economic ties among the people of African descent within and outside the continent. We have encouraged and participated actively in the celebrations marking thy 150th anniversary of emancipation from slavery held in Guyana, Trinidad Emergent new world order reveal that there is need to invariably re-define Nigeria's foreign policy in conformity with the interest of advanced capitalist countries (Babangida, 1993:27). Of course, .the Nigeria's background of history and experience should be equally examined critically in this redefinition of foreign policy consequently; it is this development that

prompted General Babangida to re-define Nigeria's foreign policy during his own tenure.

Globalization and the end of the Cold War have created a new situation in world politics. In some ways, the new world is more like traditional world politics than was the world from 1945 to the mid – 1980s. Political alignments will become more fragmented and fluid and economic competition will not be muted by alliance cooperation. In other respects, however, the new world will be very different from the world before World War II. Globalization seems irreversible with all its implications for the permeability of borders and the transformation of sovereignty among the economically advanced democracies; and international institutions have become central to the political and military as well as the economic policies of the major states (Keohane; Joseph & Hoffmann, 1993: 182).

Foreign policy is the frame work and guiding principle that states embrace to relate with their national interest. It is the objectives that transcend the boundary of a given state. It is a set of principles that defines the objectives a given state pursues in the international area in the process of its interactions with other international actors (Akinboye & Ottoh, 2007:116). Foreign policy is orchestrated within the veins of a state national interest. It is described in a triangular form. First, it examines her relation with West Africa, especially as a regional power to provoke the integration of states in the region; second, it examines her relations with the larger Africa, aim to eradicate the traces of colonialism, or perhaps neo-colonialism and external incursions to Africa's affair, and lastly, the wider world. Strictly speaking, every nation strives to protect, promote and defend the objectives of her national interests at all cost, even to the point of going to war if it is felt that the pursuit of the goals is in any way threatened. It must be stressed, however, that the articulation of these goals does not necessarily guarantee the successful execution of a foreign policy. The extent to which a foreign policy is achieved depends largely on the quality, character and disposition of the policy – makers, the resources endowment of the state, the military capability, geographical location, population and a host of other factors. It is in line with the above that one would be able to understand the factors that influenced and conditioned Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-cold war era.

However, Nigeria's ability to respond to the changing context of international political environment has significance on the most populous Africa country and biggest black nation on earth. Due to this, Nigeria has continuously played a leadership role in Africa. For about four decades, Nigeria's foreign policy was influenced by ideological rivalry of the Cold War

Era. Notwithstanding, she sustained an afro-centric foreign policy. With the collapse of the bipolar order, as a result of the victory of free market economic and liberal democracy over command economics and totalitarian political system, there emerge the need for a new and imaginative foreign policy agenda, which will improve the image of the new independent Africa and make her relevant in the new order. In response to the new pre-occupation, concerns and challenges that emerge as a result of emergence of a new order, Nigeria introduced certain innovations to improve on her afro-centric foreign policy in order to play more effective and relevant role in regional Africa and world at large, even in view of her dwindling resources and without losing sight of the national interest. (Obiozor, 1993:27) Though, since independence, Nigeria policy has been geared towards formulation and implementation of all strategies, actions and policies to achieve national goals and interests in relations to the outside environment. The major objectives include: (a) safeguarding the country's territory and people against external threat and ensuring international peace and security, (b) peaceful co-existence with her neighbours.

In accordance with Nigeria's constitutional provision and has been concerned about the welfare of Africa since independence, she has been concerned about the welfare of Africa as a whole not just issues concerning her. In effect, Nigeria of the organization of Africa Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West Africa state (ECOWAS). According to Okolo (1998:103):

Nigeria's Africa diplomacy is of the OAU as a vehicle for the articulation and promotion of Africa interest vis-à-vis the rest of the world; strong commitment in favour of the Liquidation of colonialism, a moral and political commitment to the restoration of human dignity exemplified the anti-racial, particularly the anti-apartheid policies and pronouncements, the search for economic independence and stability through the encouragement of sub-regional economic groupings and adherence to the United Nations and OAU charters in the pursuit of peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes and conflicts in Africa.

Furthermore, President Babangida then stated that in a region of 16 countries, where one out of every three West African is a Nigeria, it is highly imperative that any regime in this country should relentlessly strive towards the threat to jeopardize or compromise the stability, prosperity and security of the region (Tunji & Sam, 1991:272). Other factors include avoidance of extra African especially in the sub region; this is close to the issue of geo strategic position. It could be recorded that in the Cold War era African states were faced by ideological rivalry of the two blocs, with Eastern and Western bloc countries taking divergent

positions in African states internal crisis. Hence, the Nigerian, foreign policy makers prevented a situation whereby these powers intervene into African crisis. Part of this issue is the influence of France in West African, which needs to be curtailed.

In the late 1980s, some salient factors emerged to compliment these previously existing ones. Thus, Nigeria made some innovation in her foreign policy especially towards regional Africa. Among these were: (a) the extension of technical aid to African countries that require it, under the Technical Aid Scheme. Under this scheme, Nigerian professionals and experts whose services were required by the other countries were seconded at the Nigerians governments' expense, to those countries for a period of up to three years. This has continued to serve as an alternative to aid and grants system to these countries which were formerly given aid and grants without a guarantee that it would be effectively and judiciously utilized; two, the conclusion of bilateral agreements with as many African countries as were willing to institutionalize their co – operation with Nigerian.

A host of joint commissions were established with several countries. Any additional and outside the technical aid corps scheme was channelled to the recipient African states through the joint commission; three, the adoption of the principle of reciprocity whereby without prejudice to the centrality of Africa to Nigerians foreign policy, the government would make it a point to consult only with African Government which seek Nigerians opinion and views on matters that concern them individually and collectively; four, the government also adopted economic diplomacy as new additional plank and instrument of Nigerian foreign policy. The policy was expected to open up business opportunities to Nigerians in other African countries, help to formalize existing informal commercial links and establish new (Obiozor, 1993:24).

In addition, Nigeria also intensified the pursuit of some of the existing policies within this period Among these were: one, the strengthening of Nigeria's commitment to regional economic co-operation in Africa as whole and to West Africa in particular; two, the practice of making available Nigerians good office for the purpose of achieving peaceful resolution of conflict on the continent; three, more commitment to Africa regional organization; four, commitment to transition to civil democracy. Needless to say, prior to the demise of the cold war, Nigeria has participated in many United Nations Peace Keeping Mission, starting from Congo in 1960 till date. Yet, this increased with her involvement in virtually all peace mission in an effort to promote her principle of commitment to global peace, despite her

economic and military weakness when compared to the advanced countries in the international system.

However, despite Nigeria's commitment to world peace through membership of multilateral organizations and her subsequent activities in promotion of this principle, there were some innovations in the country's foreign policy to the outside world in the late 1980s during the era of President Ibrahim Babangida. These innovations were: one, introduction of technical aid programme in which Nigeria sent out its skilled manpower to serve in other countries of the world with black population, especially in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries at the expense of Nigeria government's purse; two, promotion of concept of economic diplomacy in region of the world outside Africa where there are concentration of blacks especially the United States with the view of encouraging business people to invest in Nigeria; three, the encouragement of cultural exchange through joint commission; four, campaign for reparation to be paid by the West for the enslavement of blacks. This campaign led to the OAU Summit of 1991 at which it was formally embraced.

The end of the Cold War and of the bipolar world order that shaped international relations over the past 50 years is forcing the government of the US to make dramatic policy changes that affect all parts of the globe (Daniel, 1993:1). And, the cyclical transformation of the international system between periods of Cold War and détente has had its impact on the character of the African sub-systems, its role within the larger global system, expectations, gains and losses (Owoeye, 1993:227). Thus, the new world order is simply a hegemonic order. It is not an alliance. It is not a concert. It is not even a collective security. It is one-nation rule whereby all others are coined to obedience. The obedience is not out of willingness but out of compulsion, which will be forced on all nations. This is because the success of the new world order could only be guaranteed through the serious and active participation of all members of the international community.

The innovations and strengthening of Nigerian foreign policy in the Cold War period were in response to development in the international arena. The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev in the defunct USSR with his policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the mid-ninety led to the collapse of the bipolar system and other monumental changes in the globe. These changes led to the emergence of the United States as the sole super power on the globe, threatening to put in place unipolar order to replace the defunct bipolar system. This brought into focus the intensification of regional integration in the international environment. This has been

evidenced by the Pacific Rim towards their economic integration. The nature of this emerging international system is thus paradoxical as the United States is set to establish a unipolar order where she will be the alpha and omega; policing and determining the fate of the rest of the world. And the rest of the world is set to enshrine polycentrism through regional integration to prevent the institutionalization of what took like a war prone order. A system or an order in which one nation-state control the rest of the world. These regional bodies include the European Union, ASEAN, the CIS as well as numerous other associations in America, Africa and Arab regions that are searching for a voice and relevance in the international system (Obiozor, 1997:1).

This tussle in creating a new world order after almost forty five years of Cold War ideological rivalry between the East and West influenced Nigeria's foreign policy in the late 1980 under general Ibrahim Babangida administration. Thus, the innovations and strengthening of sub regional polices were to intensify regional integration in Africa in consonance with the emerging international order where various regions are battling to hold on to their own – Nigerians actions, is in response to actions, and reacting to other actors in international arena; and using the opportunity offered by the collapse of the bipolar order to pave way for an international system that will accommodate the interest of all regions and forestall a situation where one country will determine the fate of the whole world. Thus, Nigeria's role in the post-Cold War era in response to the struggle for establishment of a new world order which varies between unipolarity and polycentrism is in favour of the latter rather than the former in order to void a situation where one country can be the sole determiner of activities in the globe.

Therefore, Nigeria wants to use this opportunity to promote her national interest of regional security in the West African sub-region and at the same time stamp herself as a regional power lays some other prominent states in the world: like Japan, Germany, the United States and Russia, among others. Nigeria also uses this opportunity to eliminate extra African powers involvement in the sub-region. During the cold war, African crises were influenced by ideological rivalry between the two blocs. This added with the collapse of the bipolar order. Consequently, Nigeria wants to create an impression either real or imagined that the region is capable of solving her own political, economic, social and military problems in the new order. Thus, apart from ensuring her national security, Nigeria want eagerly interested in proving her capability within the region. This desire has made her to be involved in virtually all crises – ridden areas of the globe be it in Yugoslavia, Iraqi – Kuwait, Haiti, el-Salvador,

Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone etc. All these were done despite Nigerian economic position in the post-Cold War order. Before the political changes in the globe which occurred as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's policy, there was the factor of globe economic recession and oil glut. This, of course, affected Nigerian economy seriously from 1982.

As a result of this recession and oil glut, Nigeria like other countries sought for refuge in international financial institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These institutions then came up with stringent conditionality, which created the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Nigeria. The implementation of this economic package created more economics problem in Nigeria, which was never imagined. Expectedly it sharply affected her grants to other countries. Nigeria is the single largest and most populated country in the West African sub-region with a population of about 150 million people and a landmass of about 932, 768 sq²km. She is the most richly endowed with both human and natural resources. With respect to these qualities, Nigeria is obligated to play a prominent role in the emerging international environment, using her foreign policy to project her image and also to pursue her national interest in Africa and beyond. For instance, in consonance with the stated objective of Nigeria foreign policy to the sub-region, Nigeria has borne much of the expense of ECOWAS, especially in the post-Cold War period. She has singlehandedly financed the relocation of the ECOWAS Secretariat from Lagos to Abuja. Nigeria has also worked tirelessly towards the achievement of ECOWAS goals which include: sub-regional monetary integration; the lunching of ECOWAS travellers cheques; inauguration of phase II of ECOWAS telecommunication programme, among others (Bola, 1994:14).

At the implementation level of Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-cold war, she got involved in peace keeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia and others. Although she had been involved in a number of peace keeping operations prior to this period, her role in the post-Cold War era had been peculiar as she contributed much of the financial, military and human resources used by the ECOWAS Monitoring Force which she initiated in consultation with other West African countries namely: Guinea, Ghana, Senegal, and Sierra Leone in the wake of Liberian Crisis in 1989 and subsequently in the Sierra Leone before the death of Abacha in 1998. Indeed, the ECOWAS Military Observing Group (ECOMOG) was more or less a Nigeria intervention force. Nigeria used the outfit to promote her sub-regional foreign policy. It is also basically on the promotion of her national interest of national security that Nigeria government has put in both human and other resources to achieve peace

in the sub region. In trying to achieve these objectives, Nigeria has helped through ECOWAS military observing group (ECOMOG) to intensified regional integration in West Africa sub-region and enshrined democracy which is one of the major dominating factors ideas in the post-Cold War international system and economy.

At the regional level, Nigeria has participated principally in the settlement of civil wars in most crisis ridden Africa countries. The most prominent among these is the Sudanese civil war. Sudan is with the largest landmass in the Africa continent and with about 25 million people in terms of her human population. They are diverse people brought together by the colonial administration and since the exit of the colonialist; there has been crisis in the countries. This crisis was complicated by the outbreak of famine on a large scale as well as the international and domestic politics of relief and succour. Then, in June 1992, Nigeria brought the warring factions, the Sudanese People's Liberation ARMY (SPLA) and Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) together at the Abuja peace talk. Nigeria identified with the Sudanese problem, as General Ike Nwachukwu (rtd), the then Minister of External Affairs noted in his address at the Abuja mediation conference that:

there is strong resemblance before Nigeria and Sudanese history. The fact that Nigeria has fought a Civil War over the issue of nationalist makes it easier to relate and to appreciate Sudanese turbulent search for integration or cohabitation (Ayo, 1993:10).

Nigeria further recommended federalism as the best option for the Sudanese people in resolution of their crisis the Abuja peace talk has facilitated the return of peace to Sudan despite those previous moves by the United States and others have come to naught.

In actual fact, the achievement of peace and restoration of democracy in both Liberia and Sierra Leone which occurred as a result of Nigeria's response to change in the international environment is a big political and security point for the country, portraying her ability to maintain peace in the sub region as well as her commitment to democracy despite her domestic political problem between 1983 and 1998. This achievement portrays Nigerians military capability and superiority, and placed her as a force to be reckoned with in the West African sub-region. It will boost also international security against any external incursion. Beside the national security, sub region and regional security had also been achieved through Nigeria's activities in the emerging new order. This singular act has helped to solve the problem of regional crisis and security which has been one of the major problems facing the world.

The changes in the international system in the last fifty years have been momentous. From a bipolar world, the international system is today dominated, in the military sphere, by a hegemonic power, the United States of America. However, the post-world-war II supremacy of the British Pound Sterling and the American Dollar, which was evident even in the 1960s and 1970s, is today contested by the rise of Euro, the Yen and, potentially, even the Yuan. While the Britain and America controlled the global economy fifty years ago, the world has since witnessed the emergence of new powerful players: Japan, the European Union, China and India. In ideological terms, socialism has weakened as an ideational force, leading to the near-universal spread and opportunistic acceptance, across the globe, of liberal capitalism, liberal democracy and the associated principles (Mustapha, 2008:369).

From the foregoing, it is absolutely clear that Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-Cold War is in response to regional integration going on in the international system with respect to struggle for establishment of new world order where many centres of power will control the international order and not a single and particular country controlling and dictating the affairs and determining the destiny of the whole world. Besides the opportunity created by the emerging world order in the United Nations Security Council also influenced Nigeria's foreign policy as she wants to portray her capability either real or imaginary.

4.5 THE IMPACT OF MILITARY RULE ON NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

The political history of Nigeria shows the eras of Military and Civilian rule. Until 1999, when democracy returned to the country, the Military had held office for more years than their civilian counterparts. The military had made some positive impacts on Nigerian foreign policy, which have been properly documented in the literature (Aluko, 1981). The best era in Nigerian foreign policy was recorded under the Military. During this period, the Military demonstrated more commitment to foreign policy pursuits as it recorded significant milestones than the civilian regimes.

This is not unconnected with their domination of the political landscape and monopoly of power and governance for so long. From their first incursion into national politics and governance on the morning of January 15, 1966 till May 1999 when they handed over power to a democratically elected civilian only a brief four-year interregnum called the Second Republic, 1979-1983. In the years when the military held sway, foreign policy went through a

series of twists and turns, depending on both the personal idiosyncrasies of the different leaders. Strong willed maximum rulers influenced foreign policy to suit their own whims and fancies and thus left significant imprints on the choices that the country made, and the strategies and methodologies adopted for accomplishing their set objectives (Fawole, 2003:1). From 1966 to 1999, Nigerian went from being merely the most populous Black and African nation right to the pinnacle of influence and glory. In actual fact, it became the richest African country and by extension, the most influential in African affairs. The praise for this was partly due to two main factors, namely, the unexpected oil boom of the 1970s which spelt unprecedented national prosperity, as well as the personality characteristics and preferences of some of the military rulers of the period (Fawole, 2003:2).

The military had made some positive impacts on Nigerian foreign policy, which have been properly documented in the literature (Aluko, 1981). The best era in Nigeria foreign policy was recorded under the military. During this period, the military demonstrated more commitment to foreign policy pursuit as it recorded significant milestones in the struggles against apartheid and colonialism. Although this resolve created problems between Nigeria and her traditional allies, the military ignored the complaints of the West and some national concerns by putting everything it had to prosecute the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid policies of the Nigerian state (Garba, 1987). So committed was the Muritala Mohammad government to the recognition of the popular movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against President Ford's wish on the matter that it threw everything into pursuing the policy. The General Olusegun Obasanjo went a step further by nationalising the assets of BP and Shell-BP in protest over the role of the apartheid regime in South Africa on the independence of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (Saliu, 2014).

Consequently and following her regular support to the frontline states in Southern Africa, the country was admitted as a member of the Frontline States. So successful was the country on the decolonisation policy that her image, at the level of the UN, Commonwealth and indeed in the world, soared high and she was instantly recognised as an African Liberator (Akindele, 2007). Still on the positive note, the military waged a successful civil war, which at the end saw the triumph of the federal side over the Biafran secessionist group. Flowing from the stance of *no victor, no vanquished*, the Gowon administration pursued the policies of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration, a posture that considerably healed the wounds of the war and won some international support for Nigeria (Aluko, 1981).

The policy of 'beneficial and constructive centrism' is the adopted foreign policy framework of the Obasanjo administration and it builds upon the premises established by that of concentric circles. Implicit in this perspective is the acceptance of the ecology of Nigeria's foreign policy as being in a state of flux and change. This has been characterised by developments such as the transformation of the OAU to the AU, the global spread of, and attempts to consolidate democracy, as well as the need to revitalize the country's economy and place it on a path of sustainable development. The new framework espouses a utilitarian 'means-ends' approach to the implementation of foreign policy. The means is predicated upon a tripartite strategy that underscores 'the articulation of appropriate technique evolving techniques that will make the Nigerian people the first beneficiaries of such a foreign policy effort'. The underpinning philosophy of this new focus is the need to ensure that Nigerians are the primary beneficiaries of the country's foreign policy pursuits. Despite this emphasis, the country's foreign policy still display continuity with post foci in terms of its concentration on African and problems that face the continent, as well as its commitment to the pursuit of regionalism as a fundamental means of facilitating regional development in a globalized world (Oche, 2008:364).

In general terms, Nigerian Foreign Policy under president Obasanjo had witnessed some strong points to the extent that people can easily forget about the weak point. One strong point that even the critics of the President cannot fail to recognize is the adequate exposure of the president Obasanjo to international issues. The exposure has enabled him to play a leading role in the international system especially as far as the issues affecting Africa were concerned. He was a leading mediator on the intractable Sudanese crisis as well as the Ivory Coast war. The respect which this has won for the country and the president was the wear perception of him as a kind of oracle (Saliu, 2008:378).

To appreciate this, perhaps one needs to analyse the policies of the military regimes of General Muhammadu Buhari, General Ibrahim Babangida and General Sani Abacha. The trio ruled the country respectively from 31st December, 1983 to 8th of June 1998 and some of their policies had very negative effects on Nigeria's international image. General Buhari's foreign policy was dictated or necessitated by circumstances that preceded his entry into power. Owing to the comatose state of the Nigerian economy at the time Buhari became the Head of State; his immediate concern was to initiate policies that would help to revamp the national economy which was severely bartered by the previous administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

The Buhari regime promptly rejected the \$2.2 billion loan which his predecessor had earlier applied for from the International Monetary Fund due to disagreement over the conditionality that include devaluation of the Naira, removal of petroleum subsidies (Fawole, W. A. 2003:131) and removal of import restrictions that the IMF attached to the loan facility. As Gen. Buhari could not secure the IMF loan, he decided to engage in counter-trade. Unable to pay for imports due to the dwindling fortunes from oil sales in the international market, he concluded arrangement with Brazil, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands whereby crude oil was given to those countries in exchange for much needed consumer goods and machinery. (Fawole, 2003:132) This led to misunderstanding between Nigeria and Britain who perceived Nigeria's action as detrimental to its economic interest. The promulgation of some draconian decrees that led to jailing of two journalists from The Guardian, Newspaper Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor under Decree No. 4 of 1984, and the execution by firing squad of Messrs Ogedengbe, Ojuolape (Fawole, 2003:133), and Bartholomew Owoh for drug trafficking. This also attracted widespread condemnation from home and abroad. The prolonged closure of Nigeria's land borders with Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin Republic was another policy that damaged Nigeria's image abroad. The protracted border closure greatly affected many ECOWAS countries that depended on Nigeria's economy for their economic survival.

The 'Dikko Affair' was another incident that once again smeared Nigeria's image abroad. Umaru Dikko was Shagari's Minister for Transport, and Chairman of the highly lucrative Presidential Task Force on Rice, which imported and supervised the allocation of long grain, polished rice. Apart from the power and resources that Dikko controlled, he was widely seen as the arrowhead of the ruling National Party of Nigeria. After the Buhari coup, Dikko escaped to Britain where he lived in exile, (Cyril, 2002:134) Therefore, it was not surprising that when he was found drugged in a crate labelled 'diplomatic baggage' at Hampstead airport in England with a suspected Nigerian official awaiting a flight to Nigeria, relations between Nigeria and Britain dipped, and degenerated to retaliatory seizure of aircrafts by both countries, (Cyril, 2002:134). Subsequently, Nigeria's request for the extradition of Dikko was rejected by Britain and Anglo – Nigeria relations went through a hostile phase until the Buhari regime was overthrown in a coup led by Gen. Ibrahim Babangida in August 1985.

The expulsion of 'illegal aliens' from Nigeria in early 1985 was yet another policy that caused some friction in Nigeria's external relations particularly within the West African sub-

region. The mass expulsion of ECOWAS nationals called to question the sincerity of Nigeria's claim to leadership of the sub-region. The action was viewed by the affected ECOWAS states as unjust, unfair and a violation of the spirit of ECOWAS. On August 27th 1985, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida took over from Buhari as Head of State in a palace coup. There were two significant policies of the Babangida's regime that caused great damage to Nigeria's external relations. The first was in 1986 when Nigeria masterminded the massive boycott of the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh, Scotland, to protest Britain's intransigence over the question of sanctions against apartheid South Africa. In retaliation; Britain introduced visa requirements for Nigerians to enter Britain with effect from February 1987, (Fawole, 2003:169). The annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential elections that was adjudged by both local and international observers as the freest in Nigeria's political history expectedly unleashed a chain of reactions from the international community that led to a sharp decline in Nigeria's stature and reputation. Babangida unwittingly wreaked incalculable damage to Nigeria's image as a result of the annulment. The United States, Canada, Britain and other member-states of the European Union imposed sanctions in various degrees on Nigeria, (Fawole, 2003:181).

Following the massive pressure mounted on him by a coalition of civil society groups in Nigeria and the major Western powers, Babangida unceremoniously bowed out of office on 26th August 1993, and replaced himself with the Interim National Government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan. It was Babangida's intransigence and unwillingness to complete the transition to civil rule programme and hand over to the winner of the election that actually paved the way for Gen. Sani Abacha's ascendancy. 'Abacha cannot be said to have articulated any discernible clear policy. What invariably passed for his foreign policy during his tenure was no more than a series of tragic domestic policies and actions that unwittingly snowballed into diplomatic controversies', (Fawole, 2003:189). About four major actions of his regime actually constituted the bulk of what can be termed as Abacha's sins that attracted severe consequences and culminated in Nigeria's total isolation by the international community.

Firstly, following Abacha's refusal to revalidate the June 12 mandate contrary to widespread expectations, Chief Abiola out of frustration and desperation, declared himself President of Nigeria on 11th of June 1994. Consequently, the security agencies mounted a nationwide manhunt for Abiola until he was eventually arrested on 23rd of June 1994. Abacha merely detained Abiola without trial. Abacha was unmindful of the domestic and international

implications of the detention without trial of such a high profile personality. Abiola was denied access to his lawyers, doctors and family members. The members of the coalition of civil society groups known as NADECO who were vehemently opposed to the Abacha regime were hounded and harassed by state security agents. Many Nigerians were arrested and detained without trial, some including Pa Alfred Rewane and Alhaja Kudirat Abiola were assassinated by the much dreaded Abacha's Strike Force, several were framed up in phantom coups, their businesses and properties were destroyed and many had to escape into exile abroad. Next was the arrest, detention and trial of General Olusegun Obasanjo, Retired Major General Shehu Musa Yar' Adua and a host of serving military officers like Colonel Lawan Gwadabe and Colonel R.S.B. Bello-Fadile, civilians and journalists such as Dr Beko Ransome-Kuti, Mrs. Chris Anyanwu, Kunle Ajibade and Ben Charles Obi, (Tell, 1996:21). They were alleged to have been involved in a phantom coup plot in March 1995. They were tortured, speedily but secretly tried by a military tribunal headed by Major General Patrick Aziza, pronounced guilty and were all sentenced to death, except Obasanjo who bagged 25years jail sentence. Following the general outcry and protests by Nigerians and the international community, Obasanjo's jail sentence was reduced to 15years, while the rest was commuted from death to 25years jail term. Right from the onset, the story of the coup plot was treated with widespread suspicion and disbelief. Despite efforts by Abacha regime's propaganda machine to convince Nigerian's and the international community that there was, indeed, a coup plot, the general scepticism that trailed it refused to go away, (Fawole, 2003:197).

Abacha's political miscalculations and diplomatic blunders were manifested again when Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other prominent Ogoni environmental and minority rights activists were executed by hanging on 10th November 1995. Ken Saro-Wiwa, a world famous writer, poet and playwright, was the leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). The group was established in 1990 to champion the demands of the oil producing Ogoni communities in the Niger Delta region for an end to environmental degradation caused by oil exploration, as well as compensation for the Ogoni people. Saro-Wiwa had succeeded in bringing the campaign to international limelight as he was able to present the issue to the United Nations. In an attempt to silence Saro-Wiwa and his group, the Abacha regime framed up the 'Ogoni Nine' for the 1994 murder of four prominent Ogoni citizens. They were arrested, detained without trial for nine months under inhuman conditions, denied access to lawyers and family members, and medical care (Fawole, 2003:201). They were subsequently

arraigned, tried and sentenced to death by hanging by a military-teleguided special tribunal. To the consternation of the whole world, Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues were hurriedly executed on November 10, 1995, when appeals for clemency were still pouring in from world leaders and international organisations.

The Commonwealth promptly responded by suspending Nigeria's membership of the organisation for two years. The rest of the international community also reacted; many recalled their ambassadors from Nigeria (a symbolic act of showing displeasure), imposition of visa and travel restrictions on military personnel and government officials, sports boycott by the European Union, etc., the United Nations also sent a fact-finding team to Nigeria and the report of the team severely indicted the regime for gross human rights violations. FIFA also withdrew the right to host the 1995 World Youth Soccer championship that was hitherto granted to Nigeria. Nigeria's participant at the Miss World Beauty pageant in South Africa was not allowed to participate in the contest. Thus, Nigeria swiftly fell from the impressive height of being the 'African Giant' that it had attained since the 1970s and became a pariah, (Fawole, 2003:214) a country derided, isolated and ostracised by all its traditional allies and friends.

Nigeria's foreign policy during the military interregnum can be considered more or less a mixed – bag. It is generally acknowledged that the civil war had enabled the emergence of an even keel in Nigeria's relations with other powers as the duplicity and complicity of the west enabled the Soviet bloc to score cheap, political points by making in-roads through supply of much-needed military material and proffering of diplomatic support in the effort to keep Nigeria one by Gowon and his confederates. While Murtala Muhammad was a nationalist leader who was able to call the bluff of the West during the Angola imbroglio, Babangida, is should be recalled, swung the pendulum to the other extreme by imposing IMF conditionalities on the country, much to the chagrin of many people such that, in the end, Nigeria really became a shadow of itself (Oyebode, 2013).

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CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

5.1 NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Nigeria foreign policy has witnessed historical experiences since independence. This is consequent upon the fact that Nigeria's foreign policy has always been a product of the Head of Government. This is because there were a lot of differences and little similarities in the individual foreign policy depending on the objective and the direction each administration was looking at. However, the approach and method adopted by each differs depending on the circumstances of the time and the style of leadership. The real substance of our foreign policy objectives have tended to resolve around these principles which the nation hold tenaciously in the conduct of her foreign relations over the years from the first Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, to the current Head of State, President Goodluck Jonathan, GCFR. Both the past and the present leadership recognized that the foreign policy of any nation is necessarily a reflection of its domestic reality. The basic principle of all foreign policies include the protection of the national sovereignty, enhancement of economic interest and the promotion of national image, and national security or territorial integrity. These are the basic elements that constitute and define the respective foreign policy objectives of nations (National Planning Commission, Abuja: 289).

From its independence in 1960, Nigeria, seen as the 'giant of Africa', defined its foreign policy as Africa focused. Specifically, Africa was seen as the centre – piece of its foreign policy with the liberation of Africa's remaining colonial territories from colonialism and apartheid as the main instrument. Later, the centre-piece notion was given an intellectual definition in the theory of concentric circles. The concept placed Nigeria as the epi-central area of the circles with the immediate neighborhood and Africa as a whole coming closely thereafter. In the reality of implementation, the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid focus dominated all considerations including, as some critics implied, even Nigeria's own interests, especially economic. The elimination of colonialism and apartheid coincided with the political changes taking place in Eastern Europe with demand for anti-totalitarian systems. That wind swept through Africa and encouraged similar changes of governmental systems, which ultimately saw the outbreak of an epidemic of civil wars in the continent (Adeniji, 2004: 423).

Like all nation – states, Nigeria had national interests which guided her foreign policy in the course of the twentieth century. Nigeria’s national interest at independence had to do with the restoration of human dignity to Blackmen and women all over the world, particularly the eradication of colonialism and white minority rule from the face of Africa, the creation of the relevant political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which will not only facilitate the preservation of the territorial integrity and security of all African countries but also foster self-reliance in all African countries (Olusanya & Akindele, 1986: 2). As a matter of fact, Nigeria had overwhelmingly given supports to many African countries, intervened positively in their internal crisis, provided humanitarian assistance, and deployed technical aid through its Technical Aid Corps, and deployed its troops, military and police for peacekeeping and other peace support duties, in effort to provide leadership for Africa. In most cases, these gestures were done at great cost to the country and also against some domestic challenges, yet with nothing to show for it in terms of benefit for the people (Alli, 2013: 122).

Africa, for Nigeria, remains an important sphere that cannot be ignored in its foreign policy. There are historical, economic and political reasons why Africa must be primary in Nigeria’s foreign policy. It is its immediate constituency sharing many experiences historical, political and economic. In terms of population size, it is the largest country on the continent with an economy that is critical to the survival of the continent. Since independence, according to Yoroms (2007), Nigeria’s foreign policy has been focused on the political stability and the development of Africa. He illustrates this commitment by the continuous deployment of its human and material resources to addressing various challenges on the continent.

Nigeria’s African policy began with the country’s foreign policy in 1960. Before the attainment of independence, scholars and actors had expected her to become the power house upon her attainment of independence. Nigeria did not betray this expectation. In point of fact, the country, because of her pro-western orientation, was not fully out to demonstrate her African concern with concrete steps. But the challenge posed by Nkrumah’s Ghana, woke up the country to the reality of Africa leadership. She has manifested the concern for Africa, which is also a principle and objective of her foreign policy through a number of programmes and schemes. The literature has, however, recognized the relentless wars that the country waged against colonialism and apartheid as an enduring legacy of Nigeria on African affairs. (Saliu, 2005).

