CHAPTER ONE  INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

What informed this study is the changing trends and developments in international migration and its challenges to the Nigeria Immigration service whose institutional role it is to manage international migration as it concerns Nigeria. In its efforts over the years to control criminal activities associated with international migration, the Nigeria Immigration Service is yet to succeed. Nigeria is an important destination country for migrants in the West African sub-region. The latest available figures indicate that the number of immigrants residing in Nigeria has more than doubled in recent decades, from 477,135 in 1991 to 971,450 in 2005 (NPC, 1991). The number of immigrants is expected to increase to 1.1 million in 2010 (UNPD, 2009). However, immigrants make up only 0.7 per cent of the total population. The majority of immigrants in Nigeria are from neighboring Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries (74%), in particular from Benin (29%), Ghana (22%) and Mali (16%) (DRC, 2007). Resident permit data from ECOWAS indicate that the share of ECOWAS residents has increased considerably over the last decade, from 63 per cent in 2001 to 97 per cent in 2005 (ECOWAS, 2006). Refugees constitute a small proportion of the overall immigrant stock (0.9% in 2007), the majority of whom are Liberians. The majority of asylum-seekers are from the Great Lakes Region (65%) (NCFR, 2008). Relatively few foreigners have been identified as being the victims of trafficking (2,537) in the past four years (NAPTIP, 2009). Nigeria is also a destination country for highly skilled migration. According to the latest data, immigrants figure prominently in categories such as general managers (2.73%), corporate managers (0.89%), and physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals (0.43%), and less so in clerical work such as customer service clerks (0.21%) or manual work. Most of the immigrants working in the professional/technical and related workers’ group are from Europe (47.37%), while most of the immigrants working in
clerical jobs are from the neighboring ECOWAS countries (42.84%) National Manpower Board (2004). As people migrate to Nigeria for economic and other reasons, there is migration of Nigerians to other parts of the world for same reasons.

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a gradual upturn in migration flows in most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Member countries. Owing to regional conflicts, but also to the restrictions placed on other immigration channels, the number of asylum seekers and refugees has risen substantially, particularly in some European countries. Immigration for employment reasons, permanent but in particular temporary, also increased sharply in 1999-2000 in response to economic trends in Member countries and the resulting labor shortages in certain sectors. Nevertheless, immigration for family reasons continues to predominate, especially in the longer-standing countries of immigration. Lastly, the persistence of illegal migration, the volume of which is by definition impossible to determine, indicates clearly the difficulties that host and origin countries are encountering in their attempts to control migration flows.

Immigration plays a significant role in the annual population growth of certain OECD countries. They have a high proportion of foreign births in total births, and the foreign or foreign-born population is growing and diversifying. The importance of migration inflows is sometimes emphasized in connection with the aging of the population. Without denying their potential contribution to reducing demographic imbalances, their impact in this regard should not be overestimated.

The Nigeria Immigration Service was established as a state institution with the major function of managing international migration as it concerns Nigeria. Before now, it was easy for the NIS to perform this function, but with the phenomenon of globalization, the trend of international migration has changed. It is now herculean task for the NIS and indeed every other State institution concerned with international migration to cope effectively with
migration flows. International migration flows has increased tremendously over the years without the NIS possessing the capacity to control and manage it. In other words, there is no corresponding increase both in human and material resources to cope. The changing trends of immigration and emigration especially from the period after the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1986 have posed serious challenges to the Nigeria Immigration Service. The study is about the tremendous increase in migration flows occasioned by globalization and how this has made it very difficult for the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) to cope with its statutory role of managing migration processes. International migration is used to represent both immigration and emigration processes.

Migration is a most dynamic feature of population distribution. It is a process which has been from the creation of the universe. In sub-Saharan Africa, it has been a permanent characteristic of the region long before colonization. In West Africa, it is a normal process of interaction without barrier even with the forceful partition of the continent between the western capitalist powers which paved the way for colonization.

During colonization, migration was not significantly altered either as a result of forceful separation of kith and kin into different countries nor was the native language tampered with. This can be said of the Yoruba in the western part of Nigeria, the Hausa/Fulani in the north, the Ibibio, Efik in the eastern part and so on, migration continues till this day.

However, with the advent of colonization, Nigeria came to be bonded on every side by French speaking countries. Even Cameroon is not entirely Anglophone as the greater part speaks French. Despite this enriching arrangement, migration has never been a subject of state policy in the sub – region until after independence. The changing economic fortunes of the various countries have attracted notable mobility in the direction of economically buoyant
countries and the downturns have called for state policies to stem migration which in some cases have boiled down to large scale deportation.

Theoretically, Nigeria and all the countries sharing border with her with the exception of Cameroon are all members of the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS); in which case, the citizens of these countries are to enjoy freedom of movement. All the same, migration became a subject of state policy especially for Nigerian authority with the increased rate of criminality recorded at the borders which come in form of smuggling, trafficking (Drug and Human), religious carnage fueled by imported extremism and the resulting deaths of innocent Nigerians and threat to state security and stability.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York has brought to the centre stage security implication of migration. Already, Nigeria has had at different intervals serious armed confrontations with migration intruders from the Republics of Chad and Niger trying to forcefully import religious fanaticism and extremism into Nigeria. Despite her avowed foreign policy of Africa as the centerpiece of her foreign policy, Nigeria cannot but resort to force against unwanted and criminally minded migration in order to protect its sovereignty.

According to Begtts (2008) international migration is divided into a range of different categories: low-skilled labor migration, high-skilled labor migration, irregular migration, international travel, lifestyle migration, environmental migration, human trafficking and smuggling, asylum and refugee protection, internally displaced people, Diaspora and remittances. Each of these is regulated differently at the global level. They vary along a spectrum in terms of the degree of formal institutional cooperation that exists – from asylum and refugee protection, which has a formal regime like the United Nations Organization (UNO), while labor migration largely remain unregulated at the global level.
Observations show increasing upsurge in international migration which includes both legal and illegal migration in and out of the country. This increasing immigration and emigration capacity has thrown up a lot of cross border challenges in the form of transnational crimes. These challenges have been enhanced by the porous nature of Nigeria’s vast borders. The security implication of this to Nigeria is enormous. What are the trends of immigration processes and what are their challenges to the Nigeria Immigration service? Also what is the institutional capacity of the NIS in coping with these challenges? These processes include legal migration into the country in the form of expatriates, tourists, visitors and business visitors. They also include illegal immigrants in the form of those looking for greener pastures from Nigeria’s poor neighboring States and those who come in for cross border criminal activities. Another aspect of the migration processes is those who emigrate to look for greener pastures. Among these are skilled laborers in the form of brain drain. These skilled laborers constitute the legal emigrants. Another group of emigrants are the illegal ones who mostly travel with forged travel documents. They, in addition, to the illegal immigrants constitute the real challenge to the NIS whose capacity is not correspondingly upgraded to cope with the changing trends of migration processes. An essential crime in illegal migration is money laundering which is directly connected to drug trafficking which is in turn connected to terrorism. The whole world is affected by the whole process. It is therefore important for the NIS to upgrade its capacity to grapple with these challenges. It is instructive to note that the processes of migration does not only involve movement of people but also involves movement of goods, capital and ideas across geographical regions of the world. According to Castles (1998: 182) “international migration is an essential part of globalization and if governments welcome the mobility of capital, commodities and ideas, they are unlikely to succeed in halting the mobility of people”.

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The dilemma of Nigeria’s situation as regards the unlikelihood or otherwise of controlling the movement of people, is based on the fact that the Immigration Service is very weak in capacity and in legal terms to cope with the influx of people in and out the country. Immigration capacity is not increasing with increasing migrations. It is therefore imperative that this institution must adjust its capacities to cope with the new realities. These new realities are the upsurge in international migration; increase in cross border crimes and Nigeria’s vast and difficult borders. The building of strong institutional capacity to cope with these new realities is essentially the reason for undertaking this study.

It is against this background that the study is conceived in view of the fact that International Migration poses some basic challenges to the Nigerian Immigration Service. The NIS is confronted with the porosity of Nigeria’s borders as well as the dynamics of inter-state migrations in Africa. There is also the huge challenge of illegal migration. This challenge is in two dimensions-the tremendous inflow of unwanted elements such as terrorists, human traffickers, drug traffickers and smugglers; and the tremendous outflow of needed elements in the form of brain drain and depletion of human capital. The centrality of international migration as a policy challenge to Nigeria cannot therefore be over emphasized.

In international migration Nigeria is a major origin state. The reason can be traced to the introduction of Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in Nigeria in 1986. The surge in imports on account of trade liberalization meant increased competition for local manufacturers. Many of them who could not compete were forced out of business. This of course affected a number of poorly managed establishments which in turn laid off their workers, thereby aggravating unemployment.

The increases in tariffs of public utilities that accompanied commercialization, as well as the rise in interest rate on account of deregulation, all impacted negatively on cost and consequently, exerted pressures on prices of locally produced goods and services. Consumer
price resistance persisted, resulting in accumulation of inventories and a gradual decline in capacity utilization.

Some structural factors that SAP could not address gave rise to massive unemployment. In terms of the welfare of the people, the rapidly rising prices impacted negatively on their standard of living. Incomes could not adjust as fast as the increasing inflation. Rising prices consequently, eroded the purchasing power of consumers. Worst hit in this respect were public sector employees whose wages lagged the most in terms of adjustment to rising prices. Shonekan (1998).

Against this background most Nigerians especially the highly skilled who lost their jobs or whose income could no longer cope with their responsibilities sought greener pastures abroad. Even the less skilled who could no longer get menial and peripheral jobs also sought means of going abroad for greener pastures. This gave rise to the numerous illegal networks for international migration. There has been therefore massive legal and illegal emigration from Nigeria from the period following 1986. The problem is that these processes have created massive institutional demands on the NIS which in turn has not been increasing its institutional capacity.

Most of the illegal migrants are deported to Nigeria creating serious problems for the immigration service which lacks the capacity to resettle the deportees, try the criminals among them, or assist them back to their home states.

The real problem here is that the processes of globalization have made international migration easier and consequently there has been a tremendous increase in international migration. This massive increase in international migration flows with the massive and difficult nature of the Nigerian borders creates constant challenges to the NIS especially in the form of trans-border crimes.
Various reasons are cited for the movement of skilled individuals into or out of a country. These factors are generally classified into two categories, namely push factors and pull factors (Baruch 2007: 100). Push factors are generally associated with negative factors, as they are seen to drive a person out of his/her home country. Dovlo and Martineau (2004) concur that push factors are influences that arise from within the source country and facilitate a person’s decision to leave. Most frequently, this movement is detrimental to the country because it is largely skilled people who leave. In other words, people may be forced to emigrate to countries that they find suitable in terms of, perhaps, improved lifestyles and better work opportunities. These push factors cover a broad range of issues, including:

- Crime and violence;
- Declining education standards;
- Economic instability;
- Poor working conditions;
- Poor service delivery;
- Low income levels; and
- Political events.

As a result of the above and many other push factors, there is a large exodus of skilled workers as they can afford to offer their skills to other countries. This movement has negative consequences for Nigeria. According to Bhorat(2002), The Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) (2007: 9) and Kraak (2008: 22), there appears to be consensus that skills shortages are a major obstacle to economic growth and job creation. Pull factors, on the other hand, are positive factors that attract a person to another country (Mattes and Richmond 2000: 32). These factors reflect the actions of receiving countries that create the demand for, or encourage people to leave home (Dovlo and Martineau 2004). Enhanced working conditions, better business prospects and increased promotion opportunities are a few factors that encourage skilled individuals to come to a country. Other factors include:

- Attractive salary packages;
- Early retirement within the education sector;
- An opportunity to gain international work experience;
• Family networking;
• Globalization;
• An improved lifestyle; and
• Variety of career choices (Rogerson and Rogerson 2000).

However, in the case of a developing country, like Nigeria it also has the potential to attract immigrants (CDE 2008:16). Though immigrants have been coming into Nigeria in the form of expatriates, the number of Nigerian skilled workers that have left the country since 1986 has been alarming. The unfortunate thing about it is that the NIS can do nothing about this because it lacks the legal capacity to do that. This situation has compounded Nigeria’s development effort as skilled manpower is often lost to foreign lands.

The thesis is that the Nigeria Immigration Service is grossly overwhelmed by the increasing flow of cross border activities.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The basic problem that this study wants to investigate is the inability of the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) to overwhelm the increasing trend of cross-border crimes that are caused by the increasing influx of both legal and illegal immigrants through Nigerian borders both air, land and sea. There are numerous illegal routes and most of the immigrants patronize them more than the legal routes because of the criminal activities that are carried out through them. The men of the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) have not been able to mobilize enough men and materials to cope with the monitoring and policing of these routes especially the illegal ones. The problem therefore is how does the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) cope with these immigration processes which have been increasing geometrically at the face of inadequate manpower, inadequate material resources, borderlines that are not easily accessible as a result of unfriendly topography, corruption among the rank and file coupled with inter agency rivalry among Nigerian security agencies.
Migration is a highly diverse and complex phenomenon that transcends societies, cultures and races. It is a phenomenon that has continued to impact and contribute to the transformation of the entire facets of various countries changing the racial, ethnic, linguistic and socio-cultural composition of their population (Adeola and Ogirai, 2010; Marshall, 2000). It is a dynamic process which affects every dimension of social existence. Studies have indicated that 97 percent of the world population in 2000 is not international migrants (UNDESA, 2005) yet, their communities and ways of life are changed by migration (Castles et al 2009). In the sub-Saharan Africa, it is a process which predates colonization and assumed greater impetus after the countries have traversed colonialism and became sovereign independent states. The countries were confronted with problems of integration, economic growth and underdevelopment, the people were also in haste of adjusting to the new realities brought about by self government. This of course is in response to the contact established with outside cultures brought about by long years of colonization and so the new aspirations was spectacular and the urge for modernity was high.

The motivation for employment and better life inspired migration within the countries and across borders and so cities were attracted by migration from the rural areas while economically developed regions became magnets of migratory destinations. In West African, countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria became destinations of international migration and Lagos and Dakar as preferred cities with teeming inflow of people from other parts of the sub-region. Nigeria which shares borders with francophone countries has to contend with influx of people from these countries and Lagos becomes the African metropolitan city for the citizens of these countries.

The economic boom of the 1970s and 80s brought about by the fortunes derived from the oil sector attracted increased immigrants to Nigeria from the sub-region. The Nigerian
border which is porous became easy access especially as members of a single ethnic group hold dual nationalities. As the movement was more of labour inspired, there was not much state reaction. However, Nigeria later started experiencing confrontations along the borders due to the activities of smugglers, traffickers and security challenges by the Muslim extremists who took the advantage of the porous borders to troop to the northern part of the country from Niger, Chad and northern Cameroon. At various times, some of these Muslim fundamentalists had declared holy war in the northern part of Nigeria. In the 90s the Maitasine Muslim fundamentalists and insurgency killed many innocent Nigerians before they were overwhelmed by the state security apparatuses.

At other times, in the western part of Nigeria, the menace of traffickers and smugglers who have turned armed criminals posing serious threat to the security of the nation has forced the Federal Government to make draconian laws against the affront. It got to an unbearable height during the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo between 1999 and 2003 that the president had to close the borders with the Republic of Benin at least two times. The persistent and deepened cases of smuggling and trafficking in the sub-region have induced other heinous crimes causing serious security and political problems among the states (Adeola and Ogirai, 2010). The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA have brought issues of migration and security to the front burner of state diplomatic and international relations. The analysts have (Castles and Miller: 2009) remarked that Nigeria is among the radicalized Muslim countries in the world (others are the Caucasus, Somali, Yemen etc.) and so the threat of Al Qaida cannot be swept under the carpet. Yet, the states are bound together by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Charter which accepts free movement of the nationals of the sub-region throughout the 16 states. And like other regions of the world, state security will have to be integrated into legislations dealing with international migration and external relations. Other challenges have developed at the borders
where immigrants enter Nigeria with the connivance of border communities and sometimes agents of government.

Another major problem is how to tackle the issue of corrupt practices among the rank and file in the security services along the borders. It is a known fact that corruption is an endemic social problem that affects all facets of the country’s national life. As international migration continues the Nigeria Immigration Service is enmeshed in corrupt practices which made it increasingly difficult to tackle the problem of illegal migrations. The airport, seaport and borders manned by the immigration officials and other State security agencies are poorly managed because of corruption. The idea of get-rich-quick syndrome has permeated the rank and file of service to the extent that integrity is thrown to the wind. This has made corruption to continue to thrive unabated and consequently pose serious challenge to the management of international migration.

Ironically, destination countries of North America, Europe, China and the transit countries of North Africa and also Europe are tightening up their borders while Nigeria which is source, destination and transit country remains largely weak in terms of management of international migration. In weak and corrupt state institutions the problem of illegal migrants exists unattended to.

Again, the porous nature of the borders is a big problem to NIS. There are many borders in West Africa which made border control more problematic. Nigeria Immigration Service lacks the capability to cope. The borders are not properly manned by the NIS. This may not be seen as incapability of the officers of immigration but more with the lack of more security gadgets and surveillance equipment. The introduction of e-Passport by the interior ministry was to help checkmate the forgery of Nigeria’s official travel documents. All these measures in the past to curtail the movement of people both in and out of the country have been thwarted because there are many pathways to leave Nigeria. Of course, the ECOWAS
policy of free movement of citizens across the region inhibits the operation of the immigration service as most of the migrants from the region follow these porous borders without molestation. For instance, current terrorist attacks in the northern part of Nigeria are linked with the porous borders coupled with the ECOWAS policy. It is very difficult to distinguish Nigerians and other citizens from Niger Republic since Nigeria share common border and cultural affinity with Niger.

This brings us to the issue of language. It is very difficult for the Nigerian immigration officers posted to the border areas where they do not understand the language of the people of that area. For immigration officers to be posted to a border the person must be able to understand the language of the people of that area. Ironically, this is not the case as posting are usually done based on how strongly connected one is. It is important for immigration officers to be bilingual to be able to communicate freely with people especially those from francophone countries. This is usually not taken into consideration while recruiting or posting to borders, airport and seaport.

Inadequate manpower and refusal of officers to accept posting to sensitive areas. According to Asiwaju (1992:32), Nigeria has over 5000 kilometers of borderline. To effectively monitor the borders, ten immigration officers are needed per kilometer. Therefore, for 5000 kilometers, Nigeria needs 50,000 officers. This does not include other institutional roles of the NIS. Presently, the NIS has 23,000 officers which is just 46% of the number required to police the borders. In the view of immigration officers, the Northern borders and immigration posts are not as juicy as those in the South. Therefore officers lobby to avoid posting to the Northern border posts. Through this process, the best of personnel are not posted to the Northern borders. Those who are eventually posted there see it as a punishment posting. The zeal to work for national interest is not there. This is the reason why security
challenges have mostly come from the Northern borderlines. Instances of these have ranged from Maitatsine, Ibrahim Zak Zaky to Boko Haram (Adesola, 2011).

Nigeria Immigration Service capacity building is another problem area. In this, three aspects are involved. These are:

1. Human capacity in terms of numerical strength. Nigeria Immigration Service needs more officers and men especially at the borders.

2. Logistics requirement in terms of transport, communication gadgets, and security gadgets. If we say that these are grossly inadequate it means there are some that are available. The truth is that most Nigeria Immigration officers do not even know the names of most modern information and communications technology gadgets nor have they sighted them contrary to what obtains in many other countries.

3. E-solution in terms of Unidentified Air Vehicles (Drones), Laser guided weapons and 3D cameras operating day and night at work stations, data bases, commands and controls. These can capture images of events and store them for three days. UAVs (Drones) are used in South Africa, Israel and the US.

What it will cost the country in not providing these equipment will be greater than the real cost of providing them.

Assumptions: 1. it can be assumed that if the NIS is allowed to grow in capacity correspondingly with increasing migration trends, it will be able to curtail trans border crimes. 2. The more the incapability of the NIS to carry out its institutional role, the more the increase in trans-border crimes.
1.3 Aim and Objectives of the study

The general aim of this study is to investigate the changing trends of international migration in a globalized world and its challenges for the Nigerian Immigration Service. The specific objectives of the study are to

i. Determine the reasons that influence immigration to Nigeria.

ii. Examine the challenges of international migration for the Nigeria Immigration Service.

iii. Explain the operational capabilities of Nigeria Immigration Service in coping with the challenges of international migration.

iv. Analyze the synergy between Nigerian security agencies in tackling the challenges of international migration.

1.4 Research Questions

i. What are the factors that cause people to migrate to Nigeria?

ii. What are the challenges posed by international migration to the Nigeria Immigration Service?

iii. What are the operational capabilities of Nigeria Immigration Service in coping with the challenges of international migration?

iv. How would security agencies establish synergy in tackling the challenges of international migration?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study is about how the changing trends of international migration in this era of globalization have affected the capacity of the Nigeria Immigration Service as a state institution. In this regard, the study will be significant to the NIS itself because it will not only expose the dynamics of international migration under the aegis of globalization but will
also explore how the NIS as a state institution can cope with increasing migrations. It will therefore also be significant to other state institutions in Nigeria that are involved with international migration processes. The study will also be significant for the Nigerian state, as it will provide a policy thrust for the management of international migration.

Nigeria is marked as a country of origin for migrants. This study will also be significant to other countries that are origin states like Nigeria as it will enhance their own capacities in managing migration processes. In this same regard, the study will be equally significant for other states that are transit and destination states like Nigeria, since Nigeria is equally a transit as well as destination state.

Lastly, this study will be significant as an addition to existing literature in understanding the necessity for building strong institutions for the management of international migration. It is indeed a worthy addition to the existing works on migration and this justifies the present study.

1.6 Scope and Delimitation of the Study

This study covers the changing trends and processes of international migration and how this has affected the operations of the NIS and its capacity to cope. It covers the period from 1986 to 2012 as well as immigration into Nigeria within the same period especially from her West African neighbors. Before the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), migration in the country could be described as normal. But this changed with the introduction of SAP and the devaluation of the Naira and the consequent unemployment which gave rise to a tremendous increase in international migration that stretched the capacity of the NIS to cope.
1.7 Operational Definition of Terms

An immigrant

An immigrant is a person who has citizenship in one country but who enters a different country to set up a permanent residence. In order to be an immigrant you must have citizenship in one country, and you must have gone to a different country with the specific intention of living there.

Immigration is the introduction of new people into a habitat or population. It is a biological concept and is important in population ecology, differentiated from emigration and migration. Immigration is the arrival of new individuals into a habitat or population.

Boundaries and borderlines

Boundaries and borderlines are systems features. That is they are features of a state system. A state is part of the international system. Every state in the international system has boundaries and borderlines which demarcate them as territorial entities. Boundaries indicate the limits of a system as a unit. As a concept, it connotes restrictiveness and distinctiveness. If rigidly adhered to, thereby not permitting overlaps or any form of interaction with the environment, we have a closed system. Borderlines on the other hand indicate common areas which a system shares with the neighboring countries. It indicates overlaps, which could be wide or narrow.

National Security

Security has to do with freedom from danger or with threats to a nation’s stability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interest and enhance the well-being of its people. National security is the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from internal and external threats.
**Human trafficking:**

Human trafficking is modern day slavery and is the fastest growing criminal industry in the world. It involves irregular migration for the movement of trafficked victims. It is the forced or coercive recruitment, transportation, harboring, or deception for the purpose of exploiting the victims. It deprives people of their human rights and freedoms, it is a global health risk, and it fuels organized crime.

**Illegal Migration:**

Illegal migration is a process that violates countries immigration policies. It is an unlawful entry into another land by violating their immigration laws and due process either knowingly or otherwise.

**An institution** is any structure or mechanism of social order and cooperation governing the behavior of a set of individuals within a given community — may it be human or a specific animal one. Institutions are identified with a social purpose, transcending individuals and intentions by mediating the rules that govern cooperative living behavior.

The term "institution" is commonly applied to customs and behavior patterns important to a society, as well as to particular formal organizations of government and public services. As structures and mechanisms of social order among certain species, institutions are one of the principal objects of study in the social sciences, such as political science, anthropology, economics, and sociology. Institutions are also a central concern for law, the formal mechanism for political rule-making and enforcement.
1.8 The Nigeria Immigration Service

Introducing the Service

The Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) was extracted from the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) in 1958. Since then, the service has gone through series of transformation. The Immigration Department, as it was known then, was entrusted with the core immigration duties under the headship of the Chief Federal Immigration Officer (CFIO) Mr. E. H. Harrison. The department in its emergent stage inherited the Immigration Ordinance of 1958 for its operation. At inception, the department had a narrow operational scope and maintained a low profile and simple approach in attaining the desired goals and objectives of the government. During this period, only the Visa and Business Sections were set up.

On August 1st, 1963, Immigration Department came of age when it was formally established by an Act of Parliament (Cap 171, Laws of the Federation Nigeria). The head of the department then was the Director of Immigration. Thus, the first set of Immigration officers were former NPF Officers. It became a department under the control and supervision of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs (FMIA) as a Civil Service outfit. Since that time the service has come a long way in its march toward reformations and restructuring to be better positioned for the implementation of modern migration management.

The structure has been changed to accommodate added responsibilities as well as emerging regional and sub-regional political alignments. The implication was the introduction of the ECOWAS and African affairs/bilateral division. Similarly aliens control and border patrol management were added to the responsibilities of the service. Furthermore, the service was saddled with the responsibility for the issuance of all Nigerian travel documents. The service embraced the use of ICT in its operations with the introduction of the Combined Expatriate Residence Permit and Aliens card (CERPAC). Ever since, the service has taken giant strides in the use of ICT in its processes and operational procedures, notably
the introduction of online payment for its facilities, in other words e-revenue collections by the service popularized this mode of revenue collection, leading it to become a Federal Government policy. Earlier on the Service created a website with the domain name www.immigration.gov.ng This was in a bid to create a platform for interaction and dissemination of information about its operations to a wide ranging clientele.

The introduction of machine readable electronic passports in 2007 was a landmark achievement by the service in that Nigeria became the first country in Africa to introduce the e-passport and among the first forty countries in the world to do so. The embrace of the e-passport has become a major tool in the fight against trans border criminality as the e-passport contains the biometric details of holders thus making it easy for detection of persons traveling under false identities or compromised travel documents especially as the service is poised to introduce the Passport Scanners at our borders which has been approved by the Federal Government of Nigeria. In due recognition of Nigeria Immigration Service’s stride as exemplified above, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) the global body that regulates standards for travel documents admitted Nigeria into its board as the sole African representative. Currently the country is cutting over Machine Readable Passports (MRP) to the electronic passport (e-passport) which initial deadline was December 2010 but later extended to April 2011. It was introduced on the 7th of July, 2007, and intended to be rolled out December, 2010.

As a result of the above development, e-passport machines have been installed in all the states of the federation and some missions abroad while efforts are still ongoing to deploy e-passport machines to all our missions abroad, the Nigeria Immigration Service has been sending its personnel for passport intervention to all regions of the world in line with the Federal Government foreign policy of citizen diplomacy. This implies taking the mobile passport issuing equipments to acquire and process passport for Nigerians in Diaspora.
Another significant achievement in the realm of ICT development is the establishment of a well equipped forensic laboratory for the examination of travel documents and monetary instruments. It is also to be noted that NIS personnel manning this laboratory are highly skilled due to the fact that they have been exposed to a lot of trainings locally and internationally on document fraud detection and techniques. The NIS is entrusted with core immigration duties, mainly the determination of migration status and issuance of visas. Its two major mission statements are as follows:

• to have an information technology-driven security outfit that can conveniently address the operational challenges of modern migration;

• to give the Service a new sense of direction that can make it relevant at all times to the world security order and global trends.

The following are those that have led the immigration service right from inception to date:

1. Mr E. A. Harrison 1962-1966
2. Mr. J. E. Onubogu 1966-1967
3. Mr. I. Aleyedeino 1967-1976
4. Mr. Aliyu Muhammed 1977-1979
5. Mr. Lawal Sambo 1979-1985
6. Mr. Muhammed Damulak 1985-1990
7. Mr. Garba Abbas 1990-1995
11. Mr. M. A. Baraya in acting capacity 2004-2005
12. Mr. C. J. Udeh 2005-2010
13. Mrs. Rose Chinyere Uzoma 2010-2013
14. Mr. R. B. Musa in acting capacity 2013-2013
15. Mr. D. S. Paradang 2013-date
Organizational Structure

The service headquarters of the NIS is at Abuja. The head of the NIS is a Comptroller General. There are seven Directorates each headed by a Deputy Comptroller General. According to circular number OHCSF/MSO/623/T./93 of 24th November, 2011 and NIS/HQ/ADM/10/T of 6th January, 2012 was restructured into seven Directorates. Consequently, the Nigeria Immigration Service was restructured into the following seven Directorates:

1. Finance and Accounts
2. Human Resources Management
3. Works and procurement
4. Planning Research and Statistics
5. Operations and Passports
6. Border Patrol, ECOWAS and African Affairs and
7. Investigation, Inspectorate and Enforcement.

Approval has also been given for the following units under the Comptroller General’s Office:
1. Legal
2. Internal Audit
3. Reforms (Transparency, Anti-Corruption and Servicom)
4. Internal Security (Provost Marshall) and
5. Press and Public Relations.

