

**A STUDY OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN FRENCH FOREIGN
POLICY (1990-2006) IN AFRICA**

BY

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2009

**SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS**

CERTIFICATION

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Submitted to the
School of Postgraduate Studies
University of Lagos


For the award of the degree of
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is a record of original research carried out

By

AKWAYA, CLETUS TERHEMBA
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
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
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
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
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
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
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DECLARATION

We hereby declare unequivocally, that this Thesis titled "A Study of Change and Continuity in French Foreign Policy (1990 – 2006) in Africa" is a record of original research work carried out by Akwaya, Terhemba Cletus in the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Nigeria.

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DEDICATION

This Thesis is dedicated to:

My late parents: Elizabeth Atoona Chahul Akwaya and Akwaya Igba.

May eternal rest be granted to them O Lord and may their gentle souls rest in the bosom of our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.

My dear wife: Sarah Kazan Akwaya

Our children: Ahangba, Iyua, Alutor and Akwaya Jr who individually and collectively remain my perpetual source of inspiration.

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while I was out of campus. Ottoh took interest in my area of study and often engaged me in rigorous debates on issues of approach and sometimes of facts. He also read through several drafts making useful contributions all the times. I am extremely grateful to this wonderful and selfless gentleman for his support, love and friendship. Dr Olufemi Adelusi and Dr Rasheed Akinyemi both inspired me greatly, I am very appreciative of their support.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABU	–	Ahmadu Bello University
ADC	–	Aide de camp
AFAA	–	French Association for Artistic Action
AFP	–	<i>Agence France Press</i>
AIT	–	African Independent Television
APD	–	Public Aid and development
ARMACOR	–	Armament Development and Production Corporation of South Africa
BIAO	–	<i>Banque Internationale Pour 'Afrique Occidentale</i>
BIC	–	<i>Banque Internationale Pour la Commerce et Industrie de la Cote d' Ivoire</i>
BNP	–	<i>Banque Nationale de Paris</i>
BON	–	Broadcasting Organisation of Nigeria
CAR	–	Central African Republic
CCE	–	Central Office for Economic Cooperation
CFI	–	Canal France International
CMS	–	Church Missionary Society
CFA	–	Communaute Financiere Africaine
CFAO	–	<i>Compagnie Francaise d' Afrique Occidentale</i>
CPP	–	Convention Peoples Party
DAC	–	Development Assistance Countries
DRC	–	Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOMOG	–	Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	–	Economic Community of West African States
EEC	–	European Economic Community
ENA	–	<i>L' Etoilenord Africaine</i>
EU	–	European Union
FAC	–	Aid and Cooperation Fund
FCT	–	Federal Capital Territory
FDI	–	Foreign Direct Investment
FF	–	French Francs
FIDES	–	Investment Fund for Social and Economic Development
FNCC	–	Franco-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce and Industry
FNESCO	–	French Nigeria Social and Cultural Organisation
GATT	–	General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	–	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	–	Gross National Product
IBWA	–	International Bank for West Africa
ICT	–	Information and Communication Technology
IMF	–	International Monetary Fund
ING	–	Interim National Government
KRPC	–	Kaduna refinery and Petrochemical Company
LNG	–	Liquefied Natural gas
LURD	–	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MBC	–	Merchant Bank Corporation

NADECO	–	National Democratic Coalition
NATO	–	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCNC	–	National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons
NEC	–	National Electoral Commission
NGOs	–	Non-Governmental Organisations
NNPC	–	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NPLF	–	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NRC	–	National Republican Convention
NSDC	–	National Security and Defence Council
NWRI	–	National Water Resources Institute
PAN	–	Peugeot Automobile Nigeria
PPA	–	<i>Parti Populaire Algerien</i>
PSG	–	Paris Saint Germain
PTF	–	Petroleum(Special) Trust Fund
RDA	–	<i>Rassemblement Democratique Africaine</i>
RFI	–	Radio France International
RPA	–	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	–	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC	–	Southern Africa Development Community
SCOA	–	<i>Societe Commercial Ouest Africaine</i>
SDP	–	Social Democratic Party
SFOM	–	<i>Societe Financiere Pour les Pays d'outre mer</i>
SGBN	–	<i>Societe Generale Bank of Nigeria</i>

OAS	–	Organisation of American States
OAU	–	Organisation of African Unity
OCAM	–	<i>Organisation Commune Africaine et Malegache</i>
ODA	–	Official Development Assistance
UAM	–	<i>Union Africaine et Malegache</i>
UBA	–	United Bank for Africa
UGCC	–	United Gold Coast Convention
ULIMO	–	United Liberation Movement for democracy in Liberia
UMOA	–	Union Monetaire de l'Ouest-Africaine
UNESCO	–	United Nations Scientific Educational and Cultural Organisation
UNO	–	United Nations Organisation
USA	–	United States of America
USD	–	United States Dollars
USSR	–	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTB	–	Universal Trust Bank
TV	–	Television

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ABSTRACT

As a colonial power, France developed the policy of assimilation, the most ambitious administrative system throughout the colonial experience of Africa with which she governed her colonies across the African continent. This policy was the most comprehensive in the sense that it brought France very close to her colonies just as it sought to make French men out of the colonised peoples of Africa. As colonialism came to an end with attainment of independence by these former colonies, France fashioned new ways to maintain close ties with the former colonies. This was based on well crafted defence and cooperation agreements which enabled her to be involved in the internal economic, political and military activities of the countries.

Former many years, this relationship blossomed as it mutually benefited both France and the Francophone countries. While the Francophone countries enjoyed lavish economic aids, military supplies and training, political support and solidarity in international organisations, France obtained raw materials from some of the Francophone nation-states, the same way as she made them markets for her industrial products.

From the 1990s however, the relationship changed as France drastically reduced the level of her relationship with the former colonies while building stronger ties with Anglophone countries considered more strategic to French economic and political interests. In the countries where the changes were most noticeable like Algeria, Cote d' Ivoire, Niger, Chad etc, France remained aloof to the countries' socio-political and economic problems which led to loss of many lives and large scale destruction of property. This was in spite of the existing military cooperation agreements, which France before now exploited to intervene in the internal affairs of those countries in times of political crisis under the guise of restoring law and order. As a result of the new policy thrust, France also discontinued her aid programmes to these countries in the same way as she reduced the number of military bases and troops as well as military training and supplies to these Francophone countries.

This study has investigated the factors that led to the change in France's attitude towards her once close allies and the factors that paved way for the cordial relationship with the Anglophone countries like Nigeria with which she hitherto had frosty relationship. The study found out that political and economic factors within France as well as developments in the international system compelled France to change her policy of paternalism to that of non-involvement in the internal affairs of the Francophone.

Two theoretical approaches of "hegemonic stability" and "interdependence" respectively were adopted which helped the researcher explain the issues raised in the study.

The study also adopted the historical and analytical approaches in the investigation of the problem and arrived at some findings. For instance, the study finds that France's closeness with the Francophone States in the period after independence was predicated upon the amount of benefits she derived from the relationship. And this explains why she fostered close ties with these Francophone countries when it was beneficial to do so but had to change her policy towards her once close allies due to the prevailing national and international circumstances. It also finds that although there have been changes in the foreign policy thrust of France towards the Francophone, there has been continuity of policy at some levels as the agreements upon which France based her relationship with the former colonies are yet to be reviewed, repealed or repudiated.

On the basis of the findings, the study recommends that since the change in France's policy in Africa poses new challenges, Francophone countries should necessarily look inwards for solutions to their numerous socio-political and economic problems rather than depend on France as was the case in the years shortly after independence (1960s) up to the 1980s.

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

France's presence on the African continent as a colonial power was unique for many reasons. First, it was the country with the second highest number of colonies on the continent with eighteen colonies, next only to Britain which had nineteen at the commencement of full colonial authority in Africa¹. Secondly, France's colonial policy of assimilation was the most ambitious system of administration by any colonial power in both conceptualization and practice, in the sense that it sought to make French men out of the colonised peoples of Africa (Rubin and Weinstein, 1974, p.38). For these reasons alone, France- African relations should stimulate the interest of researchers in international relations. But more importantly, the interest of this researcher is stimulated by the noticeable and fundamental changes in France's relationship with the former colonies from the 1990s.

France maintained the closest ties with her former colonies in the post independence era. The close association was based on series of carefully crafted agreements in different spheres of relations at the dawn of independence which enabled France maintain a stronghold on the former colonies. The rationale behind France's action was obviously the economic and political benefits that she stood to gain from the agreements. For instance, France made the new independent states veritable markets for her finished products as well as the source for some critical industrial raw materials like uranium, cocoa etc.

As part of the strategy to maintain the hold on these new independent states, France provided funds for their development activities under her elaborate cooperation and aid programmes. These made the countries to be heavily dependent on their benefactor for survival while France played the paternalistic role (a willing godfather) in times of political, diplomatic, strategic(military) or economic crises both locally and internationally.

France's paternalistic disposition towards the former colonies drew her extremely close to them to the extent that these countries almost became France's diplomatic outposts in international politics, international organizations and multilateral institutions. The relations were unique when compared with the relationship between Britain, another former colonial master and her former colonies.

However, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the evolution of the European Union among others became critical determinants in the realignment of France's foreign policy posture which led to some noticeable changes in the relationship between France and her erstwhile allies in Africa. This explains why France cut down on development aid to these countries, reduced her military presence and withdrew her involvement in internal political crisis in some of the countries like Algeria, Cote d' Ivoire, Niger, Benin, Rwanda etc. Similarly, France no longer regarded or conducted herself as the political "godfather" of these countries to shade them from the inclement weather of international politics as used to be case. There were changes in other spheres as well.

In addition, the change in the government in France from Francois Mitterrand to Jacques Chirac who shared different political ideologies also influenced France's foreign policy posture. Of course, these changes had their impact on her allies especially the Francophone countries in Africa. In order to understand all the issues in France's relationship with Africa and what necessitated the changes, there is need therefore for a systematic and scholarly investigation of the changing pattern of France's external relations with particular reference to Africa hence the interest of the researcher in this study.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

As stated earlier, the period covered by this study (1990-2006) marked a turning point in France's long-standing relations with Africa. During the period, France introduced changes in her relationship with both the Francophone and Anglophone countries in Africa.

As a result of the changes in official policy to Africa, France began a process of reduction of her commitment and involvement in the affairs of her former colonies. Against the spirit of the existing military cooperation agreements, France failed to extend support to some of her former colonies like Algeria, Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire, and Niger at the time of their worst internal political problems which led in many instances to large scale violence resulting in destruction of lives, property and sources or avenues of livelihood. While this was happening, France jettisoned her traditional approach of suspicion, hostility, betrayal and contempt in her dealings with Anglophone countries especially Nigeria, adopting instead, the approach of cordiality, solidarity, mutual cooperation and assistance. This was most noticeable at the time of international isolation of Nigeria during the regime of late Gen. Sani Abacha and Liberia during the fratricidal war led by Mr. Charles Taylor among other Anglophone countries.

This study therefore, seeks to bring out those changes in the Foreign policy thrust of France in Africa during this period; the determining factors for the change in policy and the implication of the changes on the future of the Francophone in particular and continent's present and future development in general.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

French foreign policy has a peculiar character. Sometimes it wears the toga of the "more you see, the less you understand." This is because France's foreign policy options at any point in time are articulated without necessarily compromising the core principles of her foreign policy set out since during the revolution (the war by Napoleon Bonaparte) as well as the fundamentals of her African policy which Martin(1985) in a critique sums up as racism, national chauvinism, hypocrisy and continuity.

The general objective: The general objective of this study is to undertake a comprehensive study of France's new foreign policy and its effects on African states and to suggest development options available to the former French colonies in Africa in cultural, economic, political and other spheres in the light of the changes in France's foreign policy towards them.

Specific Objectives: The specific objectives of this study are as follows:

1. To examine the declining interest of France in her former colonies during the period covered by this study.
2. To examine the role of France in times of violent conflicts and political disturbances, in some of her former colonies and traditional allies.
3. To explain what accounts for France's new approach in her relationship with the Anglophone countries.
4. To explain/investigate to what extent the coming to power of pro-Gaullist leader, Mr. Jacques Chirac who took over from Socialist President, Francois Mitterrand contributed or influenced France's relationship with Africa during the period covered by this study.
5. To explore whether France's changing policy towards Africa during this period was as a result of certain developments in the international system.
6. To analyse the implications of France's new policy on her former colonies and other countries in Africa.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The period 1990-2006 represents a completely new chapter in the decades of relations between France and Africa. During this period, France effectively reordered the basis of her relationship with African countries. This foreign policy posture saw France refraining from her former colonies in many spheres of interaction on one hand, while on the other hand forging closer ties with Anglophone countries on the continent.

This new dimension in Franco- African relations as this study shows is a marked departure from France's African policy since the colonial era.

The significance of this study therefore lies in the fact that the new dimension in France's African policy has not been examined in any serious research effort or publication neither has the period of this study been the focus of any recent work on France -African relations. This study therefore derives originality on this score and hopes to enrich the literature on France- Africa relations.

The choice of the period 1990-2006 is also informed by certain considerations. During this period, the international system witnessed a lot of developments most of which had far reaching implications on inter-state relations (France-Africa relations) on one hand and global socio-political and economic structures on the other. These changes spanned the political, military, economic and social spheres of interaction. A few examples include the collapse of communism in the Eastern bloc and dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); the establishment of the European Parliament and the introduction of European Common currency-Euro.

In France, certain important developments also occurred. These include a change of baton in the government from the Socialist President, Francois Mitterrand to Gaullist leader, Jacques Chirac. On the economic front, the recession in the French economy propelled new policies with far reaching implications on the country's foreign policy.

In Africa, there were also some important developments. The political crises in Algeria and Nigeria arising from annulment of elections; ethnic cleansing of the minority Tutsis by the Hutus in Rwanda in 1994; the genocide in Burundi, the rebellion of Laurent Kabila in Zaire, which led to the ouster of Mobutu Sese Sekou. Other important developments on the continent include Nigeria and Cameroun clashes over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsular and the eventual hand over of the territory to Cameroun by Nigeria; the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone; the turbulent political crisis in Niger leading to the killing of the President, Barre Mainasara and the first military coup in Cote D'Ivoire in which President Konan Bedie, successor to the patriarch of Cote d'Ivoire, Felix Houphouet Boigny was overthrown.

All these developments sometimes linked, and in other cases isolated combined to directly or indirectly determine the course of France's policy towards Africa. Since these "external determinants" of France's foreign policy have hardly been taken as a whole in any research effort of this nature, this study broadens the understanding of France's foreign policy by critically focusing on the extent to which these external factors influenced change in French foreign policy during this period.

In doing so, the study addresses the needs of students of international relations desiring knowledge or information on the currents in French foreign policy. The study also provides diplomats with a well researched document which would possibly contribute to the articulation and projection of France's foreign policy in the years ahead. Finally, the study makes recommendations on the basis of the findings for improvement, consolidation and sustenance of relations between France and Africa in the future.

1.5 SCOPE /LIMITATION OF STUDY

The concern of this study is not to chronicle the entire gamut of France's foreign policy towards Africa neither is it a comparative study of France's relationship with her former African colonies on one hand and the Anglo-phone countries on the other. Rather, it is a study of the changes in France's-African policy during the period under review (1990-2006) in the military, strategic, political, economic and cultural spheres. For an in depth understanding of the changes, two countries-Algeria and Cote d' Ivoire have been selected as case studies to show France's changing policy on the political and military matters. The variables chosen represent the areas where the changes in France's foreign policy are more visible and have greater impact on Africa. The study also examines the operation of this policy in other countries like Rwanda, Niger and Zaire. Examples are drawn from either of the former colonies or Anglophone countries in so far as those examples lucidly bring out the changes in France's foreign policy towards Africa.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The focus of this study is aptly captured by the following questions.

1. What explains France's declining interests in her former colonies during the period covered by this study?
2. What explains the role of France in times of violent conflicts and political disturbances, in some of her former colonies and traditional allies like Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger and Rwanda etc?
3. What accounts for France's deliberate efforts during this period to win the friendship of Anglophone countries like Nigeria?
4. Did the change of government in France between the Socialist President Mitterrand to a pro- Gaullist leader, Jacques Chirac contribute to the change in

France's African policy during the period covered by this study?

5. Did changes in the international system like the end of the Cold War and the evolution of European Union among others influence France's international policy during this period?
6. What are the implications of France's new policy on her former colonies and other countries in Africa?

1.7 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

For an appropriate understanding of the issues raised in this study, it is pertinent to define some terms or concepts in the context in which they have been used or applied.

Change: Change is here is defined as the shift or noticeable differences from France's foreign policy towards Africa from the period before 1990.

Continuity: For the purpose of this study, continuity is the existing level of relations between France and the former colonies in spite of the changes in foreign policy by France towards Africa. In other words, it is the existence of ties between France and the Francophone regardless of the changes in foreign policy.

Foreign Policy: In this study, foreign policy is the articulation of the defined interests of a nation- state (France) in the external environment for the purpose of promoting or protecting defined goals and objectives for the image and well being of the peoples of the State and for the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Gaullists: The concept of Gaullism emanates from the principles and philosophy of General Charles de Gaulle, the Second World War leader of France. de Gaulle was ousted by the German forces in 1944 and was only returned to power after the liberation of France in 1959. As president of France, de Gaulle launched a programme of *Grandeur* whose main objective was to restore and promote the image of France within the international comity of nations. The political associates of de Gaulle have since been entrenched in French politics and have continued to promote the ideology of their former leader. Former French Presidents like Pompidou and Jacques Chirac belong to the political school of de Gaulle's ideological adherents. In this study, Gaullists refer to the collectivity of de Gaulle's fellow ideologues, mostly found in one party. Our usage of the term here is limited to only the Gaullists who have found opportunities to play critical

roles in the French governments that have clear impact on the country's foreign policy.

Socialists: Refers to the Socialist Party in France which produced President Francois Mitterrand (1988-'96), immediate predecessor to President Jacques Chirac.

Relations: For the purpose of this study, the concept means the interaction between France and the former African colonies as well as the Anglophone countries over the years beginning from the colonial era to the period under consideration in the various spheres like economic, political, diplomatic, military, culture, science and technology.

Cooperation: This refers to the special linkage between France and her former colonies beginning from the various agreements signed at the time of independence to other areas of special relationship.

Paternalism: The "godfather" role of France to her former colonies in the period after independence especially in shouldering the responsibilities of those countries or the burden of their local and international problems.

Hegemony: The international dominance, influence or control exerted on the Francophone countries in Africa by France.

Non-involvement: The new focus of France's foreign policy during the period of the study in which France deliberately refrained from shouldering the responsibilities of the former colonies or interfering in their local affairs as was the case in the period immediately after colonialism.

1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.8.1 Research Design

The study utilises the historical, analytical and explanatory methodological approaches to arrive at findings. Historical research according to Borg (1963), is the systematic and objective location, evaluation and synthesis of evidence in order to establish facts and draw conclusions about past events. It involves exploring meaning and relationship of events and as its resource; it uses primary data in form of artifacts, records and writings. Also, it attempts to find out what happened in the past and to reveal reasons for why and how things happened (Walliman, 2001.)

The analytical or explanatory approach attempts to provide broad analysis of the subject matter in order to enable a thorough understanding of the phenomenon.

These methodological approaches are adopted in view of the fact that since the conduct of foreign policy involves the interface of both states and non-state actors in the international system, there often appear complexities which if not critically analysed or explained tend to inhibit the understanding of issues in their proper contexts.

Qualitative research employs inductive analysis to identify critical variables (Patton, 1990) and its appropriate institutions where the numbers of variables are numerous. Therefore, the choice of the historical, analytical and explanatory research approaches provides the researcher with the basis for adequate understanding of French foreign policy towards Africa. Strauss and Corbin (1990) claim that qualitative method can be used to better understand any phenomenon for which much is already known. Since the research questions are open ended and cannot be quantified, the study therefore adopts a qualitative design.

1.8.2 Sources

Documentary or Library Sources: This involved the collection of data and information from primary sources such as archival materials, government publications and gazettes, private records, seminars, and international and non-governmental organizations like *Alliance Francaise*.

It also involved the collection of data from secondary sources like textbooks on a wide range of issues pertaining to the topic and sub-topics, journals, magazines and pamphlets, published in France, Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and other countries, Radio France International and other international TV networks.

A lot of information was also sourced from various internet websites. In particular, the website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very useful in providing information on the current state of foreign policy articulation and implementation by France. Some information was obtained through phone calls, fax messages and postal services.

Interviews: Structured and open-ended interviews were designed and conducted with the view to obtaining answers relating to France-Africa relations and what has necessitated a shift in French foreign policy in Africa. The interviews helped the researcher to interact meaningfully with the policy makers in the selected countries and to

achieve the objectives of the research. According to Walliman (2001) interviews are useful method of obtaining information, opinions from experts during the early stage of research project. Essentially, interviews enable the researcher to determine the interviewees' understanding, attitude, and perception of the totality of issues involved in France- Africa relations as well as the extent of France's involvement in political crisis and other spheres of interaction in the countries studied.

In view of this, key informants interviewed were from French embassies in Nigeria, Algeria, and Cote d' Ivoire were interviewed. Interviews were also conducted in Algeria and Cote d'Ivoire with Foreign Affairs Ministry officials, academics, Research Fellows and individuals who have done some works or demonstrated scholarly interests in the area of French foreign policy as it relates to Africa.

Procedure for Interviews

Respondents were interviewed individually. These interviews were conducted in the offices of the designated officials of the Embassies, Ministries, Universities, Research Centres, Chambers of Commerce, Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) etc. Respondents were approached by the researcher for an appointment after the topic of discussion was introduced to them. The idea being to ensure that they were mentally prepared to respond to the questions which in some instances were given to them in advance. Their responses were carefully recorded by the researcher, marked appropriately and applied in the relevant sections of the study.

1.8.3 Data Gathering Techniques

The technique of data gathering is by careful and systematic sifting of scholarly works with a view to making an in -depth study and analysis of data relating to French foreign policy towards Africa. A rigorous analysis of cases of Francophone and Anglophone countries focused on the economic, political, military, cultural and diplomatic relations are the critical variables in this study.

Despite sifting available materials across geographical regions of Africa, the limited number of cases has the advantage of a thorough analysis of the issues involved.

Relevant data and information for the work were generated from several sources including documentary or library sources and interviews.

Some of the people interviewed made their responses in writing while others made their responses orally. Some adduced documentary evidence to support their claims.

1.8.4 Data Analysis:

The data gathered from the interviews were analyzed in line with the variables under study and by the research questions. Similarly, data gathered from the documentary/library sources were analyzed qualitatively. This enabled the researcher to verify certain view points, ideas, words, statistics etc. before arriving at some conclusions.

Given the nature of this study therefore, a historical method of analysis connects the researcher with the foundation of French foreign policy towards her Francophone allies with the intent of understanding the present dynamics of her foreign policy posture and the basis for futuristic projection of her foreign policy.

NOTE

- 1 At the commencement of formal colonial rule, Britain had the following colonies: Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Sierra-Leone, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho Swaziland, Malawi, Seychelles, Somalia, Namibia, Egypt and Sudan.
France on the other established administrative control over the following colonies: Senegal, Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Gabon, Bourkina-Faso, Guinea, Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, (Zaire), Djibouti (French Somaliland), Mauritania, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Benin, Chad, Niger and Tunisia.

CHAPTER TWO

2. LITERATURE REVIEW/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

France's colonial policy of assimilation brought her very close to her territories throughout the period of colonialism. The closeness which continued in the post-independence era was based on series of agreements entered into by France with these newly independent states immediately after the end of formal colonial rule. These agreements were freely exploited by France to control the countries and interfere in their domestic affairs. In the special relationship that existed, France dominated the markets in these countries for her finished goods and also for sourcing of critical raw materials like uranium, cocoa, rubber etc for her domestic needs. She also enjoyed the solidarity of these states in the international arena especially in the multilateral organizations like the United Nations.

On the other hand, the former colonies also depended almost entirely on France for their development as France supplied their military equipment (including training of their armed forces), industrial goods and also provided funds for education, health, social services and infrastructure through generous aid and official assistance. France also provided cover for these small countries in international politics and ensured the protection of their interests. This paternalistic disposition enabled France to maintain a firm grip on these countries consistent with the prevailing international situation (cold war) which saw the super powers jostling for control of the international system.

However, certain circumstances both within France and the international environment as outlined in the background to this study made it impossible for France to continue with this policy. This necessitated a change in her foreign policy posture with far reaching implications on the economies, politics and the overall development of some of these countries.

Yahya (1994) has dealt with France's relationship with Africa from the perspective of her neo-colonial activities on the African continent. He examines the post-colonial ties between France and the Francophone with emphasis on how France sought to continue the domination of her erstwhile colonies through a well thought-out strategy in the

different spheres of interaction - economic, military, culture, cooperation and development aid. In his treatise, he delves into the historical relationship between France and Africa up to the period after independence when France built and nurtured the French community in Africa. Issues like France's development aid policy under various administrations from Gen de Gaulle, trade and investment activities with both the Francophone and Anglophone, military and activities and cooperation with Africa and the spread of French language and other aspects of French culture which he submits were critical agents of French neo-colonialism. In his analyses, he also highlights France's relationship with Anglophone countries like Nigeria during the civil war, South Africa during the apartheid regime. The author adopts the "theory" of neo-colonialism to analyse the different aspects of France's engagement with post colonial Africa. Yahya sums up the negative impact of colonialism and neo-colonialism as the "legacy" of France to Africa.

The major weakness of Yahya's work is the absence of a concrete social science theory with which to explain the issues raised in the work. His choice of the "theory" of neo-colonialism which he uses in the analysis of the issues raised is confusing as neo-colonialism has not attained universal acceptance as a theory *per se* in the social sciences. The strength of Yahya's work however, is the rigorous use of statistical tables, figures and other primary data relating to the theme of Franco-Africa relations drive home his arguments. This study benefits from these data. The work, though a useful contribution to knowledge does not address the concerns of this study as it covers a different time frame in Franco-African relations.

The challenge of this study therefore, is to extend the analysis by applying the theories of interdependence and hegemonic stability in the analysis of the web of relations between France and her former African colonies on one hand and some Anglophone countries on the other in the period under consideration.

In the examination of the complexity of French policy towards Africa, Akinterinwa (1999) has shown that it is difficult, if not impossible to reasonably predict France's African policy. He holds that France's continued stronghold on Africa is a desperate initiative to sustain her friendship with African countries and the third world partners, a

move he argues is necessary for her to remain relevant in Europe. Akinterinwa x-rays France's activities on the African continent over time and demonstrates how her interests are perceived by Nigeria, the largest country and voice of the African continent. He maintains that Nigeria is strategic to France's African policy in that it is surrounded by small former French territories. He argues that whereas France is an "external power" on the African continent, Nigeria is an "internal power" in Africa. According to him, both countries sometimes seem to be on a collision course as a result of their perceived status on the continent. And to drive home this point, he highlights examples of friction like the break in diplomatic ties in the 1960s (Akinterinwa, 1999), the Nigerian civil war and France's support of the Biafra secessionist group.

On the positive side of the relationship is the increased volume of trade between the two countries and increased investment by French companies in Nigeria and the "cooperation" Nigeria enjoyed from France during years of international sanctions in the mid 1990s.

In recognition of the ups and downs in the relationship between the two countries, Akinterinwa contends that the dilemma of foreign policy of France towards Nigeria can be resolved through a permanent structure that ensures regular meetings to discuss matters of mutual interest. (Akinterinwa, 1999). This, in his view, is necessary since Nigeria cannot do away with France as long as she has Francophone countries as neighbours.

Akinterinwa's treatment of France's relationship with Nigeria, gives a clear indication of contemporary relations with a typical Anglo-phone country-Nigeria. A salient feature of Akinterinwa's work is the acknowledgement of the change in France's foreign policy towards Africa while upholding some of the core principles of her foreign policy. His work however, does not cover the relations with other Anglophone countries or Francophone countries; neither does it apply the theoretical approaches used by this study, the gaps which this study hopes to fill.

France's contemporary foreign policy whether towards Africa (Francophone and Anglophone) or elsewhere, is rooted on *Grandeur*, the doctrine of her war time leader, Gen. Charles de Gaulle. Under this policy, France sought to establish herself as a global

power in the international power scene. This perhaps explains why France in the desperate attempt to dictate the state of affairs on the African continent often came in collision course with Nigeria in the period shortly after Nigeria's independence.

In the analysis of French contemporary foreign policy towards Africa, the contributions made by the following works are relevant to the understanding of the issues and dynamics of French policy. They are: Edward A. Kolodziej (1974); Daniel Bournaud (1995); Christopher Clapham (2000); Nicholas Robert Pederson (2000); Sylvain Touati (2007). These works variously expose the foundation of French foreign policy and the underlying factors that shape her foreign policy during the period covered by this study.

Edward A. Kolodziej (1974) affirms the view that French foreign policy is anchored on the principle of *Grandeur*. This entails the promotion of French greatness through spread of her culture and influence abroad. The principle as conceived by de Gaulle was religiously pursued by the succeeding administration of President Pompidou and indeed other succeeding administrations. Kolodziej traces the factors which led to the emergence of *grandeur*, attributing it to the plan by France to shore up her battered image after the defeat in the second World War by the Nazi troops; the occupation of French territory by the Germans as well as the defeat of France in the war of liberation with Algeria.

The philosophy, as enunciated by de Gaulle essentially sought to reclaim France's lost glory and also re-establish the country as a "global power". In order to achieve this objective, de Gaulle sought a "re-ordering" of the international system so that France would have a voice on major international issues. In this wise therefore, one of the objectives of *grandeur* was France's attempt to change the alignment patterns and the distribution of power between and among states while her concrete strategic, economic and diplomatic policies became the means in the service of larger global claims. The contribution of Kolodziej however fails to show how France sought to pursue the policy of *grandeur* in the Francophone countries in Africa since he focused only on Algeria and the Middle East. His effort is nevertheless, useful in illuminating the character of French foreign policy and its roots in the Gaullist philosophy of *grandeur*.

In his contribution however, Philip Cerny (1980) extends the meaning of *grandeur* to bring out its different facets and the accompanying confusion it creates in the study of France's foreign policy. Grandeur, he contends, is

the need to create a new and more profound sense of national consciousness, capable of transcending the traditional divisions which have characterized the French policy, thus allowing and reinforcing the development of a consensus supportive of a firmly established and active state pursuing the general interest within a stable political system. (Ibid. p. 4)

In his analysis of French foreign policy from De Gaulle to the present, Cerny brings out the successes and also the failures of *grandeur*. These achievements and low points as they affect the contemporary foreign policy of France are what he calls the "legacy of *grandeur*". He, like other authors, fails to address the concerns of this study apart from providing a general understanding of the principles of French foreign policy.

Lacouture (1990) Bernstein (1993), Shenan (1993) have variously attempted to analyse the foundation of the Gaullist ideology and especially how General Charles de Gaulle succeeded in bringing about political stability in France during his tenure.

Their works form a good basis for the understanding of the foundation of French foreign policy. They are however, deficient in relation to this study in the sense that these works deal generally with foundations of France's foreign policy with no specific emphasis on her relationship with either the Francophone or Anglophone countries in Africa neither do they focus on the time frame set for this study. The intention of this study is therefore to improve on these existing contributions on the theme of France's foreign policy.

The contribution to the literature on French foreign policy from the post-colonial period up to the 1990s from some scholars tends to emphasis the local determinants of French foreign policy more than the outcome of her foreign policy implementation. One of such authors, R. Gildea (1996) for instance, takes a look at French politics and governments since 1945 focusing on the economic, foreign and cultural policies of the various administrations. Gildea also focuses on the main actors behind these policies and some of the underlying factors, which helped shape events. He therefore does not focus on France- African relations *per se*.

Bourmaud (1995) in his work on African politics and French foreign policy asserts that

the changes in France's foreign policy to Africa were anchored on the failure of French aid programme in Africa. In criticizing France's aid policy in Africa, he argues that French aid hardly derives the expected benefits. His view is that over 95 per cent of the annual 40 billion francs set aside through the Public Aid and Development (APD) hardly goes to developmental projects that meet the desire of the people who the aid were meant for. He attributes this to "corruption and clientilism" both of which he contends combine to reduce French influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to Bourmaud,

far from encouraging economic take-off and improving the lives of the people who are supposed to benefit from these expenditures, public assistance of this type is largely allocated to projects which do not contribute to development but which even serve to impede it. (Ibid.p.58).

In a similar manner, Christopher Clapham (2000) attributes the changes in French policy towards the Francophone countries to the decline in African economies. He argues that during the period under consideration, the branches of French businesses on the African continent rapidly declined with a few still operating on sentimental basis. Besides, he contends that the support to Francophone became a big burden on French treasury with the concomitant deficit on the national budget until France had to drastically devalue the CFA in January 1994 to apparently reduce the pressure on her treasury.

Clapham also holds the view that

with the end of cold war, the unification of Germany and the opening up of Eastern Europe, the pretence that the maintenance of a special relationship between France and the Francophone States of Africa served any valuable function became increasingly difficult to sustain. (Ibid. p.98.)

The common problem with these two works is that they fail to comprehensively examine the contributory factors to the kinetics or factors responsible for the changes in French policy by adopting a piecemeal approach. Thus, whereas Bourmaud identifies the collapse of French aid policy as a major determinant in the changes in her foreign policy, Clapham attributes it to the decline in African economies. However, the failure of French aid policy alone could not be the sole determinant of the changes in French foreign policy towards Africa during this period just as the end of the Cold War could not be a sole determinant of change in French foreign policy. Moreover, Bourmaud's critique of the

French aid programme in Africa does not necessarily agree with the realities in these countries as most of them had to literally depend on France to operate their national budgets or finance development projects.

The changes in France's foreign policy framework towards the Francophone countries could not have been as a result of the isolated factors "failure of French aids programme"; "the collapse of African economies" or "collapse of communism" alone as canvassed by these scholars but an outcome of a number of factors both within the immediate environment of France and those outside her immediate control as pointed out in the background to this study and aptly demonstrated in subsequent sections.

Indeed, in agreement with this study, Nicholas Robert Pederson (2000) holds that the change in France's foreign policy towards Francophone Africa is because she no longer needs to secure her raw materials from those countries. In his words "*with the new willingness of the French to procure their uranium on the world market, France no longer solely needs to depend on its former colonies.*" (Ibid.p.2) Pederson's assertion supports the thesis that there are multiple determinants of the changes in France's foreign policy.

Martin Schain (2001) has made a useful contribution to the understanding of the history, politics, economy, governmental structure and other domestic issues which constitute the local determinants of French foreign policy during this period.

Specifically, Schain focuses on the character and functionality of the executive, legislature and the judiciary as separate arms of government and how they relate with each to other to create a unique political and administration system for France in the context of the European Union.

Schain mentions some of the domestic issues which influence the direction of national politics and France's conduct of foreign policy such as religion (the role of the Church), class and status, political socialization, family, education, political participation especially voting as well as gender issues. Others include the role of interest groups like organised labour movement, business community and agricultural interests.

In relation to this study, the limitation of Schain's work is to the extent that it does not

address in specific ways, France's historical relationship with Africa whereas Africa occupies a prominent place in French national and international politics. Nevertheless, the contribution by Schain helps this study to appreciate some of the domestic issues which determine to some extent, France's foreign policy.

The picture that emerges from the foregoing is that most of the existing works related to the theme of this study are lacking in the comprehensive handling of France's foreign policy in relation to Africa especially during the period covered by this study. This study therefore seeks to update the knowledge and ease understanding of these issues by focusing on the factors neglected by the existing works. In doing so, this study shall not only examine the factors that led to the change in France's foreign policy in a more coherent and comprehensive manner but also examine the impact of the change in policy on Africa and then point the way forward to what needs to be done in the future to make for a smoother and mutually beneficially relations between France and African countries from both the Francophone and the Anglophone blocs.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAME WORK

The subject matter of this work covers a wide range of France's relationship with Francophone on the one hand and the Anglophone on the other in the period after independence generally and in the period since 1990 in particular. Since this wide range of issues in the relationship between France and these countries will be investigated, it is impossible for one theory to explain the issues. Consequently, two sets of theories are used in this study.

2.2.1 Theory of Hegemonic Stability

The theory of hegemonic stability is predicated on the existence of a powerful state actor in international relations wielding tremendous influence and control over a number or group of states closely tied to it mostly in the area of economy but also in politics and other areas of interaction.