On account of this, she was admitted into the frontline States, even though technically speaking, Nigeria was not qualified to be a member. Her voice at international system, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, carried the strength of Africa, as she was generally perceived as the authentic African Voice. A number of issues such as long absence of democracy, corruption and terrorism have taken the African weight from Nigeria's voice at the international level (Saliu, 2013: 187). It has been posited that Nigeria has been actively involved in more than 31 global peace operations, committing more than 250,000 soldiers in the process, under the auspices of the ECOWAS, AU and the UN (Oluyemi – Kusa, 2007: 140). Equally, some scholars have also differently observed that between 1990 and 1997, Nigeria, in concert with other willing ECOWAS member states contributed to the deployment of more than 12,000 troops to the organization's mission in Liberia; this is besides the commitment of other humanitarian and material resources to the mission. Additionally, Nigeria's diplomatic, financial and military involvement in many of these sub-regional interventions have helped to shape their processes and outcomes in a decisive fashion; a development which has further earned valuable international *kudos* for the Nigerian military dictatorship as it then was (Ufo, 2013). In view of this that, some analysts have equally argued that Nigeria's commitment to peace and stability in Africa is often seen as a national project, and this has severally been demonstrated by Nigeria's past and present leaders. This much they noted is further evident, judging by the continuing attention to the country has paid to the fundamental issue of regional security through the maintenance of troops not only in the two war – torn countries (Liberia and Sierra-Leone) but also in Darfur, Sudan (Ebohon & Obakhedo: 2012: 169).

Nigeria is also credited to have provided leadership to the West Africa sub-region particularly judging by its lending of support to members of the ECOWAS community following the failure of the Clinton administration of United States to help curb the spread of conflicts in West Africa (Leatherwood, 2001: 2). Consequently, the transformation of the war – like situation in both Liberia and Sierra-Leone into what they are today, are testimonies to the unprecedented post-conflict state reconstruction predicated on the massive inflow of international aid and the laying of an egalitarian economic reconstruction foundation instigated by Nigeria (Fayemi, 2004:19). A relevant case in point was the effort made by the Olusegun Obasanjo's civilian administration (1999-2007); which further re-enforced Nigeria's relentless commitment to the pursuit of and continuing sustenance of the founding

objectives of ECOWAS. The Obasanjo administration's commitment to the resolution of conflict on the continent was given more prominence by an analyst when he averred thus:

Under the current administration, Nigeria's foreign policy has undergone significant refurbishing, reformation and transformation --- At another level, the President's stature, credibility, power, influence, and understanding of the intricacies of foreign policy ---this directly translates into respect for Nigeria. Whether you consider Sierra Leone, Liberia, ECOWAS, NEPAD --- Nigeria's achievement in Liberia is unprecedented. Without American funds or subsidy and with unprecedented courage, Nigeria has brought peace to that country, stopped the killings and helped map out a new path to recovery, reconciliation and reconstruction. The world has acknowledged this feat. And I was present recently when President Blah of Liberia visited Nigeria to thank the president and the Nigeria people and described President Obasanjo as the 'Father of the Liberian nation' (Ihonvbere, O. 2004).

The assertiveness and relevance of Nigeria led her into opening new diplomatic missions in the world. Rents and allowances were paid as at when due. In the world then, every black man was seen as a Nigerian apparently because of the wealth of the country. God given resources of Nigeria were placed at the disposal of some countries in solving their problems. She was a constant source of bail-out to some countries in the pacific and she even placed her diplomatic missions at the disposal, of less-endowed countries to conduct their diplomatic relations.

Clearly, Nigerian foreign policy had excelled in the efforts to decolonize African countries. She unilaterally jerked up her contributions to the OAU Liberation fund and placed her diplomatic and technical support at the door steps of the liberation movements to increase the worries they were generating for their tormentors which shared borders with the colonized territories and apartnard countries such as Namibia and Zambia were assisted materially to overcome the devastating attacks they were receiving in the hands of the colonizers and the racist regime in South Africa. She was also bold in rendering military assistance to liberation movements at the camp established in Tanzania, while she was unrelenting in providing generous scholarships to the youths of the Sowato crisis and Youths of the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress that enabled them to resume their schooling in Nigeria and elsewhere. This development encouraged more insurgency against the wish of the abnoxious racist regime in South Africa (Olusanya & Akindele, 1986).

Quite strategically, the recognition accorded the MPLA in Angola, the support given to African Party for the Independence of Guinea – Bissau and Cape Verde PAIGC in Guinea

Bissau, Zimbabwe Africa National Union (ZANU) in Zimbabwe and others, were vital to the eventual liquidation of colonialism in these countries (Saliu, 2005). However, despite the charges of unilateralism and inadequate preparations, the role played in peacekeeping, especially in the 1990s, had catapulted the image of Nigeria to the highest level, with many other nation states marveling at how the country had achieved peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is therefore, unreasonable to write the history of global peace-keeping without recognizing the remarkable impact which Nigeria has made. She has also been quite visible in the continued search for solutions to the Darfur crisis. Equally, Nigeria was a strong voice in the Togolese debacle especially after the demise of president Eyadema and also a notable figure in the search for the resolution of the Ivorian Crisis. Judged by the commanding height of Nigeria in conflict resolution, the American sponsored African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was virtually rejected because it had not paid adequate attention to the achievements of Nigeria in peacekeeping (Imobighe & Zabadi, 2003).

Indeed, there was a time in Nigeria foreign policy when the country's position on global issues was all that mattered, especially on African issues. Nigeria once ordered the relocation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) secretariat from Lome to Lagos and it was carried out (Saliu, 2009). Even, at a time, the British were pressured into supporting the independence of Rhodesia and president Ford's letter on Angola was treated deservingly by rejecting its dictates (Garba, 1987).

All these would appear to be in the past as recent events have shown that Nigerian foreign policy is being troubled by both national and international developments on which it seems not to have an answer. Its confidence, robustness and activism are fast disappearing with the nation being apologetic or unusually silent on crucial global issues, thus making her leadership claim suspect (Alalade, 2009).

5.2 NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE: AN OVERVIEW

The foreign policy of a state is conditioned by elements of power that lie in the realms of the domestic and foreign. The domestic elements include the geographical location, size and nature of territory, natural resources, the political culture and process, the political leadership and the state of the economy. Among the external elements are the nature of the international system, which includes the distribution of power, the perception of a state by other states, and developments within the international system. It is obvious; therefore, that a country's

Foreign Policy cannot be attributed to the initiatives of one single individual. Foreign policy making is the product of many factors (Holsti, 1992:9).

Following the Nigeria's independence, the catch phrase of 'Africa as centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy' was evolved. The reason is not far-fetched. Unlike in other parts of the world, Nigeria obtained independence on a platter of gold without violent armed struggle. She therefore had the lee-way to concentrate not only on consolidation of her independence but also on frontline participation in the quest to liberate the entire African continent from colonization and racism in all manifestations. As this could be achieved better through peaceful co-existence with all neighbours, there was emphasis on cooperation with the rest of Africa. Thus began the Ideals of pacifism and Afro-centrism in Nigeria's foreign policy (Adeniji, 2005:27). Another strand of Nigeria's foreign policy which sprouted its roots in the Balewa Administration is as the policy of non-alignment. It was the Cold War era which saw a polarised world; the East pitted against the West, in a confrontation played out in the rivalry at the political, military and ideological levels between communism and democracy, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and between socialism and capitalism. Most Third World countries became independent during this era and had to make ideological choices. Nigeria, like Pakistan and others, chose to be guided by a policy of 'positive neutrality' in the pursuit of their foreign policy objectives. As opposed to passivism, this policy entailed a vibrant and unequivocal role in world affairs especially on matters affecting the country's national interest, like the African continent and World peace, without taking sides with "East or West". In terms of dividends, this policy was supposed to earn the country at a time she need development and consolidation assistance (Adeniji, 2005:27-28).

Ways placed emphasis on the Afro-centric nature and content of Nigeria's foreign policy (Zimako, 2009:119-120). An understanding of the current trends and focal is facilitated by the policy of framework of 'concentric circles' and its successors policy of 'constructive and beneficial concentricism', following the first perspective of country's own security, independence and prosperity which are connected with those of its immediate neighbours; Benin, Chad, Niger and Cameroun. The second circle denotes the country's relations with states of the West African region. The third circle signifies the country's focus on continentally significant issues such as development, peace and democratization. The country's involvement in the formation of the African Union, as well as other continental initiatives, can appropriately situate within this circle. The fourth and final circle depicts Nigeria's involvement and relations with organizations, institutions and states outside the

continent. Although uncomplicated, this framework provides an adequate scheme for understanding, the basis of Nigeria's foreign policy prioritization (Oche, 2008:359).

The fact of the matter is that there is no concrete understanding and approach to Nigeria's foreign policy. Each regime comes with what is best and administrative. There are alternating and constant changing phases of Nigeria's foreign policy. On this pattern, the pursuit of foreign policy was carried out on the basis of crisis Decision rather than on a dynamic programme policy (Yoroms, 2004:303). As Otubanjo (1989) clearly noted:

This change in the scope of Nigeria's relations with the world was, to be sure, a matter of circumstance rather than of will. It was not the result of any calculated decision or deliberate act of the Nigerian government. Rather, Nigeria was lucky to be at the confluence of events in the international system.

The broad parameters of Nigeria's Foreign Policy were first articulated at independence by the then Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in his first address to the United Nations General Assembly on October 7, 1960, and have remained the bedrock of the country's foreign policy since then. On that occasion, he stated that 'its the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all nations and to participate actively in the work of the United Nations Organization. Nigeria, a large and populous country has absolutely no territorial or expansionist ambitious. We are committed to uphold the principles upon which the United Nations is founded. Nigeria hopes to work with other African States for the progress of Africa and assist in bringing all African countries to a state of independence' (Adeniji, 2000:6). Successive governments from Tafawa Balewa, Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Muhammed/Olusegun Obasanjo, Shehu Shagari, Muhammadu Buhari/Tunde Idiagbon, Ibrahim Babangida, Sani Abacha, Abdulsalami Abubakar, Olusegun Obasanjo, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua to Goodluck Jonathan had in there different capacities demonstrated their commitments to Nigeria's foreign policy. Therefore, the history and development of Nigeria's Foreign Policy has been greatly influenced by a small number of significant factors such as :

(i) the nature and character of the Nigerian state and style of leadership (ii) the nature of economy and level of economic development (iii) the level of development of the Nigerian National Assembly members as a whole in deliberation of foreign policy; (iv) the trends and development in the International economics and politics (v) the nature and development of inputs from the citizenry and Foreign Affairs Ministry in the foreign policy formulation. The historical circumstances surrounding the emergence of

Nigerian state shows that Nigeria was first colonial, then a new-colonial and now-autonomous capitalist state (Iyayi, 2005:1).

The nature of the economy and the level of development of the economy played key role in shaping the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy. This is because, the nature of the economy and its level of development determine its kinds of challenges that will present themselves at given periods. The kinds of responses provided by the state to these challenges will have major implications for external relations and foreign policy. Since Nigerian economy is capitalist, under-developed and dependent mono-cultural one, in which petroleum sector which is the ministry's is exclusive control for foreign transactional companies, it invariably increase the influence of global capital in the foreign policy formulation and other sectors of a Nigerian economy. This explain why Nigerian state is highly authoritarian even under a democratic dispensation where some few class of elites manipulates foreign policy formulation and external relations, while citizens opinions are highly suppressed and National Assembly are mere "rubber-stamp" or totally by-passed.

The international system is characterized by decentralization of power and uneven distribution of resources (economic, man-power and technological knowledge). This unequal nature of state gave birth to state interactions and foreign policy, toward external environment (Birai 1987:1). For these basic issues, each state in the system, in its relations with other tries to achieve certain goals. Thus, the essence of foreign policy of any nation-is about goals and means. These are set within the nation's resource capability and the perception of her in the international system. Culturally, economic and even military influences and pressures are exerted by each state on each other in a variety of ways, in order to achieve set goals and objectives and to gain maximum advantages from the system while trying its unfavourable aspects to the barest minimum. The late twentieth century had brought with it recognition that world have become a global village. To a great extent, globalization has completely altered understanding of politics and nature of international political interactions from traditional view in which states were treated as the principal political actors. Globalization have weakened and perhaps destroyed the distinction between 'The Domestic' and 'The Foreign' thus leading to the emergence of a world or global society. Although nation-states continue to be the most significant actors on the world stage, the growing impact of supra-national bodies and transactional groups and organization is impossible to deny (Thompson, 2004:124). The ultimate objective of any Foreign Policy is to achieve long-range or short term goals that ensure the relative advantage of one actor over another. Thus, it is important

to perceive foreign policy in terms of the pursuit of national interests. It is with respect to the achievement of a country's national interests that some analysts evaluate the degree of success in the pursuit of a country's foreign policy (Holsti, 1992:9).

Foreign Policy is concerned with the defence and promotion of 'National Interest', as well as the continued struggle of states to secure and determine the development. But Nigeria's foreign policy is an epitome of inherent inconsistencies of successive administrations since independence in 1960, with the exception of the familiar rhetoric that Africa is the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigeria's foreign policy is characterized by ad-hoc responses to issues rather than its being based on an explicitly coherent agenda (Dunmoye; 1987). Amongst the determinants of a coherent and dynamic foreign policy are a vibrant economy, military capability, well informed legislature, population and geographical size, a committed leadership and a supportive citizenry that is motivated by an acceptable ideology. The irony of it all is that Nigeria lacks most of these attributes; hence its inability to use foreign policy as an instrument of ensuring domestic harmony that will create binding union between the citizens and political leaders. Thus, it falls short of a well-informed foreign policy that will project a glorious interests in the international arena as well as creating domestic stability and unity through the involvement of the generality of the citizens in the policy making process.

Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa Era

Nigeria's foreign policy since independence has been reactive to events as they occur in the international scene rather than addressing fundamental issues. In the end, Nigeria is found to be blowing cold, hot or firm, depending on the circumstances in which she found herself. These reactive measures resulted in a cautious and vague action under the First Republic regime of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Yoroms, 2004:302). Whereas the conduct of Nigeria's external relations under the Balewa government was guided by the laid down principles, what become most prominent in the implementation was 'Westernism' and conservatism. Britain continued to occupy the pre-eminent position in Nigeria's foreign relations even as the countries of the Eastern bloc were not reckoned with in the conduct of Nigeria's external relations. An examination of the direction of Nigeria's external trade, positions taken in international organizations, such as the United Nations, political and military ties clearly shows this (Aworawo, 2003:392).

Nigeria's foreign policy had been a matter of continuity and change because the majority of

the principles outlined on August 20, 1960, by the Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa are still being adhered to (Izah; 1991). However, the personalization of foreign policy commenced from his tenure because Balewa made relentless efforts to prevent parliament from allocating special sessions or days for the discussion of foreign policy matters. Nigeria's foreign policy under the Balewa administration was characterised by conservative, cautious, moderate and pro-West and Pro-British policies. It is essential to note, however, that the Balewa administration did not possess the resources especially the economic resources that subsequently became available to the military regime to pursue a vigorous and assertive foreign policy (Adeyemo, 2002:1). The military that came after him only built on it, causing strong personality traits to be entrenched in Nigeria's foreign policy by the successive military regimes (Fawole 2003:2).

Apparently, independence, most of the supposed foreign policy objectives were outlined but its implementation was subjected to intense party politics and economy. Economic potentials prompt many countries to established embassies in Nigeria been the largest black nation, but financial constraint prevented Nigeria from reciprocating. This made Nigeria to adopt selective posting of missions mainly to the areas that were in the same camp with Britain where economic ties, educational interest and religion importance would be maintained. Thus, Nigeria's foreign policy tilted towards Western countries, Middle East and Saudi Arabia. Nigeria's interest in playing important role in Africa because of her size and human resources prompt economic cooperation and African unity that gave birth to former O.A. U, ECOWAS and peace-keeping in Congo as well as establishment of Chad Basin commission.

Major General Aguiyi Ironsi Regime

Nigeria's First Republic came to an end on 15 January 1966, following a military coup led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. Had the Nzeogwu-led Coup succeeded as planned, there might have been a revolutionary change in the conduct of Nigeria's external relations as the leaders of the coup espoused socialist principles (Ademoyega, 1981:47). However, the failure of the coup led to a military government headed by Major General J. T. Aguiyi Ironsi . the events that followed led to the civil war which began in July 1967 and ended in January 1970. Events of the civil war period compelled the leaders of the period to widen the scope of Nigeria's external relations beyond the prism of pro-Westernism to which it had been confined since independence (Aworawo, 2003:395).

Dr. K. O. Mbadiwe has shown that power was peacefully and legitimately transferred to

General Ironsi, in accordance with the colonial tradition of peaceful transfer of power by the serving members of the Balewa's council of ministers. Even though this peaceful transfer of power was endorsed by the British High Commissioner, Francis Cumming Bruce, the legitimacy of such transfer has been a subject of heated debate. Ironsi's preoccupation before his death was with the domestic environment which must be orderly for a purposeful action within the international system. However, it must be noted that he was the one who saw politics through the bourgeois binoculars hence his inability to affect a change or add bite to the country's foreign policy. Like his predecessor, he lacked deep foresight because of the mediocre and unintelligent advisors with whom he surrounded himself. He was merely a military Prime Minister who pledged to maintain the neo-colonial relationship between Nigeria and Britain (Njokwu, 1996:65). Foreign Policy became stressful and tensed under military (Adeniran 1985:191) even though elements of continuity really exist. Nigerian civil war drastically changed her foreign policy towards Western and gravitates toward Eastern Blocs. Civil war became a turning point in Nigeria's foreign policy as it called to question some old beliefs and values about Nigeria's role in international relations. Because Nigeria's traditional allies refuse to sell arms to her until Soviet Union came to rescue and became Nigeria's true friend in time of need.

Major General Yakubu Gowon Regime

Gowon's regime capitalizes on the effects of civil war to move in era of 'Reconciliation' and 'Consolidation' (Adeniran 1985:193) where effort were spent on reconciling with old friends and consolidate: diplomatic gains of war. Priority attention was given to Nigeria's immediate neighbours, the beginning of pursuance of policy of good neighbourliness where Nigeria and Togo Republic spear-head formation of ECOWAS. To compensate Egypt's efforts during the war, Nigeria took side with Arabs in the Arab-Israeli war. Gowon's foreign policy was the beginning of 'farewell to innocence' and total independence on the West (Mamman, 1999: 15). It also gave birth to oppositional stance to apartheid and colonialism. The civil war solidarity and diplomacy prompted Nigeria in 1972 to declared 'Africa as the corner stone' of her foreign policy and proceeded to extend unlimited assistance to the Liberation struggle in Angola and South Africa. Realizing importance of US as a dominant force in United Nations, World Bank and IMF where Nigeria may need assistance. Prompt improve relations with U.S. (Nwachukwu, 1989) maintains that the exigencies of war that forced Nigeria to adopt semblance' of balanced stance between excessive Pro-Western rapprochement with Eastern blocs. Petrodollars enabled Nigeria to play effective and crucial role in Africa and World

Affairs. Ofoegbu (1978) add that Gowon era marked major rethink in foreign policy thrust of Nigeria which affect relations with Britain, non-alignment, problems of Southern Africa.

After the civil war, efforts were geared towards reconstruction, reconciliation and rehabilitation. The extent to which the then peace process succeeded has been subject of heated debate (Nwankwo, 1987:46). However over time, Nigeria returned to the international system having redefined and reconceptualised her role in the global society. The redefinition was rather important with respect to her role in the commonwealth especially as Britain remained inconsistent on issues concerning the apartheid government in South Africa. The regime launched an anti-apartheid campaign in the international fora. Indeed, it was at this time that the awareness of the total decolonization of Africa started. The liberation committee of the O.A.U was supported with financial assistance from Nigeria. On the sub-region, the regime supported and took active part in the formation of the Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS) for the purposes of economic revitalization of the region. The regime also sought to promote the cultural heritage of the black race; hence it organized and hosted FESTAC – an occasion which brought together blacks from all parts of the world to promote African Arts and culture and also the promotion and protection of the race (Njoku, 1996:65-66).

Nonetheless, as Nigeria progressed on the path of statehood end in the aftermath of the civil war, certain adjustments to its foreign policy orientation became noticeable. These adjustments were necessitated by the need to assert the country's position as an emergent regional/continental hegemonic power in Africa and the desire to be more vocal and assertive on some major international issues especially on some major international issues especially from the 1970s when decolonisation, as well as the struggle against apartheid and white minority regime in Southern Africa and which became a cardinal principle of its foreign policy. In pursuit of these goals and objectives, Nigeria's foreign policy was shaped and influenced by the following policies and principles: one, non-alignment and rejection of formal military alliances with, and political support for the West or the East in the Cold War's international political system; two, legal equality of all states; three, belief and conviction in a legally well-ordered and peaceful international system requires mutual and reciprocal respect for the views and interests of all states; four, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states; five, reliance on multilateralism through membership of key international organizations; six, fulfilment of the historic mission and manifest destiny of Nigeria on the African continent; and seven, making Africa the cornerstone and nerve-centre

of foreign policy activities and considerations (Eyinla, 2012:101).

The highest watermark of Nigeria's foreign policy relations under the Gowon administration was attained in May 1975 when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established through the efforts of General Yakubu Gowon (Rtd) and Togolese President, Gnassingbe Eyadema (Pedler, 1979:258). Nigeria's leadership role in Africa became clearly manifested with the founding of ECOWAS. This was remarkable considering the fact that nine out of the fifteen founding member country of the organization have strong attachment to France. From small beginnings in the nearly three decades of its existence, the organisation has struggled to promote political and economic integration in West Africa as well as the overall economic development of the region. In all, it can be said that a favourable condition existed for Nigeria to widen the scope of its range of friends and project itself vigorously in the comity of nations in the 1970s (Aworawo, 2003:398). The period, which lasted from August 1975 to October 1979, is generally regarded as a time when Nigeria's support for African States and defence of African interests was most vigorously displayed. In addition, more than at any other time since Nigeria's independence. This was manifested in numerous cases during the period. It was after the regime came to power, in late 1975, that the independence process of Angola became crisis-ridden on 25 November 1975, Nigeria gave a huge grant to the MPLA government in Luanda and played a huge role and support in other ways. This pitched Nigeria against the Western powers, including Britain and U.S.A. However, Nigeria stood its ground and this won her great accolade as a champion of African interests. For Nigeria's external relations, the days of low profile foreign policy were over (Aworawo, 2003:399).

Major General Murtala Muhammed/Olusegun Obasanjo Regime

The golden era of Nigeria's foreign policy was the decades of the 1970s. This was the period when Nigeria oil wealth increased, dramatically, empowering the government of Yakubu Gowon and Murtala Muhammed/Olusegun Obasanjo to embark on significant nationalist and Pan-African policies in Africa. The experiences of the civil war years in particular, imposed a more flexible outlook and comprehensive external relations portfolio on the Gowon regime. Beyond this, the post civil war era saw General Gowon endeavouring to repair the damage done to Nigeria's relations with her neighbours and some African this period, and played a more expensive role in continental West African politics. The regime gave birth to the Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS) which later led to the ACP-EEC

agreements known as the Lome conventions (Pogoso, 2010:219).

The Afrocentric foreign policy was pursued with a greater activism and determination. Murtala's personal attributes came into play especially with his dealings with the outside world. He demonstrated in no little way that leadership ability to a large extent determines the foreign policy goal and achievement of a given government. Murtala's convictions took radical actions in Nigeria's foreign policy. First to demonstrate this independence, he cancelled the scheduled visit of Henry Kissinger, the then U.S secretary of State, closed and took over the U.S. information service building and Radio monitoring centre in Lagos and Kaduna. Furthermore, in the outcry against his actions, the regime recognised the Soviet backed MPLA in Angola. The vibrancy of Murtala's regime in the area of diplomacy and foreign policy came when President Ford of the U.S who wrote General Murtala to instruct that the O.A.U summit that they should *'insist upon a prompt halt to all foreign involvement in Angola (a subtle reference to Soviet and Cuban involvement'* (Kalu, 1987:181). Murtala's response not only reiterated the freedom of actions of sovereign states but also served as a reproach to the U.S president by informing him that 'The Federal Military Government reiterates its firm decision to completely reject directives from the United States President. It also wished to express the hope and expectation that all other sister African states which hence been subjected to such untimely pressure will also reject it, to enable us to build the Africa of our choice. Gone are the days when Africa will bow to the threat of the so-called super-power' (Kalu, 1987:80).

Be that as it may, experiences under military rule have shown that strong-willed dictators were the sole determinants of the direction and contents of the country's foreign policy, even when they themselves were mere 'Diplomatic Illiterates'. Most of them exhibited an uncanny propensity for *ad hoc* measures and reliance on handpicked personal advisers to conduct foreign policy. While General Muhammad Murtala exhibited the traits of a strong and unbending personality on matters of policy, General Olusegun Obasanjo after him was equally strong-willed and relished the use of 'kitchen cabinets' and unofficial advisers in conducting external relations (Garba, 1987). General Murtala's 'sensational radicalism' challenged Western imperialism, especially with his famous speech on 'Africa has come of Age', which he delivered at the extraordinary summit of African Heads of State and Government at Addis Ababa in 1976 (Yoroms, 2004:303).

Apparently, the Murtala-Obasanjo regime was continuity of some old policy but with more

vigour and practicability, most especially with oil boom that propelled Nigeria into a wealthy nation. Murtala regime began era of activist and dynamic foreign policy that boost Afro-centric posture. The personal charisma and vibrant orientation of Gen. Murtala made Nigeria to play leadership role in Africa by providing African brotherliness in the face of Western powers like U.S and U.K. Oddih (1997:136) maintain that the regime was committed to self-reliance, restoration of the dignity of Blackman, downplay respect and importance attached to international and World Institutions. On 13 February 1976, the first of the duo in that administration, General Murtala Muhammad was killed in an abortive Coup. General Olusegun Obasanjo took over and continued to maintain the diplomatic momentum. The death of Murtala did not kill the zeal, but there was change in foreign policy thrust to favour Western countries that enhanced improved relations between U.S and Nigeria which was partially damaged by Angolan issues. Mamman (1999:16) asserted that the issue of eradication of apartheid still wax stronger to leading nationalization of British petroleum due to Britain fraternising with the apartheid South-Africa. There was greater consistence and coherence in foreign policy formulation and execution than the ad-hoc approach of the preceding administration (Adeyemo, 2002:170). As Otubanjo (1989:239) noted:

The Murtala-Obasanjo regime pursued a foreign policy that was aggressively African in its purpose. It was a policy which brought Nigeria to the forefront of Africa politics and earned her universal know ledge and widespread approval. Running through its foreign policy was the desire not only for total liberation of Africa from the colonial and racial yoke but equally important, the genuine independence and economic solvency of all African states.

Evidence shows that it was only during Murtala/Obasanjo regime that Nigeria assumed a militant or rather assertive, foreign policy posture. This approach invariably dictated the pace and direction of foreign policy for Nigeria in Africa. However, an extension was the addition of the objective to promote and protect all black people the world over (Moyosore, 1960:35).The success of military regime of Murtala Muhammed and Olusegun Obasanjo in the pursuit of a foreign policy whose raison d'être was aggressively African and earned Nigeria universe acknowledgement and approval. The proactive policies and actions against colonialism in African had a positive outcome in the decolonization of Angola and later, Zimbabwe. Under Murtala Muhammed's leadership, Nigeria's role in the recognition of the MPLA gave Nigeria's foreign policy the explicitness which many Nigeria's had yearned. It brought Nigeria to the centre-stage of the politics of de-colonization and earned Nigeria the status of a "front-line state "even when it was far from also committed to the "pursuit of Nigeria's interests, African goals and justice in the international system". During this period,

British petroleum was nationalized, Nigeria led the withdrawal of African countries from the Montreal Olympics, and Nigeria's money from Barclays Bank was withdrawn and chaired the UN committee against Apartheid. Indeed, '*Nigeria's potential for continental leadership was translated from the latent to the manifest*' (Otubanjo, 1989:240).

Under the Muhammed Muritala / Olusegun Obasanjo regime, the word 'centre-piece' replaced 'cornerstone'. The Adebayo Adedeji report on foreign relations talked about 'Africa as centre-piece'. Like 'Africa as cornerstone', it gave priority attention to Africa. By cornerstone and centre-piece as a foreign policy ideological guide, policy makers only prioritised the foreign policy operational areas. Little attention was given to the nature and type of interests to be pursued, especially at the level of the continent's five sub-regions and other individual member states of the OAU. There was also a little emphasis on the implementing institutions and strategies. The operational modalities were, indeed, ill-defined (Akinterinwa, 2012: 436).

President Shehu Shagari's Administration

A civilian government was installed in Nigeria on 10 October 1979, under the new administration which was headed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Nigeria's external relations witnessed a radical departure from the prevailing pattern under the Murtala/Obasanjo regime. From the activism of the previous government, the country's external relations came to assume a low-profile posture similar to what obtained under the Balewa government from 1960 to early 1966. Three main reasons were responsible for this difference. First was the fact that the government was a civilian one which had a measure of control by the legislature. Second was the conservative nature of the character of president Shehu Shagari, and the third reason was the economic recession which hit the country following a sharp fall in the price of oil in the international market in 1981 (Aworawo, 2003:40).

The Obasanjo regime relinquished power to a democratically elected civilian regime on 1 October, 1979. The period 1979-1983 marked Nigeria's second attempt at operating a democracy. The dynamics of the domestic structure, politics and relations conditioned foreign policy in this period. The civilian administration of Shehu Shagari inherited a foreign policy that was popular with Nigerians and respected in the international community. However, the administration was unable to keep up with the foreign policy tempo it inherited (Pogson, 2010:220).

Shagari's administration failed to carry on with dynamic and purposeful foreign policy inherited from Murtala/Obasanjo because of domestic problems, oil and economic recession. Due to decline in oil revenue, corruption and economic mismanagement the fragile domestic environment undermine Nigeria's ability to act assertively in its external relations because all attentions were diverted to domestic arena. Oparadike (1982:2) contended that Shagari's foreign policy failed to produce results because of Nigeria's failure in the Chadian crisis, the national humiliation by Cameroon in Bakassi peninsula and Nigeria's critical contribution to the failure of the OAU summit in Libya. In effect, Nigeria which had been distinguished by its success in international arena began to lose its credibility (Ogwu, 1986:36). Shagari's foreign policy thrust was characterized by indecision and ambivalence. Mamman (1999: 17) posited that foreign policy became excessive Pro-Western. Domestic instability make it a carbon copy of Balewa regime. President Shagari refused to attend the Tripoli summit to find solution to the OAU crisis but his government totally supported Namibian independence and isolation of apartheid South Africa.

Nigeria's foreign policy under Shagari administration was captured by Professor Otubanjo (1989:6) thus:

Nigeria's foreign policy remained at level of routine observance of existing relations and obligation. In no area of foreign policy was there innovation nor a more urgent approach than had previously existed. Even in the matter of Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 which emphasized the need to focus on the economic problems of Africa, the Shagari regime was not able to provide Initiative or leadership. The four years of his regime were therefore, a period of recess for Nigeria's foreign policy. It was characterized by the slowing down of the tempo and the substantial dismantling of the role expectation which the previous regime had instituted. The performance meter of foreign policy output oscillated steadily between the indifferent and incompetent. The incompetent and lacklustre foreign policy was surpassed- by the level of ineptitude political and economic management at domestic level.

Even though, it retained the idea of the Africa centeredness his regime failed to take a position and recognized the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic Adeyemi (2002: 121) remarks that Nigeria's foreign policy under Shagari was '*vague, poorly articulated lacking vigour and direction*'. Shagari's foreign policy thrust was characterized by indecision and ambivalence. Mamman (1999: 17) posited that foreign policy became excessively Pro-Western, domestic instability made it a carbon copy of Balewa's regime. Although President Shagari refused to attend the Tripoli Summit to find solution to the O.A.U. crisis, but his government totally supported Namibia's independence and the isolation of apartheid South Africa.

General Muhammadu Buhari's Regime

However, when the military Junta of led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari took over power on the 31 December, 1983 it dismissed the administration and became less enthusiastic in formulating and pursuing foreign policy on the basis of Africa as a centre piece of Nigerian Foreign Policy. According to the then foreign Minister, Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari, the principle 'was imprecise and weak in its implementation. Several questions were raised which were not adequately addressed, *let alone* resolved by the administration should we, for example, be a fire brigade, available at any time and peace on the continent, to put out conflagration. Alternatively, should we respond selectively to crisis areas on the continent that are closer to home or closer to our fundamental security and national interests.

It was at this point that the regime threw up the foreign policy. According to General Muhammadu Buhari, the pattern of concentric circles may be discernible in our attitude and response to foreign policy issues within epicentre of these circles are the national economic and security interests of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, stability and the economic and social well-being of our immediate neighbours. One of our principal priorities is to put on more constructive footing identical goals of regional stability and peace (Gambari, 1986:73). The Buhari regime articulated a foreign policy that was characterised by a purposeful attempt to restore both Nigeria domestic and foreign policies. The administration sought to solve the problems, over haul Nigeria's economy and conceptualize Nigeria's foreign policy in a way that reclaimed its voice in both continental and international affairs (Gambari, 1989:276). Although, the concentric circles approach articulated by the regime did not have much effect before the regime was overthrown, the regime's contribution to foreign policy was in its efforts to define and defined Nigeria's national interests in relation to Africa's goals and objectives and the pursuit of world peace and security.