Mr. President in addition to the above also approved as follows:

1. The retention of the eight (8) zonal structure of the service
2. That six additional commands be carved out of the existing Lagos Command
3. That additional passport offices be established in Ikeja and Area 1 Garki under Lagos and FCT commands respectively
4. That additional control posts be created along the North West and North East Zones to check infiltration of the country by foreigners

5. That some fees and charges for immigration law regulations be increased.

As we have units under the Comptroller General at the Service Headquarters, there are also units under the Directorates. The Directorates are headed by Deputy Comptrollers General. Under the DCG Finance and Accounts there are three Divisions headed by Assistant Comptrollers General namely:

1. Accounts Division
2. Budget Division
3. Revenue Division

Under the Human Resources Management Directorate, there are three Divisions each headed by an Assistant Comptroller General namely:

1. Administration and Personnel Division
2. Staff Welfare and Gender
3. Training and Staff.

Under the Operations and Passport Directorate, there are five Divisions. All Divisions in all the Directorates are headed by Assistant Comptrollers General. The divisions under this Directorate are namely:

1. Visa/Entry Permit
2. Residence Card (Combined Expatriate Residence Permit and Aliens Card-CERPAC)
3. State Coordination
4. Standard Passport
5. Other Travel Documents
Under Border Patrol, ECOWAS and African Affairs, there four Divisions namely:

1. Land Border Division
2. Marine Border
3. Air Border Patrol
4. ECOWAS and African Affairs.

There are two Divisions under Works and Procurement namely:

1. Works and
2. Procurement

In investigation, Inspectorate and Enforcement Directorate there are four Divisions namely:

1. Investigation and Intelligence
2. Anti Human Trafficking
3. Inspectorate and Enforcement
4. Migrations and Aliens

Also in Planning, Research and Statistics Directorate there are three Divisions namely:

1. Planning
2. Research
3. ICT.

There are eight zonal commands each headed by an Assistant Comptroller General. The Zonal offices are located at Lagos, Kaduna, Bauchi, Minna, Owerri, Ibadan, Benin, and Makurdi. There are forty State Commands all over Nigeria. There is one in each State and The FCT. There five in Lagos presently as against the approved six. The State Commands come under the Zonal headquarters. In each local government area of each State there are local government immigration offices headed by Divisional Immigration officers. So in each
of the 774 local governments of Nigeria, there are immigration offices. Immigration has control posts at all the legally permitted border posts in Nigeria. The NIS men also take charge of any suspected illegal route.

The institutional responsibility of the NIS is to maintain Nigeria's border security. This means that the NIS has the responsibility of making Nigeria free of security challenges from immigrants. To this effect, the NIS is deeply involved with the Joint Task Force (JTF) that is fighting to repel Boko Haram terrorists that operate mostly from across Nigeria's border in the North East. This point is buttressed with Circular number NIS/HQ/ADM/10/T of 25th January, 2012 titled "Strengthening Security at our Formations/Facilities". In this circular, the Comptroller General of the NIS has this to say "you are all aware of the recent security challenges facing our country and the NIS from the threats of the Boko Haram Sect. Of recent, there have been bomb attacks on our offices in Damaturu and Kano, in which the service lost Officers, Properties and several others wounded. The unpredictability of these attacks and their ever expanding theatre of war, calls for renewed vigorous efforts in all our formations to improve our security.

It is strongly believed that the NIS has become a target of these attacks because of its role in the recent closing of borders, biometric registration of non Nigerians, repatriation of illegal immigrants (perhaps adherents of the Boko Haram Sect), and participation in JTF operations.

Following the Top Emergency Management meeting held on Monday, 23rd January, 2012’ the Comptroller General of Immigration directed as follows:

1. That zonal/State Commands and Training Institutions should deploy at least, 30% of their junior officers to secure our buildings and facilities in their respective commands, particularly the Passport Offices.
2. That all Officers/men should be sensitized on the current security challenges to ensure that they are conscious of their environments.

3. That Zones/Commands and Training Institutions should submit security and intelligence reports on monthly basis to the Service Headquarters, indicating current intelligence information concerning their areas of jurisdiction.

4. That officers deployed to all the Local Government Area Offices should be rendering frequent security reports to their Comptrollers.

5. That all officers and men should acquire whistles to alert others in case of emergencies.

6. That all Commands should strategize on quick response to attacks especially at the borderlines.

7. That the list of all untrained junior officers should be forwarded to SHQ without further delay for necessary action.

Problem of Cross border crime of Terrorism as the major security challenge to the NIS. It has been a long time problem from across the borders that religious fundamentalists have launched attacks on Nigerian populations from across the borders. It has ranged from Maitatsine, Ibrahim Zak Zakky to Boko Haram. Some have claimed to be the Khalifa using religion as a tool to achieve political goals. The present menace is the Boko Haram fundamentalist terrorist group. This can be attested to by some official documents:

1. ABJ/HQ/OPS/731/T of 3rd May, 2012 titled Boko Haram Liaison With the Tuareg Rebels of Northern Mali. In this circular, the CGIS said that information reaching the office indicates that during the takeover of Northern Mali by the Tuaregs, substantial number of Boko Haram Trainees were spotted in that region. Boko Haram elements numbering more than two hundred (200), were reported to have fought alongside the Tuaregs during the capture of the City of Gao. Most of the Boko Haram operatives are from Kano and only a few are from Niger Republic. However, the eventual return of
Boko Haram operatives to Nigeria portends a serious national security challenge. It is expected that the Tuareg fighters if allowed to settle in Northern Mali, would lend support on quid pro quo basis to Boko Haram activities in Nigeria. In view of the above, you are expected to exercise extra vigilance to prevent the infiltration of black and white-skinned Arabs who may seek entrance into the country.

2. ABJ/HQ/OPS/1009/T of 7th May, 2012 titled Security Alert. In this circular, the CGIS referred to the Security Alert from the office of the Inspector General of Police, Ref: letter CB.0900/IGP SEC/ABJ/VOL.56/661 of 3rd May, 2012 and to draw your attention to the contents in which planned attacks of border areas, commercial centres and market places where huge cash transactions take place are targets of terrorist and criminal elements. Also, smuggling of Arms and Ammunitions with the involvement of citizens of neighboring countries across the borders to Nigeria is part of their nefarious activities. In view of above, you are to reinforce the presence of your officers/men and beef up security in your border area and environs, intensify intelligence gathering and prepare your personnel for support operation with other Security Agencies to counter such attacks when necessary. Treat as important, while remaining vigilant with a view to reporting suspicious movements to the appropriate authorities and situation reports promptly forwarded to the Service Headquarters for further necessary actions.

3. IMM/ABJ/NV/8309/Vol.1/23 of 26th June, 2012 titled Plans by the Boko Haram Sect to Smuggle Arms Ammunition and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Components into Nigeria. Here the Deputy Comptroller General for Investigation informs of the receipt of a security alert on concluded plans by the Boko Haram Sect and its external affiliates to smuggle large quantities of arms, Ammunitions and IEDs components from Mali and Ivory Coast from 14th June, 2012. The Sect's operatives from Mali are expected to pass through Maje-Kontagora-Birnin-Gwari to Abuja. The arms and Ammunitions to be
transported along the Maje-Kontagora axis will be concealed in a truck loaded with second hand clothing. The operatives coming from Côte d'Ivoire are expected to pass through Ghana, Togo up to Idiroko in Ogun State, Nigeria. In view of this, the Comptroller General directs that our officers and men along these designated routes be put on high alert. In view of the looming danger this threat poses to national security, there is need to strengthen our border control management mechanism.
CHAPTER TWO   LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review

Adedeji Ebo (2008) seeks to explore specific challenges as well as discernible opportunities for parliamentary oversight of the security sector in West Africa. It provides an overview of the performance of selected West African parliaments in the area of security sector oversight, based on a compilation of country studies from Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

Two main criteria informed the selection of countries covered in this volume: the different political contexts in West Africa (fragile, post-conflict and consolidating states) and the diverse colonial influences of Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries in the sub-region. The book also takes the sub-regional dimension of the issue into account by analyzing the growing role played by the Parliament of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in security sector governance.

While identifying good practices in parliamentary oversight of the security sector, this book provides parliamentarians, policy makers and other practitioners with a number of solutions for improving the quality of parliamentary oversight of the security sector in West Africa.

Adeola and Fayomi (2012) reveal that International migration between Nigeria and her neighbors has been a source of concern in the formulation and articulation of diplomatic and foreign policy of the nation. The porosity of Nigerian borders has made it possible for unwarranted influx of migrants from neighboring States to enter the country illegally from such countries as Republic of Niger, Chad and Republic of Benin. This paper explores the process of migration between Nigeria and her neighbors when the issue has served as a basis
of determining the foreign policy direction of the State. Also, it explores the political and
diplomatic consequences and impact of such a policy to eradicating international terrorism,
criminality and smuggling which have become intractable. This work gives a very good
insight to the challenges of immigration from Nigeria's neighbors. However, these three
mentioned countries are not the only sources of unwanted immigrants to Nigeria. Nigeria
experiences both economic, political and security challenges from unwanted immigrants from
other areas like Mali, Ghana, Cameroon among others as this present work has shown.

Adepoju (2004) provides an overview of several trends that will continue to provide
African policy makers with the difficult task of addressing migration complexities. The paper
addresses the following trends: (1) feminization of migration; (2) diversification of migration
destinations; (3) transformation of labour flows into commercial migration; (4) brain drain
from the region; (5) human trafficking, especially of women and children; (6) spreading of
AIDS; and (7) the role of regional economic organizations in fostering free flows of labour.
The work offers no concrete solutions. However, he argues that protocols cannot address the
free movement of people unless key stakeholders eliminate political and endemic conflicts.
Without this effort, sustainable development and security cannot effectively address Africa’s
migration challenges. In providing these several trends the scholar has ignored the role of the
NIS in the process of international migration. It is this gap that this present work has filled.

Adepoju (2007) says that the migration trends highlighted in this paper include
complex patterns involving internal, cross-border, intra- and interregional mobility, as well as
emigration from Africa. These movement patterns can be further dissected by South-South
migration, South-North migration, rural-rural migration, and rural-urban migration. The
author also addresses the increasing feminization of migration and its effect on the families
left behind. The author provides a thorough overview of these different migration patterns,
causes and effects, role of remittances and Diaspora, trafficking trends, and expected
development trends. He concludes by highlighting the challenge of balancing the aging populations in the North with the increasing population growth in sub-Saharan Africa. This complexity will create overwhelmingly difficult challenges for shaping development policies going forward. This scholar has also failed to link these migrations to the institutional responsibility of the NIS in managing international migration as it concerns Nigeria.

Adepoju (2008) argues that increasing population growth is at the root of international migration due to its linkages with unemployment and labour force growth. The large numbers of youth have added to the growing pool of unemployed and underemployed workers. He stresses that governments play a critical role in designing appropriate employment opportunities so that the youth can contribute economically, socially, and politically, thus offsetting the growing incidence of irregular migration, trafficking, drug abuse and violence. He also suggests that government must invest in raising female literacy due to its impact on the health and nutritional status of families. He concludes by arguing that the responsibility for fighting poverty should be borne by the government in partnership with communities and families at the grassroots level and argues that the path to ending poverty is through improved education and access to employment. The author does not give us an insight on how these illegal migrations can be curtailed by the NIS. It is this lacuna that this present work has done.

Alan Bryden (2008) intended to contribute to confidence and peace-building through developing a better understanding of the challenges of security sector governance and generating practical policy recommendations based on work conducted by West African experts. It analyses the nature of security sector governance in each of the 16 West African states, provides an assessment of the effectiveness of governance mechanisms, in particular relating to democratic oversight of the security sector, and takes into account the regional and
international dimensions to the issue. This book will be very relevant to security in West African because it captures the very essence of West African security.

Beggts (2008) observes that despite the inherently trans-boundary nature of international migration and the interdependence of states’ migration policies, there is no formal multilateral institutional framework regulating states’ responses to international migration. There is no UN Migration Organization and no international migration regime, and sovereign states retain a significant degree of autonomy in determining their migration policies. International migration divides into a range of different policy categories: low-skilled labor migration, high-skilled labor migration, irregular migration, international travel, lifestyle migration, environmental migration, human trafficking and smuggling, asylum and refugee protection, internally displaced people, Diaspora, remittances, and root causes. Each of these is regulated differently at the global level. They vary along a spectrum in terms of the degree of formal institutional cooperation that exists – from asylum and refugee protection, which has a formal regime and a UN organization, to labor migration, which is largely unregulated at the global level. Yet, overall, the degree of institutionalized cooperation that exists in all of these areas is relatively limited in comparison to many other trans-boundary issue-areas. Beggts has largely ignored the issues of migration as it concerns Nigeria which is a major origin country for migrants. This work wants to contribute to knowledge by providing migration data from Nigeria.

Cross (2006) address migration flows between countries and regions within Africa. They collectively acknowledge the trend that an increasing number of Africans are migrating from rural to urban centers. However, they argue that African countries have not yet prioritized migration at the top of their policy agenda. Therefore, they support promoting and disseminating better research data, increasing capacity building efforts, mobilizing government resources, and sharing expertise in the field in an effort to work toward
guidelines that can better shape African migration policies. These scholars have only concentrated on policies while ignoring what happens in the field with the immigration services of the various states.

Frédéric and Rapoport (2004) focus on the consequences of skilled migration for source (developing) countries. They first present new evidence on the magnitude of the “brain drain” at the international level. Using a unified stylized model of education investment in a context of migration, they then survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of highly-skilled emigration on human capital formation in developing countries. Finally they use a particular specification of the model to discuss possible implications of skilled emigration for migration, education and taxation policy.

De Haas (2008) aims to put the debate on migration and development in a broader historical perspective of migration theory in particular and social theory in general. The scholarly debate on migration and development has tended to swing back and forth like a pendulum, from developmentalist optimism in the 1950s and 1960s, to structuralist and neo-Marxist pessimism and skepticism over the 1970s and 1980s, to more nuanced views influenced by the new economics of labour migration, “livelihood” approaches and the transnational turn in migration studies as of the 1990s. Such discursive shifts in the scholarly debate on migration and development should be primarily seen as part of more general paradigm shifts in social theory. The shift that occurred over the 1990s was part of a more general shift away from grand structuralist or functionalist theories towards more pluralist, hybrid and structuralist approaches attempting to reconcile structure and actor perspectives. However, attempts to combine different theoretical perspectives are more problematic than sometimes suggested due to incommensurability issues and associated disciplinary divisions.
Since 2000, there has been a remarkable, and rather sudden, renaissance of optimistic views, in particular in the policy debate, as well as a boom in empirical work on migration and development. This has coincided with the rediscovery of remittances as a “bottom up” source of development finance and the celebration of the transnational engagement of migrants with the development of their origin societies. However, such optimism has tended to go along with a striking level of amnesia of decades of prior research. Migration and development is anything but a new topic. The accumulated empirical and theoretical evidence stress the fundamentally heterogeneous nature of migration-development interactions as well as their contingency on spatial and temporal scales of analysis and more general processes of social and economic change, which should forestall any blanket assertions on migration-development interactions.

Current policy and scholarly discourses naively celebrating migration, remittances and transnational engagement as self-help development “from below” also shift attention away from the relevance of structural constraints and the important role states and other institutions play in shaping favorable general conditions for social and economic development to occur. This raises the fundamental question whether the recent shift towards optimistic views reflects a veritable change in (increasingly trans-nationally framed) migration-development interactions, the use of other methodological and analytical tools, or is rather the deductive echo of a general paradigm shift from dependency and state-centrist to neoliberal and neoclassical views in general.

The lack of theoretical rootedness and largely descriptive nature of much empirical work has haunted the improvement of theories. As a result of the general lack of a common theoretical thread, most empirical work – especially from outside migration economics – remains isolated, scattered, and theoretically under-explored. Real progress in the understanding of the factors determining the fundamental heterogeneity of migration and
development interactions is only possible if more empirical work is designed to test theoretically derived hypotheses and, hence, to improve the generalized understanding of migration-development interactions.

Hannah Cross (2014) says that people from West Africa are risking their lives and surrendering their citizenship rights to enter exploitative labour markets in Europe. This book offers an explanation for this phenomenon that is based on close analysis of the contradictory economic and political agendas that create and constrain labour migration. It shows how global capitalism regulates different stages of the process within an interconnected system of economic dispossession, the construction of an illegal status, border control, labour exploitation and processes of underdevelopment. This is summarized as a regime of ‘unfree labour mobility’.

Combined with structural and historical approaches, this book is based on ethnographic research. It incorporates those who are left behind, those who decide to stay, migrants who fail and those who are on the move, alongside clustered migrant communities in Senegal, Mauritania and Spain. The book’s panoramic approach shows how West African ‘step-wise’ journeys to Europe by land and sea sees competing territorial and economic policies regulating an unstable and unpredictable trajectory, creating ‘illegal’ labour through dual logics of border security and selective labour mobility.

This book demonstrates that the diverse channels through which people migrate in the modern era are mediated by European states and labour markets, which utilize border regimes to control labour and be globally competitive. The themes and patterns that emerge, in their context of inter-generational change, present a challenge to the accepted wisdom about the individual and household dynamics of labour migration. This book is of interest to students and scholars of migration, trans-nationalism, politics, security, development, economics, and sociology."
Makinwa (1987) claims that Nigeria, the largest country in Western Africa, has been attracting migrants from neighboring countries for the past decade. Although most of the movement of African migrants has occurred outside the regulatory framework set up to control migration, it is important to know the main elements of the latter to understand the likely limitations of the data collection systems currently in operation. Sources of data on international migration include censuses, arrival and departure statistics, work and resident permits, and sample surveys. The author concludes that, with the exception of information on residence and work permits, the relationship between Nigeria's data sources and the laws regulating migration is weak. Arrival and departure statistics, in particular, are not designed to distinguish migrants from all other international travelers. Lacking the political will to modify the system in accordance with internationally accepted recommendations, the prospects for increasing the usefulness of available data are grim. Makinwa focuses only on immigrants but we are going to add to this the emigration aspect of migration.

Mutume (2006) addresses the complex issues of migration as it relates to the phenomenon of “globalization,” whereby information, commodities, and money flow freely between national boundaries. However, this does not mean that migrants have the same ability. He notes that policymakers are grappling with this disparity, as globalization has not led to the creation of sustainable job opportunities, especially in rural sub-Saharan Africa. With the increase in international migration, he argues that development policies should provide benefits to both industrial and developing nations to spur economic growth. By doing so, migrants would be able to send remittances home and work their way out of poverty. He concludes by noting that migration can be positive for migrants, for their destination, and for the homes they leave behind. Mutume has not done much to connect the so-called benefits of migration to the reasons that influence people to migrate.
OECD (2001) in four sections presents the analysis of the main trends in international migration. The first looks at changes in migration movements and in the foreign population of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries. The second section reviews policies to regulate and control flows and the whole range of measures to promote the integration of migrants in host countries. It also describes recent moves to enhance cooperation between host countries and countries of origin in the spheres of migration and development.

Ogbeide (2011) states that in recent times, terrorism has become one of the most dangerous threats to peace and order nationally and globally. It is so pervasive that no country on earth can claim immunity from its violent acts of bombing, shooting, armed robbery, kidnapping, hostage-taking and bank robbery. This paper examines this global human phenomenon through the analysis of its various definitions, its nature and consequences. Based on the analysis, the paper proffers a ten-point policy recommendation for enhancing the existing instruments and frameworks in the security services that would foster inter-agency cooperation in combating terrorism in Nigeria.

Olayinka and Olutayo (2012) says that although international migration has received significant attention in literature, this is usually in respect of development and remittances. Methodological issues on the subject are very scarce more so relative to the interface of kinship and international return migration. Yet methodological issues remain crucial to useful understanding of the processes and dynamics of the problem. The paper relied on the authors’ methodological experiences while undertaking research among international returnees and their kin in Nigeria. It concludes that it is impossible to successfully research international migration, especially return, within kinship frameworks, for sustainable development in developing nations without deploying original, innovative nuanced and context specific
research methodology like the one adopted in this article. What these scholars have failed to do is link return migration to emigration for their work to be well understood.

Oli Brown (2008) says that traditionally seen as an environmental and an energy issue, climate change is now also being cast as a threat to international peace and security. Africa, though the least responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, is seen as the continent most likely to suffer its worst consequences—a function of the continent’s reliance on climate-dependent sectors (such as rain-fed agriculture) and its history of resource, ethnic and political conflict.

The security implications of climate change have become the subject of unprecedented international attention; in 2007 climate change was the focus of both a Security Council debate and the Nobel Peace Prize. There have been some attempts to construct scenarios of the ways in which warming temperatures might undermine security at a global scale. But the country-level security impacts of climate change have been lost in the political rhetoric. Local experts are rarely consulted. This book has helped to address the issue of demographic and environmental concerns of international migration in West Africa.

This paper is a modest effort to address this research gap. Drawing on field visits and consultations with local experts, this paper explores the extent to which climate change may undermine security in two different countries in West Africa, Ghana and Burkina Faso.

Omelaniuk (2005) addresses migration pattern and expands the study by examining the circumstances of women left at home. To this point, she addresses the need to compare the livelihood impacts of females in host countries with those females remaining behind. Although she notes positive impacts of female migration on poverty is minimal, migration can indirectly help alleviate poverty by raising productivity, education, and health of females and their families. However, she contends that more data is needed about gender analyses to
better understand the benefits of migration for poverty reduction and the specific contributions provided by females and males. With this information, origin and destination countries can develop more inclusive policies that incorporate women with different migration patterns.

Parrenas (2001) says that Servants of Globalization is a poignant and often troubling study of migrant Filipino domestic workers who leave their own families behind to do the mothering and care-taking work of the global economy in countries throughout the world. It specifically focuses on the emergence of parallel lives among such workers in the cities of Rome and Los Angeles, two main destinations for Filipino migration.

The book is largely based on interviews with domestic workers, but the book also powerfully portrays the larger economic picture as domestic workers from developing countries increasingly come to perform the menial labor of the global economy. This is often done at great cost to the relations with their own split-apart families. The experiences of migrant Filipino domestic workers are also shown to entail a feeling of exclusion from their host society, a downward mobility from their professional jobs in the Philippines, and an encounter with both solidarity and competition from other migrant workers in their communities.

The author applies a new theoretical lens to the study of migration—the level of the subject, moving away from the two dominant theoretical models in migration literature, the macro and the intermediate. At the same time, she analyzes the three spatial terrains of the various institutions that migrant Filipino domestic workers inhabit—the local, the transnational, and the global. She draws upon the literature of international migration, sociology of the family, women's work, and cultural studies to illustrate the reconfiguration of the family community and social identity in migration and globalization. The book shows
how globalization not only propels the migration of Filipino domestic workers but also results in the formation of parallel realities among them in cities with greatly different contexts of reception.

Roger (1998) discusses perspectives of local agency in the age of the world city. It presents a brief critique of the debate on globalization and posits that globalization makes states. This includes a discussion of the local state as a complex creature of state and civil society, of the regulatory power of the urban and of the world city as a site of the emergence of the post national state. While it can be argued that globalization hollows out the state and helps facilitate the replacement of state by non-state institutions in the market or civil society, it also creates new forms of states. The state does not wither away but is rather reincarnated in a plethora of forms on many socio-spatial scales. Globalization makes states but these differ from the ones we used to know. States no longer seem to be absolute control of governmental processes because globalization goes beyond the power of an individual state to control. This article concentrates on those new forms of governance that occur on the urban level, particularly in so-called world or global cities. It makes the case for the recognition of the urban as a relevant site of the political in the era of globalization. Politics in the world cities is concerned with the governance of complexity which can be understood best through a combination of regime theory, regulation theory and discuss theory.

Russell (2012) reviews the various types of migration, and emphasizes the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the study and theorization of migration. In the main part of the paper the author provides a personalized overview of theories of international migration, divided into the following sections: push-pull theory and the neoclassical approach; migration and development transitions; historical-structural and political economy models; the role of systems and networks; the ‘new economics’ of migration; and finally approaches based on the ‘transnational turn’ in migration studies. In the conclusion he points up some future
challenges to theorizing migration: the need to embed the study of migration within global processes of social, economic and political transformation and within the biographies of migrants’ life-courses; the importance of also explaining why people do not migrate, and the notion of access to mobility as a differentiating factor of class and inequality; and the relevance of existential and emotional dimensions of migration. The paper is explicitly aimed at a student audience and is intended as a primer to understanding some of the complexities and challenges of theorizing migration.

Stephen (2000) claims that at the beginning of the 1990s, migration suddenly took a prominent place on the international political agenda: the upheavals surrounding the collapse of the Soviet bloc led to uncontrolled influxes of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers to Western Europe and North America. The result was a flurry of diplomatic activity and international meetings, leading to stricter border controls and attempts to limit certain types of mobility. By the late 1990s, it became clear that the mass migrations would not eventuate and migration was once again seen as a secondary issue in western countries. However, in East Asia, the financial crisis of 1997-99 led to a similar politicization of migration, with migrants being blamed for economic and social problems. Attempts at mass deportation and stricter border control were made, with limited success.

Tanner (2007) argues against the positive aspects of emigration. He agrees that emigration would continue and could be somewhat beneficial. However, he argues that highly skilled labour movement out of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has devastating consequences on the overall development of the region. He examines case studies in Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe and draws thought-provoking conclusions of emigration trends. For example, with the emigration of physicians from Malawi, the health care system has become severely crippled in the fight against HIV/AIDS. This leaves a large hole in HIV prevention as sub-Saharan migrants tend not to return, as remittances are erratic and do not offset emigration.
costs. To reverse this trend, he concludes with recommendations for specific policies that target foreign development aid to mitigate the negative consequences of SSA’s “brain drain.”

Truong (2006) investigates the boundary between migration and human trafficking from the dual perspectives of governance and poverty, and offers some insights into rethinking best practices. Her academic research indicates that the framework of migration management is bifurcated into “trade-connected mobility,” which is protected by government, and “mobility to sustain livelihood,” which is subject to punitive measures with limited scope to protect human rights. With the rise of migration of women, children, and young people in a growing population, human trafficking issues have increased and will put added stress on infrastructure and policy-makers. She suggests a human rights approach to migration management and concludes that new best practice concepts need to address alternative governance approaches toward human rights (especially migration management, crime, labour standards, poverty reduction, and communities at risk) since current protection has variant policies depending on what people, which location, and what interest is involved.

Van Blerk (2008) has taken an unconventional approach to understanding migrating youth, marginalized through poverty. By drawing on interviews with sixty young female sex workers in Ethiopia, she demonstrates that sex work may be a risky and vulnerable option, but often provides independence for rural-to-urban female migrants. This is not to say that she believes in this manner of employment as a means to independence. In fact, she argues that sex work in Ethiopia is extremely risky with no legal protection. However, her research demonstrates that sex work can provide a successful transition to adulthood. She concludes by stating that policymakers need to learn more about young people and draft policies that provide independence and different employment options for migrating youth, especially girls. Many Nigerian girls also migrate for sex work especially to Italy. Many Nigerian girls especially from Edo State and sparingly Akwa Ibom State are trafficked to Italy and other
European countries for sex work. Blerk has not provided any information on the plight of Nigerian girls migrating to Italy.

William (2007) reviews the economic literature on international migration in ten African countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda), as a contribution to a larger study on migration in Africa. While the selection of countries is motivated by the plan of the larger study, these countries serve as useful illustrations of the range of migration experiences in Africa. Included are some of the poorer and some of the (relatively) richer countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region; stable countries and others that have suffered internal and external conflicts; and countries that serve as destinations for migrants from other African countries but are sources of migrants to Europe and America, others that are both source and destination countries for African migrants, and some that have shifted from principally destination to source countries over time. This review will focus on the economic implications of migration, while recognizing that migration also may have important social and political impacts. The main body of the paper covers an overview of the available data on migration in the 10 countries, the benefits and risks involved in migration, the impact of migration on destination countries (an area where lack of data seriously constrains analysis), the implications for origin countries (remittances, other diaspora benefits, and the brain drain), and a discussion of health aspects of migration. He concludes with a discussion of priorities for future research, from the perspective of next steps in the broader Africa research project. William attempts to provide an integrated view of the migration experience in the ten countries based on examples from the literature, rather than a comprehensive survey of all that have been written. The annex covers additional material and data on each country that do not fit well into the main study.
It is important to note that our review of literature exposed a number of gaps, particularly the dearth of literature on the NIS and its role in migration management. It was also discovered that despite Nigeria being a major country of origin, most of the existing literature do not take their data from this country. These works base their studies mainly on migration issues as they concern the destination countries. Generally, there is a dearth of up-to-date knowledge on the dynamics of international migration in Nigeria. It is known that there is a massive inflow of immigrants to Nigeria especially from her West African neighbors, the dynamics of the volume, directions of the flows and other aspects of international migration are still indefinite.

How is border security managed in other countries like the USA? The choice of the US for a comparative analysis is due to the fact that the US seems to have perfected the act of border security control. It will be good to review The US border control management to help us come to terms with an ideal way for managing our own borders. It can be argued that the US has perfected border control but one should not forget the fact that American borderline is security friendly. On her east is a stretch of coastline on the Pacific Ocean that is thousands of Sea nautical miles away from Europe and Africa. On her west is coastline that ends nowhere. On her north is a friendly stretch of borderline with Canada. It is only on her south that there are security challenges with Mexican Drug Barons. Even at that, it a straight borderline. This is where Nigerian borderline can attract some sympathy. Nigeria's own borderline is as difficult as activities through them.

Border Security Overview shows that protecting American borders from the illegal movement of weapons, drugs, contraband, and people, while promoting lawful entry and exit, is essential to homeland security, economic prosperity, and national sovereignty. Border Security Results have shown that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has deployed unprecedented levels of personnel, technology, and resources and has made critical security
improvements to secure and manage the US borders. Through a multi-layered, risk based system, DHS has taken significant steps to ensure that immigration benefits are not granted to individuals who pose a threat to national security. DHS uses biometrics to help secure US borders and transportation. The US government has adopted common sense policies that ensure US immigration laws are enforced in a way that best enhances public safety, border security and the integrity of the immigration system.

Department of Homeland Security works internationally not only to maintain US physical security, but also protect their economic security. DHS works closely with international partners to strengthen the security of the networks of global trade and travel upon which the nation's economy and communities rely. Protecting the American people from terrorist threats is the reason the Department of Homeland Security was created, and remains their highest priority. They protect the nation’s health security by providing early detection and early warning of bio-terrorist attacks. The threat posed by violent extremism is neither constrained by international borders nor limited to any single ideology. Critical infrastructure is the physical and cyber systems and assets so vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on US physical or economic security or public health or safety. DHS’ nuclear detection and forensics missions are key elements of the U.S. government's wide-ranging approach to preventing attacks by terrorists and potential state sponsors. Protecting the United States from terrorism is the founding mission of DHS. While America is stronger and more resilient as a result of a strengthened homeland security enterprise, threats from terrorism persist and continue to evolve. The US takes proactive policies to ensure national security. It is a comprehensive policy that covers all aspects of national security.

Strengthening National Capacity—A Whole of Government Approach. To succeed, the US updates, balances, and integrates all of the tools of American power and work with
their allies and partners to do the same. Their aim is that their military must maintain its conventional superiority and, as long as nuclear weapons exist, US nuclear deterrent capability, while continuing to enhance its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats, preserve access to the global commons, and strengthen partners. They must invest in diplomacy and development capabilities and institutions in a way that complements and reinforces their global partners. Their intelligence capabilities must continuously evolve to identify and characterize conventional and asymmetric threats and provide timely insight. And they integrate their approach to homeland security with their broader national security approach.

