ABOUT THE BOOK

The diverse interests of readers were given consideration so that the book is useful for practical business world and in the academics. The essence is to expose the young businessmen/women to some basic management principles.

Those who are new to management sciences will find the book extremely useful as a basic introduction to Leadership and Management.

...To be able to function effectively, a leader must have vision, passion and imagination, the ability to observe and analyse, the capacity to make decisions and coordinate a multiplicity of activities. In all these the central coordinating vessel is communication. A leader must have the ability to communicate facts and feelings in such a way that all can understand and act upon it.
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Dr. Tayo Popoola
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CHAPTER FIVE

Public Sector Management And Policy Making In Nigeria: The Development Of Crisis And The Crisis Of Development

By: Adelaja Odutola Odukoya

Introduction:
Quite often, public sector management and policy making are treated as if they are ideological orphans. This position is not only deceptive, it is intellectually fraudulent. Furthermore, the fact that public sector managers and the policy making agencies in Nigeria are not independent agents pursuing policies which they considered to be for the overall health of the nation are often neglected. It is therefore not surprising that this concern is often gloss over and in fact not taken into consideration in discussing how their activities impact on the larger society, or in understanding the reasons for their failure in social provisioning. In essence, the fact that public sector managers and the policy making machineries are subjected to the dictates of domestic and international forces is an undeniable fact which cannot be over looked in any serious analysis.

My main thesis against which subsequent analysis is based is that, public sector management, and public policy making is not, and cannot be ideologically neutral, given the fact that the state which super-intend over public sector management and policy making is itself immersed in the class antagonisms amongst the social forces in the state. Any contrary view therefore is nothing but mere intellectual sophistry. Our contention therefore is that, any useful analysis of public sector management and policy making cannot but be situated with an ideological parameter. The objective of this paper therefore is to explore, expose and analyze the ideological context, content and contradictions that underscore public sector management and policy making in Nigeria. The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. The first section deals with the introduction, while the second section focuses on the conceptual and theoretical framework. In the third and fourth sections the paper discusses the Nigerian state> A contextual analysis, and public sector management, policy making and Nigerian Federalism. The last section of the part is on recommendation and conclusion.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework:
The public is that sphere of human activities outside of the private and exclusive arena of the individuals. While the private sphere is particularistic and limited in orientation, the public sphere is universalistic and collective by implication. It is in this sense that the public sector encompasses the totality of the affairs of the state. As Lipson (1976: 62) correctly opine, "the state originates, in short, when a group of persons have institutionalized their own protection". Public sector management and policy making is the functional and practical aspects of the existence of the state. In other words, it is through the instrumentalties of public sector management and policy making that the state fulfils its essence and justifies its existence. The governing logic of the public arena is collective welfare and security. To this end, public affair is expected to be governed by the values and norms of openness, accountability,
differentiating between the public and private organization/management, these are: the principle of who benefits; focus on service or profit; accountability and measure of success; level of complexity; organization and procedure.

Public management is simply put is the systematic and institutional devices which are constitutionally enacted for the execution of the public will and public good which flows from the social contract between the citizens and the state, and are formulated in terms of policies by the political systems after various interests have been articulated and aggregated leading to their been finally processed into authoritative decisions.

According to Babawale (n.a), public sector management has the following scope:

1. An institutional group effort in a public setting directed to achieving a common goal precisely the promotion of the well-being of the citizenry. This suggests that public sector management act in the public interest and should aim at making the public get value for their money.

2. It is the practical side of government activity based on the priorities of the ruling party.

3. Helps in the development and implementation of public policy. It shapes public values. Helps to identify societal problems, solicit public opinions, facilitate citizen participation, and advocate policy choices to politicians who are the decision-makers.

4. It is carried out within three spheres of governmental authority namely the legislative, executive and judiciary. Public administration operates in all the spheres.

5. It must pursue specific government objectives arising from the needs, demands and expectations of the public.

6. It occurs within specific government structures at the international, national, regional and local levels.

7. It must perform a wide range of activities which culminate in functions such as administration and management.
Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is, a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class. Thus, the state of antiquity was above all the state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding down the slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for holding the peasant serfs and bondmen, and the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage labour by capital.