Professor Ibrahim Gambari has it that the Alhaji Shehu Shagari administration that succeeded the Muritala / Obasanjo regime "did not practicalise the African-centeredness of the county's foreign policy..... Our foreign policy was perceived as vague, poorly articulated and lacking vigour and direction". This situation prompted General Muhammad Buhari, who ousted the Shagari administration to re-adopt the 'Africa-centredness' principle in our foreign policy, but under a new conception: Concentricism (Gambari, 1986:75). General Buhari first explained the new concept thus:

a pattern of concentric circles may be discernible in our attitude and

response to foreign policy issues within the African continent and in the world at large. At the epicentre of these circles are the national economic and security interests of the federal republic of Nigeria, which are inextricably tied up with the security, stable and the economic and social well-being of our immediate neighbours. One of our principal priorities is to put on a more constructive footing relations with our neighbours with whom we share identical goals of regional stability and peace (Gambari, 1986:75).

From this explanation, attempt was made to divide Africa into what Professor Gambari (1986) has called “*scale of priorities for our foreign policy endeavours*”. What is particularly noteworthy at the level of Nigeria therefore, is that concentricism was adopted as a foreign policy technique to address the socio-economic and political problems that the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari left behind following its ousting on 31 December 1983 by General Muhammad Buhari (Akinterinwa, 2012: 438).

The Buhari's foreign policy was ultra-nationalism and xenophobic. Fawole (2003:17) contended that what defined Buhari's foreign policy was circumstances that preceded its entry into power which the regime wanted to correct, thus Professor Otubanjo (1989:244) referred to it as rehabilitation. The thrust of this foreign policy is an inflexible and uncompromising foreign policy that was based on concentric. Despite dwindling oil revenues, oil glut and badly needed credit facilities (of which arrangement has been concluded by the ousted regime). The regime rejected IMF loan facility due to its conditionalities, instead it opted for counter trade with Brazil, France, Germany, Italy and Netherlands. This bartering attempt put Nigeria's interest against Britain who produce similar product and a major trading partner. It resisted temptation to receive aids or succumb to pressure by the Arab Moslem Group of the OIC for loans. Relations with West deteriorated due to Dikko's affairs. Buhari's foreign policy toward Nigeria's immediate neighbour was most crucial due to hardship it created for these neighbouring states. The triple policies border closures, sudden change of the national currency and expulsion of illegal aliens from Nigeria contradict Africa brotherliness. States like Togo and Benin whose economy depends on trading with Nigeria and land-locked countries paralyzed until when United States and France make representation before they were allowed to use Port Harcourt port facilities. His regime raised Nigeria's prominence by recognizing Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic against the objection of Morocco thus, discarding the fence sitting which allowed.

This allowed S.A.D.R to take a seat at the O.A.U summit. Although Africa still remained the area of primary concern, this act gave way to national economic and security interests.

(Adeyemo 2002:23). To regain her 'frontline state' status, efforts were made to liberate Namibia and eliminate apartheid in South Africa. Professor Otubanjo (1989:9) summarizes General Muhammad Buhari's performance as follows:

The foreign policy of Buhari regime did not equal Murtala/Obasanjo era in flourish, exuberance and effect, but nonetheless, it sought to match it. It could not be expected to do so, in view of economic limitations under which it laboured. But it shared its clarity of vision as well as the sense of urgency and purpose. There was an attempt to reconceptualise Nigeria's foreign policy in a way which would allow easy identification of the nation's structure of priorities. The concentric circle approach which regime articulated did not have much effect before the regime was overthrown, but in its twenty months, the regime had done enough to bring some measure of respect to Nigeria's foreign policy". Otubanjo finally concluded that: "By the time the regime' was overthrown on August 27th 1985, it had done enough to restore creditability to Nigeria's foreign policy and put her once again in the fore front of Africa and African international politics.

In distinguishing between concentricism as explained by Professor Gambari and concepts of cornerstone and centre-piece, Ambassador Adeniji (2002: 3) said:

The fundamental difference between cornerstone or centre-piece of our foreign policy and the concept of concentric circles is that concentricism attempted to promote the areas of interest and immediate needs but the immediate focus remains African in general, and Nigeria, in particular. Besides, while Professor Gambari underscored geographical partitioning in the operationalisation of our foreign policy, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, then Foreign Affairs Minister, emphasised the means required to sustain Africa as centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy by proposing the use of the international environment to restore domestic problems. It was in this context that the idea of concert of Medium Powers and Technical Aid Corps were suggested.

From this statement, concentricism was not at all an objective but a means. It was more or less a foreign policy tactic that had not been fully taken advantage of. As a means to an end, concentricism has to have a focus. In other words, concentricism, as a foreign policy guide, has to be made constructive and beneficial and that the focus of a constructive and beneficial foreign policy should, first of all, be the Nigerian people. By implication, anything "Nigerian" should really be the focus (Akinterinwa, 2013: 452). That is, constructive and beneficial concentricism is predicated on a tripod of complementary strategies: articulation of Nigeria's interests within a given concentric circle; articulation of appropriate techniques for promoting and defending such interests within that concentric circle; and evolving techniques that will make the Nigerian people the first beneficiary of such a foreign policy effort (Akinterinwa, 2012: 254).

General Ibrahim Babangida's Regime

The regimes which preceded that of Babangida no doubt pursued the goal of self – preservation, world peace and regional security as best they could. The Buhari regime actually initiated a formulation of ‘concentric circles’ which would enable Nigeria to approach world affairs from the sub-regional to the regional and global levels. But then, Nigeria’s gates were shut against her neighbours with undue threats and hostility metal against the ECOWAS sub-region. Coupled with the “threat and harassment posture” of the Buhari Administration was the acute high – handedness in domestic policies and actions which did not promote external goodwill. By virtue nations a position in Africa and among the Third World nations a number of decisions have had to be taken which tend to establish the pattern of Nigeria’s initiatives and reactions to world situation. On the sub – regional level, Babangida opened up the closed borders to Nigeria’s neighbours, thus promoting good neighborliness whose spill – over has included the strengthening of Nigeria’s position among the economic community of West African States (ECOWAS). The endearing policies of free movement of citizens and goods and services within the ECOWAS, and of export of Nigeria’s relatively low prices local manufacturers across West Africa arising from the internal gains of SAP, have promoted enormous goodwill among the governments and peoples of the sub-region. Nigeria’s image within ECOWAS has, thus improved tremendously since 1985 (Oyovbaire & Olagunju: 62).

For it to be credible in its foreign policy, Nigeria has to promote stability both at home and in its relationship with other nations. This is the reason why the Babangida Administration has found it necessary to affect the initiative of promoting good neighborliness and to relate to other countries within the frameworks of the ECOWAS, OAU, the commonwealth of Nations, the ACP – EEC and the United Nations in pursuit of the nation’s basic interest. What was observed in this regard, during the period can be summed up as follows:

- (a) Pursuit of internal policies of self reliance and social justice which elicit positive reactions from the international community with regard to Nigeria’s capacity to govern itself and to promote democracy;
- (b) Promoting stability and peace within and among nation – states;
- (c) Highly articulated African policy based on concrete action s and timely initiatives;

(d) Encouragement and promotion of stronger and meaningful relations with the technologically advanced countries (Oyovbaire & Olagunju)

More than any other Head of state before him, President Babangida has paid more attention to Africa affairs particularly the West Africa Sub- region. Apart from extending invitations to and hosting other African Heads of state, President Ibrahim Babangida has , on invitation, visited may African countries, including the Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Sudan, Egypt and Zimbabwe. In all these, the focus has been on cooperation and the promotion of peace and greater understanding. One example that is worthy of special mention is the conflict between Senegal and Mauntania which carries with it racial undertones but which, with the intervention of President Babangida, has led to the two countries accepting the wisdom of resolving the conflict peacefully (Oyovbaire & Olagunju : 64)

In actual fact, there was a reversal of the pattern of the Nigeria's external relations under the Babangida regime. One other development worth nothing in strategic term is the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) Programme. The scheme has been advertising Nigerian skills and goodwill to the outside world while giving Nigeria a special opportunity to know more about other countries. This, in no small way, helps in the successful implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy and to foster good and beneficial external relations (Oyorbaire & Olagunju : 63). Under the General Ibrahim Babangida regime (1985:1994) with Professor Bolaji Akinyemi as Foreign Minister, Nigeria's foreign policy took a higher intellectual dimension. Professor Akinyemi had grand designs for Nigeria's role in the world. For him, Nigeria must command respect in the international arena by taking the initiative to act decisively on matters which affect the African cabinet. It was Akinyemi who began the Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TACS). He aggressively pushed for the establishment of what he termed Medium Powers, which he believed had the potential to contribute positively to shaping the course of international relations (Adefuye, 1992:39).

Babangida's foreign policy was regaining lost ground (Fawole, 2003:150) and reverse isolationist policy of Buhari regime. The thrust of his foreign policy could be traced to his declaration at the All Nigerian Conference of Foreign Policy held in Kuru, Jos where he called for "creation of necessary political and economic conditions of Africa which will secure the sovereignty, territorial integrity national independence of all African countries and

their total liberation neo-colonialism and all forms of foreign dominations” (Adeyemo, 2002: 125). He set forth activist and dynamic foreign policy. Professor Akinyemi who put into practice his school of thought of power politics' approach to international relations through the Concert of Medium Powers and Technical Aid Corps Scheme (TACS). His foreign policies were tailored to serve the country's goal of economic development. The regime was a believer in sub-regional diplomacy that focused more on sub-regional integration in particular and Afrocentric in general (Fawole, 2003: 153). The regime projected foreign policy that will protect National Interest and promote National security (Babangida 1987: 105). For his regime, to secure National Security and Interest is to make West-Africa sub region safer, this led to mediating in a border war between Mali and Burkina Faso in 1986. Nigeria, through multilateral diplomacy served in the Eminent Persons Group, secured Secretary-Generalship of Commonwealth of Nations and the presidency of the U.N General Assembly.

As a matter of fact, National security consciousness brought his regime to normalize damaged relations with our immediate neighbouring states whom border closure and sudden change of currency nearly wreck their economies. To sooth their wound Nigeria offers assistance to them which prompt ECOWAS leaders to elect Babangida as their chairman for two consecutive terms 1986 and 1987 after completion of Buhari's term of 1985. This helped to project Nigeria's claim to leadership in the sub-region. The fact that his regime wants economic integration which cannot be achieved in a situation of war and political instability prompt his regime to be involved in Liberian Crisis by spearheading the formation of ECOMOG for security reasons, economic interest as well as perceived refugees problems. This put an end to Nigeria's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states (Mamman 199: 18). Because a full blown civil war will threaten the stability survival of Liberia and the rest of West-Africa sub-region by way of refugee influx into neighbouring states. His foreign policy thrust shifted radically from the political, socio and Afrocentric policies of the previous regime and placed much emphasis on Economic Diplomacy whose objective was to woo foreign investors into Nigeria and enhance the country's economic development, therefore it started dancing to the tunes of IMF/World Bank economic blue prints most especially Liberalization, deregulation, debureaucratisation of the economy and management.

‘Economic diplomacy’ was conceived as the third leg of the trippod of the Babangida Administration's structural adjustment programme. The two other legs concerned a

restructuring and diversification of the productive base of the economy and macro-economic reforms to control inflation and eliminate the annual huge budget deficits. Thus, even if foreign policy was able to create a favourable image of the economic potentials of the country through focused international interactions, the obvious lapse in the implementation of the other aspects undermined the full success of the strategy. Rather than diminish, budget deficit increased notwithstanding the windfall from the increase in oil price as a result of the Gulf War (Adeniji, 2005:40).

Perhaps the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida remains the one that made a radical shift in foreign affairs, initiating a policy of economic diplomacy. However, under General Ike Nwachukwu, as Foreign Affairs Minister, the regime redirected emphasis on economic issues, anchored on the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), an aspect of the economic reform initiated by the military government in 1986. Nigeria played a very prominent role in the establishment of sub-regional peace and security, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The country played a leading role in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which cost an estimated sum of \$10 billion (Smith, 2005:20).

Again, the foreign policy of no permanent friends or enemies but permanent interest led to the resolve in diplomatic relations with states of Israel: The regime recognized the Republic of South-Africa when president De-Klerk embarked on political reforms to usher multi-racial democracy and Nigeria helped South Africa to join O.A.U. His regime was able to use diplomatic means to secure independence for Namibia in 1989. The regimes re-establish relations with several African states such as Cote d'Ivoire, Cape Verde and Zaire. Diplomatic measures were used to iron out South-Africa's attempt to construct satellite tracking station in Equatorial-Guinea to pick up valuable intelligence information between Nigeria and Frontline states. Nigeria's efforts paid-off when South Africans were expelled and bilateral relations were restored.

Realizing the New World Order in which the great powers had little interest in Africa affairs, they now concentrate on rebuilding Europe. Unlike cold-war era when conflicts in Africa were internationalized by intervention from West and East, efforts were made to resolve internal conflict and civil war in Sudan. Nigeria now projected her power in the sub-region and response to the politics of New World Order since Africa is becoming less relevant in global calculation. The New Economic Order prompted Babangida as the chairman of OAU to call for a treaty establishing the African Economic Community which was

signed in Abuja in June 1991, this was based on current global movement toward regional integration (Fawole, 200: 167). Because African economics are too small, and weak to go it alone, hence the need or integration at the continental level to ensure that Africa would not be left completely in terms of development. Babangida foreign policy in the area of implementing economic policies of IMF/World bank endeared him to U.S. This U.S/IMF favourable score card give the regime debt rescheduling on two occasions. The cordial bilateral relations with U.S. enabled the Reagan administration to cancel an existing \$ 82 million debt and rescheduled \$274 official debt till 1995.

5.3 THE PURSUANCE OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD

General Sani Abacha's Regime

For most parts of the 1990s under the leadership of General Sani Abacha, Nigeria became a pariah state with whom none, except compliant and rebel African countries had diplomatic relations with (Pogoso, 2010:222). The Abacha regime was prominent for the extreme brutally and gross violation of human rights. Abacha's foreign policy was descent of iron curtain (Fawole, 2003:185), his government did not have clear-cut foreign policy rather it exhibit pariah isolationist posture caused by series of tragic domestic policies and actions that developed into international diplomatic controversies which became policy thrust of Abacha. His foreign policy was negatively afflicted by the domestic environment which denied his regime needed popular support. Abacha's problem was cumulative and ripple effects of the annulment of June 12 presidential election. It was thought that Abacha would come in to hand over power to the democratically elected president when court of law had declared that interim government as illegal, but contrary to the expectation of people, power is too good for Abacha to be relinquished. Thus his regime lacked legitimacy, mandate and populist supports that usually welcome other military coups in the past. His problem was compounded by his insensitivity to major domestic issues which could precipitate international reactions.

In an attempt to hang-on to power, Abacha started elimination of his perceived enemies which further caused international isolation. The first problem was phantom coup that involved eminent Nigerians, the judgment attracted worldwide condemnation and there was international call for clemency. The pro-democratic movement were active and loud

which created a scene of political instability, thus 8th World Youth soccer championship was cancelled due to political instability. Another of Abacha's diplomatic blunder was the pre-meditated killing of famous Ogoni Nine on November 10, 1995 when Commonwealth meeting was still going on. The fact that these people were tried by military tribunal rather than conventional court without any right for appeal, despite international calls for clemency which was not listened to brought further hostility like outright Common-Wealth suspension of Nigeria. This brought about abusive diplomatic statement on the personality of Nelson Mandela by Abacha and Tom Ikimi, the then Foreign Minister.

Meanwhile, as a result of the annulment, the Nigerian citizens, civil society organisations, interest and pressure groups went on mass protest, with the international community condemning Nigeria. The aftermath was that General Ibrahim B. Babangida was not only asked by the populace but also by members of his regime to accept an interim government and resign. This he did after much pressure. He handed power over to Chief Ernest Shonekan as Head of an Interim National Government (ING). However, within six months of the June 1993 fiasco, General Sani Abacha took over the reins of power after Chief Shonekan, was compelled to resign (Akinterinwa, 2014: 301). On taking over, Abacha, in his maiden speech, said in his concluding remarks that:

This regime will be firm, humane and decisive, we will not condone nor tolerate any act of indiscipline. Any attempts to test our will, will be decisively dealt with - - - and for the international community, we ask that you suspend judgment while we grapple with the onerous task of nation building, reconciliation and repairs -- - give us the chance to solve our problems in our own ways.

The tune of General Abacha speech portrayed that Nigeria was not going to tolerate any flagrant behavior from any member of the international community. One thing that stands out clearly is that Abacha inherited a country in turmoil with a number of sanctions against his predecessors, Chief Shonekan and President Babangida. Of utmost importance is that most of the sanctions were spearheaded and imposed by Nigeria's friends and allies. A part of the problem between Nigeria and the West was that the West expected, on taking over government, Abacha to address the looming problem confronting Nigeria at the time, which was the quest for democracy as a result of the annulment of June 12 elections. And since he did not restore democracy, more sanctions were placed on Nigeria. Again, part of the reasons for the sanctions was that General Abacha was a dictator and his regime clearly violated

human rights, imprisoned political opponents and clamped down on the press. For instance, in June 1994, Abiola was arrested and charged with treason when he claimed the Presidency upon his return to Nigeria after a six month absence abroad, during which time he had solicited support for his cause in Britain and the United States (Akinterinwa, 2014 : 302).

More so, during General Abacha's regime, Nigeria was targeted by countries in the West in reaction by insisting on return to democracy. The countries included some European Union states (particularly Britain), Canada, and the United States. Members of the European Union imposed or tightened various non-economic sanctions, involving restrictions on diplomatic privileges and military cooperation. Furthermore, the European Union (EU) imposed arms embargo, suspended Nigeria from the then Lome Convention done by the Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP), suspended all its funded projects and credit lines recalled their Ambassadors and imposed visa restrictions on government officials, their families, and some beneficiaries of the military government (Akinterinwa, 2014 : 303).

In reaction, the ruling military regime in Nigeria resolved to resist the demands of its adversaries, both foreign and domestic (Akinterinwa, 2001 : 78-79). General Abacha recalled and closed Nigerian embassies in countries that have also recalled their ambassadors from Nigeria. For example, on September 6, 1996, the government announced the closure of its diplomatic mission in Canada allegedly for financial constraints and further directed that all its officials seek clearance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before having any dealings with Canada Mission or its personnel in Nigeria (Richard, 2013).

In reaction to threats from the West, General Abacha decided to redefine his foreign policy and made new friends. Importantly, Abacha made friends with the enemy of his enemies. His focus was now Asia and Middle East, with strategic countries such as Asia, China, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkey. In fact, China concluded an agreement to upgrade the Nigerian railway system, the Korean Daewoo Corporation began negotiations to enter the oil sector, the new Turkish prime minister who led an Islamic political party and was criticizing the West, visited Nigeria and concluded a substantial trade agreement. Malaysian economic advisors and business executives were active in Nigeria; as a member of CMAG, Malaysia strongly favored an early restoration of Nigeria's normal Commonwealth status (Akinyemi:16). Nigeria's only friend in the West at the time was France. The Abacha regime made conscious effort to keep the relationship warm. General Abacha attended a meeting of Francophone countries in Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire, that would be the first time Nigeria

was attending at the highest level such a meeting as a non – Francophone country, and not too long after the meeting, Nigeria transferred the European office of NNPC from London to Paris (Akinterinwa, 2014 : 304).

General Sani Abacha in an address delivered at the Annual Patron’s Dinner of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in December 1997, in Lagos had this to say:

The overriding aim of Nigeria’s foreign policy must be to project and safeguard our national interest at all times. Against the background of our experiences, the main thrust of our foreign policy has been a struggle for self – determination, the alleviation of poverty and the pursuit of self – reliant development. In response to the challenges of the emerging globalization of the international system, and in expressing our right to self-determination, we have, in recent times, been looking beyond our traditional allies, to diversify and cultivate new ties with countries that we consider not only friendly but display honest desire to cooperate with us in the pursuit of our development objectives. We would always welcome genuine and friendly relations based on mutual trust, respect and equality.

This statement officially articulated the policy shift at this period. As will become evident, the momentum generated by the shift never really faltered as it marked a turning point in the increasing engagement of Nigeria with Asian countries, especially China, other countries in Asia with whom Nigeria cultivated ties included Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, North Korea and Libya in Africa. A major criticism of this policy shift to Asia was that the countries cultivated were in themselves supposedly rogue states with poor human rights records (Okolie, 2011: 164).

International isolation propelled Abacha to turn to other discredited world leaders like late Col Gaddafi of Libya, Yahaya Jammeh of Gambia, El-Bashir of Sudan and Mainasara of Niger Republic for fellowship and as close associates. The only purposeful foreign policy of Abacha era was its ability to restore democratic rule to Sierra Leone and what his regime contributed immensely to the peace in Liberia. Thus his administration was involved in regional conflict management which paved way for the 1997 Abuja Accord signed by all the parties to Liberian conflict for a peaceful settlement of the crisis.

General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s Regime

Under the Abdulsalami Abubakar regime which was installed following the mysterious death of General Abacha on 8 June 1998, efforts were made to reverse the negative trend

of Nigeria's external relations. This period could be regarded as a dark age in Nigeria's external relations. The foreign policy thrust of Abdulsalami Abubakar was sensitive to the domestic environment that could have negative impact in the international circle. The cardinal principle of his foreign policy he maintained was the commitment "to restoring democracy, the rule of law and full respect for fundamental human rights and civil liberties in our country. We are also determined to take Nigeria back to its rightful place among the comity of nations (The Guardian, 1998:2).

It is difficult, if not impossible, to classify the Abacha era's foreign policy as a success story in any meaningful way. No matter what it attempted to do, and no matter the domestic and international circumstances it had to contend with, General Abacha left Nigeria's image and standing in the world worse than he had met in November 1993. The inescapable conclusion is that the Abacha regime did not bequeath a healthy foreign policy legacy to its successor (Fawole, 2003:215). Until his sudden death on June 8, 1998, General Sani Abacha and his administration refused to release the political detainees and prisoners in various parts of detention and prison camps. However, after his sudden death, General Abdulsalami Abubakar assumed power on June 9, 1998 and at a critical period in Nigeria's political development and transition to civil rule programme. In order to achieve his administration's domestic and foreign policy goals (or objectives), General Abubakar pledged, in his first nation-wide broadcast on Tuesday, June 9, 1998 that he would pursue genuine reconciliation within Nigeria and with all nations in the world. He also pledged to hand-over to a democratically elected government on May 29, 1999. Besides, he called on Nigeria's in self-exile in foreign countries to return home (i.e. Nigeria). In this regard, General Abubakar said: "Our vision for Nigeria is a country where nobody would be intimidated on account of his (or her) views, tribe and religion (The Guardian, June 23, 1998:4).

At the graduation of (course 20 officers comprising the Army, Navy and Air force) 182 grandaunts at command attended personally in early July 1998, General Abubakar stated what appeared to be corner-stone or fundamental goals of his administration's domestic and foreign policies. According to him,

The internal and sub-regional tasks, challenges and responsibilities facing our armed forces are becoming increasingly enormous and complex. This administration remains committed to restoring democracy, the rule of law and full respect for fundamental human rights and civil liberties in our

country. We are also determined to take Nigeria back to its rightful place among the comity of nations and, above all, we are committed to taking our military back to its constitutional and professional role of defending the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation. Therefore, Nigerians and foreign friends should support us in this historic task (The Guardian, July 11, 1998:1-2).

In this third broadcast to the nation on Monday, July 20, 1998, General Abubakar further stated:

this administration will consolidate on existing relationships and maintain positive and friendly relations with all nations of the world without compromising our sovereignty and independence as we endeavour to defend and protect the legitimate interest of our sub-region on all issues...we implore our friends to exercise patience and appreciate the unique problem that faces a nation. I have, therefore, directed the immediate resolution of the Medium Term Economic Framework (MTEF) with the World Bank and IMF. We also intend to begin discussions with the Paris Club with a view to obtaining debt relief. In the meantime, we will liberalize the debt conversion programme to encourage further foreign investment we will remain an important determinant in our multilateral relationships (The Guardian, Tuesday, July 21, 1998:15).

There is no doubt, General Abubakar's public and official statements or pronouncements earned him tremendous domestic and international support. Indeed, it bolstered his credentials not only in Nigeria but in international community (Adeyemo, 2002:147). It was the succeeding regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar that began the slow process of lifting the country from the pit of infamy into which it had fallen in the course of Abacha's four and half-year dictatorship (Fawole, 2003:215). Abdulsalami's foreign policy thrust was the redirection of Nigeria's foreign relations from self-defeatist isolationism of Abacha era to international co-operation in the modern era of fast changing and integrated world. The foreign policy thrust was a continuous dialogue with major actors in the international system rather than confrontation, this place much emphasis on multilateral cooperation and engagement with regional partners (Mamman, 1999: 19-20).

In his broadcast to the nation on July 20 1998, Abubakar reiterated that:

This administration will consolidate existing relationships and maintain positive and friendly relations with all nations of the world without compromising our sovereignty and independence as we endeavour to defend and protect the legitimate interest of our-region on all issues. Implore our friends to exercise patience and appreciate the unique problem that face us nation. I have; directed the immediate resolution of the

Medium Term Economic Programme (MTEP) with the World Bank and IMF. We also intend to begin discussions with Paris club with a view to obtain debt relief. In the meantime, we will liberalize the debt conversion programme to encourage further foreign investment. Trade and investment will remain important determinants in our multilateral relationship (The Guardian, 1998:15).

All these endeared Abubakar to the international community. Thus Abubakar's foreign policy ended Nigeria's pariah status and marked a new beginning in Nigeria's international relations (Fawole, 2003:22).

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo's Administration

It was from this standpoint that the new civil administration commences their foreign policy based on the foundation laid by Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar. The New Economic Order made it mandatory for all nations on the need to improve their economic, social and political situation in Nigeria, and these are better achieved in a virile foreign policy acceptable to the international community. In his inaugural speech, President Olusegun Obasanjo demonstrated his preparedness to pursue a foreign policy that will address Nigeria's image problem. In his words, "We shall pursue a dynamic foreign policy to promote friendly relations with all nations and will continue to play a constructive role in the United Nations and OAU (now AU) and other international bodies.... (Inaugural Speech, May 29, 1999). What underscores this declaration for Nigeria's foreign policy is the fact that the contemplation of friendly relations with all nations means repositioning the country's diplomatic conduct that was characterised by inactions. Again, to seek to play a constructive role in the United Nations (UN) the African Union (AU) and other international bodies, is a reaffirmation of Nigeria's commitment to the old principle of multilateralism and Afrocentrism (Saliu, 2005:242).

The inauguration of Nigeria's Fourth Republic with Olusegun Obasanjo a retired General and former military ruler as a democratically elected president rekindled hope that the country will actualize its potential and reclaim its position in the international arena. A major challenge for the new civilian administration was how to restore the country that has become a pariah nation under military dictatorship, to good reckoning in the world. Obasanjo (1999) declared in his inaugural speech that 'it is our firm resolve to restore Nigeria fully to the prestigious position of eminence in the comity of nations'. The president rightly noted that the context of foreign policy has changed in a post-cold war era and that the country would need to leap beyond the continent in its foreign policy agenda and pursue this objective with

determination. As an experienced international mediator, Obasanjo put his personal stamp on the nation's foreign policy. He immediately created the Ministry of Cooperation and Integration in Africa (MCIA) to show Nigeria's commitment to ECOWAS and Africa. The ministry was however merged with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the eve of the end of Obasanjo's tenure as part of his reform agenda (Alli, 2013: 126). The cornerstone of Nigeria's foreign policy was shifted from Africa to the global arena. As explicated by President Obasanjo, Nigeria's foreign interest extend:

- - - beyond our concern for the wellbeing of our continent. The debt burden is not an exclusive African predicament. Many countries in Asia, the Caribbean and South America are facing similar problems with it. It is imperative therefore that the countries of these regions harmonize their efforts in their search for a fairer deal from the industrialized nations of the world and this requires of us a more global approach to world affairs than was previously the case (The Guardian, 2000: 4).

In this regard, Alhaji Sule Lamido, the then Foreign Minister, explained further that 'Nigeria has to develop a perspective in which the wellbeing, security and prosperity of Nigerians would be guaranteed (The Comet, 2001) and that the shift from Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy to globalism did not, and should not in any way be interpreted to, mean Nigeria's non-interest in the affairs of her immediate neighbours in particular, and Africa, in general. It simply means showing more interest in world affairs for the purposes of the people of Nigeria and Africa as a whole (Onoja, 2001: 62).

To actualize his conception of foreign policy, Obasanjo embarked on this new path of foreign policy with official visits to many countries - UK, US, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, Russia, China, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea and South Africa and others totalling over a hundred countries between 1999 and 2002. As a result of these efforts, and with the hope in the potential of Nigeria to overcome the legacies of long military dictatorship through the consolidation of democracy; within a short period of return of democratic rule, the suspension of Nigeria by the Commonwealth of Nations was lifted and the country went on to host the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 2003 where Obasanjo was elected Chairman of the group and Nigeria elected into the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG). Other sanctions were lifted and the country was quickly reabsorbed into mainstream of the international system. Thereafter, many of these countries returned Obasanjo's visit. The most high profile among them was that of US Presidents Bill Clinton and George W Bush in 2000 and 2003 respectively. UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair also

visited, while the Queen Elizabeth II visited to declare open the 2003 CHOGM. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien Chinese (2004) Presidents Jiang Zemin (2002) and Hu Jintao (2006) also visited as did Abdurahrnan Wahid of Indonesia, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, John Kuffour of Ghana and others.

In actual fact, Nigeria began to gain acceptance in the comity of nations again after several years of an intense hostility, hatred and isolation. This prepared the solid foundation for the new democratic regime. However, General Abubakar started a transition programme and convinced the international community of his commitment to hand over power. Eventually, he was able to radically achieve that, and in 29 May, 1999 he succeeded in handing over power to a democratically elected president of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. Suffice it to say, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo had a favourable environment to conduct external relations. After years of isolation under military rule, Nigeria's return to civilian government made it to enjoy tremendous goodwill from many countries around the world especially in the West, where the country had the greatest opposition under the military dictatorship. Indeed, shortly after Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was declared winner of the presidential election, he undertook a tour of many countries in Africa, Asia and the West in efforts to seek closer cooperation with Nigeria under the new government (Aworawo, 2003:406).

The efforts paved way for the establishment of excellent relations with many countries of the world after the government was formally inaugurated. Andrew young (2003:1) described the purpose of these early move thus:

From the very beginning of the return to democracy in Nigeria, the foreign policy of the Obasanjo administration has been refocusing on correcting misconceptions about Nigeria and enhancing the country's profile as a regional power in Africa. The foreign policy thrust has sought to reintegrate Nigeria into the global community as a means of ensuring that this global community as a means of ensuring that this large and abundantly blessed nation derives the full benefits of globalization and diversification of her economic base.

The re-integration of Nigeria into the mainstream of the global system, the restoration of its place as a regional power and the promotion of the country's economic development are thus the focus of Nigeria's foreign policy under the Obasanjo administration. Greg Mbadiwe (2003:319) gives a laconic summary of his foreign policy thus:

At the international level, the major foreign policy goals of the

integration of Nigeria into the international community after years of isolationism occasioned by military resuscitation of the Nigerian economy.

These issues have guided the conduct of Nigeria's external relations since June 1999. To implement the policy, President Obasanjo has travelled widely more time abroad than at home and wasting Nigeria's resources on fruitless foreign trips. It can be said that the efforts have succeeded in re-integrating the country into the mainstream of global politics. For example, on 30 September 2003, Professor Michael Omolewa was elected the President of the UNESCO General Conference. Apart from the increasing recognition of Nigeria in international organizations, many important world leaders actually paid visits to the country to seek closer co-operation between Nigeria and their respective countries. Prominent among these were United States Presidents Bill Clinton and George Walker Bush (Jnr.) in August 2003 respectively. President Obasanjo also became the leader of G77 in 2001 and Nigeria began to play important roles in the commonwealth. The Nigerian leader along with the leaders of Australia and South Africa equally became the leading figures in trying to find a solution to the face-off between Britain and Zimbabwe over the land seizure from white farmers (Aworawo, 2003:407).

For the new administration, the most pressing issue for Nigeria's international relations during the democratic transition, off course, was the need for the restoration of Nigeria's battered image among the comity of nations and ending the isolation and the re-admission of Nigeria into normal international interaction. But, since the primary cause of Nigeria's pariah status in the international system were a number of domestic actions of the previous governments such as the abuse of human right of its citizens, lack of commitment to democracy and the rule of law, lack of transparency in governance and massive corruption, these problems had to be tackled first, if Nigeria was to regain its rightful place among the comity of nations (Izah, 2011:349).