They are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within their military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly. They are also improving coordinated planning and policymaking and build their capacity in key areas where they fall short. This requires close cooperation with Congress and a deliberate and inclusive interagency process, so that they achieve integration of their efforts to implement and monitor operations, policies, and strategies. To initiate this effort, the White House merged the staffs of the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council.

However, work remains to foster coordination across departments and agencies. Key steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with the US national security strategy, adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination.

• **Defense:** The US government is strengthening the military to ensure that it can prevail in today’s wars; to prevent and deter threats against the United States, its interests, and her allies and partners; and prepare to defend the United States in a wide range of contingencies against state and non-state actors. They continue to rebalance the military capabilities to excel at
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring their force is ready to address the full range of military operations. This includes preparing for increasingly sophisticated adversaries, deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access environments, and defending the United States and supporting civil authorities at home. The most valuable component of US national defense is the men and women who make up America’s all-volunteer force. They have shown tremendous resilience, adaptability, and capacity for innovation, and the government provides the service members with the resources that they need to succeed and rededicate themselves to providing support and care for wounded warriors, veterans, and military families. The State sets the force on a path to sustainable deployment cycles and preserves and enhances the long-term viability of the force through successful recruitment, retention, and recognition of those who serve.

- **Diplomacy**: Diplomacy is as fundamental to national security as defense capability. The diplomats are the first line of engagement, listening to US partners, learning from them, building respect for one another, and seeking common ground. Diplomats, development experts, and others in the United States Government work side by side to support a common agenda. New skills are needed to foster effective interaction to convene, connect, and mobilize not only other governments and international organizations, but also non-state actors such as corporations, foundations, nongovernmental organizations, universities, think tanks, and faith-based organizations, all of whom increasingly have a distinct role to play on both diplomatic and development issues. To accomplish these goals diplomatic personnel and missions are expanded at home and abroad to support the increasingly transnational nature of 21st century security challenges. And the State provides the appropriate authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs and grow the civilian expeditionary capacity required to assist governments on a diverse array of issues.
• Economic: US economic institutions are crucial components of national capacity and US economic instruments are the bedrock of sustainable national growth, prosperity and influence. The Office of Management and Budget, Departments of the Treasury, State, Commerce, Energy, and Agriculture, United States Trade Representative, Federal Reserve Board, and other institutions help manage currency, trade, foreign investment, deficit, inflation, productivity, and national competitiveness. Remaining a vibrant 21st century economic power also requires close cooperation between and among developed nations and emerging markets because of the interdependent nature of the global economy. America—like other nations—is dependent upon overseas markets to sell its exports and maintain access to scarce commodities and resources. Thus, finding overlapping mutual economic interests with other nations and maintaining those economic relationships are key elements of national security strategy.

• Development: Development is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative. Government focusing on assisting developing countries and their people to manage security threats, reap the benefits of global economic expansion, and set in place accountable and democratic institutions that serve basic human needs. Through an aggressive and affirmative development agenda and commensurate resources, the US strengthens the regional partners need to help her stop conflicts and counter global criminal networks; build a stable, inclusive global economy with new sources of prosperity; advance democracy and human rights; and ultimately position the US to better address key global challenges by growing the ranks of prosperous, capable, and democratic states that can be her partners in the decades ahead. To do this, government is expanding US civilian development capability; engaging with international financial institutions that leverage US resources and advance her objectives; pursuing a development budget that more deliberately reflects her policies and strategy, not
sector earmarks; and ensuring that US policy instruments are aligned in support of development objectives.

- **Homeland Security**: Homeland security traces its roots to traditional and historic functions of government and society, such as civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border patrol, and immigration. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the foundation of the Department of Homeland Security, these functions have taken on new organization and urgency. Homeland security, therefore, strives to adapt these traditional functions to confront new threats and evolving hazards. It is not simply about government action alone, but rather about the collective strength of the entire country. US approach relies on their shared efforts to identify and interdict threats; deny hostile actors the ability to operate within US borders; maintain effective control of her physical borders; safeguard lawful trade and travel into and out of the United States; disrupt and dismantle transnational terrorist, and criminal organizations; and ensure national resilience in the face of the threat and hazards. Taken together, these efforts must support a homeland that is safe and secure from terrorism and other hazards and in which American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive. ([www.dhs.gov/visited26/07/13](http://www.dhs.gov/visited26/07/13))

- **Intelligence**: US safety and prosperity depend on the quality of the intelligence they collect and the analysis they produce, their ability to evaluate and share this information in a timely manner, and their ability to counter intelligence threats. This is as true for the strategic intelligence that informs executive decisions as it is for intelligence support to homeland security, state, local, and tribal governments, her troops, and critical national missions. Government is working to better integrate the Intelligence Community, while also enhancing the capabilities of her Intelligence Community members. The State is strengthening US partnerships with foreign intelligence services and sustaining strong ties with her close allies. And government continues to invest in the men and women of the Intelligence Community.
• **Strategic Communications**: Across all of her efforts, effective strategic communications are essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting US policy aims. Aligning their actions with their words is a shared responsibility that must be fostered by a culture of communication throughout government. The State must be more effective in her deliberate communication and engagement and do a better job understanding the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of peoples—not just elites—around the world. Doing so allows her to convey credible, consistent messages and to develop effective plans, while better understanding how her actions will be perceived. They must also use a broad range of methods for communicating with foreign publics, including news media.

• **The American People and the Private Sector**: The ideas, values, energy, creativity, and resilience of American citizens are America’s greatest resource. We will support the development of prepared, vigilant, and engaged communities and underscore that their citizens are the heart of a resilient country. And they must tap the ingenuity outside government through strategic partnerships with the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and community-based organizations. Such partnerships are critical to U.S. success at home and abroad, and the US supports them through enhanced opportunities for engagement, coordination, transparency, and information sharing (Department of Homeland Security July 15, 2013)

2.2 Theoretical Framework

There are two theoretical explanations that this study has relied on. These are the institutional theory and the migration theory. The institutional theory and the migration theory are very comprehensive and relevant to this study.
Institutional Theory

The first theory that this work utilizes is the institutional theory. Institutional theory considers the causal role of institutions (values, norms, rules, procedures, structures) in determining particular outcomes. Though institutionalism can focus on the micro foundations of institutions, it tends to consider them over time. It examines how institutions shape actors' preferences, highlight some 'paths' while blocking others. Institutionalism locks actors into particular positions or courses of action (path dependency). For this reason, institutionalism has difficulty explaining change, except through the use of 'critical junctures', which are openings created in otherwise fossilized institutional patterns; these openings usually are the product of crises, power turnover, and other macro-level structural changes that are exogenous to the institutions themselves. One part of this field of study is attempting to create theories of endogenous institutional change by looking at how change at the margins works itself toward the core institutions.

Institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It considers the processes by which structures, including schemas; rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. It inquires into how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline and disuse. Although the ostensible subject is stability and order in social life, students of institutions must perforce attend not just to consensus and conformity but to conflict and change in social structures (Scott 2004).

A key turning point in the rise of the new institutionalism is the development of a perspective in which the actors of modern society are seen, not simply as influenced by the wider environment, but as constructed in and by it (Jepperson, 2002).
The concept of ‘actor,’ in this scheme, is far removed from that envisioned in realist perspectives. The realists imagine that people are really bounded and purposive and sovereign actors, and that it is the same thing with nation-states. And so are the organizations deriving from these. The sociological institutionalists, on the other hand, suppose that actor-hood is a role or identity, as in a theatrical world (Frank and Meyer 2002): individual actors, in this usage, have socially conferred rights and responsibilities, and socially conferred agency to represent these (and other) interests. Actor-hood, in this usage, is guided by institutional structures; and the relation between actor and action is no longer a simple causal one – both elements have institutional rules behind them, and their relation has, causally speaking, strong elements of socially constructed tautology. That is, the actor–action relation is a package, and as people and groups enter into particular forms of actor-hood, the appropriate actions come along and are not usefully to be seen as choices and decisions.

The institutionalization argument, therefore, is that institutions must become institutions; being an institution is a variable not a constant, and not all are as fully institutionalized as are others. For example, a new civil service system created in a post-socialist country may have had some of the formal structural attributes of similar institutions elsewhere, but would not yet have developed the value structure or the autonomy that would enable us to typify it as fully institutionalized civil service system. Selznick (1957) argued that institutionalization involves “infusing a structure with value”, so in the case of emerging civil services it would be argued that the structures must be animated by the appropriate values, not just have formal structures than could be recognized as being like those in long-standing democracies (Verheijen, 1999). The assessment of the state of an institution must, of course, be more than a judgment call and we therefore need to develop some criteria to assess the extent of institutionalization. One set of criteria of institutionalization has been advanced by Samuel Huntington, who argues that there are four dimensions through which we can judge the level
of institutionalization of any structure that we observe: autonomy, adaptability, complexity, and coherence. These four have been applied to several types of institutional arrangements (Polsby, 1968; Ragsdale and Theis, 1997) and they do provide one avenue for understanding the transformation that structures must make in order to survive, and to be able to influence their members and their environment.

**Migration Theory**

Theories of migration tend to lack coherence and are weakly connected to general social theory. Migration theory is divided between academic disciplines, such as economics, anthropology, sociology, geography, and law. The theories also differ in their approach to migration – some examine the initiation of migration, while others focus on how migration processes develop their own momentum. Migration research has its roots in social scientific approaches developed in the epoch of nationalism, with the establishment of nation-states. However, the dynamics of migration-related social and economic relations have always transcended borders and so must the theories and methods used to study them.

We are attempting to analyze the evolution of migration processes across space and time, integrating sending, transit and receiving contexts. This allows us to achieve a deeper understanding of past and present migration dynamics and their interaction with broader global transformation processes. In doing so, we are also questioning traditional divisions between research into voluntary/forced, regular/irregular, internal/international migration, and sending and receiving contexts. Population movements have become a major feature in African history. The process of movement from one place or culture to another is viewed as a purveyor of innovation, technological development and progress. International migration has continuously forged and reforged societies and states since time immemorial (Gugler, 1969; Adeola and Ogirai, 2010; Castles, 2009). However, much as its importance can be appreciated by some, many including governments are scared by immigration when it is not
clearly defined. The reason being that in modern times, international migration has brought with it serious security issues which continue to affect international relations and shape foreign policy legislations, diplomatic and security matters.

The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines migration as “the movement of people over considerable distances and on a large scale with the intention of abandoning former homes.” Everett (1969) on the other hand, defines it as broadly as a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence. No restriction is placed upon the distance of the move or upon the voluntary or involuntary nature of the act, and no distinction is made between external and internal migration. The problem with the former definition is the abandonment of homes for a permanent one. The focus of this study is not so much abandonment or movement of people over considerable distance rather, the ability to move from one country to the other which may even be of short distance such as cross-border movement between Nigeria and Niger Republic or Nigeria and Benin Republic. Such migration is more often motivated by economic opportunity or criminal intentions (trafficking and smuggling) and so our definition for the purpose of this study is the movement of people on a long or short distance involving crossing from one country to the other and for a short or long period but usually on a short period but with high frequency for the purpose of seizing economic opportunity or perpetrating economic, political or social crime (Adeola and Ogirai, 2010) as well as security crime.

This definition will not be complete without making analogy to differentiation of migration (Castles and Miller:2003) which states that most countries do not simply have one type of immigration, such as labour migration, refugee or permanent settlement but a whole range of types at once. Typically, migrating chains which start with one type of movement often continue with other forms, despite government efforts to stop or control the movement. Cross border migration between Nigeria and her surrounding neighbors may start with one
motive and end up with another. The difference between both in terms of economic issues and amenities become heightened especially between Nigeria and her neighbors. Again, as Castles (1998) observes, the growing politicization of migration resulting from domestic politics, bilateral and regional relationships and national security policies of states are increasingly affected by international migration. In effect, the security implications are these days dictating foreign policy directions of most countries all over the world. Globalization has complicated migration issues in security terms in such a way that state security has become a deciding factor in shaping the direction of diplomatic and foreign policy of countries in the sub-region. In consideration of the stated issues, the theoretical exposition shall be articulated.

Africa has been described as the continent with the world’s most mobile population (Curtin: 1997). One of the greatest migrations in human history was recorded in sub-Saharan Africa involving the Bantu people who left the area now encompassing Nigeria and Cameroon and formed settlements throughout the entire southern half of the continent (Castles 2003). Migration is increasingly driven by economic, political and social changes. In West African sub-region migration can better be explained theoretically from economic standpoint, other factors do play a role but economic factors remain outstanding. The neoclassical links migration to movement from low to high income area or more specifically, to fluctuation in business cycle. The approaches are known as push-pull theories (Castles 2003). The “push factors” include lack of economic opportunities and political freedom among others and “pull factors” demand for labour, good economic opportunities and political freedom.

In West Africa, the trend of migration has generally followed this pattern. The mere existence of economic disparities between various areas should be sufficient to generate migrants flow (Borjas, 1998; Borjas, 1998). This form of movement has been typical in
Africa as a whole; migration tending towards economically buoyant and prosperous region from weak economic areas. However, on the international front, between countries certain factors may reduce intervening obstacles to migration. With reference to Nigeria and the surrounding francophone neighboring States, which view Nigeria as metropolitan state from all perspectives, increasing technology plays an important role in diminishing intervening obstacles.; communication becomes easier and transportation relative to average income cheaper. Even if there were no changes in the balance of factors at origin and destination, improving technology alone should result in an increase in the volume of migration.

Migration to Nigeria has been basically economic or labour motivated; people from various parts of West Africa migrating to Nigeria to seek employment. The push-pull theories also imply movement from densely populated areas to more sparsely peopled regions. We found such movements take place from the large populated countries. We see such examples from the largely populated countries such as migration from Nigeria to Ghana, Togo, even to Cameroon. There is also migration from Cameroon to Gabon, Central African Republic among others. In contemporary times, the “push-pull theories of the Neoclassical can no more be sufficient to explain migratory movements in Africa, especially in respect to migration and international security. In this respect, there is the transnational theory which cannot be over looked. One aspect of globalization is rapid improvement in technologies of transport and communication. This has made it increasingly easy for migrants to maintain close links with their areas of origin or operations as the case of international chains of criminals’ networks. This facilitates the growth of circular or temporary mobility, in which people migrate repeatedly between two or more places where they have economic, social or cultural linkages (Castles 2003). Trafficking and smuggling resulting from transnational migration network (Koser M in Marshall 2006) are carried out with ease and in rapid frequency along the porous borders. Between Nigeria and Niger Republic, a customs officer
put the number of illegal borders or entry points at 921. Alongside criminally prone migration is the importance of transnational business communities (Portes: 1999) which can either be large scale enterprise or small ethnic entrepreneurs; also the political and cultural communities. They distinguish between trans-nationalism from above – activities conducted by powerful institutional actors, such as multinational corporations and states – the trans-nationalism from below – activities that are the result of grassroots initiatives by immigrants and their home country counterparts (Portes 1999).

Trans-nationalism is thus causing the emergence of de-territorialized states with important consequences for national identity, international politics and international security. Globalization or trans-nationalism is impacting strongly on the security networks of West African states: since September 11, 2001 the foreign and security policies of most states have prioritized the combating of trafficking, smuggling and other types of transnational crimes (Castles 2009). The era of internationalism has deepened the security implications of transnational crimes among the sovereign states of the sub-region and is dictating the articulation of foreign and diplomatic policies of the States.

A variety of theoretical models have been proposed to explain why international migration begins, and although each ultimately seeks to explain the same thing, they employ radically different concepts, assumptions, and frames of reference. Neoclassical economics focuses on differentials in wages and employment conditions between countries, and on migration costs; it generally conceives of movement as an individual decision for income maximization. The "new economics of migration," in contrast, considers conditions in a variety of markets, not just labour markets. It views migration as a household decision taken to minimize risks to family income or to overcome capital constraints on family production activities. Dual labour market theory and world systems theory generally ignore such micro-level decision processes, focusing instead on forces operating at much higher levels of
aggregation. The former links immigration to the structural requirements of modern industrial economies, while the latter sees immigration as a natural consequence of economic globalization and market penetration across national boundaries.

Probably the oldest and best-known theory of international migration was developed originally to explain labour migration in the process of economic development (Lewis, 1954; Ranis and Fei, 1961; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976). According to this theory and its extensions, international migration, like its internal counterpart, is caused by geographic differences in the supply of and demand for labour. Countries with a large endowment of labour relative to capital have a low equilibrium market wage, while countries with a limited endowment of labour relative to capital are characterized by a high market wage, as depicted by the familiar interaction of labour supply and demand for labour. The resulting differential in wages causes workers from the low-wage country to move to the high-wage country. As a result of this movement, the supply of labour decreases and wages rise in the capital-poor country, while the supply of labour increases and wages fall in the capital-rich country, leading, at equilibrium, to an international wage differential that reflects only the costs of international movement, pecuniary and psychic.

The simple and compelling explanation of international migration offered by neoclassical macroeconomics has strongly shaped public thinking and has provided the intellectual basis for much immigration policy. The perspective contains several implicit propositions and assumptions:

1. The international migration of workers is caused by differences in wage rates between countries.
2. The elimination of wage differentials will end the movement of labour, and migration will not occur in the absence of such differentials.
3. International flows of human capital—that is, highly skilled workers—respond to differences in the rate of return to human capital, which may be different from the
overall wage rate, yielding a distinct pattern of migration that may be opposite to that of unskilled workers.

4. Labour markets are the primary mechanisms by which international flows of labour are induced; other kinds of markets do not have important effects on international migration.

5. The way for governments to control migration flows is to regulate or influence labour markets in sending and/or receiving countries.

Corresponding to the macroeconomic model is a microeconomic model of individual choice (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969, 1976, 1989; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). In this scheme, individual rational actors decide to migrate because a cost-benefit calculation leads them to expect a positive net return, usually monetary, from movement. International migration is conceptualized as a form of investment in human capital. People choose to move to where they can be most productive, given their skills; but before they can capture the higher wages associated with greater labour productivity they must undertake certain investments, which include the material costs of traveling, the costs of maintenance while moving and looking for work, the effort involved in learning a new language and culture, the difficulty experienced in adapting to a new labor market, and the psychological costs of cutting old ties and forging new ones. Potential migrants estimate the costs and benefits of moving to alternative international locations and migrate to where the expected discounted net returns are greatest over some time horizon (Borjas, 1990).

When used together as in this work, the institutional theory and the migration theory provide us with a framework that enables us come to terms with the changing dynamics of international migration and the challenges this poses to the capacity of the NIS as a state institution to cope with the increasing migration flows. Globalization has generally reduced the world a small village at the same time that state institutions are re-enforcing borders. Our theoretical framework enables us to see that states can hardly stop the flow of persons. Instead, the concern of states and their institutions in this era of globalization should rather be
to strengthen the capacities of these institutions to manage international migration processes such that states will minimize the ills and maximize the gains of the increasing migration flows occasioned by globalization
CHAPTER THREE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Methodology

This work is predicated on the tenets and traditions of qualitative research method. Qualitative methodologies are a complex set of techniques used to gain insight into how the social world works with little or no resort to translating observations into numbers. Qualitative methods differ from quantitative methods in the nature of the theories they examine; the ways they collect, record and analyze data; the standards of evidence they apply; and the ways they present their results. The justification for this approach is that it allows a researcher the opportunity of describing, interpreting, and explaining the existing conditions, prevailing practices, beliefs and attitudes. Qualitative research provides a more complete, meaningful and useful understanding of social phenomena by studying them in their entirety, in the context in which they occur, while considering the meanings which those being studied give to their actions and to the actions of others. It entails immersion of the researcher in the everyday life of the setting chosen for study, values and seeks to discover participants’ perspectives on their worlds. It views inquiry as an interactive process between the researcher and the participants and is both descriptive and analytic and relies on people’s words and observable behavior as the primary data.

Data is collected through key informant interviews, participant observation and other secondary sources including library, internet, journals and other desk research sources. Pertaining to this research topic non-structured interview guide is used which contains questions that allow the researcher to elicit responses from the respondents. Qualitative data is described by reading respondents’ comments (questionnaires and interview transcripts), or by listening to their comments (tape recorded interviews) or by reviewing their behavior (observation). The range of responses is described and examples of behavior or narrative are used to illustrate both the typicality and diversity of responses. Reports of qualitative research
therefore, usually consist primarily or entirely of narratives describing and interpreting what were observed.

People are referred to as key if they have knowledge that for the purposes of a given research project, requires that they be given individualized treatment in an interview. Their key status depends not on their role in society but on their access to information that can help answer a given research question. Although people who are given key treatment in research are often persons of political, social, or economic importance, this is not a requirement. In a study of the role of the immigration service in international migration processes, for example, “key” respondents (those with special knowledge of the phenomenon), may not be the very senior officers but those actually involved in the daily process of dealing with migrants in and out of Nigeria.

Intensive interviews were done on the key informants. This will enable us know events that only a few people know about and can be used to study people who are outside the norms of society. Intensive interviewing of “key” persons is as much an art as a science and has to be done in a manner appropriate to individual respondents and situations. This intensive interview of “special” respondents, who are unlikely to respond to questions the same way as “average” citizens, requires great sensitivity and in-depth knowledge of the circumstances of the respondents.

Ensuring the validity of conclusions drawn from specialized interviewing poses special challenges that require both cross-checking of the researcher’s reasoning and detailed reporting of observations so that others can draw their own conclusions. Research designs employing intensive interviewing must be far more flexible than most quantitative research designs and are aimed at developing theory, and gaining unexpected knowledge rather than rigorous theory testing. In addition, the information produced by intensive interviewing
method is almost never quantitative and must be analyzed with techniques other than standard statistical analyses.

1.2 Research Procedure/Location

Key Informant Interviews (KII) using question guide were carried out in Abuja, Lagos, Benin, and some key Nigerian border posts with Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin Republic. Abuja and Lagos were chosen because they are Nigeria’s political and commercial capitals. The four border areas were chosen for KII as well as participant observation because of the volume of migrants that pass through them on daily basis. I spent four weeks going in and out of some Nigerian borders posing as a passenger so that I could observe first hand why people crisscross the borders on daily basis. I went to border areas that Nigeria shares with four countries. The purpose was to get on the spot information through participant observation. One is Chad. There are no official border crossings between Nigeria and Chad. People make a quick transit through Gaboru Ngala in Cameroon and go for a two hours journey to the Chadian border at Kousseri.

There are four main entry points into Niger. The busiest is the Sokoto route, which crosses at Ilela in Nigeria (see appendix 2). Minibuses and bus taxes run daily to the border, just past Ilela. Crossing to Birni N’konni you can get on a bus straight for Niamey. Traveling between Kano Nigeria and Zinder Niger is equally straight forward. The final option is between Katsina and Maradi. From Niger, it is easiest to cross at Gaya. You hire a bush taxi to take you from the Nigerian side at Kamba on to Sokoto. Among the illegal routes are Bachaka and Yawu Mango.

Between Nigeria and Cameroon, there are two main border crossings. The northern border post is at Bama two and a half hours from Maiduguri across to Banki in Cameroon. The southern border crossing is at Mfum Nigeria, near Ikom. There has been an increase in
the flow of immigrants through this area as a result of the political situations in central Africa. Most of these movements have been through the numerous illegal routes which include Jimini and Indaba. Terrorists can utilize this opportunity while posing as refugees.

The fourth country is Benin Republic. I went to Iriko in November 2012 to find out how security agencies were manning the porous border in the wake of insecurity in the country. I noticed on the wall inside the NIS office a RED ALERT message: you are directed to watch out for LIBYANS and NIGERIENS. I therefore went on a journey to entry points apart from the main official point at Iriko. I took a six hours journey on a motor cycle to some of the entry points, illegal albeit, which include Ilase, Gbawojo, Ita Suba, Ogosa (washman), Ajegunle, Iko and Sharp Corner. The check on the Nigerian side was nothing but displeasing. An exchange of a few naira notes depending on bargaining power on both sides was enough for a migrant to pass through. Even those who were bold enough could walk across the Nigerian border effortlessly. When the motor bike brought me back to Iriko at about 4.30 am, the border had become a ghost town by that time. The main gate for vehicles had been firmly locked, but the small entrance gate was opened.

Later I walked up to an immigration officer who did not recognize me because I was hiding my identity and asked why people enter and leave the border post without proper check. The officer replied thus: “we cannot just stop everybody. Some are traders and farmers who are carrying out their legitimate business. We are aware of the security situation so we know how we do our work.”

Essentially, however, at Seme, a border Town between Nigeria and Benin Republic on the Lagos axis, and the border towns of Owode/Idi-Iroko in Ogun State, military operatives have been deployed to assist Immigration and Customs officials at the borders. It is no longer business as usual there as people are scrutinized by various security agencies before they are
allowed in or out of the country. At Ajilete, Atan and Ilara border towns, soldiers have been posted to strategic locations to beef up security around the borders linking Nigeria with Benin Republic.

The security provisions and situations along our border with Benin is exactly the same as the other three countries that I observed. Conducting the key informant interviews with officials in these cities and borders provides a wealth of information regarding migrations and the attendant challenges to the NIS.

The Key Interviews were as revealing as the participant observation. During my Key Interview with the Comptroller General of the Nigeria Immigration Service, she had this to say "Our men have recorded an appreciable success against cross border criminals because they are now shying away from the North East zone of Nigeria. Now the leadership of the Boko Haram Sect has directed his Commanders to shift the Foci of their operations from traditional areas like Borno, Yobe, Kaduna, and Kano to Benue and Nasarawa States. The deployed members are to adapt covers such as commercial motorcyclists, cobblers, water vendors and herdsmen, whilst concentrating surveillance activities on the following targets:

1. The State Executive Governors
3. Christian Worship Centres
4. Banks and other Financial/Commercial Facilities of value".

A Deputy Comptroller General of Customs had this to say "Criminals have devised various means of coming into the country to avoid immigration profiling. They now enter into containers carried by trailers so that it would be assumed they are carrying goods".
3.3 Study Population

The sample population for this study was thirty which consists of the following: two people at each of the two of the illegal routes I went to at the Nigeria/ Cameroon borderline namely Indaba and Jimini. Two people each at the two official borders between Nigeria and Cameroon namely Mfum and Banki. Similarly, two people at each of the chosen two illegal routes between Nigeria and Niger namely Bachaka and Yawu Mango. Two people each also at two of the officially recognized routes between Nigeria and Niger namely Birni N'Konni and Ilela. Also, two people were interviewed by me at two officially recognized borders between Nigeria and Benin Republic namely Idiroko and Seme. Two out of the illegal routes between Nigeria and Benin where I interviewed two people each were Sharp Corner and Ajegunle.

I also interviewed some people in some offices who understand why people immigrate to Nigeria. These were the Comptroller General of Nigeria Immigration Service, the Deputy Comptroller General Operations of the Nigeria Customs and Excise Service, the Executive Secretary of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), the Assistant Comptroller General of Immigration Service in charge of Zone 'A' Lagos, the Public Relations Officer of the State Security Service, and a Cameroonian genderme at Banki border between Nigeria and Cameroon.

3.4 Sample Size

A sample size of 30 respondents was selected for the study. This was to make sure that the sample has respondents that have expert knowledge of immigration processes as it concerns Nigeria.
3.5 Sampling Techniques

A purposive sampling technique was adopted especially on the border areas. This entails hand picking desired sample elements to ensure that such important elements are included. Purposive sampling technique is used because the sample sought is not representative of the study population.

*Literature/Documentary Research:* Two sources of documentary research were used: Literature review and the review of official and public documents. Literature review focused on work of scholars on the subject matter and archival materials and official documents were sourced from the Nigeria Immigration Service.

*Key-Informant Interview (KII):* Interview was conducted to elicit information from respondents who are well-informed and knowledgeable on the issues that are under investigation with the use of a question guide. Question guide is on Appendix 1. The questions were unstructured and open ended. This allowed deep information to be collected and it helped the researcher to respond with other questions to the respondent’s reactions to some questions. It also gave the opportunity to tape the discussions as well as to take notice of non verbal information through the respondent’s body language. The following individuals were interviewed: the Comptroller General of Nigeria Immigration Service, the Deputy Comptroller General Operations of the Nigeria Customs and Excise Service, and the Executive Secretary of NAPTIP, the Public Relations Officer of the State Security Service, and a Cameroonian genderme at Banki border between Nigeria and Cameroon in Borno and another 24 individuals at the legal and illegal border posts that I visited as stated above.
CHAPTER FOUR DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

The data gathered from the key informant interviews was taped and transcribed for the purpose of analysis. The analysis of the transcribed interviews were coded and categorized in order to elicit some concepts and variables needed to be measured.

4.1 Results of Findings

Q1. What are the factors that influence immigrants to come to Nigeria?

It was found that:

1. Many immigrants are attracted to Nigeria through family link. There are large concentration of Chadians and Nigeriens in the core northern parts of Nigeria due to cultural and religious affinity. Though no accurate figures of these immigrations can be provided, it is estimated that in a normal street in towns like Kano and Kaduna there could be up to 15 to 20 Chadians or Nigeriens staying with their people serving as security guards. They always form close communities. These types of immigrants are mostly used by Nigerians for residential security guards. When more Nigerians need such service, these people always bring them from their home country. Even when they are not needed they come in anticipation that they will eventually be needed.

2. Living conditions, attractive destination and quality of life are interrelated and serve to pull immigrants to Nigeria.

The living standard in Nigeria is thought to be far better than that of most other West African states. This is why other West Africans come to Nigeria to experience better conditions of life.

3. There are historical basis of West African migrations to Nigeria. According to Asiwaju (1977) with regard to the departure ends in the French territories, compelling forces generally included not only the distasteful civil obligations such as stringent fiscal charges, forced labor, compulsory cultivation of crops, conscription and requisitions. Resentment also centered on policies such as those relating to traditional chieftaincy institutions and forced relocation of existing settlements, all of which implied flagrant disregard for established institutional arrangements and cultural patterns. Many communal habits had as a result to undergo drastic modifications, if not change, to the annoyance of the conservative masses. There was widespread use of police repression, especially in the forms of arbitrary arrests and imprisonments, resulting from the operation of both the ‘Indigenat’ Code and Native Penal
Code which characterized the system of native administration in French Tropical Africa. While theses push factors operated in the French sphere, sufficiently different conditions prevailed in most parts of British West Africa to make the area a region of attraction, or pull, for refugees migrating from the French colonies. The basis for most modern migrations of West Africans to Nigeria is rooted in colonialism.