It was against the above situation that Ekekwe (1986: 10) declared that “the state does not reconcile the contradictions and antagonisms between classes, rather it maintains the social and political order of the social formation within which class exploitation and subordination takes place.” A relevant question at this point is whether the state is prima facie an agent of the ruling class alone? The answer is no. The state because of the necessity for continued reproduction, and for engendering the condition for production must even symbolically maintain at least a concern for the welfare of the oppressed majority in its public sector management and policy formulation agenda. It is in the long term self-interest of the members of the ruling class to do so.

It is then no doubt true as opined by Marenin (1988: 217) that, states are not disinterested tools but are composed of actors and organizations, which have their own interests, identities, and priorities. The implementation of rule is guided by external demands on the state and its agencies, yet the state also bends to organizational pressures (specifically, the norms embodied in organizational technologies) and the will and desires of implementing actors. Marenin (1988) consequently identifies three sets of state interests, namely: their own interests, the particularistic interests of social groups, and the dominant conception of the general interest.
Marenin (1980), counseled that for the state to be able to manage particular and general affairs of society, it must be able to manage itself to stateness (Nigeria has not succeeded in this regard), hence the necessity of state agenda for engendering stateness. It is from the management of specific interests, that state is reproduced, just as the management of public interest is the basis of state legitimacy (Ibid: 217). As he rightly argued, “were states only agents they would not be states and were state only managers of public good, they could not exist.” This underscores the dialectical imperative of public’s sector management and the necessity for the autonomization of the state especially in its policy formulation and implementation.

The Nigerian state, as we shall see presently is far from being autonomous. It is in fact seriously immersed in the class struggle within the social formation. This is due to the secondary position of the ruling class with regards to the control of the means of production, and the utility of the state as a means of capital accumulation. It is therefore no surprise that the state process and public sector management evidence the privatization of public authority. As Ake (2001: 14) rightly puts its: “at one point the public is privatized and at another the private is “publicized”. The Nigerian public sector is therefore an extension of the accumulative sphere of private capitalist claimants, both domestic and international. It is within this context of the privatized state and public sector management that a scholar, Goffredo Caccia, submitted with regard to Nigeria that:

Not only does theft go on in the state apparatus, but the state is itself the main apparatus of theft. In Nigeria, not only do officials steal, but stealing is official. It is the very principle of Nigerian class rule and subservience to the west.

Furthermore, the consequence of this limited autonomization is obvious in the unproductive nature of the public sector managers, the inelegant nature of public policies since independence, the disabilities of the productive forces, the underdevelopment of the social formation, and the massive corruption that characterized the Nigerian public life. This is not surprising, given the fact that, politics has become business investment more profitable that investment in the stock market or in industry.

The failure of the Nigerian public sector management and policy making to live up to expectations of the public is major fallout of the poverty of autonomization. As Ihonvbere (1989: 45) puts it, “we may interpret the limited autonomization as meaning that the state in Africa is still rudimentary since autonomization is the unique quality of the mode of domination in question. What needs to be kept in mind is that limited autonomization means that the African state is extremely weak to perform adequately the essential functions of a state.” However, beyond the issue of the weakness of the state as a result of its non-autonomization, the pattern of capital appropriation is such that alienates the people from the state, such that public sector programming and policy making often fail to factor people-centre concern into activities.

Consequently, since the people fail to accord the state and the public sector the necessary support, it is therefore organically weak and functionally irrelevant to the people. This follows the position of Lipson (1976:289) that: “the truth is that institutions are strong to the extent that a large enough section of the public feels keenly enough to have them so”: A state and public sector which ministers solely to the needs of the rich and mighty, abandons its welfare concerns to the people, and cannot even provides the minimum security cover for life and property cannot be positively perceived by the people. Such a state and public sector cannot but be organically weak and functionally irrelevant.