It was in view of this reality that Ambassador Olu Adeniji argued that 'the most urgent foreign policy agenda of the new democratic regime was to tackle Nigeria's credibility problem and the ignoble reputation of pariah state' (Adeniji, 2005:33). The new administration in its quest for an improved domestic and human rights abuses during the past military regimes. Apart from this, conscious efforts were made to ensure the rule of law, transparency and accountability in government business. For example, a nationwide survey of governance and corruption was commissioned in 2001. The findings and recommendations,

such as the need for open and competitive procurement (due process) and employment are being used in the fight against corruption. The net effect of all these domestic measures was to assure the international community that Nigeria is once again ready to engage the international community positively. These measures coupled with the president's travels to the major capitals of the world, resulted in the readmission of Nigeria into the comity of nations. The Commonwealth suspension was lifted and Nigeria was readmitted into full membership and even elected for the first time, to the eight member Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group. And in December 2003, Nigeria was honoured to host the commonwealth Heads of Government in Abuja (Izah, 2011:349).

For almost one year into office, the administration of President Obasanjo did not spell out any foreign policy guiding principles or objectives or even agenda to guide the conduct of reviving Nigeria's relations abroad. Indeed, president – elect, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in early May 1999, had declared that with the advent of democracy, Nigeria can no longer afford expensive foreign policy adventures like ECOMOG which cost Nigeria over ten billion US dollars, without appropriate benefits to Nigeria, and promised to bring the troops in sierra Leone home by December 1999 (ThisDay, May 2, 1999). But with the lifting of sanctions against Nigeria, and the readmission of Nigeria into the comity of nations, events took a different turn. With Nigeria's experience and past glory international peace and security matters, the international community expected Nigeria to take the lead on peace and security issues affecting the continent. The Obasanjo Government quickly found out that Nigeria cannot cut and run from burning African problems. Thus, Nigeria 's role in conflict resolution and management had to, not only, continue, but be reinvigorated. Indeed, as early as July 1999 at the Algiers OAU summit, President Obasanjo proposed that the year 2000 be declared as the year of peace, security and solidarity. This was adopted. Also, at the Extraordinary OAU summit held at Sirte, Libya, Nigeria again proposed the convening of a ministerial conference on Security, Stability, Development and cooperation in Africa, which was then held in Abuja in May, 2000 (Adeniji, 2005: 35).

The foreign policy thrust of Obasanjo's administration was characterised by shuttle diplomacy, principles of economic diplomacy, regional and continental integration, purposeful interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states that could destabilise the economic cooperation, peaceful co-existences of the region or continental arrangement, good neighbourliness and maintenance of security in the West Africa Sub-region (Odubanjo 2001:203). It laid more emphasis on pro-active foreign policy rather than

reactionary ones. Obasanjo administration admitted and got involved in the universal values of the contemporary globalization process. Mamman (1999:20) observed and opined that:

Nigeria's foreign policy under Obasanjo was relatively guided by a more global orientation which will take the-entire globe, not just Africa as-the-cavass of its exertions. The immediate concern of Nigeria's diplomacy was based on the revitalization of the economy, with emphasis on cleaning up the international image (with NAFDAC, EFCC, ICPC) reaffirming the confidence of our friends, attracting committed and efficient foreign investors, addressing the problems debt burden and capital flight generally (emphasis is mine) the general strengthening regional integrative relations. The regime is committed to an Afrocentric foreign policy where great emphasis is placed on relations within West Africa sub-region. Therefore, ECOWAS remains for Nigeria one of the major pillars in the architecture of a larger African integration project. Part of the African integration project is the commitment to establishing and nurturing stronger bilateral relations with African countries in order to promote cooperation in many areas.

In the political and diplomatic development of the country, the following may be said to constitute the core of the domestic prerequisites necessary for the pursuit of a strong foreign policy for the country:

- (a) The necessity for the consolidation of its hard – won democracy;
- (b) Addressing the natural image problem and transforming the country to a respected nation governed according to democratic principles, embedded in the respect of fundamental human rights and the rule of law;
- (c) Arresting domestic economic weakness and strengthening the economic diversification away from oil;
- (d) Checkmating corruption at all levels, and ensuring that offenders are punished approximately;
- (e) Preventing and seeking solutions to conflicts, at the national, regional and continental levels as a way of ensuring conducive environment for development (Agbu, 2011: 36).

Perhaps, it is the realization of the above imperatives that caused the then President Olusegun Obasanjo to embark on numerous diplomatic travels abroad. Though many observers of Nigeria's international relations were critical of this shuttle diplomacy, the government succeeded in improving the country's national image, attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), and in recovering a significant portion of the looted monies lodged in foreign bank

accounts. That the president could be said to have been his own foreign minister was not in doubt. He was obviously an international personality, loved it and used this status in the pursuit of Nigeria's foreign policy (Agbu, 2011: 36).

In the context of President Obasanjo's foreign visits, some foreign policy commentators argued that the visits had not achieved much when compared with the amount of resources earmarked for the trips. In early June, 2002, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, a Lagos – based human rights activist, said President Obasanjo had made 93 foreign trips lasting a total of 340 days in the period from May 1999 to May 2002. Besides, President Obasanjo made more trips thereafter. These led to three main complaints about President Obasanjo's foreign trips; that they were too many; that they would not achieve much; and that the President need not travel himself. He could send his Foreign Affairs Minister or any other person in lieu (Akinterinwa, 2012 : 366). Critics of President Obasanjo's too many trips argued that on "several occasions, the president has either had to cut short his foreign trips, or cancelled them at the eleventh hour in the face of major crises at home" (The Punch Editorial, 28 June, 2002:14). In the same manner, the editorial of ThisDay raised the culture of foreign trip in the polity as a new issue:

The dimension the culture of foreign trips has assumed, in recent months, at all tiers of government is simply indefensible. It is far from being exaggerated to point out that public officer and their spouses now take advantage of access to public funds to make unwarranted foreign trips. The recklessness of public officers in this regard is becoming increasingly alarming. The culture has become so prevalent and offensive that perceptive members of the society are warned about the consequences of this gross abuse of privilege by public officers. Governors, federal and state legislators, local government chairmen are all in the inexplicable rush to travel out of Nigeria at the expense of public purse for sundry reasons, most of which are indisputably frivolous - - - some of these public officers spend public money to travel abroad for even birthday parties. Perhaps the most ridiculous instance, of recent, was the plan of spouses of Local Government Chairmen in Ekiti State to tour the world for whatever exposure (Thisday, 9 July 2001:15).

In other words, overseas trips are seen as another outlet for financial waste. However, should the foreign visits of Local Government Chairmen, legislators e.t.c, be put at the same pedestal with the foreign trips of the President of the Republic. As the problem was not only at the level of Presidential trips abroad but also at the level of the various tiers of government, on what basis should presidential visits be placed at the same level with those of the Governors? Good enough, many informed commentators also held contrary views. They argued that

President Obasanjo's too many visits were quite in order and that the many visits clearly reflect the extent to which the Nigerian polity had been bastardized and therefore the enormity of efforts required to be able to redress the situation. In this regard, President Obasanjo himself explained that his foreign trips were aimed at promoting Nigeria's international image, attract foreign investments, recover ill – gotten funds that were stacked away in foreign financial institutions, as well as secure debt reprieve for Nigeria. He further explained that one could not get what was desired through a mere telephone call because the issues involved were critical. Besides, an eye – to – eye contact with counterparts has the potential of instituting greater confidence and generating support (Akinterinwa, 2012 : 367).

In defence of Obasanjo's foreign trips, Akin Osuntokun, Director of Publicity of the Obasanjo Campaign for 2003, introduced the logic of internationalization in Nigeria's political crisis to be debate. Before the return to civil rule in 1999, political contest was between the anti-democracy and pro-democracy forces. The proponents of democracy sought the support of the international community which was given. Although the political crisis is now history, Osuntokun posited that;

If the logic of international holds true for Nigeria's political crisis, it is even more applicable to our economic crisis. For the simple reasons that Nigeria's economy is utterly dependent on the vagaries and the disposition of our western patriots, - - - the unpalatable truth of Nigeria's economic reality is that Nigeria has been consigned by the depredations and rapacity of unconscionable regimes, to the status of a beggar nation and beggars really do not have a choice than to humble themselves, and seek the understanding and sympathy of those in position of strength (The Guardian, 9 August 2002: 45).

President Obasanjo's many trips have also been justified by some geo – political factors: that the role of Nigeria as a regional influential requires the making of many international contacts; that foreign affairs remain essentially the business of the Federal Government, headed by President Obasanjo, and that President Obasanjo's many trips clearly reflect his international clout and recognition of Nigeria's position in world affairs. More significantly, it was argued that the foreign trips have had much impact in terms of the increase in government's budgetary allocations to the constituent states. As explained by Yushau Shuaib, during the military era, the highest amount of money generated and allocated from the Federation Account in any given month had never exceeded N27 billion but today more that N120billion is realized and disbursed accordingly to all the tiers of government even with

some states receiving no less than a billion naira in a month (The Guardian, 25 August 2002:6).

Alhaji Musa Umar Yar'adua

The emergence of President Umar Yar'Adua in the Nigeria political scene was circumstantial. It was imposed through democratic process on Nigerian people after the failure of third term agenda of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. This, of course, created an image problem, as a result of the electoral malpractices. In his inaugural speech on May 29, 2007, President Yar'Adua acknowledged that President Obasanjo's administration laid the foundation upon which Nigeria's future prosperity can be built. According to him, during this period, Nigerians reached a national consensus in at least four areas namely; 'to deepen democracy and the rule of law; build an economy driven primarily by the private sector, not government; display zero tolerance for corruption in all its forms, and finally, restructure and staff our governance'. He added that the goal of his administration was 'to build on the greatest accomplishments of the past few years' and relying on the seven point agenda, "concentrate on rebuilding our physical infrastructure and human capital in order to take forms in a way that makes a concrete and visible difference to ordinary people" (Pogoson, 2010:233).

In support of this position, President Yar'Adua fashioned a foreign policy thrust for Nigeria called 'citizen diplomacy' or 'diplomacy of consequences'. Citizen diplomacy as the then foreign Minister, Mr. Ojo Madueke, defined it, entails defending the legitimate interests of Nigerians wherever and whenever such interests are under threat or outright jeopardy. Indeed, at the time it was enunciated, this policy seemed most propitious given the increasing harassment of Nigerian's across the world. The new foreign policy as unfolded by the Minister of foreign Affairs, is geared towards 'protecting: the image and integrity of Nigeria and retaliates against countries that are hostile and brand Nigeria as 'corrupt'. As the then Minister explained, 'Our (Nigeria's) foreign policy has come of age and the age of innocence is over. Although, the fundamental change in the content of Nigeria's foreign policy was announced, the then Minister explained that, the foreign policy focus"...is going to be a citizen-centred foreign policy". That is how it benefits Nigeria and Nigerians. He added that the foreign policy thrust is "a way of strengthening our (Nigeria's) commitment to Africa "and that it was "time to let the world know that Nigeria is not a beggar nation that has to be

made to feel to feel ashamed by the actions of a few criminals who disgrace us at airports in the world by their activities” (Pogoso, 2010:234).

This new form of diplomacy according to the then foreign minister “is termed diplomacy of consequences or “the concept of reciprocity”. That is to say, Nigeria would be nice to countries that are nice to her and if not there would be a cost”. In a nutshell, “citizen Diplomacy” requires the government of Nigeria to more consciously resort to the calculi of the basic needs, human rights, and socio-economic welfare of the citizen in conducting bilateral and multilateral engagements with other nations. President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua further underscored the immediate foreign policy challenges facing Nigeria at that time when he inaugurated a six-member Honorary Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations, headed by the former Commonwealth Secretary General and Minister of foreign Affairs, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, in 2009. The President charged the council to lead the efforts to reinvigorate Nigeria’s “foreign policy process in the light of the prevailing realities in today’s increasing complex world”. It was also charged with the arduous responsibility of assisting to position Nigeria as a highly respected member of the international community, a leading voice of Africa, and a champion of the interests of the South-South nations. The council’s terms of reference include: to advise from time to time on Nigeria’s membership role in regional and international organizations; to review and advise on foreign policy dimension of the seven point agenda; to review and advise from time to time on the effectiveness of Nigeria’s diplomatic missions abroad in the promotion of the nation’s interests; to advise on the reform and retooling of foreign policy institutions; and to advise on any other matter relating to Nigerian foreign relations that may be assigned to the council or which the council deems necessary (Pogoso, 2010:235).

According to President Yar’Adua, some of the immediate challenges of the nation’s foreign policy strategy include its involvement in peace-making and peace-keeping in troubled and conflicting areas of the continent; advancing Nigeria’s and Africa’s role and stature in the United Nations and other international organizations; and promoting cooperation within the West African region and effecting productive collaboration with Nigeria’s neighbours on the Gulf of Guinea. He stated that Nigeria’s foreign policy must support this administration’s seven-point agenda for the enhancement of accelerated social, economic, educational and technological development and the entrenchment of democracy and good governance”. The President Umaru Yar’Adua’s Seven (plus two) Point Agenda to transform Nigeria are: power and energy; food, security and agriculture; wealth creation and employment; mass

transportation; land reform; security; and qualitative and functional education. The two additional special interest issues are the Niger Delta and disadvantaged groups (Pogoso, 2010:236).

The late President Umaru Yar' Adua administration (2007 – 2010), was almost inactive on the international scene beyond Africa. It was typified by last minute cancellations of international appointments and a lull in filling ambassadorial positions, including that of Washington. The world sneered at Nigeria as she became the butt of jokes on various media platforms about various forms of corruption. Nigeria's diplomatic corps engaged in fruitless image making, even as Nigeria's image sank deeper, culminating in the attempted bombing of a US – bound airplane by Nigeria – born Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab (Akinnaso, 2011). America reacted quickly by putting Nigeria on a terror watch list and by heightening its existing travel advisory. Even before the Mutallab incident, Nigeria US relations were already sour. President Barack Obama had ignored Nigeria in his maiden Africa visit as president (Emmanuel, 2014:20).

The record of President Umar Yar' Adua (2007-2010) has been mixed. His Foreign Minister Ojo Maduekwe adopted what he called 'Citizen Diplomacy', with the objective of making foreign policy serve the interest of the people. The Vision 20:2020 also elaborated and mandated the MFA to pursue some high objectives including the articulation of better image for Nigeria, seeking closer relations with the great powers, acquisition and transfer of technology, ensure that Nigeria's leading role in Africa and in West Africa is sustained and safeguarded and the sustenance of Nigeria's position as the foremost black nation in the world among others. But insecurity continues to increase even after the president declared an historic Amnesty for the Niger Delta militants and a ceasefire achieved. Criminal activities also increased across the country with kidnappings, armed robbery, bunkering, piracy, and vandalization of public property, particularly oil and gas and power infrastructure. In the North and Middle Belt area of the country, ethno-religious conflicts, bombings and other criminal and terrorist activities became rampant. Following the attempted 2009 'Christmas Day bombing' in which a Nigerian was implicated, the country was also put on the US terrorist watch list (Alli, 2013: 131 – 132).

The influence of Nigeria has continued to dwindle. On the continent, candidates backed by Nigeria have not received the needed support to coin elections. Nigeria has invested enormously in ECOWAS, the AU and the AfDB Yet it could not influence them much

because of the poor administration and coordination of foreign policy. It was instructive that in 2005, Nigerian candidate Bisi Ogunjobi lost the AfDB presidency to Rwandese in an election conducted in Abuja. This was a repeat of the defeat Nigeria suffered in 1995 when Nigeria's candidate Abdullahi Sayid was defeated by a Moroccan.

This was a slap in the face of sub-regional leader, Nigeria. According to Lamido (2005) with many unresolved national problems,

‘the credibility of the country is put in question in terms of our weight to intervene successfully to resolve African conflicts when we ourselves are not able to resolve our own internal conflicts. The country has suffered a huge gap between the demand and supply of democracy and good governance’.

As observed by Akinterinwa (2007:15), Director General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs:

Several countries, including some African states, have raised issues about the contradiction between Nigeria's quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council on the one hand and Nigeria's high level of indebtedness and inability to put her domestic situation in order on the other. In other words, how can Nigeria fund the maintenance of regional or international peace and security operations with her level of financial insolvency and much dependence on the developed world's assistance?

Nigeria is also sometimes snubbed by some powers. President Yar' Adua complained openly when Nigeria was not invited to the G20 meeting in April 2009 in London. He observed that:

As the president of Nigeria, I feel sad that Nigeria is not among the 20 most developed economies of the world... In other respects, we are dropping in rating, if you go to the UN now, there are more Ghanaians in official positions than Nigerians. If you go to the AU, you will find that the last time Nigeria fielded a candidate for Peace and Security of the AU, we were not elected in the election. These are indications that we need to wake up regarding our stand in the world. We need to rework our foreign policy. That is why I created this Presidential Council under Chief Emeka Anyaoku and I have already given them a task to look at the foreign policy. Anywhere you go, the missions are a reflection of Nigeria. When we are through with that you will get a positive impression of Nigeria.

Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Administration

President Goodluck Jonathan, following his victory in the 2011 elections, before the anxious 100 days in office directed the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations (PACIR) to coordinate the reviewing (reforming) Nigeria's current foreign policy to be investment

oriented. Coupled with his interactive pulse with Nigerians abroad during his foreign visits, the president asked the nation's foreign policy experts, seasoned diplomats, professionals and the intelligentsia to 'chart a new way for the future without discarding the past' (Onuorah & Oghogho, *The Guardian*, August 2, 2011:1). In his Inaugural address, 29 May, 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan declared that:

'Nigeria, in partnership with the African Union will lead the process for democracy and development in Africa through support towards the consolidation of democracy, good governance and human rights in the continent'.

He elaborated further while declaring open the Seminar on the Review of Nigeria's Foreign Policy, 1-4 August, 2011 that:

In the era of globalization, at a time of grave challenge to national and international security, terrorism, transnational criminal network, massive poverty and youth restiveness in our country... our diplomacy must be pal at the service of our domestic priorities.

According to the Foreign Minister, Olugbenga Ashiru (2011) Nigeria's foreign policy is being repositioned through economic diplomacy to support domestic programmes and priorities of government, improve living standards of Nigerians, attract foreign investments, create jobs, and reduce poverty, in strong partnership with the Organised Private Sector (OPS). Members of the OPS are now visible in presidential entourage to other countries. Already Nigerian banks (Access Bank, GTBank) insurance companies (IGI) and manufacturing companies (Dangote, LUBCON) have registered their presence in many African countries (Ethiopia, South Africa etc.) (Abati, 2013). The government is also committed to the pursuit of the principle of defence of democracy. At his maiden meeting with members of the Diplomatic Corps, 27 July, 2011, the minister reiterated that the nation's foreign policy will henceforth be directed to aid economic cooperation, infrastructural development, food security and co-prosperity. The government recognized, according to presidential spokesman Reuben Abati, that Nigerian foreign policy should not be driven by vain glory of being a certain brother's keeper, pretensions that dominate it for years.

Having laid down his vision for Nigeria's foreign policy, President Jonathan mandated the review of the nation's foreign policy by the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations (PACIR), a process already started under Yar' Adua, to reflect modern realities and international developments. While receiving the Report of the PACIR review on 11 July, 2012, the President noted that:

- - - a stable domestic environment was essential for a successful and robust foreign policy in line with the new realities of the post-cold war era and challenges of poverty, civil war, terrorism, environmental degradation, threats of nuclear-war and others.

He observed the lack of commensurate benefit from the huge sacrifices Nigeria makes in terms of its lives and resources towards restoring peace to many African countries in Africa.

President Goodluck Jonathan administration foreign policy hinges on the nation's domestic priorities, which includes the protection of the country's socio-economic and political interests (Idonor, 2011). According to the President, there is need for Nigerian foreign policy to focus on new priorities and challenges, such as job creation, economic progress, poverty eradication and security that are the priorities of the nation's national agenda. In his words:

In the era of globalization at a time of grave challenges to national and international security, such as we face from terrorism and transnational criminal networks; at a time of massive poverty and youth restiveness in our country, we have no choice but to adjust and adapt the way we conduct foreign policy, as we respond to the forces of globalization, our diplomacy must be put at the service of our domestic priorities (Abati, 2012).

Thus, since foreign policy is the externalization of domestic priorities and aspirations of citizens, Nigeria's diplomacy in her foreign policy must therefore articulate and vigorously market the country as a conducive environment for business geared towards stable domestic economy. Nigeria dignity of humanity must therefore be defended both at home and abroad. This means that Nigeria's foreign policy in this administration aims at been re-positioned to support the domestic programmes and priorities of government in order to improve the living standards of Nigerians, including the creation of jobs and reduction of poverty. The changing circumstances in Africa have called for new directions and strategic priorities in the nation's foreign policy that will address poverty and economic deprivations (Emmanuel, 2014: 21).

Professor Bola Akinterinwa (2014) provides an incisive background to President Jonathan's foreign policy strategies and techniques in the first year. He identifies the provision of leadership in African affairs as the grand strategy of Nigerian foreign policy which all the Heads of State and Government since independence have maintained. As successor to two elected presidents under the same party, namely, the People Democratic Party (PDP), Dr. Goodluck Jonathan who had been Deputy Governor, Vice – President and Acting President before becoming elected President, a *fortiori* has followed suit. However, while Nigerian foreign policy strategies have remained essentially the same, the techniques (the distinctive

ways in which foreign and domestic politico-strategies and economic policy goals) have generally been changing. Apparently for this reason, Akinterinwa (2014) while not ignoring traditional standard operating techniques – diplomacy, negotiation, economic aid, economic sanction, trade restrictions, and military force – downplays them in his analysis of President Jonathan’s foreign policy strategies. Instead, he focuses on eleven other techniques for a twelve – item template:

- i. Professionalization of the Foreign Service;
- ii. Partnership with Specialized Institutions and Government Agencies ;
- iii. Use of Mass Media;
- iv. Introduction of the Principle of Reciprocal Treatment;
- v. Transformation Agenda;
- vi. Economic and Citizens Diplomacy: Building External Relationships;
- vii. Quest for Direct Foreign Investment (DFI);
- viii. Promotion of Trade and Commercial Relations;
- ix. Empowerment of the Foreign Missions
- x. Collaboration with the Organized Private Sector (OPS); and
- xi. Engaging the Nigerian Diaspora Community
- xii. Conventional Technique (Akinterinwa, 2014).

Under President Jonathan, foreign policy became a tool for attaining the Transformation Agenda. Not only was foreign policy called upon to support TA general, it was specifically directed to support government economic programmes, to support infrastructure development and support creation of jobs. For this purpose, the main task of foreign policy was to attract DFI and create opportunities for trade and commerce. It therefore had to devise strategies and techniques to achieve that goal. In short rather than a technique of foreign policy as Akinterinwa (2014) holds, it is maintained here that TA is the grand strategy while foreign policy is the tool, the sub – strategy and technique. As such the key strategies and technique adopted by MFA can be condensed from twelve to an eight item template as follows:

- i. Professionalization of the Foreign Service;
- ii. Partnership with Specialized Institutions and Government Agencies;
- iii. Raising the international Profile of Nigeria;
- iv. Economic diplomacy;
- v. Citizen diplomacy including the Principle of Reciprocal Treatment

- vi. Empowerment of Mission abroad;
- vii. Collaboration with the Organized Private Sector (OPS); and
- viii. Cultivating external military – strategic Relations (Akinterinwa, 2014)

A more significant outcome of foreign policy in Jonathan sophomore year beyond being taken seriously by the United States over the maintenance of peace and security in West African sub-region is the matter of providing leadership for Africa in Africa and global matters. This has been the core or grand strategy of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence. Whatever the shortcomings of the Jonathan Administration in domestic affairs, there can be no doubt that he has upheld the policy. Nigeria has demonstrated sufficient leadership qualities and accomplishments to earn the respect of African colleagues and even leaders outside the continent. Nigeria's re-election to the Security Council some two years after leaving the seat and Nigeria's being elected to fill some twenty – two top international positions in two years are a testimony to the high status and esteem the continent has for the country and her leaders (Akinterinwa, 2014).

In all successive Federal Government from that of Alhaji (Sir) Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister and Head of Government (1960) to the administration of Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, have demonstrated strong commitment to the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria (Chibundi, 2009:11). Perhaps, it should be pointed out that whilst Hon. (Dr.) Jaja A. Wachukwu, first minister of foreign and commonwealth relations, placed a lot of emphasis on "Africa being the centre-piece" of Nigeria's foreign policy, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi, mooted the idea of "medium power" seeking to make Nigeria reap more grains beyond the will of being touted as a regional power, Prof. Ibrahim Gambari, propagated the principle of 'Concentric circles' in the implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy. Gen. Ike Nwachukwu, promoted 'environmental and economic diplomacy' as the main focus of Nigeria's foreign policy during the regime of Gen. Ibrahim B. Babangida, when Chief Tom Ikimi, became foreign affairs minister. In the days of troubled Gen. Sani Abacha regime, may spoke of 'Areas Boys Diplomacy', Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, sought to bring back the 'concentric circles and Chief Ojo Madueke, the former Minister of foreign affairs sometimes announced that Nigeria's external relations would be a guided by 'citizen diplomacy' (Chibundi, 2009:11). Chief Ojo Maduekwe, his successor under president Umaru Yar'Adua, re-conceptualized this and termed it citizen diplomacy to suggest its primary and specific aim of improving the socio-economic condition of Nigerian citizens at home and their protection and assistance by Nigerian embassies abroad. Henry Odein Ajumogobia, who was appointed

Foreign Minister by Dr. Jonathan when he became Acting President, added further dimension if not mystification by adopting the Citizen Diplomacy doctrine and seeking ‘to make advantage of (it) within the framework of a well – articulated and enduring foreign policy’ (Akinterinwa, 2014).

Every regime in Nigeria has expressed some ideas and concern which would guide the implementation of the country’s foreign policy. What is significant is that not all the regimes have tried to market their thrusts to Nigerians and spent time to develop the ideas to a marketable stage before going public with them. The implication is that, most of the thrusts have ended up as mere slogans or official concerns which do not enjoy support of Nigerians (Saliu, 2010:320). Yet, millions of dollars are being spent on them ostensibly on behalf of Nigerians (Daily Trust, 2009). They do not serve the purpose of mobilization which foreign policy thrusts in other countries have served. With the possible exception of concentric circle and beneficial concentricism that have enjoyed some measure of intellectualism, all other thrusts would appear to be material – driven and that instantly give them the label of being mere slogans to convince the heads of government and indeed, Nigerians that things are happening in the external sector of the country whereas nothing is happening (Ministry Foreign Affairs, 1992).

It must be emphasised, however, that Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives have remained basically consistent despite changes in leadership, variation in style and general vicissitudes in its national life. At best, all these paradigms are no more enlightening as far as Nigeria’s core national interest are concerned. They all lack strategic vision (Alli, 2013: 122). Indeed, as observed by Pine (2013), these conceptual mutations in Nigerian foreign policy engineering, lack any ideological consistency, and are operationally barren, philosophically vague and as such, an exercise in conceptual confusion and groping in the dark.

5.4 NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN A DYNAMIC WORLD OF GLOBALIZATION

May 29, 1999 heralded a new era in Nigeria ending an unbroken stretch of 16years of authoritarian military rule. The return to democracy had long been anticipated by both Nigerians and the wider international community for many reasons. Nigeria’s pariah status had been confirmed with its expulsion from the commonwealth four years earlier, in 1995. This was the nadir of Nigeria’s international relations and of its foreign policy. The dramatic turn of events was in sharp contrast to the golden era of Nigeria’s foreign

policy when the country was the toast of Africa and when it championed the cause of African liberation. As the continent's foremost freedom fighter, she was christened a frontline state, an honour otherwise reserved for Southern African countries. During that period, if Nigeria had estranged relations with any country, it was the result of its pursuit of a worthy cause-the fight against apartheid and external domination of African territories (Sanda, 2004:269),

Abacha's demise in office in June 1998 paved way for yet another military regime, which, nevertheless, moved to restore Nigeria's thoroughly battered image and international relations generally. This they achieved by announcing and executing a transition programme that culminated in the swearing in of an elected government a little over a year later (Sanda, 2004:270). Nigeria had a pariah status before 1999 and was placed under heavy international suctions. Nigeria was as a non-conformist and a threat to efforts at globalization, democratization, and maintenance of world peace and security (Akinterinwa, 2004:360) suddenly became another centre of attraction with the enthronement of democratic rule in May 1999. The then new administration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was confronted with the task of rebranding, repackaging, reinventing and rebuilding a new Nigeria. Most importantly, the task of laying a new foundation for attitudinal change by Nigerians, both within and outside, and for proper disposition towards the international community became the major concern of the then civilian government. This attitudinal change eventually crystallizes into a new foreign policy orientation (Anifowose & Babawale, 2007:244-245).

Nigeria foreign policy has basically remained the same, irrespective of the regime in power. But that was not to deny the expectation of a successful rehabilitation of Nigerian foreign policy after the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo. The expectations were justified based on the antecedents of the new president. He was a member of the Nigerian society for International Affairs, his era as Military Head of State remains a cherished one in Nigerian foreign policy for what he did and his engagements in international affairs after retiring from the military in 1979. For instance, he was a member of the Commonwealth Eminent Group (CEG) that prepared a basis for liquidating the apartheid in South Africa in 1986 (Saliu, 2010). Hence, Nigeria successfully opened the way for democracy and democratization of a polity that had for long been under praetorian rule with all its shortcomings. The implication of this development for Nigeria's foreign relations is important, especially when juxtaposed with the foreign policy style of the previous military administrations. Again, the economic

scenario substantially changed with the deepening of economic globalization, and economic reforms in various sectors of the economy. Apparently, since Nigeria's return to civil governance, one of the most crucial dimensions of its national interest has been the consolidation of its hard – won democracy. In view of this, the country embraced the universal values of transparent, accountability and good governance and the protection of human rights as evidence of a process of national transformation in line with the demands of civilized societies the world over (Agbu, 2011:35).

The first major international victory for the Fourth Republic was the lift of suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth, shortly after the inauguration of the civilian government on 30th May, 1999. The impact of this lift was that it created the opportunity for the new leadership to gain instant acceptability and to preach the gospel of a new Nigeria to the disappointed international community. All those countries such as Canada and South Africa, which had strained relationship with Abacha's Nigeria through the platform of the Commonwealth, quickly embraced the new regime to remove the stigma which General Abacha had worked hard to win for Nigeria (Osaghae, 1998). The new president was to later head the Commonwealth for two consecutive years as her chair (Gambari, 2008). What an Irony! A country that, four years before, was the *bad guy* of the Commonwealth eventually became the toast of the organisation. Even before the Commonwealth's opportunity, Nigeria had been offered the Chair of Group of 77 countries and was returned as the spokesperson for the group (Saliu, 1999).

Nigeria was also to provide leadership for the African Union (AU) which she had been instrumental into bringing about. In a nutshell, Nigeria's relations with international organisations were cordial except occasional clashes with Libya on the platform of the AU and with South Africa over Zimbabwe on the platform of the commonwealth (Adebajo, 2006). The Yar' Adua government's most spectacular achievement is the victory of the country at the UN Security Council where Nigeria has assumed a non-permanent membership seat (Saliu, 2010).

Relations with Africa constitute another contour of Nigeria's foreign policy under the Fourth Republic. On the bilateral level, warm relations have developed between Nigeria and several African countries. The relations with South Africa are particularly warm, leading to some complaints on Nigeria's ceding too much power to President Thabo Mbeki (Adebayo, 2006). Several meetings have been held in Nigeria on Darfur crisis and she has also attended

meetings devoted to the Ivorian crisis (Saliu, 2006). Relating with Liberia are warm to the extent that President Charles Taylor was accepted in the country on asylum (Egbewole, 2005; Saliu 2007).

Within the period, Nigeria has also related with the super and great power states. While the country has tried on the balance to maintain good relations with the dominant power states, Nigeria's relations with the USA have not been too cordial (Agwu, 2014). There are many disagreements between the two states, climaxing with the arrest of the attempted bomber from Nigeria on 25th December, 2009. Indeed, the country has been listed among countries to watch on the war on terror. There has been poor handling of the matter by Nigeria, not appreciating the negative impact of the long uneasy relations with the USA (Saliu, 2010).

In this era of globalization and the breaking down of international barriers of trade, completion for investment and toward investment, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and export sales, an internal political crisis will have a cyclical effect and lead to a poor country which will be marginalized in the international political and economic arena. Nigeria, with an estimated population of over 160million people and the sixth largest producer and exporter of crude oil in the world, can pursue a more dynamic and pragmatic foreign policy. In 2004, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), at a public forum in Lagos, asserted much-needed foreign investment to accelerate its economic growth". According to the UNCTAD report, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow to Nigeria was 1.2billion dollars in 2003 and 1.3billion in 2002. This low investment is a manifestation of the problem of misgovernment and lack of democratic ethos (Anifowose, & Babawale, 2007:255-256).