4. Conflicts and crisis influence people to immigrate to Nigeria. Long drawn civil crisis has forced hordes of Chadians to migrate to Nigeria as refugees. The long drawn Liberian crisis contributed a lot of refugees to Nigeria. The crisis in Sierra Leone which ended with a presidential election in May 2002 was another factor contributing immigrants to Nigeria. Guinea-Bissau’s tenuous peace has been a force pushing her citizens to migrate to other countries especially Nigeria. Skirmishes between the Kokomba and other groups such as the Gonja and Dagomba in Northern Ghana are another example of internal crisis in the West African sub-region that influences migrations to Nigeria. These Ghanaian crises are said to have arisen from grievances over land matters, exploitation by local chiefs, and increased feelings of marginalization on the part of the Kokomba. In the late March 1994, the skirmishes erupted into a full-scale inter-ethnic war, leading to the loss of many lives and the destruction of homes on both sides. Crisis in Central Africa, Uganda and parts of Southern Africa have also contributed to the volume of immigrants to Nigeria.

5. Environmental cum Demographic insecurity cause mass movements into Nigeria. For a long time many African countries bordering on the Sahelian region and through the horn of Africa have been facing problems of droughts and increased desertification. Among the hardest hit are Mauritania, northern parts of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Droughts and famine have persisted, and in most cases worsened with the coming of economic crisis and the regime of debts and structural adjustment. The deterioration of land as the natural resource base resulting from these problems, coupled with demographic pressure and chronic poverty has meant that the little available arable land has become subject to intense dispute and life and death struggles, as in the Senegal River basin. The combination of pre-existing sources of conflicts arising from stresses of ecological disasters with pressures and contradictions of debt and adjustment has intensified struggles over basic resources such as land and water and increased mass population movements to safer climate friendly areas like Nigeria.
6. Oil wealth has attracted immigrants to Nigeria. Majority of Americans, Europeans and Asians in Nigeria have come as a result of oil based businesses and skilled labor in the form of expatriates. There has been oil-led expansion in the industrial sector, roads and communications construction, and educational and training programs for both civilian and military uses. This has attracted huge labor migration from other neighboring West African states.

7. Globalization has been another force bringing immigrants to Nigeria. Information and communications technology has made many young Nigerians rich through advance fee fraud and what is known in Nigerian parlance as “yahoo boys”. Other youngsters from neighboring countries flock to Nigeria to take advantage of this process.

8. Porous borders and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) free movement of persons has also facilitated the entrance of immigrants to Nigeria. Nigeria’s borders are expansive and porous due to geographical factors and official corruption of border management officials. In addition, the ECOWAS protocol of free movement of people makes it easier for migrants to have unhindered access to into Nigeria. Terrorists have utilized this process to cause security problems for Nigeria. According to “Information Nigeria” of Wednesday 3 April 2013, the minister of interior Comrade Abba Moro, a total of 16,000 of these illegal aliens have so far been repatriated. Moro also regretted that the ECOWAS protocol that allows free movement of citizens within the ECOWAS sub-region has been abused. Moro said that Nigeria government was forced to take the decision to repatriate these illegal elements when it became obvious that foreign mercenaries were aiding insurgency in the country. “The suicide bombings, bombers and attacks on our institutions make it imperative that certain measures would be taken to be proactive enough to forestall the continued occurrence of these activities. So in the process the Nigeria Immigration Service that is charged with the responsibility of controlling our borders rose to the occasion by setting up the necessary machinery to identify, screen, and profile aliens that are in the country with a view to identifying those that are criminally minded and whose activities are inimical to the stability of the country.
Q2. What are the challenges posed by international migration to the Nigeria Immigration Service?

It was found that:

1. Monitoring Nigeria’s long borders presents a great challenge to the Immigration Service. Nigeria has over 5000 kilometres of borderline—approximately 1000 with Benin Republic in the West, close to 1500 with Niger in the North, about 75 with the Chad Republic in the North-East, almost 1700 with Cameroon in the East, and nearly 700 along the Atlantic seaboard (Asiwaju 1992: 32). Some areas, such as Borno State, are covered by sand dunes; some are marshy while others such as Adamawa State are rocky. The borders remain very difficult to guard.

2. Nigeria witnesses daily crisscrossing movements of illegal migrants between West and Central Africa. The study found that there were some illegal migrants moving across Nigeria by land from North Africa, Central Africa up to Southern Africa on a regular basis. This points to the vulnerability of the country as illegal movements could undermine its national security as being demonstrated by the Boko Haram menace.

3. While international criminals have evolved sophisticated ways and means of traversing through the difficult terrains of the borders, state institutions like the Nigeria Immigration Service have remained largely with their obsolete equipment. The immigrations are ill-equipped to effectively monitor the 84 government approved routes and another 1,497 illegal routes in the country. Communications equipment, operational vehicles such as four wheels drive vehicles for the Northern terrain, patrol boats for the maritime borders and helicopters are either not enough or are dilapidated. There is also a manpower problem as the border posts are too many to be manned efficiently by the few security agents deployed there.

4. The porous Nigerian borders attract drug dealers, smugglers, human traffickers and even terrorists who get into the country with their sophisticated modern equipment with ease. The fact that most of these borders are not demarcated makes the situation worse. Residents of border towns stroll in and out of neighboring countries without much control. It is discovered that some of the Boko Haram terrorists are either from Chad and Niger Republic or received their training there. Even Politicians use citizens of neighboring countries to achieve their sinister motives during elections or
census. Smugglers move in arms and ammunition at will. People also smuggle into the country used cars that are above prescribed age limits, second hand clothes, shoes and poultry products. Some of these borders are notorious for the smuggling of stolen cars from Nigeria. Even armed robbers usually escape through the boundaries after committing atrocities in the country. The activities of rice smugglers are affecting government’s efforts to boost local production. Uncontrolled movement of people along the West and Central African borders are responsible for most of the security and health challenges Nigeria has faced in the recent past. The study further found that the porosity of Nigeria’s borders is aggravated by permissive corruption among Immigration and other security officials at the border posts. With corruption, illegal and dangerous activities and persons can gain entry. The rapacity of officials and security agents extorting money from and harassing and brutalizing travelers, ubiquity of check points along the Nigerian section of the international highway, rigid border formalities, and poorly equipped borders have to a great extent led to the undermining of the nation’s borders.

5. Cultural affinity with neighboring population often presents problems of identification of citizens to the Nigeria Immigration Service and the Nigeria Customs and Excise Service. Mr. C. J. Adike, an Assistant Comptroller General of Immigration said in an interview that “they often faced the challenge of placing some Nigeriens as they bear similar traits and names with the Nigerian Hausa group, and between the Yoruba of Nigeria and Benin. NIS, in 2006, retrieved 350 Nigerian national identity cards from Beninois.

6. There were syndicates, behind a booming trade in work permits, who operated with the NIS officials. Issues of expatriate quota and permits are acquired and hoarded by these syndicates which would then be traded in the black market. This matter was often a subject of controversy or a mix up between the Interior Ministry and the NIS. This is just one of such mutual disagreements between State institutions in Nigeria brought about by the changing trends of international migration. Another source of disagreements has to do with the issuance of visas. The issuance of visa is done by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead of the Nigeria Immigration Service. Yet, the NIS should be responsible for the issuance of visas to foreigners within and outside
Nigeria. By virtue of legal instrument and training, NIS stands a better chance of administering the task.

7. There was no effective follow-up and monitoring of immigrants. A case in point was a student from Cameroon who was given Subject To Regularization Visa (STR) entry permit to study for a master’s program in one of the Nigerian universities. He did not report to the authorities after the expiration of his visa. He concluded the program with a 90-day visa. His presence was known when he came to the Immigration Office to obtain working permit to teach in the same university.

8. Records are not handy or easily accessible. It was observed that the country had been embarking on development plans without information and data on migration since 2000. As a result, government does not know the number of immigrants in the country or those who entered the country legally or illegally. The nation does not also know the number of Nigerians that had left the country through the nation’s international airports, for instance, for purposes of planning. Lack of, or inadequate or unreliable data has over the years made goals of national development programs not to be achieved. Though the Nigeria Immigration Service has some statistics concerning those entering or leaving through official borders, we found that illegal migrations in and out of the country had no statistics. This is a dilemma in this era of globalization and global terrorism.

Q3. What are the operational capabilities of Nigeria Immigration Service to meet with the challenges of international migration?

It was found that:

1. Most of the equipment used by the NIS in managing international migrations are obsolete and need to be modernized. There are no modern machines for central data records. Suspect index for criminals are still being kept on torn registers and uncoordinated files. The country cannot know how many times a visitor had come to the country by inputting his data on the relevant machine, just as the Nigeria Immigration Service does not have a global central data base for visa processes. As a result, the Nigeria Immigration does not have the facility to know if a visa presented before it is genuinely issued in our foreign mission.

2. The Immigration Service has introduced the e-passport that captures biometric features and finger-prints of holders which are stored in the central database. But the
new passport has, to a reasonable extent, checked criminality by reducing multiple acquisitions and enhanced the ability of security agents to track holders if necessary.

3. The requirements or criteria for acquiring the new passports are not water-tight. People with common cultural affinity such as neighboring countries could obtain any official document or national identity card if they so wish. The only evidence of national origin of applicant (which even carries options) is the Letter of Introduction from local government or state of origin, or a reputable organization, or certificate of indigence from a local government area, or state of origin certificate. The guarantor is just to produce any two of the following: photocopy of the data page of guarantor’s passport, photocopy of national identity card or photocopy of driver’s license. A guarantor could be in a syndicate. Asides, there is evidence of non-Nigerian holders of the national identity cards as earlier cited, and there are Nigerians that have not even received theirs since 2005 due to non availability of the cards.

4. The foremost operational arrangement for the Nigeria Immigration Service is the Immigration Act of 1963. With the demands of international migrations in this era of globalization, this Act has become obsolete and needs to be changed.

Q4. How would synergy be established among security agents in tackling the challenges of international migration?

The study found that:

1. There is low level of inter-agency cooperation among the country’s institutions in matters relating to international migration. It was found that when some agencies were confronted with some challenges that is not under their jurisdiction may find difficult to act rather the agency will refer such to the appropriate agency for necessary action. For instance, when the NIS arrests a smuggler with goods, it refers the issue to the Customs. There is also some level of cooperation between NIS and State Security Service (SSS) on deportees with criminal cases. NIS hands over such cases to the SSS who also forward it to the police for further investigation. Both NIS and SSS checked travelers if their names are in the stop or inadmissible list before clearing for departure or arrival”. In the same vein, the NIS is charged with the control and issuance of visa over the entry and exit of migrants under the supervision of the interior ministry, and monitoring of
foreigners in the country. It does these tasks with the assistance of other agencies in Nigeria. Any immigration matters that confront these agencies are referred to the NIS and, conversely, it links up with intelligence agencies on investigation and enforcement of immigration laws. Since it has no prosecution power, it refers cases to the Police”.

2. There is low level of collaboration between Nigeria’s border security agencies and their counterparts in other countries. The agencies of different States exchange security information such that even when a criminal escapes arrest in one country, he will not escape in the other. This collaboration ironically, is more between Nigeria and the countries of the West than between her and her neighbors. This is explained by the arrangement of international communications flows, which makes it easier for Interpol to share information with Nigerian agencies than for these agencies to share information with their sister agencies in neighboring countries.

3. Government has taken a number of initiatives to prevent security lapses at airports, border posts, and to improve the reliability of stop list of individuals considered to be of interest to intelligence organizations. Auto gates have been installed at the major international airports. Document scanners and finger print readers have also been installed. All these have been done with the aim of conforming to international best practices.

4. There are still deficiencies in many areas of coordination and sharing of information between national agencies concerned with international migrations. The capacity of the Nigerian agencies to support information sharing is low, due mainly to low level of technology and priority settings, and it affects the management and sharing of intelligence information. It was found that there was no computerized system to analyze digitalized fingerprints in the country. It was further found that there was no communication link between the airports and the borders except through the use of GSM by individuals. Most of the border areas had no GSM signals. There was no common culture of data and statistics among the agencies. Furthermore, the organizations handling national migration issues tend to work at cross-purposes. The Ministry of Labour, National Planning Commission, and the National Commission for Refugees, sometimes have mutual differences on migration responsibilities.
5. The level of collaboration between Nigerian agencies concerned with international migrations and the agencies of other countries as well as international migration agencies is still low. There are mutual complaints of these agencies not cooperating in cases of extraditions, and persons on wanted lists continue to criss-cross borders of neighboring countries, without the ‘cooperating’ agencies doing much to nab them or hand them over to the countries where they are wanted.

6. There is no significant support among the ‘cooperating’ agencies of countries, in terms of aids and transfers. Most of the up-to-date technologies and equipments that are available to the migration agencies of the West are lacking in Nigeria. Yet there is hardly any attempt on the part of Western countries to help equip and maintain the Nigerian agencies and others like them, so that they can play their own roles in the international management of migration processes. As a result these later agencies have continued to be the weak links in the attempts to meet the challenges of international migration.

7. It was found that there are no international institutional frameworks for the management of international migration.

8. Nigeria is not in the forefront of international efforts at institutionalizing a framework for international migrations governance. In this regard, Nigeria has either not participated or played any significant role in the international dialogues such as: 1. Regional Consultative Processes on Migrations; 2. International Organization for Migration’s (IOM). 3. International Dialogue on migration and the Berne initiative.
CHAPTER FIVE CHANGING TRENDS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND ITS CHALLENGES TO THE NIGERIA IMMIGRATION SERVICE (NIS)

5.1. Factors that cause international migration in the era of globalization especially to Nigeria.

Historically, cross-national flows of labor and capital have influenced the structure and growth of the global economy (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton, 1999). The contemporary global economy, however, is distinct in terms of the magnitude and frequency of labor (Castles and Miller, 2003) and capital (Dicken, 2003) flows across national boundaries. An estimated 75 million migrants lived abroad in 1960; in 2005, the stock of international migrants reached 191 million – a 155 percent increase in 45 years (UN, 2006b).

The movement of capital has also increased. Between 1980 and 2000, the worldwide stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) increased 991 percent to $5.79 trillion in 2000 (UNCTAD 2005) – a level larger than the current size of the economy of each country in the world except the United States (WB 2006a). Indeed, FDI now represents approximately 50 percent of total world capital flows (Stallings 2007). International migration is widely recognized as an integral component of globalization (Castles and Miller 2003; Sassen, 2007). International migrants facilitate globalization processes by linking together disparate peoples and places into an increasingly single, shared global political-economic context (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Black 1995; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt, 1999). Globalization is central among the various factors that are responsible for the movement of people in and out of a country.

While we recognize the importance of understanding how cross-national population movements impact receiving societies and structure the global political-economic context, we focus here on how globalization influences international migration patterns from sending
countries. Indeed, there is growing acknowledgement among scholars and public policy practitioners that globalization is associated with the increasing scale and scope of international migration: ...large-scale movements of people arise from the accelerating process of global integration...migrations are not an isolated phenomenon: movements of commodities and capital almost always give rise to movements of people (Castles and Miller, 2003: 4). ...globalization has increased the number of people with the desire and capacity to move to other places...international migration today cries out for a global discussion (Annan, 2006).

The increase in these international flows of people, goods, capital and ideas has remained unimpeded by state institutions. This is because there is a fundamental linkage between international migration and globalization.

Yet despite increasing recognition of the relationship, it has become apparent that relatively little is known about the fundamental structural causes of international migration. This deficiency in the knowledge base is often expressed as an appeal for a better understanding of the basic, underlying, root' causes of international migrations: It is essential to address the root causes of international migration to ensure that people migrate out of choice, rather than necessity (Sheikha Haya Rashed Al Khalifa, 2006).

Our knowledge of the structural root causes of international migration is impeded by the paucity of cross-national empirical analyses. Recently, migration theories have been synthesized into a coherent analytical framework (Massey 1999), but empirical research has not yet caught up with theoretical advances. As a result, our knowledge of international migration continues to be derived largely from country- specific case studies, despite the recognition that migration is increasingly a global, or supra-national, phenomenon: ...what we have today is mostly an amorphous mass of data on immigration to different countries and
a series of concepts whose scope seldom exceeds those of a particular nation-state (Portes, 1997: 819).

The limited scope of previous analyses has left fundamental questions about international migration unanswered: How does globalization influence the prevalence of international migration? What aspects or dimensions of globalization influence international migration? Does globalization impact international migration independently from the effects of economic development? The response to these gaps in our knowledge base are clear:

Needed are explicitly comparative projects that focus on research topics at a higher level of abstraction than those guiding policy concerns and that employ a common cross-national methodology. (Portes, 1997: 819)

These questions can be addressed with a cross-national empirical analysis of less-developed countries (LDCs) This is because the majority of international migrants originate in LDCs and two out of every three migrants move either from a LDC to a developed country or from a LDC to a LDC (Castles and Miller 2003; UN 2006a). An analysis of emigration from LDCs thus assesses the source of a large portion of international migration.

Second, the processes driving migration from developed countries are qualitatively different from the processes driving migration from LDCs (OECD 2004). Thus, it is important not to confound these divergent processes. The study of international migration has generated a large, variegated, and well-developed theoretical and empirical literature (Massey, Arango, Hugo, Kouaouchi, Pellegrino, and Taylor 2005 for a review and integration of this literature). In addition to sociology, scholars on this issue come from across the social sciences (Borjas 1989; Daly 2006; Freeman 1995; Hatton and Williamson 2006; Hollifield 2004), and studies employ a wide array of methodologies to examine migration from the micro-level to the macro-levels of analysis (Massey 1999b).
Because we are interested in potential causes of migration that transcend specific countries, we focus specifically on macro structural explanations of international migration from LDCs that are related to global dynamics. While the role of explanations situated at the micro-level – such as individual and household decision-making such as migration networks – should not be diminished, examining large-scale structural explanations of international migration, particularly cross-nationally, is the most appropriate strategy for developing our understanding of the relationship between globalization and international migration (Portes 1997). This study considers—structural and globalist perspective using Zolberg’s (1989) schema as well as Massey’s (2005) historical-structural typology. With this typology the roles of two important macro structural determinants of international migration can be discussed: economic development and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Global governance has been developed particularly in response to the emergence of trans-boundary issues. A range of issues are inherently trans-boundary insofar as the nature of the problem is one that crosses borders and cannot be addressed by a single state acting in isolation. Climate change, international trade, communicable disease, transitional crime, international financial markets, and terrorism, for example, are amongst these trans-boundary issues and, as such, states have developed forms of institutionalized international cooperation to address these issues.

Globalization – in terms of growing trans-boundary interconnectivity – has therefore created a growing need for governance that goes beyond the nation-state. The demand for global governance is closely associated with globalization and the need to address cross-border spillovers and externalities. However, although international migration is one of the most striking contemporary manifestations of globalization, and it is, by definition, a trans-boundary issue that no state can address individually, it has not developed a coherent, multilateral global governance framework. Instead, it has remained largely the domain of sovereign states without a formal multilateral institutional framework. This is not to say that
there is no global migration governance – but that what exists is fragmented and incoherent in comparison to most trans-boundary issue-areas. Global migration governance is a complex picture (Newland 2005; Ghosh 2000). International migration is not regulated by a single formal multilateral structure in the way that health, monetary stability or trade are regulated through the WHO, IMF and WTO frameworks, for example. Although the International Migration Organization (IOM) exists in the area of migration it exists outside of the UN system and mainly as a service provider to individual states that pay for its services. The IOM has no clear mandate provided by the international community, in the way that most UN agencies have a statute that provides them with normative authority. Perhaps more importantly, with the exception of asylum and refugee protection, there is no formal migration regime in the sense of a formal set of inter-state agreements. This contrasts with the global governance of most trans-boundary issue-areas in which the main international organizations’ work is underpinned by a mandate to uphold a particular normative framework based on international law. Global migration governance is instead based on a range of different formal and informal institutions, operating at different levels of governance. States’ responses to the various different categories of migration are regulated in different ways. The institutions that regulate states’ responses to human trafficking and smuggling are not the same as those that regulate states’ responses to skilled labor migration. In each category of migration, there is a complex range of multilateral, regional, inter-regional, and bilateral agreements, with different levels of governance having greater importance in relation to some categories of migration than others. For example, while refugee protection is predominantly regulated through multilateral and regional governance, labor migration is predominantly regulated through bilateral and regional governance, and Diaspora relations are predominantly regulated through the extra-territorial scope of individual states’ policies. In
different categories of migration, regulation in different issue-areas matters to a greater or lesser extent.

In the case of environmental migration, for example, the global governance of climate change matters; in the case of labor migration, ILO conventions on labor rights and WTO law matter; in the case of refugee protection and IDPs, human rights law matters. Furthermore, in the different areas of migration, different actors matter to different degrees. The relevant international organizations, private sector actors and NGOs vary. The complexity and variation in global migration governance makes mapping the institutional landscape at the global level an important but challenging task. It is important to provide a comprehensive overview of global migration governance. This is important because the way in which migration is regulated at the global level matters significantly for the international politics of migration, and this in turn has implications for both migrants and non-migratory communities. Indeed the regulatory framework within which states determine their migration policies matters because it affects individuals’ and communities’ access to human rights, human development, and security.

Mapping and understanding the institutions that regulate states’ responses to international migration also has wider implications for understanding global governance. The complexity of global migration governance points to a different type of global governance beyond the formal and inclusive multilateralism that characterized the post Second World War consensus. In the absence of a comprehensive UN framework, it highlights an environment in which institutional proliferation has created a complex, multi-level tapestry of diverse and contested institutions. This form of pluralitarianism in which a range of institutions with different degrees of inclusivity and exclusivity coexist, is increasingly becoming the norm in a range of issue-areas and global migration governance offers an
extremely salient case study within which to explore international politics in the context of a dense framework of overlapping, parallel and nested institutions.

Once set in motion, international migration develops a momentum of its own, and is supported by a complex web of networks - private, commercial and governmental. And the intensification of communications will promote further transnational communities providing their own networks. Also, migrant trafficking is now a multi-billion dollar organized industry. Industrial countries too, because of demographic and other factors, including unwillingness of their nationals to take on some kinds of work, will have an irreducible requirement of immigrant labor in the years ahead.

Indeed, if globalization expands the number of jobs at the bottom of the employment scale, particularly in services, it could well increase the demand for their labor. This prospect is not inevitable. Both states and enterprises could choose to improve salaries and working conditions to make certain jobs more attractive to national workers. But given the nervousness even about setting minimum wages, this seems unlikely to happen on any significant scale, leaving most industrial countries with an irreducible demand for some immigrant workers. There was also an increasing demand for high-skilled professional workers, like computer-programmers. Each year tens of thousands of such workers are brought into the US by job-contracting firms, known as "body shops", which recruit foreign professionals and contract them out to US companies. But critics point out that "these imported professionals are effectively indentured to their employers, as 'techno-braceros', the high-tech equivalent of migrant farm workers."

As globalization proceeds, the flow of professionals may not increase in volume, but would become ever more complex. At present there was relatively low resistance to these flows, since so far they have largely filled gaps at the top of the employment ladder. But with employment agencies developing cadres of mobile, educated, and skilled people that can be
employed on short-term contracts, there could be a stronger response from local professionals who feel they are being undercut by cheap foreign-based workers. It can be argued that globalization has repositioned the territorial state rather than signaled its demise. The expansion of trans-border trade and finance has made claims of sovereign statehood obsolete, but the significance of states themselves remains. Through both unilateral decisions and multilaterally coordinated policies, states have done much to facilitate economic globalization and influence its course.

States have encouraged the globalization of commerce through various policies of liberalization and the creation of special economic zones and offshore financial centers. At the same time some governments have also slowed globalization within their jurisdiction by retaining certain restrictions on trans-border activity. However, most states including those still nominally communist have sooner or later responded to strong pressures to liberalize. Those retaining strict regulations have generally suffered capital flight abroad especially offshore. In any case governments have always lacked effective means to enforce their territorially bound controls on global mobile capital. Only in respect of immigration restrictions have states largely sustained their borders against economic globalization.

However, states are by no means powerless in the face of economic globalization. Even the common claim that global finance lies beyond the state requires some qualification. After all governments and central banks continue to exert major influence on money supplies and interest rates, even if they no longer monopolize money creation and lack direct control over the money markets. Likewise, particularly through cooperative action, states can significantly shift exchange rates, even if they have lost the capacity to fix the conversion ratios. Governments have also pursued collective regulation of trans-border banking to some effect. The offshore financial centers, too depend to a considerable extent on the goodwill of governments, both the host regime and external authorities. Similarly national regulators of
securities markets have collaborated since 1984 the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO).

In short, there is little sign that global commerce and the state are inherently antithetical. On the contrary, the two have shown considerable mutual dependence. States have provided much of the regulatory framework for global trade and finance, albeit that they have shared these competences with sub-state and supra-state agencies. These processes of globalization have contributed in no small measure in bringing immigrants to Nigeria. However, there are other factors different from globalization that bring immigrants to Nigeria.

One factor that makes West African immigrants especially from Niger, Chad and Mali to immigrate to Nigeria is terrorism. Most of these immigrants come for terrorist activities. Most terrorist activities in Nigeria have come from across the borders. Maitatsine and Ibrahim Zak Zakky have been influenced from across the borders. Boko Haram has been influenced from outside by al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. The structural background conditions for such terrorist activities may be factors deriving from the differences between groups regarding language, culture, religion, and social organization. Another is where the taking up of arms against one’s cultural enemy is held as sanctioned by God’s will. Another is the legacy of some system of “internal colonialism”, including a structure of division of labor that condemns certain sections of given territory, state or region to the perpetual status of “hewers of wood and drawers of water”, while according a privileged political, economic, and social status to others could provide the grounds for the festering of terrorism. Others could be the feelings of physical and psychological dispossession, growing alienation, sense of abandonment, and resentfulness that tend to accompany such experiences. Manipulation by the elites has always and everywhere been a factor in mobilization for ethnic and social conflict, including terrorist activities and the role that the whole question about psychology of
domination and resistance plays in all such conditions. To be sure of the kinds of precipitant factors responsible for the explosions of ethnic and social conflicts and by extension terrorism, the most salient include the following such ones as the socio-economic conditions of impoverishment consequent on the regime of economic liberalization, debt, and strains of environmental and human insecurity; pressures of democratization; signals from the breakup of the former Soviet power and other Eastern European countries; millions of peoples forced to leave their homes and residing elsewhere as migrants and refugees/asylum seekers; explosion of social identities everywhere; “demonstration effects” of all these through global communications. Most of the factors and forces concerned come under the rubric generally labeled as “globalization”.

One very important factor that scholars have ignored that influence international migration is the desire to inflict terror. Terrorism is at the root of most international migration. This can be seen in the clandestine movements of the Boko Haram group and the Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb across the borders of West African states especially between Nigeria and her neighbors. As Charles (1990) has reminded us, international terrorism is a subject whose analysis tends to be bogged down by “many semantic, epistemological, and evaluative issues.” They are issues that have made the topic too “highly subjective, sensational and emotional” to treat, and agreement on a common definition of phenomenon impossible to reach; by same token, the proffering of sustainable solution to the problem seems almost a futile attempt. Historically, international organizations have been unable to agree on common definition, in part because, as the saying goes, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. As in the past, much of the discourse regarding the phenomenon is suffused with mostly negative images conveyed by such cultural-stereotypical statements as: “terrorism is the handwork of individuals or groups predisposed to ‘mindless violence’”, “terrorism is a product of culturally warped mind”, “terrorists are
mad men/women”, “grievances have nothing to do with terrorism”, “terrorism is essentially a Middle Eastern problem, and most of the targets are Americans”, “terrorism is a deliberate attack on civilization, and a reversion to primitivism”. One has seen, read or heard expressions about similar images and stereotypes regarding terrorism and terrorists before.

Perhaps, what one finds different in the current discourse, is that, with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet power and other communist party regimes in Eastern Europe, a new set of stereotypes has come to be added to those old known images about terrorism and the terrorist. Much of the talk now is about “Islamic fundamentalism as the source of the terrorist menace troubling today’s world, and deliberately aimed at filling the void created by the collapse of international communism”, piqued by the fact that the core of men from Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, who launched the September 11, 2001 bloody terrorist attack against the United States, were drawn from the Middle East and although operating from the then Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, most Western analysts as well as policy makers also view terrorism as a “problem for the civilized World”, as if re-echoing the thesis from Huntington’s (1993 and 1996) “clash of civilization”, a few members of the public have even gone so far as to depict “most Arabs as terrorists”.

There are historical bases for West African migrations to Nigeria. In the pre-colonial era, it was not unusual for groups to express their sense of injustice felt under given systems of rule and political regimes or protest certain harsh economic measures and environmental conditions, through resort to mass population movement and resettlement in new territories. The unbounded nature of most pre-colonial political units had permitted such free movements of people. And the artificiality as well as porous nature of all the colonially created borders ensured that rather than abating, such mass-population movements across borders would continue for the next two and a half decades after independence, further
stimulated no doubt by armed conflicts and ecological disasters that came to plague many of the West African states.