The functions of public sector management and policy making alluded to above include the maintenance of the social and political order, legitimation and accumulation. (Ekewke, 1986: 10). These functions are discharged with a class imprimatur,
Not only was the capitalist mode of production half-heartedly introduced, the existing traditional and pre-capitalist mode of production were not fully destroyed in a systemic manner. The result of this was that though the dominance of foreign capital and capitalist relations of production in Nigeria where entrenched it exists side-by-side with the feudalist mode of production, thus engendering crises and contradictions. One of the results was the stunted bureaucratic processes and the negation of democratic institutionalization. This favours colonial capitalism, as the exploitation and appropriation of the resources and wealth of an unwilling people by a foreign power cannot be achieved within democratic parameters. This informs Ake (2001) submission that: “the power of the colonial state was not only absolute but arbitrary, both in practice and in principle. Therefore, colonial rule in Nigeria, like elsewhere, entails, authoritarian rule, the disempowerment of the people, the integration of the Nigerian economy into the global capitalist system as a producer of primary products and a dependent peripheral country. Further implications include the disarticulation and deindustrialization of the domestic economy, the centrality of foreign capital in the economic processes, the expropriation and disempowerment of peasant from their means of production thus engendering the proletarianization of the peasant population. The creation of a class of elite subservient to western capitalist interests, the hegemony of western developmental ideology, the underdevelopment of productive forces, and finally, the fragmentation of the society along ethnic lines through the policy of divide-and-rule, which foreclosed the possibilities of class alliance and state transformation even after independence (Ake, 1981), are other fallouts of colonialism in Nigeria.

The net effect of the above process was the impoverishment of the Nigerian people, the low development of entrepreneurial class or a national bourgeoisie class, the development of an elite lacking in the control of the means of production, and the...
alienation of the state form development of the citizens. The state played a pivotal role in the accumulative and predatory activities of the colonial regime, thus underscoring its centrality (Ihonvbere, 1999; Ekekwe, 1986). For instance, the state ensured that capitalist production reduced the development of peasant and petty commodity production. As Williams (1981: 40) opines, “the transfer by the state of resources from agriculture and the rural economy to itself and to capitalist production and the urban economy reduces the returns on rural labour and investment, which impoverishes farmers and encourages the transfer of private resources, including skills, from the rural to the urban economy”. Williams (1981) further declare: “capitalist development is parasitical on peasant and petty commodity production. Control of state policy and relations of exchange enable capitalists to determine the conditions of production of peasant and petty producers”. However, this situation led to a stunted public sector and malnourished policy making process after the nation was granted ‘flag independence’ on October 1, 1960.

It is therefore not surprising that, the struggle for independence in Nigeria was a subverted project. What happened at independence was the transfer of power by the colonialist to the most trusted of the competing Nigerian elite. At independence, the colonial state and its decadent institutions were left intact, and continued to be used as before. To this end, independence for Nigeria evidenced changes without change. It was largely ceremonial and symbolic, without substantial or concreted transformation of relations of power, and the character of the state and its relations with both the domestic population and the international power arrangements. Given the organic alliance of the succeeding elite as domestic representatives of foreign capitalist interests, the arrangement was never contested.

Consequently, the state usage as an instrument of oppression, exploitation, disempowerment, immesiration, and pauperization continued to be reinforced. As a result of these conditions and the deliberate use of the pretence of development as a tool for the consolidation of exploitative capitalist social relations of production, the oppressive hegemony of foreign capital, and the desperate needs of the domestic ruling elite to build their own material bases through primitive capitalist accumulation, the people became progressively disempowered, demobilized, alienated, and divided through the instrumentalities of the entrenched public sector management and the policy making process.

According to Ihonvbere:

The character of the Nigerian state continues to be directly responsible for reproducing the country’s deepening socio-economic and political contradictions. In fact, the state seems to worsen the country’s predicaments with every policy action or inaction it initiates or fails to initiate in the process of trying to consolidate the interests of its custodians. The state has never been able to build an appreciable degree of confidence among Nigerians, ensure some discipline within the ranks of the elite, manage the economy in the interest of the people, or construct the much needed platforms for inclusion, tolerance, and participation (Ihonvbere, 1999:3)

It is therefore undisputable that the post colonial state in Nigeria is structurally imperfect and defective, productively weak and lacks autocentric momentum for development and regeneration. Consequently, the persistent state crisis, public sector mismanagement and policy miscarriages are rooted in these inelegant and immanent contradictions. Our thesis in this respect is that, the non-neutrality of the state, the fractured public sector management and policy making mechanisms, the impossibility of social transformation, the disempowerment and impoverishment of the masses are logical results of the nature and character of the Nigerian state, and the orientation and ideological conditioning of its
managers and state institutions.