This is what Adeniji (2004:41) regarded as redefining Nigeria's Economic Foreign Policy in which paramount importance is giving to economic interest of state., economic interest precedes all other interest. The Foreign policy thrusts of the Republics are:

Economic Diplomacy: The basis of Fourth Republic Foreign policy is 'Economic Diplomacy' which Babangida (1990:9) described as '*foreign policy thrust which basic objectives are the fostering of great inflow of foreign capital and expansion foreign trade*', therefore the main focus of the fourth Republic is how to attract foreign investment and improved economic relations of Nigeria in order to improve economic capacity building of Nigeria as a nation. This economic diplomacy led to commitment to

deregulation and liberalization of the Nigerian economy to make it more attractive to the foreigners whom it was thought would take the advantages these policies to bring in much needed Direct Foreign Investments thereby boost capital base of many Nigeria industrial sectors which in turn will have positive multiplier effects on the citizenry.

Another important concern of the Fourth Republic economic diplomacy is to enhance national economic growth and development through 'supports for joint ventures and partnership' with people and organizations that find Nigeria a gainfully interesting place for their investments. Thus, Foreign investment are source for and welcome by removing any perceived domestic impediments such as organized labour (that led to the amendment of labour law in 2004), increase capital base of the financial institutions (i.e. commercial Banks to recapitalize N25b and while insurance company recapitalize to N5B). To meet up with globalization, hindrance to trade were also removed to give opportunity for trade expansion and cooperation through concrete bilateral-economic agreement such as Nigeria-Sao- Tome and Principe oil blocs agreement. Caned Pact Agreement on Sharing Contract (PSC) signed on March 14th 2006 in Abuja. This globalized economic diplomacy was clearly directed towards Western capitalist states that the government believed will provide the economic deliverance through Direct Finance Investment. Although "UNDP (1999:25) agreed that accelerating integration are policy shift aimed at promoting economic efficiency through liberalization and deregulation of national markets and the retreat of state from economic activities that would attract more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) international aid. UNDP (2001:xiii) ranked Nigeria fourth (4th) in a poll conducted by UNCTAD on the potential to attract foreign investment after South Africa, Egypt and Morocco. In recent times, the foreign policies of nations worldwide have undergone a paradigm shift from political diplomacy to economic diplomacy.

On the economic front, Nigeria was able to establish Bi-National Commissions with several countries including the US, Germany, Canada and South Africa and has been considered by the US as a strategic partner. This effort has yielded some increase in the inflow of investment into the country to the tune of almost US \$ 9billion in 2012 alone (The Guardian, May 15, 2013).

Reciprocal Order: The government adopted the diplomatic technique of reciprocity, a sort of tit-for tat for hostile or harmful actions and one good turn deserves another principle to send two strong signals to other countries. The first is that the government actions towards livelihoods will be met with similar negative actions. The second signal was that Nigeria's contribution particularly on the African continent must be acknowledged and must translate into according its citizens the benefits that are due to them on the basis of the multiple

positive actions undertaken by the government in the past. These signals were prompted by the growing perception that despite Nigeria's long historical legacy of aid and support to other African countries and despite its regional and sub-regional commitments to co-operation and assistance, other African countries have not responded in kind but persecute and maltreat Nigerians with arbitrary arrests, summary deportations, discriminating restrictive labour policies, violence including killings in which governments are complicit and increasing arbitrary denial or undue delays of issuance of visas to deserving Nigerians and, most worrisome, to key government officials (Ojo, 2014: 375 – 376).

Shuttle Diplomacy: It was another important tenet of Obasanjo's foreign policy thrust. It is a foreign policy thrust in which the president commuted from one national capital to another for the purpose of achieving a perceived National Interests or Objectives. The president did this to the relegation of the office of the Foreign Minister Diplomatic ambassadors or High Commissioner to the background in terms of some basic functions expected of the office, his physical presence at most of the negotiations and mediation that Nigeria participated in Odubanjo (2001:208), deduced that this foreign policy (Shuttle Diplomacy) is instituted to reconstruct the domestic scene through active engagement of all key sectors in the international system to facilitate concrete democracy. Thus, the expressions of local problems are comprehensively and authoritatively conveyed to all key actors in international system. Shuttle diplomacy aimed at achieving these objectives: The following were the visible achievements of Obasanjo's shuttle diplomacy:

- i. Cooperative diplomacy and regional economic integration: Nwoke (2001:11) describes Regional integration as 'A permanent arrangements characterized by the establishment of joint institutional mechanism and a degree of shared sovereignty'. He submits that Nigeria government had played significant role through the Ministry for Cooperation and Integration to foster monetary union to Minister Diplomatic ambassadors or High Commissioner to the background in terms of some basic functions expected of the office, thus physically present at most of negotiations and mediations that Nigeria participated in. Odubanjo (2001:208) deduced that this foreign policy (Shuttle Diplomacy) was instituted to reconstruct the domestic scene through active engagement of all key sectors in the international system to facilitate concrete democracy. Thus, the expressions of local problems are comprehensively and authoritatively conveyed to all key actors in international system. Shuttle Diplomacy aimed at achieving these objectives.

- ii. Reintegration of Nigeria into the World Community after some years of pariah status and diplomatic blunders: The desire of Nigeria leader to rise to the challenge as a member of interactional organizations that wants to play significant role in with international political calculation and economic development led to the extension of warmth hands of friendship to members of the international community. This gave the Nigerian leader an opportunity to invite some of these world leaders at slightest opportunity to Nigeria. This made Nigeria to play host to presidents Clinton and Bush of United States, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac of France and many others. Besides, regional economy was enhanced, regional infrastructure was developed while ECOWAS parliament and ECOWAS Court of Justice were established. Due to cooperative diplomacy and continuous support for G77, which is a Third World grouping, President Obasanjo was appointed the chairman of the body in Havana, Cuba. Nigeria became the initiator and leading promoter of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) and Millennium Africa Programme. All of which have potential interest in providing the basis for promotion of the much needed peace, unity and economic development on African continent.
- iii. Recovery of Stolen Monies: Shuttle diplomacy provided avenue through which every available reasonable diplomatic means was utilized by Obasanjo administration to recover the money looted from national treasury which were stashed away in different foreign accounts.
- iv. Economic Engagement: Realizing that globalization is synonymous with capitalism while capitalism is synonymous with competition and interest, if African nations were to engage in the destructive competition with their little resources, the damage and waste will be more disastrous. To prevent South African (which is at par with Nigeria's economic realm) from been a Nigeria's economic competitor in the African continent, Nigeria adopted economic engagement with South Africa which happily resulted into NEPAD.
- v. Strategic Partnership: Akinboye (2001:219) describes Obasanjo's foreign policy with South Africa as strategic partnership that culminated in establishment of a Bi-National Commission in October 1999. This is done to forge closer bilateral economic partnership by creating the enabling environment. Because both Nigeria and South Africa are two potentially giants and powerful African states. Both are uniquely located within Africa to

respond to the global challenges that are unfolding for the continent in the new century. Since the recent happenings shows that Nigeria earlier pre-eminent power and leadership position in Africa can no longer be maintained without the support and cooperation of South Africa which possess enormous power and exemplary leadership quality in the continent. This forging a consensus on bilateral mutual relations will helps the two states to redefine their- economic relations in the areas of relative economic position. This high level bilateral dialogue on trade, industry and technology had created opportunity to listen to complaints and avoid confrontation. Thus Nigeria-South Africa relations in the economic areas will reduce frictions and enhance taking advantages from substantive cooperation.

- vi. Therefore, Nigeria South Africa are driven by a similar strategy based on consensus building, national reconciliation and a private sector-led development paradigm which can help in strengthening this strategic partnership in a rapidly changing global system. These two giants economies can propel economic growth of Africa and deliver the continent from the negative effects of globalization
- vii. Millennium Development Goals: It is an economic cooperative part of the foreign aid drive from Western Countries donors that was signed in 2000. It was established to create more positive relationship between Africa and the West and thereby create greater opportunity for Nigeria to benefit from.
- viii. Image Laundering: It is continuation of objectives of Shuttle Diplomacy. Nigeria Foreign policy thrust takes cognizance that for Nigeria products and government to be attractive to potential markets and encourage foreign investors. Nigeria re-engineered both private and public sectors to make it possible for people to successfully transact business with agencies of the Nigerian government electronically. The banking sector was revolutionized (to tune. of N25billion) to support Nigeria's status as Africa's largest and fastest growing economy continental hub of business. To attract the potential external investors and donors, government is committed to the principles of freedom, transparency and accountability through (establishment of EFCC, ICPC and Due Process) which are defining matrices of good governance and development. To gain confidence of outside market NAFDAC'S breakthrough and NDLEA'S seizures 'are revealed to show that Nigeria's products are up to international standard.

Good Neighbourliness: Garba (1987:40) asserts that ‘countries choose their friends but never their neighbours. Nigeria's neighbours are a matter of colonial heritage and making friends out of her neighbours has been and will continue to be a major preoccupation of Nigeria's foreign policy’. Maintenance of good relations with all her immediate neighbour is a necessity and matter of importance as far as Nigeria is concerned because of Nigeria's fragile political structure coupled with this is envy as a result of wealth that create fears of domination and hatred by both Franco and Anglophone countries.

This good neighbourliness gesture were exhibited during this regime on several occasions, such as Ahmada Tijani episode, Nigeria did not practically intervene in taking him despite the capability to do so, rather she closed her border knowing full well that Benin Republic economy depends on trading with Nigerians. The closure of border forced government of Benin Republic to find the cause of border closure which prompt her to physically captured, arrest and brought Ahmada Tijani to face trial in Nigeria.

To the Nigeria neighbour in the North-west, Niger Republic, which is battling with acute drought and famine, Nigerian government and National Assembly contributed financial support, food stuff and other materials needed. Neighbourliness prompted Nigeria to settle the Bakassi peninsula issue through International Court of Justice rather than open hostility that might jeopardize peace exist in that region. Knowing full well that Nigeria herself is having fragile peace; Nigeria government is always interested in reassuring her immediate neighbours of her peaceful intention in the sub-region despite her resources which create envy and fear of domination.

Intervention in Domestic Affairs: Also known as constructive Intervention in internal affairs of nation-state that can distort peace and affect freedom of economic activities. Although Nigeria's rhetoric foreign policy paradigm is non-interference in the internal affairs of nation-states but this paradigm is pragmatically discarded during the period under study because of recent happenings and development which Nigeria government unlike before did not sit on the fence and remain neutral to condemn such incidence as internal affairs of the state. Due economic interest in which any major uprising can disorganize and which its ripple effects will directly have on Nigeria. Nigeria intervened in Togo self-succession bid of Faure Gnassingbe after the death of his father, when it was stipulated in the constitution that in the case of death of president the speaker of House of Assembly should carry on. The military hurriedly chased away the Speaker and install Faure Gnassingbe as president of Togo but

opposition among Togolese was obvious. Nigeria as the ECOWAS chairman mobilized other West African State and use her influence to secure non-recognition of Faure's government until election was conducted in which every opposition members participated. Thus force Togolese government to conduct election to formally legitimize government of Faure Gnassingbe.

Again, Nigeria intervened in the Sao-Tome coup saga. The Sao-Tome president was in Nigeria when some military officer announced that his government has been toppled. The then president of Nigeria, Chief Obasanjo sent emissaries to the coupists to come down to Abuja where an amicable solution was worked out while the president returned to power, the coupists were retained in Nigeria at Nigeria government expenses.

Hegemonic Regional Economic Power: Foreign Policy thrust of the Fourth Republic exhibit that Nigeria is aiming to play important role on World Affairs and making different diplomatic efforts to secure the permanent seat of the United Nations due to' the reforms proposed by the incumbent Secretary General Kofi Annan. In preparation for this U.N seat, Nigeria reposition her armed forces and to cooperate with other friendly nations in carrying out anti-terrorism operations most especially those directed against oil installation. Osuntokun (2004:24) using economic diplomacy as lever argued that "Diplomacy is not based on morality' This makes Nigeria to pursue economic power which is a foreign policy orientation tailored towards economic development. This economic diplomacy subordinate political consideration to economics. Because for a black man to be recognized and respected he must either have economic or military power but since military power is becoming elusive, dangerous and costly with a lot of negative repercussion and difficulty it becomes pertinent to start with economic perspective. Being economically powerful was realizable, more legitimate and less threatening compared to the idea of nuclear power. Due to Nigeria's natural endowment and good policies, coupled with current increase in revenue from oil which swells foreign reserves and availability of foreign exchange, Nigeria's financial position is becoming attractive.

Security and Peace: Nigeria's Foreign Policy thrust takes into consideration national security and regional and world peace as large. This is because there is linkages between peace, security and economic development. A peaceful and secured environment is a precondition for global economy thus serious diplomatic asylum from many presume potential rebels or

warlords and coupists. Nigeria had taken active, and bold steps resolving the Darfur crisis by calling and having a workable arrangement for the warring parties in Abuja. Nigeria has contributed the peace economic transaction in Sierra Leone, Sao Tome, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, and Liberia. For instance, in order to have lasting peace in Liberia, Nigeria agreed to grant political asylum to the biggest Liberian warlord in person of Charles Taylor which paved way for the conduct of election to the office of executive President in Liberia. Again due to the need to have peace and security and showcase that border or land dispute can be resolved without necessarily resulting to armed conflict like India - Pakistan, Ethiopia-Eritrea etc. Nigeria complied with international court of justice decision that Bakassi Peninsula belongs to Cameroon and handed the disputed territory honourably to Cameroon.

5.5 THE POLITICS OF DEBT RELIEF

Nigeria's during this period understudy make use of international economic relations to secure debt relief realizing that one of the major things that is inimical to economic development is debt burden. Nigeria used all effort to negotiate debt relief amounting to 60% which is \$8 billion, the largest debt deal in Africa and the second largest in the world after Iraq. This is because Nigeria wanted permanent exit from debt bondage, she commit herself to paying the remaining 40% of about \$6.4 billion up front for the cancellation of the debt.

Be that as it may, the major effect of globalization is the problem of economic dependency. The major problem of economic diplomacy is economic dependence. Although, no country can grow without foreign investment and trade, but Nigeria with a sizable quantity arable agricultural land need not to import food. But according to Guardian (2002:6) Nigeria spent N180 billions on food importations, every year. These are money taken from Nigeria farmers to foreign farmers. Forced liberalization of economy opened Nigerian market to foreign trade causing a flood of Western food, clothes, drinks and other domestic or household items in Nigerian market at a price levels that are unaffordable on one hand and discourage competition on the other hand. This makes Western producers to prosper at the expense of Nigerian producers. Also developed capitalist states are 110t indebted to, thus have no obligation to open their market to African goods. Therefore, charge tariffs and grant subsidies to their own producers. For instance in May 2001 President Bush signed a Bill that gave American

farmers subsidies of \$190 billion for the next ten years. European countries also grant high subsidies to their producers but, which Nigeria government cannot do that due to IMF/World Bank implemented economic policy.

But, in Africa, to a country like Nigeria, this means that Nigerian farmers will not be able to compete with the cheaper agricultural goods at home and abroad. This forced liberalization versus closed economies of the western states which led to problems erupting between Nigerian government and IMF over economic programme in March 2002 where Nigeria government threaten to withdraw before amicable solution was worked out. Both Adeleke and Ogunbanjo (2002: 156) termed it interdependence and refer to it as 'a curse' and not a 'cure': This global interdependence lies at the heart of the external challenges states now face. Interdependence has reduced states autonomy by curtailing their control of their own fate. This leads to declining ability of many sovereign states to cope with global problem. While Saliu (1999:53) posits that what the new' economic diplomacy would do was to implement the class project of the dominant fraction of domestic ruling elites class in alliance with imperialism *but in a manner* that reflect increasing dominance of interests of the latter. The overbearing of effects of the money spend on political asylum is alarming that Olujimi Adeniji (2006:6) called for a review of political asylum because asylum seekers are abusing it.

Authoritarianism and rogue state style of diplomacy of the Abacha's regime, as well as Babangida's annulment of the June 12, 1993 election, made Nigeria an outcast state in the comity of nations before Obasanjo became Nigeria's President in May 1999. Although General Abdulsalami Abubakar recorded some success in trying to remedy the situation, his tenure was too brief to make any major impact capable of bringing Nigeria totally out of her pariah status; and more importantly, he was also a military ruler who cannot be trusted by the West. When Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999, the urgent diplomatic task was, therefore, to reverse her pariah status. This task was soon achieved, as in no time, the sanctions were lifted and Nigeria resumed her leadership role in Africa and the Third World (Asobie, 2010:19). The premonition that Nigeria might once again bounce back prominently into global reckoning was obvious from the volume of goodwill that General Abubakar's transition programme generated for the country. However, the actual indication of what to expect came during the inauguration of the new President of Nigeria on 29th of May 1999. The event which attracted about forty Heads of State and governments foreshadowed the country's resumption of a prominent role in African and world affairs (Dokubo, 2010:256).

At no time in Nigeria's history since independence has any national event attracted such an impressive array of world leaders.

There is no doubt that the warm embrace was both a function of the new democratic dispensation, as well as the international community's perception of the personality and moral stature of President Obasanjo. Thus, to achieve the ultimate aim of re-integrating Nigeria into the comity of respectable nations, Obasanjo had to rely on his personal clout amongst the world leaders both in and out of government. After his inauguration as a democratically elected president, Obasanjo traversed the globe, seeking to restore Nigeria to its place of pride in the international community, while also seeking external support in the form of foreign investments, debt forgiveness, and the return of Nigeria's 'stolen billions' (Dokubo, 2010:257) stashed away in foreign banks by past corrupt leaders. Without doubt, Obasanjo has achieved the foreign policy objective of reintegrating Nigeria into the international community. This was evidenced by the high profile visits of prominent world leaders including President Bill Clinton of the United States of America, Jacques Chirac of France, to mention but a few. The lifting of sanctions and improved trade relations are other indices to measure his level of acceptance. President Obasanjo was also appointed Chairman of the G77, an influential voice in the Non-Aligned Movement, Chairman of ECOWAS, and Chairman of the African Union from July 2004 – January 2006. He is the only person who has held the position of Chairman of the African Union for two terms consecutively.

However, at the inauguration of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as President of Nigeria on 29th May 1999, he sooner realised than later that extensive debt was a heavy burden on the nation, implored 'the Western World to help sustain democracy by sharing with us the burden of debt which may be crushing and destructive to democracy in Nigeria' (Ogwu, U. J, & Aki, W. O, 2006:5). Accordingly, he decided to pursue debt relief as a cardinal element in the nation's international economic relations, realising that the heavy debt burden of the nation would hinder the prospects for rapid economic transformation. This decision gave rise to a new brand of economic diplomacy aimed at achieving debt relief, a historic and unprecedented international diplomatic campaign never before seen in the nation's interaction with critical forces on the international scene (Ogwu, & Aki, 2006:5). The campaign required great skills of persuasion and at the same time high level of political engineering and the construction of a new economic reform architecture.

The efforts of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in pursuit of debt relief for Nigeria yielded positive result. It addresses the nature, the structure, the management and the dynamics of Nigeria's relations with her major creditors as well as other critical forces on the international financial scene. There were many dimensions to the debt crisis. The exact amount of the debt was in dispute; the management of the debt portfolio was fragmented between several government ministries and agencies, e.g. Federal ministry of Finance, the Federal ministry of Trade, the Central Bank and the Office of the Accountant General; the total amount of the debt and to whom it was owed was difficult to establish; inadequate resources to service the debt was a major problem; and the huge need of funds for development purposes made the debt unsustainable (Ogwu, & Aki, 2006:6). President Obasanjo's strategy was to embark on a diplomatic campaign for debt relief. This was the tactic of travelling extensively across the globe to canvass for understanding, support and co-operation in the quest for debt relief. In spite of the opposition to debt relief for Nigeria in several quarters, domestic and international, President Obasanjo was undaunted and unwavering in his commitment to the policy direction he had adopted to deal with the debt crisis.

The genesis of Nigeria's foreign debt is traceable to a loan obtained in 1958 to the tune of US\$28 million which was meant for the construction of railways. In the 1960s, Nigeria contracted loans through contractor finance mainly to execute developmental projects. Between 1958 and 1977 the resort to external loans was minimal, and the small amount of debt that was accumulated had long repayment periods and was obtained from bilateral and multilateral sources. However, from 1978, the collapse of international oil prices led to a decline in government revenue and placed enormous pressure on government finances. It therefore became imperative to borrow for balance of payments support and also for project financing. Therefore, in 1977, the Federal Government promulgated Decree No 30 which raised the limit of the amount of foreign loan obtainable by the Federal Government to US\$5 billion. Consequently, the Federal Military Government headed by Gen. Obasanjo obtained the first jumbo loan of US\$1 billion from the international capital market (Oche, 2006:160) in 1978. This development raised the country's total debt stock to US\$2.2 billion. After this, the spate of borrowing increased sharply with the entry of state governments into contractual obligations in form of external loans. The provision that enabled state governments and the Federal Government to independently contract loans made the situation even unmanageable. Many state governments took advantage of this

development to contract loans from diverse sources with federal government guarantees without due regard to their effective utilization.

Between 1980-1981, the external loans contracted by the states and guaranteed by the federal government amounted to US\$6.9 billion. In the early 1980s, Nigeria's economic crisis deepened seriously as Western creditors refused to grant new credits and the nation's industries became distressed. There was a drastic fall in the external reserve from US\$8.5 billion in May, to US\$2.8 billion (Ali, 2006:25) in December 1981. In April 1982, the Shagari government sensed an imminent collapse of the economy, introduced the Economic Stabilization Act, which relied mainly on a combination of import restrictions, monetary controls and fiscal policies. Subsequently, the government also applied for an IMF Extended Fund Facility of about US\$2.4 billion. Furthermore, importers were allowed to import virtually anything for which they were expected to deposit the Naira equivalent with the Central Bank of Nigeria and such imports were guaranteed by the Export Credit Agencies and automatically these had to be assumed by the government. This added between US\$4 and US\$5 billion to the debt stock (Ali, 2006:25).

In 1985, the new military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, reopened negotiations with the IMF in order to have access to credit facilities to refinance trade arrears. The IMF indicated that additional loans would only be given to Nigeria if she accepts certain conditionalities. The regime therefore organised the famous IMF debate and even though Nigerians overwhelmingly rejected the IMF loan, Babangida went ahead to adopt the IMF designed Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986. SAP brought about the imposition of deregulation, trade liberalization, privatization and commercialization of public enterprises, restructuring of the civil service, and withdrawal of subsidies on public services among others (Dokubo, 2006:103). Between 1985 and 1986, Nigeria's foreign debt increased astronomically from US\$18.904 to US\$25.574 billion. The year 1986 marked a watershed in Nigeria's debt management as the Babangida regime introduced the Second-tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM), later known as the Foreign Exchange Market. This new innovation led to a serious devaluation of the Nigerian currency, the naira. The devaluation of the naira had severe negative impact on the debt burden as the outstanding external loan more than doubled from its previous level and this really affected the nation's debt serving capacity.

It is pertinent to mention that in three years, between 1987 and 1989, the Nigerian government spent a total of US\$19 billion on foreign debt repayment, yet there was an outstanding external debt stock of US\$28.9 billion in 1989 even though there was hardly any new loan during the period. The increase in external debt during the period under review was largely due to “drawing down of loans, capitalized unpaid interest charges on rescheduled debt obligations, and depreciation of the US dollar against other currencies” (Asobie, 2010:114). At this junction, it is noteworthy that previously, Nigeria adopted the policy of seeking for rescheduling of her external debt repayments. The overall effect of the rescheduling agreements which Nigeria periodically negotiated was to further increase her external debt burden as can be seen from the previous paragraph.

The tactic of debt rescheduling deepened Nigeria’s financial dependence on external creditors; harmed her economy and hampered her capacity to pursue her national interest as an independent actor in the international system. However, a new direction was initiated in the policy and strategy for the management of the country’s external debt when Obasanjo assumed office as civilian president in 1999. The Obasanjo administration found the rescheduling strategy unsuitable and unsustainable to the Nigerian situation. It was therefore understandable why Obasanjo was concerned about the issue and was determined to do something drastic about it. For the first time, a Nigerian leader actually adopted the pursuit of debt relief from mainly G8 creditors, as a policy. The critical issue in Nigeria’s debt crisis is of course its management. Ogwu & Ali (2006:40) asserts:

‘scholars and policy makers are in agreement that Nigeria’s debt could have been sustainable if the leaders had been better managers of the nation’s resources. Essentially, while the amount of debt which Nigeria accumulated was not so high, when compared against its income from petroleum, it should have been possible to sustain the debt through good resource management and utilisation; and the focused and effective servicing of the debt’.

In this sense, Obasanjo demonstrated his commitment in solving the debt management problem by establishing the Debt Management Office (DMO) in October 2000. The objective was to achieve a radical transformation of Nigeria’s debt portfolio into an asset for growth and development, and changing the whole debt management process by bringing together the debt management functions under one central agency.

The establishment of the Debt Management Office (DMO) was considered a good step due to the confusion and contradictory pronouncements by different stakeholders on the nature, composition and quantum of Nigeria’s debt in the past. The DMO is a crucial phenomenon in

Obasanjo's diplomacy of debt relief. The agency carried out significant improvement in debt management operations including systems, procedures and practices. It also helped to improve relations with Nigeria's creditors including multilateral institutions. It has been able to also regularize the whole debt management process, infusing great clarity and vision; implementing a foreign debt verification exercise, and reconciling external debt data between the Federal and State governments. Other policy frameworks for debt management which the DMO introduced include improvement of institutional arrangements for debt management to enhance transparency, efficiency and cost effectiveness, thereby bringing debt stock and debt service payments down to manageable and sustainable levels through debt rescheduling and relief; ensuring proactive debt management strategies to seek advantage of opportunities and formulating borrowing policies to prevent excessive built-up while ensuring productive use of borrowed funds. The DMO also has the responsibility to convert Nigeria's debt into an asset for growth and development.

Notwithstanding the efforts of the Obasanjo's administration, most leaders of the West argued that Nigeria does not deserve debt cancellation or forgiveness largely because Nigeria was not considered a poor country basically because of her huge income from oil which stood between \$11 and \$12 billion annually (Ogwu & Ali, 2006:42). In an interview with The Guardian on 14th March 2005, the then French Ambassador to Nigeria, Yves Gauduel, asserted that Nigeria's resources were vast enough to meet its debt obligations. It was also observed that the \$12 billion Gulf War oil windfall that accrued to Nigeria under Gen. Babangida was declared missing or unaccounted for. Nigeria's creditors have been baffled that Gen. Abacha and members of his family could steal over \$4 billion from government coffers with impunity. Western nations like Germany, France, United Kingdom and United States of America, etc., were individually and collectively unconvinced about the need for debt relief for Nigeria on account of the above reasons. Many Western leaders believed that Nigeria should be able to pay her debts if only the government would be accountable, transparent and reduce corruption by fighting it more vigorously. These observations made it difficult to convince the Western leaders that Nigeria deserved debt forgiveness or cancellation. In response, the Obasanjo government continued to devise other instruments to improve on its image with regards to fighting corruption in order to change the perception of the international community about Nigeria. These include the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), the Due Process Office, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency

Initiative (NEITI), as well as the introduction of a mechanism for Budget Monitoring (Ogwu & Ali, 2006:43).

All the above were aimed at improving the image of the country and its profile with respect to resource management. He also adopted an elaborate economic reform programme and good governance practices which the nation's creditors applauded. The adoption of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), which could be considered as response to the demands of creditors, also contributed to the rising profile of the Administration as one that was focused. The NEEDS programme prescribed a certain level of debt repayment which the IMF accepted in its 2005 report to the effect that Nigeria should continue debt service repayment at the level already agreed. Following his victory in the April 2003 elections, Obasanjo's choice of personnel for his vision and economic reform agenda was also of great benefit to his debt relief campaign. At the beginning of his second term, his Economic Team which was made up of such high profile technocrats as Dr (Mrs) Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Minister of Finance; Prof. Charles Soludo, Governor of the Central Bank; Mrs Oby Ezekwesili, Due Process Office; Dr. Mansur Mukhtar, Debt Management Office; Mallam Nasir El-Rufai; Minister of Federal Capital; and Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, Chairman of the EFCC, have all gained international recognition and respect which was very useful for the diplomacy and campaign for debt relief. In particular, the inclusion of Okonjo-Iweala, as the Head of the Economic Team, earned the administration a lot of respect and credibility from Nigeria's creditors because of her pedigree at the World Bank from where she was recruited. Chief Obasanjo led a sustained diplomatic effort in the campaign for debt relief including personal contact at the highest levels with the leadership of the G8, the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union as well as the multilateral financial institutions, particularly the World Bank and the IMF. In President Obasanjo's discussions during his numerous trips abroad was the issue of debt cancellation for Nigeria. He frequently canvassed for a negotiated solution by which the creditors and debtors would work together to achieve a permanent solution.

For purpose of clarity, the Paris Club is a major grouping of international creditor nations, made up of industrialized developed countries that are official creditors to most of Third World debtor countries. It is so called because it meets and operates from Paris. It is made up of nineteen permanent members who are government of countries with large credits on governments of other countries. Canada, Denmark, Austria, Italy, France, Germany, United Kingdom, USA, Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, Japan, etc., are some of the members of the

club. Basically, the role and central function of the Paris Club is to provide co-ordinated and sustainable solutions to the debt payment difficulties facing debtor nations. They do this mainly through the provision of debt relief in form of postponement, rescheduling and reduction in debt service obligations of the debtor nation concerned. It was to the members of the Paris Club that Nigeria owed about 85% of her debt. One of the conditions imposed on debtor nations seeking substantial debt relief from the Paris Club was that it must have a 'policy support instrument' (PSI) from the IMF/World Bank. It was on this basis that the two Breton Wood institutions became involved in the design and implementation of Obasanjo's government's economic reform programme. Consequently, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) got the approval and special favour of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They were also involved in closely monitoring the implementation of the reform programme by the Nigerian government to ensure full compliance.

Interestingly, signs that Nigeria may soon achieve her objective of substantial debt relief came in May 2005 during the visit of the then IMF Managing Director, Rodrigo De Rato when he made the following statement:

I told President Obasanjo that I continue to be impressed by the Nigerian government's strong commitment to comprehensive economic and social reforms. And I commend the President for the prudent management of the economy in 2004 under his leadership. Fiscal restraints, along with a tight monetary policy have helped strengthen Nigeria's external position and restored macro-economic stability(Ashafa, 2006:206).

Regarding debt relief from the Paris Club, the IMF boss continued further:

I noted that Nigeria's strong economic performance augurs well for reaching such a solution, and that the IMF would be prepared to provide an assessment letter to this effect, if requested by the Paris Club (Ashafa, 2006:206).

The perseverance and doggedness of the former President eventually paid off early in June 2005, when at the G8 Finance Ministers meeting the news was broken that Nigeria should be granted substantial debt relief. It stated further that the G8 took cognisance of the efforts made by Nigeria in the implementation of economic and social reforms, especially with the implementation of the NEEDS programme and had therefore agreed to grant Nigeria sustainable debt treatment within the framework of the Paris Club. Consequently, at the end of the Paris Club meeting held on 29th of June 2005, a formal announcement was made to the

effect that a decision was reached in principle, to grant Nigeria a debt relief package. Under the deal, Nigeria was required to make an upfront payment of US\$6 billion of existing debt service arrears to the Club by September 2005, thereby reducing the debt to about \$25 billion. With this development, the Club will write off 67% of this balance amounting to US\$18 billion. Another sum of US\$6 billion was also expected to be paid by Nigeria in early 2006, being the market related discount of the remaining balance under the Naples Terms⁴¹ thereby allowing Nigeria to completely exit the Club's debt.

There is a popular saying that says: "All is well that ends well". Right from the inception of Nigeria's fourth Republic in 1999, former President Obasanjo's ultimate objective with regards to debt was the pursuit of debt relief either in form of total cancellation or attainment of substantial debt absolution. The reasons that informed this line of action were that the debts imposed the arduous obligation of servicing upon the nation, a burden which makes development almost impossible. It also deprives the generality of the Nigerian citizenry of funds that could have been channelled into infrastructural development projects and welfare programmes, thereby perpetuating and deepening poverty. Nigeria's exit from the debt peonage is considered by many as being very significant and a huge success for Chief Olusegun Obasanjo's administration. The economic significance of this development is also enormous as funds that were hitherto used for debt servicing could now be used for physical development purposes. It is hoped that successive regimes will resist the temptation of embarking on another round of debt accumulation.