There is, however, something qualitatively different about the new wave of mass-population movements in Africa in the post-1985 period. It has to do with the very nature of the factors and forces propelling the new movements, together with their level of intensity and scale; as well as the tendency of these factors, forces and, of course, the movements themselves, in calling into question the problematic nature of the post colonial ‘state’ and the prospects of its continuation as presently constituted. For post-1985 population movements have been taking place as part of the new rising wave of social tensions, crises and conflicts that have produced violent ethnic, regional and religious outbreaks in most of the continent. Coinciding with the struggles for democratization and/or reconstitution of the centralized state structures, the new population movements are being fueled by deteriorating economic conditions, debts, and adjustment combined with stresses of environmental and human insecurity. Such conditions have resulted almost everywhere in loss of state capacities. For example, among the effects of the growing in-formalization of the salaried class (that is, professional, permanent, and public officials taking up part-time employment in the informal economy, as one of the coping strategies induced by such socioeconomic conditions) has been the reduction of these officials’ regular job performance and efficiency. An even more relevant point for our purpose is that these same socioeconomic pressures of debt and adjustment are also responsible for growing emigration of highly skilled manpower, professionals and technicians. Both are among the most important indices for measuring loss of state capacities. The later development reaches its nadir with the phenomenon of regime breakdown or collapse, followed perhaps by complete state disintegration, creating still more forced migratory movements, including refugee flows.
These same socioeconomic conditions tending towards the loss of state capacities, including the breakdown of states, are at the root of the new wave of migrations, both voluntary and forced, affecting contemporary Africa. Although it is not possible to pursue much more dynamically the functional inter-relationships of conflicts, loss of state capacities and mass-population movements, it is important to stress that interaction among the three is one of reciprocal causality, rather than linear. Take, for example, the relationship between conflict and refugee flows. The standard postulation in refugee studies is that ‘armed conflict results in massive refugee flows’ (Zolberg 1989). But from a more dynamic reconsideration of that particular interrelationship, it is apparently no less equally true that ‘in most countries where they are forced to live, the very presence of refugees is a considerable source of conflict with the local people’. The coming of refugees always and everywhere implies considerable pressure on, and indeed a forced sharing in, the local people’s already fast diminishing resources, including land, social amenities, and above all ecological space. Another way by which huge refugee flows arising from conflict tend to further exacerbate the initial conflict sources is where organizations of ethnic refugee warriors that are provoked by the cycle of violent conflicts are committed to staging violent home coming at the slightest opportunity, the definition excellence of the Rwandan/Burundian situation (Adekanye 1996).

Conflict could be said to be both the cause and effect of increasing loss of state capacities. But the latter may well be uniformly true of the effects of the kind of post-1985 conflicts. These conflicts have resulted to massive increase in international migrations especially from the conflict prone states to less conflict prone countries like Nigeria. There has been a rising wave of ethnic conflicts, including alarming violent ones, in contemporary Africa. Even so, armed conflicts had been known in Africa before, particularly in the immediate post-independence era. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo, soon after independence, was torn by separatist struggles and would in fact have completely
disintegrated but for the intervention of the United Nations peacekeeping forces (1960-1965). Nigeria had also experienced an armed secessionist bid by one of the regions namely ‘Biafra’ (formerly Eastern Nigeria), which required federal armed forces to fight a prolonged and bloody war (1967-1970) in order to keep the country one. Other past cases of armed ethnic conflicts recorded in the past were those experienced by Uganda from the mid-1960s through the 1970s to mid 1980s; Chad in the 1970s through 1980s; and Angola and Mozambique (post-1974/75), carried over no doubt from the anti-colonial struggles where conflicts had been encouraged by the interest and intervention of certain foreign powers or their proxies, right into the early 1990s. The Sudan, which had seen a coalition of that countries southern minority, including Christian and animist, rise against the Khartoum-based, Arabized government to the north, led to conflict in the late 1960s which gathered momentum in the 1970s and 1980s and continued to rage many years later. The same would seem to be true of Burundi/Rwanda; conflicts started there in the late 1950s through the 1960s, intensified in the 1970s and 1980s and continued until recently. Lasting peace could still not be said to have been established there. The minority Tutsi is still bent on controlling the majority Hutu and therein lies the fragile peace.

However, most of those past ethnic conflict cases are similar to the contemporary ones in only two major respects. First, both have tended to bring to the fore the problematic and inchoate nature of the ‘states’ in Africa. Second, the underlying or structural predispositions for the new wave of ethnic conflicts remain basically the same as those that had gone into producing the earlier cases. But beyond these, there is a qualitative difference between most of those armed conflicts, including secessionist and separatist tendencies that had been experienced in the pre-1985 era and the latest cases to hit Africa in the post-1985 period. The difference has to do with the kind of factors and forces precipitating the new explosions. The new cases of armed conflicts fall under the category covered by the growing
literature on Africa’s ‘failed states’, or ‘collapsed states’, or better still ‘descent into statelessness’, including the controversial article by Kaplan, 1994; Kartz, 1995; Widner, 1995; and Zartman, 1995.

Another factor that has influenced migrations into Nigeria is the stresses of environmental and demographic insecurity. Intimately linked to debt and adjustment are precipitants of conflict that stem from stresses of environmental and demographic insecurity. Unlike debt and adjustment, whose effects were felt only after the mid-1980s, the issues of environmental and demographic insecurity had been at work for much longer. For example, over the last 20 to 25 years, many African countries bordering on the Sahelian region and through the horn of Africa have been facing problems of droughts and increased desertification. Among the hardest hit are Mauritania, northern parts of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. Droughts and famine have persisted and, in most cases, worsened with the coming of economic crises and the regime of debts and adjustment. The deterioration of land as the natural resource base resulting from these problems, coupled with demographic pressure and chronic poverty, has meant that the little available arable land has become subject to intense disputes and life and death struggles, as in the Senegal River basin. The combination of pre-existing sources of conflicts arising from stresses of ecological disasters with pressures and contradictions of debt and adjustment has intensified struggles over basic resources such as land and water and increased mass population movements.

Environmental problems are linked to security both internal and external. This linkage is borne out of three major considerations: the expansion in the notion of security to include non-military (Ullman 1993), human centered threats, more so in the face of the recession of cold war geo-political and strategic calculations, increasing challenges to statistics, new-realist and militarized definitions which had hitherto dominated security studies (Brown
The debate has hinged on the trans-nationalization of environmental security concerns in which the issue of the transmissibility of environmental threats across local, national, regional and global levels has become a moot point (Brown 1994).

Existing security studies on Africa are largely dominated by realist and new-realist paradigms which are usually state centric and emphasize the elimination of military threats to national sovereignty and order. It is important to note, however, that some scholars in Africa have recognized the vital link between human welfare, the environment and security on the continent (Imobighe 1986). Furthermore, the interconnection between environment and security and its strategic importance to conflict resolution in post cold war Africa has been recognized (Singh 1996).

Environmental security is hinged upon the critical part played by environmental factors in shaping global security and international relations (Obi 1997). This is because the reality of global economic and ecological interdependence ensures the expansion of the notion beyond narrow statist boundaries and strictly military (external) threats (Obi 1997). Therefore, the environmental-security nexus constitutes an important part of the reconstruction of Africa’s place in global peace and security based on issues of equity and redress.

While there is a growing consensus that threats emanating from the exploitation and degradation of the environment largely as a result of the economic extraction of resources by man (and the resultant pollution of the ecosystem) needs to be tackled in a globally coordinated manner, affecting as it does, the entire human race. Struggles over shrinking environmental resources—either as a result of overuse, misuse or degradation, lead to stresses which trigger off conflict. Writing extensively on the linkage between resource/environmental scarcities, and violent conflict, Homer-Dixon (1996) concludes that the interaction between supply-induced scarcities, demand-induced scarcities and structural
scarcities can provoke conflict. While supply-induced scarcities are the result of the reduced availability of environmental resources either as a result of over-exploitation or degradation; demand induced scarcities are attributed to population growth rates outstripping the supply or reproduction of resources, technological changes requiring the use of larger amounts of raw materials and immense pressure on renewable resources. Structural scarcities are basically the outcome of distributional inequities, in which tiny elite monopolizes resources to the exclusion of the rest of society, who violently seek access to shrinking resources, and a fair share of resources critical to their survival.

Environmental conflicts in Africa find expression at the local, national and global levels with the first two being quite pronounced and violent. The increased global control of Africa’s resources alongside the deepening of economic crisis on the continent has influenced the intensity of conflict in combination with a host of other social, political and historically constructed contradictions. Obi (1997) has shown the linkage between structural adjustment and the deepening of environmental conflict in Africa, thus underscoring the role of economically rooted contradictions in the contestations over the environment. In many cases, what is at stake is the very survival and reproduction of excluded groups, classes, regions and nationalities.

A major impetus to mass population movements to Nigeria is the Economic Community of West African States’ free movement of persons, residence and establishment. The provisions of this protocol make it difficult for the NIS to control migrations. A basic and most widely recognized assumption of this protocol is the free movement of capital, goods and service among member states to enhance a sense of community and the gradual imposition of common tariff against non-members of the community. A corollary to this is the belief that a sense of community is better appreciated if community citizens are free to move from one sector of the integrated region to the other in the drive to take advantage of
the relatively larger market arising from the integrative process. Besides the success achieved with the introduction of the protocol on trade liberalization, another significant area where some achievements have been made is reflected on the protocol on the free movement of persons, residence and establishment which was signed on May 29, 1979 in Dakar, Senegal by the authority of the Council of Heads of States and Governments of the Community. The protocol came into effect in June, 1980 after ratification by eight out of the sixteen member countries. By 1998 every member of the community had ratified the protocol. The ECOWAS program on the protocol for free movement of persons within the community is expected to be accomplished in three stages, all within a period of fifteen years. The first stage, which took immediate effect, is the right of entry without visa. Under this provision, a community citizen may stay in a member country for 90 days without visa. The second stage is the right of residence while the third stage is the right of the community citizen to establish business in another country within the community. There were circumstances that made the provision of free movement of people within the sub-region, a significant development in consolidating the integrative process in ECOWAS. Three basic points according to ECOWAS (1981) have been adduced in support of the move:

1. For a regional integration scheme to succeed in West Africa, efforts must be made to bring the people of the different countries together rather than limiting the processes of integration to the activities of member governments alone.

2. It was also felt that given the goal of the community to establish a customs union by 1990, free movement of people would remove the psychological barrier arising from colonialism which in effect had hindered the free movement of the people of West Africa within the sub-region, and

3. Since the goal of regional integration in West Africa is to improve the socio economic well being of the people, free movement for the community citizen will ensure that every one has the opportunity to take an advantage of the economic and social forces available anywhere within the sub-region without hindrance of political boundaries.
Under the general principles on the movement of persons, residence and establishments, specific provisions of the protocol as they relate to the rights of community citizens to move within the sub-region can be found under part 2 articles 2 subsection 1-3 of the protocol, namely:

1. Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of member states.

2. The right of entry, residence and establishment referred to in paragraph (1) above shall be progressively established in the course of a maximum transitional period of fifteen years from the definitive entry into force of this protocol.

3. The right of entry, residence and establishments which shall be established in the course of a transitional period, shall be accomplished in three phases, namely:

   Phase I-Right of entry and abolition of visa

   Phase II-Right of residence

   Phase III-Right of establishment.

3 (1) Any citizen of the community who wishes to enter other territory of any other member-states shall be required to possess valid travel document and international health certificate.

3 (2) A citizen of the community visiting member-states for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days shall enter the territory of that member state through the official entry point free of visa requirements. Such citizens shall, however, be required to obtain permission for an extension of stay from appropriate authority if, after such entry, such a citizen has cause to stay for more than ninety (90) days.

Taken together with all the other provisions of the treaty, it is clear that each member still reserves the right to weigh the provisions against the national policies as they may relate to the immigration and naturalization laws of the member-state. A more intimate appraisal of the protocol suggests a serious commitment by the Council of Heads of States of the Community to the original intent of the founding fathers. It is abundantly clear that the protocol recognizes the need to promote a sense of community through allowing free movement of people from one country to the other with a strong of community identity.
The issue of implementing this particular protocol raises serious policy considerations.

Firstly, member states have to weigh their commitment with ECOWAS, which the implementation of the protocol is intended to enhance, against the background of the particular socio-economic and political imperatives of the states concerned. For example, member states must grapple with the situation where opening their doors to the influx of ‘aliens’ from other member states, would not put an increased demand on the scarce resources available with respect to priority areas like health, educational and social welfare services in the host countries.

Secondly, member states must satisfy themselves on the degree of convergence between their respective national interests and the larger interests of ECOWAS.

It is perhaps in the context of these policy considerations that one might refer to the problems that gave rise to Nigeria’s expulsion of illegal aliens. These problems were the expansion in the population of Nigerians and foreigners depending on Nigeria’s limited socio-economic resources. The problems were aggravated by the large influx of foreigners into Nigeria.

Nigeria’s oil wealth is the largest factor that brings immigrants to Nigeria. According to CIA World Fact book 2010, estimate, Nigeria is the 11th largest producer of oil in the world. It produces 2,525,000 bbl/day representing 2.62% of world production. Oil production refers to the sum of barrels of crude oil extracted each day from drilling operations compounded with the equivalent production of natural gas liquids and refinery gains from domestic or imported petroleum production. By oil, we usually mean crude oil here which is present naturally and is a flammable liquid. It is a complex mixture of hydrocarbons which is extracted mostly by oil drilling. The crude oil contains within itself a myriad number of consumer products which are separated by the phenomena of reaching different boiling points. Some of the products which are obtained are petrol, kerosene, diesel, asphalt and
some chemical reagents primarily used in the manufacturing of plastics and pharmaceuticals. The importance of petroleum is not a recent phenomenon rather it dates back to the ancient times-from the time of the internal combustion engine, the increasing use of plastic and the propensity of the society towards the use of commercial aviation. Nowadays, oil production is the bloodline of every country and striving economy. As of 2000, oil and gas exports accounted for more than 98% of export earnings and about 83% of Federal government revenue, as well as generating more than 14% of its GDP. It also provides 95% of foreign exchange and about 65% of government budgetary revenues CBN Annual Report (2001).

In differing a little from the CIA Report, Nigeria’s proven oil reserves are estimated by the U.S. United States Energy Information (EIA) at between 16 and 22 billion barrels. Its reserves make Nigeria the 10th most petroleum rich nation, and by far the most affluent in Africa. In mid 2001 its crude oil production was averaging around 2.2 million barrels per day by EIA reports.

Nearly all of the country’s primary reserves are concentrated in and around the delta of the Niger River, but off-shore rigs are also prominent in the well endowed coastal region. Nigeria is one of the few major oil-producing nations still capable of increasing its oil output. Nigeria has a total of 159 oil fields and 1481 wells in operation according to the ministry of petroleum resources 2001. Nigeria’s petroleum is classified mostly as “light” and “sweet”, as the oil is largely free of sulphur. Nigeria is the largest producer of sweet oil in OPEC. This sweet oil is similar in composition to petroleum extracted from the North Sea. This crude is known as “Bonny light”. Names of other Nigerian crudes, all of which are named according to export terminal, are Qua Ibo, Escravos blend, Brass River, Forcados, and Pennington Anfan.

The U.S. remains the largest importer of Nigeria’s crude oil, accounting for 40% of the country’s total oil exports. Nigeria provides about 10% of overall U.S. oil imports and
ranks as the fifth-largest source for oil imports in the U.S. according to the ministry of petroleum resources 2001.

Nigeria has an abundance of natural resources, especially hydrocarbons. The Nigerian economy is largely dependent on its oil sector which supplies 95% of its foreign exchange earnings. The upstream oil industry is Nigeria’s life blood. It is the single most important sector in the economy. According to the 2012 BP Statistical Energy Survey, Nigeria had proven oil reserves of 37.2 billion barrels at the end of 2011, equivalent to 41.4 years of current production and 2.25% of the world’s reserves while the country produced an average of 2457.3 thousand barrels of crude oil per day in 2011, 2.93% of the world and a change of 0.1% compared to 2010.

Nigeria’s oil wealth makes it most attractive to the major oil-multinationals, most of who are represented in Nigeria, with the major foreign stakeholder being shell.

According to the 2011 BP Statistical Energy Survey, Nigeria had 2010 proved natural gas reserves of 5.29 trillion cubic meters representing 2.8% of the world reserves. Due mainly to the lack of gas infrastructure, 75% of associated gas is flared and 12% re-injected. Nigeria set a target of zero flare by 2010 and is providing incentives for the production and use of gas. The government also planned to raise earnings from natural gas exports to 50% of oil revenues by 2010. As at 2013, this is yet to be realized.

Nigeria’s downstream oil industry is also a key sector including four refineries with a nameplate capacity of 438,750 bbl/d. Nigeria has a robust petrochemicals industry based on its substantial refining capacity and natural gas resources. The petrochemical industry is focused around the three centers of Kaduna, Warri and Eleme.

What has been given above is the evidence of Nigeria’s oil wealth. Oil has kept Nigerian economy afloat irrespective of mismanagement, crises and poor leadership. While other countries especially in Africa have crumbled under the forces of debt and adjustment,
the Nigerian economy did not crumble. This reason and the extraction of the natural resources are the major reasons for the influx of foreigners into Nigeria. Expatriates come in to bring their expertise for the extraction and production of Nigerian oil for domestic and international consumption. Construction of oil related infrastructure is handled mostly by expatriates. The unskilled labor in the oil industry and related industries attract other West Africans who lack such opportunities at home. The multiplier effect of oil in the Nigerian economy has thrown up a lot of job opportunities for both the skilled laborer and unskilled laborer. These opportunities are scrambled for by expatriates, Nigerians and immigrants alike. A lot of West Africans migrate to Nigeria because they know that the Nigerian economy offers some sort of job opportunities as a result of oil wealth.

The 1973 oil crisis and skyrocketing oil prices caused a tremendous 350 percent increase in oil revenues. The associated economic boom made Nigeria into a major migration destination within Africa. Rising incomes of the urban middle class and rapid industrialization attracted substantial number of West African labor migrants. However, the post 1981 decrease in oil prices would herald a long period of economic downturn alongside with sustained political repression and violence. In 1983 and 1985 Nigeria expelled large number of west-African migrants, including about one million Ghanaians (Arthur 1991: 74).

Despite past expulsions and the economic decline after 1980, substantial communities of west-Africans migrants remain in Nigeria, and immigration has continued at more modest levels. Between 1984 and 1991, the number of migrants from Mali and particularly Ghana declined, whereas the number of Togolese and Beninese seem to show an increasing trend. Although official figures probably underestimate the true number of migrants, those from Benin, Ghana, Mali, Togo and Niger form the largest groups, altogether comprising 305,000 officially registered migrants in 1991. According to recent UN estimates, over 971,000 immigrants would live in Nigeria (UN 2006).
The influx of migrants into Nigeria in the last three decades (from about 1970) has very serious consequences for the country, particularly in the pattern of employment observed. Migrant workers have successfully competed with and displaced Nigerians in a number of diverse job settings. This has been possible because migrant workers, majority of who are undocumented easily accept demeaning and demanding jobs that local Nigerians may be unwilling to take and often with wages much lower than the previous recommended minimum wage of N7, 500.00 per month. Migrant workers are found in jobs on construction sites, schools, hospitals, small-scale industries and the hospitality business. They have acquired a reputation for hard work, obedience and sincerity while providing cheap labour and are therefore preferred by some employers. The construction industry particularly in Abuja, the new federal capital territory has benefited greatly from the influx of migrants and has been a major source of attraction for semi-skilled and unskilled migrant workers in Nigeria.

One other significant impact of the influx of migrant workers in Nigeria is in the additional pressures exerted on available goods and services such as simple household goods and food items, health and educational services provided by government. While the country has suffered from lack of proper economic planning, the presence of a yet to be known number of migrant workers and members of their families puts greater burden on economic planners and renders government efforts ineffective.

Significant economic loss to Nigeria is another negative economic impact of the influx of migrant workers. This is directly through various illegally transferred remittances estimated at N150 million in1983 (Chhangani, 1983) mainly through the black market by illegal migrant workers. It is expected that this has increased tremendously over the last two decades. On the positive side, migrant workers’ contributions to the development of the
country have not been properly evaluated but it is generally viewed as very significant going by their presence in diverse work settings in the country.

The social impact of migration is most visible in the increase in anti-social and criminal behaviors such as prostitution, armed robbery, car theft, smuggling, currency trafficking, trafficking in women, girls and children, religious riots and other fraudulent practices wherever aliens of African origin are concentrated (Idris, 1998). Large number of migrants from Niger Republic, Mali and Chad have taken to begging in virtually all parts of the country as a result of their being unemployable. The large and uncontrolled influx of migrants as it is the case in Nigeria pose serious challenges to the political security of the country. In the northern part of the country, illegal aliens are often recruited to vote by desperate political parties taking advantage of the affinity of Nigerian border inhabitants with others in Niger Republic and Chad. Illegal immigrants often constitute a ready group for use as mercenaries and agents of disorder and lawlessness, posing security threat to many communities in the country.

The increase in the development of slums and shanty residential areas in many urban areas is partly associated with the influx of migrants due to their inability to secure and pay for good residential accommodation. Large numbers of illegal migrants and poor migrant workers live in unhealthy open and public places, without basic social amenities and are exploited by local residents who take advantage of their illegal status. Xenophobic feelings may have been generated and directed at aliens in Nigeria in the last few decades when their presence had increased tremendously and social and economic conditions had worsened for most Nigerian workers. This has however originated not mainly because aliens on their own constitute the problem but because Nigeria was experiencing a downturn in economic development, viability and management. This was heightened by the expulsion
of illegal immigrants of West African origin in 1983 and 1985 which somewhat confirmed their official rejection and increased certain prejudicial sentiments towards them.

Of significance is the feeling that the rise in unemployment may have suffered from increase in the employment of aliens, signifying a gradual replacement of nationals through the creation of opportunities for aliens. However, the argument has been put forward (Adediran, 1980; Chhangani, 1983) against this myopic and unjustified feeling since Nigerians are also present in large numbers as migrant workers in other African countries.

Generally, existing strong cultural affinities between inhabitants of contiguous (sometimes undemarcated) border areas between Nigeria and her immediate neighbors (Republics of Niger, Togo, Benin, Cameroon and Chad) may have lessened the cultural impact of the influx of migrants. However, it is perceived that large population of migrants of diverse origins in Nigeria is partly responsible for the increase in unbridled ethnic rivalry and the development of violent and terrorist inclinations for the purpose of obtaining religious and political concessions. The presence of aliens from African and other countries is also believed to have contributed significantly to changes in attitudes to cultural values and norms by the younger generation of Nigerians and the growing development of a violent political culture.

5.2 The Challenges of International Migration to the Nigeria Immigration Service

International migration is a challenge for both less-developed and advanced societies. The settlement of Nigerians in South Africa, for instance or Bolivians in Argentina creates peculiar problems. But immigration to advanced nations creates special problems. Modern societies have been transformed so thoroughly from the past as to represent a difference in kind, not just in degree. The changes over the past century—in the economy, society, technology, government—are so profound as to render our previous experience with
international migration irrelevant. And these changes mean that international migration is not compatible with the goals and characteristics of a modern society. This conflict between mass immigration and a modern society is also clear in the area of taxpayer-funded government services. This same pattern is repeated in other policy areas: security, sovereignty, population growth. The various concerns may seem unconnected, as though critics of immigration were selecting from a menu of options to cater to the concerns of varying constituencies. But in fact, the many challenges posed by international migration are simply different facets of the same problem: the incompatibility of mass immigration (legal or illegal) with modern society. This incompatibility lies in the fact that while globalization has enhanced the processes of international migration, state institutions that manage international migration have not been correspondingly enhanced. The major challenges of international migration to the Nigeria Immigration Service find their roots in this problem. Consequently, international migration has brought a lot of challenge to the NIS which border mainly on cross border crimes. One major challenge is border security, arms proliferation and terrorism. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons is increasingly and dangerously becoming a transnational organized crime in Nigeria with Boko Haram's insurgency, reemerging Niger Delta crisis and escalating kidnappings, communal crisis and armed robbery in the South East serving as hubs or impetus for arms trafficking.

Some border towns particularly in the North Eastern flank serve as locus for trafficking of arms as well as centers for stolen goods, drugs and hostages perpetrated by criminals, terrorists and their collaborators. The recent kidnap of a French family at a border town between Nigeria and Cameroon is an evidence.

Similarly, many arms and ammunition of various types, sizes and caliber have been intercepted and confiscated by security agencies. So also is the occasional recovery of stolen goods and hard drugs from criminals and terrorists' camps or hideouts.
Despite efforts of security agencies, the "merchants of Death" continue to engage in arms trafficking/ trading through covert and deceptive use of porous Nigerian borders with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

Nigeria's borders are massive with hundreds of footpaths crisscrossing to neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger with links to Mali, Libya and Sudan. From conservative estimate by locals, there are well over 250 footpaths from Damaturu/Maiduguri axis that link or lead direct to Cameroon, Chad or Niger. These paths are mostly unknown by security agencies, are unmanned, unprotected and thus serve as leaky routes for arms and ammunitions trafficking into Nigeria.

The "merchants of death" have since devised methods used to beat security agencies at the borders and through the footpaths. These methods include the use of camels, donkeys and cows to traffic arms, ammunition and drugs, like cocaine into Nigeria.

The fact that the weapons are small, light and collapsible makes it easy to be concealed and moved on camels and donkeys' back in a specially crafted skin or thatched bags mainly meant for the illegal "expedition" unexpected, unsuspected and therefore undetected.

Similarly, some cows and grains merchants in the North- East sub - region of the country, device means of hiding cache of arms and ammunition in empty fuel tankers, under vehicles' engines and inside bags of grains mostly undetected by security agencies at the affected border posts. The "grains" are transported in large numbers via trucks, trailers, Lorries and old model pickup vans and jeeps with little attention given to them by security agents.

The use of Keke- Napep (a form of tricycle) as well as camels, donkeys, and cows (moving in flocks) to deceive, hide and conveniently traffic arms in some parts of the North
are ways hitherto unknown, not well exposed or documented. Their capacity for arms trafficking is beginning to be uncovered and is being curtailed by security agencies.

The security situation in JTF (Joint Task Force a combination of military, police and para-military forces of Nigeria and also sometimes joint with security agencies of neighboring states) Operation RESTORE ORDER Area of Responsibility forced the Task Force to take on additional responsibility to trace sources of arms and ammunition to Boko Haram Insurgents, how the arms are trafficked and are also taking measures to block or curtail it.

This is one way at effectively checkmating terrorism in Nigeria - destroy its centre of gravity! And this seems to be a task that has so far proved difficult but necessary to be accomplished if the war against insurgency is to be effective and successful.

Similarly, the former Libyan and now Malian rebels are desperate to exchange arms for money to Boko Haram Terrorists, their financiers and collaborators as the Sect has since been affiliated to Al-Qaida in the Maghreb.

This has added to the overwhelming challenge of the influx of illegal aliens, arms, ammunitions and sophisticated Improvised Electronic Devices (IED) materials into the country and an efficient and effective fight against terrorism.

Additionally, the water ways/ seaports provide havens for arms trafficking through ships and speed boats on high sea and the use of canoes in the creeks. The exchange of stolen crude oil for arms/ ammunition is a well known "trading activity" nurtured and ferociously protected by militants or sea pirates and their financiers and collaborators with the possible connivance of unscrupulous law enforcement agents in the Niger Delta. This is one major source of arms and ammunition that strengthen militants' arms and ammunition holding not only in the Niger Delta but also in the South East and South Western parts of the country.
According to the generality of security agencies at the borders and seaports the porosity of the nation's borders and waterways is a big challenge.

Inadequate personnel, patrol vehicles, surveillance helicopters and equipments compound the problem of porous borders. Consequently, most of the borders are leaky and this makes effective control of intruders, smugglers and "merchants of death" a mirage.

The vastness of the nation's borders in the face of these challenges bring to the fore the need for a rethink on the management and security of Nigeria's borders and seaports - without which effective fight against insurgency, arms trafficking and proliferation will remain an optical illusion.

There must be innovative technology; sound policies, proficient process that will help protect our borders. It is worrisome that the exact number of illegal routes and means through which illegal aliens, arms and ammunitions are trafficked in to the country is largely unknown by the nation's security system.

The use of innovative technology - radars and alarm systems are major ways modern nations utilize to monitor and secure their borders. Some radar can be used as primary detection sensor for long range remote surveillance platforms.

The ability to detect slow moving targets, even in complex mountainous, thickly forested terrains and large open areas make some radars such as Blighter Radar ideal for remote surveillance and detection of vehicles and people trying to cross borders illegally. In remote areas, it is common for intruders to follow natural routes across the land, valleys, mountain paths or animal tracks.

In these instances, Mobile Surveillance System provides a cost effective way of monitoring key areas with limited resources. Similarly, Blighter Radar, unlike traditional Air Surveillance Radar can effectively surveil both the land and low air zone simultaneously.
Correspondingly, the fundamental problem of border security, arms trafficking, efficient and effective fight against terrorism in Nigeria can be linked to institutional fragmentation, intelligence and policy non-coordination between and among security agencies.

These challenges are real and must be addressed for the fight against terrorism; arms proliferation and border security to be effective.

One of the greatest challenges is the threat of immigrants. NIGERIA is under threat from immigrants. Unlike the thinking in most quarters, the challenge is not only from illegal immigrants. Most of those who pass for legal immigrants have little business, if any, in the country.

The Nigeria Immigration Service, which should manage these issues, is at the centre of expatriate quota abuses, the platform on which thousands of expatriates live in Nigeria legally. Expatriate quota is a cesspool of fraud through which expatriates flood the country to take up positions that Nigerians should occupy.

No society can develop without external expertise. Nigeria needs high doses of expertise in certain areas to develop. Those who can provide it are welcome. However, dubious officials of the Service have for years exploited expatriate quotas as business. Their activities account for unqualified expatriates taking jobs off Nigerians. Immigrants seen as the real threats are those who cross the borders without documents. They also enter Nigeria without any reason, but in most instances they constitute high security risks. They arrive without skills, work mostly as security guards and are open to recruitment as criminals. They live in uncompleted buildings and set up their own communities where they are the law. As they settle, they invite more relations, who are seeking safety from the ravages of the deserts.

The porous borders are not the main reasons for the number of immigrants in Nigeria, many of whom are technically not illegal. Under the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of
persons, nationals of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo can live in Nigeria for 90 days. They can come and go as they will. Even nationals of Mauritania which withdrew from ECOWAS in 2001 can assume nationality of any of these countries and benefit from the free movements.

With the ECOWAS protocol, migration is a major security challenge and the feeble efforts to address them through deportations cannot work. Those deported can return in weeks. Porous border routes are used mostly for smuggling not movement of people. Once anyone has a passport of any ECOWAS country, he does not need a reason to migrate to Nigeria.

The challenge should be tackled from various angles but an oft-neglected one is climate change. Nigeria should lead in addressing climate change in ECOWAS. As desert encroachment hits harder, inhabitants of the Sahara, which runs across the entire ECOWAS northern belt, would naturally migrate southwards to areas, where life has more prospects. Nigeria is the major target.

It is in our collective interest, for national survival, to proactively manage immigration. To do that, we have to think beyond border post management.