To this end, we argue that the developmental transformation of the state, the empowerment of the people, the eradication of poverty, and the reordering of the relationship of the Nigerian state in the global capitalist division of labour which are expected to be the concern of a progressive public sector management and policy making process, are understandably not a programmatic agenda of Nigerian state managers since it is antithetical to the organic interests of the domestic ruling elite, the bureaucratic apparatuses of the state, and that of their international capitalist mentors. This we contend, is at the root of the crisis which leads to generalized poverty, high level corruption, nepotism, inflation, underdevelopment of the nation’s productive forces, political violence, ethnic conflicts, diseases, squalor, and other social anomie, which evidences the failure of public sector management and policy making that characterized the first few years after the nation’s post-independence, and ultimately led to the intervention of the military in the politics of the country.

The military intervention on 15th January 1966 turned out to be a class action to prevent the Nigerian state from being hijacked by revolutionary elements and people centred leadership. The years between 1966 and 1979 were spent under military directed public sector management and policy making trust with their arbitral, centrist, and ill-digested policy orientations. There was a brief civilian ‘intervention’ in the politics of the country between October 1, 1979 and December 31, 1983, when the military again took over the rein of governance until May 29, 1999, when another civilian administration under a one time military head of state was inaugurated.

Military rule not only failed to resolve the crisis of the Nigerian state, it complicated and compounded the contradictions. Neocolonialism became entrenched in Nigeria by a tri-podal alliance of the military, the political and bureaucratic factions of the Nigerian ruling elite, and foreign capital.

As Imonvbere (opt. cit) again argued:

The military not only concentrated power in itself and the centre, but also ensured that the states were reduced to administrative units taking orders from the centre. The excessive centralization of power, resources, and opportunities also encouraged the rise of authoritarianism and other forms of despot rule, and the negation of democratic values. As well, the personalization of power and resources under the military made possible by the centralization of power and resources at the centre.

The fallout of this was bad governance, reification of violence as a preferred tool of governance, mismanagement, and the institutionalization of a culture of impunity, disregard for constitutionalism, corruption, amongst others. During his inauguration as the civilian President on May 29, 1999, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military Head of State observed that “one of the greatest tragedies of military rule in recent times is that corruption was allowed to grow unchallenged and unchecked, even when it was glaring for everyone to see”. The discovery of oil and its peculiar modality of production and appropriation exacerbated the phenomenon of corruption in the country, with serious but negative implications for public sector management and policy making.

The oil boom of the period, coupled with the absolute powers of the military and their unity commandist structure facilitated the centralization of resources and expansion of the public sector, and the primitive capitalist accumulation of wealth by the various factions of the Nigerian ruling class. Rather than promoting the development of the Nigerian state and the people, oil has turned out to be more of a curse for the nation. The primary reason for this can be located in the transformation of the country into a rentier state. Within the context of a rentier state, public sector management was abandoned, with the result that the nation literally speaking suffers paradoxically from non-management
and mismanagement. Oil prices and politics were left to dictate what happens in the country, with deliberate and programmatic developmental initiatives not pursued. Gone therefore was the era of creative and purposeful public sector management and policy making.

Oil ensured the overdevelopment of the allocative capacity of the Nigerian state, (Obi 2000:206), without any corresponding development in productive capacity. In fact, it relegated the issues of the production of the national wealth to a secondary position through the underdevelopment of the productive forces. The need for the development of an enabling environment and technology for production was totally foreclosed. Oil and military rule promoted the politics of allocative and distributive federalism. As such, the politics of allocation is heavily dominated by the rentier nature of oil revenues. It also implies, that ‘capacity to allocate’, is divorced from control over production, just as it makes the location within, or access to state power a very important issue. This explains the emphasis on politics and power, instead of development. Factional in-fighting amongst the domestic elite, increased development of the coercive machineries of the state was a direct consequence of the advent of oil. This is coupled with the dominance and total subservience to foreign capital that control the technology for production in the enclave oil economy. Under this crisis situation public sector management and policy making became seriously compromise, with the two becoming tools for particularistic interests of the dominant factions of the ruling class, their respective ethnic formations and the hegemonic international imperialist oligarchy.

As Mkandawire (2002) succinctly aver, the rentier states is much more prone to rebellion than the merchant states. The reason for this is the enclave and exclusivity, which characterized the social system of accumulation which provoke popular resentment and discontent, thus leading to revolt. By implication therefore, the rentier state is not only conflict ridden, it is ipso facto an authoritarian state. This is so because, the maintenance of a system of economic exclusion demand the deployment of the coercive powers of the state in order to sustain the system of unjust advantages. It in this sense that we agree with Bangura’s (1992: 40) that: “the way production and business activities are organized have implications for the organization of civil society and state power. Authoritarianism and democracy represents opposing modes of regulating conflicts thrown up by the dynamics of accumulation and development.” Consequently therefore, the poverty of public sector management and policy making in Nigeria finds expression in this contextual trajectory.