5.6 NIGERIA IN AFRICAN UNION AND NEPAD

It is not an exaggeration or mere expression that Nigeria is a giant of Africa. Since her independence, she has played a big role not only in the West African sub-region but in the African continent as a whole. That is why her foreign policy is Afro-centric. It is pertinent therefore, to give an insight into Nigeria's involvement in the activities or membership of both the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). An in-depth knowledge of this will enable us to better appreciate Nigeria's role in the organisation and how they impact on Nigeria's foreign policy and economic development particularly during Chief Olusegun Obasanjo's administration. Nigeria played a crucial role in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Nigeria was a prominent member of the 'Monrovia Group', one of the three such groups that held divergent opinions

on the nature of continental organisation that was to be formed. The two others were referred to as ‘the Casablanca Group’ and ‘the Brazzaville Group’. Following the reconciliatory meeting held in Ethiopia, The OAU Charter was drafted by a team of Nigerian legal experts led by the first Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Dr. Teslim O. Elias. After the adoption of the OAU Charter and the launching of the organisation in 1963, Nigeria also dispatched Mr Philip Asiodu to Addis Ababa, to help set up and nurture the General Secretariat of the OAU (Agubuzu, 2009:110).

In contrast with the crucial role played by Nigeria in the founding of the OAU, Nigeria merely reacted to the rapidly evolving events leading to the transformation from OAU to African Union (AU). The events that eventually gave birth to the AU are traceable to the extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, in September 1999. At that summit, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi presented to the African leaders a draft charter in which he proposed the formation ‘The United States of Africa’. His proposal contained an African political configuration consisting of one government, one leader, a single Army, one currency, one central bank and one parliament (Oche & Ojurongbe, 2008:397). Gaddafi wanted to create an African continent that was essentially without borders and loss of state sovereignty as currently existed, and the time frame given for the realization of the proposal was the year 2000. The above was a replica of what Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and the Casablanca Group had proposed when the Organisation of African Unity was to be established in 1963. Gaddafi’s proposed ‘African Union’ received full support from Togo and Burkina Faso. However, Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa expressed grave reservations. Libya’s relations with Nigeria have never been a model of intra-African relations. Nigeria in particular found the excesses of Gaddafi intolerable. In the early 80s, Gaddafi had proposed to merge part of Chad with Libya. Nigeria responded with threat of military action if the merger should take place. She warned that Libya should not interfere in the internal affairs of African nations (Victor, 2005:172). In the past, Gaddafi had gotten away with contempt for Nigeria, but under the civilian administration of President Obasanjo, things changed. It is pertinent to say that Nigeria’s response to Gaddafi’s initiative was consistent with her historical commitment to Africa’s functionalist integration approach. It was the view of Nigeria that ‘Africa’s integration arrangement must focus primarily on trade promotion through trade liberalization schemes based on the creation of Free Trade Area’ (African Today, 2001:11).

Therefore, African leaders felt that Gaddafi’s proposal was too idealistic in nature and saw the need to substantially alter it. Thus, the negotiations and compromises that followed led to

the Sirte declaration which eventually formed the basis for the Constitutive Act of the African Union which was adopted during the 36th Ordinary Summit of the OAU in Lome, Togo on July 11, 2000. Nigeria deposited the instrument of ratification of the Constitutive Act of the African Union on 26th April 2001 with the OAU General Secretariat and she was the 36th member to do so (Victor, 2005:163). This concluded the two-third requirement and the Act entered into force on the 26th of May 2001. And thus, Nigeria became one of the founding members of the African Union. Right from inception, the foreign policy of the Obasanjo government was characterized by an African focus; it revolves around the core issues of African unity and independence, non-interference and non-alignment in sovereign affairs of other states, promotion of regional development and economic co-operation, and resolution of disputes by peaceful means. Since the transformation from OAU to AU, Nigeria has remained very visible and has played very important leadership roles in the various programmes and activities of the organisation.

It was partly the need for a holistic African economic policy and the eagerness on the part of some African leaders to curtail the rising profile of the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Gaddafi in the AU that NEPAD was hurriedly conceived. Consequently, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria and Senegal, all struggled for prominence in the search for an African doctrinal economic policy. The Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade, was the first African leader to conceptualize and articulate an African economic agenda which he christened 'the Omega Plan'. It consisted of four main parameters, namely: Agriculture, Education, Health, and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) (Agbubuzu, 2008:112). Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria all worked in collaboration and partnership, and produced an alternative African economic policy document called 'the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme (MAP)'. Following this development, Nigeria hosted a conference of notable African Heads of Government with a view to harmonizing the two programmes listed above into an action plan for the continent (Victor, 2005:179). Thus, the Omega Plan was synthesized with the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery to form 'the New African Initiative' (NAI). However, the New African Initiative was later renamed the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) at the July 2001 OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia as a result of the argument that the word 'Initiative' was too general to convey any particular meaning.

At inception, the highest organ of NEPAD was the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee. It was made up of three countries from each of the five regions of Africa. Chief Obasanjo was elected as the first Chairman of the Committee while the Presidents of Senegal and Algeria served as Vice Chairmen. Nigeria also served in the Steering Committee which is the second-ranking organ of NEPAD and was made up of Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, Senegal and Egypt. The purpose of this committee was to shield the operations of NEPAD from the constraints of the bureaucratic machinery of member states. The commitment of Nigeria to the goals of African unity and regional integration through the African Union was demonstrated in the ratification of the Constitutive Act of the African Union and also in the pivotal role the country has played in the evolution of the core programmes of the AU. In 2002, the African Union saw it fit to entrust Nigeria with the noble but highly demanding task of leading Africa out of the woods of low local content in jobs, goods and services (Egom, 2009:91). The intention was that Nigeria should lead the way through the example of using endogenous and private sector equity naira to grow Nigeria into an abundance of home-made jobs, goods and services. The common good central banking model which was meant to help Nigeria to achieve this goal, gives the currency financial and industrial market action-guidelines and milestones for the Economic Governance Initiative (EGI) of the NEPAD Agenda.

The Obasanjo administration used Nigeria's membership of the African Union and NEPAD maximally to enhance Nigeria's economic diplomacy, especially at the time (July 2004 – January, 2006) when Obasanjo was both the President of AU and Chairman of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee. Nigeria's exit from the debt stranglehold of the Paris Club in 2006 was one of the gains of the enhanced economic diplomacy; and it is sure to have a catalytic effect on the overall economic development of Nigeria in particular and the ECOWAS region in general. The African Union and NEPAD were used by Africa to present a common front on many global economic and social issues such as the debt-problem, international trade matters, health and environment (Agubuzu, 2009:114).

Laudable as the various economic policies and programmes of the African Union and NEPAD appear to be, they only ended up on paper. It is regrettable that concrete achievements on ground particularly by NEPAD became elusive. There were several conferences and so much talk, but very little actions and no visible NEPAD projects in any part of the African continent to tell the success story. On the positive side, NEPAD enabled

Africa to present common agenda, programmes and requests with one voice to the international donor agencies and Africa's development partners. It rekindled the hope for Africa's economic emancipation. Indeed, if the African leaders could put their political and ideological differences aside, overcome the needless distrust of each other, and muster the necessary political will; then NEPAD could serve as a catalyst for rapid economic development and growth that will catapult Africa from the doldrums of poverty to an economic giant. The enormous human and natural resources that abound in Africa only requires focused, dedicated and committed political leadership to harness them for Africa to achieve economic stability and greatness.

5.7 CITIZEN DIPLOMACY

A refinement and elaboration of the concentric circles first espoused by Ibrahim Gambari under the Muhammad Buhari Military administration occurred during the second term of President Olusegun Obasanjo between 2003 and 2007 when Ambassador Olu Adeniji served as foreign Affairs Minister of Nigeria. Before it, Alhaji Sule Lamido, the first foreign affairs minister under the President Obasanjo had initiated what looked like foreign policy for democratic consolidation project (Asobie, 2007).

However, the appointment of Chief Ojo Maduekewe, a former National Secretary of the ruling party in Nigeria, the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) as the Foreign Affairs Minister coincided with the adoption of citizen diplomacy as a thrust of Nigerian foreign policy. The coinage of citizen diplomacy does not attract the deluge of attacks as did economic diplomacy launched under President Babangida administration on the variety of grounds including the indivisibility of diplomacy into political, economic, cultural e.t.c. and the illogicability of the assumption that unless a policy of economic diplomacy is launched, an ambassador may not be concerned with economic issues (Saliu, 2006).

On the home front, it has meant that Nigerians had to be the main economic beneficiaries of Nigeria's transactions with international actors. Foreign policy activities such as socio-economic treaties, programmes and negotiations would be expected to grant Nigerian companies, products and individuals the appropriate concessions, contracts and appointments. For example, in post – conflict states where Nigerian troops had played a key role in restoring peace, forthcoming contracts ought to be commensurate with the country's sacrifices. Thus, unlike the past when Nigeria made sacrifice in the African liberation movements but barely

got a “Thank you” in return, today it insists on fair returns or treatment from a post – conflict situation. In the matter of UN Peacekeeping Operations where Nigeria has excelled, ranking fifth in terms of troop contribution, the Jonathan Administration expected Nigeria to be accorded some recognition by appointing its Generals to command missions especially as its troops invariably comprise the bulk of the contingents. When that did not happen in Mali, the Nigerian troops were withdrawn (Olatunde, 2014: 375).

On the international scene, in the face of numerous cases of maltreatment abroad, and the proliferation of negative stereotypes of Nigerians, the Nigerian government made protection and assistance to its citizens by its Overseas Mission is a central priority. This commitment to protecting citizens informed, for example, the decision to support freedom and democracy in the struggle against Colonel Gadhafi and consequently dispatching an aircraft to evacuate Nigerians at the outbreak of the Libyan civil war while the Nigerian Embassy provided protection for those who remained behind (Olatunde, 2014).

Therefore, citizen diplomacy has been dissected as the framework for the defence of the rights of the citizens where-ever they may be. The concept presupposes that there is a kind of bond between officials conducting the business of the state and the citizens. Whatever a country does outside her border it must be in furtherance of the interest of her citizen (Ogunsanwo, 2009). Within this context, it is necessary to reiterate that the concept of citizen diplomacy is not ordinarily a flight of fancy kind of concept. It is a deep rooted concept manifesting the responsibility that a state has towards its citizens towards the state by being the ‘ambassadors’ of their country in other lands. It is thus diplomacy with many adages or what some have called multi-track diplomacy (Agbu, 2009).

From the pool of confusion that visits the implementation of citizen diplomacy in Nigeria, it is quite obvious that the concept is intended to emphasize the Nigerian – ness in the conduct of Nigerian foreign policy. It was reasoned, quite wrongly, of course, that the previous attempts at implementing Nigerian foreign policy were characterized by less emphasis on the Nigerian – ness of the foreign policy (Maduekwe, 2009). A review of the foreign policy under President Obasanjo through projects such as the Heart of Africa, constructive and Beneficial concentricism and others would suggest that the Nigerian has always been the central focus of the country’s foreign policy (Saliu, 2005).

5.8 NIGERIA EXTERNAL IMAGE CRISIS

There was a time in the conduct of Nigerian foreign policy when Nigeria and Nigerians were warmly welcomed all over the world. Citizens of other nations were always proud to play host to Nigerians whom they believed has plenty of dollars to spend. Nigerian nationals were literally being given a red carpet treatment everywhere. Not too many Nigerians then were available for menial jobs such as bathing of corpses or serving as taxi drivers or security guards in other countries (Saliu, 2002:22). The flag of Nigeria was flown high in almost all capitals of the world. The national currency, the Naira, was very strong and there was no centre of the world one would go without being able to convert it to other nations' currencies. The Naira was even stronger than the USA dollar and almost at par with the Pounds Sterling. Infact, the blacks in the Diaspora were full of admiration for Nigeria which they willingly considered as their roots. Therefore, when the Second Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) was held in Lagos in 1977, quite a number of them came down to Africa through Nigeria. The country subsequently became a Mecca of sorts for the blacks in the Diaspora. Nigeria's relations with Brazil, Jamaica, Grenada and other countries with black populations picked up as she was seen as a centre for the promotion and defence of blacks all over the world (Saliu, 2010:2011).

Precisely, Nigeria foreign policy in the 1970s and 1980s was propelled by a profound level of confidence. Perhaps on account of petro-dollar, Nigeria radiated a lot of confidence. This was, however, in the past. The current state of Nigerian foreign policy shows lack of confidence and this has added to the cost of Nigerian foreign policy failure in some ways. The loss of confidence may be as a result of too many domestic issues on which there are no consensus. Moreover, the national economy is not yet on the part of solvency, despite many reform programmes that have been tried out (Saliu, 2010:218). The declining fortunes of Nigerian foreign policy starts with the failure of the country to imbibe the culture of reviewing her foreign policy to make it in time with the profound changes that have visited the global system in the last two decades. The last time that the country ever carried out any major review of her foreign policy was in 1976 popularly referred to as Adebayo Adedeji review. The impact of the non-review of the foreign policy is that Nigeria is facing erupting issues in the international system with kits and tools developed essentially to respond to the bipolar world with colonialism and apartheid as the main agenda on the African continent. Thus, Nigeria does not show her adequacy in terms of meeting the needs of globalism and the

progressive movement towards making foreign policy an important tool in increasing the welfare of Nigerians both at home and abroad (Adebayo & Mustapha, 2008).

The world over, the importance of research to the effective pursuit of foreign policy objectives is increasingly being recognized. Even within the foreign policy bureaucracy there should be a lot of research activities going on. It is only with the benefit of deep research that a foreign policy can be adequate in generating responses to issues of global significance. Quite unfortunately, Nigerian foreign policy is not being propelled by rich research environment. Most research arms of Nigerian foreign policy have been poorly funded and those in Nigerian Universities are being pulled back from productive engagement by dearth of data with which to analyse policy options for the Nigerian nation. The phenomenon of “grabbing” which is affecting every facet of the Nigerian life has not helped sustain interest of policy makers and researchers in documenting foreign policy issues for future generations. Thus, as the culture to conduct foreign policy short of documentation is entrenched, the laboratory for engaging the foreign policy is destroyed. The implication of this is that instead of having options in terms of world views to guide policy choices, policy makers are restricted to their own worldviews which, often times, do not take all factors into consideration before coming out with policy statements (Maduekwe, 2009).

For Nigeria, the external image she projects is a negative one. Even here in Africa, fellow African countries share the belief that Nigeria has not totally been a positive note in Africa. This belief is even worst outside the continent. Nigerians in their hundreds and thousands continuously migrate to other countries for better living conditions since things are no longer rosy at home. The repeated association of Nigerians with human and drug traffickings, and credit card scams has not helped to project a good image for the country. Also, the passive response of the Nigerian missions to Nigerians in distress is compounding the image problem of the country (Nigeria Tribune, 2009). A foreign policy is expected to show its power and influence in protecting citizens both at home and abroad. The USA can go to war over the death or maltreatment of a citizen in a foreign land. The stress in Nigeria’s foreign policy has thus become more noticeable in the manner of responding to cases of maltreatment of Nigerians in other lands. Liberia, Libya, Gambian, Ghana, Italy, Indonesia and other countries top the list of countries in which Nigerians are regularly maltreated or killed on trumped-up charges of not having the valid documents (Adekola 2009). Many more Nigerians, were executed after waiting in vain for Nigeria’s authorities to intercede and others deported without a finger being lifted by Nigeria on the appropriateness or otherwise

of the decisions of America, Libya, Sudan and other countries to repatriate Nigerians to Nigeria without extending the usual diplomatic courtesy to the country. The repeated incidences of attack on foreign nationals particularly Nigerians in South African and Zimbabwe, for instance, have seen Nigeria being flat footed on each occasion. This has often warranted legislative enquiry on the issues involved (Usigbe, 2008).

The leadership claims of Nigeria are also increasingly being challenged even in Africa. Hardly would Nigeria indicate interest in any position without a contest. In the African Development Bank (AfDB), where Nigeria has established a Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF), it has never fully exercised influence commensurate with its status and voting power in the Bank. Its influence, according to Mailafia (2000:177) remains weak at the highest levels of the management. This was forcefully brought home when Nigeria failed twice (in 1995 and 2005) to get its candidate elected as President of the Bank even when the election was conducted in 2005 in Abuja. This defeat was particularly painful because it happened under a democracy and this removes the strength in the argument on lack of democracy for Nigeria's first defeat in 1995 under the draconian rule of General Sani Abacha by Morocco. The glittering credentials of the country's candidate notwithstanding (Saliu, 2006).

Disturbingly, though active internationally, Nigeria was not invited to join the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral Forum or the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) group. In effect, some of the major realignment of forces on the international scene, including the G20, are leaving Nigeria out. Governance breakdown in Nigeria remains a threat to Nigeria's role in the world (Tom, 2010). In ECOWAS, even though Nigeria pays 60 percent of the budget, its influence within the organization is not commensurate with its contribution. Even though in the African Union (AU), a Nigerian Ambassador Aisha Laraba Abdullahi, now occupies a high position as Commissioner for Political Affairs, there are still other challenges in terms of how the nation wields its influence in the organization at large. Nigeria was in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a nonpermanent member for January, 2010 to December, 2011 and is planning to go back again in January, 2014. ECOWAS and the AU have endorsed the ambition. It is interesting to note that during the election into the UNSC in 2009, Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Togo voted for themselves even though they were neither candidates nor listed for the election contest. According to Akinterinwa (2011:13), 'this was open protest against Nigeria's candidature'.

Another example, Nigeria backed Jean Ping of Gabon for the position of Chairman of the African Union (AU) Commission but it was South Africa's Mkosazana Dlamini-Zuma who won. In 2012, the UN removed Professor Ibrahim Gambari as Co-Representative of the UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID) against Nigeria's objection, even though Nigeria had the largest contingent serving in the Peace Support Operation (PSO) (Adebayo, 2013). There was also confusion about the intention of Nigeria at the 2013 summit over the chairmanship of the AU which was eventually won by fellow ECOWAS member, Benin (Alli, 2013: 138).

Two recent developments have shown more clearly the declining fortunes of the Nigerian foreign policy. The visit of President Barack Obama to Africa in July 2009 was expected to take off from Nigeria or that it should involve the country. But from the record of the visit, he visited Ghana at the expense of the country though Nigerian opposition leaders were invited to Ghana to have a handshake with the first African – American president. In the fashion of President Bush's visit to Ghana in 2008, President Obama used the occasion of the visit to put the heat on African leaders when he referred to as African big men, not democrats. From all accounts, he kept away from Nigeria on account of disappointments which the world has on the country with respect to democracy, good governance and economic management. If the Obama speech was not pointedly against Nigeria, the make-up visit of the USA Secretary of State, Mrs. Hilary Clinton, to Nigeria in August 2009 removed the lid from Nigerian official eyes when she squarely blamed the leadership for the growing religious and sectarian conflicts in the country as well as the thriving corruption which has made her to import oil even though she is the sixth producer of oil in the world (Saliu, 2010: 197).

Having lost the confidence informed by absence of foundations for a robust foreign policy, Nigeria has lost a good ground for proactive foreign policy. The country reacts to situations instead of providing the leadership. The once giant of the continent is unusually silent on major issues affecting the continent and this has often made people to wonder about what is happening to Nigeria's foreign policy (Saliu, 2008). Two examples are sufficient. Indeed, Nigeria disappointed the world when her voice was not as loud as expected on the Zimbabwean crisis. As a country whose voice was counted in the roll call of honour during the Zimbabwean war of liberation, Nigeria was expected to play a leading role in the search for the resolution of the political logjam in 2008 but the country was not on the front row despite repeated appeals to the contrary. Also, on Nigerian, Chadian and Guinean crises, the front role is being played by other countries, especially France, not Nigerian (Saliu, 2010 : 219).

According to Adebayo (2013), all these are happening because Nigerian foreign policy has suffered decline and the country's international voice has become mute. However, in reality the nation's voice is not mute as such. Rather, it is just that it does not carry as much influence as it used to, largely because of failure to provide good governance at home and an incoherent foreign policy abroad. All these ugly developments was as a result of poor leadership in the pursuance of Nigeria's foreign policy both locally and internationally.

It is however, disturbing to note that, under General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida who took over power on August 27, 1985, a terrible blow was dealt on Nigeria's external image with the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential Election, which both domestic and foreign observers had adjudged the freest and fairest in Nigeria's political history. The scuttling of the democratic process and political upheavals it created could only project a negative image for the country. Infact, there was no time in the political history of Nigeria that her national image ever suffered more damage than under the late General Sani Abacha whose regime openly engaged in acts of flagrant violations of human rights that culminated in the unlawful incarceration of pro-democracy activists gruesome murder of the regimes unrepentant critics, unwarranted cases of media gagging, total disregard for the rule of law and the direct stealing of public funds (Zimako, 2009: 242). The controversial execution of environmental activist, Mri Ken Saro- Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders, for instance, led to the suspension of Nigeria's membership of Commonwealth. All these events which were lavishly reported in the local and international media combined to bring down the image of the country (Adeniyi, 2012:360).

Under successive democratic governments since the 1999 transition, a good number of internal and external issues have also been shaping Nigeria's external image either for better or for worse. During the Obasanjo civilian administration (1999-2007), for instance Nigeria was in the eye of the storm over the conduct of the 2003 and 2007 General Elections. In the case of the 2007 elections, the International Republican Institute (IRI) held that the entire process failed to meet domestic as well as international standards. The failed attempt to seek an extra- constitutional third term, the controversy it generated and the wide reportage of these issues, impacted negatively on Nigeria's image (Adeniyi, 2012:361).

Again, the image crisis under the administration of the late President Umaru Yar' Adua became manifest in the manner he prosecuted, or more appropriately, failed to prosecute, the anti-graft war. His controversial health challenge which created power vacuum for a period of

six months also led to a situation in which Nigeria grabbed global attention as a country to worry about. The administration of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was ushered in at a period of heightened violence by Boko Haram, serial bombing in the North aside the post – election violence that claimed several lives in the Northern part of the country. All these have combined to pose a serious challenge to Nigeria’s external image (Adeniyi, 2012: 361).

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CHAPTER SIX

6.0 DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

6.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodology refers to the choices made in executing a research (Silverman, 2001). It is the means by which we reflect upon the methods appropriate to realise fully our potential to acquire knowledge of that which exists. It thus relates to the choice of analytical strategy and research design – which is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study's initial research questions and, ultimately to its conclusions (Yin, 2002).

This research is analytical and explanatory in nature. Therefore, this study uses primary and secondary data and adopts interpretation techniques borrowed from social sciences.

6.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

This research adopts a qualitative research method. The qualitative research method is a research method strategy designed to gather qualitative information, usually in a narrative form, in order to describe or understand people in their natural setting (Manhein, *et al*, 2008).

6.2.1 INSTRUMENTS OF DATA COLLECTION

In setting the task of gathering primary data for this study, two research instruments were developed, these include: Elite Interviewing and Semi-structured Interview guides. A total of twenty question guides were developed for both the elite interview and semi-structured interview. These questions captured the whole gamut of the research questions and objectives of study. The interview guides were prepared to serve as the basis of engagement with the respondents.

The interview guides were structured in such a way that the researcher was able to vary the questions, depending on responses from the respondents. Notwithstanding the variations, the questions were asked in accordance with the questions guides and the broad purposes of the research. These instruments assisted the researcher to probe deeply into all issues under discussion and invariably control the discussion so as to get as much information as possible.

The primary data for this research were collected between November 2012 and December 2013. Due to the differences in the location for this interview, and to ensure that the identified samples are effectively interviewed, the researcher conducted face to face interviews with

respondents. As dictated by the ethics of research, the researcher introduced himself, explained the purpose of the research, the confidentiality of the responses and sought the permission of the respondents to have the interview recorded. Consequently, the researcher asked questions based on the prepared interview guide and the responses were recorded.

During the interview, the researcher intermittently sought for clarifications on some issues. This allowed discussions to probe into the underlying expectant response. Substantial parts of the responses were handwritten, so as to serve as a contingency solution in case of lost or damage of recorded responses.

At the end of the interview exercise, the interview schedules were collated, screened, sorted out and checked for non-response or completion.

6.2.2 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

In order to ensure the internal validity of the study, the research instruments were subjected to close scrutiny by experts, including the supervisors, who examined them. Responses from the respondents were also matched with documentary evidences. Thus, a thorough analysis clearly aligns with documentary evidences. Where necessary, the researcher made further contact with the respondents to ensure that the conclusions reached in the study aligned with the response given on the variables and categories developed for the study.

Efforts were made to ensure internal consistency and coherence of data. To achieve this, field notes were read and studied several times at the initial stage in order to have a thorough grasp and understanding of the responses as a basis of understanding effective thematic classification of data.

6.2.3 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES

This study is concerned with collection of data for the purpose of describing, interpreting, analysing and explaining the existing conditions and trends that are developing in the area of study. Thus, the study uses data collection methods of Elite Interviewing (EI) and In-depth interview. Elite, in the context of this research are people with special knowledge and information relevant to our research problems (Manheim, 2006: 356). The semi-structured interview further helped to ensure the validity and reliability of the data. These two methods were considered appropriate to investigate the issue under review, so as to gather necessary and relevant information needed for the research.

Respondents that the researcher specifically chosen were scholars, technocrats, intellectuals and policy makers. Their divergent views and opinions at my disposal enable me to critically access and examine the research questions.

In the focus group discussion, number of respondent interviewed were ten and five questions were carefully structured in line with the research objectives. While in the indepth interview the number of people engaged were thirty people and twenty questions were structured to achieve the stated objectives.

The discussion sessions involved questioning, interrogating and astute comments. These sessions helped in a number of ways as it facilitated closeness and familiarity with the respondents in such a way that assisted in divulging some of the privilege information.

These instructions enable the respondents to elaborate on documentary data which the researcher has already gathered. Though the mode of responses were different, the respondents more or less all agreed on some fundamental issues. In general term, the outcome was interactive, engaging and interesting.

6.3.4 STUDY LOCATION

Given the nature and sensitivity of the research questions, the researcher endeavoured to interact and interview respondents that were relevant to the research. This informed the effort of the researcher to spread the interview into different states to conduct the interview so as to ensure that the information gathered is not limited or restricted to a particular set of scholars, parastatals or institutes.

The study was conducted in three geo-political zones of Nigeria. The study locations selected were Lagos in South West, Kwara in North Central, Kaduna and Kano in North West; and Capital Territory Abuja in North Central zone. These locations were selected due to the strategic place within the purview of the discourse. Lagos was Nigeria's former capital where most of the strategic offices and several institutes of research are located.

Similarly, Abuja is Nigeria's Federal Capital Territory and the seat of power where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is strategically located. The most interesting fact about other locations like Kwara, Kaduna and Kano is that they harbour some renowned scholars and intellectuals that shed more light on the discourse.

6.3 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

In this research, the two sources of data collection were the primary and secondary sources. The primary source made use of Elite Interview and semi-structured interview with focus on gathering and analysing data relevant to the study. The secondary data were obtained from books, journals, newspapers and magazines. This method allows the researcher to take into accounts the opinions, views and tendencies unrepresented by the elite interview and in-depth interview, especially the opinion of critical audience that were not within reach. Thus, the views, opinions, perspectives and arguments of scholars, academicians, policy-makers and seasoned diplomats are given utmost consideration.

The data collected from the in – depth interviews, focus group discussions as well as secondary data were organised and prepared for analysis. Following the suggestion by Creswell (2003), the interviews were transcribed, necessary materials were scanned, field notes were read and typed, just as collected data were sorted and arranged into different types depending on the sources of information.

After reading through all the data with a view to obtaining a general sense of the information and to reflect on its overall meaning, bearing in mind the tone of ideas, the general impression of the overall depth, credibility of information and how the information is to be put to use, the content analysis method was used to analyse the data.

This stage involved taking text data, segmenting sentences paragraphs into categories and labelling those categories with a term, which is often based in the actual language of the participants. This sometimes is called *in vivo* term. The codes involves setting and context codes, perspectives held by subject codes, subjects' ways of thinking about people and objects process codes, activity codes, strategy codes, relationship and social structure codes and pre-assigned coding schemes. Simply, coding process was used to generate a description of the setting or people as well as categories or themes for analysis. The description entails a detailed rendering of information about people, places or events in a setting; the coding system was used to generate a small number of themes or categories.

At the next stage, how the description and theme will be represented in the qualitative narrative was advanced. Then, a narrative passage was used to convey the findings of the analysis which includes the chronology issues, events and development, detailed discussion

of several themes, multiple perspectives from individuals and quotations as well as discussions with interconnecting themes.

The last stage involved making interpretation or giving meaning to the data through rigorous and systematic analysis of the data collected with a view to ensuring that the analysed data speaks to the overall objectives of the research. This was done using historical narratives as well as contextual analysis of all the data gathered.

6.3.1 INTERPRETATION OF FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION

6.3.1.1 Research Question 1:

What is your objective assessment of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence in 1960?

The foreign policy of a country is the external projection of some of the domestic policies of that country that have relevance in such arena. Both domestic and foreign policies of a country are interrelated or, perhaps more accurately stated are inter-penetrated. On the other hand, national interest is, unarguably, the major determinant of country's foreign policy. Nigeria seemed destined to play a significant and influential role in world affairs on attaining her independence in 1960. She was seen as a natural leader of Africa because of her size, population and resources. Subsequently, all Nigerian leaders toed this line in their actions. This was most evident even during military rules as the leaders maintained continuity in the foreign policy objectives enunciated at independence. Nigeria's foreign policies were articulated immediately after it achieved sovereign nationhood in 1960. Professor Akinterinwa argued that in 1960, Nigeria's foreign policy was specifically designed to be an instrument of national development and particularly to facilitate the political objective of leadership in African affairs. Political leaders and the elite in general wanted Nigeria to be Africa's leader and also an African leader to be reckoned with in global affairs.

However, the country's foreign policy over the years has been quite epileptic. This is largely due to the myriad of military coups and constant shifts in power and leadership though this has been refined in the course of time by various administrations. Nigeria's foreign policy, though limited in scope, but achieved more than 50 percent and this was despite the mono-cultural and weak economy of the country. Notably, each regime came with what is best and administrable. On this pattern, the pursuit of foreign policy was carried out on the basis of Crisis Decision rather than on a dynamic programme policy. Hence, Nigeria's foreign policy

since independence has been reactive to events as they occur in the international scene rather than addressing fundamental issues. It is important to note that since independence Nigeria has constantly pursued a policy of 'good-neighbourliness' especially within its immediate sphere of influence. Through the country's numerous acts or inactions, the country succeeded in preventing the emergence or escalation of conflicts in Africa. Examples abound from Nigeria's interventions in Zimbabwe, Chad, Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Cote D'Ivoire, Sao Tome and principle and Sudan. Hardly can the struggles against apartheid and colonialism, especially on the African continent, be written without according due recognition to Nigeria.

The rising profile of Nigeria role in world affairs reached its peak in the decade between the early 1970s and the early 1980s. This period has also been described as the golden era of Nigeria's foreign policy, especially the period from 1975. Hence, from political independence to July 1975, foreign relations experts have generally agreed that Nigeria's foreign policy thrusts were stable, predictable and sustainable in the sense that the constituency and faithful prosecution of its basic tenets such as commitment to the complete eradication of colonialism and racist regimes in the African continent was vigorously pursued to logical conclusion. It is argued that Nigeria's foreign policy had no focus but was only pursued on the maniacal quest for liberating Africa from colonial rule in a poorly articulated manner. This development has prompted and generated a lot of discourse in recent time. Nigeria, unimaginably, focused too much attention and commitment in tackling intractable conflicts and issues on the continent of Africa and the world at large. But, the question is: what is the clear objective for the policy choice? As a result of this poorly defined policy, what Nigeria gets for all her good neighbourliness and philanthropic gestures in Africa in general and West Africa sub-region is nothing but disappointment.

Critics of Nigeria's foreign policy, therefore, argued that this past policy needs to change and that Nigeria needs to make its presence felt in relation to her financial, material and moral support. There are increasing concerns and strident calls among ordinary Nigerians and civil society organizations that the country must reap greater benefits from its African and foreign exertions. They would like to see the government demand more of reciprocal benefits, understanding and support from African countries, commensurate with the huge investments in materials and resources deployed in the name of African unity, solidarity, peace-keeping and development. Even some scholars have wondered why Nigeria should continue to assist from its meagre resources and in the face of its own domestic needs and challenges and with

little or no gratitude from other African countries, whose sometimes treat Nigeria with disdain, disrespect and ingratitude.

Naturally, Nigeria has the right to expect a lot of prestige in Africa and the world at large for her contributions to Africa. As the richest, largest and most powerful state in the black world, Nigeria's potential resources and elements of power are yet to be translated into manifest power and greatness. In the first four years of the fourth republic, emphasis shifted to globalism so as to restore respectability for Nigeria. Globalism was then conceived as a technique by which the country could use the international environment to grow the economy at the domestic level. The Nigerian was, however not targeted as the ultimate beneficiary as of right.

6.3.1.2 Research Question 2:

With every sense of objectivity, have Nigerian leaders lived up to expectation in articulating and achieving the nation's foreign policy objectives?