Another challenge posed to the NIS by international migration is the issue of migrant smuggling by air.

Currently, information available about migrant smuggling by air is incomplete and scattered. Smuggling routes are often circuitous. Smuggled migrants travel through several different airports in different continents, using fraudulent documents or documents obtained on fraudulent grounds. The transnational and sophisticated nature of this crime highlights the need for a comprehensive and international response to counter it. However, to date, very little is known about the modus operandi of criminal groups who smuggle migrants via air.
The lack of comprehensive knowledge about the phenomenon hampers a concerted and cooperative response to it. To address this lacuna, the United Nations Office on Drug Control (UNODC) convened an Expert Group Meeting in Vienna on 7 to 9 December 2009 aimed at increasing understanding of migrant smuggling by air, with the objective of better preventing and combating the phenomena. The Expert Group Meeting specifically aimed to gain a better understanding of:

- the modus operandi of migrant smugglers who use air routes to commit their crimes;
- good practices of law enforcement and other actors involved in responding to this problem;
- what the gaps in knowledge of and response to this particular method of migrant smuggling are; and
- how UNODC and other international actors can better assist states in strengthening capacities to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants by air.

**Article 3** of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Migrant Smuggling Protocol) defines migrant smuggling as: “...the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state of which the person is not a national”.

**Article 6** of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol requires the criminalization of this conduct.

In addition, Article 6 requires states to criminalize the following conduct: “enabling a person to remain in a country where the person is not a legal resident or citizen without complying with requirements for legally remaining by illegal means” in order to obtain a financial or other material benefit.

In short, the combination of the following elements constitutes ‘migrant smuggling and related conduct’:

1. Either the procurement of an illegal entry or illegal residence of a person; and;
2. Into or in a country of which that person is not a national or permanent resident; and
3. For the purpose of financial or other material benefit.
Furthermore, Article 6 of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol requires states to criminalize producing, procuring, providing or possessing fraudulent travel or identity documents when done for the purpose of enabling smuggling of migrants. Migrant smuggling by air is often used in combination with other forms of travel. For instance, a smuggled migrant may travel in airplanes for part of their journey but transit through or between countries on land or by sea. The combination will depend on which routes offer the least resistance. Use of air routes by migrant smugglers also offers a degree of flexibility. Often routes will be tested and adapted, with larger groups of migrants sent along successful ones. This makes migrant smuggling by air difficult to analyze given that in some regions, journeys will often begin with air travel but the remainder of the process will employ land and/or sea routes.

Central to the commission of migrant smuggling by air, is the role of document abuse, including use of ‘look-a-likes’, and corruption. Document abuse can involve alteration of genuine documents (including passports, visas or other documents to support visa applications) or counterfeit documents. Corruption can involve low level actors such as cleaning staff at airports or high level actors including immigration or consular representatives. Another modus operandi of migrant smuggling has been the misuse of asylum procedures, whereby migrants are coached to claim asylum. While the misuse of asylum claim procedures has been successfully used to irregularly migrate, two key points must be stressed in this respect.

Firstly, legitimate refugees may use the services of criminal smugglers. Article 19 of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol stresses that the fact of having been smuggled, cannot jeopardize a person’s asylum claim. Secondly, the fact that a smuggled migrant makes a legitimate asylum claim and is correctly accorded the status of refugee, does not make the actions of the migrant smuggler any less criminal where he or she smuggled the migrant for financial or material gain. The misuse of transit facilities of airports in common transit hubs
is an increasingly used modus operandi by migrant smugglers throughout the world. In this method of smuggling, criminal organizations will send migrants on an airplane with legitimate documents (passport, visa as required) to a transit hub. At the point of transit, on the instructions of the smugglers, the migrant will destroy his or her documents and deliberately miss the onward flight to the stated destination. The migrant is often given contact details for a member of the criminal organization in this transit port, who will meet them in the international lounge. During this meeting, falsified documents and new travel tickets will be provided to the migrant for their onward travel to their intended destination. In this modus operandi, the travel to the point of transit is regular, or legal, and becomes irregular thereafter.

Some of the less prevalent and rarely reported means of using air travel for irregular migration has been use of emergency exits in airports into domestic areas, often with the assistance of airport staff. There have been isolated incidents of persons hiding in planes during transit and then finding an available seat for the second leg of the journey. In smaller airports, groups of people have rushed security gates in an attempt to overwhelm staff. Migrant smuggling by air is relatively risk-free for high-level smugglers, given that they rarely travel with the people they smuggle – perhaps only having contact with them in transit zones of large international airports. Where migrants are escorted, it is generally with low-level smugglers. This means that the high-level actors of groups or networks that smuggle migrants by air are very rarely brought to justice. Often routes are operated by networks of smaller organized groups.

Clients will be passed from a local organized crime group to the next, reducing the vulnerability of smugglers to detection along the routes, given that law enforcers rarely have an overview of the entire route used. This lack of overview makes several smuggling
attempts possible. For instance, where a fraudulent passport is identified at a particular airport by airport staff, the person bearing the document may be prevented from boarding a plane but the passport returned to them, enabling them to attempt to use it at another airport. In short, migrant smuggling organizations are generally flexible and well-informed, and able to adapt routes and methods to law enforcement counter-measures. They sometimes have strong intelligence networks and are well-resourced to adapt and implement new strategies. The extent to which migrant smuggling by air occurs throughout the world is difficult to ascertain.

One reason for this is that apprehensions of irregular migrants at airports can only be an indicator of the total number of irregular migrants traveling by air (including those who are not apprehended). Among those who are apprehended, the extent to which smugglers have been involved can often only be assumed. In this context, smugglers are believed to be involved in smuggling via air to a significant extent, in the recruitment of migrants, facilitation, and production of necessary travel documents, coaching / training of migrants and in their insertion into destination countries by providing housing and / or work.

Apart from irregular migration that takes place between neighboring countries, it is generally assumed that a significant portion of irregular migration includes smuggling-facilitated air travel at some point in the journey. Despite this, there is a relatively low-level of detection. One concrete example is the successful operations involving small groups of migrants traveling on the same route every day with an escort who carries a suitcase concealing the forged documents meant for the following group of migrants. There are several other such examples. The air routes that are used by migrant smugglers are constantly shifting to evade preventive measures put in place by authorities. Large international transit areas where there are a large number of people to process on a daily basis are particularly at risk of being exploited by smugglers. Contrarily, smaller airports where there are fewer
officials, and/or where officials are not adequately trained in document control are also targeted. Low-cost airlines are also vulnerable to abuse for reason of their lack of resources to thoroughly check documents. Web check-in systems are also exploited by smugglers; e-ticketing and frequent flyer programs involving fewer document checks are often favored by smugglers.

A trend that has been observed in the last few years is that of drug smugglers switching to migrant smuggling. Migrant smuggling – for which there is high demand - is considered to be equally profitable but significantly less risky than drug smuggling; migrants can transport themselves making it is easier to deny having smuggled a person than it is to deny having smuggled drugs which must be physically carried. There are very few criminal networks which control an entire smuggling process. Rather, smugglers tend to outsource various parts of the process or legs of the journey, passing clients from one local organized crime group to the next. Some organized crime groups are careful to recruit individuals with no criminal background so as to avoid drawing attention to their operations. Individual smuggling actors involved in the process of air smuggling include intermediaries, coordinators, forgers, money brokers, escorts (employees or organizers) who travel with clients, sponsors in destination communities, corrupt officials and persons who may unknowingly facilitate the smuggling process. Some groups also employ analysts to research routes, observe smuggling teams in transit and profile law enforcement authorities to inform the group on how to evade detection. Another role is played by individuals sometimes known as ‘friends of the NIS’. The role of these individuals is to build close links with the NIS, often by denouncing irregular migrants to ‘test’ the NIS response and adapt routes and modus operandi accordingly.
Some individuals are specialists in visa systems and regulations and extremely well informed on airport and law enforcement procedures, making them highly adaptable. Smugglers stay abreast of changes in policy and know where detention facilities are when and when they are full and therefore unable to accommodate more intercepted persons. Smugglers will change routes as soon as law enforcement or airport authorities become suspicious. The various roles played by these individuals indicate a high level of sophistication of the modus operandi used by organized crime groups. The role of travel agents in migrant smuggling by air is significant. The involvement of a legitimate travel agency business has frequently been reported; travel agents will often mix regular travelers with smuggled migrants to disguise the crime. There have been rare examples of travel agents even organizing chartered flights specifically for the purpose of smuggling migrants. There have also been isolated reports of well-resourced organized crime groups owning their own travel companies.

Individual smugglers will either work full time in the smuggling business or occasionally as opportunities arise. Smuggling businesses may be family-run, with one member of the family taking responsibility for a particular aspect of the process (for instance, document forgery) and other members overseeing other aspects (such as escorting clients or handling financial transactions).

Initial contact with clients in the country of origin is generally made by smugglers of the same ethnicity. Similarly, contacts in destination countries often share the same ethnicity as the ‘client’. In transit countries, where a particular ethnicity would draw attention to the smuggling operation, locals from transit countries or corrupt officials will be used. It must be noted that some migrant smugglers also operate as human traffickers. What begins as smuggling may become trafficking; often victims of trafficking are escorted along the journey. Though generalizations as to the migrants who use the services of smugglers for air
travel are difficult to make, it has been generalized that clients are generally males between the ages of 25 and 34 who travel alone. However, where migrants are traveling from politically unstable countries of origin, migrants tend to be more diverse. There have also been several reports of cases in which situations of smuggling becoming situations of trafficking involving females.

Nationalities of migrants are diverse and often difficult to ascertain given that one modus operandi is for migrants to claim nationalities that are not their own in a bid to take advantage of policies of non-return to countries where lives and safety would be put at risk. A migrant’s choice of destination is based on several factors. Key among them is the language of the destination country, often related to historical / colonial ties. Destination countries are also selected based on their asylum procedures, employment opportunities, access to social rights, family ties or presence of migrant communities. In some instances, the distance of the destination country from the country of origin may be a consideration.

Because migrant smuggling by air is relatively safe and successful compared to other means of travel, smugglers can charge migrants more for their services. Air travel is also significantly faster than other forms of transport, making it a sought-after means of smuggling. Another attraction of some air smuggling services is that smugglers sometimes offer their ‘clients’ free re-trials in the event that the initial attempt fails. In some situations, the smuggling fee is only paid where the smuggling has been successful, but generally payment of the smuggling fee is given for various legs of the journey. Where one leg of the journey has been completed, the family of the migrant may be contacted to pay the next installment to the recruiter and the journey continues. Some groups use hawala, or informal financial systems. Other groups have more sophisticated full package arrangements in place.

Though it is difficult to ascertain what the profit margin for migrant smugglers by air is given that it largely depends on the modus operandi used, it is generally considered to be a
profitable mode of migrant smuggling from which smugglers derive a high profit margin. In cultures where a higher cost of a service indicates a higher quality of that service, smugglers are able to significantly raise fees. Generally it can be assumed that an organized crime group would only engage in this activity where the profit margin is well above 50%. Smuggling fees raise issues of other crimes including drug smuggling and human trafficking. There have been instances of migrants carrying drugs with them to fully or partly pay for the smuggling fee. Otherwise, the smuggling fee has been paid through sexual services, often rendering the smuggled migrant a victim of human trafficking. Another big challenge that international migration creates to the NIS is the role of document abuse.

The use of documents can either be in the form of forged documents (where documents have been fraudulently altered), fraudulently obtained documents (for instance passports issued on the basis of false birth certificates), or in the misuse of valid documents (for instance, where documents are used by a person who is not the owner of the documents; look-a-likes). The quality of forgeries is increasing as is the use of genuine documents. Forged and fraudulently obtained documents can be re-used several times after being returned to the country of origin. The same visa for instance, can be used repeatedly within its date of validity. There have also been situations where the same passport will be used several times to smuggle several people. In addition to sophisticated methods of document abuse to facilitate migrant smuggling by air, there have been many incidents of document swapping, whereby flight tickets, passports and boarding passes will simply be swapped in airport transit zones.

Migrant smugglers have employed several different forms of document abuse pertaining to passports to facilitate air smuggling operations. These have included passports which have been forged, falsified, fraudulently obtained, stolen for use by ‘look-a-likes’, counterfeited or even ‘fantasy’ (where a passport is created for a country that does not exist).
The use of genuine passports has been aided by passport theft or even passport bearers themselves (for instance, backpackers or members of the migrant’s family and/or community) selling their own passport and then reporting it lost or stolen. Genuine passports can be used in a variety of ways. Substituting a passport photo for that of the migrant is increasingly rare given that there is a high rate of detection. Rather, smugglers generally replace the bio-data page, sometimes with the involvement of corrupt officials using official techniques. Passports with counterfeit bio-data pages are a very expensive form of falsified document used by migrant smugglers, often costing several thousands of dollars. Passports from countries with visa-free entry are the most sought after and therefore the most expensive, particularly where they come from a country with a large community of people with same ethnicity as people wanting to be smuggled.

The introduction of electronic passports in some countries has resulted in an increase of impersonation through their use by ‘look-a-likes.’ The use of look-a-likes is a common means of smuggling migrants. In this method, the smuggled migrant will travel with a passport or other document belonging to a person who looks very similar to them. In some very sophisticated, albeit attempts to make a would-be migrant look like the person whose documents they are traveling on, migrants have undergone plastic surgery or altered their fingerprints where fingerprint technology is used. The ‘look-a-like’ technique may be used to obtain a genuine passport; for instance, whereby an imposter will apply for a renewal or replacement of a document with their photograph. Passport or other document factories are prevalent in some parts of the world and are professionally and productively run. Often forgers will work as contractors, not necessarily working as a fixed part of a smuggling group but independently for anyone paying for forged documents. In some cases, the forged documents are not purchased by smugglers outright but rather a deposit is paid for their use and the documents are returned to be used again. The quality of a particular forgery depends
on its intended use by the migrant paying for smuggling services; for instance, where the intent is to claim asylum the quality of the document does not need to be as high given that the passport may be destroyed once a plane has been successfully boarded.

However, if the document is intended to be used to remain in the destination country, it will need to be of high enough quality to evade detection by immigration officers. Poor quality of a given document or documents as a barrier to smuggling can be overcome where corruption is employed. A common modus operandi for migrant smugglers is ‘visa smuggling’ understood to be the obtaining of regular visas (of various categories including travel, student and business visas) through fraudulent means. Visa smuggling is often planned well-ahead of the actual travel and combines a variety of methods for different stages of the journey. Such methods can include for instance, the creation of fictitious companies to obtain executive visas to a particular destination country, for the purpose of working in a phantom branch of that company with the help of a lawyer or other actor in the destination country. Visa applications can also be supported by other counterfeited documents including flight tickets, boarding passes, resident permits and other documents to show that the identity of the visa applicant is the same as that in their passport.

Another type of ‘visa smuggling’ is visa fraud in the country of origin. In this method, a facilitator will provide fraudulent supporting documents to the visa issuing authority. Such documents can include birth certificates and sponsorship letters which may be used to support a fraudulent visa application submitted to a consular authority. The extent to which this occurs is so significant that some consular authorities are no longer able to give any credence to supporting documents in considering visa application requests. Another type of ‘visa smuggling’ is by proxy. The visa can be delivered by mail or to a person other than the requester of the visa him/herself. For example, a travel agency may apply for a visa on behalf of the applicant, and complete the entire process to obtain a fraudulent visa in the migrant’s
passport. The consular authorities then can only rely on the information provided in the application form to deliver the visa, with no interview conducted to cross-check the information at the embassy/consulate, hence making it difficult to detect fraudulent applications.

Abuse of approved destination status processes can result in successful irregular entry of another person. With this method, travel agencies in origin countries have been approved by destination countries to issue visas. After such visas have been used for legal entry, the passports are returned to the country of origin with exit stamps, while the person to whom the visa was issued remains in the destination country. This can be more easily done where there is no exit control.

There have also been cases of counterfeit residency cards being issued to smuggled migrants, who will enter the destination country as if they are residents returning. Often, smuggled migrants are coached by smugglers before their travel on aspects of the destination country and their fictitious lives there, so that they may evade detection upon being questioned by law enforcement and border officials. In other cases, the true resident, usually of the same nationality as the migrant, either lends or provides his or her documents to a migrant in order for them to enter the country of destination as a look-a-like. Official corruption has greatly affected the role of the NIS in managing international migrations. The role that corruption plays in migrant smuggling by air is significant and can take place at any stage of the smuggling process from origin through transit to destination. An organized crime group can take over entire law enforcement and airport staff at a given airport, purely through corruption.

Corruption to facilitate migrant smuggling by air can be both high and low level, from consular officials through to cleaning staff at airports. At the higher level, visa-issuing
authorities and immigration officials will receive a benefit to provide a service or turn a blind eye. The replacement of a bio-data page in a passport for instance, requires the involvement of people or a person with access to official techniques but more often the role of corruption comes into play where a government official issues genuine documents by fraud rather than altering a document. An example of this is where a criminal obtains a falsified birth certificate for instance, which can in turn be used to obtain a genuine passport. At the low level, immigration, airport and airline staff may be paid to do something as small as unlock a door or stamp a document without closely inspecting it or as mentioned, corruption has been used to overcome the hurdle of poor-quality falsified or fraudulent documents. Corruption may also be facilitated by the use of blackmailing or intimidation; there have been reports of threats made to the lives of people who have initially refused to be corrupted.

Border crimes and security is also a challenge to the Nigeria Immigration Service Migration has changed the concept and practice of security, and the rules of human interactions. Its threats or perceived threats have made individual governments to formulate policies and strategies to regulate and control the way people move across their borders. Despite its dominant gains, the challenges of migration have become a part of human existence and a matter of survival for countries, most especially in the light of globalization. The dramatic increase in worldwide flow of people, goods, and ideas has created a new group of threats. These are transnational organized crimes such as smuggling, trafficking, terrorism; cross-border crimes, illegal migration, sharp socio-economic differences, mismanaged refugee and asylum seeker flows, amongst others. Countries of origin, transit, and destination are now on the defense against the attacking influences of migration flows.

A major challenge confronting the Nigeria Immigration Service is the problem of transnational crimes. They are trans-national because they are committed across international
borders. A little review of forms of international crimes will reveal its challenges and implications to Nigeria.

While the integrative imperative of globalization calls for borders to be increasingly porous without little or no barriers, the dark side of globalization has brought to the fore the need to fend off contrabands, criminals, illegal immigrants and terrorists. As the threat level increases, so also is the pressure and attention on border management. Borders must necessarily stop, interdict and examine people, conveyances and cargoes at points of entry or exit. Our border performs the dual role of a line that links as well as a line that separates (Willie, 2008). The two border towns which are Seme border in Lagos State and Idiroko border in Ogun State that connect Nigeria to Benin republic are of crucial concern due to the large state of trans-border activities between the two countries. Benin is a country where animistic beliefs are widespread. (50% of the population is animistic) both Christian and Muslim groups have continued to practice animistic traditions and practices vary across the ethnic groups. The implication is that definitions of crime also vary just as much and forms of traditional justice in particular are different (Chikwanha, 2007). Crime and unemployment figures are generally unavailable for this country, life expectancy is 52 years, one third of the population are illiterate and live below the poverty line. The high level of poverty and generally poor economic conditions are thus likely to contribute to high crime state level, 2006 in particular saw an increase in the sophistication of criminals in conducting surveillance of their victims especially in car jacking and organized crime. The high level of these crimes and their transnational nature, including the high number of criminals involved which are both Nigerians, Beninese and even criminals of other nationalities make these threats not a problem for Benin republic alone but also any other countries in the world (Chikwanha, 2007). The criminal activities in Benin republic in one way or another threaten our national security and vice versa. Crimes such as Human trafficking, smuggling of
weapons, drugs, goods and other contrabands across the Nigeria-Benin border has made border security a very crucial concern for Nigerians and Beninese alike. Good border management from the foregoing is an attempt to seek to balance the competing and not conflicting goals of collective security of facilitating access for people, goods and services that are desirable and needed with interdicting or stopping criminals that can cause insecurity in Nigeria and globally. The joint management of Seme border in South West Nigeria between Benin and Nigeria in terms of collective security arrangement under bilateral and ECOWAS initiatives is an attempt to efficiently manage the borders. Good border management as identified must systematically act as fitness, being able to accurately and efficiently identify high-risk people and cargoes, target them for inspection and reject same without hindrance to legitimate cross-border traffic. This to a large extent holds great potentials for policy makers and may form the solution to the elusive problem of insecurities in Nigeria (Willie, 2008).

Transnational organized crime suggests in simple terms the movement of persons, goods and services across sovereign national jurisdiction in a manner devoid of acceptable norms and standards. At the local level, the sophistry of organized groups can be described as rudimentary. However, with international linkages, the operational base of organized crime in Nigeria has widened beyond immediate frontiers which is a source of great concern to government. Most of these organized crimes are made possible in Nigeria because of the porous and notorious Nigeria – Benin border (Ngor Ngor: ND).

The Nigerian government has mapped out policies and strategies to deal decisively with transnational crimes across the Nigeria-Benin border but the solution has constantly eluded us due to a number of reasons among which is the level of corruption at the border and within the country. These threats have been perhaps most noticeable in regard to drug-
trafficking, human trafficking, arms smuggling and the smuggling of other goods which are mostly cars and petroleum products. (UNDOC, 2005).

While these operations might appear quite different there are frequent relationships and interdependence between most of them. Although terrorist and insurgent groups are politically motivated, they often provide armed protection to drug trafficking in exchange for money or arms. Conversely organized crime groups and drug trafficking commit terrorist acts that target government agencies and personnel who attempt to bring them to justice, drug trafficking and related transnational organized crime encourage money laundering and makes possible the financing of non-governmental armed troops (Sheller 1995). These organized crime groups consist of complex clandestine, hierarchically organized networks and operate internationally with little regard for our borders. The gravity of the problem lies not only in the increasing complexity and number of their organization, but more importantly, with the serious challenge they pose in their ability to penetrate and operate with relative impunity in several states simultaneously. In the same vein, these illegal enterprises not only threaten aspects of our country’s sovereignty and security that have traditionally been taken for granted, but they also prove the permeability of our national borders and vulnerability of state institutions.

Human Trafficking

The trafficking of children for the purpose of domestic service, prostitution and other forms of exploitative labor is a widespread phenomenon in Nigeria. In the view of the clandestine nature of trafficking, accurate and reliable figures are hard to get (UNICEF, 2009). It was the case beginning from the mid 1980’s that Nigeria experienced increased incidence of human trafficking especially women and children (Agbu, 2008). These trafficked persons are at risk of involving in domestic and forced labour, prostitution, entertainment, pornography, armed conflict and sometimes ritual killing (UNICEF, 2007).
For Nigeria, the situation was so bad that the then first lady, Titi Abubakar through her non-governmental organization – Women Trafficking and Child Education Foundation (WOTCLEF) took it upon herself to spearhead what would eventually become a serious fight against human trafficking in Nigeria. Utilizing all advantages desirable from the position, political legal and social, she was able to kick-start a serious challenge to human trafficking and its corruption support case in the country (Agbu, 2003). In July 2003, the trafficking in persons prohibition and Administration Act was passed in Nigeria, a legislative framework that prohibits all forms of trafficking in person and protects children and adults against criminal networks (UNICEF, 2009). There are diverse reasons why many Nigerian Children are vulnerable to trafficking, including poverty, large family size, rapid urbanization with deteriorating public service, low literacy levels, high school drop out rates (UNICEF, 2007), and to top it all up is the porous borders of Nigeria – Benin republic. The poor economic situation in Nigeria has led to unemployment and high rates of school drop outs.

These circumstances which are also present in Benin have created a large pool of inactive and unengaged children and adolescents who are much more vulnerable to trafficking than their peers who go to school.

Nigeria is a centre of trafficking in human beings, especially women and children. It is an origin, transit and destination country for trafficking children and serves predominantly as an origin country for trafficked women. These women and children are trafficked to different parts of West Africa, North America, Europe and Middle East from Nigeria mainly through the Seme Border. Benin also serves as a destination country for children trafficked for labour exploitation from Nigeria. Trafficked women trafficked from Nigeria are also forced into prostitution in Benin (Chinkwanha, 2007).

Foreign children trafficked to Nigeria come mainly from Benin and Togo (an estimated 96%, with 90% of that figure coming from Benin alone), Cote d’ Ivoire and Niger.
Children as young as five and six years trafficked from Benin have been found working in exploitive conditions in Nigeria mines in the Western part of the country. Trafficked girls are used for domestic services or street trading as well as commercial sexual exploitation while boys are generally forced to work on plantations or in commercial farming, construction, quarries and mines or engaged in petty crimes and drug trade (UNDOC, 2006). With respect to women trafficked to Europe for the purpose of sexual exploitation, an estimated 94% are from Edo State while the remaining are from Delta, Kano and Borno State.

The activities of women victims of trafficking especially those who go into prostitution either on their own or are forced to do so, has implications for their reproductive health and general health of Nigerians. Young Nigerians are alleged to be active participants in officially sanctioned prostitution in Benin, Italy and some other parts of the world. In other words, trafficking has consequence not only for the victim alone, but also for their families and the nation as a whole, especially as women and little girls are involved in risk of pregnancy, maternal immortality, sexually transmitted disease and HIV/AIDS. Child prostitution and child labour deprive the children of the opportunity to pursue and achieve their full potentials, thereby depriving the nation of vital human resources for development. It also detracts our self esteem as a nation and devalues our pride and moral values (Olujuwon, 2008). Notwithstanding the socio-economic consequences of prostitution, to our country, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate for Benin and some other destination countries which young Nigerian girls are trafficked to expose them to higher risk of contracting HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted disease that has serious repercussions on their reproductive health. It is estimated that, to date, about two-third of the reported AIDS cases have been females usually between the ages of 15 and 49 years who incidentally forms part of the segment of the women population who often migrate or are trafficked. It will be right to now say that the increase in the trafficking of women from Nigeria to other countries and also the trafficking
of young girls from other countries to Nigeria via the Nigeria – Benin border has to a large extent contributed to increase in the HIV prevalence due to the mobility of infected women victims of trafficking (Taylor, 2002).

Trafficking of humans, particularly in women has negative cost implications on the economy of home country of the trafficked. Victims of trafficking are normally of low employable skills on account of their relatively lower education levels. Most of them are also trafficked on fake travel documents and hence occasionally get apprehended by the law enforcement agencies of the destination countries leading to their forced repatriation, the cost of which is borne by their home government. Most often, the evacuated migrants are not well oriented and rehabilitated to properly integrate them into the society. As a result, some returned migrants see their perceived new environment as an opportunity to put into practice some of the negative socio-cultural practices learnt abroad that are diametrically opposed to the socio-cultural settings of the Nigeria society. Victims of trafficking sometimes resort to desperate behaviors when they fail to reach their destination. Victims of trafficking in those situations become stranded and despondent and resort to all sorts of socio-economic activities including prostitution, illegal drug peddling and burglary. In some instances traffickers use their victims as carriers of illegal drug across our borders.

Trafficking in women and children has also negative socio-political implication for both origin and host continues especially where many of the women and children are let lose to practice prostitution in the open in the host country. Apart from putting a derogatory tag on the Nigeria womanhood, it also increases pressure of the host government to take appropriate action to remove the offensive behavior.

**Drug trafficking**

The problem with drug trafficking is probably among the most alarming problems in transnational crime (Muna, 2002). Nigeria is neither a producer nor consumer nation in the
illicit drug trade but serves as a major transit route. Of all transnational criminal activities prevalent in Nigeria, the drug trade has brought the country much more woes and international pariah status than any other has. Drug trafficking came to official prominence from 1983-1984 in Nigeria, following public execution of some convicted drug traffickers (Ngor Ngor: ND).

Nigerian Traffickers operate with impunity in Benin so also Beninese in Nigeria through the Nigeria – Benin border. Traffickers use legitimate business to camouflage drug operation. Proceeds are often invested in property (Real Estate) and this enables them to launder illicit profits. In Nigeria, which is the most populous country in Africa and one of its dominant economic players and where there is significant problem of organized crime, the police and other agencies appear to have only limited capacity to analyze the structures of organized crime, tending to regard all those whom they apprehend as individuals, the problem with drugs shows that actors both supplier and users are internationally linked (Muna, 2002).

According to almost all accounts drug trafficking was pioneered in the region of West Africa by Nigerians. Soon joined by others, and police force in Ghana and Sierra Leone both allege that drug trafficking was introduced into their countries largely by Nigerians criminals seeking new operating locations. But although international drug trading in West Africa appears to have been pioneered by Nigerians and by all accounts Nigerian entrepreneurs now play a major role in the international drug trade, every country in West Africa has the capacity to become a transit zone used by criminals of any nationality (UNDOC, 2008). For example, most persons with Nigerian International passports that are arrested, prosecuted and convicted in connection with drug trafficking are couriers working for drug barons in other countries (Ngor Ngor: ND), and although it is pointed out that Nigeria is by far the most populous country in West Africa, and indeed the whole of Africa, and that it is therefore to be
expected that the country will produce greater number of criminals than its neighbors, it is still important to point out that criminals of other nationalities including Beninese may sometimes find it convenient to pass themselves off as Nigerians. But even if one were to make allowance for doubts over the true nationality of some couriers bearing Nigerian passport, there is overwhelming evidence to support the view that drug trade remains one of the specialties of Nigerian criminal group – of couriers intercepted with drug transmitting through West Africa, according to statistics compiled since 2000-2005, 92 percent were West Africans and no less than 56% were Nigerians (UNDOC, 2005). A striking tendency in Nigeria is its continuous emerging role as a zone of transit. Just within West Africa Drugs are trafficked from Ghana through Togo, Benin cutting across the Nigeria-Benin border into Nigeria to Southern Africa.