Charles Kindleberger (1981) who was one of the first to espouse the theory preferred to use the term "leadership responsibility" to refer to a hegemonic regime. In his exposition, he holds that an open and liberal world economy required the existence of a hegemonic

or dominant power. According to Robert Keohane (1980, p. 132), the theory

holds that hegemonic structures of power dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and obeyed.... the decline of hegemonic structures can be expected to presage a decline in the strength of corresponding international economic regimes.

A key component of Kindleberger's definition is "liberal economy" which he says is a pre-condition for the existence of hegemony. By liberal economy, it connotes the existence of open and non-discriminatory international economic order. This notwithstanding, the theory does not presuppose that there can be no international economy without hegemony. Indeed, it could be as was the case in the defunct Soviet bloc. However, the difference between the liberal structure and the absence of it in international economy is that such hegemony is likely to lead to imperial systems and the imposition of political and economic restrictions.

According to Frohlich *et. al.*, (1971), there is specific features of a hegemonic situation in international relations: Firstly, an international hegemony must be based on a general belief in its legitimacy and the overall necessity to maintain it. Other states accept the rule of the hegemon because of its prestige and status in international political system.

Secondly, there must be a high level of consensus in ideology, what is otherwise known as ideological hegemony, if the hegemon is to have the support of the other states. (Keohane, 1984a). To this extent therefore, the hegemonic system is greatly weakened if other states in the system begin to feel that the actions of the hegemon are self-serving and against their political and economic interests. Similarly, the hegemonic system is impaired, if citizens of the hegemonic power suspect that other states are cheating or the cost of leadership exceeds the perceived or real benefits. (Gilpin, 1972).

Proponents of hegemonic stability also contend that, "*an open market economy constitute a collective or public good*" (Olson, 1965). What this entails is that such a good "*is one, the consumption of which by an individual, household or firm does not reduce the amount available for other potential consumers*" (Kindleberger, 1981, p. 243). A few examples of such collective goods in international relations include an open and liberal trading regime based on principle of most favoured Nation (MFN)-non-discrimination and unconditional reciprocity. Under this principle, a tariff concession made to one country must be extended to others. Another example of collective good is "*a stable international currency, because it facilitates commerce from which everyone can benefit.*" (Gilpin, *op cit.* P. 74.)

According to Gilpin (Ibid. p.74) "*the hegemon or leader has the responsibility to guarantee provision of the collective goods of an open system and stable currency.*"

The theory of hegemonic stability holds that a hegemonic economy performs several important roles relevant to the operation of a world economy. A hegemonic state uses its influence to create international regimes such as principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area. (Krasner, 1982.) Keohane (1982) argues that a hegemonic regime prescribes legitimate and proscribes illegitimate behaviour in order to limit conflict, ensure equity or facilitate agreement. In addition, it is also incumbent on the hegemonic power to prevent cheating, free riding, enforce rules and encourage others to share the cost of maintaining the system.

The hegemon posits Keohane (1984), should be in position to exercise reasonable control over raw materials, sources of capital, markets and should have competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods. Its leadership over other economies is to the extent that it controls the financial market, particular technologies and to some extent natural resources.

Proponents of the theory of hegemonic stability assert that historically, circumstances favourable to hegemonic leadership and the emergence and growth of liberal world economy seemed explainable only in two circumstances. The first is the example of

British economic success and the USA both of whom exercised their leadership to promote international liberal trade. Britain played the role of a hegemon during the era of *Pax Britannica* up to the outbreak of the First World War, while the USA was a hegemon in the period immediately after the Second World War. Indeed, it was through the leadership of the US that the Brettonwoods institutions (IMF, the World Bank and GATT) were established to facilitate trade and economic development. Some scholarship even regard Holland as a hegemon in the 17th century but Gilpin(Ibid) argues that Holland controlled the economy during this period but did not command much political influence on the international system to dictate the rules and compel conformity as required in a hegemonic environment.

Although the theory of hegemonic stability was first used to explain international trade and economic development, its application has been adapted in the explanation of related issues in inter- state relations. The theory can therefore be relied upon to explain the post-independence relationship between France and her former colonies.

In relation to our topic therefore, France's paternalistic posture also made her the hegemon while the Francophone were members of the hegemonic regime or system. France played the hegemon by establishing the rules (agreements/military pacts), moderating the behaviour of the erstwhile colonies in the international system and determining largely what the level of benefits would flow to them in terms of cooperation and development aid. France also not only maintained the system but also had to intervene in the affairs of these states in the overall interest of hegemonic stability since the crucial role of the hegemon according to Kindleberger (*op cit*) is that of crisis management and not merely a routine one of regime maintenance. Although France's leadership was much more imposed than willingly accepted by the Francophone countries, her hegemony and ideology- superiority of French culture and civilization were nevertheless established.

France played a central role in the formulation and implementation of monetary policies in the Francophone countries. Martin (1985) asserts that through the franc zone, France controlled the issuance and circulation of currency, monetary and financial regulations, banking activities, credit allocation as well as their budgetary economic policies.

"Through their acceptance of the strict membership rules of the franc zone, these African governments have actually entrusted all their monetary and financial responsibilities to France in what amounts to a voluntary surrender of sovereignty" (Ibid.p.200-201).

This is one classical feature of a hegemonic regime which characterized the relationship between France and Francophone countries. On the strength of the above therefore, the theory of hegemonic stability will be applied to explain the paternalistic relationship which existed between France and the Francophone in the period immediately after independence.

2.2.2 Theory of Interdependence

The second theoretical approach for the study is the theory of interdependence.

The theory of interdependence was first used in international relations in 1919 when the then Secretary-General of the League of Nations made statements about *"the fast developing interdependence of the world as an economic unit"* (Jean Monnet, 1978, p. 81).

The pioneering work on the theory of interdependence was by R.Muir (1933). In the work, Muir stated that *"it has become a platitude to say that the whole world is now interdependence"* (cited in Scott, 1977, p. 429). Since 1933, the interest in the subject of interdependence has increased with the attendant plurality of definitions.

According to Rosecrance (1977) *"interdependence can be defined as the direct and positive linkage of the interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others and in the same direction"* (quoted in Adelusi, 1992,p.95). Interdependence is said to be symmetrical when happenings or developments in a particular country say 'A' influence or alter developments in another country say 'B'. In another dimension, interdependence is said to be positive if and when favourable or negative changes in a country say 'B' trigger-off similar changes in another country say 'A'. Rosecrance's (*op cit*) definition states further that interdependence can be measured in terms of "horizontal and vertical interdependence". In the first, it implies the flow of goods between states while in the second, it connotes the equalisation of factor prices.

Another view of interdependence is that given by Marshal Singer(1972, p.44) who defines interdependence as the “*psychological relationship between individuals or states that feel themselves more or less equal but recognise the advantages of reciprocal dependence.*” This definition presupposes that each actor is conscious of his responsibilities in the relationship. This consciousness is what Singer considers as the basis for interdependence. There is yet another view of interdependence. This view is one whereby Statesmen and politicians use it as a concept to explain their policies on economic or political relations with other states to their constituencies, especially the relevant pressure and interest groups.

In the realm of economics and especially in international trade, there are two schools of interdependence- Liberals and Realists. The liberal position of economic interdependence is that since “trade provides valuable benefits to any particular state, a dependent state should strive to avoid war, cognizance of the fact that peaceful trading gives it all the benefits of close ties without any of the costs and risks of war (Dale, 1995). On the other hand, the realists argue that economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace, but in fact heightens the likelihood of war (Ibid). This view implies that states concerned about security would invariably dislike depending on any other state for supply of goods for the simple consideration that critical imports such as oil and raw materials could be cut off during war period. For this reason therefore, such states would prefer to wage war so as to control the source of its supplies.

In relation to our study, the definition of interdependence by Singer best helps the explanation of the problem the study has set out to investigate. Going by Singer’s view, France and the Francophone are all independent nation- states and have sovereign powers in international relations. However, the countries still recognized the “reciprocity” in their dependence.

Although the theory of interdependence has roots in economics, its usage as a tool of analysis goes beyond the economy and encompasses other aspects of international relations. Interdependence is no longer constrained to the economy or trade. Since it is nearly impossible for states to exist in isolation in the long run and conscious of the mutual benefits derivable from interaction on trans- national basis, nation- sates engage

in a web of relationships that are largely economic but also political, diplomatic, military strategic, cultural or scientific in nature. In this light therefore, interdependence goes beyond the economic sphere. The choice of this theory therefore is to the extent that it sufficiently helps in the understanding of the various aspects of relations between France and Africa during the period covered by the study.

As useful as the theory is, it does have its limitations. One drawback of this theory is the tendency for erosion of sovereignty. The argument against interdependence is that states that are too woven together either in a bilateral or multilateral arrangement tend to act in concert with the partners most times to the detriment of national identities. According to Allan James (1986 p. 179):

The picture... is of the world in which states are in the process of losing or may be have already lost, a good part of their sovereignty... For the day of completely autonomous decision-making does seem for most states on many issues to past... security and prosperity are much influenced by what goes on from day to day beyond a country's border

Another difficulty in the application of the theory is the seeming inability to reasonably predict the outcome of interdependence. In the liberal and realist schools of interdependence already considered, it is clear there are two irreconcilable positions. The first is that interdependence leads to cementing of ties (liberal) while the second is that it leads to war (realist). Both schools have a common denominator which is that the outcome of interdependence can hardly be predicted a priori. These limitations notwithstanding, the theory of interdependence is suitable for the analysis of France's policy towards Africa in the 1990s and beyond.

CHAPTER THREE

EVOLUTION OF FRANCE'S AFRICAN POLICY

3.1 IMPERIALISM AND PARTITION OF AFRICA

One of the most significant developments on the African continent in the 19th century was the scramble for and partition of Africa by the leading European countries namely Britain, Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Italy. The eventual partition and colonisation of Africa however, did not come as a sudden development. It was direct fallout of the once lucrative Trans Atlantic Slave Trade, which linked Europe, Africa and the New World (the Americas) for almost four centuries.¹

Following the end of the inhuman trade, the vast infrastructure and the specialization in international trade acquired by slave merchants over the years became redundant. There was the need therefore, to replace this obnoxious trade with trade in commodities otherwise known as "legitimate trade". This essentially involved trade in agricultural raw materials like palm oil and kernel, cotton, cocoa, minerals and precious stones, ivory, Arabic gum, from Africa on one side and cheap finished products like gins, clothes, mirror, gun powder etc from Europe on the other hand.

Apart from the redundancy of slave merchants, which accentuated the push for a new form of trade with Africa, two reasons account for the rise of the so called legitimate trade. One, the Christian Missionaries including the Church Missionary Society (CMS), Methodists, Roman Catholics, and Church of Scotland etc; who had campaigned vigorously for the abolition of the slave trade had commenced expeditions to parts of Africa for missionary activities. Where elements of the old trade still existed, they liaised with home governments to ensure deposition of African Kings still involved in the trade. It was in this kind of situation that the British Government deposed King Akitoye of Lagos to Abeokuta in 1852 (Crowder, 1978). Since the Missionaries were against slavery and slave trade, they encouraged the growth of trade in commodities. The second factor was the rise of industrialisation in Europe which has been severally argued did not only render the slave trade expensive, unprofitable and therefore unattractive, but raised the demand for agricultural produce and other raw materials to feed the burgeoning industrial sector in Europe. There was therefore the need to bolster the trade with Africa in commodities.

The philosophical or intellectual justification for the new trade is best represented by the work of Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton (1839) who argued that the best way to end the continuing trade in slaves in the face of abolition was to "call out the natural resources of Africa" and if necessary, rehabilitate those slaves being rescued from the high sea by British Naval Patrol ships.

At the beginning, this trade was limited to coastal towns and cities. But as time went on there was need to expand the market into the interior. By the same reason of the need for expansion of the market, there was also the need for expansion of missionary activity into the interior. All these were only to be made more effective if the European countries or their trade and missionary agents assumed a good measure of political control of the territories primarily to control the flow of goods but also to further the evangelizing mission. With rising turnovers and increasing political powers to the bargain, it is not doubtful that the companies became sole determinants of both political and economic events.

In the British West Africa for instance, the Royal Niger Company managed by Sir George Taubman Goldie, did not only get the charter to principally control the trade in the Niger Delta, it soon set up its own defence Force, the Royal Niger Company Constabulary. In fact Goldie had through the activities of the company signed numerous treaties with African rulers. These treaties were to be useful at the Berlin Conference as they provided the basis for which Britain was allowed control of the vast protectorates in West Africa. Several other companies of British origin sought and got the charter to trade in parts of Africa but especially along the Atlantic coast. These companies as this study shows played a crucial role in the colonies acquired by Britain.

French companies were not left out of the prosperous commodity trade and the politics, which went with the trading activities. Some of the many French companies operating in Africa at the time include *Compagnie Francaise d' Afrique Occidentale* (CFAO) and *Societe Commercial Ouest Africaine* (SCOA). Rodney (1972) asserts that the French companies were "most notorious" in the movement of goods to and from Africa. Most of the French companies operating in Africa were formed by former slave merchants from Bordeaux who transferred the capital made from the trade in slaves into trade in

commodities especially groundnuts from Senegal and Gambia by the middle of the 19th Century. French companies like Maurel & Prom, Maurel Brothers, Buhan & Teyssere, Delmas & Clastre became household names in Mauretania, Senegal and Mali right up to the time of effective colonial rule on account of their trading activities.

Unlike Britain which left most of the initial "imperialistic" work with the trading companies, the case of France was different as senior government officials also teamed up with the companies to assert French interests in Africa. In Egypt for instance, France worked jointly with Britain to advance huge financial facilities for the construction of the Suez Canal. This was apart from assistance to the Khedive to establish more authority in the region by spreading Egyptian authority to Sudan. The French were also active in Senegal. Anene *et al* (1966) assert that when the French started building the railway from Dakar to St Louis in 1879 with the planned extension in 1880 to the Niger, by sending out surveying parties, this provoked the first military push designed to link the headwaters of the Senegal and Niger rivers.

In Congo, Jules Ferry, French Minister of Education in the 1870s began moves to establish his country's presence in the Central African territory. This was in response to moves by King Leopold of the Belgians who had conceived the idea to carve a niche for himself in Africa (*Ibid.*) as it was also part of agenda to secure tropical raw materials and protect markets for French backward industries as part of the overall plan to rebuild France. Ferry using the funds of his ministry dispatched de Brazza to apparently carry out scientific research in the Congos. But as it turned out de Brazza completed several treaties with African rulers such that by 1882 France did not only establish her influence over the northern banks of the Congo, a solid foundation had been laid for the control of Gabon.

The French moves were however not taken lightly by Britain which feared that France could use her influence to access the on-going lucrative palm -oil trade in Niger Delta through Cameroun and Igboland. As the tension and suspicion rose, political developments in France made it impossible for her to maintain firm grip on Egypt.

Khedive Ismail apparently irked by the financial control of Britain and France dismissed them in April 1879. Obviously embarrassed by the development, Britain and France quickly planned his dismissal with the Sultan of Turkey. Ismail was then replaced by his son Tawfiq. (Anene, *et al* 1966) In 1882, some young Egyptian Army officers worried by the development took over the government under the leadership of Col. Ahmad Urabi. Under his nationalist government, Egypt showed clear signs she would not be in a position to pay interest on her loans. Indeed, the new administration contemplated repudiating the debts owed Britain and France.

Faced with this challenge, Britain and France agreed on a joint military expedition to oust Urabi. However, a change of government in June 1882 made it impossible for France to participate in the operations. Thus Britain single handedly landed her troops in Alexandria in June 1882 and ousted the nationalists. British military forces then continued with the occupation of Egypt not necessarily for colonial considerations but primarily to get Egypt honour her commitments. But the occupation went on for months and years to the disappointment of France, which had considerable investments in the empire. Of course, France felt shortchanged considering the huge financial investments in the territory especially in the building of the Suez Canal and the maintenance of the Khedive. This fueled resentment of Britain by French politicians and laid the foundation for the bitter rivalry in the years to follow at the time of the partition of the continent.

In 1883, Ferry whose imperialist ambition was not in doubt became Prime Minister of France. He then gave fillip to French imperialist interests by annexing Cotonu, Agoue, Great and Little Popo and Port Novo. (Crowder, 1978). France even sent a gunboat to Bonny in the attempt to secure a treaty and establish a protectorate at the mouth of the Niger.

In West Africa, France and Britain maintained their influence through the activities of their trading companies, consuls and other officials through strings of treaties of course clashing in several areas. Indeed France had to draw a demarcation of sorts carving her territories from North of the Sokoto empire through to Senegal. (Anene *et al*, 1966). At the same time Germany, Portugal and other European countries also jostled for space

elsewhere on the continent. But the growing tension as the contest for territories worsened could no longer be contained. It was in the face of all these that the Berlin West African conference was convened in 1878 at which Africa was partitioned to the major European countries based on their "spheres of influence".

Following the outcome of the conference, the European powers were to embark on "effective colonialism" which entailed establishing political control over the territories "allocated to them". This invariably meant some system of administration had to be worked out. This was the challenge of France in her colonies of Ivory Coast, Algeria, Senegal, Mali, Chad, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Togo, Tunisia, Congo, Cameroon, among others.

3.2 FRANCE AND THE COLONIAL POLICY OF ASSIMILATION

Having secured her territories, the next challenge for France was to evolve a system of administration with which to govern the territories. That system of government was to be rooted in the policy of 'assimilation' which was later replaced with the policy of "association" in some parts of the colonial territories.

The policy of assimilation derived its origin from the French revolution of 1789 when the convention in 1794 declared that all people living in the colonies were French citizens and enjoyed all republican rights. (www.countrystudies.us/mauritania). The revolution emphasised the basic rights, liberties or freedom of French peoples whether at home or in the colonies. This aspect of the law was later repealed under the regime of Napoleon Bonaparte (1799-1804). In 1848 however, citizenship rights were again extended and representation in the National Assembly was provided for the four communes of Senegal-St. Louis, Dakar, Rufisque and Goree. (Anene *et al*, 1966).

There are a few controversies surrounding the French colonial policy of assimilation. The first has to do with the nature and character of assimilation-whether it was mental or psychological-biological, personal or individual, institutional or political and economic assimilation. A critical analysis of the practice of the policy in the French colonies shows that the different aspects of assimilation were in place at different times. Culturally, the colonized peoples reasonably acculturated as they were made to speak French and imbibe some aspects of French culture. Politically, there was also limited participation of the

colonial elite in the home government and politics of France while economically; the economies of colonised states were tied to that of France. The combination of all these gave the colonized people a psychological feeling of assimilation.

The second controversy is the reason for the adoption of assimilation as a system of administration in the colonies. In other words, to what extent did the policy of assimilation succeed especially in making "Frenchmen out of Africans?"

The argument has been made that the policy of assimilation had as main undertone, the quest to restore the international prestige of France battered by internal political problems, but more importantly, defeat in wars in Europe. Another factor explains the policy as a reactionary measure by France to the successes recorded by Britain in her colonial adventure. This school of thought asserts that colonies were a necessary burden the French took on to maintain their international stature (Anene *et al*, 1966). This study found out that the choice of assimilation was adjudged correctly by French policy makers at the time within the overall agenda to achieve the objectives of colonialism among which as stated earlier were the exploitation of cheap labour and procurement of raw materials for the industrial sector in Europe (in this case, France) as well as to secure markets for industrial goods. The operation of the policy for the greater part of the colonial rule in most of French speaking West Africa for instance, lays credence to this.

The policy of assimilation as already noted had the ambitious agenda to make French men out of the colonized people. One area to achieve this was massive introduction of French language which was not only made the *Lingua Franca* but also the medium of instruction in schools and churches. This was done through the promotion of non-governmental organisations and principally by an organisation created for that purpose known as *Alliance Francaise Pour la propagation du francaise dans nos colonies* founded in 1884. (Nwokedi and Daloz, 1990). This led to quick spread of the language. In Senegal as in Algeria, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, hundreds of French language experts were deployed from the home country to teach French in schools and communities. As a follow up France liberalised interaction and travel between colonised people and the Metropole and expanded educational opportunities both at home but more importantly, in France. For this purpose, The Department for Schools Abroad was founded in the

Foreign Ministry, which was later to become Department for Cultural Relations. (*Ibid*)

The language barrier having collapsed considerably, population of French men coming into the colonies began to rise. In Algeria, which was the first French colony (1832), there were over one million Europeans precisely, 1,042,000 by 1954 constituting about 11 per cent of the National population (Yahya, 1984). About three quarters of the European population were French. By 1946, France declared Senegal and all her colonies as members of the "French Union" and on that basis accorded French citizenship to all Senegalese. (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2001)

This paved way for the election of Africans like Leopold Sedar Senghor, Felix Houphouet Boigny and Aime Cesaire as members of the French Deputies (National Assembly) in 1951-60). Even before then the *Frenchnisation* policy made it possible for Blaise Diagne, to become the first native Deputy (parliamentarian). Diagne was succeeded by Galandou Diouf (1934-40), Lamine Gueye (1945-51).

France adopted a uniform administrative system throughout her African colonies. This was in contrast with the British whose administrative policy of indirect rule used traditional rulers to establish control over the colonized peoples, France preferred direct administration of her colonized peoples (Ward, 1966 in Anene *et al*). Teachers for instance were posted from France and they had no choice than accept the postings, the same way military postings were carried out. This uniform policy helped for easy deployment of personnel to any of the colonies at short notices. The administration of the Federation of French West Africa was first run from St Louis, Senegal as early as 1885 until the capital was moved to Dakar in 1902.

The French economic policy in the colonies was not different from any of the colonial powers. The primary objective was to source raw materials for the home industries and provide markets for manufactured goods produced at the metro pole. Thus, no efforts were made to industrialize the colonies. In Senegal, the French encouraged the growth of crops like peanuts, millet etc while Ivory Coast became famous for her contribution to cocoa needs of the metropolitan industry. And to ensure effective movement of the raw

materials to the coastal areas for onward shipping to Europe, France built railways linking Upper Volta with Senegal and other colonies in the sub-region. The case of Algeria was different. The heavy presence of "original" French population led to the seizure of African lands on which the whites set up farms and plantations, on which Africans were hired to provide cheap labour. A few light industries were set up in Algeria ostensibly to cater for the needs of the growing white settler population in the North African colony.

The policy of assimilation initially appeared to succeed but was to receive serious opposition as the full consequence of the policy dawned on the emerging African elite including ironically those nurtured under the colonial educational system and mentality. As noted earlier, the goal of assimilation was to make Africans French men or make Francophone Africa and France one country. But Mpofu (www.thermacusgarveybbs.com/board/10516.html retrieved on January 19, 2004) notes that "*assimilation was a deliberate lowering and denaturing of Africans.*" Indeed the policy was far from seeking to promote equality as it *ab initio* presupposed that French culture was superior.

Roggers (1999) reinforces this view when he asserts that "*the fundamental flaw with the policy of assimilation was that although it was theoretically based on a belief in the equality of man, it still assumed the superiority of European culture and civilization over that of Africa (or rather assumed that Africa had no history or culture*". (www.libarts.co.uk.edu. Accessed on April 22, 2006). This feeling gave rise to reactionary feelings expressed in a cultural movement known as *Negritude* which was co-founded by Leopold Segar Senghor. The proponents of *Negritude* emphasised the need for Africans to look into the richness of their past and of their cultural heritage in order to chose which values and traditions could be most useful to the modern world. Senghor for instance, became famous for his insistence on his charge to countrymen to "assimilate, not to be assimilated."

This cultural reaction forced the French to abandon the policy of assimilation for "association" which emphasised that French Africans be allowed to enjoy the full benefits of being African French people in their countries. Of course, this new policy

clearly placed the few elites who had been “assimilated” over and above the many African masses that were not.

3.3 NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

A discussion about nationalism in this study will not be complete without ascribing to it the meaning or context in which it is used. Nationalism in one sense refers to “strong devotion to one’s own nation, patriotic feelings, efforts, principles”; or a “movement for political/economic independence (in a country controlled by another)” (Hornby Dictionary). In Europe, the concept was used in the 19th century to imply “*unity of language and culture and often a tradition of former political unity, existing prior to the attempt to free the people in question from foreign rule and to reunite them politically if they had disunited in the mean time*” (Post, 1966, p.326 in Anene *et al op cit*). In the case of Africa, many of the states enjoyed little political or cultural unity prior to colonialism since they were the creation of the colonized powers. The case of Nigeria and Ghana is useful. The colonialists had to unite several independent empires into a whole; first through the creation of the Northern and Southern protectorates and later, the amalgamation of the two protectorates in 1914 by Sir Frederick Lugard to form a country, which was to be named by Lugard’s wife as “Nigeria” (Crowder, *op cit*).

Before the unification of 1914 several kingdoms and states – Tivs, Jukun, Nupe etc and the Hausa states of Zaria, Kano, Rano, Kebbi and the remnants of the Kanem Borno empire had been brought under the authority of the Northern protectorate. The same was the case in the Niger Delta protectorate and the Lagos protectorate, which were in the years preceding the amalgamation, brought under one authority of the Southern protectorate. In the Gold Coast, several powerful states, which came after the ancient Ghana Empire – Fante, Asante etc were brought under one colonial authority of the Gold Coast State.

It therefore follows that nationalist agitations in Africa during the period of colonialism were not so much to restore the cultural, political or economic homogeneity of the respective African states (since it was not there) but rather a struggle to end European political and economic control and domination (colonialism) of affairs of the African

people. The Berbers had been a famous and dominant race in the Maghreb and had built tremendous confidence and pride in their culture. This explains why nationalist agitation began earlier in Egypt than any of the British territories on the continent.

3.3.1 Nationalist Struggle in British West Africa

Nationalist struggles in British West Africa increased momentum in the period immediately after the Second World War. The defeat of Britain in the Second World War 1941-1946 and the emergence of more militant elite combined to inspire nationalist feelings. A typical case in the Gold Coast was Dr. Kwame Nkrumah who formed the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) to replace the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). CPP continued with its mobilization against colonial rule and in 1951, it won elections conducted in that year. The popularity of the party left the British with no much choice than to hand over power to its leadership (Nkrumah) in March, 1957 (Post, K. 1966 in Anene and Brown (eds.) 1966).

The case in Nigeria was different. The Zikist Movement formed in 1932 by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, maintained its fierce criticism of the colonial administration. The Zikist Movement was to be joined by the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) formed in 1944. Other parties formed on regular basis though adopted non-violence approaches, yet helped the nationalist struggle. The regions, which emerged in the midst of the nationalist agitation and the parties formed on regional lines helped the British colonialists to hold on to power. This was as a result of the disagreements between them on the basis of approaches to the struggle on the one hand and the determination of Britain to forge a federal system for Nigeria on the other. The activities of the nationalists however, compelled the British to organise the constitutional conference in London leading to independence in 1960 (Ken, P. 1966 in Anene and Brown (eds) 1966).

Elsewhere in British Africa, the struggle for independence assumed violent dimensions anchored by freedom fighters and pro-independence movements. The Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya is a typical example of the armed-struggle approach to the struggle for independence. At micro levels, individuals (Plantation workers) downed tools to press for independence. Where this failed, some deliberately spoilt production equipment

including machines to press for independence.

The Aba Women's riots though preceded World War II, represents a typical rebellion by groups in most of the colonies under British control. Added to the above, newspapers played critical roles in mobilisation of anti-colonial sentiments in schools and churches where there existed the literate and semi-literate population.

In Nigeria for instance, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe published notable newspapers like the *West African Pilot*, *Eastern Nigeria Guardian*, *Calabar Chronicle*, etc, which he used to launch attack on colonial policies. This was later complemented by Chief Obafemi Awolowo's *Nigerian Tribune*. In Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah bolstered his activism with the publication of his newspapers. The nationalist agitation was further spurred by war-time commitments made by leaders of the allies. For instance, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Britain and President Franklin D. Roosevelt of America made commitments through a charter to, allow the allies choose a government of their own if the war was won. The charter aroused consciousness among African nationalists who rightly believed they would have the right to ask and obtain self-government or independence at the end of the war.

On the other hand, there is a view that Britain was willing to decolonize Africa and move to a new – colonial system in which she would continue to hold her economic interest in the newly independent nations. The British thought that by cautiously giving up colonial rule they could safeguard their economic interests. While this view is correct, suffices it to add that British attitude was born out of pragmatism as the pressure exerted by nationalists no longer made the business of colonialism worth the risk. Recent scholarship also points to an underground maneuver of some great powers particularly the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which felt that all pre-war empires should give way to new states.

The United States particularly believed that the pre-war empires should disappear and that the colonised people should have political freedom and Africa should become part of a new international world system under indirect American leadership. For these reasons,

the U.S supported colonial nationalists by openly attacking imperialism while at the same time supporting the demands of the oppressed people. The U.S justified her stance as a measure aimed at stopping the encroachment of communism. *"Russia on the other hand, was against colonialism for ideological reasons such as freedom and world peace. Russia also wished that Africa should fall in line with the national interest of USSR"* (Post, 1966).

This study finds out that the support of these two super powers to the cause of Africans was not exactly for altruistic purposes as the underlining intention was to create more markets for their products while opening up the sources of industrial raw materials hitherto controlled by the colonial powers. The motives of the United States of America and the Soviet Union in supporting the quest for independence by the colonies was different from the United Nations' objective as the Organisation supported independence of the colonies based on the desire to establish relationships between states based on the principle of equality of peoples and the rights of nations to self-determination.

The deep incursion into nationalist struggles in British colonies helps to understand the nature of anti-colonial struggles in both the French and British colonies and the post-colonial relationship which emerged. We shall now proceed to examine the situation in the French colonies and how this helped to lay the foundation for post-independence relationship.

3.3.2 Nationalism in French West Africa

The pattern of colonial nationalism in French West Africa was different from the situation in British West Africa. The French colonial policy of assimilation hardly envisaged independence for the colonies. And even when it was replaced with the policy of 'Association', the strategy remained to work out a special arrangement by which the colonies and the home government in France would relate without necessarily granting independence status to the colonies.

It was under this kind of atmosphere that Felix Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast founded the *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* (RDA) in 1946. The RDA was

intended to serve as a unified party for the whole of French West Africa and Equatorial Africa. Its main objective was to challenge the conservative mien of the French government. RDA was supported in this mission by the French Communist Party. In the succeeding years, especially in 1950s, some colonial territories got powers to establish national governments even though with limited powers as a result of *Loi cadre*, ('Outline law') reforms of 1956-1957 (Post, *op cit.*)

General Charles de Gaulle who came to power in 1958 had a different attitude to French influence. He sought to unify the territories to France and this created the Franco-African community. de Gaulle gave the territories the chance to decide their membership of the new community by organizing a referendum. However, Guinea opted out of the community preferring independence while other territories – Senegal, Benin, Togo, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania and Upper Volta voted to become members of the community. Thus, by October 1, 1958, Guinea became independent. Post notes: "Guinea's choice of independence was the death-blow to attempts to preserve any integral unity between France and the African countries" (*op cit.*).

It is therefore no surprise that the French colonies got their independence in quick succession – Benin August 1, 1960; Burkina Faso, August 5, 1960; Chad, August 11, 1960; Ivory Coast, August 7, 1960; Mali, September 22, 1960; Mauritania, November 28, 1960; Niger, August 30, 1960; Senegal, August 4 1960; and Togo, April 27, 1960.

3.3.3 Nationalism in North Africa

A greater part of North Africa came under French authority at the time of partitioning of the continent. Apart from Egypt, which was controlled by Britain the colonies of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria were under French influence and authority. As noted earlier, nationalism in Egypt began decades before the close of the 19th century. In fact by 1866, Egyptian nationalists had mounted opposition to the introduction of Parliamentary System of Government by Khedive Ismail.

Essentially, early nationalist movements were inspired by Islamic intellectual ferment associated with Djamal al-Din al-Afgani and Muhammad Abdu (Ayandele, 1966, in Anene *et al op cit.*). These scholars laid the foundation for Pan-Islamism in Egypt and

indeed much of North Africa upon which nationalist agitation was based.

The main grouse of the nationalists was the British support for the alien Turkish and Circassian elements and the corrupt Khedival authority in the administration of the country. These elements had earlier been purged from the army by Colonel Urabi. *"As a consequence of the British retaining these aliens in power, there developed a progressively widening gap between the Khedive and the alien elements on the one hand, and the radical effendiya, mostly Egyptian by blood, on the other"* (Ibid. p. 201). The radical effendiya were led by Mustapha Kamil, Muhammad Farid and Said Zaghlul most of whom were of *fallah* origin (Ibid). The pressure mounted by the effendiya led to the abolition of the monarchy in Egypt. New parties emerged; opposed to the radical effendiya were remnants of the old order – aristocrats, and landowners who coalesced into Umma party.

But it was the First World War that strengthened the Egyptian nationalist struggle. Not only was the Egyptian territory used as military base by Britain, Egyptian nationalists were conscripted into the war while her food stuff was commandeered by British forces. This created tension and violence leading to an inquiry under Lord Alfred Milner. By 1922, Britain unilaterally granted quasi independence to Egypt but retained control on vital issues like defence of Suez Canal, protection of polity. With the loosening of the grip by Britain, Egypt attained her independence on March 15, 1922 and by 1956, one of the major points of disagreement with Britain, was addressed, being the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Colonel Abdel Nasser.

3.3.4 French Speaking North Africa

Just like the situation in West Africa, where the British were either arm twisted or convinced to relinquish power, France was most unwilling under any circumstance to relinquish her hold on the territories. This of course only meant more militant agitation.

(a) Tunisia

Nationalist movement in Tunisia was pepped up in 1932 with the entrance on the scene of radical lawyer, Habib Rugayba (called by French as Bourguiba) as leader of Neo-Destour Party. The Neo-Destour Party was approved to the methods of the Destour Party

controlled essentially by the upper class. Bourguiba's approach was to seriously engage the French in a non-militant, non-violent but consistent manner. According to Ayandele (1966, p.205 in Anene *et al op cit*), "*in the struggle for independence from French rule, Bourguiba's watchword was gradualism. He believed that pressure, constantly brought to bear on France, would ultimately, if slowly, lead Tunisia to her ultimate goal – full sovereignty*".

Bourguiba had intended to accomplish his goal of an independent Tunisia in stages. As Ayandele (*ibid*) notes "*first, a decent voice for Tunisia in the protectorate administration, then internal autonomy and then complete independence.*" During the Second World War when the Germans defeated and occupied France, Bourguiba led Tunisia and indeed Moroccan support for France in the hope to use that to press for independence. Unfortunately, this was not to be as a request in that direction drew the ire of France. Bourguiba escaped arrests and traveled to other Arab states like Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the US where he raised international consciousness about the quest for independence in Tunisia. While he raised international consciousness, guerilla fighters constantly irritated the French authorities with military action.

In 1955, Bourguiba negotiated a gradual process of independence for Tunisia. His incremental approach to attainment of self-government drew the flacks of some extremists and other Arab states but Bourguiba would not be bothered. Bourguiba had reasoned and rightly too that "*to expect France to grant full independence in that year was a wild dream; and to attempt to force France to grant it would end in the spilling of Tunisian blood and further postpone the achievement of the desired goal*" (*Ibid.*)

As it turned out, Bourguiba was vindicated as the French saw the wisdom to grant independence to Tunisia perhaps guided by developments in the North African states. In March 20, 1956 therefore, Tunisia got full independence status. As already noted, Bourguiba epitomized Tunisian nationalism. His philosophies, which became known as "*Bourguibism*" traversed political, economic and social life of Tunisia. The economic strand of his philosophy recognized the relevance of French entrepreneurs just as it allowed women to dress without veil and participate in politics, a direct assault on

Islamic dogma. "*In foreign policy Bourguibism means enmity to none and friendship with all foreign countries*" (Ayandele, 1966, P. 206). His philosophy did not favour communism neither was it blindly pro-Arabic to the extent of discriminating against the Jews.

(b) Morocco

The struggle for independence in Morocco took nearly the same direction as in Tunisia. France effectively launched colonial rule over Morocco in 1912. A few years after, nationalist agitation broke out. The initial driving forces of the struggle were two effendiya, Ahmed Balafrej and Alal al Fassi whose organisations fused to become the Moroccan League, the nucleus of the Istiqlal Party (*Ibid*). The Moroccan League spread rapidly such that by 1932, it had branches in all of Morocco and vital support base in France. The French supporters even published a newspaper *Maghreb* edited by Balafrej to further the cause of mobilisation.