The rentier state with its characteristic injustice, and disproportionate spatial spread of resources within the context of Nigeria’s distributive federalism, evident the institutionalization of what has been described as “competitive modernization”. The idea of “competitive modernization” though right to the extent that the different ethnic formations struggle for access and entry to modernization imperatives, it gave the mistaken notion that the struggle is within an open market context of equal strength. This is fat from the truth. On the contrary, public sector and policy manipulation are veritable formula in these intra-elite and inter-group struggles. This robs both public sector management and policy making of its collective and public imperative. It is therefore understandable why both the public sector and the policy that emanates from them are not developmental.

It is for this that we consider Young (1976:41) concept of “differential modernization” as more appropriate, as it conveys the discriminating nature of the modernization process, and consequently explains the logic of the ethnicity as an equalization formula. The abject poverty of public sector management and policy making in this respect was manifested in the outbreak of the gruesome thirty-months Nigeria civil war, and the countless of religious, political, ethnic and communal crises which the nation witnessed over the years.
In the same vein, the present violence in the Niger Delta Region, which has now snowballed into hostage taking and domestic terrorism are contemporary evidence of the failure of public sector management and policy making in Nigeria.

Because of the failure of public sector management and contradictions of policy making, competing ethnic groups perceived one another in this struggle for access and control over resources as predators to be violently liquidated. Ethnic violence not only leads to the destruction of existing infrastructures, it has profound implications for ill-health, increased death rate, resource wastages, economic disruptions, political instabilities, and policy malfunctioning. In all these crises, children and women are the most vulnerable groups. In other words, the very basis of the nation’s productive and reproductive capability and human capital formation are seriously threatened. The ethnic camouflage of the contradictions of the Nigerian state assists the ruling elite in ensuring that the national question in Nigeria continued to be posed as an ethnic question. This not only keeps the masses divided, it ensures that the struggle for social justice becomes problematic. In the same vein, it prevented the possibility of reinventing and revolutionaryizing public sector management and policy making in Nigeria.

It should be remembered that Nigerian public sector management and policy making were in the first two decades after independence in a state of blissful splendour, such that Nigeria became not only a father Christmas, General Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State, declared that “the country’s problem is not money, but how to spend it”! However, the fall in the price of oil on the international market exposed the vulnerability of the Nigerian economy which was occasioned by its dependency nature, and threw the state into serious balance of payment crisis, such that the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), designed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was adopted as a bailout formula.

SAP not only signifies the international context super-intending on the Nigerian public sector and policy making, it was an international certification and acceptance by the Nigerian domestic elite that their over two decades of public sector management and policy super-intending was a colossal failure.

SAP’s bitter pills which the Nigerian elite were forced to take involved the devaluation of the national currency, financial and trade liberalization, privatization, withdrawal of the state from the social provisioning, commercialization of education, and the surrendered of the state to the dictate of private capital. In this wise, corporate interests took precedence over the interests of citizens, and profits came before welfare matters. In the advent of SAP, and the surrender of state management to the dictates of the terrible twins, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), under the imperative of casinocapitalism, the issue of public sector management and policy making has become a mere academic exercise.

The privatization of the state and its processes, have removed the pro-active basis of public sector management and policy making, and reduced these imperatives to inelegant caricatures and ideological effigies. This was as a result of the state, relegation from social provisioning and enforced focus of ensuring favourable conditions for capitalist profits and corporate hegemony under a public-private sector architecture in which corporations have replaced citizens, just as profit has supplanted peoples’ welfare.

