

**Arithmetic Operations On Elliptic Curve Defined Over Radix-7 Symmetrical
Quaternary Signed -Digit Finite Fields And Their Application In Secure
Communication Systems.**

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the Thesis:

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
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Michael Naseimo Daikpor

Lagos, Nigeria

DEDICATION

To GOD Almighty

ABSTRACT

This thesis proposes a Restricted Radix-7 Symmetrical Quaternary Signed Digit Number system (RR7SQSDNS) both as an alternative processing logic threshold system and as a signed digit algebraic structure. The thesis also presents the arithmetic operations on elliptic curves defined over this special type of finite field and develops Restricted Radix-7 Symmetrical Quaternary Signed Digit (RR7SQSD) modular exponentiation scheme that uses a multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain to compute the product of very large word length integer operands in data word length constrained compute environments. The multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain is also used to develop a one-stop multiply-by-7 point multiplication computation strategy for elliptic curves defined over RR7SQSD finite fields.

A Complementary Pass (CP) gate derived 7-valued symmetrical quaternary signed-digit T-gate realized as a basic building block for implementing the SMVL arithmetic unit VLSI circuit operates on RR7SQSD profile voltage signals. The VLSI functional logic circuits were thus synthesized on this basic building blocks level. Multisim Electronic Work Bench was used to analogue simulate the T-gate's MOSFET circuit. The T-gate's multiplexing ability, the RR7SQSD full adder and quasi-multiplier circuits' accuracy were simulated using qbasic language hardware-descriptive-styled source code program with results that confirmed the efficiency of RR7SQSD arithmetic.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION	MEANING
AES	Advanced Electronic Signature
ALU	Arithmetic and Logic Unit
ANSI	American National Standard Institute
ASIC	Application Specific Integrated Circuit
ATM	Automated Teller Machine
BDCM	Bi-Directional Current Mode
CH	Chapter
CMOS	Complementary Metal-Oxide Semiconductor
CP	Complementary Pass
DBNS	Double Based Number System
DES	Digital Electronics Signature
DFT	Discrete Furrier Transformation
DLP	Discrete Logarithm Problem
DRAM	Double Random Access Memory
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
EC	Elliptic curve
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDHA	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Algorithm
ECDLP	Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECL	Emitter Coupled Logic
EEA	Extended Euclidean Algorithm
FA	Full Adder
FEAM	Field Element Adder-Multiplier
Fig	Figure
FPGA	Field Programmable Gate Array
FPLSC	Field Programmable Level System Circuit
HA	Half Adder
ICTS	Information and Communication Technology Systems
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IFP	Integer Factorization Problem
ISO	International Standard Organisation
ISP	Internet Service Provider
LSI	Large Scale Integration
LUT	Look Up Table
MIPS	Millions of Instructions Per Second
MOSFET	Metal-Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor
MVL	Multiple-Valued Logic

ABBREVIATIONS

N/A	Not Available
NAF	Non-Adjacent Form
NIST	National Institute for Standard and Technology
OS	Operating System
P[N] MOS	P [N] Metal Oxide Semiconductor
PDA	Personal Digital Assistant
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKC	Public Key Cryptography
POS	Palm held Operating System
RFID	Radio Frequency Identification
RNS	Residue Number System
RR7SQSD	Restricted Radix-7 Symmetrical Quaternary Signed Digit
RRR7SQSDNS	Restricted radix-7 Symmetrical Quaternary Signed-digit Number System
RSA	Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
SD	Signed – Digit
SDFA	Signed Digit Full Adder
SDNS	Signed Digit Number System
SET	Secure Electronic Transaction
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SMVL	Symmetrical Multiple-Valued Logic
SSH	Secure Shell
T_ULM	Tree-type Universal Logic Module
USN	Ubiquitous Sensor Network
VLSI	Very Large Scale Integration
WAP	Wireless Application Protocol
XOR	Exclusive-OR

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE BACKGROUND OF STUDY

As today's human society becomes more and more information technology driven the integrity of received information continue to be a very important security issue. Communication among community of information users is said to be secured and trusted if it can be proved that the received intelligence at the authorized receiver's end is original, un-intercepted or re-transmitted and un-adulterated by an un-authorized party. With most communication channels open and accessible to all and sundry, the desired security of transmitted message can only be provided at the sending end while authentication can only be performed at the receiving end. Cryptography is one of the several means of making transmitted plaintext messages secure over open and insecure communication channels and provide facilities for authentication at the receiving end. Cryptography transforms the plain text message into an obscure form which can only be reconstructed by the intended recipient in record time.