By 1937 however, the Moroccan League was proscribed and the nationalists went underground. Nevertheless, the nationalist principles were deepened by Sultan Mohammed V. Sidi Mohammed who unlike the Khedives in Egypt challenged the continued domination of his kingdom by the French. Sidi Mohammad's later day opposition to French rule was generally regarded a huge surprise as both the French and his fellow Moroccan nationalists doubted his capacities. The doubts stemmed from the impression the French had of him as someone who looked "*pensive and controllable and never gave the picture of someone who would ever strike an emphatic line in politics*" (Ayandele, 1966, P. 208). The French were wrong as the Sultan who was versed in French history attempted to modernize his state as a prelude to challenging French colonial control. His objective was to encourage Western education hand in hand with Islamic tradition of learning. His eldest son, Moulay Hassan obtained a degree in French law while his daughter discarded the veil and lived out of seclusion against the requirement of women under Islamic tradition. While he imbibed the western culture, he at the same time publicly maintained Islamic principles to leadership.

Sultan Mohammed's major contributions to the nationalist cause was his refusal to sign decrees inimical to nationalist interests by strengthening French control and for making public speeches, which seemed to emphasize independence for Morocco.

The French could no longer stomach the "excessiveness" of the Sultan and by 1952, he was deposed. However, the ranks of Istiqlal Party formed since 1943 most of who had been surreptitiously employed into the civil service continued with the struggle. Thus the deposed Mohammed was even stronger than the Sultan on the stool as the Moroccans believed that "*he had placed in the moon to watch over us*" (Ayandele, (1966).P.210). For the French, the handwriting on the wall was clear enough as conditions for violent rebellion had been established. Mohammed V was reinstated, negotiations for full independence were completed in February 1956 and on March 3, 1956, France surrendered sovereignty to the Moroccans (Ayandele, 1966.P. 213)

(c) Algeria

Independence struggle in Algeria was unarguably, the bloodiest in all of North Africa. Nationalist struggles surfaced as early as 1918 after World War I among Muslims who at the time demanded equality with Europeans. But it was Hadj Messali who gave a definite character and direction to the nationalist movement. Messali who worked in the Renault factory in Paris formed an organisation known as *L'Etoile Nord Africaine*; initially conceived as a social organisation for North African leaders, Messali soon transformed it into a political organisation with revolutionary, proletarian, nationalist and Islamic bent. Through E.N.A, Messali and his increasing supporters demanded unconditional independence for Algeria. Of course, their demand met with stiff resistance from the French authorities. In 1937, ENA broke its alliance with the French Communist Party due to betrayal of the objectives of the alliance. Messali then formed the Parti Populaire Algerien (PPA). The party was banned sooner than it was founded. Many of its leaders were jailed; others ran into exile. Messali himself was jailed for sixteen years.

As the World War II strained France, Gen. de Gaulle moved to rally support of Algerian Nationalists by granting concession, which for instance allowed Muslims to become Frenchmen while retaining their Muslim status. de Gaulle also granted voting rights to

majority of Muslims who were not French citizens. These proposals issued in the ordinance of March 7, 1944 arose also as a consequence of the new leaf turned by Ferhat Abbas, an otherwise Pro-French character under his platform, Manifeste au Peuple Algerien (Manifesto to the Algerian People) in which he demanded among others a separate Algerian Constitution, equal political rights, land reforms, recognition of Arabic as official language, freedom of the press, right to form political parties and trade unions etc (Ayandele, 1966.P.211)

The Gaullist proposals were however rejected. Two years after the proposals (1945), a violent opposition to colonial rule broke out in the region near Setif during which about 100 Europeans were killed. Expectedly, the French reacted decisively using the Army, gun boats and aircraft fighters. At the time the "rebellion" was quelled, 15,000 Berbers were slaughtered even though official figures put it at 6,000. Four thousand were arrested out of which nine later died (*Ibid.*)

The French reaction sharply divided the ranks of nationalists. For instance, Ferhat Abbas recanted his earlier stance and endorsed the Gaullist proposals leaving Messali and his supporters to carry on.

Messali after the insurrection founded the Movement Pour le Triomphe des Liberte's Democratiques (Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberty). This party won virtually all seats reserved for Muslim Algerians in 1947. Its success at the polls made the French to rig the elections through the Governor-General, Mr. Chataigneau in 1951 and 1953. This therefore, made possible, the election of only Pro-French politicians to represent the Muslim community in the Algerian Assembly, Municipal Councils, and other organs of government. The onslaught on the *Messalists* continued when in 1954, Messali was exiled to France when he was linked to a 'plot' and a lot of ammunition was recovered from him. At this point, the nationalists had been pushed to the wall. A full scale war was declared against France, waged essentially by the National Liberation Front. The war, the bloodiest in nationalist struggle anywhere in the continent went on for about eight years from November 1954 claiming about 500,000 Berber-Arab Algerians (*Ibid; Clark, 1960; Mansell, 1961*)²

The French mobilized a huge force of about half a million to confront the Algerian challenge with an annual war budget of about 1,000,000 Pounds Sterling. The war claimed at least 20,000 French soldiers and hundreds of European population. At this point, it dawned on France that the same war was over. de Gaulle ordered a plebiscite that favoured independence of Algeria against continued French rule. This led to the independence of Algeria in 1962.

For the French, the battle to retain Algeria was a single chance to defend the legacy of the policy of assimilation as Algeria provided the best success story of the French colonial policy. By the time the Algerian civil war was raging, there were at least 1 million colons who did not only own large parcels of land but controlled the economy and the political administration of the country. With such a firm control, the French hardly envisaged independence for Algeria. This perhaps, explained their avowed commitment to the *Frenchisation* policy, which of course meant the integration of Algeria with France.

3.4 FOUNDATION FOR POST-INDEPENDENCE RELATIONS

In the preceding segment of this chapter, we thoroughly appraised nationalist movements in French colonies in West and North Africa and how these culminated to the independence of the various countries. In section 3.3, our conclusions indeed pointed to France's acceptance of independence for the colonies out of pressure arising in some cases, from the militancy or violent character of the nationalist agitation. However, it does appear that the activities of the nationalists just played one role as France herself had perfected the strategies to relinquish direct control of the colonies in West and Central Africa.

To give vent to this strategy, France introduced the policy of *loi ordre*, which emphasized the spitting of her colonies and redefinition of boundaries as France envisaged that she would deal more conveniently with small independent states. This was followed by the erection of the 'French community', which in itself was a prelude to the 1958 referendum. The foundation for the French community was laid by de Gaulle when he came to power upon collapse of the Fourth Republic. Yahya (*op cit*) notes that one of de

Gaulle's pre-occupation upon coming to power was to give France a new constitution, which the creation of a French community was accommodated. This was followed by de Gaulle's extensive tour of French colonies in Africa during which he sought to establish the willingness of the territories to join the emerging commitment and their level of commitment to the arrangement. de Gaulle had argued that the decision to "grant independence" to the states was as a result of his appreciation of the value of freedom having just got France liberated from Nazi occupation. But the 1944 Brazzaville conference where he canvassed independence for African states issued a communiqué, which contradicted de Gaulle's pretensions. "*The goals of the French mission in colonies cannot be reconciled with any idea of autonomy or with the prospect of an evolution outside the French empire. The self-government of the colonies even as remote possibility is to be rejected*"(de Gaulle, 1949, speech at the National Assembly cited in Yahya, 1994, p.11). In his memoirs, de Gaulle wrote that:

after what happened in our African and Asian possessions, it is unlikely that we can maintain our empire there in the same manner as before. If we want the peoples for whom we are responsible still to remain with France tomorrow, we must transform their present status as subjects into one of autonomy. But with the provision that we hold firmly to our values and demand such countries keep their word to us (Ibid.)

That "demand" meant that countries, which subscribed to the community, would show unalloyed loyalty and in return enjoy protection from France. Indeed the spirit of the community also left some aspects of national life of the members under the exclusive control by France like the economy, defence, foreign policy and education.

Guinea, which in 1958 voted in the referendum under Sekou Toure, to stay out of the community was treated with disdain by France who reportedly removed all moveable assets from the country.(Yahya *op cit*). France could be said to have been infuriated or embarrassed by the margin of the "No" in Guinea compared to other West African states – for example, Ivory Coast voted 99% Yes, Senegal 97.6% Yes, Upper Volta 99.1% Yes while Guinea recorded 95% No.

The neo-colonial strand of the French decision in 1958 is underscored by the fact that "*independence of the Francophone countries did not provoke any radical changes in*

their relations with France" (Bach, 1986, p.75).

In military sphere for example, the attainment of independence by the Francophone did not translate to end of military presence by France. If anything, the presence of French military was re-aligned to conform to prevailing realities at the moment (Lellouche and Moisi, 1979). The policy of cooperation, which France chose to pursue in her relations with former colonies after independence was well thought out as several commissions were set up to organize aid and cooperation for the former colonies and other developing countries. The Commissions set up were Pignon Commission (1961); Jeannenay Commission (1963); Gorse Commission and the Abegin Commissions which were set up in 1975 (Akinterinwa, 1995).

It is to be noted that the French neo-colonial policy just like its sister policy of assimilation had no regard for the rights of the African people even though it was a negation of the French national motto of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity", which was also noted in the French Revolution of 1789.

Yahya (*op cit*) notes that "in France's struggle to preach the desecration gospel of liberty, equality and friendship, the French assumed a certain degree of arrogance and insensitivity. Their mission, which was to educate the "barbarians" of this world about beauty and culture, was to be implemented by a military might, which trampled upon the liberties of other peoples and made them less equal and less fraternal to the French. Of course the French had at the back of their mind that "the declaration of the rights of man was not written for the blacks of tropical Africa".

One area where this "insensitivity" and "arrogance" were best displayed was in the spread of French culture. France began exportation of French language in 1883 with the establishment of *Alliance Française*, and by 1910, a National Universities office for the exchange of French teachers was set up. de Gaulle who perfectly understood the impact of language to the spread of French culture set up the Ministry of Culture to further this policy. The teacher training programme (Training the Trainers) had a clear target to make 100-150 million French speakers in 1990 (Akinterinwa, *Ibid.*)

It is clear from the foregoing that France's policies were neo-colonialist in that they aimed at furthering the domination of former colonies by maintaining a stronghold in the area of culture, international trade, the government, military operations and economic development.

CHAPTER THREE- NOTES

1. The Trans Atlantic Slave Trade which began about 15th C and ended in the last decade of the 19th C is generally believed to be one of the greatest tragedies against Africa and the worst evil or inhumanity of man to man. There are several studies and scholarly works on the theme. But for a deep insight on the consequences of the dehumanising trade on Africa, see Rodney Walter (1972). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House. Pp. 103-111.
2. The avalanche of literature on the Algerian war is usually divided into two: the Algerian version and account of French scholars. Both traditions offer the general information on the adverse consequences of the war but differ on issues of causative factors and the roles of the actors.

CHAPTER FOUR

FRANCE AND POST-INDEPENDENCE AFRICA

4.0 INTRODUCTION

In the last segment of the preceding chapter, attempts were made to highlight the kind of foundation laid by France for her post-independence relations with former colonies and also other countries of Africa. This foundation was built upon, on attainment of independence. But then in what ways was this relationship crystallized? What was the guiding principle? These are some of the issues the study addresses in this chapter. In doing so, examples shall be drawn from both the Francophone and Anglophone countries as this would help the appreciation of what the relationship was in the period before 1990 and the changes after.

4.1 GRANDEUR AND THE BUILDING OF A FRENCH COMMUNITY

As noted in chapter three, France made adequate arrangements to safeguard her interest in Africa after formal de-colonization. These arrangements are best reflected in the policy of *Loi Cadre* and the 1958 Constitution from which de Gaulle's policy of building a French community derived its legitimacy. These two policies from Paris were in themselves, offshoots of the policy of *Grandeur*, which in a nutshell were the major philosophy of French foreign policy under President Charles De Gaulle and the succeeding administration of President Pompidou.

The notion of grandeur Cerny notes,

has been seen by most observers as the embodiment of General de Gaulle's hopes and aspirations for his beloved France. That France should be great, that the potential for greatness is written in her history and present in the spirit of her culture, and that it ought to be the inspiration of her politics (Cerny, 1980, p.3)

The definition and interpretation of grandeur present a problematic depending on its appreciation. For instance,

it can mean, in French, anything from simple measurable size or 'bigness', through a sort of 'grandness' with connotations of the extensiveness of the influence, power or glory associated with a particular social, political or cultural phenomenon, to a much more profound sense of transcendental moral or cultural value of worthiness (Cerny, 1980, p.5)

The concept of *grandeur* even takes different connotations in both British and American scholarly traditions. Perhaps, the best possible understanding of *grandeur* is that which is noted in the customs and experience of France during the Second World War. German troops overran France in 1941 and for four years took over administration of France. General de Gaulle who proceeded on exile to London rallied the allied forces to route the Nazi forces and recapture France. If this experience reduced the stature of France in the international community, the war of independence with Algeria in which France suffered huge losses left no one (including de Gaulle) in doubt that France's stature had diminished at the international level.

Against this background, as noted by this writer elsewhere "*de Gaulle sought to re-establish France as a global power. To achieve this, he canvassed a re-ordering of the international system to apparently give room for France to have a major say in global affairs*" (Akwaya, 1998, p. 17). In summary therefore, France under de Gaulle sought through the policy of *grandeur*, to promote and protect her security, economic and political interests as well as further the *internationalisation* of her culture, which took firm roots, during the colonial period.

Kolodziej (1974, p.10) captures the objective principle of *grandeur* as "*France's attempt to change the alignment patterns and the distribution of power between and among states while her concrete strategic, economic and diplomatic policies are seen as means in the service of larger global claims*". As it turned out, *grandeur* and the other aspects of de Gaulle's philosophy became the embodiment of "Gaullism", which has remained a permanent feature in French politics". The Gaullist Party has formed two administrations- Georges Pompidou who succeeded de Gaulle and Jacques Chirac. The other former Presidents, Valéry D'Estaing and François Mitterrand were however, of the Socialist Party.

The Neo-colonialist strand of *grandeur* is best explained by Martins (1985) in his analysis of the underling objectives of France's African policy, which he argues runs through all the administrations regardless of the political party in power. He lists some of these "traditional objectives" as "racism; national chauvinism, hypocrisy, and continuity"

(*Ibid*). Be that as it may, France proceeded to build a community that ensured her influence and control in the political, economic, cultural and military matters of the former colonies under the guise of “co-operation”, which Yahya (*op cit*) notes was an “euphemism for neo-colonialism”.

France indeed attempted to create a union of sorts, of all French speaking countries – *Union Africaine et Malegache* (UAM) in 1962 through Senegalese President, Leopold Senghor with the full backing of some of Francophone leaders (Baous, 1970). The idea was to strengthen the cooperation behind France and the former colonies. There was also *Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache* (OCAM), (Bach, 1980 in Medrad and Faure (eds.) cited in Sesay, 1986). Although this initiative did not quite succeed, it added to the official policy to massively spread the French language and culture to further consolidate the French community.

In the rest of the chapter, we shall proceed to show in detail how France “co-operated” with the former colonies (Members of the French community) on the one hand and the Anglophone countries namely, South Africa and Nigeria on the other hand, in political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and military spheres. This analysis helps test the chosen theoretical approaches of hegemonic stability and interdependence.

4.2 POST-INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

4.2.1 Francophone Countries

The post-independence political leadership in most of the former French colonies had no problems dealing with France in the new community. Not only were concrete arrangements made to ensure smooth relations as in the formation of the unions (*Union Africaine et Malegache* and *Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache*), the existence of a common currency zone (CFA) helped forge a feeling of solidarity among the countries on one side and between the former colonies and France on the other.

More importantly, the political leadership that emerged was a product of the French colonial policy of assimilation. Thus, the new leaders regarded themselves more as French people than as Africans. Of course France made a huge political and diplomatic

capital of this arrangement. Not only did successive French Presidents decide who led each of the former colonies, these countries looked up to France for decisions in international fora and organisations including the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations among others.

As Bach (1986, p.76) notes "*Gaullist policy moves tended to the establishment of close, strongly personalized relationships, which accounted for the preservation of the existing strong networks of influence*". Thus, leaders like Felix Houphouet Boigny, (Ivory Coast), Francois Tombalbaye (Chad) Omar Bongo, Jean Bokassa etc were not only propped up but were also preserved in their positions by France. Thus, most of the independence political leaders in the former colonies ended up holding power for several decades. These include Felix Houphouet Boigny (Cote d'Ivoire); Mobassa(CAR); Mobutu Sese Sekou(Zaire); Ahmadu Ahidjo(Cameroun); Gnassingbe Eyadema (Togo); Mathew Kerekou(Benin).

The basis for France's support for these leaders was the cooperation agreements and defence pacts, both of which were entered into at independence. The agreements or pacts made it possible for France to get involved in the internal affairs of these former colonies. France offered two forms of defense cooperation with former colonies. In the first case, bilateral defense agreement provided for French military intervention on the basis of a request by the state concerned and upon approval of French authorities. By the time of independence in the early 1960s, eleven sub-Saharan states signed this agreement. They include Senegal, Mauritania, Madagascar, Togo, Central African Republic, Gabon, Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire), Congo – Brazzaville, Chad, Niger and Dahomey (Benin). On the strength of these agreements therefore, France established several military bases across Africa. (Lellouche and Moisi, 1979.p.114). The second variant of the defence agreements was military / technical assistance (*accords d'assistance militaire technique*) under which France provided for the organisation, equipping and training of the national armies and the national police of the newly independent African states (Ibid).

Table I: Cost of French Arms Transfer Deliveries to Africa Compared with other Regions of the World, 1973 – 84 in US Million Dollars

Recipients	Suppliers					
	France	Britain	United States	Soviet Union	West Germany	Italy
Africa	7.5	1.6	1.8	31.6	2.6	3.8
East Asia	0.9	1.4	29.4	8.3	1.1	0.8
Europe (All)	3.0	2.6	37.4	17.5	6.6	1.1
-NATO Europe	1.8	1.2	31.8	0.0	4.1	0.8
-WARSAW Pact	0.1	0.3	0.0	16.0	0.0	0.0
-Others	1.1	1.1	5.5	1.5	2.5	0.2
Latin America	3.1	0.6	2.0	6.7	2.9	1.7
Middle East	29.4	8.6	44.1	36.4	3.2	5.5
North America	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Oceania	0.0	0.4	4.3	0.0	0.2	0.0
South Asia	2.5	2.1	1.9	14.5	0.8	0.1
Developed Countries	0.7	2.8	40.3	14.0	4.5	0.2
Developing Countries	45.6	14.5	81.4	101.1	13.2	12.5
The Whole World	46.3	17.4	121.7	114.9	17.7	12.8

*Source: Compiled from Defense and Economy World Report No. 42 – 977 of 28
October, 1985, pp. 5451 - 5452*

Table II: French Military Posture in Africa in Figures

Countries	Date of Defence Agreement	French Military Advisers (Jan. 1985)	African Trainees in France 1961-73	African Officers in France 1985	Date of Technical/Military Agreement
Algeria	-	21	-	-	1967
Benin	24/4/61	2	636	106	24/4/61; 1975
Burkina Faso	-	15	846	92	24/4/61
Burundi	-	27	21 (Wef. 1971)	35	7/10/69
Cameroon	1974	84	1222	113	13/11/60; 1974
CAR	15/8/60	78	550	30	13/8/60
Chad	15/8/60	125	574	52	11/8/60; 19/5/6; 1976
Cameroon	1972	25	-	29	1978
Congo	15/8/60	10	920	181	15/8/60; 1974
Djibouti	1977	115	-	101	1977
Gabon	17/8/60; 20/6/61	122	742	230	17/8/60
Equatorial Guinea	-	-	-	-	
Ivory Coast	24/4/61	74	1296	286	24/4/61
Libya	-	2	-	1978	
Madagascar	27/6/60	8	1520	117	27/6/60; 1973
Mali	22/6/60	5	88(Wef. 1972)	38	1977
Mauritius	- 2	-	6	1979	
Morocco	-	183	-	-	1973
Niger	24/4/61	60	516	55	24/4/61; 1977
Rwanda	- 20	15(Wef. 1972)	54	1975	
Senegal	22/6/60	54	1904	92	22/6/60; 1974
Seychelles	-	-	-	1	1979
Togo	19/7/63	75	429	98	26/10/61; 1976
Tunisia	-	28	-	-	1973
Zaire	-	110	202(Wef. 1971)	20	1974
Mauritania	-	52	618	151	1976

Source: French Ministry of Co-operation; Pierre Dabiez, "La Politique, militaire de la France en Afrique Noire sous le generale de Gaulle," in D.G. Lavroff, (ed.), *la Politique Africaine du General de Gaulle* (Paris: Pedone, 1981), p. 250.

In the table one above; France delivered the highest amount of arms to Africa coming second only to the Soviet Union which is understandable on account of the status of the defunct USSR as a major player in the Cold war at the time. France's supply of US\$7.5million was higher than Italy's US\$3.8million; West Germany's US\$2.6million; America's US\$1.8million; and Britain's US\$1.6million. It was only the USSR whose arms supplies had a higher value of US\$31.6millions. This shows clearly the extent to which France exploited the military agreements with her allies in Africa. The second table shows the nature and dates of agreements France signed with the former colonies. From the table, it is clear that there was serious engagement between France and the former colonies going by the number of French military advisers posted to Africa, as well as African trainees and officers from various countries in France for different kinds of military activities.

On the basis of these agreements, France fully intervened militarily in the internal affairs of the countries and also exploited same to deploy huge number of troops and military equipment in different parts of the continent. And in most cases, such interventions were tailored towards defending an unpopular regime considered supportive by Paris. For instance, in 1964 French troops landed in Gabon to suppress an attempted military coup. In the same manner, French troops were airlifted to the Central African Republic in 1967 to embolden the regime of Jean-Bedel Bokassa and in 1968; French Forces were in Chad to suppress a rebellion against President Francois Tombalbaiye. France had intervened "several" times in Chad between 1960 and 1963. In Cameroun, France intervened in 1960 and 1961 "to re-establish order"; she intervened in Congo Brazzaville in 1960 "to end tribal warfare"; in Niger in 1963 "to quell a military uprising against President Hamani Diori; in Mauritania in 1961, to help the government control tribal agitation and in Gabon in February, 1964, "to restore friendly President M'ba to power" after he had been removed by a military coup". (*Lellouche and Moisisi, 1979.Pp. 117-118*).

Justifying France's defence of friendly regimes, Minister of Information, at the time, Alain Peyrefitte said: "It is not possible that a few gunmen be left free to capture at any time any presidential palace, and it is precisely because such a menace was foreseen that the new African states have concluded with France, agreements to protect themselves

against such risks”(Le Monde, February, 28,1964). He had explained that France did not intervene in Togo, in 1963 following the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio because Togo had no mutual defence agreement with France at the time just as he said France did not intervene in Dahomey in October 1963, because President Maga voluntarily gave up the presidency. The same case, he stated applied in Congo-Brazzaville in 1963 when troops had to be recalled on discovery that President Youlou had signed his resignation. Although Peyrefite’s explanation contradicted French actions where she intervened in Cameroun, Mauritania, and Zaire where she had no defense agreements,(Lellouche and Moisi *op cit*) have argued that passivity in itself is a form of intervention. And to effectively carry out her military operations on the continent, France deployed over 14,000 troops in different parts of Africa in 1978. This placed her only next to Cuba with about 34,000 troops but ahead of U. S and USSR in the number of foreign troops deployed on the continent (*Ibid*) The following table gives the distribution of French military personnel across the countries on the continent.

Table III: Deployment of French and Cuban Military Personnel in Africa

Country	French Military Personnel	Cuban Military Personnel
Algeria	90	
Angola		21,000
Benin	(**)	
Burundi	30	
Cameroon	90	
Central African Empire	(**)	
Chad	1,800	
Congo	10	300
Djibouti	4,500	
Ethiopia		12,000
Gabon	500	
Guinea		200 to 300
Guinea Bissau		70
Guinea (Equatorial)		20 to 30
Ivory Coast	500	
Lybia	25	100 to 125
Madagascar	50	30
Mauritania	100	
Mayotte	2,000	
Morocco	250	
Mozambique		300
Niger	60	
Reunion	2,000	
Senegal	1,300	
Sierra Leone		100 to 125
Tanzania		20 to 30
Togo	80	
Tunisia	40	
Uganda		20 to 30
Upper Volta	20	
Zaire	70	
Indian Ocean Islands	80	
Total	13,695	34,000 to 34,500

With estimated figures**

500
14,195

*Iles Glorieuses (10), Juan de Nova (50), Bassas de India, Europe (10)

** Estimated figures: 500

Source: Derived from estimated figures obtained by Rene Backman and published in Le Nouvel Observateur, 22 May, 1978.

French military activities on the continent infuriated even fellow nationals. Former Prime Minister Pierre Messmer, of the Gaullist party once warned President D'Estaing that "France must not be a gendarme in Africa" (*Le Monde*, August, 26, 1978). Similarly, Nigeria's military leader, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo in 1978 also took a swipe on D'Estaing's policy of meddling in the internal affairs of African countries (Lellouche and Moisi *op cit*) during the July annual conference of the OAU in Khartoum, the Sudan.

These criticisms however, appeared not to have slowed down France's military activities on the continent as in the same year, France was calling for a Pan African Defence Force at the Franco-African Summit held in Paris (Akinterinwa, 1989). France took her campaign to the 6th Summit in Kigali, Rwanda and through President Senghor of Senegal, reviewed the call at the ECOWAS and OAU summit conferences in 1979. And to give vent to her position, France indeed set up what was intended to be the nucleus of the proposed force, which was deployed to the second Shaba Affair in Zaire (Ede, 1981). The troops were drawn largely from Togo, Gabon, Cote d' Ivoire, Morocco and Senegal.

4.2.2 Anglophone Countries

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, France's political, diplomatic and military involvement in Africa at this time was largely with the Francophone. Two Anglophone countries however, found relevance in the French complex political and diplomatic maneuvers on the continent. These were South Africa and Nigeria.

(a) South Africa

Relations between France and South Africa date back to several years. But political and strategic relations assumed significance in the early 1960s as a result of France's negation of the UN resolution barring military supplies as well as political and diplomatic support to the minority white (apartheid) regime in South Africa.

A number of African countries had on July 11, 1963 called on the UN Security Council to look into the issue of arms supply to South Africa. Surprisingly, the country's delegate, Mr. Seydoux indicated before the Council that France would supply to the racist regime, those arms she required for defence of her territory. As it turned out, France and Britain abstained from the council's in the meeting which banned supply of arms to South

Africa. France however voted in the next meeting of the Council in December, 1963 to support the council resolution.

In spite of her stance, France maintained strong economic, political and military ties with South Africa. On the military front, France maintained supply of helicopters, missiles, aircrafts, armoured vehicles to South Africa backed up with license to produce them (Yahya, *op cit*). "On June 27, 1971, the South African Armament Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR) signed contracts with French Aviation company Marcel Dassault, for manufacture under license in South Africa, of two of the company's Mach 2 Supersonic aircraft – the mirage 111, some 45 of which were already in force; and the mirage F.1, which made its first public flight in France in June, 1970" (Yahya, 1994. p.110). Although the agreement did not state the number of aircrafts that were to be manufactured by Atlas Aircraft Corporation, a subsidiary of ARMSCOR, an initial 50 planes planned under the deal were to cost USD 50 million. Interestingly, all these took place less than a year after President Pompidou promised an OAU delegation headed by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia that no anti-guerilla equipment would in future, be supplied to South Africa (*Ibid*). France thereafter supplied assorted military hardware to South Africa including Panhard armoured cars mounted with DTAT guns for onward supply to Ian Smith, the racist (white) minority leader in Rhodesia (*Ibid*.)

Table IV: French Military Supplies To South Africa, 1962 – 76

Date	Number	Item	Comment
1961-70	600	Panhard Model 245	
1962	30	Sud Alouette 2	
1963	16	Aircraft: Dassault	
		Mirage 111-CZ	
1963	48	Nord AS 30	
1963	96	Matra R-530	
1963	48	Nord AS 30	
1963	48	Matra R-530	
1964	3	Dassault:	
		Mirage 3-BZ	
1965-66	50	Sud Alouette 3	
1965-66	16	Dassault Mirage 3-RZ	
1965-66	48	Nord AS-30	
1965-66	96	Matra R-530	
1966	4	Dassault Mirage 3-RZ	
1966-67	16	Sud SA-3210	
		Super Frelon	
1968	120	Torpedos	FF 33 million
1968	7	Missiles	FF 54 million
1968	3	Dassault Mirage 3-DZ	
1968	20	AML Armoured Vehicles	FF 8 million
1968	5	Sud Alouette 3	
1968	250	4HD Engine	FF 4.2 million
1969	9	Nord Transall C-160	
1969	16	Sud SA-320 Puma hel	
1969	16	Sud Alouette 3	
1969	9	Nord Transall C-160	
1969	16	Sud SA-330 Puma hel	
1969	16	Sud Alouette 3	
1970	3	Sud-Marine	
		Daokube Class ²	US\$ 37.8 million
1975	2	Agosta Class Subs	US\$ 4.2 million
1976	2	Freighters, type A. 69	
1976	??	Exocet SSM	

Source: *The Military Balance – Various issues.*

Table V: Additional French Military Equipment and Licences Sold To South Africa, 1961 – 73

Year	Weapon	Type	Quantity	Manufacturer
1961	Armoured car	AML 60	...	Panhard & Levasseur
1961	Armoured car	AML 90	Panhard & Levasseur
1961	Machine gun	60 mm	Direction Techniques
1961	Machine gun	90 mm		Des Armaments Terrestres
1963	Armoured car	AML 60 & 90	Licences	Panhard & Levasseur
1963	Machine gun	60 & 90 mm	Licences	DTAT
1963	Interceptor	Mirage XCZ	16	Marcel-Dassault
1963	Jet engine	Atar	16 + spares	SNECMA
1963	Air- Ground			
	Missile	AS 20 & 30	SNIAS
1963	Helicopter	Alouette 2	6	SNIAS
1963	Hel. engine	Artouste	6 + spares	Turbomeca
1963	Rocket	37 mm 447	SNEB
1963	Transport	Mystere 20	3	Marcel-Dassault
1965	Fighter-Bomber Mirage 3EZ	20	Marcel-Dassault	
1965	Jet engine	Atar	20 + spares	SNECMA
1965	Air-Air Missile	R30	45	Engins Matra
1967	Reconnaissance	Mirage 3RZ	4	Marcel-Dassault
1967	Jet engine	Atar	4 + spares	SNECMA
1961	Armoured car	AML 60	Panhard & Levasseur
1961	Armoured car	AML 90	Panhard & Levasseur
1961	Armoured car	AML 60	Panhard & Levasseur
1961	Armoured car	AML 90	Panhard & Levasseur
1961	Machine gun	60 mm	Direction Techniques
1961	Machine gun	90 mm	Des Armaments
				Terrestress
1963	Armoured car	AML 60 & 90	Licences	Panhard & Levasseur
1963	Machine gun	60 & 90mm	Licences	DTAT
1963	Interceptor	Mirage xCZ	16	Marcel-Dassault
1963	Jet engine.	Atar.	16 + s[ares	SNECMA
1963	Air-Ground			
	Missile	AS20 & 30	SNIAS
1963	Helicopter	Artouste 2	6	SNIAS
1963	Hel. engine	Artouste	6 + spares	Turbomeca
1963	Rocket	37 mm 447	SNEB
1963	Transport	Mystere 20	3	Marcel-Dassault
1965	Fighter-Bomber	Mirage 3EZ	20	Marcel-Dassault
1965	Jet engine	Atar	20 + spares	SNECMA
1965	Air-Air			
	Missile	R530.	45	Engins Matra
1967	Reconnaissance	Mirage 3RZ	4	Marcel-Dassault
1967	Jet engine	Atar.	4 + spares	SNECMA
1967	Interceptor	Mirage 3CZ	3 cells	Marcel-Dassault
1967	Radar system	Thomson-CSE
1967	Helicopter	Alouette 3	50	SNIAS
1967	Hel. Engine	Artouste	50 + spares	Turbomeca
1967	Helicopter	Super Frelon	16	SNIAS
1967	Hel-engine	Turmo	16 + spares	Turbomeca

Cont. on page 63

Year	Weapon	Type	Quantity	Manufacturer
1968	Tank	AMX 30	20	Panhard DTAT Crusot
1968	Radar/Missile	Crotale	3 batteries & Engines	Matra & Thomoson
1968	Submarine	Daphne	3	Dubigee-Normandie
1969	Helicopter	Puma	20	SNIAS & Westland
1970	Transport	Transall	9	SNIAS & W. Germany
1970	Gunboats	Missile-firing	3	de Normandie
1971	Anti-Submarine- Atlantic		8	Breguet Aviation
1971	Interceptor	Mirage F1	48	Marcel-Dassault
1971	Jet engine	Atar	48 + spares	SNECMA
1971	Bomber	Mirage-Milan	Licences	Marcel-Dassault
1971	Air-Air			
	Missile	Magic	Engines Matra
1973	Antitank			
	Missile	Milan	SNIAS & W. Germany
1973	Sea-Sea	Missile Exocet	SNIAS

Source: The Military Balance Various issues from 1977-80 Institute for Strategic Studies, London and JANES Survey, 1974.

The two countries also cooperated for supply of several other military equipment including handmade grenades, radar arms etc and joint research for ground to air missiles, which were supplied in 1971.

France also supported South Africa to develop nuclear capability. In 1976, a consortium of Framatrine, Spie – Batignolles and Alsthorn, French companies signed contracts to build for South Africa, G22 MW size of nuclear reactors around Cape Town at the cost of FF15 billion (Africa Confidential, 1982). Further to the above, French companies were also said to have won substantial contracts to supply enriched uranium to the plants alongside Belgian companies. Yahya (op cit) citing a UN report states that the two reactors had capacity to produce tonnes of uranium per year or one bomb per week, equivalent to the one dropped at Nagasaki by the USA during the second World War by the US.

The arms sales and military support to the belligerent South Africa continued through all the administrations from de Gaulle to President Mitterrand. Although France's official policy condemned racism, in actual fact, France continued exportation of arms to South Africa (Otubanjo and Davies in Akinyemi, Agbi and Otubanjo (eds.), 1990). For instance, Mitterrand's party favoured reduction in trade with South Africa and outright cessation of trade with Namibia while it

stated that the frontline states be accorded political, diplomatic and humanitarian support.

Ironically, these policies of the Socialist Party were observed in *the breach* as Mitterrand stated clearly during a state visit to Cameroun in 1983 that:

"we do not have any binding commitment towards South Africa. We have maintained diplomatic relations just as we do with other states whose policies we don't necessarily approve of. Having chosen a policy of presence rather than one of absence, we maintain some ancient and limited trade and exchange relations. We honour our contracts and we try not to renew them when they relate to 'auspicious' matters. There have been no major innovations in this area over the last two years" (Guy, Op cit).

Mitterrand by and large maintained this picture until the collapse of apartheid and the establishment of an all inclusive popular elected government. The French attitude which obviously violated UN resolution and betrayed international confidence, was not for nothing. By exporting sophisticated military technology to South Africa, France made the apartheid enclave to be entirely dependent on her for spares. Besides, most of the hardware was exchanged for Gold, which in turn helped maintain monetary stability in the French economy. The military items added to export of industrial machines, electrical equipment, synthetic textiles, optical equipment, chemicals etc to enhance France's balance of trade with South Africa.

(b) Nigeria

Franco-Nigeria relations date back to pre-colonial and colonial eras when French companies joined their European counter parts to carry out trading activities in the Niger Delta and the interior of the territories which later became known as Nigeria. However, formal diplomatic relations began at the dawn of independence by the self-government of Alhaji Tafawa Balewa. The initial friendship between the two countries was however, punctured on January 5, 1961 following the French nuclear tests in the Sahara. Despite protests from Nigeria, Morocco, the forum of independent African countries, the UN and other international actors, France went ahead to detonate her nuclear bombs on February 13 and in April 1960. On December 27, 1960, France dropped the third bomb from a

tower of the testing site in Reggane region of Sahara (Akinterinwa, 1990 in Akinyemi *et al, op.cit*). An enraged Nigerian government ordered France's Ambassador in Lagos, Mr. Raymond Offroy to leave within 48 hours. Nigeria also announced closure of her Embassy in Paris. Before the first blast, Nigerian Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa led a delegation of Ministers to protest the proposed plan. Britain however, could not stop France but rather, promised to raise a Committee of experts to determine the amount of radioactive effects on Nigeria. Ghana on the other hand recalled her Ambassador to Paris and imposed minimum sanctions in her trade relations with France.