Malfunction public sector management, and convulsed policy making process, coupled with bad leadership and corruption compromise development in a multiples of ways. They lead to inefficiency in resource allocation, misallocation and waste of scare resources, inequality in income distribution, corruption and underdevelopment. Other negative implications include: insecurity, gender injustice and miscarriage of justice, difficulties in property rights enforcement, lack of investors...
The result is increase unemployment and under-employment, inflation, retrenchment, deindustrialization, under-utilization of productive capacities, economic stagnation, starvation, poverty, diseases, and illiteracy. As it pertain to the children, this is evident in cases of increase maternal and infant mortality rates, malnutrition, increased death from preventable diseases, ethnic militia, juvenile delinquencies (Area boy's and girl's phenomenon, Yandaba phenomenon, Almajerri syndrome), cultism, child abuse, child trafficking and slavery, sexual perversion and prostitution, increased rates of school dropouts, examination malpractices, advance fee fraud (419), drug addiction, juvenile delinquencies, and other criminalities.

This is better appreciated when attention is called to the profound statement by Lipson. According to Lipson (1976: 5): Poverty, ignorance, unemployment, despotism, and war which are among the worst scourges that afflict humanity- generally wreak more disaster than do hurricanes, droughts, earthquakes, or volcanoes. But, whereas the latter are not our making, the causes of the former lie within humanity’s power when our own doings turn to our undoing. *A fortiori*, therefore, where the causes spring, resides the cure. Human being can change what human beings have made.

It is therefore safe to argue that the crisis of development and general backwardness of Nigeria and her people cannot be separated from the nature and character of the state, public sector management and policy making in Nigeria.

**Public Sector Management, Policy Making and Nigerian Federalism:**
Federalism is a constitutional management device for the management of public affairs in heterogeneous societies. This is especially relevant in societies with segregated pluralism. It is no gain-saying that in some context, federalism is conceived as a cure-all-crisis and conflict political formulation. Given the democratic imperative and inclusiveness of federalism, a federal arrangement is believed to be promotive of national unity, progress and development. As a public affairs management technique, federalism allows for the paradoxical possibility of centralization and decentralization, which can otherwise be expressed as unity in diversity.

Federalism, according to Kunle Amiw, “is, in the final analysis, a more or less studied attempt to share power in order to balance multifaceted and variegated interest”. As he further noted “federalism is built on at least a dual sovereignty; the assumption being that only when power is divided – as well as susceptible to being divided or parceled out – is individual liberty best guaranteed.” It is for these reasons that under a federal arrangement there exists constitutionally more than one level of authority. This follows the federalist inherent tendency for deconcentration and demonopolization of power. It is for this reason that Babawale (2000:45) conceived federalism as both a structure and a process of government.

Following the Rikerian conception of federalism, under a federal arrangement there are: (1) two levels of government rule the same land and people; (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous; and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere (Riker, 1964; 1975). The core of the above position is the existence of coordinate power centers which are constitutionally established. These power centers equally have constitutionally specified responsibilities. As a result of these factors there developed the need for Intergovernmental Relations. The three component parts of IGR are: political, administrative and fiscal aspects.

According to Odukoya (2005:106), historically, federalism has
developed as a result of two contradictory and diametrically opposed processes, namely, federal integration and federal restructuring. Federal integration is a product of the “federalization” of a unitary state as in the case of Spain. Nigerian emergence from colonial unitary governance is another example of federal restructuring. On the other hand, federal integration involves an agreement based on a rational choice by two or more independent political entities to acquire common political structure. The USA, Canada and The European Union (EU) typify this situation (Weinstock: 2001).

Writing in the same vein Skalar (2004:3) identified two modalities for the formation of federal unions, namely “bottom up” and “top down”. According to Skalar (2004:3), the “bottom up” is a situation whereby pre-existing independent political entities decide to come together under one government without concentrating political power in one central place. On the other hand, “top down” is a deliberate diminishing of the concentration of sovereign authority at the centre under a previously unitary government by the means of devolution of power.

The implications of the above theoretical orientations and conceptualizations according to Odukoya (Ibid), “is that federalism is about regulating and tempering the exercise of power in such a way as to prevent absolutism, abuse and violation of the rights of groups and individuals within the state. A further implication is that, the diffusion of power should not be so absolute as to mitigate the possibility of national unity, just as it must be mediated and conditioned to support the independent identities of the micro-nationalities.” In other words, the utility of the federal solution lies in its paradoxical possibility for integration and differentiation without being disintegrative. In this sense, successful and effective management of a federal system is a litmus test of the effectiveness and capability of institutionalized public sector management and policy making mechanisms.