1.1.1 Classical cryptography

At the beginning there were just two basic techniques of cryptography: substitution cryptography (where letters of the original plain text are replaced by other letters) and the transposition cryptography (in which letters of the plain text are re-arranged in a different order). Concerned parties agree on a particular technique and exchange single secret keys that would be used for encryption and decryption of plain text messages. Such cryptosystems ciphers were either monoalphabetic (that is only one substitution/transposition) or polyalphabetic (characterized by a combination of several

substitution/transposition) and concatenation techniques were used. These were the symmetric cryptosystems and they require extreme strict key exchange management to ensure the desired security level [1].

According to available records classical cryptography dates back to 400 BC in the city of Menet Khufu in Egypt, in the form of hieroglyphic inscriptions on tombs while Julius Ceaser extensively used substitution ciphers between 100 to 44 BC [2]. Ever since then, cryptography has continued to flourish in governance, diplomacy, wars and in all other human endeavours. Some of the ubiquitous examples in history include: the sensational “Babington plot” of 1586 in which Mary Stuart of Scotland plotted to dethrone and kill Queen Elizabeth I of England; the infamous “1917 Zimmermann Telegram” that contained the top secret plan of Germany to invade the United States of America during World War I (WWI) and the Japanese top secret diplomatic code on the plans to attack Peel harbour during World War II (WWII). Cracking of these ciphers were not only historical but were also academic achievements in their times. History also has it that America’s uncertainty concerning the authenticity of the deciphered message and thus her delay in taking counter measures cost her loss of over 3000 sailors and Airmen along with several hundreds of warships and planes in one single day. This underscores the need for fast and secure information delivery systems. Today proper functioning of the Information and Communication Technology Systems’ (ICTS), the secret intelligent service, crime detection, e-banking, e-commerce, working wireless, internet shopping, e-payment, pay television broadcasting, satellite image processing and communication,

etc, is based on fast secure and authenticable information delivery systems.

1.1.2 Elliptic curve cryptography: - corner stone and future of modern cryptography

Modern cryptography made popular and open by White Diffie evolved along a completely different direction. It is public-key-oriented and based on the practically-reverse-operation intractability of some mathematical hard problems [3]. These hard problems typically have forward operations that are relatively easy to perform and reverse operations that are computationally infeasible even with all available cutting edge computing systems working in parallel. Such hard problems are the: Integer Factorization Problem (IFP), index calculus or Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) and the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). They formed the basis of today's acclaimed cryptographic protocols such as: IFP in Rivest, Shamir and Adlemans (RSA) cryptosystem protocol, the DLP in the Diffie Hellman's Digital Signatures Algorithm (DSA) and the ECDLP in Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [4-16]. Communicating parties maintain a pair of keys each: a private key and a public key. The private keys are selected randomly and independent of the other party and used to compute the public keys. The public keys are made public and an intending message sender uses the public key of the intended receiver and his private key to encrypt the plain text message using an agreed hard mathematical algorithm and transmit the cipher over a public domain (an insecure) channel. The message can be deciphered only by the intended recipient. This type of cryptosystem is referred to as asymmetric or Public Key Cryptography (PKC). It ensures data integrity, provide

authentication and does not repudiate hence a secure and trusted communication. Elliptic curves are mathematical constructs with complex addition and point multiplication arithmetic operations. Today there exist a large variety of improved Elliptic Curve (EC) arithmetic techniques for performing integer factorization, primality testing, pseudorandom number generation to mention a few. However, the major arithmetic operation in Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is EC point multiplication [4 -7]. EC point multiplication is essentially scaling a point $p = (x, y)$ on the elliptic curve with a scalar quantity m , in such manner that the product $W = mP = (x_w, y_w)$ is also a point on the same elliptic curve. Consequently, point multiplication is often referred to as EC scalar multiplication or modular exponentiation since EC point multiplication is equivalent to exponentiation in modular arithmetic [8 - 13]. The procedure for computing EC point multiplication requires two other basic elliptic curve arithmetic operations namely: elliptic curve points addition and elliptic curve point doubling. These basic elliptic curve arithmetic operations are in turn executed using finite field addition, multiplication, squaring and inversion operations. Finding W , from known values of P and m is easy; but finding m from given values of W and P is a mathematically exponentially hard problem. This problem, often referred to as the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [9 - 10], is the kernel of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and the foundation basis of modern cryptography.