Akinterinwa (*Ibid*) asserts that Nigeria's decision to sever ties with France was based on the resolve to assert her sovereignty based on the prevailing local sentiments which favoured sanctions against France. It was also a measure to query France's claim that the test site was part of her territory. In Britain's view, the fear of radioactive fallout was unfounded as scientific tests conducted after the first and second blasts by a joint Committee of Scientists from Britain and Nigeria did not indicate any radioactive dangers. On the strength of this therefore, it follows that Nigeria's decision arose from her determination as a true African leader, to act decisively in the absence of a continental body through which to articulate coordinated and joint action against France.

Be that as it may, Nigeria sustained the measure until October 26, 1965, when the two countries agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors. Throughout the period of the crisis, French President, de Gaulle viewed Nigeria with grave suspicion. Indeed, Nigeria's action was interpreted in *Elysee* as an affront to France as well as a challenge to her claim to global power status. The French did change the method of the nuclear tests from atmosphere to underground and later shifted further tests to the Pacific. The change of method and site for the tests was explained more to some technical and scientific realities rather than the protests from Nigeria. In any case several tests were carried out in the Sahara after the break in ties before France moved her arsenal to the Pacific. Although France trusted Nigeria to resolve the Chadian crisis (threat to President Tombalbaye's administration by insurgents) which broke out during this period, France had not forgiven Nigeria by any stretch of imagination.

(c) Nigeria and EEC

In the light of developments from the atomic tests, relations between the two countries were characterized by confrontation, competition and much later cooperation. One area of confrontation was Nigeria's quest to secure associate membership status with the European Economic Community (EEC). Nigeria, a key member of the Commonwealth and major trading partner of Britain had sought association membership status of EEC where France, Germany and Italy were key members. The status sought by Nigeria was to come with favourable trade terms better than those agreed upon by the EEC and the 18 Associated Francophone countries under the Yaoundé Convention. This possibility was however, unacceptable to Paris. And as Nwokedi (1986) notes, even though France was not directly involved in the preliminary negotiations, which ended in April 1964, she nevertheless intervened in a rather dramatic manner at crucial moments to delay or outrightly frustrate Nigeria's association objective.

The French delegates at the Council of Ministers at Brussels sought for example, further clarification on three issues, which they considered fundamental before an agreement could be reached with Nigeria. They sought to know what effects Nigeria's dual membership of the Commonwealth and the community preference systems would have and how those were to be handled, how the interests of the Yaoundé Eighteen were to be protected and finally what tariff concession Nigeria was prepared to offer the six in return (Nwokedi, 1986. p.286).

With negotiations heading for the rocks, Nigeria, which earlier rejected France's demand for an apology over the manner her Ambassador left Lagos in the wake of the Sahara bomb tests soft - pedaled. Nigeria, working through Francophone countries like Ivory Coast and Senegal, got France to accept re-establishment of diplomatic ties. As it turned out, the Nigeria-EEC accord was finally signed in July 1966, barely two months after Nigeria and France exchanged ambassadors after re-establishment of diplomatic ties.

Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cote d'Ivoire interviewed by this researcher said France acted out of pressure to ward off the mounting pressure from her influential former colonies in the West African Sub-region rather than a genuine acceptance of Nigeria's olive branch. It is thus surprising that the agreement was never

implemented as France and Luxembourg refused to ratify it, citing unimpressive human rights records of the new military regime of Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (*Ibid.*)

(d) Nigerian Civil War

Although France appeared to have resolved her differences with Nigeria, in all practical purposes, she was not yet done. The civil war therefore provided a rare opportunity for the country to take her pound of flesh off Nigeria.

The Nigeria civil war arose as a result of the unilateral declaration on May 30, 1967 of the "Republic of Biafra", hitherto the Eastern Region of Nigeria, by Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu. The secessionist bid launched by Ojukwu was the climax of months of tension which began January 16, 1966, with the first coup d'état by young officers, spearheaded by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and the counter coup of July 1966 led by Gowon. In the first, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of Northern region, Sir Festus Okotie-Eboh, Finance Minister and Chief S. L. Akintola, Premier of Western region were killed. The collapse of the First Republic led to the emergence of the military government headed by Major-General Johnson Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi. In the second (retaliatory) coup, Aguiyi-Ironsi was killed and Gowon took over as the new Military Head of State. For the purpose of this study, we shall not delve into details of the remote causes of the war. Suffice it to say that the war was a fall out of the violence which followed the 1964 elections in some parts of the country.

When Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra, little did he know that he was falling into a long-held plan by France to destabilize Nigeria. Indeed the administration of Charles de Gaulle had considered Nigeria, a major stumbling block in the way of her neo-colonial interests in West and Central Africa. Nwokedi (1986. p. 287) asserts that "*the pro-Biafra stance adopted by Gen. de Gaulle was a calculated attempt by the French leader to reduce Nigeria to its size*". The overall objective was to reduce Nigeria's influence around the neighbouring Francophone countries where France held strategic political and economic interests and secondly, to "punish" Nigeria for the humiliation suffered by France from the 1961 atomic bomb tests episode. Indications to this status emerged from comments of French officials.

In a sponsored newspaper article in 1969, French authorities stated their involvement in Biafra thus: "*the crisis in Nigeria, a country, which is historically and geographically bounded by former French colonies, cannot be taken with indifference. Four Francophone African states surround Nigeria, most of which contain minorities from the major Nigerian tribes of Yoruba (in Dahomey), Hausa (in Niger) and Ibo (in Eastern Cameroon)*" (*Revue de Defense Nationale* (Special Edition on Biafra), Paris, March, 1969).

There were also economic considerations to French action. France had feared the rumoured nationalization of French assets in the country. France, which had an oil exploration firm SAFRAP, acted to not only protect the investment but also possibly expand her stake in the oil industry in the event of Biafra victory (*Le Monde*, September 10, 1968). Beside the economic interest, there was also the influence of Israel, which had a senior official, George Foccart in the government of de Gaulle. Israel had nursed grudges against Northern Nigeria over the region's stance in her relations with the Arab world and saw the civil war as an opportunity to get back at the region.

Four clear years earlier, France had completed plans to destabilize Nigeria. This assignment was given to Foccart, then Secretary-General of African and Malagasy Affairs but who actually was the arrowhead of French intelligence services in Africa. Foccart had appointed a Senior French Secret Service officer, Lt. Col. Bischelot to Ivory Coast as "Special Technical Adviser" to President Houphouet Boigny but who in actual fact had a clear mission to work out ways to undermine Nigeria (Pean, 1983). He did work out the ways and Mr. Jean Mandeau Beaupre was appointed Coordinator of the Biafra operations based in Ivory Coast. Beaupre was to work hand in hand with Foccart himself and Bischelot.

But beyond the political, diplomatic and economic consideration, France also used humanitarian reasons as the rationale for her involvement in the war on the side of Biafra. Specifically, France cited the alleged killing of Igbo in the North and the deteriorating condition of women and children in the Biafran held territory as further basis for involvement. This same reason was coincidentally adduced by Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Gabon to recognize Biafra. Of course Gabon and Ivory Coast were seen as speaking for

France. While France initially played a hide and seek game by giving covert support to Biafra while publicly recognizing a united Nigeria, the attitude in 1968 as she changed for open support to the cause of Biafra.

France's attitude to the war was directly opposed to Britain's who extended support to the Federal Government to preserve Nigeria's unity. Britain also mounted pressure on both the OAU and UN Secretary-General to stand firm for a united Nigeria. It is important to emphasise that other European powers gave a veiled support to Nigeria. Where they did not, they also did nothing to aid the cause of Biafra in the way and manner France did.

French assistance came in various ways – military supplies, diplomatic support, parliamentary support, the media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

As noted earlier, Mr. Beaupre, working in Ivory Coast facilitated the recruitment of mercenaries for Biafra including the ruthless Bob Dernard (Pean, *op cit*). Arms supplies to Biafra were routed mostly through Gabon, perhaps because of proximity and more so as the country's President, Omar Bongo was working with Ivory Coast to support Biafra. In one instance, a B26 bomber jet supplied by France landed in Enugu, the Biafran capital less than two months after the declaration of the State of Biafra by Ojukwu (*Le Monde*, July 17, 1967). A pilot with Air France, Mr. Languillaume, grounded for an air crash was dispatched to Gabon to coordinate Biafra air operations. A ruthless mercenary, Rolf Steizer also arrived Uli, with a French plane to supply ammunitions to the Secessionists. An estimated 35,000 to 200,000 tons of arms and ammunitions were supplied weekly to Biafra by France with an estimated value of \$384 million (SIPRI, 1971 cited in Yahya, 1994)

France also availed Biafra unofficial support to procure arms on the international arms market with assistance provided by former West African colonies. "In one of the most dramatic episodes of the civil war, Carl Gustar Von Rosen, a Swedish who at one time commanded the Ethiopian air force and several other Swedish pilots flew five jet trainers modified for combat in successful strikes against Nigerian military installations" (www.google.com, retrieved November 4, 2004). While military supplies went on, France mobilized international opinion in support of Biafra. In addition, not only did various

spokes persons consistently justified the secessionist move, President de Gaulle himself spoke variously on the need to allow the Igbo the right of self determination. Parliamentary delegations were dispatched to both Nigeria and Biafra to supply a firsthand account of the situation in the two Republics to the French Government.

Special programmes were mounted in France to give support to Biafra while the French Red Cross supplied food and medicaments through Gabon under the auspices of International Red Cross Committee in Geneva (Akinterinwa *op cit*). The French Red Cross established a 300-bed clinic at Uli Airport under the leadership of Dr. Max Recamier and a number of nutrition clinics. The Red Cross also facilitated the transportation of children to Gabon for treatment after which they were transferred to Ivory Coast. On the whole, the French Red Cross spent at least 26 million French Francs, most of it contributed by the public (*Ibid*). In France, Biafra became so popular to the French such that many years after the war, Nigerians were being referred to as Biafrans (Haruna and Massoud (eds.) (1987). The government was equally supportive of the humanitarian efforts of the Red Cross. In June 1968, the Government released 125,000 Francs with President de Gaulle making a symbolic personal donation of 1,300 Francs. The government sent more the 2000 tonnes of medicaments and food. Government overall commitment in that regard amounted to 13 million Francs, 1200 tones of food, two French medical teams were sent to Biafra, a hospital created in Libreville apart from the cost of maintaining the medical and administrative personnel(*Le Monde*, January 16, 1970).

In all of the humanitarian effort, Gabon played a significant role as transit camp between France and Biafra out of "brotherly concern". In actual fact, Bongo had held back 3,000 Biafran children with the hope of using them as bait to demand compensation from Biafra after the war (*Canard en chaime* Paris, August 23, 1967) cited in Yahya *op cit*). That opportunity never came as Ojukwu who could not sustain the military campaigns abandoned the war and defected to Abidjan leaving his stranded deputy, Gen. Effiong to hand over to Federal troops in January 1970.

The collapse of Biafra arose largely from the change of attitude in Paris. With the death of President de Gaulle in April 1969, Mr. George Pompidou who succeeded him saw no

wisdom in maintaining support for Biafra especially when Gowon had repeatedly assured that French economic interests in Nigeria would not be undermined. Ojukwu who had placed his confidence in continued French support was disappointed in the new administration. And with military support no longer forthcoming from France, his chances gloomed and the logical thing was to end the war. With the collapse of Biafra, France succeeded in "punishing" Nigeria but failed in the plot to destabilize her.

(e) Nigeria – Cameroon Border Dispute

Nigeria's border dispute in 1981 was one opportunity France exploited to continue with her destabilization programme against Nigeria. In 1981, Cameroon Gendarmes over-ran some Nigerian border communities in the North-East and killed five Nigerian soldiers keeping security at the border. Nigerian authorities detested this unprovoked action. War was imminent given the mobilization of troops on both sides to the area of conflict. Cameroon, which had an existing military pact with France immediately reached out to French troops and military supplies from Central Africa in preparation to confront Nigeria. But for the diplomatic initiatives of Nigeria's President Shehu Shagari, full-blown military confrontation would have ensued between the two neighbouring countries. And since France backed the Biafrans during the Nigerian civil war, her support for Cameroun, even if subtly was a possibility.

4.3 TRADE AND INVESTMENT WITH AFRICA

As noted in the preceding chapter, economic relations between France and Africa date back to the pre-colonial era when French countries carried out businesses in many parts of Africa at the end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This relationship was firmed up during the colonial era and consolidated at the dawn of independence when France concluded a number of cooperation agreements with the colonies. These agreements mostly reached from 1960 and beyond ensured French dominance of the (former) colonies while most of the Francophone Africa depended on France almost entirely for economic survival.

French dominance and Francophone's dependency was predicated on two major policy strands from Elysee Palace: First, twelve African countries were into the Franc zone.

What this meant was that international business transactions by these countries were carried out through French Franc and thirdly, the foreign exchange obtained through these transactions was deposited in the French treasury (Otubanjo, and Davies, 1985). The implication of this was that it was possible for French companies operating in Africa to repatriate profits in the same way as the policies gave France some measure of control of monetary issues. The main objectives for French dominance of the economy were threefold. The First was to secure a source for steady supply of raw materials for the French industrial sector. The second was source market for finished products and technology and finally, control of the political leadership in these states. The methodology of course was provision of the so-called development aid. While France maintained a stronghold on the economy of the Francophone, she at the same time sought in-roads into the economies of some Anglophone countries namely Nigeria, South Africa.

4.3.1 French Economic Relations with Francophone Countries

As stated earlier, France depended largely on the Francophone for supply of strategic raw materials especially minerals for industrial growth. For example, "France's rate of dependency on these minerals from Africa was 100 per cent for cobalt, 87 to 100 per cent for Uranium, 83 per cent for phosphates, 68 per cent for bauxite, 35 per cent for manganese, 32 per cent for copper, 32 per cent for chromium and 22 per cent for phosphates from Senegal and Togo (*L' Afrique: Un Partenaire Indispensable*' in Actuel development, 1980. cited in Yahya, op cit)

In 1974, France completed a cooperation agreement with Gabon to have exclusive or at least priority rights over supply of uranium, thorium, lithium, beryllium and helium. (Martin, *op cit*). Apart from minerals, agricultural raw materials like timber and cocoa from Ivory Coast, groundnuts from Senegal, Nigeria, cotton, etc were supplied French industries by the Francophone. By 1977, France was importing huge quantities of crude oil from Gabon and Congo and different kinds of minerals from Mauritius.

The point to be noted is that the balance of trade remained perpetually in favour of France. For instance, Ivory Coast considered France's leading Francophone market in sub-Saharan Africa imported US\$480.5 million from France as against US\$542 million in 1982. Yahya, *op cit*). "French exports to the Cameroon rose from US\$298.2 million to

US\$83.4 million giving a surplus of US\$298.5 million. The surplus with Congo was even higher US\$339.2 million of imports and US\$420.6 million in exports" (Yahya, 1994, p. 56). In the same way other countries recorded deficits like Gabon US\$106 million, Niger US\$100 million and Mauritius US\$37 million (*Ibid*). While the Francophone recorded continued trade deficits, France on the other hand maintained surpluses even when her trade with other countries showed consistent imbalance.

France's balance of trade, which is in chronic deficit vis-à-vis other industrialized countries, has practically always been punitive with Africa between 1975 and 1983. This trade surplus, which amounted to a staggering 25,500 million French Francs in 1981, diminished to the still respectable figures of FF7,900 million in 1982 and FF5,000 million in 1983. (L'Afrique cited in Martin, 1985, p. 199).

Apart from trade in raw materials and finished goods, French economic interests with Francophone Africa progressed in virtually all areas of the economy – shipping (transport), construction industry, oil, electronics, chemical market, insurance, hotel industry, book publishing, banks and financial institutions.

In shipping, for instance, exports from Africa went to the French ports of Le Havre, Dunkerque Ronen, Nantes and Bordeaux for various items like timber, crude, LNG, phosphates and other raw materials. The Nantes port in France received timber imports from Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Gabon and Congo, Molasses from Djibouti, Mozambique and Mauritius, and phosphates from Senegal. The port of Bordeaux received imports mostly from Senegal while Le Havre handled mostly general cargoes. In terms of tonnage, Le Havre port was the leading centre for West Africa trade accounting for 300 million tones traffic in 1981 largely from Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cameroon and Senegal. Algeria was leading exporter to Nantes – Saint Nazaire port in 1981 with exports consisting mainly natural gas (AED Magazine, September 18, 1981).

One noticeable area of investment is in oil production. For many years, French oil firm, Elf-Aquitaine dominated oil business in Africa with considerable investment in Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon and Congo. The company's four production centres had combined crude output of 19.9 million tones in 1981 as against the group's overall world production level of 24.3 million tones. Elf's production base in Gabon contributed most

to its activities in Africa with 6.27 million tones in 1981(*Ibid*). As a major producer of electronics, computers and information and communication systems in the world, France sought to take a fair share of the largely untapped market in Africa. Thompson CSF a major French company in this area has been involved with Africa since the 1970s providing various types of electronics – radar, navigational aids, weapons and detection systems, broadcasting and telecommunications equipment, computer, x-ray machines and medical scanners. The company and its subsidiaries set up television stations in Ivory Coast, Gabon, Zaire, Niger and radio stations in the Francophone. In Gabon, the group supplied and installed 34-500KW transmitters for the Mayabi Radio Station, which has since become “Africa No.1” radio station. It also supplied the television facilities for the country. By 1981, Thompson group made a turnover of \$3,406 million from its operations outside France with Africa accounting substantially for the performance. (Yahya, 1994 P.68.)

In the same vein, French computer company Cit-Honeywell Bull did good business in Africa with controlling share of about 35 per cent of the computer market in French speaking Africa (*ADB Feature Magazine, 1983*). Its operations were mostly in Ivory Coast, Congo, Benin, Senegal and Niger where it signed major contracts.

French companies involved are in production of assorted chemicals – pharmaceuticals, agricultural chemicals, films, veterinary etc. Rhone Poulenc made a huge turnover of \$5,060 million in Africa in 1982 from its operations in Africa where it had a number of subsidiaries including May & Baker representing its interest in the Commonwealth countries (*Ibid*)

As for banks, insurance and other financial institutions, France’s presence was largely confined to her African colonies until after independence. Three French banks operated in Africa – *Banque Nationale de Paris* (BNP), *Credit Lyonnais* and *Societe Generale*. BNP, which was the largest, had presence in 19 countries mostly in partnership with other banks from the industrialized world through the local affiliate *Societe Financiere pour les pays d’outre mer* (SFOM). The group set up a number of local banks in which they had controlling stakes. SFOM (Representative of BNP) operated in Burundi, Senegal, Togo, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Rwanda, Chad, Bourkina Fasso,

Zaire and Zimbabwe. Another local bank, *Banque Internationale Pour le Commerce et l'Industrie de la Cote d'Ivoire* (BIC) owned 60 per cent by SFOM had 50 branches in Ivory Coast while BICI du Cameroon in which BNP and SFOM jointly owned 36 per cent had 29 branches.

"Outside the network of the SFOM, BNP intercontinental has 100 per cent owned subsidiaries in Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritius and Reunion. The BNP itself has 31% stake in the United Bank for Africa (UBA) in Nigeria a 100% owned subsidiary in Niger" (Yahya, 1994.p.82).

The second of the French banks, Credit Lyonnais had presence through independent (private) banks in 10 countries, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Chad, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Societe Generale bank, which first started in Tunis spread to Morocco and later opened branches in Senegal, CAR, Congo, Guinea, Cameroon and Ivory Coast.

The fourth bank, Banque Internationale Pour 'Afrique occidentale (BIAO) was established in the 19th century in one of the four communes of St. Louise. By 1853, it was issuing currency from its new base in Senegal. The bank supported a lot of development projects in the West African sub-region including coffee and cocoa plantations in Ivory Coast, banana plantations in Guinea, forestry in Gabon, groundnuts in Senegal and Sudan and cotton in Equatorial Africa (Yahya, 1994.p.82). The bank lost its power to issue currency in 1955 and transformed to full commercial bank spreading its tentacles into West Africa especially in Ivory Coast, Chad, CAR, Mali, Niger and Togo and had considerable interests in associated companies in Gabon, Mauritania, Senegal, Upper Volta and Zaire.

In Nigeria it set up the International Bank for West Africa (IBWA) now Afribank in which it had 40 per cent interest. Other smaller French banks also established their presence in many of the Francophone countries. One segment of the economy where the French had appreciable investments is the hotel industry. French hotel chains, Novotel group founded in 1967 expanded rapidly in three segments – Novotel, Sofitel and Ibis, which are in 4-star and 2-star categories. Novotel operates five units in Cameroon, two in Gabon and Tunisia, one each in Congo, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Guinea, Senegal and the

Comoros. The subsidiary Sofitel has presence in Yaoundé, Yamoussoukro, Libreville, Dakar, Freetown, Lome and Lubumbashi and three units each in Mali and Morocco. The Novotel, which is among 10 top hotel groups in the world has become the biggest hotel chain on the continent with a turnover of \$81.4m in 1982 representing 15% of total group turnover worldwide, which was \$548.3 million in 1981.(AFP April 20,1981) French companies participated in several other businesses like book publishing and construction with the later being more visible in Anglophone countries.

4.3.2 France's Economic Relations with Anglophone Countries

French economic relations with Anglophone countries have over time remained complex. Whereas French companies invested in virtually all areas in the Francophone, France began investment in the Anglophone on a cautionary note and initially restricted to capital intensive but high profit areas especially crude oil and gas, manufactured goods, military hardware and strategic minerals. In banking, hotel industry as in exports and imports of raw materials, the French got engaged in Anglophone countries on the condition that they guaranteed higher returns on investment than trade with, and investments in the Francophone. Thus, the French construction companies were visible in Nigeria because of the higher profits the same way as were French oil companies (AED Magazine September 18, 1981). On the whole, Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Namibia were some of the Anglophone countries where French companies found suitable for trade and investment.

4.3.3 Nigeria

Economic relations between France and Nigeria started since 1902 when CFAO (*Compagnie Francaise Africaine Occidentale*) began operations in what was then the Southern protectorate, which was later merged by Lord Frederick Lugard, the first Governor General of the Northern Protectorate, to form one country Nigeria in 1914. CFAO was later joined by *Societe Compagnie Africaine Occidentale* (SCOA) in 1926, UMARCO in 1954, Total in 1956 while IBWA and *Alrairie* both commenced operations in Nigeria in 1957. It is to be noted that economic relations between the two countries have hardly been influenced by political or diplomatic relations. Thus when political ties between the two countries were ruptured by France's support of the secessionist bid of

the Biafrans against Nigeria's interests, economic relations were still maintained. Before then, economic relations between the two countries were maintained throughout the period 1961-1966 when diplomatic ties were terminated by Nigeria to protest France's test of atomic bomb in the Western Sahara.

The following statistics go a long way to justify this position. For instance, in 1960 France sold items to the value of 69.7 million Francs while investment in Nigeria stood at 100 million Francs at the time of breaking up of ties in 1961. Even though Nigeria had no investments in France but the value of her trade with the country increased to 124.1 million Francs in 1964. The increase was largely due to the activities of French oil production firm – SAFRAP (Akinterinwa, (1987) in Akindele and Ate (eds.)(1987). The oil company, which was a subsidiary of Elf-Safrap, suspended production at the end of the civil war in 1970 until April 1971 when the Federal Government allowed it to resume oil exploration.

The Nigerian Government began her new policy of acquisition of stakes in foreign companies with Safrap with the acquisition of 35 per cent equity. The Government had planned to raise the stake to 50 per cent by the time the company's production hit 400,000 bpd. By 1970, thirteen French companies were fully established in Nigeria doing all manner of businesses in sectors such as banking, oil production, and marketing, manufacturing and marketing of industrial goods. By March 1978, twenty French companies were engaged in projects on public building, road construction, oil-industry and telecommunications worth about N2.6b (Badejo, *op cit*).

In the same year, Nigeria was the most important market for French goods in Africa South of the Sahara and controlled the fourth largest French investments abroad" (Delanchy, (1983) in Shaw and Aluko, O.(eds). In 1982 Nigeria's trade with France climbed to \$1.642 million constituting of mostly crude oil. This figure, which placed Nigeria as a leading trading partner of France manifested in patronage of French ports. In 1981, Nigeria goods dominated the port of Le Havre ahead of Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cameroon and Senegal.

Between 1979 and 1984 Nigeria signed agreement to acquire four Airbus 310 aircraft for the Nigerian Airways just as the Nigerian Navy acquired units of patrol boats from France. The following table presents the status of the balance of trade between France and Nigeria in the first twenty five years after independence.

Table VI: Franco-Nigerian Balance of Trade, 1960 – 1985

Year	French		Balance of Trade	Cover Rate of French Product ² (Taux de) (Converture)	Variations in Percentage ²	
	Imports from Nigeria (In million of French France)	Exports to Nigeria			Import	Export
1960	101.9	69.7	-32.2	68.4%	-	-
1961	86.0	68.8	-82.2	45.6%	48.2%	-1.3%
1962	86.0	86.9	+0.9	101.0%	-43.1%	26.3%
1963	214.3	98.8	-115.5	46.1%	149.2%	13.7%
1964	165.6	124.1	-41.5	74.9%	-22.7%	25.6%
1965	253.2	122.7	-130.5	48.5%	52.9%	-1.1%
1966	363.7	136.7	-227.0	37.6%	43.6%	11.4%
1967	363.7	107.9	-255.8	29.7%	0.0%	-31.1%
1968	173.5	81.5	-92.0	46.8%	-52.3%	-24.5%
1969	443.5	94.1	-349.4	21.2%	155.6%	15.5%
1970	665.8	164.1	-501.7	24.7%	50.1%	74.4%
1971	1,549.8	273.9	-1,275.9	17.7%	132.8%	66.9%
1972	1,748.2	383.1	-1,365.1	21.9%	12.8%	39.9%
1973	1,837.1	479.0	-1,358.1	26.1%	5.1%	25.0%
1974	4,390.7	833.3	-3,557.4	19.0%	139.0%	-73.9%
1975	638.2	1,912.0	+1,273.8	300.0%	-85.5%	129.4%
1976	3,642.3	2,555.9	-1,086.4	70.1%	470.1%	33.7%
1977	4,614.0	3,675.4	-938.6	79.7%	-26.7%	43.8%
1978	4,191.2	3,797.0	-394.2	90.6%	-9.2%	3.3%
1979	6,382.2	3,245.0	-3,137.3	50.8%	-52.3%	-14.5%
1980	12,729.5	5,716.0	-7,013.5	45.0%	-99.5%	76.1%
1981	8,357.0	9,243.0	+886.0	110.6%	-34.3%	61.7%
1982	12,134.0	8,265.0	-3,869.0	68.1%	45.2%	10.6%
1983	15,002.0	7,002.0	-8,000.0	46.7%	24.5%	-13.3%
1984	19,767.0	7,942.0	-11,825.0	40.2%	31.8%	13.4%
1985	9,627.0	2,175.0	-7,452.0	22.6%	-14.0%	1.6%

- Notes:
1. The figures for 1985 covered only the first half of the year (January – June 1985).
 2. % of the cost of French purchase = $\frac{\text{Value of exports}}{\text{Value of imports}} \times 100$ covered by exports
 3. Variation (import or export) = $\frac{\text{value of import or export for the year considered, (e.g. 1985}^4\text{, minus the value of import or export for the preceding year (1984), divided by the value of import or export for 1984, multiplied by 100.}}{\text{value of import or export for the preceding year (1984)}}$
 4. Only the first six months are covered. The value of French imports and exports for the same period in 1984 are: 11,199 and 2,141 million Francs. (French Embassy Statistics).

Source: Compiled from the statistics of the French Centre for Foreign Trade (Centre Francais du Commerce Extérieur)

What is discernible from the table above is that Nigeria exports to France were predominantly petroleum products, a development which made balance of trade to remain on the deficit side against Nigeria.

In services industry, French Banks SGBN, *Credit Lyonnais*, IBWA, UTB and MBC established strong presence in Nigeria with a substantial share of the market. In the same manner Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria (PAN), Michelin Tyre producing plant and others maintained visibility in the manufacturing sectors.

Construction is also one sector where French companies sought a big pie in the Nigerian economy. In the 1970s and 1980s, French companies handled major construction contracts amounting to millions of Francs. In 1982 for instance, French company Interinfra won contract for building the Lagos Metroline (CMC) project under the administration of Alhaji Lateef Jakande, then Governor of Lagos at the cost of N689.45 Million. This was after a Japanese company Mitsui, which initially won the contract could not deliver. (Akinterinwa, B., *op cit*). Although this contract was terminated in 1984 by the succeeding military regime, several other French companies executed their construction contracts and were paid. The following gives details of French construction companies operating in Nigeria and the projects they executed.

Table VII: Contracts Won By French Construction Companies In Nigeria. 1987 – 1981

Year	Contract/Client	Company	Value/MFRF
1987	Regina Brewery	Technip	130
"	Urban Development of Umuahia (Imo State)	Fougerolle	216
"	NNPC – Construction of Depots	UIE	700
"	Nigeria International Communications (Federal Government)	CIT – Alcatel	100
1978	Nigerian Newsprint Mill Company Oku-Iboku (Federal Government) Brewing Plant, Kaduna, Beverage Industries of Nigeria	Sode teg	140
1979	Hydro-Electric Complex, Niger/NEPA	Fougerolle	1,300
"	Petrol Reservoirs	Delattre-Levi-vier	120
"	Atlas Cove Jetty Nigerian Ports Authority	Dragages and Travaux Publics	211
1980	Brewery Plant Sona Breweries	Serete	150
"	High Tension Electric cables and Infrastructural Provisions in Abuja-FCDA	Dumez	1,000
"	Modern Public Housing (Infrastructure) Constructions in Warri/Federal Government	Dumez	900
1980	2,000 Housing Unit Federal Ministry of Housing and Environment	Sainraptaud Brice in Association with Sefri Construction Internationals and Sefri Nigeria	215
"	1,000 Housing Units FCDA	Societe Auxiliaries d'Entreeoruze with SAE Construction's – Nigeria	100
"	Construction of Plat-Form/Shell	UIE	128
"	Abuja International Airport – Federal Ministry of Aviation	Dumez	360
"	Airport Road Abuja (44 km)	"	180
"	Central Civil Works Construction Ajaokuta Steel Plant	Fougerolle	2,800
"	Construction in Ajaokuta Complex (lot no 3) Ajaokuta Steel Plant	Dumez	2,000
1981	Eastern Breweries Ltd. Plant Owerri	Technip	250
"	Plan African Breweries Ondo State Government	"	220
"	Diamond Breweries Enugu	"	150
"	Construction of Hilton Hotel Abuja	Dragages and Traveux Publics	1,157
"	Construction of Sheraton hotel 300 Rooms – Borno State Government	Sefri Construction Internationale	200
"	Construction of Sheraton Hotel 300 Rooms – Benue State Government	"	174
1981	500 Housing Units Construction at Ajaokuta	SAE/Fougerolle Nigeria	100
"	Electricity Supply from Thermal Power Plant Egbin for Distance of 40km to Lagos	Bouygues	1,000

Year	Contract/Client	Company	Value/MFRF
"	Construction of Oil Platform – GOCON	UIE	360
"	Construction of Flow Station & Gocon	UIE	125
"	Rehabilitation of Road Drainage Culverts etc. in Okigwe, Federal Ministry of Works	Fougerolle	174
1981	Potable Water Treatment Plant, Okene Kwara State Government Water Corporation	Degremont	143
"	Construction of Onitsha Port – Federal Ministry of Transport, Inland Water Ways Division	Dragages and Travaux Publics	126
"	Potable Water Treatment Plant Iju-Lagos State Government Ministry of Environment	Degremont	100

Source: *Moniteur du Commerce International (M.O.C.I) (Paris) August (AOUT) 1982 p.37*
Akwaya, op cit, p.139)

4.3.4 France's Economic Relations with other Anglophone Countries

Apart from Nigeria, South Africa came next in French economic relations with Anglophone countries in Africa. As noted earlier, France supplied the apartheid regime with military equipment and allied goods in exchange for South Africa's Uranium, coal and iron ore, Gold and diamond among other strategic minerals. France also imported timber from Liberia.

One of the world's leading producers of electronics, Thompson CSF was also very active in Anglophone countries as it was in the Francophone. In the 1970s, the company entered Nigeria and carried out a number of businesses. During the same period, Thompson won a contract of \$13.6 million to provide broadcast facilities for the Voice of Kenya. It also supplied vital equipment for the aviation and telecommunications sectors of France. The group also signed a contract for installation of navigation equipment for Zimbabwe's eight airports with credits of about \$10.9 million provided for the project under the Franco-Zimbabwe financial protocol signed in 1981(Yahya, *op cit*).

From the foregoing, a distinct feature of French economic relations with Anglophone countries is easily discernible. Apart from investments in oil exploration and production in Nigeria, French companies focused more on trade in commodities (exports and imports). The trade was only in items she either had comparative advantage or needed most as raw materials for industries. Thus, French companies preferred juicy government

contracts in all sectors of the economy to getting involved in the real sectors with the rare exception of Nigeria where French companies like PAN, Michelin etc were involved in active manufacturing. This situation was different in the Francophone as the various cooperation agreements and French aid policy made it possible for more concrete investments to flow to the former colonies.

4.4 AID, COOPERATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The 1958 Constitution provided opportunity for the colonies to secure their independence on the basis that the countries would continue to cooperate with France. Cooperation between Paris and the Francophone came in military, economic, cultural and political spheres based on agreements concluded in each case.

The "French community", which France was committed to building, was strategic to her power projections in the international scheme of affairs. For the community to endure, France went out of her way to sustain the African states with development aid.

In order to pursue this policy on a long-term basis, a special Ministry Of Overseas Development and Cooperation was created with the responsibility to coordinate and administer development aid to Africa and strengthen the various strands of cooperation.

To say that France attaches great importance to aid as a key component of her foreign policy might be an understatement. This commitment clearly manifested in the frequent reviews of the country's foreign aid and development policy. These reviews came through the Pignon Report of 1961, the Jeanneney Report of 1963, the Gorse Report of 1970 and Abelin Report of 1975. These Reports recommended various measures to streamline French aid and make them more potent as a tool for French control and influence.

In the Jeanneney's Report, a clear distinction was drawn between aid and cooperation. The report defined aid as "*that totality of intellectual and material contributions, which involve the sacrifice made by the countries that make them*" while cooperation on the other hand is viewed principally as "*as contribution through coming together*" (Yahya, 1994. p.45.)

Since 1956, France concluded several cooperation agreements covering the fields of finance, industry, commerce, culture, technical assistance, investment and training.

One of the first of such agreements was signed with Tunisia on June 16, 1956 for post-independence economic assistance. This agreement became a model document used by France in preparing economic development agreements with other countries. France later concluded several agreements with her core colonies in West Africa – Ivory Coast, Senegal, Benin, Togo (initially a German territory, was only handed over to France after the Second World War as a trust territory under the trusteeship agreement of the UN) etc. In West Africa, the creation of the France zone otherwise called West African Monetary Union was a product of cooperation between the former colonies in West Africa and France. The Union was legalized with a treaty on 12th May, 1962 and an accord of cooperation between France and the member states of Africa on the same date (*Ibid*). A similar treaty had been signed earlier between France, Central banks of Equatorial Guinea and Central Africa in 1960 for the setting up of a Monetary Union (UMOA). This is a clear case of France's hegemonic influence as members of the France zone gave up their sovereignty with their national currencies controlled from Paris. Although most of the agreements were timeless, they had to be reviewed constantly to take care of emerging concerns of both parties. In a few cases, some countries unilaterally repudiated the agreements. Mali for instance initially withdrew from the zone on November 22, 1960 only to re-join a few years later.