Professor Akinterinwa elucidated that the foreign policy of nations is an articulation of the totality of their international relations. This is because, nations engage in varied relations with one another in the international system and interact with both governmental and non-governmental actors in pursuit of objectives which they considered vital to their national interest. The national interests of a country are an overriding factor in determining the present, as well as future policy postures of a country. Indeed, a critical appraisal of the future of Nigeria's foreign policy could be done by examining the relationship between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours, Africa, and the major world powers. The continuity which ran through Nigeria's foreign policy since 1960 under the various governments and management of the Foreign Affairs Ministry would seem amazing for a country that had sixteen different Heads of State and governments in 53 years. In all sincerity, the country has had a relatively stable Africa policy. Nigeria's foreign policy objective of continental leadership has been achieved, but to a limited extent.

Perhaps, as a result of the natural resources endowed with Nigeria, the nation is expected to play a significant role ever before she got her independence in 1960. As soon as she was declared an independent nation, Nigeria evolved an Africa-centred foreign policy. At least three crucial areas are clearly identified as part of her priority in Africa: security functions, mouthpiece for Africa and support to liberation movement and against apartheid. And, as a

matter of fact, the involvement and performances of the country on these key principal issues has been globally acknowledged. Specifically, the deep concern and unapologetic support for independence facilitated and accelerated the disappearance of colonialism in Africa. The human and material resources were unhesitatingly and abundantly made available to Angola, Guinea – Bissau, Namibia, Rhodesia, Zambia and South Africa. In the aspect of security, related to maintenance of peace and security, Nigeria has performed creditably well and demonstrated her leadership role in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, among others. In fact, it is practically impossible to address the question of peace, without necessarily making reference to the wonderful role played by Nigeria.

6.3.1.3 Research Question 3:

Is Nigeria truly the 'Giant of Africa'? What was the rationale for Nigeria's 'Africa as centrepiece' policy in the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives?

Nigeria, despite her demographic position and advantage, as the most populous Black Country in Africa had her foreign policy making and implementation distorted as she in practice combined economic alignment with the West and political non-alignment principle. Essentially, with regard to its continental interests, Nigeria, right from independence in 1960, designated Africa as the centrepiece of her foreign policy, with the liberation of Africa's remaining colonial territories from colonialism and apartheid as the main instrument since the attainment of its status as a sovereign state in 1960, Nigeria has conducted its external relations through bilateral and multilateral relations with other players in the international arena, with strong emphasis on Africa as its foreign policy centre piece. The main rationale for this was geo-cultural and was far from being driven by articulated interest *per se*. The prosecution of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives has been undertaken without requisite diplomatic tact and political sagacity, because the country has altruistic intentions in her relations with other African states. Thus, Africa as the centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy simply means that Nigeria should identify with and defend the legitimacy of Africa collectively and individually, then it also means that Africa and African states should identify with and defend Nigeria's interest.

Nigeria does not throw its weight around by seeking to lord herself over other African countries. Instead, it has shown remarkable moderation, accommodation and restraint in its

relations with other African countries, especially her neighbours. It has never threatened them nor gone to war with any country as it seeks to assiduously maintain peaceful and friendly relations with all countries in African and the world. As a demonstration of this magnanimity and maturity towards Africa, Nigeria did not hesitate to mend fences with the three African countries and one in the Caribbean (Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania and Haiti) that granted premature recognition to the defunct State of Biafra after the Civil War of 1967 – 1970. It is consistent with Nigeria's policy of good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence that the country chose to respect and cooperate fully with the implementation of the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding its territorial dispute with Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula. If astute diplomacy, pragmatism and good statesmanship had not prevailed, it could have been otherwise, with Nigeria and Cameroon resorting to the use of force to settle the protracted conflict at enormous costs for the two countries and for African solidarity. Thus, Nigeria has faithfully implemented the Green Tree Agreement by handing over the peninsula to Cameroon on August 14, 2008. This singular act of good neighbourliness and respect for international law must be seen as a model of pacific settlement of dispute among nations.

Though, under the Murtala Mohammed /Olusegun Obasanjo regime, the word 'centrepiece' replaced 'cornerstone'. By this, foreign policy which was ideologically guided, policy makers only prioritized the foreign policy operational areas. Little attention was given to the nature and type of interests to be pursued, either within the West African sub-region or in Africa at large. There was also a little emphasis on the implementing institutions and strategies. The operational modalities were indeed, ill-defined. Political leaders, diplomats and commentators have over the years described Nigeria as the 'giant of Africa'. It is an appellation Nigeria and Nigerians are proud of has worn with pride. The people are talented, creative and immensely productive. Nigeria is also blessed and endowed with an abundance of natural resources. Nigeria is a potentially great country of very dynamic people, having all the necessary wherewithal to be actually great and be a global leader and player in international politics. Nigeria is one of the largest of the world's developing nations. It is the most populous nation in Africa with a population of over 160 million people, comprising over 400 languages and a multiplicity of cultural and religious diversity. As a matter of fact, Nigeria accounts for one – fifth of the African population: for every five Africans, one is a Nigerian. What this means is that Nigeria is the most populous country in the African continents. By implication, the huge concentration of Africans in Nigeria also means that she

has the highest concentration of black in the world; she is the number one black country of the globe. The impact of these on her foreign policy is that international actors generally believe that she is a country that cannot be ignored due to the importance still being attached to high population in contemporary international relations.

The perception of Nigeria as a leader in Africa is also based on her immense resource endowments. She is currently the highest producer of oil in Africa, has the highest deposit of natural gas. All these resources which enjoy a high global demand have enhanced the status of Nigeria as a leading nation not only in Africa but indeed, the world. There is no doubt that Nigeria has over the years maintained her Afro – centric foreign policy posture. Important fulcrums of Nigeria’s African policy essentially include providing political and material support to nationalist forces in the struggle to eliminate colonialism and white minority regimes, and the termination of apartheid in South Africa. Irrespective of regime type – civilian or military, Nigeria has also been unrelenting in its commitment to the peaceful resolution of inter-state disputes; its opposition to external intervention in African continental affairs. In the 1960s, the country played prominent role in the establishment of Organization of African Unity (OAU) and in its eventual transformation into African Union (AU) in the year 2000. Nigeria has not only acted in concert with other African states to transform the OAU into African Union (AU), but also instigated the launching of a vigorous campaign in pursuit of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

Nigeria had been committed to the promotion of regional integration, partnership with the development partners for Africa’s interest, and the deployment of technical assistance to needy countries of the Southern Hemisphere, especially African countries. Aside this, the country has had to spend huge sums of money in the numerous peace – keeping operations across the world, majorly, in Africa, and had lost men and materials in the course of such noble humanitarian engagements. It was Nigeria’s leadership and commitment that led to the establishment of the ECOMOG in 1989, which intervened to restore peace, stability and normalcy to Liberia and Sierra Leone. Following the military coup in Mali in April 2012 and the threatened disintegration of the country by the rebels from the north, Nigeria provided the leadership and was the second largest troop contributing country. In recent past, Nigeria’s intervention in Guinea Bissau, Togo, Sao Tome and Principe was decisive in bringing peace and avoiding war in those countries. In actual fact, peace in Africa without Nigeria’s intervention or a direct Nigeria’s contribution is a mirage.

6.3.1.4 Research Question 4:

Why is it that most countries in Africa that had been supported or assisted by Nigeria to get independence or to restore peace in their countries are now demonstrating ungrateful attitude towards her?

Ever since independence in 1960, Nigeria has played her part as a true brother's keeper, supporting the oppressed and defending the rights of African citizens throughout the continent. The Nigerian leaders have unhesitatingly provided aid, resources and support to various African nations, inter – governmental organizations and economic institutions whenever and wherever the need arises. Surely, acts of this nature should warrant accolades of praises and admiration, not to mention respect and influence within the continent. Unfortunately, Nigeria has not been well – acknowledged for all her contributions towards the development of the continent.

Particularly, issues such as the deportation of lawful Nigerian citizens, lack of support in various intergovernmental organizations and a total disregard on the international scene signifies the act of ungratefulness on the part of some Africa leaders. In recent past, the scuttling of Nigeria's unanimous election into the UN Security Council in 2010 by Guinea which absented itself and by Liberia, Togo and Sierra Leone which voted against Nigeria are but a few of the issues and challenges that confronted Nigeria as a nation. Paradoxically, these are countries which at one time or the other benefited from Nigeria's generosity and in some cases, peace – keeping operations to prevent their collapse. Along the same lines, Nigerians have often been treated harshly by several countries to which Nigeria has extended various kinds of assistance, particularly, South Africa.

Many scholars argued that the assaults are not unexpected as Nigeria's foreign policy has been inconsistent and incoherent, lacking the clarity to make other countries know where the country stand in matters of international concern to enable other countries relate with her with utmost seriousness. In addition to that, unclear and inconsistent definition of national interests, the issues of misplaced priorities, that is, foreign policy does not reflect the domestic realities, insincerity of the foreign policy makers; lack of consultation among the diverse groups of the country; and insensitivity of Nigerian political leaders to respond effectively to changes in the international system consequentially crippled the expected respect by other African countries.

6.3.1.5 Research Question 5:

In what ways and manners did the Cold War influence the formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy? What kind of changes does the Nigerian government need to situate Nigeria's foreign policy in proper context after the Cold War era?

Foreign policy is a very dynamic process. It is often a product of continuous interaction between the domestic and external environment based on the national interest of a state, which describes those things that the state wants to achieve, maintain and protect vis-à-vis other states. The conduct and administration of a state's foreign policy is governed by its national interests, especially the core and secondary ones. While core interests refer to these critical values of the state that are non – negotiable and cannot be compromised, secondary interests are values that are subject to negotiation and compromise.

The Cold War was the major defining character of the international system at the time of Nigeria's independence in 1960. Part of the factor that facilitated the independence at this period was the effort of both the Eastern and Western blocs whose explicit drive was to control the international environment. Prior to the independence struggle, the two have been involved in ideological warfare which metamorphosed into the intense 'Cold War'. This environment thereby created about two distinct principles of foreign policy namely: the alignment and non-alignment or neutrality. These two encompassed those who were on either side and those on neither side, who made independent judgment of situations irrespective of which of the blocs was favoured or not. In a significant manner, this influenced the formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy.

Nonetheless, the collapse of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s signalled a paradigm change in international relations and global diplomacy in all its dimensions. The post-Cold War era was very challenging. The United States as only dominant and unrivalled power firmly established her hegemony in the world, solely based on unipolarity. There is no doubt, that given the objective realities of Nigeria's present situation, the challenges are many. In the first place, the strategic objectives to be pursued are yet to be well articulated even as dramatic changes have occurred in the international scene. The challenge for Nigeria's foreign policy is that how can Nigeria take advantage of the international environment more than ever before in redressing domestic problems? Some aspects of Nigeria's foreign policy

objectives that are fiercely challenged by the emergence of unipolarity are those most vital to any sovereign independent nations. Nigeria should respond to the challenges of unipolarity in a manner that represents the totality of Nigerian foreign policy objectives.

Nigeria, as a potential sub-regional power or as an aspiring regional power, feels challenged in her pursuit to articulate the vital national interests of African countries. This is because most of the problems associated with the world today are no longer limited to continent, but the global world, which ultimately needs a global solution or attention: security problems, climate change, poverty and the globalization of terrorism. Indeed, the speed at which the world politics is changing and the level of integration focus just on Africa will be dangerous in the future. Thus, Nigeria needs to ensure that its foreign policy is dynamic enough to face the challenges and reap the benefits occasioned by the evolving international system. In other words, Nigeria needs to review its foreign policy to seriously address some of these new global realities.

It is every evident that there are many challenges facing the pursuit and attainment of Nigeria's national interest. Perhaps, the most visible of these challenges is the unsatisfactory nature of the domestic environment. One major problem that has been militating against cohesive national development is policy inconsistency. Every successive government has a development agenda that takes a little or no account of what had been done before it. Consequently, whenever a government is ousted or voted out of power, its policies and agenda are also ignored completely. In the area of foreign policy making and implementation, the situation is not that different. Nigeria's foreign policy attitude should no longer be predicated on general principles. It should be henceforth country – specific. African brotherliness or good neighbourliness should be of general application subject to the rule of reciprocity.

Nigeria's foreign policy attitude should be predicated on a modified conception of stick and carrot rule; that is, about using what one has to get what is needed. In other words, it is about the rule of giving and taking, on the one hand and ensuring 'taking and giving' in return, on the other. Better still, giving goes with conditionalities. Nigeria's assistance must go with conditionalities. Simply, the foreign policy of 'good neighbourliness' must be replaced with that of reciprocity. Nigeria must give, but at the same time, be resolute in making sure all nations that receive her support and friendship behave themselves and do the same for Nigeria and Nigerians when the need arises.

Importantly, however, emphasis should be placed on ‘the Nigerian’ as the ultimate beneficiary of Nigeria’s foreign policy endeavours, making Nigeria’s environment more conducive to the development of national capacity to meet the challenges of the current international conditions. Again, the main solution to Nigeria’s foreign policy debacle, however, lies with its economic plan. No nation can ever achieve global recognition and prominence without first sorting out its economic and security issues at home. Thus, Nigeria’s foreign policy must be backed by a strong and vibrant economy. The world is changing and for Nigeria to compete favourably with any nation in the world, Nigerian leaders must put the economy to follow the trend of dynamism and prevent over reliance and dependence on oil. This has been observed by several scholars, who have argued that the country’s over – dependence on crude oil for more than 90percent of the state revenue as well as getting about 80 percent of the state Gross Domestic Product (GPD) from the same source is dangerous.

Another challenge facing the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy is that over the years, there has been an increasing decline in the level of input and participation from the Nigerian public on defining what should be the national interest. To be sure, some efforts typified in all the Nigerian foreign policy conferences, had been made in the past to open the country’s foreign policy to inputs from ordinary Nigerians through debates and consultation. However, the last of such conference was held in 1986. As a matter of urgency, the Nigerians particularly, the diplomats and the intellectuals in Nigerian universities need to be consulted on some critical areas so as to fashion out a lasting and enduring foreign policy for the nation. Consultation on international affairs and foreign policy is crucial to effective leadership.

6.4 INTERPRETATION OF INDEPTH INTERVIEWS

Qualitative method was used to analyse the primary and secondary data which were sourced from Focus Group Discussion and In-depth Interviews. The analysis of the data was carried out in line with the research questions and the areas of agreement and disagreement on the respondent’s views were juxtaposed and sieved. The interpretations of the data based on the analyses are as reflected below:

The Five Research Questions were broken down into twenty questions for the In-depth Interviews i.e. each research question has four questions and the level of understanding or respondents to the questions are analysed below:

i. 6.4.1 Research Question 1:

What is your objective assessment of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence in 1960?

TABLE 6.4.1

S/N	Question	Deep understanding by respondents / positive response	Poor or low understanding of respondents / negative response
1.	What is your assessment of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence in 1960?	28	5
2.	In a specific term, what is the content of national interest in the structure of Nigeria's foreign policy?	16	17
3.	Why has it been difficult to shift the pattern and structure of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence in 1960?	20	13
4.	With every sense of objectivity, have Nigerian leaders lived up to expectation in articulating and achieving the nation's foreign policy objectives?	17	16

As shown in table 1 above, the level of understanding of respondents were ascertained in respect of the formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy. The table shows that 28 out of 33 respondents representing 84.8percent understand and were able to explain in detail the impacts of Nigeria's foreign policy implementation since independence. However, only about 49% could adequately explain the challenges that incapacitated the Nigerian leaders in the formulation and implementation of a vibrant and robust foreign policy. While 60percent responded positively in the implementation, about 40percent believe that Nigeria has not pursue her core national interest vigorously in the implementation of the foreign policy. Respondents were almost equally divided on what should constitute the content of the

national interest, particularly in a globalized world: economy, security, migration, climate change and so on. The response was 51.5percent to 48.5percent respectively. The above analyses show a high level of understanding of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives.

6.4.2 Research Question 2

With every sense of objectivity, have Nigerian leaders lived up to expectation in articulating and achieving the nation’s foreign policy objectives?

TABLE 6.4.2

S/N	Question	Deep understanding by respondents / positive response	Poor or low understanding of respondents / negative response
1.	What is the impacts of the military in the pursuance and implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy?	29	4
2.	Who among the Nigerian leaders, past and present, would you consider the best in terms of determined effort to pursue Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives?	24	9
3.	What critical areas have governments, past and present, performed credibility well in the implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy?	21	12
4.	What was the rationale for Nigeria’s “Africa as centrepiece policy” in the formulation of Nigeria’s foreign policy?	30	3

Table two describes the attitudes and behaviours of Nigerian leaders in the effective formulation and implementation of Nigeria’s foreign policy. 29 respondents representing about 89percent believe that Nigerian leaders have failed to live up to expectation in the pursuance of aggressive foreign policy objectives for Nigeria. About 72.73percent sufficiently advances reasons for this failure. About 33.36percent are of the opinion that it was the founding fathers that failed to define appropriately the content of Nigeria’s national interest within the context of the foreign policy. While the remaining 63.3percent believe that it is the total failure of the succeeding regimes and administration not necessarily the fault of the founding fathers. The divergent opinions show a high level of understanding on the impacts of Nigerian leaders in the articulation and implementation of robust foreign policy objectives. About 90percent of the respondents gave suggestions on the way forward in achieving vibrant and robust foreign policy objectives.

6.4.3 Research Question 3

Is Nigeria truly the “Giant of Africa”? What was the rationale for Nigeria’s “Africa as centrepiece” policy in the formulation of Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives?

TABLE 6.4.3

S/N	Question	Deep understanding by respondents / positive response	Poor or low understanding of respondents / negative response
1.	What are the critical factors, considered to be militating against the formulation and implementation of a robust Nigeria’s foreign policy?	23	10
2.	Why is it difficult for world powers to admit Nigeria as permanent members of the Security Council in the United Nations?	26	7

3.	What factors would you consider as hindrance to the achievement of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives both in Africa and on the global arena?	30	3
4.	Why is it that most countries that were supported and assisted to get independence by Nigeria are now demonstrating ungrateful attitude towards her?	19	14

The response of those interviewed on the rationale for Nigeria's "Africa as Centerpiece" policy in the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives shows that 23 out of them believe that the international system is challenging. This represents about 69.7 percent, others (30.3 percent), do not really align with the challenges of the international system. In the same token, 26 respondents (78.78 percent), posit that there are serious challenges for Nigeria in her formulation, pursuance and implementation of a robust and vibrant foreign policy. About 90.9 percent gave very insightful suggestions on how Nigeria can assert her influence despite these overwhelming challenges. Many of the respondents were sceptical of their acceptability of their suggestions as only 57.58 percent believe that their recommendations would work, while about 42.42 percent were not sure of the effectiveness of their recommendations in ensuring the formulation and implementation of a robust foreign policy. But, it was unanimously agreed that, there is no corresponding benefit for this pride.

6.4.4 Research Question 4

Why is it that most countries in Africa that had been supported or assisted by Nigeria to gain independence or to restore peace in their countries are now demonstrating ungrateful attitude towards her?

TABLE 6.4.4

S/N	Question	Deep understanding by respondents / positive response	Poor or low understanding of respondents / negative response
1.	Today, a country like South Africa which was heavily supported by Nigeria to defeat the apartheid policy is doing better than Nigeria in world affairs. What factors could have been responsible for this development?	28	5
2.	In what ways and manners did the Cold War influence the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy in the past?	27	6
3.	Does globalization play any role in determining the success or failure of Nigeria's foreign policy?	20	13
4.	Has there been any radical change(s) in Nigeria's foreign policy since the advent of globalization?	18	15

The majority of respondents believe that Nigeria has played her part in Africa as a true brother's keeper. More than 84 percent of respondents understood the role Nigeria has significantly played in Africa as a whole, some of the remaining 24 percent do not understand the considerable degree of impact, while a few conservative ones do not appreciate that

Nigeria has played a significant role at all. 28 of the 33 respondents believe that Nigeria has tremendously and positively impacted on the entire African continent, but about 18 percent do not see this as a serious challenge.

20 respondents (60.6 percent) gave some suggestions / recommendations towards achieving a sustainable and robust foreign policy formulation and implementation, while 39 percent were not sure of the way forward. This gives room for serious concern which this study addresses. Of the 33 respondents, 54.6 percent identified what could be done for the effective formulation and implementation of foreign policy in Nigeria, while 45.5 percent could hardly offer any serious or radical suggestion(s) on the formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy.

6.4.5 Research question 5:

In what ways and manners did the Cold War influence the formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy? What kind of changes does the Nigerian government needs to situate Nigeria's foreign policy in proper context after the Cold War era?

TABLE 6.4.5

S/N	Question	Deep understanding by respondents / positive response	Poor or low understanding of respondents / negative response
1.	To what extent has Nigeria's foreign policy been able to effectively and efficiency respond to external pressure and dynamism brought about by globalization?	27	6
2.	What kind of change does the Nigeria government needs to postulate in putting Nigeria's foreign policy in proper context after the Cold War era?	17	16

3.	What is the impact of country's political economy, the character of the state or the world view of its ruling elite in the formulation of a vibrant foreign policy?	25	8
4.	What are the factors that incapacitated Nigeria "as a great, giant and hope of Africa, to realize its manifest destiny as espoused by the founding fathers?"	31	2

81.81 percent of respondents made useful recommendation on the needs for Nigerian government to situate appropriately Nigeria's foreign policy in proper context after the Cold War era. This group of people majorly laid the blame on the Nigerian government failure to respond to the demands, pressures and influences of the international system. A little over 50 percent believe that Nigeria can maximize its benefit. 48.48 percent do not align with this view.

25 respondents made suggestions / recommendations for effective formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy. 25 percent of the respondents either did not know the implications or the negative impacts of globalization or do not have a deep insight of what could be done.

Almost all the respondents (93.94 percent) believe that Nigeria, as a giant country in Africa, needs to look inward and ensure that her foreign policy is refocused and reformulated to respond effectively to the demands of contemporary realities. Only 6.06 percent did not offer serious suggestions for effective and robust formulation and implementations of Nigeria's foreign policy.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

7.0 SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE

7.1 SUMMARY

Nigeria's adventure into the global arena began with its attainment of independence on 1st October, 1960. A major defining characteristic of the international system at the outset of Nigeria's independence which influenced tremendously the evolutionary trend and development of its foreign policy was the cold war between the capitalist west and the communist east. The end of the cold war has resulted in a fundamental change in the dynamics of contemporary international politics. Developing countries, like Nigeria, with oil wealth, a large army and a large pool of well-educated citizens are now expected to play a leadership role in Africa, owing partly to the reduced strategic significance of the continent to the major external powers. But, Nigeria has failed to respond to this challenge.

It has been established that there has been no continuity in Nigeria's foreign policy because each leader implements his own ideas thereby making it difficult to define Nigeria's national interest that can respond appropriately to the global reality. However, while the makers and executors of Nigeria's foreign policy appear to be committed to responding to demands, pressures and influences from the external environment, they need to respond appropriately to domestic demands, pressures and influences.

Against this background of Nigeria's main challenge at the end of the Cold War era, the main issue that arises is about how to redefine its foreign policy objectives to take full cognizance of the changing world order. With the country's valuable experience as a relatively independent actor in world affairs in the 1970s coupled with its enormous human and material resources, Nigeria's role remained pivotal in efforts to make Africa a full partner in the promotion of a truly new and all-inclusive world order. This was clearly demonstrated through the country's contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. Indeed, under the regimes of General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993) and Sani Abacha (1993-1998), Nigeria made great contributions to one of the fundamental objectives of the UN charter of 1945 – the maintenance of international peace and security – through the instrumentality of ECOMOG in the West African sub-region.

However, the main foreign policy challenge for Nigeria's post-1999 civilian administrations remains the urgent need for a clearer definition and more vigorous defence of Nigeria's national interest. This calls for the elaboration of an unambiguous foreign policy agenda in which the roles of the executive and legislative arms of government are clearly defined in consonance with the country's constitutional provisions. The foreign ministry – Nigeria's primary foreign policy instrument – needs to be better managed while the personnel need to be better trained and better motivated so as to enhance its capability to produce well-thought out, well-articulated and well implemented external positions for the government's consideration. As Ibrahim Gambari has argued, despite the military and economic clout of the Great Powers during the Cold War, even small and weak states were able to exercise some influence in the international system. This fundamental truth has not changed, even in the face of the unipolar moment of the post-Cold War era, and growing concerns about America's unilateralism. Many of the challenges facing international system continue to defy purely national solutions. It is in this context that since its independence in October 1960, Nigeria has played an important role in the international relations of Africa.

Given the complexity of the unipolar world order, Nigeria, the large, dynamic and the most populated black nation in the globe, has an important role to play in the international system. Though, she has to struggle for relevance in the emerging order to be able to overcome a situation in which she will be faced by similar disadvantage she witnessed from the former order. Hence, it was observed that the tussle for the creation of the new world order influenced the intensification of regional bodies in the international system, all in an effort to build polycentric blocs to counter America's unipolar ambition. In view of this, it can be observed that, despite the efforts by these bodies, the international system cannot be said to be totally polycentric or unipolar as both have continued to feature in the international system. Thus, it can be safely asserted that Nigeria's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era is in response to the tussle for a new world order though it is further argued that Nigeria intensified regional integration measure in Africa in which the countries are building up polycentric blocs to counter United States' dominance.

Over the last two decades, the phenomenon of globalization, whether real or illusory, has captured public imagination. In an epoch of profound and unsettling global changes in which traditional ideologies and grand theories appear to offer little vouchsafe on the world, the idea of globalization has acquired the mantle of a new paradigm. Called upon to account for developments as diverse as the value of the euro, the worldwide popularity of Star Wars, the

rise of the Third Way politics and religious fundamentalism, the discourse of globalization seems to offer a convincing analysis of the contemporary human predicament. As with the idea of modernization, which acquired intellectual primacy primarily within the social sciences during the 1960s, so today the notion of globalization has become the leitmotif of our age. Although media references to globalization have become common over the last two decades, the concept itself can be traced back to a much earlier period. Its origins lie in the work of many nineteenth and early twentieth century intellectuals, from sociologists such as Saint-Simon to students of geo-politics such as Mackinder, who recognized how modernity was integrating the world.

This research has critically examined conceptions pertaining to the various actors that play determinant roles in international relations, focusing more sharply on the state as the main actor in these relations. If states are indeed the key actors in international relations, it becomes quite obvious that a crucial task for analysis and theoretical work lies in the elucidation of the dynamic processes that constitute the basis of the exchanges that define inter-state relations or interactions – complex, multitude, and, in our highly interdependent world, essentially continual – constitute the domain of foreign policy. If we may define foreign policy very schematically as those actions of a state that are designed to achieve particular objectives involving other actors beyond the state's own boundaries, it is clear that the foreign policies of states are the sinews of international relations. Globalization thus describes a process of transition towards the integrated global society and away from a cluster of merely internationalized societies. Accordingly, globalization can also be seen as a process which reduced the significance of national societies thus calling into question the distinction between domestic and foreign relations. In this view, the living conditions of people and local communities have changed through globalization; distant events of all sorts have immediate consequences not only for states but for individuals' daily lives. Nigeria's foreign policy since independence was visionarily projected and rhetorically pronounced but lacked ideological perspective for effective implementation that will yield expected dividends to the citizens that ought to have benefitted immensely from these foreign policies most especially in this era of hard earned democratic rule. Current economic diplomacy of interdependence is basically dependent politics that originated from capitalism and capitalist expansion. The collapse of the communist Soviet Union has given way to the United States' hegemonic capitalist regime to start ravaging the world through economic diplomacy because military option is very dangerous, expensive and not necessary.

Economic diplomacy, it must be stated, creates economic dependency (not interdependence). For instance, Nigeria with large quantity of arable land does not need to import so much food. According to The Guardian newspaper edition of June 6, 2002, Nigeria spent N180 billion on food importation annually. This was money taken out of Nigerian farmers to foreign farmers. Therefore, interdependence is not a 'cure' but a 'curse' that can worsen the economic condition of a state. International relations and politics of globalised era played by industrialized Western capitalist nations is 'real-politics' that is strategically based on a clear-cut ideological paradigm of economic advantages and national interest. The foreign policy of this era of ascendance to economic power is ultimate but military might, and can be used to induce, intimidate or coerce weaker nation's economic alliance or subordination.

Nigeria's foreign policy during the period under review (1993-2013) is externally influenced because politics of globalization is based on global governance that promotes liberal ideology of free trade, unfettered financial flows, direct investment and other objectives advocated by Western industrialized states. These are implemented by the Nigeria's government (a satellite state) in order to reduce involvement of state in economic production through privatization thereby opened ways for powerful industrialized state to influence domestic policy direct or indirectly. Therefore state has lost control over trans-border transactions to market forces and constant intervention of powerful states on the territories weak states.

Nigeria's foreign policy is externally determined because it is as a result metropolitan international economic relations that propelled Nigeria's foreign economic relations (tagged Economic Diplomacy and Reciprocal Order), thus Nigeria lacks coherent and clear-cut ideological perspective on which its foreign policy is practically based in terms of formulation, focus, vision implementation. Rather, it is basically ad-hoc approach or response based on the perception of the political elite in power. This makes Nigeria's foreign policy of personal interests wrapped in the clothes of national interests. It is obvious that Nigeria's foreign policy is not static, rather it is a dynamic process that is greatly influenced by both domestic and external environment which depends on 'situation' to 'situation' which makes Nigeria's foreign policy to South Africa in the era of apartheid different from the present situation where South-Africa has embraced multiracial democracy. The present economic realities call for economic cooperation rather than unhealthy competition. 'Country to country' indicates that Nigeria's foreign policy to big and powerful nations is more

considerate compared to weak nations without capacity.

Nigeria's foreign policy since inception from contemporary time is a matter of continuity and change. Foreign policy thrust like concentric relations was moved by Prof Ibrahim Gambari of Buhari era while economic diplomacy was prominent under Babangida regime. But Reciprocal Order and state intervention in internal affairs of a sovereign state are new developments contrary to non-intervention of the earlier republics. The main concern of the present economic diplomacy for Nigeria like any typical globalised satellite state is increase in trade and international or foreign financial flows to the country to rekindle the almost collapsed domestic economy. Although the international economic (diplomacy) relations are yielding some dividends but this does not trickle down to the citizens. Because most of the cash that came in only leave as capital flight due to the fact that transfer technology that Nigeria is building is not home-grown rather it is import-substituted. This consumed the benefit realized back to the western industrialized world. To cope with globalised economy, Nigeria adopted its own home grown multinational conglomerate known as Transcorp (Transnational Corporation) which is an amorphous of Nigerian elites in different sectors of economy.

Forced liberalization of economy opened Nigeria's market to foreign trade causing a flood of Western food, clothes, drinks and other domestic household items in Nigeria market at a price levels that are unaffordable on one hand and discourage competition on the other. This makes western producers to prosper at the expense of Nigerian producers. Saliu (1999:53) submits that the new economic diplomacy is implementation of the class project of the dominant faction of the domestic ruling class in alliance with imperialism but in a manner that reflects increasing dominance of interest of the latter. Nigeria is widely exposed through trade investment and finance to industrial capitalist economies and there is no concrete effort to protect the national economic interest with any practical policies. Because globalization has reduced the power of the Nigerian state, its only concern has been with how to move with the tide of metropolitan economic agenda as designed by multilateral institutions. As it is, the Nigerian state is gradually surrounded by several agencies from Europe and America like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United State Agency for International Development (USAID), International Republican Institute (IRI), National Democratic Institute (NDI), the British Department of International Development (DFID) and several International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and Foundations who serve as marketing agents

for their principals. These NGOs are the new foot soldiers of global capital in the era of globalization.

Globalization has reduced the power of the Nigerian state not only over its domestic affairs but importantly over Trans-National Corporations and Multilateral Agencies. They have grown in influence due to resources at their disposal as well as political power and protection given by Western powers. Our weak and mono-cultural economy further raises their power to churn out policy offerings on economic reforms, good governance and due process which are emanating from international donor agencies. Although the major cause of marginalization of the legislature is rooted in the calibre of the legislators, most of whom lack cumulative experience and knowledge necessary and essential for effective legislative capacity in the conduct of foreign affairs. Related to this is the perennial antagonistic posture that characterized Executive-Legislature relations which did not allow them allocate proper time for foreign policy development. Frequent changes of National Assembly committees and leaderships greatly affect the dominance of the executive in matters of foreign affairs and relations. This situation usually allows any strong and experienced leader like President Obasanjo to shoulder more than his fair share of the responsibility for directing the nation's foreign policy.

President Olusegun Obasanjo's foreign policy, it must be emphasised, re-awakened Nigeria's position of reckoning in the international arena but the major problem that arose was the sad reality that the citizenry were not carried along. Therefore, his foreign policy recorded more success stories abroad than at home. This is because despite reconceptualising Nigeria foreign policy thrust, it, all the same, lacked coherent ideological perspective that can be used as a yardstick to mobilize citizens' support. Thus, while the then democratically elected leader was striving to strengthen good governance, reduce corruption, build robust economy and resolve international crises and tension, he failed in successfully addressing critical national questions including the Niger Delta crisis.