Odukoya (2005) further opines that: Federalism in essence is a constitutional and democratic device for the management of power relations under a pluralist political arrangement, in such a way that the competing and contending political forces are balanced out with none sufficiently powerful enough to dominate and consume the others. Because of the inherent balance of power and the constitutionally parceling of power to the different levels of government, a regime of political compromise, administrative decentralization, power non-concentration and representative democratic governance is engendered. Theoretically, interests are harmonized, common national vision and consciousness promoted, without individual autonomy compromised. Practically however, the possibility of actualizing this mental construction is a herculean task demanding a high degree of political resilience and rare political engineering. The next task is to critically examine the degree of conformity or otherwise of Nigerian federalist practice with the extant theories of federalism elucidated above, and the implications this has for the possibility of using federalism as a governance tool for the management of the nation’s diversity.

As we know federalism is essentially about a multi-layer governmental structure. Three dimensions of federalism exist in the literature, namely, political, administrative and fiscal federalism. This tripartite federalism engenders different Intergovernmental relations; having management and policy implications within the public realm.

Political federalism deals with the division of power between tiers of government, under a condition in which the tiers are each within a sphere, coordinate and independence. For administrative federalism, focus is on the delegation of functions to lower-level governments, usually according to the guidelines or controls imposed by the higher level government, and consequently, without the autonomy which is characteristic of decentralization. Finally, fiscal federalism is essentially about the allocation of government spending and resources to the
various tiers of government. Other issue of concern to fiscal federalism is that of tax powers for revenue mobilization in order to be able to discharge the constitutional tasks of each levels of government. It for this reason that there is a consensus of opinion that fundamentally the concern of IGR is the issue of revenue that is, spending responsibilities, revenue-raising responsibility, intergovernmental transfers and administrative aspects of fiscal decentralization. One can understand most of the conflicts and crisis in the Nigerian federation and the vested issue of the national question from the inability to properly manage and marry these three contexts of federalism in Nigeria for the purpose of achieving national unity, progress and development.

As opine above the imperative of achieving the above objectives is a function of the effectiveness of the public sector management and policy making machineries. It must be stated clearly that federalism is not an easy formula for state management. The management problems engendered by federalism are multi-various. Every federating unit confronts in one form or the other problems associated with and having bearing on citizenship and indigeneship, participation, democracy and equitable power sharing, constitutionalism, self determination, majority domination and minority subordination, national unity, the negotiation and revalidation of the 'social contract', resource accumulation and allocation, welfare dilemma and the structuring and restructuring of the political system. The Nigerian federation is not in anyway different nor immune from these concerns. The solutions to these problems are the functions of effective public sector management and policy making.

According to Odukoya (2005):

These problems of fear of domination, marginalization, oppression, exploitation, power balance and economic accumulation amongst many others which are at the core of the thirty months Nigerian civil war, were equally responsible for the national crises that followed the annulment of the June 12, 1993 Presidential elections won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola, a Yoruba from South West Nigeria. No other event has ever called to question the utility of the federalist arrangement in Nigeria and threatened the continued existence of the country like these two events. The attempts at confronting the imperatives of these issues at the core of the Nigerian federalism has resulted in the adoption of a number of strategies some of which are considered in the next part of this work.

Some of the policy measures adopted as public sector management formula to tackle the above problems of national integration and nation-building in Nigeria are: state and local government creation; resource allocation, federal character, quota system, tinkering with the party systems, i.e. two-party and multi-party systems; rotational presidency; national spread of political parties; zoning of political positions; presidentialism; import-substitution industrialization, export promotion, green revolution, operation feed the nation, rural development, Better Life for Rural Development, Family Support Programme, War Against Indiscipline, etc.

It is sad to note that despite these efforts at the policy level, Nigerian federalism is a colossal failure. To this extent, public sector management and policy making in Nigeria have been dysfunctional and consequently require serious and radical surgical operations. Some of the reasons at the root of this failure some of which have been canvassed hitherto are: the dependency nature of the Nigerian state; the centrality of foreign capital; the non-autonomization of the state in the class struggle process; the monopolization and non-democratization of political power; the conversion of the state by the Nigerian ruling class as a tool for intra-class struggle and as a means of production for the primitive capitalist accumulation; the asymmetrical power relationship between the centre and the state, as well as the executive and other arms of government.
The Nigerian 1999 Constitution has given to the nation a Kabiyesi Presidency, whose arrogance though deeply entrenched in ignorance, is of a messianic orientation. This amounts to a proudonic order which is the order of the grasshopper, and the order of the grasshopper is an orderless order. Other reasons include: the institutionalization of a choiceless democracy and democratization of disempowerment under which elections have been transformed into selection; and last but not the least, elite conspiracy and manipulation, and the polarization of the working classes and the poor.