4.4.1 French Aid to Africa

French aid to Africa came through two aid agencies, *Le Fond d'aide et de cooperation* and *La caisse centrale de cooperation economique*. In the 1970s and 1980s, French aid to Africa came mostly in public grants. But as the economies of the former colonies expanded, France moved from grants to soft loans for development support. Martin (*op cit*) notes that the total official development assistance increased from 16 per cent in 1979 to 30 percent in 1982. Sub-Saharan Africa received 60 percent of total French bilateral assistance with the main beneficiaries being Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal and Gabon. In 1982, total French financial flows to these countries showed that Ivory Coast received

\$631 million, Cameroon \$303.2 million, Senegal \$294.4 million and Gabon \$168.4 million (*Ibid*).

Martin (1985,p.200) asserts:

these same countries were in 1974-5 the recipients of 60 percent of French direct investment in Africa, primarily directed towards oil in Cameroon, Congo and Gabon; Phosphates in Senegal and Togo; Iron in Mauritania; Manganese in Gabon; Copper in Zaire; Chlorite in Madagascar; Bauxite and Aluminium in Cameroon and Guinea; and Uranium in Gabon, Niger, and the Central African Republic.

French official development assistance to Africa fluctuated over the years reflecting either the mood of the administration in Paris or dictates of international economics. In 1980 for instance, France ODA was 0.38 percent of her GNP. The package increased to 0.45 percent of GNP in 1981; 0.49 percent in 1982 but reduced to 0.47 percent in 1983(*Ibid*).

These figures however, fell below the official target of 0.70 percent. About 50 percent of the ODA to Francophone Africa went to technical assistance with the balance provided as economic, budgetary and financial assistance. In order to strengthen and sustain cooperation with the Francophone, France constantly encouraged formation of groups or associations of African states and their leaders.

As early as May 1959, four countries Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey formed *Le Conseil de l'entente*. This was to be followed by *L'organisation commune Africaine et Malgache* (OCAM), which comprised all Francophone African states in February 1965. When President Pompidou noticed certain weaknesses in OCAM, he initiated the Franco-Africa Summit Conferences in November 1973(Martin,1985,p.202). The conferences have not only become an annual event they have expanded in scope and relevance. France sustained the complex mix of cooperation links with the former colonies as well as the aid regime for the economic benefits derivable from it. As Nwokedi correctly asserts, the "*financial and technical exchanges have not jerked spectacular dividends* (Nwokedi, 1983.P. 58).

Indeed, complaints from West African States under the Franc zone led to reform of Central Banks of the member countries in 1972 and 1973. The reform included Africanisation of staff of the Central Banks and approval to place a certain percentage of their foreign reserves – (35 percent for West Africa and 25 percent for Central Africa) in countries other than France. This policy was “*circumscribed by the proviso that in the event of a run on the reserve standing of these African states, these minority percentages placed outside the Franc zone must first be exhausted*”(Ibid). Furthermore, the reforms never addressed fundamental issues of fixed parity, limitless convertibility and compulsory deposits.

A Major criticism of French aid policy was the uses to which the beneficiary states deployed them.

French aid, whether or not disbursed through the investment fund for social and economic development (FIDES), aid and cooperation fund (FAC) or the Central office for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) is usually tied to purchases from French industries or from their subsidiaries in other Francophone countries (Nwokedi,1983.p.58)

Besides, African countries were worse off under the policy, which sought to introduce French people in the management of the various sectors of the economy. In this regard, the case of Ivory Coast is particularly striking. By 1960, the number of French technical assistants stood at 1,346. This increased to 3,390 in 1974. This personnel cost the French government an average of 2.2 billion Franc cfa per annum. On the Ivorian side however, the cost rose from 1.3 billion Franc cfa in 1960 to 12 billion Franc in 1974 being its contribution to the management of the personnel (Ibid). This scenario was even worse in other countries and indeed introduced enormous stress on public expenditure. But even at that France was beginning to feel the burden of overseas assistance and attempted to review her aid policy towards Africa. Attempts by the Maury Government in June 1981 to re-order France and Francophone relations met with stiff resistance from some African leaders including David Dacko (Central Africa Republic), Omar Bongo (Gabon) and Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire).

President Georges Pompidou for instance sought to re-order priorities in the administration of aid. His idea was to expand activities of industrial sector abroad and drive more investment flows to the ex-colonies. Pompidou felt "the stage of aid was "outdated" and that countries like Ivory Coast and Cameroon needed more private investments than handouts. He therefore adopted an aid policy, which sought to reduce the cost of cooperation and by extension, burden on public treasury. This policy meant that aid would assume a technical character – contributing more to the economic growth of the African states concerned. This of course meant a reduction in French overseas development package. Of course, this was unacceptable to many African countries under the OCAM arrangement with countries like Zaire, Congo, Cameroon, Chad, Madagascar and Gabon suspending participation (Bach, 1986. p.77).

The disagreements peaked in July 1981 when President Francois Mitterrand refused to receive visiting CAR Prime Minister who was in Paris to discuss the future of relations between the two countries. Similarly, Lionel Jospin, First Secretary of Mitterrand's Socialist Party declined to receive visiting Gabonese President but instead accepted to host the President's opponents about the same time. President Bongo who was facing criticism from the French press over his relations with the preceding administration of Giscard d'Estaing felt embarrassed as he was infuriated by the turn of events. France was however, forced to abandon this stance following indications by the USA to embrace those countries being neglected by her with development assistance (Bach, 1986.p.82).

In a rather desperate move, France returned to full embrace of these countries by adopting very unpopular measures just to protect her interests. For instance, in the following month of August 1981, she supplied equipment to Cameroon to prepare for war with Nigeria as the border dispute between the two countries heightened tension. Also, in November 1981, French Presidential Adviser on African Affairs Guy Penne declared full cooperation with Zaire in spite of Mobutu's worsening human rights record. This was against the prevailing international mood, which favoured sanctions and isolation of the Mobutu dictatorial regime. In fact, French troops training Zairean army received fresh instructions not to get involved in the local affairs of Zaire thus foreclosing any possibility of Mobutu's ouster by the military with the support of French troops

(Bach, 1986. p. 82). During the Franco-African summit of November 1981, France's new administration of Mitterrand declared it would relate with Africa, regardless of their human rights records and to give vent to this, Zaire was allowed the privilege to host the next edition of the Summit in 1982. These strategic maneuvers by France were in line with her status as a hegemon who had to lay the rules and provide leadership for the stability of the system.

4.4.2 Cooperation and Aid to Anglophone Countries

French net flow of aid and financial assistance to the Anglophone was insignificant when compared to the flows to Francophone. This was however, in line with the underlying philosophy guiding provision of development finance assistance to African countries. France generally based her assistance to Africa on a number of factors including

the extent of rapprochement between former French colonies and metropolitan France the extent of conduciveness of the operational environment in which French economic interests can be expanded and promoted in non-Francophone countries and humanitarian consideration (natural disaster, economic instability, etc)
(Akinterinwa, 1999, p.148).

From this criteria therefore, most Anglophone countries did not meet French conditionality to attract aid except for the prospects of expansion of French economic interests like the case of Nigeria. Besides, most of the Anglophone states were initially hesitant of French aid and cooperation and preferred direct investment inflows. Nigeria, for instance, avoided French aid in the 1970s given her role in the Biafran crisis. The economic assistance rendered South Africa in the apartheid era was illegal and a violation of sanctions placed on the country by the international community.

As noted earlier, France must have provided various forms of aid to Nigeria through secondary methods like multilateral organisations. Although attracted higher aid from France for economic reasons, her package was far less in relation to the aid inflows to the Francophone as already pointed out.

Table VIII: A Comparison of the Total Official Net Flow of French Assistance to Nigeria Compared with the Other Main Donors, 1977 – 1993.

	FRANCE		U.K.		U.S.A		GERMANY		NETHERLANDS		CANADA		JAPAN		DAC:TOTAL
Year	Value \$(m)	% of total	Value \$(m)	% of total	Value \$(m)	% of total	Value \$(m)	% of total	Value \$(m)	% of total	Value \$(m)	% of total	Value \$(m)	% of total	(\$ M)
1977	N/A	N/A	4.8	21.9	-7.0	-31.9	2.3	10.5	4.3	19.6	3.6	16.4	10.9	49.8	21.9
1978	-5.3	34.0	8.8	56.4	-6.0	-38.5	0.9	5.8	2.7	17.3	1.6	10.3	9.7	62.2	15.6
1979	3.2	17.8	2.3	12.8	-3.0	-16.7	7.6	42.2	2.5	13.9	0.7	3.9	1.5	8.3	18.0
1980	37.1	52.0	3.9	5.5	-3.0	-4.2	20.8	29.2	3.4	4.8	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	71.3
1981	4.1	6.9	2.5	4.2	7.0	11.8	12.3	20.8	1.0	1.7	0.8	1.4	0.0	0.0	59.1
1982	4.0	4.7	3.5	4.1	-5.0	-5.9	60.3	71.1	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.5	3.7	4.4	84.8
1983	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A
1984	4.3	1.9	2.4	1.1	50.0	22.5	131.9	59.2	0.6	0.3	1.5	0.7	0.7	0.3	222.7
1985	3.9	1.8	4.2	1.9	152.0	68.3	42.0	18.9	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.6	1.7	0.8	222.5
1986	5.8	4.6	5.5	4.4	1.0	0.8	100.0	79.6	2.3	1.8	1.1	0.9		13.0	10.4
1987	563.5	54.3	3.9	0.4	1.0	0.1	388.1	37.4	2.9	0.3	1.2	0.1	83.7	8.1	1038.6
1988	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A	=	N/A
1989	5.4	1.7	103.2	33.3	6.0	1.9	8.9	2.9	2.2	0.7	2.8	0.9	165.9	53.9	309.8
1990	6.3	3.6	24.7	14.3	22.0	12.7	18.0	10.4	3.7	2.1	2.5	1.4	78.7	45.6	172.7
1991	6.1	3.6	68.2	39.7	13.0	7.6	36.4	21.2	15.8	9.2	1.1	0.6	19.6	11.4	171.6
1992	18.8	13.7	21.3	15.5	19.0	13.8	15.2	11.0	3.7	2.7	2.3	1.7	42.6	31.0	137.7
1993	7.6	10.7	20.0	28.2	15.0	21.2	14.5	20.5	0.9	1.3	2.3	3.2	1.2	1.7	70.8
TOTAL	664.8	24.2%	279.2	10.2%	262.0	9.6%	859.2	31.3%	47.0	1.7	24.5	1.0%	433.2	15.8%	2742.7

Source: Compiled from OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows of Developing Countries (1977 – 1980, 1979 – 1982, 1984 – 1987 & 1989 – 1993) (OECD: Paris). Akinterinwa, (1999) Nigerian & France, 35 years of Dilemma op. cit).

The table above shows that from 1978 to 1993 French financial assistance was \$664.8 million representing 24.2 per cent of the overall flows from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. This placed France in the second place after Germany, which aid stood at 31.3 per cent. From 1979-1985, Nigeria was clearly the highest recipient of French aid among Anglophone countries in West Africa with 75.1 percent of French financial assistance to Anglophone countries in the sub-region in 1980, 38.1 percent in 1982 and 36.4 per cent in 1985.

Ghana came next until 1982 but was replaced in that position by Gambia from 1984. The table also shows that Ghana took over the first place from Nigeria in 1989. This notwithstanding, Nigeria still remained the biggest destination of French financial assistance when viewed in total as the figures from 1980-'93 show clearly that Nigeria received 73.7 per cent or \$666.9 million of the total financial assistance of \$904.3 million from France to Anglophone West Africa. This represented 12.7 per cent of the total of \$7129.9 million financial assistance from DAC countries to Anglophone West Africa during the period. The above picture presents two motives of French aid. Firstly, in the Francophone countries, French aid circulated to all the countries as an instrument of control and influence in France's international power calculations. In the Anglophone, aid was a window through which French economic interests penetrated the countries.

4.3 CULTURAL RELATIONS

Culture occupies a pride of place in the formulation and conduct of French foreign policy. It was for this reason that the French colonial and neo-colonial policies centred on the spread of French values abroad especially the colonized people. This was the essence of the colonial policy of assimilation, which was espoused in Chapter three (3.2), as it was the basis of De Gaulle's policy of *grandeur*. The spread of French culture has a long historical basis dating back to the French revolution of 1789 when French language became more widely spoken in parts of Europe and Asia. Since then France worked deliberately to internationalise her language and other values such as liberty, fraternity and equality. In the colonial territories however, these values were hardly enjoyed in full by the people. French culture found expression in various ways including Catholicism, music, sports, education and spread of French Language.

France's cultural activities in Africa came in three approaches. First through multilateral agencies like the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and other international organisations, through bilateral relations and through private French citizens. French cultural agents abroad apart from the Christian missionaries include military personnel at the various commands and the national voluntary service members. The media also played a crucial role especially, the Radio France International which broadcast in English, French, Hausa, Swahili, Arabic, Amharic, Lingala and other languages. The radio station which broadcasts to all of Africa is supported by the *Agence France Press* (AFP), the wire news service and French newspapers like *la monde* were distributed to all Francophone countries the same way television programmes were distributed to Francophone countries free by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation.

By 1976, there were about 16,300 French religious agents abroad, 1,350 of the 17, 500 strong military personnel abroad were working as cultural agents, there were 7,300 national voluntary service members and about 18,910 civilian agents from both governmental and non-governmental establishments working actively to popularize French culture across the globe (*Statistics from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Paris, 1982*). These agents were in virtually every area of endeavour including sports (soccer) either as players or coaches.

The French have over the years perfected the ways of ensuring the spread of their language. One of such ways has been through conferences involving African states. As noted earlier, the Franco-African summit of Heads of Governments initiated in 1973 by President Pompidou and sustained over the years by successive Presidents became a veritable avenue for cultural indoctrination of high level officials as French language was used in those conferences for communication and in the official records. The French community has since been extended to include former Belgian colonies like Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi.

Before the 1973 summit was initiated there were organizations like the Federation of Universal French whose activities included the organisation of biennial French language conferences; the International Law Institute for French Speaking States established in 1964 as well as the High Committee of French language and the Association of Francophone Solidarity established in 1966. There was also the Organisation of French Speaking Deputies established in 1967. Two years later, the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation was created (Data from Ministry of Foreign Affairs Paris, 2007). Still at the governmental level, there were several conferences of French and African Ministers in areas like justice, education and culture, health and sports. These meetings meant the sustenance of French systems of education, judiciary and administration in the former colonies. As Martin (1985, p. 203) notes "*the wholesale importation of the French administrative, fiscal, judicial and educational systems by these states necessarily leads to a situation of acute cultural dependency*".

Since France considered the spread of her language essential for promotion of her culture abroad, huge budgetary votes were made to finance the spread of the language. In the 1977 budget for example, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation earmarked FF441, 944, 208 for cultural activities abroad representing about 12.5 per cent of the budget at Quais d'Orsy (French Budget, 1977). On the whole, the French Government provided FF5 billion that year alone on cultural activities with education, training and teaching services getting FF1.42 billion; Research and scientific co-operation FF 1,44 billion; while assistance to development and cultural and technical cooperation excluding education and training got FF.1 billion. Of course, a substantial part of these funds went to African countries. In 1965, the African countries got 88 per cent of the total bilateral cooperation between France and foreign countries. The African countries got 73.9 per cent in 1969 and 70 per cent in 1977 (Yahya, *op cit*).

Another vital source of her cultural policy is through educational opportunities. The French believed that through education, students would imbibe French culture, values and language. Thus, successive French Governments paid more than a passing attention on cooperation in the educational sector. In the 1970s there were an estimated 130,000 students enrolling in French institutions annually from countries with which she had

various co-operation agreements. This was in addition to the estimated 900,000 students who were children or dependants of foreigners working in France.

It has been established that there were 130,000 foreign students in France in the year 1978-79. Out of this figure, over 108,000 were full-time students in universities and colleges as against 25,000 in 1963-1964 and 52,386 in 1972-1973. Out of the figures of 108,471 foreign students, 51.5 per cent came from Africa (32,112 from Maghreb and 21,363 from Africa South of the Sahara and the Indian Ocean countries (Statistics from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Paris. 1982).

The point to note here is that majority of the students from Africa were from the Francophone countries as France had no cultural agreements with the Anglophone countries to enable them benefit from her educational opportunities.

The case of Nigeria further justifies this position. It was not until 1979 that the Francophone studies programme was inaugurated between the University of Ife (Nigeria) and the University of Bordeaux (France). There was also some level of cooperation between the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) Zaria and the *Universite de Bordeaux* Centre For Local Government Studies for training of manpower in the area of local administration. In 1980, six Polytechnics in Nigeria- Bauchi, Calabar, Enugu, Ibadan, Kaduna and Yola entered into cooperation to offer training in civil engineering and electronics. This was further to the French cultural centers known as *Alliance Francaise* established in Kaduna, Lagos, Ibadan, Kano, Port Harcourt and much later Owerri and Ilorin. Such centers were also established in other Anglophone countries notably Ghana and Sierra Leone. Through these centers, France promoted the study of French language and other cultural activities like painting, sculpture, architecture, music and literature. Some Nigerian students got scholarships to study in French Universities and other institutions of higher learning. The language barrier did not encourage much of private citizens of both countries to travel to both countries for holidays, exhibitions, and other pleasure visits (Franco-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce, Lagos.2007).

The skeletal cultural ties with Nigeria were a reflection of the hostility and confrontation, which characterised the relations between the two countries in the 1960s up to early 1970s. The cultural ties were however boosted in 1984 when Nigeria signed a cultural,

scientific and technical co-operation agreement with France. The agreement provided in the main to:

develop co-operation in the fields of culture, education, arts and sports between their two countries through exchange of university Professors, teachers, experts, technicians, scientific research workers and providing scholarships and grants to students and graduates to study at each others universities, institutions of higher learning, technical training institutions, laboratories , factories and other educational institutions. (Agreement between Nigeria and France, 16TH May, 1984).

This new wave of cultural relations led to conferment of the prestigious award of Officer of *Legion D'Honneur* (Legion of Honour) on Nigeria's Petroleum Minister, Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman in 1989 by the French Secretary of National Cultural Relations, Thiemy De Beauce (*The Punch*, October 5, 1989). What is remarkable about this agreement is that it was consummated at a time Nigeria's relations with Britain, her former colonial master were at the lowest ebb because of the military overthrow of the democratically elected government of President Shehu Shagari and the diplomatic row which broke out between the two countries over the failed attempt to smuggle in a crate, the former Transport Minister in the ousted administration of Shagari, Alhaji Umaru Dikko. Of course, France's action was clearly to take over the position of Britain in the area of trade, contracts and market for her goods.

In South Africa, the dominance of the Dutch and British within the white segment of the population did not pose an attractive area for French cultural activities. Thus, relations between the two countries were confined to economic, strategic, political or diplomatic activities.

CHAPTER FIVE
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY TO AFRICA
1990 – 2006

5.1 DETERMINANT FACTORS FOR CHANGE OF FRENCH POLICY TO AFRICA

The last decade of the 20th century came with a lot of challenges to France both in her continued development as a nation-state and in her relationship with the international community. These challenges as stated earlier arose partly as a result of developments within France and happenings in the international system both of which combined to influence the conduct of French foreign policy.

One of such developments was the collapse of communism in the defunct USSR and the rest of Eastern Europe and the subsequent end of the Cold War- the ideological and military contest of the leading superpowers, USSR and the USA. While the Cold war lasted, United States and Britain watched developments on the continent keenly with the view to checking the advance of communism. In doing so, the two countries had to contend with France, which as earlier stated, regarded herself as an external force on the African continent. France showed reluctance in allowing the territories of her former colonies as theatres for the ideological war. The sheer presence of her military personnel on the continent in large numbers was to ward off any intrusion by any of the superpowers. But the end of Cold War necessitated fresh policy options for France in her dealings with Africa. One of the new policy initiatives was to get closer to the Anglophone countries and at the same time embrace Britain by cooperating on issues concerning Africa. In other words, the end of the cold war opened up the international system making it possible for France to engage countries which she hitherto did not have close ties with.

Another factor was the collapse of the Berlin wall and re-unification of the East and West Germany. This remarkable political development brought about a more cohesive Europe with Germany, France, Britain and Spain playing key roles. In the spirit of the new union therefore, France like other European countries had to adjust to the new reality of the regional structure. The new regional structure had a number of institutions which

emerged after the consolidation of the European Union (EU). These include inauguration of the E. U. Commission and Union Parliament among other integration structures in Brussels, Belgium. There was also the introduction of a common currency, Euro in 1999 and establishment of European Central Bank etc. These institutions required France to think and act in the larger interest of the objectives of the Union. Of course this was antithetical to the fundamentals of French foreign policy anchored on the Gaullist philosophy of *Grandeur* which placed emphasis on the propagation of French civilisation. This development also raised genuine fears among the citizenry about the independence of France to express herself in the international community. The debate on whether to join the common currency for instance became a controversial topic in French politics with direct consequences on the government. Equally polemical was the debate to integrate French military command structure into the NATO arrangement. Both of these impinged directly on France's identity within the emerging union.

Internally, France witnessed a change of administration during this period. Francois Mitterrand who was president for 14 years was succeeded by Mr. Jacques Chirac who was elected Conservative (Gaullists) President on May 7, 1995. Chirac had to share power with the Socialists under the policy of *cohabitation* (power sharing by different political parties in the central government under one presidency) begun in 1986. After two years in the saddle and faced with numerous challenges, Chirac called for a surprised legislative elections in May 1997. In the election, a coalition of the left, led by Lionel Jospin, a Socialist who had lost to Chirac in the 1995 general elections took over power as Prime Minister. Under the French constitution, the President has the final say on matters of diplomacy and defence. But since the policy of cohabitation was introduced in 1986, the Prime Ministers select the Ministers who implement the policies. During Chirac's first term, he shared powers with Socialists until in 2002 after his re-election before he assumed firm control of the foreign policy apparatus of France. This situation had its consequences on France's foreign policy posture towards Africa since the Conservatives differ in their approach to African affairs from Socialists. Chirac in his campaigns had indicated his intention to run a policy of "changes in continuity"- meaning changes in tactics and implementation strategies while maintaining the core objectives of

French policy to Africa.

Chirac's declaration on the future of relations with Africa raised hopes of possible return to the old era of paternalism. According to him

"..between France and Africa, there is another level of relations, which is that of the heart,..., based, among other things, on the lives laid by so many Africans when our freedoms were threatened... My resolve therefore is to re-affirm with force the African priority of France (African International Magazine, Paris, 1995, published in The News, Nigeria, May 22, 1995).

Chirac also indicated his intention to move closer to the major economies in the Anglophone bloc when he stated that *".. we must first encourage regional grouping while taking due cognizance in particular of the economic importance of Nigeria and South Africa, of their integration process with other African economies and of their capacity for becoming poles of growth"*(Ibid) The change in administration did create a lot of anxiety in Africa going by the policy pronouncements of the new administration. This anxiety was best captured by the *New York Times* thus

when Jacques Chirac won the French presidency ... returning conservatives to power, champagne toasts were offered in some Africa capitals by leaders who expected a return of the Cozy paternalism that had marked Gaullist policy towards Africa for more than three decades.... But far from ushering in a return to a comfortable past, Chirac's tenure has coincided with one of the most turbulent periods in French's long and deep involvement in Africa. Increasingly, in both France and Africa, people have begun to wonder if Paris' special relationship with the continent can or should survive (New York Times 6th December, 1996).

Whatever were the expectations, Chirac's policy of "changes in continuity" made it impossible for Franco-African relations to return to the past era of paternalism of the Gaullist regime. More over the overwhelming presence of Socialists in his administration meant that such a policy would not be very popular or implemented in its true spirit and context. Chirac's shift from the traditional basics of French foreign policy as already noted was dictated by local and external factors. For instance, his successive appointment of radical prime Ministers beginning from Alain Juppé and Lionel Jospin and Jean-

Pearle Raffarin also translated to implementation of radical policies both at home and abroad. Juppee lost his job in the election of June 1, 1997 largely as a result of the extreme pro-Europe policies of his government.

Another factor is the change in the generation of French leaders and foreign policy experts on African affairs. One of such figures was Jacques Foccart¹ who was generally regarded as the architect of Francophone system in Africa. The change in the generation of the old leaders led to changes in the French foreign policy configuration towards Africa as the younger elements saw little or no need for the sustenance of the old policies. Furthermore, French domestic economy played a crucial role in the change in French policy during this period. The difficulties faced by French citizens led to endorsement of new minimum wage of \$6.75 per hour by the new government of Jospin in 1992(*The Post Express, with agency reports*, July 4, 1997), of course with the accompanying burden on the national budget. This compelled Jospin to propose austerity measures in the management of the national economy to cut down budgetary deficits which stood at 3.8 per cent of GDP. This proposal met stiff resistance from the organized labour movement. France indeed witnessed several strike actions in the years between 1990s and the end of the millennium. In 1994, national strikes by high students on the streets of Paris and other cities forced the Balladur Government to shelve the planned imposition of a "youth" minimum wage which was designed to increase employment of young people. Similarly, in November and December 1995, the new Government of Chirac was compelled to drop plans to reorganize the nationalized railway system and also revised the plan to reorganize the civil service following public service strikes and massive demonstrations. The following year, striking truckers won a number of concessions to enhance their operations while another round of strike by the Truckers and Taxi drivers in 2000 against rising cost of oil and gasoline compelled the Jospin government to reduce consumer taxes on fuels (Schain, A. Martin, 2001). These strikes, the worst in the history of France since 1968 had far reaching repercussions on French economy, politics, government and foreign policy as they reduced France's capacity to relate with the Francophone as in the past in the face of the local crises. The downturn in the economy therefore meant that France would introduce checks on foreign assistance thereby

dropping her paternalistic disposition of many decades towards former colonies.

Another factor that influenced the change of French foreign policy to Africa was the devaluation of the CFA franc. The value of the CFA franc was decreased by 50 per cent in January 1994. This policy was pursued by the French Ministry of Treasury in order to end the country's links with the Franc zone.(Pederson, Nicholas, 2000). The reason for this was to enable France become fully integrated into the emerging European monetary zone. It goes to say that if France had not devalued CFA franc and severed her monetary ties with the Francophone, she would have had to bring these countries into the monetary zone of Europe thereby tying the CFA to euro. The implication of this is that European monetary policies would automatically affect Africa whereas there was no economic or political justification for this. It can therefore be argued that the devaluation of CFA and the subsequent severance of France from the CAF franc paved way for the easy monetary unification of Europe.

More fundamentally, France's access to alternative sources for uranium supply to fire her military capabilities other than Niger and Gabon which exclusively sold uranium to France over the decades was one of the factors necessitating policy change to Africa. As noted in chapter four, France relied almost 100 percent on Africa for "strategic raw materials" required for her military complexes to maintain her profile as a world military power. French company COGEMA had procured Uranium at relatively cheaper prices over the decades from Chad. But for strategic and other interests however, France during this period took her uranium deliveries from the United States, Australia, Canada and some little quantities from local production (www.google.com/search site visited on April 23, 2007). This economic and strategic decision combined with the other factors already outlined to influence the change of French foreign policy in Africa.

The Rwandan crisis and the international bashing which France received over her role in the genocide also necessitated a re-consideration of her policy to Africa. In the light of the country's bitter experience in Rwanda, Chirac in 1995 ordered the French Army to develop a new strategic approach to prevent them from getting implicated in intricate civil and ethnic wars (Touati, 2007). (The details of French involvement in the Rwanda

crisis and the impact on her foreign policy are presented in greater detail in section 5.2.4). Having looked at the factors which led to new foreign policy posture of France towards Africa, we shall turn to the components of the new policy. France's new policy to Africa during this period is best captured by French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine in Chirac's government.

The policy Charles Josselin and I are conducting consists in adapting to new realities and attitudes while maintaining a strong commitment – in contracts to most western countries. Historically, our policy has often been conceived in a spirit of rivalry with western countries present in Africa, starting with Britain. We are doing all we can to transcend that sterile competitiveness and adopt a concerted approach. Another major change: we no longer interfere in domestic crises. Since Lionel Jospin became Prime Minister, we have resisted pressure to intervene on what could in the short term seem good grounds. Finally, there is a policy of encouraging democracy in Africa, but without cynicism. The idea is not to apply criteria or make immediate demands on African countries so that they never manage to get their heads above the water (Le monde July 11, 2001).

An essential element of the new policy is that France prefers to partner with the former colonies rather than continue with the benefactor (paternalistic) status of the period immediately after independence.

the relationships with African states, with the whole African continent, are relations which today, are going out of the assistance system to enter into the partnership system. What is the partnership? It is reciprocity enrichment; it is a relation from equal to equal, that every partner builds with the acknowledgement of his rights and duties, in responsibility, with reciprocal obligations. It is a new way in which we engage with an immense hope and that not only concern this or this African states but all the relationship between France and Africa (Chirac's speech during the 22nd France-Afrique Summit in Paris cited in Touati, Sylvain:2007)

But the correct understanding is that France's new policy has as its cornerstone, reduction in military intervention and domestic affairs of Francophone countries, a new and better level of friendship with Anglophone countries through elimination of "rivalry with other countries in Africa starting with Britain" and operation of democratic governments as the

basis of future interaction and by extension co-operation with Francophone.

In differentiating the new policy from the old, Vedrine asserts that

firstly, it differs from not having one at all! Most western countries don't even think its worth having a policy vis-à-vis Africa, except a humanitarian one. As far as we are concerned, we don't think its enough to give a bit of aid, to issue ritual condemnations of obstacles placed on democratization and beyond that, just say "sort things out yourselves!" We aren't distancing ourselves in this way, France; Europe must have an African policy. Then, of course, our policy to be ashamed of what she did in her former colonies from de Gaulle up to Francois Mitterrand's La Baule Speech (June 1990). Neither fiasco, nor guilt. But both Africa and French realities and attitudes have changed. What was once considered self-evident in relations between France and Africa is no longer today (Ibid).

From this statement, the Minister does not say in definite terms what constitutes these "African and French realities and attitudes" but one can deduce that they include the global realities already mentioned at the beginning of this study.

In Africa, the global wind of democratisation which swept across the continent during this period; the wave of globalization aided by information technology which has collapsed borders and internationalized cultures; the death of old French stooges and collapse of their puppet regimes like Ahmadu Ahidjo(Cameroun), Omar Bongo (Gabon), Felix Houphouet Boigny (Cote d'Ivoire), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire) constitute part of these "realities" on the African side. The end of "rivalry" in Africa between France and other Western powers also necessitated reduction in military pressure and change of focus in future military relations with Francophone. In defence of the criticism against France for abandoning the African continent, Vedrine avers:

That criticism, comes from people who, in reality would like to go back to France's erstwhile Africa policy, which they were more comfortable with, even though that's not what they're actually saying. The criticism of us for abandoning them is designed to make us feel guilty. But we don't need to "abandon" Africa, if that paternalistic expression has any meaning today (Ibid).

According to Vedrine

Adopting a global view of Africa today does not in anyway imply a withdrawal on France's part, quite the contrary, the truth is, it is no longer possible to consider Africa as a series of pigeonholes. Consequently, when I traveled to Gabon, South Africa, Ethiopia and the Ivory Coast, I stated that our policy has to consist in "loyalty" to our friends and parties, in "adaptation" of the various policy agendas to the African realities of today' and in "openness" towards the rest of Africa (Label Magazine, January, 1998).

Of course, the new French policy has come under criticism. Many Francophone States feel let down by "an old reliable friend" at the time of their domestic problems which in many instances claimed thousands of lives with devastating effects on development, peace and stability of the countries. The classical cases are Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Niger etc. This is in spite of their willingness to more meaningfully assert their sovereignties in the light of contemporary "realities".

This new attitude of France towards some of her former colonies has been viewed as waning influence in Africa. The former US Ambassador to Zaire, Daniel Simpson, for instance asserts that "France is no longer capable of imposing itself in Africa" (*New York Times op cit*). Whatever the criticisms might be, France does not appear to revert herself to the "old paternalistic policy" and she is "not ashamed" of her new policy irrespective of the reasons that informed it.

5.2 APPLICATION OF THE POLICY OF NON-INVOLVEMENT: MILITARY, STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ALGERIA AND COTE D'IVOIRE

France and her former colonies in Africa maintained long and very cordial relations at the highest political levels over the years. These relationships were strengthened by the existing military cooperation agreements which enabled France to station and maintain troops in military bases for protection of her interests in Africa and those of her Francophone allies. The main objectives for deployment of these troops were to quell internal revolt as well as checkmate Anglophone and American influences. This necessarily meant that France kept at arms length, Anglophone countries notably Nigeria which she largely regarded as a competitor on African affairs.

In the years 1990 – '99 however, France took steps to re-order her political and military alignments on the continent moving closer in the process to the Anglophone bloc. One way in which she did this was the drastic review of her military presence on the continent. Three years into his first term, President Jacques Chirac in 1996 announced fundamental restructuring of French armed forces in which he declared suspension to recruitment (conscription) into French armed forces just as he said emphasis would henceforth be placed on professionalism. His first Defence Minister, Charles Millon while elaborating on the new policy a few months later, said France would review her 8,200 troops deployed in Africa in consultation with countries with which she had defence agreements.(Europe 1 Radio. Reported in *Daily Champion Newspaper* January 10, 1997).

Millon's successor, Alain Richard was even more explicit on the plan when he announced after a tour of three African countries Gabon, Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), that France would cut its troops from 8,100 to 6,000 and the forces redeployed at France's five bases in Senegal, Gabon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire and Djibouti as well as the *Bour* base in the CAR (*Liberarazion* (France) August 4, 1997 republished in *Daily Times*, August 5, 1997). France implemented this plan by reducing her troops to 5,600 in 2002. Richard also said the number of French combat planes based in Africa would be cut to a dozen from 15 while transport planes would be increased from about six or seven to nine(*Ibid*).The higher number of transport plans was France's strategic plan to provide for evacuation of nationals in the time of emergency.

The reduction in French troops in Africa meant also the reduction of French intervention in the internal affairs of former colonies. In pursuance of this new policy, France opted to pull out her nationals in areas of conflicts as opposed to the old order when she deployed troops to quell uprising against puppet regimes (*Label Magazine, op cit*). This new policy also entailed suspension of military supplies to the former colonies with which she had outstanding military cooperation agreements.

Vedrine's defence of this new policy explains France's new military posture towards Africa.

The five French bases are still a stabilizing factor. They were, in the past, sometimes, used for old-style interventions. That's over. Today, the forces on our bases are used for training the host countries' armies or regional peace forces, and if need be, in the evacuation of foreign communities. We stopped thinking solely in terms of the 'French community' a long time ago (Le monde, op cit)

Vedrine had canvassed this position as early as 1997 when he, in the company of President Chirac arrived Hanoi, Vietnam on state visit. According to Vedrine

"As far as the French military presence in Africa is concerned, France will of course honour its commitments under the agreements it has concluded. However, it will refrain from any interference in internal conflicts. At the same time, France is also seeking to reduce its military presence. Indeed, with the armed forces now turning professional in France, military personnel numbers no longer need to be as high and military bases may well be reduced" (Label, Magazine, January, 1998).

On the political level, France used the instrument of La Francophonie to draw Anglophone countries closer to her. La Francophonie which is the Forum of French Presidents and Heads of governments of Countries which use French as a working language was started in 1987.

It was successor to the French African Summits started in the late 1970s by President Pompidou. The annual conferences were initially restricted to the Francophone counties. In 1997 however, Anglophone countries notably Nigeria were invited to join the conference as observer. The invitation which was then seen in the light of French support for the largely isolated military regime of Gen. Sani Abacha, has continued to be extended to successive leaders. President Olusegun Obasanjo also attended some of the conferences which France used to further expatiate on her new policy towards Africa. In February, 2003, Obasanjo and South African President, Thabo Mbeki attended the summits in Paris. In spite of protestations from Britain, France invited embattled Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe under suspension at the time from the Commonwealth for alleged human rights abuses. This was because Nigeria favoured the invitation of the Zimbabwean Leader. (Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, 2007). From all indications, it appears that France took the decision to please Nigeria in obvious safeguard of her economic interest in Nigeria's oil industry. It was nevertheless in defiance of the international opinion which favoured sanctions against Mugabe and the

isolation of his administration.

In the 1997 conference, France used the opportunity to subtly but firmly sound a note of warning on the imperative of "democracy and governance" which according to the French President had become pre-condition for development assistance.

Good governance naturally elicits international solidarity and encourages increased commitment on the part of providers of official development assistance. It allows private initiative to flourish and by creating a propitious business climate attracts foreign businessmen without which no development is possible. Good governance has become the essential precondition for development. An absolute imperative for funds donors and recipient countries (Chirac, speech at 19th Conference of Heads of State of France and Africa, Hanoi (Vietnam), November, 1997).