The couriers are mostly youths within the age bracket of 18-40 years. The methods of peddling in drugs varied from simple concealment in personal effects, lining of clothing, animals, concealment in women’s reproductive organ (Vagina), designed as talcum powder, packaged in small molded balls and swallowed, engraved in cultural artifacts to so many ingenious unimaginable methods. The drugs are transported across the Nigeria – Benin Border by land, air or sea. The Nigerian government established the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDIEA) to fight the upsurge in drug trafficking. Added to this, is the promulgation of National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act. The act seeks to enforce laws against the cultivation, processing, sale, trafficking and use of hard drugs and to empower the Agency to investigate persons suspected to have dealings in drugs and other related matters. The NDLEA with the cooperation of other international agencies has relatively fought the war against drug trafficking but the porous border of Nigeria – Benin has limited the effects which the Agency must have made (Agbu, 2008).
Drug trafficking has both social and economic cost for Nigeria. In Nigeria, drug trafficking helps in worsening off or raiding helpless skewed income distribution. The traffickers are rich people whereas the non traffickers are not. Also the manner in which the drug traffickers in Nigeria spend their money also has social implications. They spend their money recklessly before the poor masses; a consequent manifestation is that those without such access will express their anger and ill feelings in the act of crime of delinquency (Jaja, 1990).

Drugs also constitute a big damage to health. The transiting of drugs through any given country means that some of it inevitably stays there, either as payment for services rendered or as a source of profit for the traffickers, these drugs are thus consumed locally with the dire effects on consumers that we all know. Addiction sets in and the afflicted persons become a huge burden in all respects. They will steal to feed their habit, resell drugs at extremely low prices to earn their fix, thus contaminating their surroundings. They will use violence if necessary to obtain cash, or simply because they become frustrated and angry. A cycle of dependency, distress, poverty and crime sets. It becomes a major internal security and National Security Issue (Shehu, 2009).

The influx of drug and other dirty or unsafe money has also put the economy and the banking system under great pressure because although it might build its net worth, it puts the bank at risk of prosecution or worse if monies are withdrawn too fast. Legal system becomes over burdened, prisons fill up, resource offering help and rehab are insufficient or not up to par, and the whole attitude of fear in society seeks retribution and punishment rather than rehabilitation and reintegration. Government officials are corrupted at the same time and can cause serious violence to those who pose threat to their lucrative business, police forces become unable to cope and the list goes on and on. At the end if this threat is not properly
handled could cripple every institution of our economy and leading to grave national insecurity (Shehu 2009). Proliferation of arms and terrorism has already been mentioned.

The smuggling of other commodities such as oil and cars have been constantly reported across the Nigeria-Benin border. Just this year alone, 380 cars stolen in Nigeria have been traced to Benin Republic which had the suspects released. Oil bunkering in Nigeria has also continued to occur at an alarming rate due to the easy smuggling of the stolen oil via the Seme border. According to the Federal Government, some 300,000 barrels are illegally exported per day with the Nigeria-Benin border acting as a major transit zone.

Efforts have been made to reduce smuggling activities to its minimum at Seme border due to its economic consequence which is a vital part of our national security. Between last year and January 2010, Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Badagry Area Command says it made a massive seizure. The head of the command, comptroller Aliu Barhriel Toba, put the value of goods seized at N573.3 million. Among the seizure were (Tokunbo) vehicles, bags of rice, wines, textile material and vegetable oil as well as pharmaceutical products topping the list of the seizures. The mode of concealment equally was amazing as some of these goods were concealed in a manner that ordinarily will not give an inkling of suspicion.

The command according to Aliu in a personal interview in December 2011 recorded huge revenue of N3.8 billion in 2009 as against N3.5 billion recorded in 2008. He also disclosed that his command recorded N443.6 million as revenue in January this year as against 238.6 million in January 2009, a comparative difference of N204.9 million. Smuggling is like a cankerworm that does no good.

The nature of our wide expansive border and coastland with the attendant difficulty of covering it because of limited resources has aided in both the smuggling out and smuggling in of different goods. Similarly the dominance of substandard goods, fake drugs and
prohibited items in our local markets also has serious health implications for the people of the Nigerian Federation.

A state’s borders represent the geographical boundaries of its enforcement jurisdiction. While these borders may appear to serve as a bulwark against the activities of criminals from other states, in fact criminals cross these borders in a whole range of ways. They walk, run, ride, sail, and fly across them, and they tunnel under them. They dispatch or transmit things across them—every kind of contraband, humans, body parts, digital information, messages, and dirty money (Williams 2001). They appear to work in a borderless world, whilst the authorities that pursue them are constrained by borders. But these criminals also rely on borders for advantage. Borders create markets with different prices for illicit goods, which the criminals exploit. In ‘national sanctuaries’, borders provide impunity from the criminal jurisdiction of states seeking to arrest and prosecute these criminals. For transnational criminals engaging in transnational crime, borders are part of the business. This work takes a look at the distinctive features of criminal activities that have a cross-border nature and the kinds of harm these activities cause. It then advocates a policy process for the development of special international legal measures to suppress these transnational crimes. There are various characteristics and causes of transnational or trans-border crimes. Transnational crimes are commonly characterized as private or non-governmental crimes (Bassiouni, 1974), that is crimes committed by non-state actors. They are committed by individuals or groups for unofficial ends. These individuals may be private natural persons, or juridical persons such as companies, but they may also be state officials acting in their private capacity or units of state organizations such as the police, acting unlawfully (Flem 2001:81).

Most transnational criminal activities is driven by desire for personal economic gain. Transnational criminals take advantage of cheap goods or services in one state and move them across borders to another state where there is strong demand and the goods or services
can be sold or hired out at a profit. The main difference with licit economic activity is that the goods or the services are prohibited in one or other or both states. These activities may take a myriad of forms ranging from small-scale smuggling to transnational activities of great complexity and value. Transnational criminal flows are essentially chains of supply composed of producers, wholesalers, distributors, transporters, exporters, and importers and retailers that exist for each illicit product or service. Sometimes supply chains are used only for one product or service, sometimes for multiple purposes.

Economic disparities are among the main causes of transnational crime because they strengthen demand for illegal goods and services across borders (Passas 2001). Poverty or relative poverty is the main ‘push’ factor in source or producer states, but political conflict, culture, and opportunity also play a role. Low wages mean that illicit goods and services are cheap to produce or secure. Various facilitative factors make the cross-border supply possible, including the availability of transport and corruption. ‘Pull’ factors in destination states include the demand for goods and services. The absence of appropriate law and/or enforcement in a particular state may push or pull by facilitating production, supply, or consumption.

Some states may seek to attract crime because of the benefit from taxation of financial activity (e.g. bank secrecy jurisdictions) while others may try to repel it because of the cost to victims (e.g. the US and drug use) (Broude and Teichman, 2009). A range of domestic policies can influence the growth of transnational crime including economic protectionism, fiscal austerity, privatization, public procurement, and promotion of domestic industries, domestic prohibition of commodities like drugs, and the imposition of quotas on immigration. And while one set of factors may explain the rise in incidence of a transnational crime, an unrelated set of factors may explain its spread. For example, the collapse of the Colombian drug cartels gave Mexican criminals the opportunity to switch from the transit to the
production of illicit drugs, and the failure of local policing, corruption, and poverty in Mexico explain the spread of this involvement. Criminal markets are also spread through displacement; they react to suppression by relocating their activities or switching to other less visible crimes.

Although these illegal markets often have close relationships with legal markets by, for example, using the banking system to launder profits, illegal and legal markets are not identical (Arlacchi, 2001) Illegal markets generally use violence to ‘enforce’ contracts and to gain market share. The costs involved in avoiding getting caught mean that the market prices of illicit goods tend to be much higher, although transnational criminals rely on personal relationships as well as ethnic and other group loyalties to reduce transaction costs.

Not all transnational criminals pursue economic advantage. Some transnational criminals seek political advantage through violence or the threat of violence. Transnational terrorists, for example, may hatch a plot in one state and execute it in another. Though shocking, violence is an incidental feature of their activity, as their main aim is to influence either official or public opinion to achieve their own political goals.

Although organization is not a necessary condition of transnational crime—cross-border smuggling by one person would suffice—transnational crime is heavily associated with organized crime. The concept of organized crime is, however, not settled (Levi 2007). The difficulty is what is meant by ‘organized’: it may mean a large range of things from hierarchical organizations to lose networks.

An economic model of crime suggests that it is rational for criminals to go where they can to do business and to spread out into unregulated areas. In antiquity, when formal boundaries were weak, it was relatively easy for criminal activity to cross borders. The ‘harder’ borders (border controls, passports) characterized by the rise of the nation states of the post-Westphalia era made cross-border crime more difficult and tended to offset
improvements in transport and communication mechanisms. It is generally believed today that the conclusion of the Cold War led to ideal conditions for transnational crime to flourish because legal controls became weaker as transport became cheap, frequent, rapid, and easy to access, communication became international and mobile, and financial transactions instantaneous and unregulated. The conclusion of free trade agreements reduced or removed the legal barriers to trade. As market control of the legal economy ascended and state control was discarded it became easier for criminals to move goods, persons, and money. In what he calls the ‘dark side of globalization’, Levitsky (2003), claims that transnational criminals responded more rapidly in exploiting this new market opportunity than states did in shutting down the opportunity for crime (Levitsky, 2003). Without clear evidence, however, we should be cautious about blaming the boom in transnational crime on globalization (Nelken, 1997). Political events such as the breakdown of the Soviet bloc have also contributed. Glenny’s view is that ‘it is not globalization in itself that has spurred the spectacular growth of organized crime in recent years but global markets that are either insufficiently regulated, especially in the financial sector, or markets that are too closely regulated, as in the labor and agricultural sectors’. Moreover, transnational crime has a long history. There has always been cross-border trade of a both legal and illegal kind. We are slowly becoming more aware of long-standing criminal practices like human trafficking that predate globalization. This perfectly exemplifies the Nigerian security situation.

The inherited boundaries have been a major problem to Nigeria's security to monitor, to recognize, to defend it against unwanted incursion, movements or activities. Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria’s internal security has been threatened by cross-border crimes such as trafficking in arms, persons, drugs; armed banditry, gun-running, vehicle theft, smuggling, touting and duping, illegal or silent migration (i.e. unnoticed or undocumented movements across borders), illegal lumbering, bunkering of
petroleum products, and of course the trans human activities of cattle rearers who move their herds across national borders regardless of any regulations. Others are terrorism, expatriates hostage taking, expatriate quota abuse, violation of immigration laws, document frauds, and financial crimes.

The various crimes have caused or influenced rate of ethno-religious and political crises in the country, where several lives and property were lost and people displaced. The more recent was the Boko Haram (Nigerian version of Taliban) sectarian crisis against the state. Foreign nationals were discovered among its fold and the Nigeria police alleged that the group received training and arms in Afghanistan. The migration induced conflicts and violence has led to reductions in revenue of the government, foreign direct investment, infrastructural facilities, and the ability of the government to deliver dividends of democracy to its citizens. Lots of Nigerians and immigrants now live in constant fear of insecurity. Kidnappings of expatriates, robberies and other forms of criminality have led some citizens to call for overhauling of the national security; states to agitate for state police, and also led to growth of private security companies. Some Nigerians in Diaspora are hesitant to come home due to the state of insecurity because a few of them have either been killed or robbed while visiting home.

Unregulated or under-managed international migration has also ridiculed and stained the country’s image in the international community. Government often expressed embarrassments at the ways and manners at which Nigerians are treated abroad or deported for immigration offenses and criminal activities. Some Nigerians have been executed while a large number are either awaiting trial, execution, in detention, or jailed. There are syndicates behind fake documents and visa racketeering. The government agencies in charge of migration and security issues also have their criticisms in the way they discharge statutory
assignments. On the whole, national security is threatened as a result of the numerous migration challenges.

Essentially, security is primarily a preoccupation of an individual state to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity, citizens, and their values. It is on this basis that Nigeria will have to gear up and take preemptive measures to manage migration in a way to enhance its national security. The priority of any democratic government must be to establish effective control over security issues. One of the ways to achieve this is to effectively police and control its borders by evolving effective and sustainable migration management strategies. Therefore, migration is becoming a focus of attention for Nigerian policy-makers and analysts, especially in the area of cross-border crimes and the ways Nigerians are treated abroad.

In migration, individual states threatened by migration challenges are always on the guard or imposing. Unlike other global issues, national security apprehension denied the world to evolve a common body to provide a framework for the formulation of a coherent and comprehensive response to the issue of international migration. Nigeria is a main source, transit and destination of trafficking in persons in spite of all efforts to curb the obnoxious practice. Making use of the borders, Nigerians are involved in international prostitution, forced marriage, forced labor, slavery, body parts, and illegal migration in Spain, Italy, Morocco, Libya and other Western nations. It posed a serious challenge to the state and citizens because organized criminal groups are behind the trade. They make use of fake documents and infiltrate the ranks of security agents to perpetuate their act. Whenever such groups exist is a threat to national security like the Mexican drug gangs, and Italian mafia.

Other cross-border related crimes that have various complications for Nigerian migration management include the activities of touts and dupes, illegal migrants, illegal lumbering and poaching, bunkering of petroleum products, and cattle rearers. At the sea
borders, smuggling, piracy and bunkering and the activities of Niger Delta militants are ongoing. According to the Nigeria Immigration Service Public Relations Officer, E.S.King, “it is difficult to monitor our maritime borders effectively. The Service has its challenges”.

The effect on the nation is the upsurge in crime wave. There are expatriate hostage taking, kidnapping, terrorism, and armed robbery which has instilled fear of insecurity among the people. Former President Yar’ Adua attested to this situation when he said “insecurity is the greatest challenge of its administration” (The Punch Sept.25 2009: 1). Other migration challenges facing the country are as a result of the government laissez faire approach to migration and improper or absence of planning, implementation and monitoring of migration laws. Majority of interviewees agreed that the approach has security implication. For example, Ekpedeme S. King (a second time Public Relations Officers of the Nigeria Immigration Service) said some Nigerians travelled on student’s visa, but while in the country they began to study. This often does not come to the knowledge of NIS except the host authorities intimate the Service of their presence. He said a lot of Nigerian emigrants are even not known to the Nigerian authorities while some are there illegally. They became a burden to the host government and when their request for refugee or asylum status is turned down, they could join criminal gangs. They were sometimes arrested, detained, or deported. Nigeria is concerned by this phenomenon. Countries differ in whether or not they regard mistreatment of their citizens as a threat that calls for state action, Nigerian governments had in the past showed cold attitude to its emigrants in their countries of destination. The democratic regimes have introduced a number of measures to advocate for its citizens. The policy of “citizen diplomacy” of a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ojo Madueke, and various initiatives of the Nigerian in Diaspora Organization to advocate for the release from jail, converting death sentence to imprisonment, and good treatment of emigrants are some examples. For example, Nigerians serving jail sentences are being negotiated to come home.
and serve their terms, those on death row (in Libya) have had their execution put on hold with the assistance of the African Union. Same intercession is going on in Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. The study discovered that Nigeria is also cooperating with Morocco, Italy and Spain on the same issue. The cultural affinity with neighboring population often presents problems of identification of citizens. Authorities (Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) and Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) said they often faced the challenge of placing some Nigeriens as they bear similar traits and names with the Nigerian Hausa group, and between the Yoruba of Nigeria and Benin. NIS, in 2006, retrieved 350 Nigerian national identity cards from Beninese (The Guardian, June 9 2006: 3). In September, two Ghanaians were paraded trying to obtain Nigerian passports by the Ogun State Command of the Nigeria Immigration Service. Their agent resides in Israel (The Punch September 8 2009: 8 and Leadership September 8 2009: 7).

This common occurrence often challenged the Nigeria Immigration authority and other security agencies. Security implications of the act not only conferred the citizenship of Nigeria upon the holder, but also have adverse effect on public facilities. National security can be threatened when immigrants get recruited into the security and other strategic sectors of the economy using the cards. Similarly, there are times when non-Nigerians are deported with Nigerians due to the problem of identification.

A few respondents are of the opinion that unemployment of large number of youth also compounds the migration problems. They said unemployment could lead to desperation. The desperate dreams of illegal migrants on the sea, victims or membership of trafficking or document syndicates and other atrocities associated with the problem are as a result of unemployment. The youth with shattered dreams could join criminal gangs in order to make ends meet. To monitor about 5000 kilometres borders present a great challenge to the security agencies. Approximately 1000 with Benin Republic in the west, close to 1500 with Niger in
the north, about 75 with the Chad Republic in the north-east, almost 1700 with Cameroon in the east, and nearly 700 along the Atlantic seaboard (Asiwaju 1992: 32). A former Comptroller-General of the Nigeria Immigration Service, Mr. Chukwuah Ude attested to this difficulty in his first comment on the Boko Haram crisis (Daily Trust July 30 2009: 5). All this implies that Nigeria witnesses daily crisscrossing movements of illegal migrants between West and Central Africa. The study finds out that there are some illegal migrants moving across Nigeria by land up to Southern Africa on a regular basis. This points to the vulnerability of the country as illegal movements could undermine its national security.

Similarly, the study discovered that some part of southern Niger has its traditional authority under the Nigeria’s Sultan of Sokoto, and still pay homage to the king. This set of people may decide to obtain Nigerian National Identity Cards or E- Passports if so desired. Also there is evidence of emergence of Al- Qaeda elements in Nigeria and Niger. Chad and Niger are often pointed to as sources of fundamentalists to northern Nigeria. Illegal migrants from these countries are sometimes accused by some southern Nigerian opposition groups of participation in national election and census. How the above affects cross-border movements is that nefarious activities could still be active across the borders. Illegal movements would thrive and any fallout of major crisis in any the states could precipitate refugee flows. There would be huge tasks for border officials to monitor the borders. Deep cooperation on migration issues will require strong political will and commitment of both the governments and their citizens.

But, from history, Nigerians are receptive and accommodating by nature. Furthermore, it has the ability in terms of space, to absorb immigrants and refugees in large number. Their presence is hardly felt or visible due to its vastness and population. This trait again has been to its security disadvantage. The recently evacuated Darul-Islam members and the deportation of non-Nigerians among them is an example. Weak institutions have
contributed to Nigeria’s inability to manage these types of movement. Immigration officials and other security agents at the borders are frequently accused of corruption. The ill has adversely affected the way it carried out implementations of bilateral and multilateral agreements entered into, including the ECOWAS migration policy. In fact, most of the ills of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment adopted on 29 May 1979 emanated from deep-rooted corruption and Nigeria is the most accused (Babatunde 2005: 127). With corruption, illegal and dangerous activities and persons can gain entry. The rapacity of officials and security agents extorting money from and harassing and brutalizing travelers, the ubiquity of checkpoints along the Nigerian section of the international highway, rigid borders formalities, and poorly equipped borders have to a great extent led to undermining the nation’s security. Traders might decide to circumvent the border posts and take his goods through the paths across the borders to avoid delay and loss of time. This situation often increases the level of smuggling and other cross- border crimes and the tenacity in which they operate.

Furthermore, Nigeria’s implementation of the ECOWAS legal framework on migration in the 1980s, i.e. the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and additional Protocols and Decisions, throws up a lot of challenges to its national security. Security implication of large influx of undocumented migrants could be serious. A lot were in prostitution, menial jobs, while some were unemployed. Threatened by the realities of economic crunch as a result of the Structural Adjustment Programmes, Nigeria jettisoned the protocol and expelled thousands of community citizens. The Buhari/Idiagbon military regime (1983-1985) risked dissolving ECOWAS by taking the drastic measure of closing the common borders indefinitely (Ate and Akinterinwa (1992: 6)

From the above, it is clear that Nigeria has been confronted with a lot of cross-border challenges and which have made it unable to effectively control and regulate its borders
against unwanted migrants. However, the understanding of these enormous, pervasive, and peculiar cross-border threats will help in the formulation of a comprehensive and sustainable security sensitive migration policy and practice.

5.3 The Operational Capability of the Nigeria Immigration Service

To address this issue let us first look comparatively at how another country the USA manages its own borders. According to Edward Alden (2012) for the past two decades the USA, a country with a strong tradition of limited government, has been pursuing a widely popular initiative that requires one of the most ambitious expansions of government power in modern history: securing the nation’s borders against illegal immigration. Congress and successive administrations have increased the size of the border patrol from fewer than 3000 agents to more than 21000, built nearly 700 miles of fencing along the southern border with Mexico, and deployed pilotless drones, sensor cameras, and other expensive technologies aimed at preventing illegal crossings at the land borders. The government has overhauled the visa system to require interviews for all new visa applicants and instituted extensive background checks for many of those wishing to come to the US to study, travel, visit family or do business. It now requires secure documents for all travel to and from the US by citizens and non-citizens. And border officers take finger prints and run screening measures on all travelers coming into the US by air in order to identify criminals, terrorists or others deemed to pose a threat to the United States.

The goal is to create border control system that ensures that only those legally permitted by the government to enter the territory of the United States will be able to do so, and that they will leave the country when required. The ambition of such is little appreciated. For most of its history, the US had only the loosest sort of border controls. Scrutiny of most visa applicants was cursory; few checks were done on incoming airline passengers; and it was possible to walk freely across almost any portion of the more than 7,500 miles of land
borders with Mexico or Canada. This has drastically changed with the challenge of drug trafficking and mostly the terrorist incident of 9/11.

Migration has become one of the most topical issues in the world today to the extent that the position of the governments of popular destination countries towards migration could make election campaigns a failure or a success. It has become an issue that can no longer be ignored or put on the back burner. According to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) in his speech to the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, in September 2006, about 200 million people live outside their countries of birth. The management of migration in the past was limited to the monitor and control of the flow of persons in and out of States, as well as the use of passports and other travel documents to ensure a more orderly movement of persons across land, and sea borders, including the airports.

However, modern migration has witnessed increased movement of persons due to rapid globalization as well as improvements in the dissemination of information, communication technology and modern modes of transportation. This spiraling increase in migration has highlighted an urgent need to design and implement more efficient and effective means of managing migration such that its benefits would outweigh the demerits. The desperation that accompanies the efforts of many unskilled or low skilled persons to migrate in an irregular manner has resulted in serious danger to life and limb and to an increase in smuggling and human trafficking rings. In addition, medium to highly skilled citizens also leave their country in search of better opportunities leading to the phenomenon of „brain-drain“ and its consequent negative impact on the availability of critical manpower. The current trend among migration experts is that organized labors migration is the key to reducing the negative impact of migration and enhancing its positive benefits for the migrants, their countries of origin and destination. At various international meetings
including the recent Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) 2009 and 2010 as well as UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and during negotiations for bilateral and multilateral agreements on the repatriation of persons, the importance of respect for the human rights of migrants was emphasized. Furthermore, during these meetings, the international community has consistently called for the non-criminalization of irregular migration as well as a more consistent and coordinated manner of controlling national borders. Nigeria recognizes the fact that migration is a cross cutting issue. It is impacted by and in turn affects the sectors of education, health, security, demographics and population, national planning and development, human development, organized labour, direct foreign investment, foreign relations, law and order, agriculture and food security, among other sectoral themes. The management of this international migration is the institutional responsibility of the Nigeria Immigration Service. What is the effort of the NIS in discharging this responsibility?

The manpower capacity of the NIS is 23000. As part of its effort to curb the influx of illegal immigrants into the country, the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) has reinforced the country’s border by recalling more officers from the hinterland where they are not currently needed to fortify the border patrol considering the ongoing war efforts in Mali. As regards to Mali, the NIS has taken proactive measures by enforcing the borders with many officers; officers were called back from hinterland where they were not needed much and were posted to Borno, Kebbi, Yobe and Zamfara States’ borders, the service knows what is happening in Mali, that Nigeria is a vulnerable country and people will want to move into Nigeria and the NIS has been patrolling our borders to forestall any security challenges. Motorcycles had been purchased to help in patrolling the borders and to track down illegal immigrants that might want to cross into the country. But how efficient will motorcycles be to the sophisticated means used by trans border criminals. However, in its little institutional
capacity, the NIS is spreading its limited capability along Nigeria's borders to at least maintain some security presence. This is sequel to the violent activities of cross border criminals who pose threats both to Nigeria and her neighbors. One of these potential criminal groups is known as Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The militant Islamic movement Boko Haram, which has its roots in Nigeria, poses a potential danger to Nigeria’s neighbors should its influence spread beyond the country’s borders. This potential threat should be evaluated and managed as Nigeria and the international community attempt to address the challenge posed by Boko Haram. The risks presented by the militant group are amplified primarily through the prevalence of porous borders in the West African sub-region. Countries like Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger are all potential targets due to their proximity to Nigeria, their demographics and their socio-economic realities. At greatest risk are Cameroon and Niger, which share considerably vast borders with Nigeria.

Nigeria’s borders with Benin and Chad are fairly short – 773km and 87km long respectively. In comparison, Nigeria’s borders with Niger and Cameroon span 1 497km and 1 690km respectively. The porous nature of these borders heightens the potential spread of terrorist activities into the neighboring countries. Their vulnerability to the spread of Boko Haram is compounded by the fact that Niger and Cameroon have borders with the northern Nigerian states, where Boko Haram already exerts a strong influence. The border with Niger, for example, stretches along Sokoto, Katsina, Jigawa and Yobe states. This proximity to northern Nigeria is therefore a particular threat to Niger’s already fragile security, given the relative ease with which terrorist elements can cross into the country. Cameroon faces a smaller risk than Niger as only two of the four Nigerian states bordering Cameroon (Taraba and Adamawa states) are part of northern Nigeria, while Cross Rivers and Benue states are in
the south-eastern and Middle Eastern regions of Nigeria. However, the Boko Haram risk to Cameroon should not be underestimated.

It should be noted that citizens of Cameroon and Niger have been suspected of participating in Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria. This alleged involvement implies that Boko Haram activities could already be spreading across Nigeria’s borders and that it could possibly already be conducting some of its activities in neighboring countries such as training recruits, and planning and executing terrorist acts. It could also be using neighboring countries as safe havens. Allegations that some Boko Haram militants have migrated to Niger and Cameroon after committing attacks in northern Nigeria buttress the need for swift action in addressing the problem. In addition, there have been incidences of Boko Haram attacks on the border between Nigeria and Cameroon. The May 21 suicide attack on a police station in Taraba State, on Nigeria’s border with Cameroon, illustrates the growing level of insecurity at this border post. Although Boko Haram has not claimed responsibility for this incident, the attack is in line with the modus operandi of the militant group and, needless to say, exposes the vulnerability of this border area.

Niger has been identified as fertile ground for terrorist activity due to its weak government, socio-economic challenges and the marginalization of certain components of society. Furthermore, the existence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) suggests the presence of Salafist ideology, which Boko Haram is also rooted in, and adds to Niger’s fragile security situation. The spread of Boko Haram into Niger would therefore create further national and regional insecurity.

While Cameroon’s vulnerability to terrorism is not as substantial as Niger’s, socio-economic malaise and dissatisfaction with the government do exist. If left unchecked, the combination of these two elements might allow for fundamentalist ideology to thrive and
result in the sprouting of terrorist activities in this country. It is therefore crucial to prevent the movement and infiltration of any elements such as Boko Haram into both countries.

The governments of Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon have made efforts to strengthen border security and prevent the spread of terrorism. For example, the Nigerian government closed down sections of its border with Cameroon and Niger as part of stricter border control measures. However, this is insufficient and tighter, more efficient border control measures need to be put in place to prevent the movement of Boko Haram and other criminal elements across borders. In addition, the closure of borders is not a permanent solution as it has various repercussions. It is notable, for instance, that citizens in Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria rely on cross-border trade for economic sustenance. Nigeriens in particular have borne the brunt of the closure of their border with Nigeria as drought in Niger means that many citizens rely on trade with Nigeria for food. The closure of this border has compounded the food shortage problem in Niger.

Other efforts towards border security include the agreement to create a Nigeria-Cameroon trans-border security committee. The committee’s establishment should, however, be matched with immediate and precise action to prevent wide-scale terrorist movements across borders. Action is required to redouble efforts to secure the countries’ vast borders.

In this regard, action constitutes deeper collaboration between the various border agencies. Information and resource sharing, as well as the standardization of policy, are crucial in this respect. Relevant legal instruments and frameworks should also be harmonized. More so, regional and international organizations should support efforts geared at tightening borders and restricting the flow of terrorists within the sub-region. Funding infrastructural development for enhancing border security is one way in which border control efforts can be supported.
Another effort at curbing terrorism based illegal immigration into Nigeria is the search for military and security cooperation between states. According to Abdoulaye (may 21, 2013), Nigeria has asked neighboring Niger for support in a week-old offensive against Islamist insurgent bases in its semi-desert frontier region, underlining moves towards West African cooperation against jihadis seen as a cross-border threat.

Concerns grew particularly after Islamist militants associated with al Qaeda seized the north of Mali last year and were dislodged only after French-led military intervention.

Nigeria declared a state of emergency in its northeast states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa last week before unleashing forces on well-armed and determined Boko Haram militants. Nigeria claimed some early successes on Monday.

Nurudeen Muhammed, Nigeria's minister of state for foreign affairs, delivered the request for help from President Goodluck Jonathan to his Nigerien counterpart Mahamadou Issoufou late on Monday in Niamey.

"We currently have military operations under way in Nigeria in three federal states to combat terrorism and we would like to have Niger's support in the common fight against these terrorists," Muhammed told Niger state television.

Military sources say Nigerian forces have faced stiff resistance by hardened Islamist rebels entrenched in the north and using cross-border routes to smuggle in weapons.

Nigeria and Niger signed a bilateral defense pact in October 2012 that includes sharing intelligence on Islamist groups and joint military exercises. The deal stipulates that a request for military aid by one nation cannot be refused by the other.

The two West African nations share a porous frontier of more than 1,500 km (940 miles). The fighting in Nigeria has pushed more than a thousand refugees across the border into Niger in the past few weeks, according to U.N. estimates.
Soldiers from Niger and neighboring Chad participated with Nigerian forces in a joint assault on Boko Haram fighters last month in Baga, a fishing settlement on the shores of Lake Chad.

Neighboring countries were alarmed last year when jihadi militants overran vast tracts of Mali's desert north, imposing a violent form of sharia (Islamic law) and establishing training camps, some of which trained Boko Haram operatives.

A lightning French offensive ousted the Islamists from northern Mali's towns but rural pockets of insurgents remain. France is now due to hand over to a U.N. peacekeeping force made up mostly of African troops, the bulk of them Nigerian.

Another capability of the NIS in curbing the menace of illegal immigration is immigrant raids. A series of raids by Nigerian authorities in recent days has brought fear to Katangwa Market in Lagos, where immigrant labor makes the market thrum amid piles of secondhand clothes, shoes, purses and other accessories that are laid along narrow dirt alleyways. Immigrant workers, who come largely from neighboring Niger to the north, are finding themselves targeted by security agencies anxious about a growing Islamic extremist insurgency in northern Nigeria that could spread southward.