It was observed in this research that since a state's role on the international stage cannot be divorced from its domestic progress, this propelled Nigeria to change the focus of her foreign policy from diplomatic Santa Claus to the new economic relations (economic diplomacy) in which Nigeria's flag must follow where her grants and aids go. For instance, Nigeria has reviewed her political asylum offers. Besides, though Africa still remains the cornerstone of Nigeria's foreign policy, some pragmatic changes occurred of non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign state as it can be seen in the cases of Sao

Tome & Principe and Togo Republic. As a result, Nigeria's foreign policy thrust has been shifted from an African-centred one to a globally focused one. This makes Nigeria's current foreign policy perspective to be essentially Africa focused at the political level but globally centered at the economic level. Therefore, Nigeria now emphasises economy to the detriment of political consideration. This globalised foreign policy has endeared Nigeria to spearhead the development of global, continental and regional governance such as African Union, ECOWAS as well as her support for the restructuring of the United Nations to give other regions permanent seats in the Security Council.

It must, however, be stressed that Nigeria's avowed 'Africa as the centre-piece' policy has never been abandoned. Nigeria has worked and still continues to work with other African countries to produce home grown solutions to African problems which led to the establishment of, among others, New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD). In order to pursue good governance in Africa, Nigeria became instrumental to the introduction of the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APPRM) where African leaders peer review themselves on political, economic and socio-economic policies and programmes. Globalised foreign policy had tremendous impact on trade and investment promotions. Among other benefits, Nigeria has succeeded in re-establishing air link with United States, had agreement on Investment Promotions and Protection Agreement (IPPA) with Germany, concluded Trade Agreement with India and many other countries which are partially yielding dividends. These efforts prompted the establishment of Joint Economic Partnership Committees with USAID where Ex-Im Bank of the U.S. sponsored programmes to assist in rehabilitating Nigeria's defence establishment.

What's more, Nigeria has played prominent role in peace making in Africa in general and West Africa sub-region most especially. In such far flung places as Sudan (Darfur region), Liberia, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, Sao Tome & Principe and others, Nigeria facilitated the signing of peace agreements between governments and other forces which paved way for government of national unity being formed in some of these countries or despotic leaders, such as Liberia's Charles Taylor, removed through diplomatic means or illegitimate means of ascension to power were reversed in favour of constitutional rule as it happened in Togo when the illegitimate government of Faure Gnassingbe was diplomatically pressurized to legitimize his rule by conducting elections while all opposition parties were allowed to be involved.

Nigeria's foreign policy, over time, seriously engaged the promotion of coalition strategy/mega diplomacy as a major plank of constructive engagement in which Nigeria through the collective efforts of the OAU and G77 met with G8 in Japan in July 2000 to find positive solutions to African crises. There had been considerable increase in bilateral relations now being strengthened and diversified. For instance, Nigeria signed a bilateral agreement with Morocco in 2000. Besides, pacts were signed with both Iran and Saudi Arabia to stabilise the oil market as well as for deepening scientific and technical cooperation. Similar pacts were signed with Japan, China, Sao Tome & Principe, Canada, Cuba, Britain, France and Brazil.

During this period under review, multilateral cooperation was pursued in which Nigeria became an active member of G77. As the chairman of G77, Nigeria became a prominent player in the field of multilateral negotiations on such important global issues as trade, finance and monetary matter by which she was able to use her diplomatic effort to prevent a repeat of Seattle violence in Bangkok, Thailand. This spirit of Bangkok paved way for the first ever South-South summit held in Havana Cuba from April 10-14 2006 where President Obasanjo was chairman from where the principles of a 'Fairer Global Order' was initiated.

It was observed rather regrettably, that in all these, little inputs were derived from academics, intelligentsia and carrier diplomats. Thus, the majority of inputs taken were the preferred objectives and interests of the President.

7.2 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

1. Nigeria's foreign policies were articulated immediately after it achieved sovereign nationhood in 1960. At independence, Nigeria's foreign policy was specifically designed to be an instrument of national development and particularly to facilitate the political objective of leadership in African affairs. Political leaders and the elite in general wanted Nigeria to be Africa's leader and also an African leader to be reckoned with in global affairs. However, Nigeria's foreign policy since independence, with the exception of the vibrant Murtala/Obasanjo era in 1970s, has generally remained lacklustre, docile and unimaginative characterized as it has been, by moderation, caution, indecision, and timidity. In other words, the country's foreign policy over the years has been quite epileptic. This is largely due to the myriad of military coups and constant shifts in power

and leadership though this has been refined in the course of time by various administrations.

2. The robust conduct of Nigerian foreign policy is being hampered by the deplorable conditions of Nigerian Mission abroad. Poor funding has been the bane of the 106 Mission that the country has overseas. Rents are hardly settled as at when due, allowance are hardly paid on time and adequate and efficient mobility can hardly be associated with the mission. Lack of proper coordination is evident and long standing in the conduct of the country's foreign policy. There are diplomatic issues arising from the unguarded statements of government officials on foreign matters and sometimes undiplomatic behavior on the part of the accredited officials on foreign policy.
3. For a country that has had sixteen Heads of State and governments in 53 years since independence, Nigeria has had a relatively stable African policy. Nigeria's primary foreign policy objective of continental leadership has been achieved to a limited extent. At least three crucial areas are clearly identified as part of Nigeria's priority in Africa: security functions, mouthpiece for Africa and support to liberation movement and against apartheid. And, a matter of fact, the involvement and performances of the country on these key principal issues has been globally acknowledged.
4. Since the attainment of its status as a sovereign state in 1960, Nigeria has conducted its external relations through bilateral and multilateral relations with other players in the international arena, with strong emphasis on Africa as its foreign policy centrepiece. The main rationale for this was, however, geo-cultural and was far from being driven by articulated interest *per se*. Africa as the centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy simply means that Nigeria should identify with and defend the legitimacy of Africa collectively and individually. Nigeria does not throw its weight around by seeking to lord herself over other African countries. Instead, it has shown remarkable moderation, accommodation and restraint in its relations with other African countries, especially her neighbours. It has never threatened them nor gone to war with any country as it seeks to assiduously maintain peaceful and friendly relations with all countries in African and the world.
5. Political leaders, diplomats and commentators have over the years described Nigeria as the "Giant of Africa". It is an appellation Nigeria has worn with pride. Its size is

intimidating, its population surpasses many sub-Saharan African countries combined. The people are talented, creative and immensely productive. Nigeria is also blessed and endowed with an abundance of natural resources. There is no doubt that Nigeria has over the years maintained her Afro-centric foreign policy posture. She has used her endowments to further the cause of Africa in many laudable ways as the continent's *prima inter pares*.

6. Paradoxically, the countries which at one time or the other benefited from Nigeria's generosity and in some cases peace-keeping operations to prevent their collapse have often treated Nigerians harshly. Scholars argue that the unclear and inconsistent definition of Nigeria's national interests, the issue of misplaced priorities, insincerity of the foreign policy makers, lack of consultation among the diverse people of the country and insensitivity of Nigerian political leaders to respond effectively to changes in the international system consequentially crippled the expected respect by other African countries.
7. The Cold War was the major defining character of the international system at the time of Nigeria's independence in 1960. Nigeria, despite her demographic position and advantage, as the most populous Black Country in Africa had her foreign policy making and implementation distorted as she in practice combined economic alignment with the West and political non-alignment.
8. Nigeria needs to ensure that its foreign policy is dynamic enough to face the challenges and reap the benefits occasioned by the evolving international system. In other words, Nigeria needs to review its foreign policy to seriously address some of these new global realities. Besides, Nigeria's foreign policy attitude should no longer be predicated on general principles. It should be henceforth be driven by clearly defined national interests and country-specific. African brotherliness or good neighbourliness should be of general application subject to the rule of reciprocity. What's more, Nigeria's foreign policy must be backed by a strong, vibrant and diversified economy.

7.3 CONCLUSION

The continuity which runs through Nigeria's foreign policy since independence in 1960 under the various governments would seem amazing for country that has had twelve different heads of state and government in 51 years. In reality, the country has had a relatively stable Africa policy, if there were any noticeable changes at all; these were not with the basic policy orientation, but rather with the intensity and capacity with which each leader tried to implement this policy. Nigeria, no doubt, possesses the necessary potentials as well as institutional structures needed to formulate a vibrant foreign policy. The research, therefore, concludes that, for Nigeria to play her role in the era of globalization, she needs to assert herself as a continental power through the formulation and implementation of a robust and vibrant foreign policy. It is only this that can ensure domestic wellbeing, regional acknowledgment, continental leadership and global respect.

Globalised economy and politics do not provide level playing ground for independent sovereign states. The developed states that are not indebted to Bretton Wood institutions (World Bank/IMF) have proved that they have no obligation to open their market to African goods. Thus charge high tariffs on foreign goods and grant subsidies to their own producers. For instance, in May 2001, President Bush signed a Bill that gave American farmers subsidies of \$190 billion for the following ten years. European countries also grant high subsidies to their farmers. But in African countries like Nigeria, this new Bill means that Nigeria's farmers (products) will not be able to compete with the cheap agricultural goods both at home and abroad. This forced liberalization versus close economies of the western states which degenerated into problem between Nigeria government and IMF over economic programme in March 2002, when Nigeria threat to withdraw, before politics of debt reschedule and forgiveness were dangled before her.

So far, it is clear that, Nigeria's economic structure and external trade remain largely capitalist and pro-West, hence; Nigeria is unlikely to be able to pursue truly non-aligned and sustainable radical policies abroad. What is responsible for ensuring more continuity than change in Nigeria's domestic and foreign policy orientations is the existence of the relatively loose group which has consistently exercised powerful influence on government since independence. Thus, while those who are installed in public offices through elections or military coups may change from time to time those groups who exercised real power in Nigeria's foreign relations have not.

The foreign policy of Obasanjo administration was compelled by prevailing circumstances both domestic (dwindling economy) and external factors (globalisation). The commitment to recapture the lost glory that set in due to the annulment of June 12 presidential election and Abacha's glorious regime as well as the need to maintain minimum power relations caused some changes in the Fourth Republic's foreign policy thrust. Although the regime was deliberate in perception and conduct of foreign policy but it lack the desired input from the critical segment of the Nigerian society, namely: the National Assembly, academic and the intelligentsia. This made most of their rational and deliberately calculated objectives and interests to favour the capitalists and their agents rather than the Nigerian citizenry. The regime did its best in the critical period to channel its energy to basic problems of domestic economy even though it tied this to capitalist tenets. This had positive impact on international economic relations of Nigeria and other African states, and Third World countries. This was a positive foundation laid for future Nigeria's foreign policy to claim expected African leadership status in the comity of nations in the international system.

It can be concluded that Nigeria should work towards creating a stable investment climate that will enhance economic and technological development that will position her in the region and make her a regional power at the global stage. It will be more imaginary than real to claim the status of a regional power without a sound economic capability. Hence, more effort should be exerted towards achieving the dream of an African Economic Commission and West Africa Common Market, as these will not only create a larger market for Nigeria but also allow Africa to measure up with the current trend in international relations where the European Union has established common market and military capability. This, it was argued will create room for an improved negotiating power in the international arena and further improve Nigeria's peace keeping capability within the region.

7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

The task of rehabilitating Nigerian foreign policy must, of necessity, begin with a comprehensive review. In this regard, the objectives, strategies or instruments of implementing the foreign policy must be reviewed to bring the policy up to the modern realities. Against the background of Nigerian leaders' penchant for churning out foreign policies that have no ideological direction and programmes and which have always been characterised by narrow focus, abstract facts, trivial details and empty and irrelevant rhetoric, Nigeria should have an

all-out ideological paradigm that will encompass more on the domestic benefit from a given foreign policy thrust. The National Interest on which our foreign policy is to be based should be coherent, scientific and capable of unifying the citizens for domestic support.

Therefore, Nigeria's foreign policy should be more practical, flexible, realistic and pragmatic rather than the current system where it is considered more of an administrative routine and political ritual. The policy must be closely coordinated and geared toward renegotiating the terms of participation of foreign capital in Nigerian and African economy; reducing the repatriation of funds; encouraging the procurement of technology; harnessing external resources to the industrialization of the economy; ensuring balanced economic relations that will enhance economic independence and strengthening domestic economy.

More efforts should be made to seek the support and co-opt those in the academia mostly in the disciplines of international relations and foreign policy to generate better ideas that will assist in fashioning out and formulating coherent foreign policy for the nation. For coherent foreign policy formulation to be achieved, the National Assembly needs to be re-orientated about their roles in international relations and foreign policy development, by acquiring the necessary legislative skills and knowledge. This will help them rise to the challenges of modern international politics and relations through better and constant research and genuine consultancy for a better deal in foreign policy that will be beneficial to Nigeria.

Nigeria's political leaders should struggle at all time through international relations for economic independence in order to sustain political independence and to make the essence of nationhood meaningful to the citizenry. Dependent role in production should be minimized to the barest level if it cannot be totally cut off in order to remove powerlessness and dependence in external transactions that compel Nigeria to dance to the dictates of foreign nations and their multilateral agencies such as IMF and World Bank.

Hence, this research urges that Nigeria uses its endowments to promote her national interest of regional security and at the same time strengthen her position as a regional power. To this end, efforts should be sustained with such laudable initiatives as ECOWAS, ECOMOG and technical aid support to ACP countries. It has been shown that this way, Nigeria stands to benefit immensely ranging from the political respect to improved economy through the creation of a large market in economy through the creation of large market in the region which has about 700 million populations. And more importantly, this will boost the nation's national and regional security as well as image in the international system. Lastly, all these

efforts will afford Nigeria the opportunity to secure one of the proposed permanent seats in the United Nations Security Council.

In a more pragmatic way, this research recommends the urgent need for Nigeria to develop a sustainable democratic culture and a culture of accountability on the part of her leaders. Otherwise, her acceptability on the international scene will be difficult if not practically impossible. It is believed that the establishment of a good democratic culture and accountability will offer Nigeria the leverage to help champion the establishment of the same in the region and thereby enhance peace and security on the continent. Doing this will go a long way to prevent the intervention of extra-Africa powers and entrench stable democracy that will make Africa a notable polycentric bloc in the post-Cold War era. Ultimately, this will eventually help Nigeria reclaim her place as a regional power.

There is an urgent need for a paradigm shift in the manner of conducting Nigeria's foreign policy. The government should reconstruct, restructure or reformulate Nigeria's foreign policy to respond to the contemporary challenges as dictated by the forces of globalization.

The challenge of globalization revolves around the political economy which constitutes the bedrock of a vibrant foreign policy. Government, must therefore, diversify the economy and be attuned to the realities of contemporary globalization. In other words, there is the need for Nigeria's foreign policy to be built around core and specific national interests that can respond appropriately to changes in the external environment.

Foreign missions in the country are critical factors in the effective delivery of Nigeria's foreign policy. There is the need to overhaul Nigeria's Foreign Service apparatus through the instrumentality of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. The Ministry must be improved to be more efficient and effective: adequately funded and Nigeria's diplomats must be well and better trained.

7.5 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE

1. The study demonstrates that the dependent nature of the Nigerian state within the international community affects its capacity to conduct a purposeful and dynamic foreign policy.
2. The implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy has not been vigorously pursued and effectively carried out during much of the period covered in this study.
3. This study offers new insights into the significance of governance in the study of Nigeria's foreign policy during both the military and civilian administrations.
4. The studies unveil some of the salient features of the international system after the end of the Cold War and how these changes have impacted on Nigeria's foreign policy.
5. It sheds light on the factors limiting or militating against the realization of the country's role and pre-eminence in global affairs with the enumeration of the basis for potent foreign policy objectives that connect domestic yearnings with international aspirations and opportunities.

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APPENDIX 1

NIGERIA'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERS (1990 – DATE)

The Nigerian foreign ministry is a statutory body created to handle the external push of Nigeria's domestic vision and ideals. It is headed by the Foreign Affairs Minister. At the earlier stage, the ministry played a significant role in the decolonization and anti-apartheid struggles that Nigeria was deeply committed to. As of late, its mission has geared towards increasing awareness about Nigeria's economic potential. It is part of the government's executive branch.

From 1961 to 1965, Jaja Wachuku was the First substantive Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, later renamed External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs). Before Wachuku's tenure, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the then Prime Minister, doubled as Foreign Affairs advocate of Nigeria from 1960 to 1961 when his government created an official Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations ministerial position in favour of Mr. Wachuku as pioneer Minister.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minister_of_Foreign_Affairs_%28Nigeria%29

LIST OF SUBSTANTIVE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERS SINCE 1990

1. Major-General Ike Omar SandaNwachukwu (*December 1987 - December 1989; September 1990 – January 1993*)
2. Dr Rilwanu Lukman (*December 1989 – August 1990*)
3. Chief Mathew Tawo Mbu (*January 1993 – November 1993*)
4. Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (*November 1993 - February 1995*)
5. Chief Tom Ikimi (*March 1995 - June 1998*)
6. Ambassador Ignatius C. Ollisemeka (*June 1998 – May 1999*)
7. Alhaji Sule Lamido (*July 1999 – June 2003*)
8. Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji (*June 2003 – June 2006*)
9. Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (*June 2006 - August 2006*)

10. Prof Joy Ogwu (*August 2006 - May 2007*)
11. Chief OjoMaduekwe(*July 2007 – March 2010*)
12. Chief Henry OdeinAjumogobia(*April 2010 - May 2011*)
13. Ambassador OlugbengaAshiru (*July 2011 – September 2013*)
14. Ambassador Aminu Bashir Wali(*March 2014 – Date*)

Major-General Ike Omar Sanda Nwachukwu(*December 1987 - December 1989; September 1990 – January 1993*)

Major-General Nwachukwu was born in Port Harcourt, Rivers State on September 1, 1940 to an Igbo father and a Fulani mother. He had his early education at the Ladi-Lak Institute, Yaba, Lagos and Lagos City College, also in Yaba, Lagos. He had Diploma in Journalism and was news reporter with several newspapers (Daily Service, Daily Express and Daily Times) from 1959 to 1961.

He obtained military training at the Nigerian Military Training College, Kaduna, the Royal Canadian School of Infantry and the School of Infantry, Warminster, United Kingdom. He also studied at the Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy, the United Nations Peace Academy and the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPPS), Kuru, Plateau State.

He rose to the rank of Major General prior to his retirement with the Nigerian Army. He was Directing Staff, Command and Staff College, Jaji from August 1977 to February 1979 and Commandant Nigerian Army School of Infantry, Jaji from February 16, 1979 to September 20, 1979 and General Officer Commanding 1 Mechanised Division, Nigerian Army.

Nwachukwu held the position of Military Governor of Imo State from January 1984. From 1986 to 1987 he was Minister for Employment, Labour and Productivity where he founded the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) to alleviate the problems of unemployment, especially graduate unemployment.

He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs from December 1987 to December 1989. He thereafter returned to a field military command position. In September 1990 he was re-appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. He served in this position till January 1993. He was

active and effective as Foreign Minister, taking a mercantilist approach to diplomacy. As Minister, he initiated and vigorously pursued Economic Diplomacy.

Dr Rilwanu Lukman (*December 1989 – August 1990*)

Dr. Rilwanu Lukman was born on August 26, 1938 in Zaria. He trained as a mining engineer at the College of Arts, Science, and Technology, Zaria (now Ahmadu Bello University), and then at Imperial College, London. He earned a higher degree in mining engineering from the University of Mining and Metallurgy in Leoben, Austria (1967–1968). He obtained a degree in Mineral Economics from McGill University, Montreal in 1978, and an honorary doctorate degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of Bologna in Italy.

He was Minister of Mines, Power and Steel from 1984 to 1985; Minister of Petroleum Resources from 1986 to 1989 and Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1989 and 1990. He was the Chairman of National Electric Power Authority between 1993 and 1994. He was OPEC President (1986 to 1989) and the Secretary-General of OPEC from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2000.

From 1999 to 2003, he was Special Adviser on Petroleum and Energy Matters to the President and Chairman of the Nigerian national Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Lukman was appointed Honorary Adviser on Energy and Strategic Matters to President Umaru Yar'Adua in August 2007. Between December 2008 and March 2010, he served as the Minister of Petroleum Resources. He died on 21 July 2014.

Chief Mathew Tawo Mbu (*January 1993 – November 1993*)

Born on November 20, 1929 at Okundi in Osokom Clan in Ogoja Division, Cross River State, Chief Mbu was educated at the Wolsey Hall, Oxford (Postal Tuition) University College London, and at the Middle Temple, London.

He was the first High Commissioner for Nigeria in the United Kingdom from 1955 to 1959. He was also the first Nigerian Chief Representative in Washington DC between 1959 and 1960, as well as the first Nigerian Chief Representative in the United Nations from 1959 to 1960. He was Federal Minister of Labour in 1953/1954, Minister of State in the office of the Prime Minister in 1960, Minister of Defence (Navy) from 1961 to 1965, as well as Minister of Transport and Aviation in 1966.

He served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from January to November 1993 during the transitional government put in place by General Ibrahim Babangida.

Ambassador Baba GanaKingibe*(November 1993 - February 1995)*

A diplomat and politician, Ambassador Baba GanaKingibe was born in 1945 in Borno State. At different time in his career, he served as Nigeria's Ambassador to Greece and High Commissioner to Pakistan.

After serving as the National Chairman of the defunct Social Democratic Party (SDP) in the Third Republic, he became the running mate of Chief MKO Abiola in the 1993 presidential election. After the annulment of the election, between November 1993 and February 1995, he served as Nigeria's Foreign Minister. He was later appointed as the Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Power and Steel.

He was African Union's Special Envoy to Sudan from October 2002 to September 2006. He later became the Special Representative of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Mission in Sudan and Darfur. In June 2007, he was appointed Secretary to the Government of the Federation. He was removed in September 2008.

Chief Tom Ikimi*(March 1995 - June 1998)*

Chief Tom Ikimi was born on April 10, 1944 to Mr. John Onilekimi and Victoria IsierwaIkimi, both of Igueben, Esan Central in Edo State. He was born in Kumba, Southern Cameroons and had his secondary education in Saint Joseph's College, Sasse-Buea, Southern Cameroons from 1957 to 1961. He read Building and Civil Engineering at the Mid-Western Polytechnic, Auchu from January 1966 to December 1967. He had his University education in Architecture from 1968 to 1973 at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

He was elected the first National Chairman of the National Republican Convention Party in July 1990 and appointed Special Adviser to Head of State, General SaniAbacha in February 1994. He was later appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 1995. He was in this position until the demise of General SaniAbacha in June 1998.

Ambassador Ignatius C. Olisemeka (*June 1998 – May 1999*)

Ambassador Olisemeka was a career diplomat, born on March 12, 1932 and educated at the University of Ibadan from 1952 to 1957. He read History at Ibadan and International Relations at the London School of Economics.

He was twice Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was Nigeria's High Commissioner to Kenya, with concurrent accreditation to Lesotho, Botswana and Madagascar from 1970 to 1973. He was Ambassador to Spain with concurrent accreditation to the Vatican from 1976 to 1981; Ambassador to the United States from 1984 to 1987, High Commissioner to Canada and Ambassador to Israel from 1993 to 1998.

He was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the transitional government of General Abdulsalami Abubakar.

Alhaji Sule Lamido (*July 1999 – June 2003*)

Alhaji Lamido, a politician, was born in August 1948 in Bamaina, Birnin Kudu Local Government, Jigawa State. He attended Barewa College, Zaria for his secondary education, from 1962 to 1966. He was trained as a Rail Engineer at the Permanent Way Training School, Zaria. He has also attended many courses at the Nigerian Institute of Management. He was a member of the Federal House of Representatives from 1979 to 1983 and member of the National Constitutional Conference from 1994 to 1995. He was National Secretary of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) during the Third Republic between 1992 and 1993.

He was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs by President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999. He served till 2003. He was later elected the Governor of Jigawa State in 2007.

Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji (*June 2003 – June 2006*)

A diplomatic careerist, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji was born on July 22, 1934 in Ijebu Ode, Ogun State. He attended the Nigerian College of Arts, Science and Technology and the University of Ibadan. He graduated with Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in History in June 1960. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1960. He retired from service in 1991 after serving as the Director-General of the ministry of foreign affairs.

He was appointed Ambassador to Austria and Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency. He was also Nigeria's Ambassador to Switzerland from 1977 to 1981 and Ambassador to France from 1987 to 1991. He is an international expert on Disarmament and International security. He was President of the 1979/1980 UN Conference in the Prohibition or Restriction of the use of certain convention of Weapons. He has authored many books. He is also the chief proponent of *Constructive and Beneficial Concentricism* as a foreign policy thrust.

He was the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative for the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) between 1998 and 1999. He later became the Special Representative of the General Secretary of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) from November 19, 1999 to July 16, 2003

He was appointed the Foreign Affairs Minister from July 2003 to June 2006. He later became the Internal Affairs Minister from 21 June 2006 to May 2007.

In March 2008, led the negotiations in Kenya related to that country's political crisis, following the departure of the previous head negotiator, Kofi Annan.

Dr.NgoziOkonjo-Iweala(June 2006 - August 2006)

Dr Okonjo-Iweala, a globally renowned economist, was born to Professor ChukwukaOkonjo, the Obi of Ogwashi-Ukwu, Delta State, on June 13, 1954. She graduated with B.A. magna cum laude in Economics from Harvard University. She obtained a Ph.D. in Regional Economics and Development from Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

She rose to the position of Vice President and Corporate Secretary of the World Bank Group. She was appointed the Minister of Finance by President Obasanjo in July 2003. She later served briefly as the Foreign Minister in 2006.

In October 2007, the then World Bank President Robert Zoellick appointed her to the post of Managing Director, effective December 1, 2007. She served in this position till July 2011 when she against reappointed as the Minister of Finance with the expanded portfolio of the Coordinating Minister for the Economy by President Goodluck Jonathan.

Prof. Joy Ogwu (*August 2006 - May 2007*)

Prof Joy Ogwu was born on August 22, 1946 in Lagos. She attended New Rochelle College, New Rochelle, New York between 1970 and 1971, the College of Arts and Sciences of the Rutgers University, New Jersey from 1971 to 1974 and obtained a Bachelor and Master of Arts degree in Political Science. She later received her Ph.D. from the University of Lagos.

She was a member of the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations, former Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and member of its Board of Regents. She was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 30 August, 2006 to May 2007. Since 2008, she has been serving as Nigeria's Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

Chief OjoMaduekwe(*July 2007 – March 2010*)

A lawyer and politician, Chief OjoMaduekwe was born on May 6, 1945 in Ohafia, Abia State. He read law at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka and graduated with LLB Honours in 1972.

He was elected a member of the House of Representatives in 1983. He was Special Adviser to the Foreign Minister in 1993 and a member of the National Constitutional Conference between 1994 and 1995. He served as Minister of Culture and Tourism between 1999 and 2000, Minister of Transport from 2000 to 2003. He became the National Secretary of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in 2005. He was later served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from July 2007 to March 2010.

As Foreign Minister, he reviewed Ambassador OluAdeniji's foreign policy thrust, that is, *Constructive and Beneficial Concentricism* and branded it, Citizen Diplomacy, both of which underscored the citizen as the main focus of foreign policy calculations. He also became the chief apostle of Preventive Diplomacy as an approach to ensuring peace and security in the era of globalisation.

Chief Henry OdeinAjumogobia(*April 2010 - May 2011*)

Chief Ajumogobia, a well-respected lawyer, was born on June 29, 1956. He obtained his LLB at the University of Lagos (1978) and LLM at Harvard University in 1988. He became a Senior Advocate of Nigeria in 2003.

A former Attorney-General and Commissioner of Justice of Rivers State, he was appointed the Minister of State for Energy (Petroleum) (July 2007- December 2008); Minister of State for Petroleum Resources (January 2009 - March 2010) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (6 April 2010 - 29 May 2011). As the Foreign Affairs Minister, he served as President of the UN Security Council in August 2010 when he introduced a well-received debate in the Council on 'Preventive Diplomacy'.

As the Minister of State for Petroleum, he played active parts in removing obstacles to understanding between militants in the oil producing areas and Government and advocated for the regulation of the downstream sector of the oil industry to prevent oil shortage and ensure the saving of tax payer's money.

Ambassador Olugbenga Ashiru (*July 2011 – September 2013*)

Ambassador Olugbenga Ashiru, a career diplomat, was born on 27th August, 1948 in Ijebu Ode, Ogun State. A graduate of the University of Lagos, he was Third Secretary at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972.

He served as Nigeria's Ambassador to the South Korea in 1991. He later became Nigeria's High Commissioner to South Africa with concurrent accreditation to Lesotho and Swaziland, in 2005.

He was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs in July 2011. He served in this capacity till September 2013. He laid the groundwork which saw Nigeria being elected as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2013. Besides, he played a key role in resolving the diplomatic face-off between Nigeria and South Africa in 2012 over the deportation of 125 Nigerians for not possessing valid yellow fever vaccination certificates.

He died in South Africa on 29th November, 2014.

Ambassador Aminu Bashir Wali (*March 2014 – Date*)

A businessman and politician, Ambassador Aminu Bashir Wali was born on August 3, 1941 in Kano. He was educated at Kano Provisional Secondary School (Runfa College), School of Arabic Studies in Kano, Nigeria, the Federal Training Centre in Lagos, North-Western Polytechnic (North London University) from 1963 to 1967, and the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies at Kuru in Jos, Nigeria.

He was a founding member, a member of the board of trustees and the deputy national chairman of the Democratic Party of Nigeria in 1998. He was appointed Nigeria's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in June 2004. He was in the position till 2007. Prior to this, he had served as the Special Adviser to the President on National Assembly matters from 1999 to 2003.

Between 2008 and 2014, he served as Nigeria's Ambassador to the People's Republic of China with concurrent accreditation to Mongolia. He became the 26th Foreign Affairs Minister since Nigeria's Independence in March 2014.

APPENDIX 2

LIST OF RESPONDENTS

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APPENDIX 3

INDEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS

1. What is your assessment of Nigeria's foreign policy since – independence in 1960?
2. In a specific term, what is the content of National interest in the structure of Nigeria foreign policy?
3. Why has it been difficult to shift the pattern and structure of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence in 1960?
4. With every sense of objectivity, have Nigerian leaders lived up to expectation in articulating and achieving the nation's foreign policy objectives?
5. What is the impacts of military in the pursuance and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy?
6. Who among the Nigerian leaders, past and present, would you consider the best in terms of determined effort to pursue Nigeria's foreign policy objectives?
7. What critical areas have governments, past and present, performed credibility well in the implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy?
8. What was the rationale for Nigeria's "Africa as centerpiece policy" in the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy?
9. What are the critical factors, considered to be militating against the formulation and implementation of a robust Nigeria's foreign policy?
10. Why is it difficult for world powers to admit Nigeria as permanent members of the Security Council in the United Nations?
11. What factors would you consider as hindrance to the achievement of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives both in Africa and on the global arena?
12. Why is it that most countries that were supported and assisted to get independence by Nigeria are now demonstrating ungrateful attitude towards her?
13. Today, a country like South Africa which was heavily supported by Nigeria to defeat the apartheid policy is doing better than Nigeria in world affairs. What factors could have been responsible for this development?
14. In what ways and manners did the Cold War influence the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy in the past?
15. Does globalization play any role in determining the success or failure of Nigeria's foreign policy?

16. Has there been any radical change(s) in Nigeria's foreign policy since the advent of globalization?
17. To what extent has Nigeria's foreign policy been able to effectively and efficiency respond to external pressure and dynamism brought about by globalization?
18. What kind of change does the Nigeria government needs to postulate in putting Nigeria's foreign policy in proper context after the Cold War era?
19. What is the impact of country's political economy, the character of the state or the world view of its ruling elite in the formulation of a vibrant foreign policy?
20. What are the factors that incapacitated Nigeria "as a great, giant and hope of Africa, to realize its manifest destiny as espoused by the founding fathers?"

APPENDIX 4

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE QUESTIONS

1. What is your objective assessment of Nigeria's foreign policy since independence in 1960?
2. With every sense of objectivity, have Nigerian leaders lived up to expectation in articulating and achieving the nation's foreign policy objectives?
3. Is Nigeria truly the "Giant of Africa"? What was the rationale for Nigeria's "Africa as centrepiece" policy in the formulation of Nigeria's foreign policy objectives?
4. Why is it that most countries in Africa that had been supported or assisted by Nigeria to get independence or to restore peace in their countries are now demonstrating ungrateful attitude towards her?
5. In what ways and manners did the Cold War influence the formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy? What kind of changes does the Nigerian government needs to situate Nigeria's foreign policy in proper context after the Cold War era?

APPENDIX 5

Below is the map of **Nigeria** indicating federal capital territory, **Abuja** where the major decisions are taken in the formulation and implementation of **Nigeria's** Foreign Policy.