In the light of the new policy, the summit endorsed the Francophone community's political decisions and appointed a Secretary-General, a political spokesman for the community and coordinator of economic, cultural and linguistic cooperation programmes.

It is instructive to note that France has in the face of diminishing resources for assistance to her African allies introduced the pre-condition of "good governance" which in the Western sense is only possible through democracy. Before now, France extended huge development aid to African countries with sit-tight dictators like Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko and even nurtured and sustained such regimes regardless of the international tide of opinion as long as they served her interest. In the 1999 summit, the principles of Hanoi were reinforced with clear cut declarations on the need for respect of human rights. Canadian prime Minister, Jean Chretien, who hosted the summit explained that:

"As a political group, La-Francophonie will place respect for human rights and the guarantee of fundamental freedoms at the center of our priorities"(Communiqué of meeting of Heads of States of France and Africa in *Thisday*, Nigeria, September 7, 1999)

Apart from the Summit/Conference, France moved to warm up to non-Francophone countries through carefully organized State visits. In 1997 for instance, Vedrine made his first but comprehensive tour of Sub-Saharan Africa by visiting Gabon, South Africa,

Ethiopia and Cote d'Ivoire to explain the new French policy (Label op cit).. This was followed in July 1999 by President Chirac's State visits to Guinea, Togo, Cameroon and Nigeria which BBC said "marked French policy shift" (BBC, Monday, July 19, 1999 17:49 GMT; 18:49 UK). The visit to Nigeria, the first by any French President was particularly significant for the fact that Chirac was the first leader among permanent members of the UN Security Council to visit Nigeria less than two months after restoration of democratic rule on May 29, 1999. Beyond this, the President undertook a series of activities while in the country to underscore the new relevance of Nigeria in the scheme of French foreign affairs. Apart from the traditional meeting with his Nigerian counterpart, Olusegun Obasanjo, Chirac met with Senate President, Evan Enwerem, before signing an agreement with Nigeria for the establishment of Nigeria -France Economic Commission. He also laid the foundation for the French Embassy in Abuja. During Chirac's visit, he spoke on very controversial issues including the Bakassi dispute expressing confidence in Nigeria's ability to amicably resolve the crisis with her neighbour Cameroon, which was slated as his next point of call (*Thisday*, July 23, 1999, *Guardian* July 23, 1999).

A few months after Chirac's visit to Nigeria, a delegation of French Parliamentarians led by Deputy Chairman of French National Assembly, Patrick Ollier visited Nigeria. The Ollier delegation spent one whole week with the leadership of the Nigerian House of Representatives. The delegation discussed issues of cooperation including training Nigerian legislators and staff. Ollier announced during the visit, the formation of Nigeria-Friendship Association in the French Parliament, which he said already, had 77 members. He used the visit to re-assert France's confidence in Nigeria to promote the union of West Africa.

In the foregoing analysis the study has showed the new paradigms in French policy and the factors that influenced the change of policy towards Africa. In the following sections of the chapter, the focus of the study will be on selected case studies in both the Anglophone and Francophone blocks where we shall demonstrate how the new French policy played out under specific circumstances.

5.2.1 The Political Crisis in Algeria

Algeria, the North African country was one of the territories where France's policy of assimilation recorded the best success anywhere in Africa. At the time of Algeria's independence from France in 1961, France had well over two million nationals in the country, making Algeria, the country with the largest concentration of French population on the African continent. For this reason alone, Algeria was central to France's foreign policy calculations in Africa. This was underscored by the fact that Algeria was the only non-European country mentioned in the North Atlantic treaty as French territory. It was this treaty which paved way for the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Algeria meant much to France because the North African country served as a reference point for the projection of French civilisation to the rest of Africa.

Although Algeria waged a bitter independence war to free herself from the claws of French colonial rule, successive governments in the post independence Algeria could not but maintain strong relationship with France. This was necessary since the peoples of the two countries had become closely linked by language and other elements of French culture as a result of the French policy of assimilation. Relations between the two countries were however impaired during the period covered by this study due to the changes in French policy towards her former African colonies. The political crisis in Algeria during the period best captures this situation.

Political crisis erupted in Algeria in January, 1992 following the cancellation of elections in which an "extremist group", the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win. Following the election annulment, the Fundamentalists unleashed violence and terror on the Algerian nation in varying dimensions over a period of three years. The violence was targeted at the military backed government of Liamine Zeroual, former Defence Minister, who was appointed interim President of Algeria in the wake of the crisis. The violence was characterized by explosion of car bombs; burning down of public buildings, armed attacks on political opponents, crackdown on the militants by government forces and security apparatus.

The protracted violence claimed between 30,000 and 50,000 lives even though the government admitted that only about 20,000 lives were lost. (*Sunday Champion*, November 26, 1995.) The Algerian Prime Minister, Mokdaj Sifi said his country had spent about \$2billion in budgetary releases to fight the militants. (*Daily Champion*, May 1, 1995). The violence went on unabated despite several efforts by the Algerian Government and members of the international community to contain the militants until 1995 when new elections were conducted and Zeroual was elected president of the country. (*Sunday Champion*, November 26, 1995). The political violence as it were took a heavy toll on the relationship between France and Algeria. An analysis of the casualties of the crisis indicates that of the 100 foreigners killed, 31 were French. At the time of the civil strife about 2000 French nationals were in Algeria, 1000 of them mostly elderly and clerics and another 1,000 temporary oil and gas workers working in Algeria.

Of the 31 French nationals killed in the crisis, the death of two nuns touched France the most. Denise Leclerc, 65 and Maltese Jeanue Little John, 62, had lived and carried out missionary work in Algeria for about 30 years. The two nuns were gunned down on a Sunday evening September 3, 1995 while returning from evening prayer just outside their residence. (*Daily Champion*, September 6, 1995). The death of the two nuns brought to 11, the number of Christian clerics killed in the violence among which were seven French, two Spanish, one Maltese and one Belgian. These developments compelled France to order her nationals to leave Algeria unless their presence was indispensable. ((*Sunday Champion*, November 12, 1995).

Beyond the death of French nationals, there were indeed other developments which further affected the relationship between the two countries. A French Airbus aircraft bound for Algeria was hijacked in December 1994 in a bloody operation masterminded by FIS agents. This development forced French authorities to compel Air Algeria, the Government owned carrier to direct its flights to Charles de Gaulle Airport Paris instead of the Orly terminal where it usually landed. The disagreements which followed this directive led to the suspension of flights by the Algerian Airline to France. The airline which operated 10 daily flights to Paris had already sold 40,000 tickets at the time of the suspension. The development made many passengers including those on transit to be stranded as Air Algeria was the only company serving the Algeria – Paris route at the

time (Sunday Champion, July 2,1995). In another round of violence, an Algerian national, bombed a Paris commuter train in the heart of the Latin quarters in Paris in which seven people died and 80 were wounded. (*Daily Champion*, August 28, 1995).

The hostility between the two countries arose mainly as a result of the lukewarm attitude of France to the crisis. Apart from feeble comments by French officials, there was no concrete action by France to support her former colony to contain the insurgence of the Islamic militants. This was in spite of the fact that France was extending huge financial packages to Algeria before the crisis at the level of about five to six billion francs (about \$1 billion) a year. The seeming inaction or unwillingness of France to "intervene" in the Algerian crisis as she had done in many former colonies shortly after independence was informed by her new policy towards Francophone countries which de-emphasized involvement in the "internal" political activities of the countries. This showed a clear difference from the era of paternalism when the political problems of a Francophone were taken as a direct responsibility of France.

Curiously enough, France came out forcefully to demand an early conduct of parliamentary poll shortly after presidential election in which the military backed Zeroual was returned President on November 16, 1995 . The refusal by Algeria to heed French "advice" worsened relations between the two countries. Algeria in fact labeled French advice as "interference" in her internal affairs. It was not until 1996 at the funeral of former French President, Francois Mitterrand that Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf met with his French counterpart Herve De Charette. This was the first step taken to improve relations between the two countries since the crisis. (*Daily Champion*, January 15, 1996).

With benefit of hindsight, France's new policy on Africa prevented Chirac's government from assisting Algeria to sort out her political problems. In that circumstance, we contend that the crisis would have been resolved sooner if France had played a mediating role at the onset and also backed the government in its campaign to deal with the Islamic militants. Although the existing agreements between France and Algeria had sufficient provisions to enable France intervene in the crisis to stop the blood letting, she chose to look the other way as long as the crisis lasted. It is significant to note that in the period

after independence, France would have found justification to move troops to support the government in power.

5.2.2 Political Instability in Cote D'Ivoire

The political instability in Cote d'Ivoire started in 1993 after the death of Felix Houphouet Boigny, the President of Cote d'Ivoire (formerly Ivory Coast) since independence in 1963. Boigny who ruled the country with iron fist, hailed from the Baoule ethnic group found mostly in central and eastern parts of the country. The Baoules are mostly Catholics as opposed to the northern groups who are mainly muslims and practitioners of other traditional African religions.

Following the death of Boigny, his protégé Henri Konan Bedie, another Catholic from the South who he had groomed as successor actually succeeded him. Boigny's Prime Minister, Alassane Quatarra, a Muslim from the North felt short-changed with the ascendancy of Bedie as he felt he should have succeeded the late Leader. He protested this and resigned his position vowing however, to stage a comeback someday (Hodge, T. Theodore, 2003). After two years in the saddle, Bedie's policies earned him a large army of opposition built largely around the personality of Quatarra. As the 1995 general elections approached, Quatarra surfaced as one of the frontline presidential candidates.

The administration of Bedie, apparently threatened by the prospects of Quatarra's victory at the polls introduced the policy of "Ivoirite or Ivorianness". The policy stipulated that only Ivoriens whose parents were both descendants of the country could be regarded as truly citizens. Under this policy, it mattered very little if you were born and bred in Cote d'Ivoire of parents from other countries. This policy was targeted, in the main, at Quatarra whose mother the government claimed was from Burkina Fasso. (Hodge Theodore op cit). Quatarra apparently frustrated by the turn of events boycotted the elections but insisted he was Ivorian. Having served as the country's Prime Minister, it is doubtful if the government's claim was tenable. Nevertheless, Quatarra accepted his fate but remained a credible rallying point for opposition politicians and groups. As another general elections approached in 1999 political tension in Cote d'Ivoire reached a feverish pitch. An army officer, General Robert Guei seized power in military coup d'état and ousted the administration of Bedie (*The Guardian*, January 12,2000) The coup was

largely condemned by Nigeria, ECOWAS and the international community, which gave the junta six months to restore constitutionalism in the country.

Guei, like Bedie continued with the divisive politics up to the elections. He barred both Bedie and Quatarra from contesting the polls but accommodated Laurent Gbagbo, historian and trade union activist who had been for many years, a pro - democracy activist and leader of the Ivorian Popular Front. If Guei's action was to place himself in a vantage position to win the elections, he was wrong. As the results of the polls poured in, Gbagbo took an early lead. A disappointed Guei halted the electoral process and declared himself winner.

The mass protest which trailed Guei's action ousted him from power. Gbagbo was installed President. In the bid to bounce back to power, Gen. Guei staged a coup when Gbagbo was on official engagement outside the capital. The coup attempt led to an uprising in which Guei was killed. Gbagbo was reinstated but Cote d'Ivoire had become a theatre of war. Quatarra was chased by armed men. He ran and took refuge in the French embassy. Several militant groups emerged each championing an ethnic or religious cause. Cote d'Ivoire once regarded as peaceful, stable and fast growing economy under Boigny slid into a country replete with chaos, insecurity, violence and criminality, perpetrated by rebels groups.

France's Stance on the Crises

France watched without concrete action as the political instability in her former Colony snowballed into ethnic rivalry and violence. This was against the spirit of the existing agreement between two countries. Unlike the past when France intervened in countries like Chad to reinstate an elected administration after coup d'état, France failed to get Guei out of power to allow the elected administration of Bedie conduct elections. The much France did was protect her citizens and several investments of her nationals which were obviously threatened during the crisis.

After much prodding, Chirac eventually responded to intervene in the crisis by summoning all the parties to Marcoussis. At the meeting however, Chirac and his Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin harshly treated Gbagbo, whom France had supported over the years. Among the agreements reached, Gbagbo was to appoint from the rebels,

the key Ministerial positions of Defence and Interior Affairs.

Gbagbo's political platform, the Patriot's rejected this aspect of the agreement even though it had been ratified by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. The Patriots, in demonstration of their anger against Chirac and France, led mass actions which sacked the French Embassy and Cultural Center. They also invited the US to replace France as Ivorian's superpower master as the protesters banners read: "French out, Americans in" (Hodge. 2003).

As the violence against France and European nationals deepened, about 9,000 French residents and other European nationals fled Cote d'Ivoire (*Le Monde Diplomatic* 1997-2003). The fleeing French nationals were evacuated on 14 flights chartered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and military aircrafts provided by other European countries. France spent about E5million to airlift her nationals and provide relief and temporary accommodation on arrival in France through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "The demonstrators torched French schools, looted the homes and businesses of white residents and confronted French troops which took control of the airport and several other key locations (www.irinnews.org accessed on Jan.18.2007). Ivorian military aircraft bombed a French military base at Bouake. In that operation, eight French military men were killed (<http://www.diplomatic.gouv.fr> retrieved on February 2, 2008) In the violent confrontation against French nationals in major Ivorian cities, 57 people were killed and over 2,000 others sustained injuries of varying proportions. (*Ibid*). This development really shook France which had to expand its military presence of 1,000 troops to 5,000 personnel to protect her economic interest in the country. French nationals controlled Cote d'Ivoire economy with about 500 small and medium enterprises and also controlled public services like water, electricity, telephones and transport. (*Ibid*)

It is to be pointed out that this kind of treatment before the 1990s could not be contemplated by any of the former French colonies talk less of Cote d'Ivoire which had the closest ties with France. But the change in policy which meant reduced influence in the affairs of the former colonies paved way for this unfortunate state of affairs.

5.2.3 Violence in Niger and the Killing of Mainasara

Although Niger is not a main case for consideration in this study, developments in this Francophone country are similar to those in Algeria and Cote d'Ivoire and are relevant to further demonstrate the new French attitude to her former colonies. It is therefore appropriate to consider the political development in this country and what France's response was in the light of her new foreign policy posture to Francophone.

Niger acquired a somewhat negative reputation for political instability during the period covered by this study. Since independence from France in 1963, the country was ruled largely by military governments which seized power in turns until President Malamane Ousmane was elected the first democratic president in April, 1993. Ousmane's administration was however overthrown late January, 1996 by Colonel Barre Mainasara who immediately set up a body of 300 Nigeriens to review the country's constitution. Under the new constitution, Mainasara manipulated the political programme for handover of power with impunity and imposed himself as the new "democratically elected President". Barely two years into his first tenure, Mainasara was shot dead in broad day light by his own Aide de camp (ADC), Lt. Col Mallam Wanke in 1999. The bloody coup precipitated political tension in the impoverished country as the new military government led by Wanke haunted politicians loyal to the assassinated President.

While the crisis lasted, France did nothing to help the former colony stem the violence despite the fact that the military cooperation agreements between the two countries were still in force. France's attitude during this period marked a clear departure from her decision of 1963 when she intervened in the political crisis of the country to quench a military uprising against President Hamani Diori.

As in Algeria and Cote d'Ivoire, France's inaction was clear indication of waning interest in the internal political affairs of the former colonies in line with the new African policy.

5.2.4 The Rwandan Genocide

Rwanda was originally not a French colony but came under French control as one of the mandate colonies during the Second World War. This explains why the French speaking Tutsis of Rwanda have enjoyed France's support and solidarity since the country's

independence. Indeed France treated the Tutsis as if they were one of the former French colonies in Africa even though it is part of the independent State of Rwanda. For this reason France signed a cooperation agreement with Rwanda in 1970 thus bringing the Eastern African country effectively into the network of the Francophone countries in Africa.

The crisis in Rwanda presented the greatest challenge to peace and security on the African continent in the 1990s. The crisis which enveloped the entire great Lake region began on April 6, 1994 when a rocket attack (surface to air missile) brought down the plane carrying Rwanda President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundi President, Cyprian Ntaryamira who were returning from an OAU meeting on Burundi. The crashed plane also claimed the lives of several French citizens on board.

Habyarimana, a Hutu was believed to be the target of the attack which was suspected to have been carried out either by Tutsi rebels or moderate Hutus opposed to the Arusha agreement which provided for power sharing between the majority Hutus and minority Tutsi. Paul Kagame, the next Tutsi president of Rwanda was at the time of the attack Head of the Tutsi rebel- Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), which had after a fierce resistance of the Hutu onslaught, dislodged the Hutu -led government to gain control of the country.

The violent clashes lasted for just over three months but claimed between 800,000 and 1,000,000 lives (Mthembu, Gregory, 2004); Report of the War Crimes Security Centre, January1, 2004). Horrible scenes were witnessed during the short but bloody crisis. In some scenes, crocodiles and vultures fed on human corpses. The Bishop of Gisenyi was buried alive in the North Western border of Rwanda. (*Daily Champion* September 15, 1995). Such scenes became common place throughout the period of the genocide.

As a result, thousands of Tutsis flee to neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo and other countries for safety. They were however, not safe as President Laurent Kabila of DRC backed the Hutus in reprisal attacks to ensure ouster the Tutsi led -government. After the Tutsi gained control of the government eventually, over two million Hutus flee the country ending up as refugees in Tanzania and Zaire. Almost half of these people died in the refugee camps while survivors suffered disease and squalor. (Garuba,1998).

The Rwandan crisis did not only challenge the sensibility of the international system, it

tasked the UN, OAU and the Super Powers who traded blames on whose responsibility it was to intervene in Rwanda while the crisis lasted (Roland, Marshal, William, I., 1996).

The Role of France in the Conflict

Two months after the outbreak of hostilities between the Hutus and Tutsis, France launched an "interventionist" programme for Rwanda code named "Operation Turquoise." The "aim" of the operation which saw deployment of French troops to the region, was to facilitate aid shipments to hundreds of thousands of refugees scattered in virtually all countries of the Great Lakes region. As it turned out, Operation Turquoise became an outfit for promotion and protection of French interests in the genocide.

Under the auspices of the operation, France effectively organized airlift of hundreds of her nationals trapped in the war zones. France which was suspected to have supplied the rocket fired at the aircraft conveying President Habyarimana also surreptitiously backed the French speaking Hutus who carried out the genocide. (*Thisday* March 17, 2004).

As noted earlier, rather than mobilize international support to end the crisis, France engaged in debates with the US as to who had responsibility to intervene in the crisis. France also failed to properly brief the EU on the right measures to take to halt the bloodletting.

The crisis claimed over 800,000 lives, mostly Tutsis. But the massacre of some Hutus late April 1995, a year after the crisis began by the Tutsi dominated government of Paul Kagame made the EU to suspend direct aid to Rwanda EU had pledged to give Rwanda grants and assistance totaling E111.1 million and another E41.5 million assistance to help rebuild Rwanda's infrastructure. But all these were withdrawn by the EU including another #58 million long-term grants and E11.6 million risk capital from European investment. (*Daily Champion*, May 1, 1995). All these were predicated on human rights abuses of the Tutsi- led government. France had influenced EU decisions on these issues given her strong backing for the Tutsis.

France's role in the entire crisis became a subject of inquiry in 1998 when a panel of the French parliament began investigation into French international policy in the last three decades. A special National Assembly Committee was set up to probe allegations that:

French forces in Rwanda propped up the Hutu – led government, slowed the advance of rebel Tutsi forces seeking to end the 1994 Massacre of moderate Tutsi and Hutus and helped genocide organizers flee Rwanda for safe havens in other countries. The panel also wants to determine who killed Hutu President, Juvenal Habyarimana in April 1994 rocket attack, the incident that triggered the killings (www.cnn.com Retrieved 9th December, 2004).

At the inquiry, Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine who was Chief of Staff to President François Mitterrand at the time of the Rwanda crisis defended France's actions saying the Mitterrand government's involvement was to seek a cease fire despite lack of international support, the objective being to maintain stability in French – speaking Africa where Paris had a number of mutual defence treaties.

According to Vedrine, " France was the only country to be in contact with everyone, that's why the contacts were maintained even after the massacres. That's why its wrong to talk about support. We were working towards a cease fire seeking UN mandate. Most major nations don't like Africa and don't believe it has a future. France had an African policy unlike others (Ibid).

In its comment about France's role in the genocide ten years after the crises, French Magazine, *World Revolution Archive* asserted that "... inside Rwanda, our country's troops, under orders, had trained the killers who carried out the genocide against the Tutsi. We armed and encouraged them and when the day came, provided cover for them". (www.internationalism.org visited last on December 20, 2004).

The magazine states further that:

It was France which had fully supported the régime of President Habyarimana. From the early 90s Rwanda had become a prize in the geo-strategic game between French imperialism and American imperialism. Rwanda had an obvious importance in this inter-imperialist conflict because it is at the frontier of the zone under French control and the one under US control (Ibid)

It is significant to note that French action in the region was against the prevailing international mood which favoured an immediate halt to the ethnic cleansing. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said, the reluctance of the UN, the US and indeed other critical members of the international system to act decisively to bring the genocide in Rwanda to a halt was underscored by their strategy to avoid a possible confrontation with

France, who had engaged the US in hot exchange of words over the supposed roles and responsibilities of the two countries in the region.

5.2.5 Political Crisis in Zaire

Zaire, the country with the largest territory in the Great Lakes region also witnessed its round of conflict in the mid-1990s. The violence stemmed from the political differences between the “Patriarch” of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko and opposition politicians who later formed rebel groups. The Zairean crisis however, peaked immediately after the genocide in Rwanda. Of the rebel groups, Desire Laurent Kabila stood out for his consistent onslaught on the Mobutu – led government in Kinshasha.

Kabila was product of a coalition of four ethnic groups of Tutsi roots including Banyamulenge of the South Kivu Province and Banyarwanda of Northern Kivu. These groups which had been denied Congolese nationality since the early 1990s engaged in clashes with their neighbours. The new government in Rwanda led by a Tutsi – Paul Kagame decided to extend support to the Tutsi groups in Congo. Rwandan authorities then consolidated these groups into a main opposition (rebel) coalition with Kabila, originally from Katanga province as the leader and spokesman. (*Ibid*) The Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), the armed forces of the new Rwanda administration provided extensive support to Kabila leading to his overthrow of the Mobutu government in May 1997. As the battles raged, Mobutu fled the country when rebels closed in on the capital Kinshasha, taking control of vital areas and public buildings.

Kabila who took over power changed the name of his country from Zaire to Democratic Republic of Congo. He formed a government dominated by RPA elements who also had a stronghold in his armed forces. This romance did not last long as Kabila in the middle of 1998 ordered the RPA out of DRC. This action angered Rwandan authorities who felt embarrassed by this seemingly “ungrateful” act of Kabila.

In August 1998, RPA working with Rwandan armed forces attempted to overthrow Kabila's government which they accused of supporting anti-Rwanda government elements still residing in the eastern part of the DRC. The attack was however, repelled with the combined support of Zimbabwean and Angolan troops. (www.selfdetermine.org retrieved on August 8, 2002). The bloody conflict which followed left Kabila with only a part of his large territory as Rwanda and Uganda took control of the east of the country. By 1999, the two countries also clashed and their alliance against DRC broke down until Britain intervened to broker a truce (*Ibid*)

The events in Congo- the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko and re-establishment of the Democratic Republic of Congo dealt a big blow to French foreign policy in Africa. While the crisis lasted, France tried to protect Mobutu who had been isolated by many African countries and world leaders by launching a humanitarian initiative similar to the Operation Torquoise in Rwanda in December, 1996. This move was suspected by the international community which saw it as a ploy to rally international support for Mobutu. That support however, was inadequate to stop the movement of rebel leader, Laurent Kabila into Kinshasha and the eventual ouster of Mobutu. Consequently, the crisis took its toll on Congolese and foreign nationals especially in the capital where the struggle to control the Presidential Palace and other public buildings became so fierce. It is worthy of note that giving the experience of French armed forces in quelling rebellions in African countries as established in the preceding chapter, and coupled with the clear advantage in military equipment France obviously had over the rebels, it would have been possible to stop or at least delay the advance of Kabila. From all indications, the conclusion can be made that the last minute support of Mobutu was pretentious. This view is supported by the declaration by Paris of a policy of "concerned neutrality" (*ni ingerence, ni indifference*) (McNulty, 1999:1) which made it possible for France to begin to deal with Kabila in 1998. A year earlier, France was hostile and vehemently opposed to the Kabila administration to the extent that cooperation aid was suspended and loans for reconstruction of the destroyed economy and collapsed infrastructure were conditioned upon observance of human rights (*Ibid.*)

France's action in the Congo (DRC) as in Rwanda were based on perceived threats to French speaking people by groups backed by the "Anglo-Saxons" particularly, the US and Britain. In the second war which erupted in DRC following the killing in 2001 of Kabila and his succession by the son Joseph, the US and Britain backed the English speaking Uganda and the RPF regime in Rwanda led by English speaking Tutsi. These events made the entire Central African region a "front in global culture war."

5.3 MILITARY, STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SOME SELECTED ANGLOPHONE COUNTRIES 1990-2006

5.3.1 Nigeria

The mutual suspicion which seemed to guide political and strategic relations between Nigeria and France in the period after independence (1960s-1980s) changed to one of cordiality, mutual understanding and cooperation when Nigeria was engulfed with serious political crises in the early 1990s. The crisis began with the implementation of the nation's transition from military to civilian rule initiated by the military administration of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida in 1986.

The transition programme was planned to terminate by 1990. The terminal date was however, shifted thrice in what became known as the "Maradona" style of the military ruler. (The military ruler was nicknamed "Maradona" after the famous Argentine soccer star of the time, Diego Maradona whose dribbling artistry was internationally recognized, in reference to the many times he dribbled Nigerians about the terminal date of military rule and his regime). The final date for military disengagement from power, August 27, 1993 again was not realized as the military regime annulled the election of June 12, 1993 which was to have produced an elected President. In the election widely acclaimed as the most transparent in Nigeria's political history, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola was in the lead and un-official results indicated he had won the polls with a wide margin. The umpire of that election, Professor Humphrey Nwosu, later confirmed that Abiola actually won the election (Nwosu, 2008).

The manipulation of the of transition programme culminating in the annulment of the poll began shortly after the commencement of the programme itself. Some of the glaring cases of manipulation include change of the Chief electoral officer of the federation

(Chairman of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) Professor Eme Awa, arbitrary cancellation of gubernatorial primaries in some states, initial ban and later lifting of ban on certain categories of politicians; dissolution of the elected executive committees of the two government- founded and funded political parties-Social Democratic Party(SDP) and the National Republican Convention(NRC); cancellation of presidential primaries of the two parties in 1992 among others. In spite of these contradictions, the international community gave Nigeria a chance and extended a good measure of support to ensure an end to decades of military rule. Most of the advanced countries of the world rendered various forms of assistance to the government and people of Nigeria in the implementation of the political transition programme.

The last segment of the programme was the presidential primaries of the two parties held under fresh guidelines in April 1993. This process produced Chief Abiola as Presidential candidate of the SDP and Alhaji Bashir Tofa as candidate of the NRC. However, eight days to the scheduled general elections on June 12, one of the earlier disqualified presidential aspirants, Chief Arthur Nzeribe claiming to be representing a hitherto unknown political organization, the Association for a Better Nigeria (ABN), sought and obtained an order from an Abuja High Court restraining NEC from conducting the scheduled polls. The order also directed the elections be held in 1997 implying that the military regime of Babangida would continue in office until the elections were held.

The court order notwithstanding, NEC proceeded with conduct of the elections and as the results came from the states, Abiola took a clear lead. Results from 14 states were released by NEC. These were Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, Plateau, Kaduna, Kogi, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Edo, Kano, Borno, Niger, Abia and FCT(Abuja). Announcement of the results had to be discontinued on June 16 following yet another order from an Abuja High Court. By now tension was rife across the country. The National Security and Defence Council(NSDC), the highest decision making body in the Babangida regime held a crucial meeting June 23 to appraise events of the previous weeks. At the end of the protracted meeting, the Council annulled the polls *to save the nation from chaos and anarchy and protect the integrity of the judiciary.(National Concord, June 24, 1993).* This development was greeted with outrage both within and outside the country. Protests

mounted in parts of the country led largely by pro-democracy and human rights groups. The press took side either in support or opposition to the decision depending on the interest of the proprietorship; markets were closed in parts of the South West of the country; lawyers boycotted court sessions etc all in the bid to compel the military regime to de-annul the election.

At the international scene, there were moves by Nigerians in diaspora to get their host governments nationalize assets of serving Generals. The US Congress and British Parliament passed resolutions urging the Nigerian military authorities to revalidate the polls. The international media did not spare Nigeria either just as multi-national organizations condemned the action by the military government. Canada and Japan campaigned for respect for the outcome of the polls. The European Community on its part suspended all forms of aid to Nigeria and imposed sanctions on Nigeria, banning government officials from visiting any of the European Community member countries except the headquarters in Brussels for purposes of negotiations.

The political impasse that followed led to the un-ceremonial exit of Babangida on August 27, 1993 but only after he had instituted a handpicked civilian government tagged Interim National Government(ING) led by renowned businessman, Chief Ernest Shonekan. The new leader initiated a six-month transition programme, appointed a new electoral chief in Prof. Okon Uya, a historian and slated fresh presidential elections for March 1994. However, three months on the saddle, the military led by Gen Sani Abacha, Minister of Defence and one of Babangida's close confidants seized power from ING, and re-instated full-blown military rule. At this point, the international community had given up on Nigeria. The country was heading towards a failed state.

Abacha who took over power soon consolidated and went on the offensive against pro-democracy and human rights groups. Not only did he refuse to revisit the issue of the annulled election, he initiated a transition programme which he manipulated at will to pave way for his emergence as civilian president at the end of the programme. In the process, anybody who constituted an impediment to Abacha's self-succession bid was eliminated by his agents, hounded into detention or constantly harassed by security

agents acting on the express directive of the Commander-in-chief. The climax of the human rights abuses was the brutal execution of Ogoni minority rights crusader and playwright, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his Ogoni kinsmen on November 10, 1995. The "Ogoni nine" had been convicted by a military tribunal over treasonable charges. The killings coincided with the meeting of Commonwealth heads of government in Auckland, New Zealand. This action drew the ire of the international community at large. The Commonwealth which received news of deteriorating human rights condition in Nigeria immediately suspended the country's membership and imposed a wide range of sanctions (*Daily Champion, November 11, 1995* with Agency reports) which include travel restrictions on top government officials, ban on importation of arms, training of all cadres of the Nigerian armed forces, stiff visa application procedures for Nigerian citizens wishing to visit any of the commonwealth member countries especially Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand etc.

Under these conditions, Nigeria became an outcast in the comity of nations. Her citizens lived under the fear of the unknown as political activists were declared missing, eliminated or detained by the day. While this went on, Gen. Abacha began plotting his way for self - succession as civilian president at the end of his warped transition to civil rule programme. The manipulation continued until June 8, 1998 when Gen. Abacha suddenly died.

While Nigeria suffered isolation from the rest of the world, France saw this as a rare opportunity to warm up to the country and take the position of Britain and other advanced countries of the world which were hitherto close allies of Nigeria. According to Akwaya (1998)

while Britain and the US were in the forefront of condemning the military leadership in Nigeria, France maintained such undignified silence on the political situation in the country. Apart from the action of the European community which France is a leading member, she did little or nothing independently to show that the situation in Nigeria was a set back to democracy and travesty of justice whereas France parades herself as a promoter and protector of fundamental rights of liberty and fraternity.

The attitude of France most probably explains why Abiola did not visit the country when he embarked on an international campaign to sensitise the international community about the political problems of Nigeria. This also explains why pro-democracy activists who fled the country at the height of the dictatorship never opted for France for asylum. (political activists who fled the country include: Nobel prize winner in literature, Prof. Wole Soyinka, Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Air Commodore Dan Suleiman(rtd.); Chief Anthony Enahoro; Chief Odigie-Oyegun; Chief Ralph Obiora, Chief Cornelius Adebayo; Hon. Tokunbo Afikuyomi etc).

There were three reasons for France's action. First, France at this moment was having not the best of times with Laurent Kabila, the new leader of Zaire and therefore needed the friendship of Nigeria at all cost to make up for the loss in Zaire. Secondly, France had for long viewed Nigeria as a threat to her interests in West Africa. The crises therefore presented an opportunity to engage Nigeria more closely.

A clear example of the friendship between the two countries was the ease with which French diplomats had audience with Gen. Abacha and other top officials of government when it was nearly impossible for diplomatic missions of other countries to meet with top government officials. While EU envoys sought to no avail to meet with Abacha or his Ministers, French Ambassador, Pierre Garrigue-Guyonnaud and his successor Philippe Peltier had unfettered access to top government officials. Their visits to Nigeria's seat of power were usually given elaborate coverage by the government controlled media especially for the complimentary remarks they usually made about Abacha and the programmes of his regime. In one of such visits to the Minister of FCT, Gen. Jerry Useni, Garrigue-Guyonnaud declared "*we are in favour of a speedy return to democracy, but we do not want to give a name or give precise advise to Nigeria as to where, how and when to evolve its own democracy. It is up to Nigeria and Nigerians to fashion out its own type of democracy and our wish is for the country to return fully back to democracy as quickly as possible.*" (Daily Times, July 11, 1995)

This statement was a clear endorsement of the much criticized political transition programme Abacha was bent on executing for the already stated objective.

As a follow up, Mr. Peltier who took over the following year from Garrigue Guyonnaud criticized Britain for opposing the self-succession plot of Abacha when he declared in his speech on the occasion of the *Bastille* day that “ *no one can dictate to France neither will France do same to any country*”(Daily Times, July 17, 1997). Of course, there were economic and other benefits France targeted in the new level of relationship with Nigeria. On the political level, the two countries enjoyed the confidence of each other as long as Abacha was alive. Suffice it to say that French posture came under severe criticism by the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), the umbrella body for anti-military, pro-democracy and human rights crusaders. The organization in one of several statements said:

Since change is the most permanent thing in life, France should not continue to undermine its long time promising business relationship with Nigeria because of the opportunities for making easy money under the current expediency...Nigeria will remember those nations in support of democracy when victory is ultimately won. (The Guardian, August 4, 1997).

Whatever were the intentions of France, she had a ready ally in Abacha who at the time was most willing to court the friendship of major World power(s) as replacement for Britain and the US.

Under Abacha, France courted Nigeria's friendship when other European countries were isolating the West African country on account of her poor human rights records. The partnership between the two countries is a classic example of interdependence both at the political and economic levels. France needed to “snatch” Nigeria from her traditional allies-Britain and the US and the political crisis offered a rare opportunity to achieve that objective. At the same time, Nigeria needed the support of a powerful country like France as a check to the hostile disposition of Britain, US, Canada and other powerful countries of the West towards her.

5.4.1. Liberia

Major political violence erupted in 1990 in the West African country of Liberia founded by ex-slaves from America in 1822. The crisis was mainly as a result of the rebellion launched by Charles Taylor under his organization known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) aimed at seizing power from the country's dictator, President Samuel

Doe. NPLF under the leadership of Thomas Quiwonkpa had unsuccessfully attempted to take over power from Doe in 1983; but it was Taylor's initiative which plunged the country into many years of bloodshed. Taylor, a former top official of Doe's government fled the country after he was accused of helping himself to the public till of \$900,000. Following the shameful massacre of Quiwonkpa in the event of his failed coup plot, Taylor embarked on international campaign to mobilize support against Doe. As part of the campaign, Taylor launched his first major armed raids in 1989 from bases located in Cote d' Ivoire into Nimba county with the help of Burkinabe soldiers provided by the country's President, Blaise Compaore. And in just six months of the rebellion, Taylor's NPLF took over Buchanan, the country's second largest commercial town and port. In July 1990, Doe's control of Liberia was only limited to Monrovia, the capital where he tried in vain to repel the onslaught of the rebels until he was killed by a factional leader of the NPLF, Yomie Johnson in the same year.