Nigeria's porous borders and corrupt bureaucracy allow people to enter the country, giving extremists the chance to freely move and avoid capture. But those same borders give those living in poverty in neighboring countries a chance to earn money. Now even immigrants with proper travel documents worry they'll be rounded up as well.

"If they come here and arrest me and I don't have my papers, I don't know what's going to happen," said Abdu Tanimu, a leader of Nigeriens working in the market. "I don't know what's going on out there."

Immigration raids have happened before and even have a place in the slang of oil-rich Nigeria, home to more than 160 million people. The colorful recycled plastic bags carried by
travelers in the region are known as "Ghana-Must-Go," a reference to when Nigeria kicked out Ghanaians and other immigrants in 1983 as oil prices collapsed and the country's economy cratered.

Today, immigrants make up much of the menial labor workforce in Lagos. Nigeriens push wheelbarrows and carry goods on their heads in markets, while others serve as gate guards and night watchmen in commercial properties and residential estates. Young men from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana and other nations also crowd into the city, looking for jobs.

While some carry a proper passport and work permit, the majority of immigrants simply cross the border without papers. Some pass through with a payment of less than $1 to immigration officials. Others simply drive through the unpatrolled sandy stretches of the Sahel into Nigeria.

That loose arrangement is now being challenged, however, by a growing wave of shootings, bombings and kidnappings carried out by Islamic extremists in Nigeria's predominantly Muslim north. Since 2010, the extremists' guerrilla campaign has killed at least 1,548 people, according to an Associated Press count. Authorities and civilians increasingly fear that violence could spread into Lagos and Nigeria's largely Christian south, potentially destabilizing the nation.

"Now that there's insecurity in the country, those of them who came in here without the regular traveler certificate are the ones being sent out of the country," said R.O. Odupeyin, the Lagos state comptroller of the Nigeria Immigration Service. In recent weeks, the service has deported some 345 Nigeriens and 11 Ghanaians, Odupeyin told the Associated Press on Monday 15th of April, 2013. Another 22 Malians have been arrested and
handed over the United Nations refugee agency as French and Malian forces continue to fight Islamic extremists there, Odupeyin said.

However, critics point to the fact that nearly all those arrested in connection with extremist groups come from Nigeria and are not foreigners. That means while those arrested may have violated immigration laws, the arrests have little value in Nigeria's current fight against the radical Islamic extremist network Boko Haram and others.

"The Nigerian government knows the Boko Haram," said activist Declan Ihekaire, a Nigerian. President Goodluck Jonathan "once told Nigerians openly that he has members of Boko Haram within his Cabinet and if that is correct, the government should look for Boko Haram where they know they are — not going to all these market places (arresting) poor people."

Soldiers, police officers and Nigeria's domestic spy agency repeatedly have raided Katangua Market, a sprawling maze of shops where tons of clothes from the Western world — some likely donated — are resold. In the latest raid on April 9, authorities arrested 251 suspected illegal immigrants, Lagos state police spokeswoman Ngozi Braide said. While some have been released, others remain held at state government headquarters in Lagos, likely to be handed over to the immigration service for deportation.

Signs of the raid on the market remained days later.

Yushau Ibrahim stood near the metal door that security forces broke down, his still-bleeding hand wrapped in a sling made out of a man's black tie. Ibrahim said police officers beat him and stole nearly $10,000 he held for local moneychangers. Other merchants said officers stole money from them as well, something Braide denied. He said that during the raid, young boys sleeping in the local mosque jumped down and ran when authorities began firing sporadic gunshots.
The police arrested immigrants who couldn't immediately show their stamped passports. That worries Tanimu, who has children who were born and only have lived in Nigeria. Once, authorities arrested his 15-year-old son and for a while refused to release him.

"He was born here. He doesn't know anywhere else," Tanimu said in the Hausa language of northern Nigeria and neighboring countries. "They wanted to take them back to Niger. My worry was where are they taking him to? Is he going to look for his parents in a place he doesn't know?"

Immigration service in some areas uses closure of border to address the issue of illegal immigration and terrorism. The Nigeria Immigration Service, has embarked on total closure of the nation’s borders in Borno and Yobe States with the support of other Security Agencies.

Considering the security imperatives of the announcement by President Goodluck Jonathan declaring state of emergency in some Local Government Areas in Borno and Yobe States, the Nigeria Immigration Service was mandated to ensure the closure of the borders of the affected States.

A statement from the NIS signed by the former (Assistant Comptroller of Immigration Service) Public Relation Officer Joachim Olumba said it has “the former Comptroller General of Immigration Service, Mrs. Rose Chinyere Uzoma, mobilized officers and men of affected State Commands to intensify surveillance, monitoring and patrol of the borders in those States.

She also deployed her deputies to the affected States to supervise the implementation of the border closure order, so as to ensure the exercise attains maximum level of compliance.

Furthermore, at the instance of the Comptroller General of Immigration, authorities of the Army, Police, Customs and Civil Defense deployed their operatives with the necessary
logistics to assist Nigeria Immigration Service in patrolling and monitoring the extensive borders of Borno and Yobe States.

All these were in addition to the massive deployment of officers and men of Immigration Zone ‘C’ by the former Zonal Coordinator, Mr. Bakare Betso, an Acting Deputy Comptroller General of Immigration Service.

A chronicle of recent happenings and achievements of the NIS are handy to explain the efforts of the service in curbing illegal migration and maintaining border security. We secured a piece of land which we are using for a post housing scheme for Immigration Officers and the general public. We also expanded the directorate of the services from three to seven, created additional seven commands in Lagos and Rivers states and introduced the new visa policy. Aside the total closure of borders during the 2011 general elections, we also attracted the Federal Government to award contracts for the production of extra six million e-passport booklets and installed the night vision/ICT equipment in Nigeria Immigration Service border surveillance aircraft.

One other important achievement recorded by immigration is the introduction of e-registration which is its strategic response to proper monitoring of foreigners of ECOWAS/African descent. The service was able to collect and configure machines used by INEC during the 2006/2007 voters registration exercise to enable it collate and maintain the data of ECOWAS Nationals and African citizens in Nigeria for the purpose of monitoring their activities very closely.

It has been able to impress on the Federal Government to approve the deployment of Immigration attachés to more of our Missions abroad. Before the service had only 10 officers in five Nigerian Missions.
Today, there are 46 officers covering 12 foreign Missions, far more than the five the NIS was covering before. This has gone a long way in ensuring that foreigners and Nigerians in Diaspora enjoy more efficient and professional services from our operatives in those Missions.

The service had to undertake a massive e-passage intervention exercise to meet the huge demands for the essential travel documents by Nigerians in Diaspora after the Machine Readable Passport had been phased out.

This measure was able to alleviate the plight of Nigerians who would have fallen out of status if we had not intervened by providing them with the e-passage in the various countries of their residence. It would have necessitated majority of Diaspora Nigerians returning to the country to process their e-passage and the aggregate cost would have been unprecedented on them.

The Nigeria Immigration Service has turned back over 35,000 foreigners since the beginning of the year 2012 when the borders were closed. We are not unmindful of the fact that the closure of some areas of our international borders could necessitate immigrants attempting to gain entry through other areas.

Therefore, we have stepped up our activities in all areas of our operational land borders. But this has not been easy. The challenges have been quite tasking, we have had to discharge this herculean task with limited human and material resources. The porous and chaotic nature of our borders poses severe security challenges for the nation and in particular, the Nigeria Immigration Service in the arduous task of border control and management. The difficult terrain in most of these border locations, existence of settlements along border lines without regard for buffer zones and the contiguous nature of our borders make effective migration management a quite herculean task.
The situation will improve remarkably if border settlers are relocated to distant locations from the buffer zones to give statutory security agencies at the borders the latitude to operate within clearly defined border territories. Under a scenario like this, it will be very clear to any person entering or leaving the country that he or she is crossing international boundaries.

The current experience where houses are built along border lines makes strict control impossible. We know that clearing buffer zones of settlements has huge cost implications as border settlers will have to be provided with new accommodation and other basic facilities. But the real cost implication of not doing this may be far more enormous.

However, it is of great essence to recognize the need for such program. We can start gradually and over the years, total relocation will be achieved. The entire nation can then go to sleep trusting that all aspects of our borders are properly secured. We can also remedy the present situation with the construction of border plazas or auto-gates, equipped with all necessary modern migration management facilities as obtained in most international borders.

Again, border operatives need to be adequately provided with office and residential accommodation as well as other necessary operational logistics. A situation where Immigration officers stay under trees with rope tied across the road without adequate arms and ammunition does not create proper atmosphere to discharge their duties effectively.

In many cases, you find border security operatives residing in houses owned by suspected human traffickers and smugglers. Under such situation do you expect these people to live up to desired expectations? This is why it is very necessary to make necessary provisions for security operatives in border locations.
It has not been easy, at all, meeting the competing demands in the Service. Of course, there is hardly any MDA that has sufficient resources to discharge its responsibilities and obligations. I must tell you that Immigration Service does not fare better. We operate under very tight circumstances as budgetary provisions for us are grossly inadequate to tackle the issues of effective border control and migration management.

It has been the desire of the service for the government to provide necessary operational facilities for officers and men of the Service to enhance service delivery including vehicles, communication gadgets, arms and ammunition, conducive office and residential accommodation; however, the funds are simply insufficient. Sometimes, we find it difficult to repatriate illegal immigrants due to lack of funds. This is why the service is advocating for the Service to retain portion of revenue it generates to be able to tackle some of these challenges.

5.4 How would synergy be established among security agencies in tackling the challenges of international migration?

The most essential function of any government is to provide peace and security for its people. There can be no development without peace, meaning that security is also an essential pre-condition for delivering on developmental pledges.

Nigeria is the one country in Africa that must remain stable at all costs. However, the country is confronted with new challenges that are evolving day-by-day. For this reason new security concepts are required to ensure that the government excels in providing the most basic Sovereign good (i.e. security) and improving the lives of the people living within its borders. There is a need for the government to credibly deter, disrupt and dismantle threats to the peace, before they are able to start internal crises, conflicts or launch deadly attacks that
sow panic across the country, and reduce the Nigerian peoples’ confidence in their government.

Currently, the government has adopted a deterrent posture in the form of a ubiquitous security concept. This seeks to ensure that armed security personnel are visible to potential troublemakers. However, this concept will not and has not deterred committed adversaries. The people behind insecurity in Nigeria are becoming increasingly adept at identifying and exploiting the weaknesses of the Nigerian security establishment. For this reason, the government must implement new security concepts in order to improve security across the entire federation. This strategy argues for an intelligence-driven national security establishment that is trained and equipped to deal with the new generation of security challenges currently facing Nigeria. These security challenges have their impetus in external influence mainly international terrorism.

One of the manifestations of international migration is terrorism which threaten security of nations. To be able to combat such cross border security problem, security agencies of states need to join their capabilities for success. Intrastate and interstate cooperation is therefore needed to combat cross border crimes especially terrorism. There is a linkage between the management of international migration and the containment of cross border crimes. This link is that money laundering is at the root of all international crimes. This money laundering is linked to drug trafficking which is linked to terrorism that affects the whole world.

In recent years, terrorism has become one of the most dangerous threats to world order. In its effects, and sometimes in its causes, terrorism is comparable to more traditional forms of war. It destabilizes governments, preys on innocent victims, and taps vast monetary and human resources. Yet unlike war, terrorism is covert. It is a non-conventional and an
undeclared warfare. It seeks to sway the masses by intimidation (Julian and Kornblum, 2003).

Although random acts of terrorism have occurred throughout history, modern terrorism began in the early nineteenth century, when it was used to promote various revolutionary movements throughout Europe (Heren, 2001). In the 1950s and 1960s, terrorism was used in revolutionary or liberation struggles in Asia, Africa, Middle East and Latin America.

According to Professor T.A. Imobighe (2006), even today, activities associated with terrorism still form part of the paramilitary instruments in the struggle against foreign occupation of various parts of the world such as Palestine, Chechnya and Kashmir. As a means of redressing perceived grievances, according to him, terrorism has spread to virtually all the regions of the world and has caused destruction to lives and properties in many countries in both developed and under-developed world. Even those countries whose homelands were adjudged to be relatively safe from acts of terrorism, like the United States of America before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack have had their facilities and citizens in other countries violated. The truth is that no country can claim immunity from terrorist attacks any longer. The Professor wrote in 2006.

Nigerians both at home and abroad witnessed the fulfillment of this prophesy on October 1, 2010 with the two bomb blasts that rocked Abuja during the 50th Independence Day celebrations. These terrorist attacks have generated a lot of tension and controversy in the Nigerian polity. They have also stimulated the need for inter-agency cooperation in combating terrorism in Nigeria irrespective of whether the terrorists are based within or outside the country. From the experiences of other countries that have witnessed terrorist attacks, it is evident that terrorist acts are not only deadly but also can occur at anytime, anywhere. Consequently, a collective, programmed and continuous approach is needed
among the security units of Nigeria’s military and paramilitary establishments to combat terrorism.

Therefore the following suggestions can be made for a programmed and continuous approach among the security agencies to combat terrorism.

1. **Directorate of Counter Terrorism** – All the security operatives in the civil, military and paramilitary establishments of the Nigerian State should be organized into a single directorate headed by a director- general appointed from outside their ranks who will be responsible only to the Head of State and Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces. This must be given priority legislation by the National Assembly.

2. **Gun Control** – There is the need for stricter control and supervision of the purchase and importation of firearms into the country. This will make less guns available to the criminals. The National Assembly is called upon to enact the necessary legislation.

3. **Proactive Defense Measures** – The Federal and State Government functionaries should be provided with sophisticated information- gathering equipment that would enable them to detect terrorist activities early and nip them in the bud.

4. **Personnel Training** – Since modern terrorism has increasingly become sophisticated due to improved information and communication technology in terms of internet services and electronic banking techniques, there is urgent need to train and retrain our security personnel in these areas of socio-economic endeavors.

5. **Conflict Management Techniques** – Terrorist attacks are manifestations of deep-seated conflicts in the society. The conflicts may be economic, political or socio-cultural. Understanding the nature of these conflicts and how to manage them to prevent violence is the surest way to combat terrorism. Consequently, security personnel must be knowledgeable in conflict management techniques such as bargaining, negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration.

6. **Global Networking** – The Nigerian security agencies should be provided with the necessary facilities that would enable them to efficiently network among themselves and with similar agencies in other countries. Border monitoring equipment like Unidentified Air Vehicles (drones), Blighter Radar, Air Surveillance Radar and other modern equipment should be provided the security agencies for border security. This approach will assist in no small measure in the prevention and control of terrorism.

7. **Protection of Fundamental Human Rights** – Government functionaries, especially the security operatives should be encouraged to observe and enforce the fundamental human rights of the Nigerian citizenry as enshrined in the 1999 Constitution. Included in these rights are the freedoms of association, speech, expression, religion, etc.
8. **Intensification of War Against Corruption** – Massive embezzlement of public funds by state elite has conspicuously generated mass poverty, unemployment, hunger and disease among a significant proportion of our population. This condition is a fertile soil for terrorist activities. To this end, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Crimes Commission (ICPC), State Security Service (SSS), the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and other law enforcement agencies must wake up to the enormous challenges posed by official corruption in the country. On its own part government should take necessary measures to stamp out the virus of corruption among the officer corps.

9. **State Capacity** – The Nigerian security agencies should closely monitor and assist the politicians (elected or appointed) to close or eliminate what Staurt E. Eizenstat (2005:136) referred to as “three interrelated gaps in the structure of governance and public policies of a state” which are characteristic of most countries in the Third World. According to this scholar, to be viable a state must be able to close these “gaps” of which the first is the most important:

**Capacity:** The basic aspect of the capacity of a state is its ability to provide for its citizens the basic needs of water, electric power, food, health, housing, clothing, closely followed by education, communication and a working economic system. An inability of the state to provide these essential amenities could create a capacity gap, which can lead to a loss of public confidence and trust in government and then perhaps to political upheaval and turmoil.

**Security:** This refers to the protection against internal and external threats, and preserving sovereignty over territory. If a government cannot ensure security, rebellious armed groups or criminal non-state actors may use violence to exploit this security gap.

**Legitimacy:** Closing the legitimacy gap, according to Eizenstat and his associates, is more than an incantation of “democracy” and “elections,” but the establishment of a government that is perceived to exist by the consent of the governed, has minimal corruption, and has working law enforcement and judicial systems that enforce human rights.

10. Adopting a whole of government approach to improving security in the country. The national security establishment must be supported by all other levels of government (i.e. state and local levels) in the country, in addition to all the ministries, agencies and parastatals of the federation. Unity of purpose throughout the government is the sine qua non for improving national security.

11. There is also a need to contain existing threats and crises in the country, to prevent them from spreading to other local government areas and states of the federation. In addition, Nigeria must ensure that threats within neighboring countries do not spill into its national borders.
12. Improved border security is an essential part of containment. Preventing the movement of dangerous persons, expertise and weapons, is essential for preventing further instability in Nigeria.

13. Improved efforts to monitor the movement of goods and people within the federation is an essential means of preventing the spread of conflict and other forms of instability within the federation.

14. Hardening potential targets across Nigeria is a necessary step in denying extremist groups and others the opportunity to successfully sow fear and panic across the nation.

15. The nation’s Intelligence services must be prioritized as the single most important tool that the government has for detecting and dismantling threats to the peace in Nigeria.

16. In order to further bolster the nation’s intelligence gathering capabilities, the country must leverage its dominance of its airspace to improve intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance across the federation.

17. The federal government must also leverage its ability to procure advanced technologies, to improve its ability to detect and defeat conflicts, criminality and terrorist attacks.

18. Another critical intelligence-related development is the need for the security forces to re-align its relationship with society. At present there is a lot of mistrust directed towards the Nigerian security forces. This is inimical to securing the critical human intelligence reporting required to detect and dismantle emerging and existing threats to the peace.

19. Increasing the productivity of international partnerships will also serve to boost Nigeria’s ability to improve internal stability. The country’s international partners possess valuable intelligence and other resources that will provide the national security forces with a decisive advantage in maintaining stability.

20. Training and procuring for threats that are likely but have not yet materialized is a critical measure designed to improve the country’s readiness to combat all forms of insecurity.
CHAPTER SIX       SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6. 1. Summary of Findings

i) The study found that there is inability of Nigeria Immigration Service to contain the problem created by international migration as a result of globalization. This is because Nigeria Immigration Service lacks the facilities to cope with the emerging trend in international migration.

ii) The study revealed that the long borders that stretched over 5000 kilometers bordering Benin Republic in the West, Niger Republic in the North, Chad Republic in the North-East and Cameroon in the East pose a major challenge to Nigeria Immigration Service. Some of these borders are either poorly manned or unmanned thereby giving room for illegal migration in and out of the country.

iii) The study also found that Nigeria Immigration Service lacks the operational capabilities in tackling the high rate of international migration. This is why it is difficult to detect those migrants that enter the country legally or illegally and even with forged documents from Nigeria’s missions abroad. Besides, the process of obtaining Nigerian passport is not so stringent compared with other countries. Thus, it is subject to manipulation and various abuses by dubious and insincere immigration officers.

iv) The study found that despite the co-operative relationship that exists between security agencies in Nigeria, especially in the management of borders, there are still some problems ranging from inter-agency rivalry to unwillingness of the agency responsible for the prosecution of migration offenders. Again, there is no communication link between/or among security agencies. The absence of information flow partly because of lack of modern communication equipment inhibits the cooperative relationship that is supposed to exist among these agencies. It is also the absence of international institutional framework for the management of international migration that makes it difficult for extradition processes to be completed early.

v) An exchange of a few Naira notes depending on the bargaining power on both sides was enough for a migrant to pass through into or out of Nigeria.

vi) I walked up to an immigration officer at Idiroko and asked why people were entering and leaving the border post without proper checks. The officer replied thus: “we cannot just stop everybody. Some are traders and farmers who are carrying out their legitimate business. We are aware of the security situation so we know how we do our work”.

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6. 2  Contributions to Knowledge

Emerging from our analysis and findings, the study has made the following contributions to knowledge:

1. This study has filled gap in literature by exposing the increasing trends of immigration to the incapability of the NIS in coping with migration processes and border crimes.

2. This work has effectively shown what happens daily at the various borders in West African states.

3. This work has provided adequate information on cross border movements from neighboring states to Nigeria. Appendix Ten shows that between 2007-2011 immigration from five selected African countries to Nigeria has been on a steady increase.

4. The work has further established the link between the management of international migration and the containment of trans-border crimes.

5. This work has established the role of the Nigeria Immigration Service and other security agencies in the management of movements across Nigerian borders. Appendix 11 shows a good documentation of movements across the borders.

6. 3  Conclusion

Nigeria is one of the few countries in West Africa to have developed a draft national policy on migration, which still awaits ratification by the National Assembly. The policy is comprehensive, covering migration and development, migration and cross-cutting social issues, national security and irregular movement, forced displacement, the human rights of migrants, organized labour migration, internal migration, the national population, migration data and statistics, and funding for migration management. In addition, the draft policy proposes the establishment of an agency or commission to coordinate the different management aspects of the migration policy, among others. In 2009, through a presidential directive, the National Commission for Refugees was mandated to become the focal agency on migration responsible for revising and, in close coordination with other agencies, implementing the draft national policy.
This policy when adopted will provide legal cover for the activities of immigration officials. It will also give government the necessary push to equip the NIS to manage border security. The government has a duty to increase the operational capacity of the Nigeria Immigration Service. This is necessary for the effective monitoring of our borders. In this period of international terrorism, our borders should not be allowed to continue to be porous. Immigration has achieved a low level success against cross border crimes especially terrorism. If the capacity of the NIS is enhanced to meet international standards, their success will not even increase to moderate but a high level. Effective border and migrations management will not only secure our borders for national security but guarantee a quality human capital base.

Strategic policy development is required in four critical areas of migration management: migration and development, migration facilitation, migration regulation and forced migration management. Better policies in these areas will ensure a more comprehensive approach to migration management that maximizes benefits, while minimizing the negative impact of migration on development. The positive links between migration and development need to be strengthened by promoting the involvement of the Nigerian diaspora in development, improving procedures for transferring remittances, protecting migrants’ rights, encouraging the immigration of skilled human capital, focusing on income tax by immigrants and carrying out other related measures.

In order to devise appropriate policies, it is important to take stock of migration patterns and the socio-economic context in which migration takes place in Nigeria. The aim of the Migration Profile is to provide an overview of some of the key socio-economic and migration trends in Nigeria.

Improvement in migration management calls for the development and input of the socio-economic indicators that are relevant to migration issues in individual ministries and
agencies. The former would include further promotion of the positive aspects of migration and improvements in the education system to ensure an adequate supply of the required skills for development, among others. The anticipated promotion of remittances from the diaspora should be a two-way interactive system: as the Government offers a safe and secure environment at home and shows more concern for its citizens abroad, the diaspora are likely to get more involved in the development of the country.

Furthermore, better management should embrace further regulation of irregular migration and the protection of vulnerable groups. The former should consider better ways of integrating repatriated trafficked persons in the country. The protection of vulnerable groups should also cover that of internally displaced persons, which constitutes the major group in the country. Past incidences of internally displaced persons have been on a relatively large scale and sporadic, and there are indications of imminent and more frequent occurrences; hence, adequate provisions should be made way ahead of emergency situations.

Again, the yet-to-be ratified agreements, laws and protocols should be dealt with. Given that they pertain to Nigeria, the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, a more coordinated implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, ECOWAS anti-trafficking efforts and the joint effort of ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States would be among the different measures that can be used to rectify the inadequacies of the migration situation and migration policy in the country.

The institutional role of the Nigeria Immigration Service to manage international migration as it concerns Nigeria's territorial borders has not been satisfactory. This has been seen in the overwhelming challenges the service has faced with increasing trends of international migration. Forces of globalization and porous borders have reinforced these
challenges through cross border crimes. While these crimes are becoming more sophisticated, immigration service is being consistently neglected in capacity building.

There is an urgent need to equip the Nigeria Immigration Service to be able to police Nigerian borders both land, air or sea. Government needs to adopt an immigration policy that can make the NIS as an institution to succeed.

6.4 Recommendations

From the findings and general conclusion to this study, we make the following recommendations:

1. One important way of building a strong institutional capacity for the Nigeria Immigration Service is human capacity. It is very important to train and continue a process of retraining of officers in migration management. Provisions should be put in place on a permanent bases for refresher courses for the officer corps.

2. To complement human capacity Immigration needs to be well equipped with modern instruments for border management. Nigeria Immigration needs equipment like Unidentified Air Vehicles (Drones), Blighter Radar, Air Surveillance Radar, Patrol boats, high speed SUV vehicles, 3D Cameras and other modern equipment that will enhance border management.

3. The draft national policy on migration which has been delayed for so long should be implemented. At this point in time, all necessary protocols should have been addressed in implementing the national migration policy. The National Commission for Refugees, which is responsible for coordinating the different activities, should urgently move to perform its functions.
4. There is a need for a strong data base system by which different categories of migrants can be classified and their registration effected by the National Population Commission with photographs and finger prints (biometrics) as is done in the US system.

5. Nigeria State should enhance its capacity and pursue necessary reforms to be able to maximize the benefits of the globalization process as well as to minimize the challenges of migration.

6. There is a need for an international security framework involving Nigeria border security agencies and those of other countries especially Nigeria's neighboring States in fighting trans border crimes.

6.5 Suggestions for Further Research

1. Illegal migration through illegal routes is a major problem for Nigerian security. Therefore a comprehensive research into the existence of illegal routes and the activities through these routes should be undertaken to enable the government to come up with a good policy to address the problem.

2. An extensive research should be undertaken to determine why other West African nationals are prone to be used for terrorist activities in Nigeria.

3. A research should be undertaken to determine why Nigerian security agencies do not easily cooperate and why there is rampant corruption among the officer corps.
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United Nations Population Division (UNPD)

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Appendix 1

QUESTION GUIDE
1. What is your name sir?
2. What security agency do you work with?
3. How long have you worked at this particular border post?
4. Have you worked at other border posts previously?
5. Is this an officially recognized border post?
6. How many officers are manning this border post?
7. Do you think there is a need for more officers to be posted to this border post?
8. Do more people patronize the legal or the illegal routes?
9. Why do you think more people prefer going through the illegal routes?
10. How many people pass through this border on a daily basis?
11. What do you think make people to come to Nigeria as they do?
12. Are there gadgets for the monitoring of the borders?
13. How effective are the official equipment for the monitoring of the borders?
14. Do security agents feel threatened sometimes or most of the time?
15. Would you still want to continue working at the border in spite of security threats?
16. Is your welfare covered by your official remuneration?
17. How often do you share information with other security agencies?
18. Which security agency would you consider more important in the management of border security?
19. Do you think there are some form of security cooperation between Nigerian security agencies and those of this neighboring country?
Appendix 2

Geographical map of Nigeria showing local and international boundaries. Map based on a UN Map. Source: UN Cartographic section.
Appendix 3

Map of the Gulf of Guinea showing the maritime border of Nigeria

Source: Microsoft Encarta 2008
1983-2007 Microsoft Corporation
All Rights Reserved.
### Appendix 4

Table 1. Numbers of Foreigners that entered Nigeria from the following countries from 2007 to 2011

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<td>2011</td>
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*Source: Immigration Archives*
# Appendix 5

Table 2 Nigerians who were repatriated/deported from these countries between 2007 and 2011

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*Source: Immigration Archives*
## Appendix 6

Table 3 Number of Expatriates Deported / Repatriated from Nigeria between 2007 and 2011

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*Source: Immigration Archives*
## Appendix 7

Table 4. Number of Combined Expatriate Resident Cards (CERPAC) Issued to Selected foreign Nationals

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*Source: Immigration Archives*
## Appendix 8

### Table 5 Number of Nigerians that Travelled out through official Routes to selected Countries

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*Source: Immigration Archives*
Most of the migrations to Europe were through illegal routes. Also some of the migrants were nationals of those countries going back to their own countries.

Appendix 9

Table 6. The Number of International Passports that have been issued in the recent five years to Nigerians (2007-2011)

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Source: Immigration Archives
### Appendix 10

Table 7  Number of ECOWAS nationals from selected countries that entered Nigeria between 2007 to 2011

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<td>2007</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>470,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>475,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Immigration Archives

More than half of these immigrants are undocumented either because they entered through illegal means or they claimed not to be immigrants in situations where half of the community is in Nigeria and half is in the other country. Again many of these migrants come in and out on daily basis.
### Appendix 11

Table 8. Number of Nigerians that travelled to five selected ECOWAS States from 2007 to 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAD</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>400,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>420,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>450,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>350,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>300,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGER</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>370,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>383,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>390,050</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>360,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>340,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMEROON</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>380,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>397,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>401,009</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>407,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>420,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURKINA FASO</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>160,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>153,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>157,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>159,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENIN</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>162,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>470,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>490,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>493,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>502,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Immigration archives.*

The bulk of migrants who crisscross Nigeria’s borders on daily basis are mainly undocumented illegal migrants who cross for criminal activities and also those who do not possess travel documents and those who do not want to pay bribe money to migration agencies on both sides of the borders. The documented migrants travel mainly for economic activities.
A. The Summary of Number of Foreigners that have entered Nigeria in the last five years (2007-2011) from selected countries.

1. United States of America 97,984
2. Italy 84,000
3. Britain 162,829
4. China 111,500
5. Spain 65,823
6. Burkina Faso 822,000
7. Chad 1,620,000
8. Cameroon 1,864,000
9. Niger 1,970,000
10. Benin 2,375,000

Total 9,173,136

B. The Summary of Number of Nigerians that have travelled to these countries in the last five years (2007-2011)

1. United States of America 217,000
2. Italy 151,000
3. Britain 227,000
4. China 106,000
5. Spain 111,000
6. Burkina Faso 792,018
7. Chad 1,920,781
8. Niger 1,844,558
9. Cameroon 2,005,452
10. Benin 2,438,035

Total 9,812,844
C. The Summary of Foreigners repatriated/deported from Nigeria in the last five years (2007-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>242</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. The Summary of Expatriate Resident Cards Issued in last five years (2007-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>14,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>12,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>23,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>12,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>77,609</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. The Summary of Nigerians repatriated in the five years from these countries (2007-2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>18,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>17,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>16,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>10,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,045</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>