From the forging how then do we understand the Nigerian public sector management and policy making? Momoh articulation aptly captures our problematic. According to Momoh (2005:9):

In summary, the characteristics of Nigerian politics [Public sector Management and Policy Making] can be defined as follows, personalization of political rule, professionalization of corrupt, institutionalization of rigging, consolidation of militarism, democratization of violence, hegemonization of domination, subordination of democratic and social forces, ruination of the peasantry, emasculation of opposition forces, compradorization of development, and veneration of political crooks. Additionally, there is de-industrialization and de-democratization. To be sure, the professionalization of corruption has resulted in the epidemiology of stealing. There is a posturing by a so-called emergent economic class pursuing a superficial economic reform, within a deceptive statist accountability framework, and driven by a tokenist approach to the youth and women question [development question].

Conclusion:
We cannot continue to shear away from the fact that public sector management and policy making in Nigeria have been an unmitigated disaster. We must be honest to admit that the ineptitude, dependency, lack of vision, selfishness and class conspiracy of our petit-bourgeois ruling classes have resulted in the privatization of the Nigerian state, and by extension the corporatization and marketization of public sector management and policy making. We must be bold to confront the reality that whatever spurious arguments and advantages canvassed for neo-liberal market development formula, the market no matter its efficiency (this is debatable) is not, and cannot be a social manager. It cannot take care of non-profit considerations that are fundamental for state stability and human progress. Furthermore, there is nothing in the nature of public sector management that makes it prima facie inefficient. Experiences of bank failure in Nigeria and failure of big corporations in the West have demonstrated beyond any doubt that private enterprises possess no mantra for success.

The state and public sector management and policy making in the western world is still very strong. Similarly, public sector management and policy making were at the root of the development of the economies of the western world. According to Narain (2003:2):

PE [Public Enterprise] has served an important and significant purpose in developing countries. Even in developed economics, for supersonic travel or communication by way of earth satellites, state initiative was accepted without hesitation. Similarly, for the development of atomic energy there was no alternative to government action. These were big leaps for many developed countries, where the market could not be relied upon.

The state is an indispensable variable in the development of Nigeria and other third world nations. Thus, engendering a developmental and interventionist state in Nigeria is a categorical imperative, and a sine qua non for national socio-economic and political transformation.

The first task in this respect is to revolutionaryize the nation's public sector management and policy making mechanisms such that the people become the desideratum for actions and social
Rather than uncritical submission and cooperation with our oppressors who daily and mercilessly brutalize us, the people should organize, network and form alliances of social actions to recapture the public sphere as a prelude to reorienting public sector management and policy making in Nigeria. The generalized apathy, cynicism and ethnic sentimentalism are ways in which the people have unconsciously collaborated with their oppressor and assisted in the debauchery of the public sector management and policy making in Nigeria. To this end the character of the following cannot be meaningfully separated from the rot. Professor Claude Ake captures this scenario aptly when he opined as follow:

We are submissive to those who have power over us as we are oppressive of those who are weaker than we are. We corrupt those who are stronger by allowing them every indulgence, including the liberty to abuse us. We have no will to resist power, our inclination is to worship it. We think nothing of submitting to all manner of indignity to get those in power to notice us or throw us some crumbs. Even without the crumbs, we still ache with the desire to please them.

The people therefore must change their attitudes, challenge those who supper-intent over them, call for state reforms, and the radical transformation of public sector management and policy making in Nigeria so that poverty, diseases, banditry, unemployment, underdevelopment conflicts and instability in Nigeria would be a thing of the past. This is because “a society of beggars, parasites and bandits cannot develop, it cannot know peace or stability, and cannot be democratic. It can only gravitate endlessly, as we are doing, in material poverty, and moral regression. This is a call for critical citizenship capable of engaging the state and its managers, and with the contextual and technical competency to interrogate public policies. An alert and informed citizenry and following is indispensable for a progressive and proactive public sector management and policy making, especially in a dependent capitalist social formation like Nigeria, where the capitalist processes of development is grossly underdeveloped and the pains of capitalism far out-weigh its benefits.

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