The events in Liberia were not helped even with the arrival of a 3,000 strong contingent of armed forces dominated by Nigeria under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) whose duty was to keep peace in the war-torn country as fighting exacerbated with more factions emerging. One of the factions which emerged in 1991 called itself United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) and led by two former Ministers of Doe, tried to engage Taylor's NPLF in bitter struggle to control Liberia. Several agreements brokered by ECOWAS under Nigeria's leadership to end the fratricidal war broke down ever before they were implemented. By the time the historic Abuja accord was being signed in August 1995, at least seven rebel groups were operating in Liberia each laying claims to leadership of the country.

The fighting continued after the agreement but the campaigns also went ahead in the spirit of the accord which enunciated a time table for elections. Despite the pockets of violence and fighting in some parts of the country, the elections eventually held in July 1997. Expectedly, Taylor who always had an upper hand in the armed conflict won the vote with a large margin of 75% of votes cast(*Lutte de Classe*, the political magazine of the Comrades of Lutte Ouvriere, France, issue 75, October 2003). One year after Taylor's

Presidency, fighting resumed in the country but this time between NPLF forces who had been incorporated into the national army and ULIMO-K faction. The faction was defeated by Taylor's army but another militia group which called itself Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) emerged. This group made Liberia ungovernable for Taylor leading to return of full blown conflicts in Liberia until Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo brokered a peace deal which saw Taylor voluntarily relinquish power and moved to Nigeria to avoid being tried by the US -British -backed UN war crimes tribunal

Throughout the many years of conflict, France subtly supported Taylor in his military operations. This earned Taylor continued hatred from US and Britain. Taylor was believed to be receiving military assistance from Libya, a sworn enemy of US and Britain. The two Western powers had consistently accused Libya of sponsoring terrorist activities in Africa and beyond. Also, Taylor was perceived as being backed by President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, a known puppet of France in the sub-region. In addition, Taylor received support mostly in finances and military supplies from President Felix Houphouet Boigny of Cote d' Ivoire, who was an embodiment of French assimilation policy in Africa as outlined earlier. The behind the scene support of France for Taylor best explains the opposition mounted by the Francophone countries in the region to the idea of the ECOMOG, the Nigerian initiative and what role it was expected to play until Nigeria used her political weight to push through with the idea (*Lutte de Classe* 2003).

France's backing of Taylor through her allies in the West African sub-region offers a classic case of interdependence. While Taylor, the warlord needed military supplies and bases of neighbouring Francophone countries to recruit and train his militia men, France tapped into the economic opportunities in the war-torn country. For example, immediately Taylor took control of the country, he signed agreements with French companies for export of iron-ore from Mount Nimba. This operation was supervised and coordinated by Jean- Christophe Mitterrand, one of the sons of the French President who was said to be a close friend of Taylor. For three years under this agreement, large tonnages of ore were shipped regularly from Buchanan to the French port of Dunkirk.

This went on side by side with export of hardwood logged from the NPLF controlled South through the port of San Pedro in Cote d' Ivoire for export to France and other European countries. These activities in addition to illegal diamond mines and sales attracted huge revenues for Taylor. These monies were kept in accounts in Abidjan through which payments for military supplies were done (*Lutte de Classe* ibid).

It is clear from the foregoing therefore that France acted at variance with other Western powers as far as the Liberian crisis was concerned. And this was in so far as her (national) economic interests were protected. The meddling into the internal affairs of Liberia was a deliberate strategy aimed at giving France an upper hand in the post war affairs of Liberia under the leadership of Taylor appeared the most likely militia leader to rule Liberia at the end of the war.

CHAPTER FIVE: NOTE

1. Mr. Jacques Foccart in all practical purposes coordinated French neo-colonial policies in Africa. A secret service officer, Foccart assumed different identities at different times to enable him carry out the assignments of the moment. At one time he was the official adviser to President Houphouet Boigny in which vantage position he coordinated French involvement in the Nigeria civil war (Biafra) working with one of his agents, Mr. Jean Meridieu Beaupre. He formed several companies for clandestine operations in support of the Biafran project including Beaujolin and Biafra Cada, which operated freighting of arms to Biafra through Gabon (Pean, 2003) *Affaires Africain*, Marabout, Paris.

He facilitated security liaison between the Israeli intelligence service MOSAD, and French secret service (SDECE), which later became known as DGCE. Foccart also doubled as Secretary-General for African and Malagasy Affairs controlled at No. 2, Elysee Street, Paris. From this vantage position, he also coordinated clandestine activities in Rhodesia through a network of secret service agents now operated under different identities like "Technical Adviser" as was the case in Ivory Coast (Ibid)

Indeed Mr. Foccart ran several other missions in Africa on behalf of French governments all aimed at ensuring neo-colonial dominance and firm control of Francophone by their former colonial masters.

CHAPTER SIX:

FRANCE'S NEW LEVEL OF SOCIO- CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ANGLOPHONE COUNTRIES: 1990-2006.

6.0 INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapter, the study established the new relationship of France with other Anglophone countries in Africa especially Nigeria in the 1990s on the political level. This chapter shows how the change in France's policy towards Africa affected relationship in cultural, economic and other spheres.

6.1 SPREAD OF FRENCH LANGUAGE IN ANGLOPHONE AFRICA

French language remains a major element of France's identity and patrimony. Since 2001, official policy on French language has been to develop teaching in foreign lands, promoting an active policy of plural linguism that makes French, the language of technological innovation and modernity across the world. The changing pattern of relations between France and her new found Anglophone partners was anchored on the spread of French language. And to achieve this, France focused on Nigeria.

Since 1969, France has developed a plan to popularize the French language in Nigeria. However, the frosty relationship between her and Nigeria as a result of France's involvement in the civil war did not help the realization of the plan. The plan to spread French language in Nigeria was anchored on two reasons. The first is that Nigeria is the largest (Anglophone) country on the continent and secondly, the fact of her strategic location as neighbour of a number of former French colonies in West Africa. France had thought that a sizable number of French speakers would draw Nigeria closer to Francophone and possibly reduce the mutual suspicion which existed between them. This was in line with France's long standing policy to "*consolidate French language wherever it is spoken as a mother tongue and to maintain the presence of French language in all the five continents of the world through international institutions and regional groupings*" (Yahya, 1994: p.154).

In this direction therefore, France as early as 1970 began to subtly influence the inclusion of French in the curricular of schools and colleges and also as a discipline in some Nigerian Universities. This she did through agreements with Universities and State

governments. One of the first in this regard was the Memorandum of Understanding with the Federal Ministry of Education on October 4, 1991 for the establishment of the Nigeria-French Village in Ajara, Badagry, Lagos. The French Village was designed to be an inter-University centre for French studies for the compulsory one year of French abroad programme which is part of the curriculum of most Universities offering degree programmes in French. The agreement provided that France would provide six of the twenty initial staff needed for take-off of the Village, award scholarships for training of staff; supplement the equipment provided by the Federal Government; and establish links between the Village and relevant organizations in France particularly, CAREL France. By 1997, the Village had graduated about 1000 students. The French Village library with over 8000 volumes of books in French language, literature, culture etc is the largest of its kind anywhere in Anglophone Africa (Ojo: 1996 cited in *Daily Champion*, April 12, 1996).

On June 20, 1991, the French Embassy concluded an agreement with the Imo State University to set up a programme for training of translators and interpreters. When Abia State was created and the University was moved to Okigwe, the agreement was renewed on November 12, 1992. Similar agreements were signed with Plateau State on December 19, 1991 and Kano State on March 30, 1995. These agreements were mainly to train teachers and exchange expertise in the teaching of French language. In the same vein the French Embassy signed another agreement with the Yaba College of Technology for the French Bilingual Secretary-ship programme which entailed the training of two staff of the Department of secretarial Studies in France, three week scholarship in France for the best two graduating students in French/ English Bilingual Secretary-ship in October 1993, 1994 and 1995. The programme was successfully concluded on schedule.

The other set of agreements were for the broadcasting of French language on radio and television channels with Anambra State Broadcasting Service on May 24, 1991; Borno TV Corporation May 14, 1993 and Broadcasting Organisation of Nigeria (BON) on July 18, 1994 (Akinterinwa, 1999). These broadcast stations were required to produce and broadcast French lessons, cultural, scientific, technical programmes, children films, features films and weather news in French.

The real opportunity to popularize French language in Nigeria however, came in 1996 when the then Head of State, Gen. Sani Abacha while receiving in audience, the French Ambassador to Nigeria, Garrigue Guyonnaud announced that French would become Nigeria's second official language. In keeping with the political decision, the Federal Ministry of Education issued a circular making French language a compulsory course of study in all secondary schools in Nigeria with effect from the 1998/'99 academic session(FME Circular, Nov.4,1998).

The official policy of the Nigerian government was complimented by non-governmental organizations sponsored by France. One of them –French Nigeria Education, Social and Cultural Organisation (FNESCO) founded largely by academics has become popular in driving French language in Nigeria. Three years after the policy of compulsory French in secondary schools appreciable progress was recorded. By 1999, there were at least one million students studying French spread across 130 institutions in Nigeria as pilot centres of excellence(Interview with Philip Peltier, French Ambassador to Nigeria 12/7/99). The pilot institutions comprised six universities and Colleges of Education, 11 French language centres, 109 secondary schools among them 15 Federal Government Colleges. These centres were being manned by over 4000 teachers (Ibid.) The figures more than quadrupled by the end of 2006.

In other Anglophone countries such as South Africa, Ghana and Liberia, although French has not been adopted as a national language, France has continued to spread the French language with the establishment of French Cultural Centres (*Alliance Francaise*) In order to attract more Africans to the French language, Radio France International (RFI), the propaganda wing of French foreign policy in 2007 introduced Hausa on its daily broadcast schedule. The Hausa language programme has continued to run for two hours daily (7-8am and 5-6pm). The aim of the programme has been to “enable Hausa speakers all over the world to listen to international and local news and also air their views on interactive programmes (Lanni Smith, Project Coordinator, Hausa service RFI). The choice of Hausa as the first African language to be broadcast on RFI itself speaks volumes of France's ranking of Nigeria and indeed Anglophone Africa in her new foreign policy posture given that RFI is a state owned broadcast station.

According to Smith "there was a bit of debate in trying to choose which African Language service to begin and this debate was between Hausa and Swahili but I opted for Hausa Language because I love Nigeria and Hausa." (Smith, 2007). French Ambassador corroborates Smith's position. According to him

This respect for Hausa people is the attitude I have adopted since my arrival in your great country, Nigeria, four years ago. It stands to reason that Hausa culture deserves this respect. This has translated into a cooperation project with the University of Zaria and IFRA which aims to promote studies on contemporary societies in the North and to help Nigerian researchers in their investigations. It goes without saying that increasing the prestige of the Hausa language, in its oral and written forms, is part and parcel of the activities at the university.

Our interest in Hausa culture goes beyond that. What I intend to do today is to support the preservation of the Hausa cultural heritage. I am thinking especially about the rich written archives of the Kano Empire, some of which date back to the 10th century. In the first instance, we could provide support by sending an expert in archive preservation to assess the heritage and the needs in terms of preservation" (Speech at the inauguration of RFI Hausa service in Lagos. December 8, 2007

Such sentiments by two high ranking French officials is a reflection of the thinking of Elysee Palace since RFI is one of the major instruments of French foreign policy.

The budget for teaching of French language abroad also increased steadily during the period covered by this study rising to euros 325.5 million in 2007 (Foreign Ministry's Budget for 2007). A substantial part of the funds were set aside for the spread of French Language in Anglophone countries.

6.2 CULTURAL EXCHANGES AS PART OF FOREIGN AID, COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Cultural activism at international level has been a long standing phenomenon in France's foreign policy. France prides herself as a cultural power among the developed countries of the West. To this extent, cultural policies are designed to not only promote French culture abroad but also encourage cultural diversity in the World by supporting the small countries whose cultures are being threatened to increase capacity to express themselves

culturally in the international arena. In 2002 for instance, French President Jacques Chirac called for an international convention on cultural diversity (Address at Johannesburg Sustainable Development Summit 2002). The convention has since been debated by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).

France's international cultural programmes are coordinated by the French Association for Artistic Action (AFAA) an arm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Culture and Communications. AFAA maintains France's over 200 cultural centres and registered alliances in developing countries including of course, the Anglophone Africa. In 2007, AFAA mounted a special programme, *Afrique en créations* which supports African artists in their careers to prepare them for incorporation into the world's major artistic currents.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also pays special attention to film and audiovisual. From 2007, the Ministry created a number of programmes- *Fonds Images Afrique* which backs film and television production; Africa Cinemas, which supports distribution of African films; as well as Plan Images Archive, which seeks to preserve the most vulnerable elements of cinematographic, audiovisual and photographic heritage.

France took more than a passing interest in the promotion of the arts and artists from the two countries cutting across music, cinema, painting, sculpture and performing theatre. In 1994, the French cultural centre and *Alliance Française* staged the first contemporary dance show in Lagos (*Le piedestal des vierges*) by the Claude Brumachon Troupe from the National Choreographic Centre in Nantes, France (Akwaya, 1998). After this maiden show, Nigerian dancers including Abudu Yisa and Olabayo Ogunriola of the Omitun Cultural Dancers, Adebayo Liadi of Black Marbles troupe and Abimbola Olaniran of Ebony Cultural Troupe visited and performed in France with Brumachon Troupe, Nantes. After this initial success in exchange of artists, Nigerian artists became part and parcel of every important cultural event in France and vice versa.

The first Franco-Nigeria Ballet was staged in Lagos on May 16 and 17 1996 and on May 29 of the same year in Nantes, France. Renowned French jazz music star, Belmondo

Quintet played in Nigeria on April 18, 1996 on invitation by Nigerian authorities. This was about two months after Nigerian star, Wasiu Ayinde Marshal played at the *Maison de France* on February 16. Nigerian artists who featured in French organized cultural programmes include Victor Olaiya, Fatayi Dollar, Gloria and Jeanette Rhodes, Mohammed Danjuma, Thelma Ike, Aladin, the Ambassadors and Tunji-Fuji. In the same vein French artists like Artheir if Tzigawe, a jazz musician and Emmanuel Bex Quintet were also invited to play in Nigeria by the French Cultural Centre. (*Alliance Franciase*, 1997). During the 1996 edition of the international Music Day (*Fete De la Music*) Nigerians star musician and broadcaster, Steve Rhodes was named a lead discussant at a special conference on "Nigerian Urban and Social Development on the invitation of *Maison de France* (*Alliance Franciase*, 1996) Two other Nigerian artists Arnold Udoka, a university teacher and Kunle Filani, critic and educationist had earlier presented literary papers-"Dance in Contemporary Nigeria, Change, Continuity and Relevance "and Form and Content for Classification of Contemporary Nigerian Art" respectively at *Maison de France*.

In order to consolidate the success recorded in the area of exchange of arts, Nigeria and France in 1997, created the Franco-Nigeria Cooperation project in theatre, in the same manner as The Franco-Nigerian creation in contemporary dance. As part of the cooperation arrangement, French Theatre Director, Albert Weiss met with Nigeria's Felix Okolo to explore opportunities for closer collaboration in development of their theatre sectors. One important development in the area of Franco-Nigeria cultural relations was the establishment of the French Cultural Centre in Lagos on March 1, 1996 for the documentation of cultural activities and promotion of image of France. The centre services the needs of other organizations like the FNCCI among others through the provision of services like collection of annuals, books and magazines, video films, data bases etc. It organizes book exhibitions and similar activities to boost the reading culture of Nigerians. Local NGOs such as Nigeria-French Cultural Association led by Molade Okoya Thomas and the France Alumni Association led by M.M Bolarinwa were actively and constantly supported to promote French cultural programmes in Lagos and other parts of Nigeria.

The French television network, CFI signed agreements with Nigerian satellite stations AIT and Minaj for transmission of French programmes aimed at propagating various aspects of French cultures. France contributed to renovation of classrooms and facilitation of access to information and communication technology (ICT) as part of the overall support to education, science and technology. This was apart from the provision of books in Sub-Saharan Africa of which Nigeria was a substantial beneficiary.

These cultural activities have increased in size and numbers because the French Embassy in Nigeria consciously promoted them out of France's respect for other cultures. The point to note here is that French cultural activism in Nigeria has been aimed at drawing the attention of Nigeria arts lovers to the French traditions instead of British culture which has been part of Nigerian experience since the period of colonial rule.

6.3 ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ANGLOPHONE AFRICA

Economic relations between France and Anglophone countries witnessed tremendous growth during the period under study traversing the areas of direct trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), development aid and cooperation. The increased economic activities showed clearly, the new found relevance of the Anglophone in France's foreign policy projections. To drive home this point, this study examines the economic relations between France and two Anglophone countries-Nigeria and South Africa as case studies. The choice of these countries is obvious as they are the two most economically strong countries in the Anglophone bloc.

6.3.1 France's Economic Relations with Nigeria

Economic relations between Nigeria and France date back to over 100 years since a French company, *Compagnie Francaise de L'Afrique Occidentale* (CFAO) opened a trading post in Lagos in 1902. Over the years, French companies have established viable and various businesses in Nigeria. By 2007, more than 120 French companies were actively involved in the Nigerian economy (FNCCI, 2007). These companies are involved in the industrial, petrochemical, agricultural, hospitality, infrastructure, construction and a host of other sectors. Some of these companies are controlling the market in their sectors of operations. The table below contains the list of French companies operating in Nigeria and their sectors.

Table ix: Selected French Companies and their Economic Sectors

Company	Sector
Bouygues	Construction
Dumez	'
ALSTOM	Electrical Suppliers
Schneider	'
AREVA	'
Clemessy	'
Alcatel	GSM telephony
Sagem	'
Air France- KLM	Aviation
Michelin	Agriculture-(rubber tree plantation)/Tyre manufacturing
Air Liquide	Gas/Oxygen supplies
SDV Bolloré	Transportation and Logistics
Peugeot	Auto manufacturing(Peugeot cars)
Total	Petroleum(upstream and downstream)
Lafarge	Second Largest cement manufacturer

The combined investment of these companies reached a total of \$4billion in 2007(FNCCI, 2007), surpassing the entire investment of French companies in the rest of West Africa (*Ibid*). This level of investment placed France slightly behind the US but ahead of Britain among companies from the major economies of the world operating in Nigeria.

Since 1990, France and Nigeria took a number of steps to improve their economic ties. One such measure was the signing on February 27, 1990, of an agreement on "Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains". Another agreement on Mutual Encouragement and Protection of Investments" was also signed for an initial period of 10 years lasting up to 2000. The first agreement covered business enterprises; private, independent individuals (personal services); students, trainees and researchers. This provision meant that if a French teacher came to Nigeria to teach, he would be exempted from tax in respect of remunerations due to him for an initial period of two years if his work was adjudged to be in the interest of the public. As for businesses, the agreement provides for profits of French companies operating in Nigeria to be taxed only in Nigeria unless the company has evidence of

another permanent establishment in France. The agreement further provides that where it becomes necessary in line with some existing national legislation for double taxation to be enforced, low rates would be worked out.

The agreement on mutual encouragement and protection of investments provides for total security of investments, incomes and re-investments made from the incomes. It provides that if a French investor is dispossessed of his investments, compensation will be made to the investor on the current value of the particular establishment being acquired or nationalized. Apart from these agreements signed by Military President Ibrahim Babangida and his French counterpart, Francois Mitterrand during his official visit to France, Nigeria also secured a soft loan of 140million francs from France to support the country's various development efforts.

These agreements are complemented by Nigeria's investment promotion laws which provide for 100 per cent repatriation of profits and generous tax holidays of up to five years on FDI in certain sectors of the economy. French companies of course capitalized on these institutional safeguards to shore up businesses in both the "virgin and non-virgin" sectors in Nigeria with the resultant upward swing in the volume of trade between the two countries.

TABLE X: Nigeria's Major Trading Partners.
(Direction of Trade)

Imports from Nigeria cif (\$ m monthly average)	Jan – Sep 1995	Jan – Sep 1996	Exports to Nigeria fob	Jan – Sep 1995	Jan – Sep 1996
USA	424.1	539.0	USA (fas)	51.7	64.8
Spain	91.5	121.2	Germany	47.0	55.8
France	64.9	101.3	UK	55.2	54.8
Portugal	41.3	52.7	France	33.2	41.8
Germany	61.2	51.1	Netherlands	23.7	23.4
Netherlands	28.0	40.2	Brazil	19.9	21.1
UK	17.8	31.0	Italy	17.2	20.6
Canada (fob)	40.4	19.4	Japan	14.9	17.0
Italy	19.4	20.6	Spain	5.9	13.4
Australia	14.1	16.0	Belg Lux	10.6	9.8

Source: Statistics from Franco-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Lagos.

The impressive standing of France from the above table shows that French companies and business people had by 1995, begun to exploit the favourable climate to increase the tempo of activities in Nigeria in a number of sectors.

In the banking sector for instance, French interests in the financial services sector grew rapidly with the increase in the number of banks substantially owned by French business interests. Before the Nigerian banking consolidation exercise of 2005, French companies had substantial interests in five banks namely International Bank for West Africa (IBWA) which later became the Afribank Plc; United Bank for Africa (UBA); Societe Generale Bank of Nigeria (SGBN); Credit Lyonnais; Universal Trust Bank (UTB) and a number of merchant banks. These banks helped in financing and facilitating the businesses of the other French companies in both the oil and non-oil sectors of the economy.

General Trade: Trading activities between Nigeria and France grew steadily since 1990 with only a drop in 2003 and 2004. France's exportation of professional equipment to Nigeria stood at 624mFF in 1996, consumables rose to 375mFF while vehicle spare parts stood at 587mFF (*French Embassy, Lagos:1998*). The total export of France to Nigeria in 1996 stood at 2,591mFrF while her imports stood at 7,097mFrF, showing a deficit of 4,506mFrF in favour of Nigeria. Trade deficit between Nigeria and France has always been in favour of Nigeria because of the concentration on hydrocarbons. The trade results for 1996 placed Nigeria among the first five of France's clients in Africa, the others being Congo, South Africa, Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal (*Ibid*).

French sales in Nigeria rose for the first time to Euros 1billion 2005 (FNCCI, 2007) from about \$1.2 billion in 1995. Nigeria ranked 52nd among France's global trading partners in 1998 in terms of French exports and 42nd in terms of French imports from Nigeria.

Table XI: Total Trade Volume between Nigeria and France 1995-1998

Year	Total Volume of Trade
1995	\$1.2billion
1996	\$1.9billion
1997	\$1.2billion
1998	\$1.3billion

Source: Statistics obtained from French Embassy in Nigeria 1999.

The main export categories were petroleum products, electrical appliances, electronic equipment, transport equipment, motors and turbines, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and beverages. The volume of trade between the two countries grew to Euros 2 billion in 2006 with Nigeria's exports to France standing at Euros 1.2 billion. For the first time in 2006, Nigeria became the first trading partner of France in Sub-Saharan Africa ahead of South Africa. This performance is remarkable given the fact that in 1998, France was ranked the 4th largest supplier of Nigeria behind the United States, Britain and Germany. French purchases were mostly crude oil, natural gas and refined petroleum products which consist over 90 per cent of French purchases from Nigeria. Nigeria is thus the first destination of French private investment in the Sub-Saharan Africa with investments coming mainly from the big French group of companies.

Table XII: Trade Between France and Nigeria

Recent Evolution Statistics in Thousand euros Source: Mission économique	Exportation FOB			Importation CAF		
	2004	2005	Evolution %	2004	2005	Evolution %
Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery products	3407	14676	330,76	49215	54882	11,51
Industrial products for Agro-allied	41099	36555	-11,06	28277	32310	14,26
	106177	141636	33,40	598	870	45,48
Clothing, Leather	574	488	-14,98	251	313	24,70
Publishing, printing/reprinting products	1588	647	-59,26	1	0	-100,00
Pharmaceutical, perfume and cosmetic products	72575	112594	55,14	0	0	
	31440	27907	-11,24	346	557	60,98
Household equipment	62380	72880	16,83	30	65	116,67
Automobile Industry products	277532	370504	33,50	2081	3158	51,75
Professional equipments for household	7365	9841	33,62	635	227	-64,25
Boats, Aircrafts, Trains, Motorbikes	69338	96782	39,58	562	1204	114,23
Mechanical equipment	200829	263881	31,40	884	1727	95,36
Electrical and electronic equipment	144024	178078	23,64	2368	2503	5,70
Semi-finished goods	5148	6961	35,22	37	45	21,62
Mineral products	4414	2721	-38,36	610	310	-49,18
Textile products	7191	5531	-23,08	659	533	-19,12
Pulp & Paper products	42171	58867	39,59	437	1176	169,11
Chemical products, plastic/rubber	46054	64932	40,99	117	250	113,68
Metals and metallic products	39046	39066	0,05	508	189	-62,80
Electric and electrical components	2143	1207	-43,68	5	72	1340,00
Others	125546	231918	84,73	833709	1085542	30,21
Petroleum products						
TOTAL VOLUME OF TRADE	762308	1047454	37,41	916283	1179402	28,72

2006

The volume of Trade between Nigeria and France increased considerably in 2006 compared to 2005 with an increase of 68% about #2 billion Euros of Nigeria's export to France while France export to Nigeria stood at #1.2 billion Euros which also represent an increase of 17% compared to 2005.

For the first time in 2006, Nigeria became the 1st business partner of France in front of South Africa in the Sub-Saharan Africa.

Nigeria is the first destination of French investment in the sub-region and essentially made of French big group of companies.

From the above table, it can be deduced that trade between France and Nigeria continued to witness steady increase and spread across other articles even though oil maintained its lead as a major trading item as in the years before 1990. This however, shows the strategic placement of Nigeria in France's new foreign policy calculations towards Africa as the trade volume by far outweighed the total volume of trade with the traditional Francophone partners.

6.3.2 Increased Stake in the Oil Industry

Oil constituted the greater share of France's imports from Nigeria during this period. In 1992, France's crude oil purchases from Nigeria stood at 21,248 barrels with the value of N7,854.0 million representing 3.9 per cent of Nigeria's total value of crude oil export for the year. The value of oil exports to France rose to N13,615million in 1993, N25,611.5million in 1994 and N59,785.3million in 1995.

Table XIII: Direction of Oil Exports to France 1988 – 1995

Year	Qty (Thousand Barrel)	Value (=N= Million)	Percentage of Total Value
1988	23,696	2,161.1	7.6
1989	25,366	2,750.8	5.0
1990	14,192	3,051.0	2.9
1991	29,840	5,157.3	4.4
1992	21,248	7,854.0	3.9
1993	57,007	13,615.0	6.4
1994	75,384	25,611.5	12.5
1995	48,526	59,785.3	8.2
1996	N.A	N.A	N.A

Source: *Figures compiled from trade statistics of the Franco-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce, Lagos, 2007.*

An analysis of the above table indicates that oil exports to France grew steadily during this period with a peak in 1994. This increase is a reflection of the strong relationship between the Abacha regime and France during this period. France has since remained for many years, the highest buyer of Nigerian crude-Bonny Light after the US and Germany.

France's stake in Nigeria's oil industry as noted earlier is represented by the two oil giants Elf and Total. During the period under study however, the two companies merged to create a mega oil company-Totalfinaelf with active interest in both the upstream, downstream and service sectors of the Nigerian oil industry.

The enhanced political and diplomatic relations between the two countries accentuated by the regime of limited economic sanctions placed on Nigeria during military regime of Gen. Sani Abacha combined to give France an upper hand in the petroleum sector. Through Total and Elf, France won juicy contracts and concessions ahead of other oil companies of British and American ownership.

Activities of Total

In 1997 for instance, Total was appointed consultant on downstream operations by the Nigerian government and in the same year won the contract for the turn around maintenance(TAM) of the Kaduna Refinery and Petrol-chemical Company(KRPC) at the sum of \$225million(*Daily Times*, April 3, 1998). Under the contract, Total was to rehabilitate and manage the refinery for three years. Total's contract generated a lot of controversy. Major oil companies accused the Nigerian government of awarding the contract "secretly" without an open tendered bid. Secondly, other oil multi- nationals operating in the country, Shell and Mobil queried the basis for the cost of the contract. And to prove their claims, the companies submitted proposals to carry out the same job at amounts far less than the contract sum in question. Mobil for instance, submitted a proposal of \$1billion for the TAM of all of the nation's four refineries, three of which were in worse condition than the KRPC. This was to suggest that the contract was inflated. Besides, Total's competencies were more in refining than in building of refineries.

One other suspicious element of the contract was the down payment of the whole contract figure to Total in fulfillment of one of the preconditions for the contract. (*Daily Times April 3, 1998*). It was later revealed that the contract was overvalued to the tune of \$16million. After several months of inactivity at the project site, Total approached Japanese experts to help in the repair of highly critical equipment at the refinery (two tubor generators). The Japanese declined. The equipment were sent to Paris for repairs but unfortunately got damaged at the Paris airport (*The Guardian*, April 13, 1998) After several months of failure to deliver on the contract, the Federal Government of Nigeria reviewed the terms of the contract and re-awarded some aspects of the job to other companies for better results at additional costs to the government (NNPC Memo GMD

45 cited in *The Guardian*, August 19, 1998).

From the above, it does appear that France was only being compensated for her political support of the isolated regime of Abacha as every step of the contract appeared either faulty or fraudulent.

In defence of allegations of Total's favouritism in the contract, French Ambassador to Nigeria, Phillipe Peltier noted that "*many companies got a lot of advantages during the General Abacha era. Look at Julius Berger (German company) for instance, they got many contracts and that's because they are a good company. Total is a good company just like Berger (laughs)*" (*Thisday*, October 27, 1998). The Ambassador's defense cited above is faulty as there were indeed many "good companies" operating in Nigeria at the time who never got patronised by the Nigerian government with contracts.

In addition to the KRPC contract, Total took over Ashland Oil which was about to wind up. Total's bid was considered low, but the company nevertheless won the bid for Ashland shares. The company also continued its expansion in the downstream sector with more service outlets across the country. By end of 2006, Total was clearly the leading oil marketing in Nigeria with more number of service stations and the highest value of shares at the Nigerian capital market(NSE, 2006)

Elf Oil: The second French oil company, Elf was as lucky as Total in its operations. Through juicy deals it secured from Government, the company expanded rapidly in the upstream sector to place third largest joint venture operator with NNPC only behind Shell and Mobil. Elf's speedy growth was achieved through certain strategic projects. The company commissioned its Ofon oil extraction project at \$290million on December 24, 1997. (*Daily Champion*, March 20, 1998). The project on OML 102 opened opportunity to Elf to tap 160million barrels of crude oil. This project combined with the offshore operations helped Elf to raise its production from 125,000bpd to 134,000bpd. Other concessions won by Elf include 400million barrels reserve at Amenan which it outwitted Mobil to win in 1998, By 2006, Elf's production was nearing 300,000bpd. The company's investment in the \$500million Escravos Gas project shored up its earnings and overall performance in Nigeria. The subsidiary, Elf Marketing Nigeria maintained its steady growth in the downstream sector until the parent company decided to end its presence in

the downstream sector as part of its strategic decisions in Nigeria operations.

At the governmental level, Nigerian authorities took a decision to move NNPC's centre of international operations from London to Paris in 1996. This was followed by the transfer of NNPC's bank accounts from London in France. This policy was criticized as being political rather than economic or technical (Akwaya: 1998) as London offered better environment for NNPC's international operations as had been the case before the Abacha regime. With benefit of hindsight, it can be deduced that the sour political relations with Britain may have influenced the decision by the Nigerian authorities as Britain together with the US were in the forefront of championing imposition of sanctions against Nigeria on account of alleged human rights violations by the Abacha regime.

6.3.3 Performance of French Companies in Nigeria

French companies in Nigeria outside the oil sector also maintained growth in their different areas of operations. Companies operating in the construction industry won big contracts with the Federal Government and oil companies to handle roads, bridges and water projects.

The boom for French construction companies with Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund (PTF), a development intervention fund created by General Abacha with proceeds from increases in cost of petroleum products. PTF's budget for roads repairs and construction was N32billion in 1996, the first year of operation. In the second year of operation (1997), the Fund earmarked N35billion for the repair of 12,500km of inter and intra-state roads as well as the repair of 1000km of urban and semi-urban roads. The French group of construction companies (Dumez, Fougerolle, Bouygues, Spibat and SAE) enjoyed about 18 per cent of the total contracts awarded by PTF for road projects ahead of the British and Italian firms and second only to Julius Berger, the German firm (PTF: 1999). Just like the situation in the oil industry, Nigerian authorities were more at home with French companies during this period on account of the enhanced political relations between Abuja and Paris. In addition, the Nigerian-French Insurance Company was appointed by the PTF as a member of the consortium of insurance companies to provide insurance cover to PTF projects, a deal considered juicy by industry operators (*Thisday*

October 29, 1998). Afribank which had substantial French interest was also beneficiary of part of the N25 billion placed by the PTF in some commercial banks to shore up their liquidity bases and avert distress in the financial services sector.

In the aviation sector, French companies capitalized on crisis in the sector to shore up their performance. The aviation row between Nigeria and Britain on one hand and Nigeria and the US on the other in 1996, provided yet another opportunity for French aviation companies to further penetrate the Nigerian market. The aviation row led to the ban of British Airways to Nigeria and Nigeria Airways to London. In the circumstance, Air France became the favoured airline of Nigerian passengers to London flying through Paris. Air France got a bigger share of the business ahead of Alitalia, Sabena and Lufthansa. In the hospitality and tourism sector, Sofitel, a French hotel chain arrived Nigeria to manage the five star Abuja Sofitel hotels. The group soon expanded its business to hotel units in Lagos and other cities.

Peugeot Automobile Nigeria Limited (PAN), one of the most successful French companies outside the oil industry survived for the greater part of the period covered by this study on government patronage. Not only did the Nigerian government maintained the policy of adopting Peugeot brands as official cars, which gave it a good measure of advantage in the market among the competing brands, it massively acquired Peugeot cars for the military, the police and other security establishments in a special scheme designed to enable officers purchase cars with loans either provided or guaranteed by the government. Under this scheme which started in 1991, PAN sold over 50 per cent of its cars.

The other conglomerates like SCOA, CFAO have continued to maintain leadership in their various areas of operations.

The exchange of visits by Nigerian and French leaders also helped to foster closer ties by citizens of both countries with the attendant increase in the number of private visits by citizens for holidays, medical checks, exhibitions, workshops, seminars and studies.

6.3.4 Cooperation and Development Aid

Like culture, cooperation and development aid have been very powerful instruments of French foreign policy since independence. French aid programme to Africa was initially concentrated on the former colonies with whom she established series of cooperation agreements as outlined in the preceding chapters. However, French aid policy altered fundamentally in the period under study to accommodate the Anglophone in line with the changes in France's foreign policy. The reasons for this were basically same as outlined in 5.1.

The most important development in France's aid policy was therefore the absorption of the French Ministry of Cooperation which hitherto coordinated international aid programmes into the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although French authorities explained this as part of reforms in line with emerging era of globalization, the implication on the former colonies is that they were now lumped together with all other countries of the World rather than treated separately by France as was the case in the period preceding our study (Martin, 2000). With the new administrative structure for aids, France no longer wishes to deal with Africa directly as national emphasis is on multilateral and not bilateral aid. France continues to channel her international aids through the EU system and international financial institutions, notably, the World Bank and IMF (Touati, 2007).

The changes in aid and cooperation policy led to a number of decisions. For instance, France reduced her troops stationed in Africa from 8,000 in 1997 to 5,600 in 2002 (Martin, *op cit*). The troop's presence in 2007 stood at about 7000 with a spread of 2,800 in Djibouti; 1,100 in Dakar; 1000 in Abidjan; 800 in Libreville and 1000 in N'djamena (Touati, 2007). Similarly, France reduced her civilian personnel who operated various technical agreements in her former colonies from 7,669 in 1988 to a meagerly 2,919 in 1998 (*Ibid*). As Martin (*op cit*) notes, the reduction in French personnel was indicative of her waning interest in Africa. In the circumstance, French troops were no longer to be stationed in Africa and as technical agreements between Africa and former colonies expire, the French civilians in charge of fulfilling those agreements were expected to return to France.

The period under consideration also witnessed a decrease in the level of economic support by France to the former colonies. This came through the devaluation of their national currency CFA. In January 1994, the value of CFA was reduced to 50 per cent and the subsequent split with the French franc which became necessary as France entered into the EU monetary policy with Euro as the common currency. Side by side with the devaluation of the CFA was the reduction of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the Francophone. From 1995 to 1998, the ODA budget reduced drastically by 7.5 billion francs (Pederson, 2000). Since the former French colonies were major recipients of ODA from France, it follows also that less funds were availed them during this period in development assistance.

Apart from the reduction in ODA budget, France also imposed pre-conditions upon which future development assistance will be based. This was hitherto not the case in the many years of official aid to Africa. Some of the pre-conditions include:

- a) Consolidation of the rule of law and democracy by reinforcement of institutions, practical democracy and public management systems, process of democratization and civil society organizational representation
- b) Satisfaction of the basic needs of the population by the grace of programmes to fight against poverty and inequality, health and education as well as upliftment of the conditions of women
- c) Promoting diversified economy that is less vulnerable and favouring the development of small and medium enterprises as well as the amelioration of the productive activity in the rural environment.
- d) Rational administration of natural resources, territorial landscaping, sustaining the surveillance of fishing, exploitation of forest zones, vegetation zones as well as underwater resources.
- e) Support for the process of regional cooperation and integration, an important priority of French cooperation in Africa
- f) Promotion of cultural development by policy in favour of free expression for the civil society and the reinforcement of the media
- g) Support for research and Culture, most importantly, upgrading of research in

development countries as well as reduction in the North-South gap (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 2005); (www.france.diplomatie.fr retrieved on December 9th, 2006).

The conditions above appeared too stringent for most African countries. Nigeria like other countries was nowhere close to meeting these pre-conditions, France nevertheless, extended various kinds of aids packages to the country.

One assistance package which came to Nigeria before the pre-conditions came into force was in the area of water resources development. A cooperation agreement on water resources management was first signed between the two countries on April 9, 1987. Two other agreements were signed by the National Water Resources Institute (NWRI) based in Kaduna with the French embassy in Lagos in 1991 and 1994 respectively. The three agreements had broad objectives of intensifying technical and scientific cooperation in the areas of water supply, sanitation and hydrology. The agreement also provided for introduction of a Post Graduate Diploma Certificate programme in Water Resources Engineering. Apart from the programme, the agreements provided for organization of seminars, workshops and professional training. A provision was also made for an evaluation committee which was to meet January of every year to assess the implementation of the agreements.

One project that benefitted from these agreements was the Hadejia-Jamaare River Basin Development Authority irrigation scheme. The management of the Authority had requested for assistance of the French embassy in training on the use of modern techniques of irrigation. Consequently, a French company was awarded a contract for civil engineering works of the scheme.

On the agreement with NWRI, France agreed to provide and set up a water supply equipment (Claribloc model CB2 with flowrate 17m/h in 1992 and a waste water management equipment in 1993; to provide maintenance kits for the equipment supplied for a yearly minimum amount of FF50,000; to computerize the equipment for data exchange by setting up a pilot documentation unit costing FF120,000 in 1994 and developing a documentation unit for a yearly minimum of FF50,000; to provide an oil treatment plant to the NWRI in 1996; to finance cost of books and journals annually to

the tune of FF20,000 etc(Akinterinwa,1999). By the virtue of these agreements operated on behalf of France by *Foundation de l'Eau in Limoges*, NWRI received the total of FF400, 000 annually for its activities between 1987 and 1991. This level of support by France was never known or considered in the period immediately after independence when France regarded Nigeria as a major threat to her political and economic interests on the continent.

6.3.5 France's Economic Relations with South Africa

France maintained a strong presence in the economy of South Africa during the era of apartheid. As noted in chapter four of the study, France breached the international restrictions and sanctions imposed by the UN on South Africa to deal with the racial regime in the supply of military hardware, aviation and other science and technologically based goods. In the post apartheid era, the new democratic leadership of Presidents Nelson Mandela and successor, Thabo Mbeki continued trade relations with France. The bilateral economic relations between the two countries remained on course for most of the period since 1994 when the first non-racial democratic government of Mandela took over from the transitional administration of President Frederick De Klerk.

By 2007, France had become South Africa's sixth-leading supplier of industrial goods and its 14th customer. South Africa is France's 35th customer. The amount of French investment however, account for only 1.5 per cent of foreign economic players in RSA standing at about Euro500million in 2003(<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr> Retrieved January 1, 2007 17). French presence in South Africa is mostly in the area of infrastructures, transport and energy.

The level of trade between South Africa and France however, remained far below the volume of trade between Nigeria and France because South Africa is not an exporter of crude oil whereas oil constitutes over 90 per cent of trade between France and Nigeria as well as France's purchases from Africa. France has continued to supply military equipment to South Africa among other industrial products.

6.3.6 Promotion and Protection of Democracy

In chapter Four, this study unveiled France's support for military, puppet regimes or dictatorships in a number of Francophone countries in line with the existing military cooperation pacts or bilateral agreements as in the intervention in Chad, Niger, Zaire etc to restore unpopular regimes ousted in military putsches or support for rebellions against national governments as in the support for Biafran separatists in Nigeria. The situation however, changed in the period of this study as a result of the changes in France's African policy. During this period, France did not just actively encourage emergence of democratic rule in both the Francophone and Anglophone, she made the promotion of good governance and the rule of law a cardinal precondition of her aid and development assistance since 1993(Touati, Sylvain, 2007). President Chirac's policy on this issue was clearly spelt out in his address to the 19th summit of France and African Heads of State.

Good governance, of course, means efficiency and sound management of public affairs, transparency and stringency... Good governance pursues ideas to dignity and progress, it helps satisfy people's basic needs. Good governance means legitimate institutions which are therefore, accepted and supported by all, able to win support and mobilize energies. Good governance naturally elicits international solidarity and encourages increased commitment on the part of providers of official development assistance (Chirac's address at the 19th Summit of Heads of Governments of France and Africa in The Guardian, January 7, 1997).

Even though Chirac spoke vehemently on the need for good governance, he was unclear on the issue of democratization, which is considered as a condition precedent to good governance. The absence of emphasis on democracy is what Touati (Ibid) describes as absence of "a defined democratic agenda for the different African States".

According to Mitterrand, *"France does not have to dictate a constitutional law model which will be imposed de facto to all peoples. By themselves, African people have to know how to lead themselves towards the universal principle which is democracy"*(Mitterrand, 1990: speech at La Baule, cited in Touati op cit). Like Mitterrand, President Chirac was also clear that France would dictate any particular approach to democracy: *"France has to rethink, with a tolerant and humble spirit, its role in helping Africa towards the difficult way of democracy..... We do not have any lesson to*

give... *Democracy is a state of mind... It is the fruit of a long apprenticeship*" (Chirac's speech in front of Congo's Congress in Brazzaville. *Politique étrangère de la France*, May-August, 1996 cited in Touati, op cit).

France's warm embrace of the new democratic government in Nigeria in 1999 was as a result of her preference to deal with democratic governments. President Chirac was the first President from the Permanent members of the UN Security Council to visit Nigeria. During the visit, Chirac addressed a joint session of the National Assembly and held bilateral talks with Obasanjo. Back in France, French Legislators formed the French-Nigeria Parliamentary friendship Association to help promote Nigerian interests in France. This visit was followed by reciprocal trips by top Nigerian officials including Vice President Atiku Abubakar and Obasanjo at different times.

6.4 SPORTS AND FRANCO-AFRICAN RELATIONS.

France and Nigeria have both distinguished themselves in international sporting competitions. Nigerian footballers, sprinters and other sportsmen have had rewarding careers in many European countries. Since 1985 when Nigeria won the first U-17 Football World Cup, Nigerian footballers became the toast of many clubs in Europe. For France however, it was until in 1989 that Samson Siasia, Nigerian professional became the first player to be signed by French Club, Nantes. FC. Before then French clubs concentrated on players from the Francophone on account of the cordial political relations at the governmental level. This situation however, changed in favour of Nigeria by 1993, owing to the improved relations between the two countries. In that year, Nigerian Captain, Stephen Keshi who led Nigeria to the 1994 African Cup of Nations victory moved to Strasbourg FC, a first division team in France. Keshi's movement opened a flood gate to Nigerian players. Victor Ikpeba was hired by Monaco in 1993 where he stayed on to win the Africa Footballer of the year award in 1997 (www.footballdatabase.eu/football.club retrieved on May3, 2008). Another Nigerian player, Taribo West was also signed by a French Club Bordeaux just as Godwin Okpara who joined Keshi at the Strasbourg.

The biggest buy was however, Austin (Jay Jay) Okocha who was signed by PSG FC in July 1998 from Fenerbahce of Turkey at a record \$17million. The contract placed the young Nigerian player as the highest paid footballer from Africa in the French league and the most expensive Nigerian footballer to be hired by any club in the World. Since then Nigerian players have remained a permanent feature of the French league, the latest being the National Team player, Taye Taiwo who plays for Olympique Marseille-FC. Other Nigerian players who played in the French league include Wilson Oruma, Onyekachi Akpan Nantes FC, and Osaze Odewingie FC Lille

As stated earlier, the focus on Nigerian players was not just for their experience and talents but also the cordial relationship at the governmental level which created the right environment for negotiation of the various contracts. Secondly, French clubs appreciated the sentimental attachment of Nigerians to football and so exploited this window to win the solidarity of ordinary football-loving Nigerians. Nigeria also reciprocated the mass movement of Nigerian players to France with the signing of a French man Philippe Trousier as the National Technical Adviser for the National Team, the Super Eagles.

Trousier's appointment was far from merit. In the interview conducted in Lagos to select the Eagle's handler, three coaches were recommended in order of merit by the NFA technical committee. Kalman Mezoly (Hungary) came first, Burkhard Zeise (Germany) came second while Trousier came third. The NFA ignored the rating of the coaches by its technical committee and instead appointed Trousier for the job. Although the French man led the Super Eagles to qualify for the World Cup in France, he was rated poorly for his lack of technical knowledge and was therefore sacked at the eve of the World Cup. He was replaced by a Yugoslav, Bora Milutinovic. Zeise who missed the opportunity to coach the Eagles was hired by Zambia where he led the country's team of youngsters to qualify for the African Cup of Nations in Ouagadougou in 1998. The choice of Trousier was meant to generate solidarity among French supporters during the World Cup which France was hosting and also to strengthen the relationship between the two countries at the sports level.

Nigeria's action paid off as France issued visas to government officials including Minister of Sports, Commodore Emeka Omeruah (rtd.) as leader of Nigerian delegation to attend the World Cup finals. This was in violation of the ban placed on top Nigerian officials from entering the European Union and also for participation in sporting activities. This ban was part of the sanctions imposed on Nigeria in 1995 in the aftermath of the hanging of Ogoni rights activist, Ken Saro Wiwa.

French Ambassador to Nigeria Philippe Peltier explained his country's violation of the ban to grant visas to Nigerian officials as part of the "persuasive" approaches France wanted to adopt in dealing with Nigeria during the period (*Thisday*, Nigeria, October 27, 1998).

The professional competencies of Nigerian players coupled with France's resolve to warm up to the Anglophone countries have helped create opportunities for other players from the Anglophone countries who are currently availed opportunities in the French league. The hiring of foreign players requires the political support of the government of France in issuing the necessary approvals and licenses to enable the players live and work in the country. Such approvals were never contemplated in the period before 1990.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RESULT OF INTERVIEWS, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

7.1 RESULT OF INTERVIEWS/ DOCUMENTARY RESEARCH

Result of the interviews conducted is presented in line with the research questions as follows:

Qi. What explains France's declining interest in her former colonies during the period covered by this study?

The last decade of the 20th century came with a lot of challenges to France both in her development as a nation and in her relationship with the international community. These challenges arose partly as a result of developments within France and events in the international system which combined to influence the conduct of French foreign policy. These developments were varied but all impacting on the conduct of politicians and French citizens in their relations with the outside world.

Qii. At the international scene, communism collapsed in the defunct USSR and the rest of Eastern Europe, thus ending the cold war between the ideological and military superpowers USSR and the USA. The end of cold war also meant that the rivalry in Africa which characterized US and Britain's relations on one hand with France on the other as regards African issues had to disappear. This necessitated fresh policy options for France in dealings with Africa top of which was to open up and deepen relations with the Anglophone countries and at the same time embrace Britain. The collapse of the Berlin wall and re-unification of the East and West Germany meant a more cohesive Europe that had Germany, France, Britain and Spain playing key roles in affairs of Western Europe. Of course France like other European countries had to adjust to the new reality of the regional structure.

Qiii. One other significant development was the inauguration of European Union (E.U) Commission and Union Parliament among other integration structures in Brussels,

Belgium. The establishment of EU key institutions like the European Central Bank which issued a common currency, Euro in 1999 etc, required of France to think and act in the larger interest of Europe on a number of issues. Of course this was antithetical to the fundamentals of French foreign policy anchored on the Gaullist philosophy of Grandeur. This development also introduced genuine fears about the erosion of French sovereignty and her freedom and liberty to express herself among the international comity of states. The debates on whether to join the common currency for instance, strained the Republic as much as the consideration to integrate France military command structure into the NATO arrangement. Both of these impinged directly on France's identity within the emerging union.

Qiv. *What explains the new policy of "non-involvement" of France in times of violent conflicts and political disturbances in some of her former colonies and traditional allies like Algeria, and Coted'Ivoire, etc?*

There was a change in the generation of French Leaders with the death of Jacques Forccart, generally regarded as the architect of Francophone Africa. The change in the generation of the old leaders led to changes in the French foreign policy configuration towards Africa as the younger elements saw little or need for the sustenance of the old policies.

Furthermore, French domestic economy played a crucial role in the change in French policy during this period. The difficulties faced by French citizens led to endorsement of new minimum wage of \$6.75 per hour by the new government of Jospin in 1992. This had serious consequences on the national budget, compelling Jospin to propose austerity measures in the management of the national economy to cut down budgetary deficits which stood at 3.8 per cent of GDP. This proposal met stiff resistance from the organized labour movement. The problems in the economy therefore meant that France would introduce checks on foreign assistance thereby dropping her paternalistic ("father Christmas") disposition of many decades towards former colonies.

More fundamentally, France's access to alternative sources for Uranium supply to fire her military capabilities other than Niger and Gabon which exclusively sold Uranium to France over the decades was one of the factors necessitating policy

change to Africa. France had hitherto relied 100 percent on Africa for "strategic raw materials" required for her military complexes to maintain her profile as a world military power.

French company COGEMA had procured Uranium at relatively cheaper prices over the decades. But for strategic and other interests however, France during this period, took her Uranium deliveries from the United States, Australia, Canada and some little quantities from local production. With this therefore, there wasn't much at stake for France to get enmeshed in the domestic political crisis of these countries.

The Rwanda crisis and the international bashing which France received over her role in the genocide also necessitated a re-consideration of France – Africa policy.

Qv. What accounts for France's deliberate efforts during this period to win the friendship of Anglophone countries like Nigeria?

France has always considered Nigeria as a competitor for influence on the African continent and therefore a threat to her interests. The fact of Nigeria being the largest and the strongest African country and surrounded by small French speaking countries even made the threat more apparent. Given the size of Nigeria and her oil wealth, France had always looked forward to an opportunity to get closer and control the economy but could not because of the overbearing presence of Britain as a former colonial master of Nigeria. The political crises in Nigeria and her subsequent isolation by the international community including Britain therefore provided a rare opportunity for France to actualize her long held ambition. The political crisis in Nigeria arose from the cancellation of the 1993 general elections by the military government of Ibrahim Babangida. This was followed by widespread agitation for a break of the country. The crises was exacerbated by other developments like the militant struggle for a better share of the country's oil wealth by the Niger Delta Communities which led to the execution of the Ogoni Minority rights crusader, Ken Saro Wiwa and eight of his Ogoni kinsmen. These and other factors drew the outrage of the international community. The Commonwealth responded by suspending Nigeria from her

membership. Other countries especially from the West imposed various sanctions on the Country including suspension of military supplies and training, exchange of visits by senior officials, trade and aids among others. Nigeria became a pariah State before the international comity of nations.

France capitalised on this development to draw Nigeria closer to her from Britain which has been Nigeria's traditional ally among the Super Powers. France got contracts to overhaul the Kaduna Refinery, the largest of the four refineries in the country as a result of the new relationship with the isolated military leader. Nigeria also transferred her foreign reserve account from London to Paris to reflect the new level of relationship.

In addition, French companies also got juicy oil production and sharing contracts (OPS) to operate in the troubled Niger Delta as most European and American companies reduced operations as a result of the sour political relationship between their home governments and that of Nigeria under General Sani Abacha.

Nigeria adopted French as her second national language to show the seriousness attached to the new level of relations with France. French language was then made a compulsory subject in schools and Colleges while France reciprocated with the opening up of more *Alliance de Francaise* (French Cultural Centres) for the teaching of French Language as well as supplied French teachers to help teach and develop the language in the schools. France also supplied instructional materials to ease teaching of the language.

Qvi. *Did the change of government in France from the Socialist President Francois Mitterrand to a pro- Gaullist leader, Jacques Chirac contribute to the change in France's African policy during the period covered by this study?*

France witnessed a change of administration during the period of this study (1990-2006). Francois Mitterrand who was president for 14 years handed over to Mr. Jacques Chirac who also handed over to Nicholas Sarkozy in 2006. The changes in administration did create a lot of anxiety in Africa. When Jacques Chirac won the French presidency ... returning conservatives to power, some

leaders expected a return of the cozy paternalism that had marked Gaullist policy towards Africa for more than three decades. But far from ushering in a return to the past, Chirac's tenure coincided with one of the most turbulent periods in France's long and deep involvement in Africa. Increasingly, in both France and Africa, people have begun to wonder if Paris' special relationship with the continent was on or should survive.

Chirac's shift from the traditional basics of French foreign policy was dictated by local and external factors. For instance his successive appointment of radical prime Ministers beginning from Alain Juppé and Lionel Jospin and Jean-Pierre Raffarin also translated to implementation of radical policies (political, economic, cultural, Military) both at home and abroad.

The foreign policy thrust enunciated by President Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister Charles Josselin and then Foreign Minister Vedrine consists in adapting to new realities and attitudes while maintaining a strong commitment – in contrast to most western countries. Historically, French policy was often conceived in a spirit of rivalry with western countries present in Africa, starting with Britain. The administration tried to transcend that sterile competitiveness and adopt a concerted approach. Another major change is the cessation of interference in domestic crises.

Since Lionel Jospin became Prime Minister, we have resisted pressure to intervene on what could in the short term seem good grounds. Finally, there is a policy of encouraging democracy in Africa, but without cynicism. The idea is not to apply criteria or make immediate demands on African countries so that they never manage to get their heads above the water.

France's new policy also has as its cornerstone, reduction in military intervention and domestic affairs of Francophone countries, a new and better level of friendship with Anglophone countries through elimination of rivalry with other countries in Africa starting with Britain and operation of democratic governments as the basis of future interaction and by extension co-operation with Francophone.

The difference of this new policy from the old one is that most Western countries

don't even think its worth having a policy vis-à-vis Africa, except a humanitarian one. As far as France is concerned, She doesn't think its enough to give a bit of aid, to issue ritual condemnations of obstacles placed on democratization and beyond that, just say sort things out yourselves. France must have an African policy. Then of course French policy is not to be ashamed of what she did in her former colonies from de Gaulle up to Francois Mitterrand's La Baule Speech (June 1990). But both Africa and French realities and attitudes have changed. What was once considered self-evident in relations between France and Africa is no longer there today.

Some of the realities in Africa include the global wind of democratisation which swept across the continent during period; the new era of globalization accentuated by revolution in information technology which has collapsed borders and internationalized cultures; the death of old French stooges and collapse of their puppet regimes like Omar Bongo (Gabon) Felix Houphouet Boigny (Coted'Ivoire), Ahmadu Ahidjo (Cameroon) and Mobutu Sese Sekou (Zaire). The end of "rivalry" in Africa between France and other western powers also necessitated reduction in military pressure and change of focus in future military relations with Francophone.

This new foreign policy is criticized by some people who, in reality would like to go back to France's erstwhile Africa policy. The criticism that France has abandoned Africa is designed to make her feel guilty. But France doesn't need to abandon Africa, if that paternalistic expression has any meaning today.

Adopting a global view of Africa today does not in anyway imply a withdrawal on France's part, quite the contrary, the truth is, it is no longer possible to consider Africa as a series of pigeonholes. Consequently, France's new policy consists in loyalty to her friends and parties, in "adaptation" of the various policy agendas to the African realities of today' and in "openness" towards the rest of Africa".

Many Francophone feel let down by an old reliable friend in the time of their domestic problems which in many instances claimed thousands of lives with

devastating effects on development, peace and stability of the countries involved. The classical cases are Algeria, Coted'Ivoire, Rwanda, Niger etc. This is in spite of their willingness to more meaningfully assert their sovereignties in the light of contemporary realities. This situation has made some to conclude that France is no longer capable of imposing itself in Africa. The criticisms notwithstanding, France would not revert herself to the old paternalistic policy and she is "not ashamed" of her new policy.

Qvii. *What are the implications of France's new policy on her former colonies and other countries in Africa?*

From the investigation carried out in the course of the study including of course the fieldwork in some of the Francophone and Anglophone countries, the study was able to establish the following:

1. That France's closeness with any African country at any time is dependent on the amount of benefits she derives from the relationship. And this explains why she fostered close ties with the Francophone when it was beneficial to do so but has to change her policy towards her once close allies when current national and international circumstances made it more beneficial for her to act in that manner.
2. France's decisions and actions with regards to her relationship with Africa is predicated first and foremost on her subsisting national goals and aspirations than the prevailing international mood or opinion.
3. That the reduction of tension in the international system as a result of the collapse of communism coupled with the rising profile of Anglophone countries like Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa as veritable markets for French goods and arena for investment of French capital made the country to embrace them at the expense of former colonies. That much of France's policies towards Africa were a product of the idiosyncrasies of advisers on African Affairs at the time or the background of the foreign policy makers in Paris.
4. That the change of government in Paris between Socialists and Gaullists as well as some changes within the polity and economy contributed to the change in France's foreign policy towards African countries

5. That the change in France's foreign policy towards the Francophone has posed new challenges to the countries especially the challenge to look inwards for solutions to their socio-political, economic, military and technological problems as well as their relevance in international scheme of things.

7.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This study investigated the circumstances which led France to substantially change her foreign policy in Africa anchored on the principle of paternalism towards former colonies to that of non-involvement in their internal affairs from the period 1990-2006. The study also examined the new but vibrant partnership France developed with the Anglophone in replacement of the post-independence policy of minimum cooperation and suspicion in the period. The study also considered the implementation of France's new foreign policy in some selected Francophone and Anglophone countries as well as the impact of the changes in the foreign policy on the development of the Francophone.

From the investigation carried out in the course of the study, the study was able to establish the following:

1. That France's closeness with the Francophone States in the period after independence was predicated upon the amount of benefits she derived from the relationship. And this explains why she fostered close ties with these Francophone countries when it was beneficial to do so but had to change her policy towards her once close allies due to the prevailing national and international circumstances.
2. France identified with and supported pariah States and dictatorial regimes in Africa regardless of sanctions imposed by the international community against such regimes or States. This explains why she chose to fully engage the Apartheid regime in South Africa when the whole world was isolating the racist government. France supported unpopular leaders and despots like Mobutu Sese Sekou, in Zaire against the tide of international opinion to isolate those regimes. Similarly, this attitude underscored her close ties with the military regime of Gen. Abacha in Nigeria when the international community isolated the country on account of the poor human rights records of the regime.
3. That the reduction of tension in the international system as a result of the collapse of communism coupled with the rising profile of Anglophone countries like

Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa as veritable markets for French goods and arena for investment of French capital made the country to embrace these countries in many spheres at the expense of former colonies.

4. That much of France's policies towards Africa were a product of the idiosyncrasies of advisers on African Affairs over the time. The exit of these old time African Affairs experts like George Foccart, made it possible for new actors to push for new perspectives in Franco-African relations.
5. That the change of government in Paris from Francois Mitterrand of the Socialists Party to the pro- Gaullists President Jacques Chirac as well as some changes within the polity and economy contributed to the change in France's foreign policy towards African countries.
6. That although there have been changes in the foreign policy thrust of France towards the Francophone, there has been continuity of policy at some levels as the agreements upon which France based her relationship with the former colonies are yet to be reviewed, repealed or repudiated.
7. That although France has abandoned her policy of paternalism towards the former colonies, she nevertheless does not adopt a confrontational approach in her dealings with them.
8. That the change in France's foreign policy towards the Francophone has posed new challenges to the countries especially the challenge to look inwards for solutions to their socio-political, economic, military and technological problems as well as their relevance in international scheme of things.

7.3 AN APPRAISAL OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

The full exposition of the theme of this study in the preceding chapters, has established the fact that French foreign policy is not only a stimulating area of scholarly work, it is unique in form and content. It is interesting to note the fact that although France changed her relationship with her once close allies in Africa, due to a number of local and external factors as indicated in Chapter five; she nevertheless continues to maintain official contacts with the same countries in some ways.

One such area is the continued existence of the military and cooperation agreements which signed with the Francophone either at the dawn of independence or immediately after. As stated earlier in this study, France exploited these agreements to maintain a stronghold on these countries. The agreements even tended to suggest that the Francophone only got "flag independence" while in actual fact they were still under the influence, control and even domination of France.

In the period under study when France decided to change the basis of her relations with these countries, none of the agreements has been repudiated, cancelled or withdrawn. This, in effect, is a critical aspect of "continuity" in spite of the "change" in French foreign policy towards Africa as the topic of this study indicates.

The second aspect of the continuity despite the change in policy is the continued use of French Francs as national currency by the Francophone. The use of a common currency was a strong instrument of control. It was possible for instance, for France to devalue the CFA in 1991 preparatory to her joining the European as discussed earlier in this study. As already noted, this action also ensured that the value of the CFA is no longer tied to the French Franc. This development notwithstanding, the Francophone have yet to not change the name of CFA as their national currencies or introduce a new currency altogether, a decision that looks most reasonable in the circumstance. The maintenance of this shared identity in the national currency also is indicative of the "continuity" of the old relationship France shared with these countries even if psychologically.

Another aspect of continuity is the use of French as the national language by the Francophone. The promotion of the French language abroad is an important element of French foreign policy. In that wise, France still shares deep feelings of cultural affinity with the Francophone even though she has changed the policy of paternalism in which she actively supported these countries economically and also meddled in their internal political problems exploiting as it were, the existing agreements between them.

In line with her new foreign policy posture, France has drastically cut down on aid to Francophone and even abolished the Ministry of Cooperation which had the primary responsibility to administer aid inflows to Francophone. France still extends some measure of support to these countries through the European Union and other multilateral organizations like the World Bank and the UN agencies.

The change in the French foreign policy has been of advantage to the Anglophone. In line with new thinking in Paris, France actively supported Nigeria's quest for resolution of her debt problems with the Paris Club which ended in the country's exit of the over \$30billion debts owed to the Paris Club of Creditors. France has continued to increase and expand relations with Nigeria at the economic level through purchase of Nigerian oil, investment by French companies, exchange of technology etc.

Nigeria is also engaging France to develop Civil Nuclear capability to solve the country's lingering energy crisis. This formed the kernel of the visit in May 2008, by President Umaru Yar' Adua. France is also supporting Nigeria in various other ways to realize her potentials.

On the whole, the change in continuity of France's African policy has no doubt had grave implications on the Francophone. On one hand, it freed them politically to assert themselves as truly independent nation-states. Even at that, the political crises in Cote d'Ivoire, Chad and Benin put to question whether the Francophone are better without the political control from Paris. On the other hand, the end of paternalism marks the attainment of true independence by the Francophone countries. The implication is that the Francophone now have to make a fresh start in their quest for development. This challenge becomes more serious when viewed against the background of the weak economic base of most of the Francophone countries who almost depended entirely on France for their sustenance.

7.4 TEST OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES/ RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In chapter three, the study adopted the twin theoretical approaches of hegemonic stability and interdependence to explain the problem under consideration. In retrospect, these theoretical approaches have proved useful to the understanding of the issues. The theoretical approach of hegemonic stability has helped the study to establish that the relationship that existed in the period immediately after independence between France and Francophone was that of a hegemonic system where France was the hegemon (leadership) in the system while the Francophone were under her leadership. Although there can hardly be a perfect hegemony, all the conditions for a hegemonic system existed between France and the Francophone i.e. common currency, shared economic

philosophy (liberal economic development) influence and control, etc. The study showed that France fully exercised the powers of her status as hegemon by intervening in the internal political affairs of the countries and in many other instances determined who provided political leadership to these countries. This was the case when she intervened to preserve in power, puppet leaders like Felix Houphouet Boigny(Cote d'Ivoire), Mobutu Sese sekou(Zaire), Gnassingbe Eyadema (Togo)etc. The Francophone also accepted France's leadership and therefore took common position with her on vexed international issues. This explains why the Francophone joined France to actively support the secessionist effort of Biafra as the study showed in chapter four.

The second theoretical approach, the theory of interdependence helped the understanding of issues in chapters five and six. The study established that when it no longer became possible to maintain a hegemonic regime, France decided to change her policy towards the Francophone while seeking to build "interdependent relationship" with the Anglophone. The theory of interdependence proceeds from the reality that the whole world is a system where the sub-systems depend on each other for what happens to them (reciprocal interdependence). France therefore had to relate with Anglophone as the local and international circumstances dictated. Indeed, the whole concept of globalization proceeds from the realization that the whole world has collapsed in boundaries as a result of improvements in science and technology and that countries of the world must necessarily be "interdependent" to leverage on the strength of others in order to attain their national aspirations in a globalised world.

In the spirit of interdependence therefore, France fully engaged Nigeria, an Anglophone country which she hitherto treated with contempt politically. Nigeria on the other hand found France a worthy political ally in the time of her worst political crisis (Election annulment of 1993) when the international community isolated her with a regime of sanctions. Such a relationship was inconceivable in the 1960s when Nigeria protested French atomic bomb tests in the Sahara and followed up with severance of diplomatic ties or when France supported the Biafra secessionists during the civil war and further still when France through the Francophone frustrated the formation of ECOWAS etc. On the economic front, France continues to expand her economic presence in Anglophone

countries notably, Nigeria while Nigeria also looks forward to France for technological support to address her developmental challenges.

The reliance of both countries on each other for goods and services for economic growth is indicative of interdependence. The two theoretical approaches helped the study address the six research questions in chapter one. The first, second, third, fourth and fifth research questions were answered by the data and analysis in Chapters five and six while the sixth research question is addressed through the findings of the study and the recommendations which follow.

7.5 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE

The efforts made in this study have enriched the literature on Franco-African relations and by extension international relations in the following ways:

- (a) The study has shown that it is possible to use the two theoretical approaches of hegemonic stability and interdependence simultaneously to explain the complex relations between a highly developed economy and democracy like France in her interaction with allies- the developing countries of Africa
- (b) Students of international relations, businessmen, diplomats and foreign policy makers are better availed an information and reference document which captures in an organized scholarly manner, the nuances of contemporary French policy towards Africa.
- (c) The study has provided the basis for further academic inquest especially in areas like development options to Francophone countries in the face of reduced French presence in their politics and economies.
- (d) France's behaviour towards former colonies as articulated in this study helps for a comparative analysis of Britain's relations with former colonies within the context of the Commonwealth as well as the USA's behaviour within the context of the Organisation of American States (OAS).

7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the findings of this study, the following recommendations are made:

- (a) Francophone countries must immediately adopt alternative approaches to their national development as the days of paternalism when they benefited from France for economic survival are all over.
- (b) Francophone countries must rekindle their interest in the African Union (AU) as well as sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS and SADC, which shall henceforth serve as platforms for expression at the international scene as it is now clear that France can no longer provide the canopy for them as was the case in the past without breaching the EU position on issues.
- (c) Francophone countries in West Africa had hitherto antagonized regional "influentials" like Nigeria especially during the Biafran crisis and during the formation of ECOWAS. This, of course, was with the active support of France. However, given the present scenario, the Francophone must resolve to work closely with regional powers in charting a future course for their national development and in confronting some regional and international challenges.
- (d) Nigeria has benefited tremendously from the new foreign policy posture of France in Africa. In order to consolidate on these achievements, the Nigeria-France Joint Commission established in 1999 must be strengthened. Nigeria and French Presidents should hold annual meetings on rotational basis in Abuja and Paris to review past developments and strategise for better ways of strengthening the ties between the two countries. This is necessary as there is remote possibility of France distancing Nigeria on economic issues given the high level of French investments in the Nigerian economy.
- (e) Trade between Nigeria and France has always been in deficit against France because of the dominance of oil in the terms of trade between the two countries. Official policy by the Nigerian government should be geared towards encouraging non-oil exports to France as well as importation of goods which France has comparative advantage over Nigeria.
- (f) In the light of the vastly improved relations between both countries, official policies should be made to promote and encourage aviation companies from the

two countries to operate direct flights between Paris and Abuja or Lagos to take care of the increasing number of passengers who at the moment have to travel through London or Amsterdam.

- (g) There is an urgent need to promote the study of French in the Anglophone countries beyond the efforts by France as this would prepare experts in these countries especially Nigeria, South Africa and Ghana to take advantage of highly technical jobs in the Francophone countries given the present attitude of France which does not favour supply of manpower needs of these countries as was the case before the 1990s.
- (h) It has been established that NGOs can play significant roles in the exchange of cultures and therefore the improvement of relations between France and the Anglophone. There is therefore, the need for Nigerian and French policy makers to actively support NGOs working on various aspects of Franco-African relations for the benefit of sustained good relations between the two countries.

7.7 CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters, the study has successfully investigated the changes in France's foreign policy in Africa from 1990-2006. The findings of the study were also brought up and recommendations made towards the future development of both the Francophone and Anglophone countries and their relationship with France.

Since the study did not cover in details, the period from 2007 to date when a new President, Nicholas Sarkozy was elected in France, this area of research is still opened to scholars who might wish to continue with the stimulating theme of Franco- African relations.

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APPENDIX I

DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR INTERVIEWS

A Discussion Guide was prepared for the study based on the research questions as follows:


1. What explains France's declining interests in her former colonies during the period covered by this study?
2. In what ways did France's economic problems affect her aid policy to former colonies?
3. What explains the new policy of "non-involvement" of France in times of violent conflicts and political disturbances in some of her former colonies and traditional allies like Algeria, and Cote d'Ivoire, etc?
4. Is French foreign policy tied to the idiosyncrasy of her foreign policy officials? How different is the French contemporary foreign policy in Africa (1990-2006) from the policy immediately after colonial rule?
5. What accounts for France's deliberate efforts during this period to win the friendship of Anglophone countries like Nigeria?
6. What does France need to do in order to consolidate her relationship with Anglophone countries?
7. Did the change of government in France between the socialist President Francois Mitterrand to a pro- Gaullist leader, Jacques Chirac contribute to the change in France's African policy during the period covered by this study?
8. What are the implications of France's new policy on her former colonies and other countries in Africa?
9. How can the Francophone countries make progress in the light of France's new policy in Africa?
10. What are the policy measures France needs to adopt to enhance the teaching and spread of French language in the Anglophone countries?
11. To what extent do the French companies operating abroad especially in the Anglophone countries benefitting from the new level of cordial relationship between the France and their host countries?
12. How has France's membership of the EU affected her relationship with former colonies in Africa?

APPENDIX II

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES:

1. Philip Peltier- Former French Ambassador to Nigeria - 1999
2. Pierre Garrigue Guyonaud Former French Ambassador to Nigeria - 1998
3. Ambassador Dr Mahmud Yahya-Former Nigerian Diplomat in France/Expert on France-Africa relations
4. Prof Bola Akinterinwa-Scholar on France's Foreign Policy in Africa- Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, Lagos.
5. Dr. Olufemi Adelusi-Expert on France's foreign policy in Africa
6. John Chiahemmen-International Journalist with Reuters who worked in France for many years
7. Executive Secretary, Franco-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Lagos
8. Hon. Sadiq Yar' Adua-Chairman House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Abuja-2001.
9. Alhaji Sule Lamido - Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria (1999-2003)
10. Lani Smith-Coordinator, Hausa Language Programme, Radio France International
11. Dr. Ogaba Oche-Senior Research Fellow, Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, Lagos.
12. Prof Bolaji Akinyemi-Former Nigerian External Affairs Minister
13. Ambassador Mathew Mbu- Former Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister
14. Director- Alliance Franciase, Lagos-1999
15. Officials (African Desk)-Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris
16. Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yammoukro
17. Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Algiers.

Map of Africa Locating the French Speaking Countries



Africa