1.1.3 The emerging secure and trusted communication devices and standards

Most emerging secure and trusted communication devices such as: pocket size laptop computers, smart cards, mobile or cell phones, Personal digital Assistants (PDA), Ubiquitous Sensor Networks (USN), pagers, Palm held Operating Systems (POS), digital post markers, internet service providers, radio frequency identification (RFID) tags and environmental sensors, as well as the Automated Teller Machines (ATM) and other critical service delivery systems for all e-banking, e-commerce and e-shopping have become routinely supported by ECC [17-22]. These devices are required to execute millions of computer instructions in a matter of seconds in special environments where there are limitations to the system's computing power, memory space, bandwidth and power supply (battery) [3,19-21]. Many of these devices are capable of handling voice, data and video images (3G) over electronic data communication channels and connect to the internet as terminals. This novel technological advancement further highlights the need for an improved secure and trusted communication system. The traditional cryptosystem algorithms (DES, DLP, RSA, and DSA) have become impractical as they require bigger memory and intensive power hungry big integer computation co-processors to complete calculations in timely manner. RSA comparatively slow but an acclaimed powerhouse of today's e-commerce, e-banking, e-purchase will have its key length doubled before the start of the next decade in order to sustain the present security level. The increase in key size will render RSA crypto-systems unsuitable for constrained environment devices. EC based crypto server security arrangement will further enhance internet security and allow Internet Service Providers (ISP) to utilize fewer crypto servers to provide secure gate way operations. As ECC becomes ICTS

only security tool globally, e-transactions traffic will be on the rise and servers will be have to perform signature generation, signature verification and key exchange operations using standard elliptic curves. Although present ECC supported communication standards include ANSI X9.63, IEEE 1363.2000, IETF RFC 3278, ISO 15946-3 and NIST SP 80056 [3], none-the-less there will equally be users with non-standard curves but meet prescribed parameters. For example elliptic curves defined over non-conventional number system or algebraic structures such as the $RR7SQSDNS$ element finite field. Certifying authorities must have to tolerate and servers must have to handle them.

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Despite the prominent role cryptography has come to play in transforming today's secure communication gadgets- 21st century wonders, they are still beset with conceptual, technological and operational challenges that need urgent attention. The problem statement of this study is formulated by considering these challenges and certain other foci that help to define the boundary conditions.

1.2.1 The challenges of secure communication gadgets

1.2.1.1 The conceptual challenge

This challenge is as a result of the variations in the degree of hardness of the mathematical problems and the vanishing gap between forward and reverse computation times. The hardness of the mathematical problems is a function of the length of the operands or the key size (number of decimal digits or bits) in the

mathematical operations; thus the longer the key size the better the security. Also key sizes for minimum security requirements vary with the type of cryptosystem protocol but because ECDLP hardness is exponential with key size unlike the sub exponential hardness for non-EC based PKC systems such as RSA and DSA, ECC provides minimum key size for the same level of security and confidentiality of the transmitted message. Table 1.1 gives the minimum security level per key size and period to break a corresponding cipher text for EC and non-EC cryptosystems. It can be seen that while a 210 bits key size in ECC requires 10^{20} MIPS-years to break, ten times this number of bits is required by non-EC cryptosystems for the same code breaking period.

Furthermore, under normal circumstances bigger processing power is required to calculate the inverse function of a PKC hard mathematical problem. However, as microprocessors increasingly become faster and of bigger memories yet smaller and cheaper, the time to solve the reverse problem reduces and approaches that of the time to solve the forward problem. This in effect reduces the security level of the cryptosystem.

Today's sufficient and adequate minimum security level key sizes may be inadequate tomorrow. To continually maintain the same acceptable minimum security level, key sizes will have to creep upward but so are clock speeds of processors increasing daily. It is thus, a "race between guns and armour" [17] that may not end. Notwithstanding, even if microprocessor and DRAM clock speeds will continue to increase as human

activities become more and more ICTS driven, it is necessary to find some means of widening the gap between forward and reverse operation computation times.

Table 1.1 Comparative code breaking period

Time to break cipher(MIPS- years)	Minimum key size (bits)		
	ECC	Non-ECC	Ratio
10^4	106	512	1:6
10^8	132	768	1:6
10^{11}	163	1024	1:7
10^{20}	210	2048	1:10
N/A	256	3072	1:12
N/A	384	7680	1:20
N/A	512	15360	1:30
10^{78}	600	21000	1:35

1.2.1.2 The Technological challenge – a binary processing logic threshold problem

This challenge is due to semiconductor device leakage current and in-circuit heat generation as a result of technological procedure involved in the manufacture of binary logic VLSI circuits. The binary logic system is a throw-back of Aristotle's law of excluded middle ("0" for the past, "1" for the present). This law though made popular by George Boole in 1854 had nothing for the 'future' but, in 1965 Jan Lukasiewicz proposed the Multiple-Valued Logic (MVL) to address the deficiency in Aristotle's

work called “Art of discourse”. MVL is higher radix r ($r > 2$) processing logic threshold none-the-less only binary logic Very Large Scale Integrated (VLSI) circuits continued to dominate the mind of electronics system designers up to the early part of this decade. This late interest can be attributed to the ease with which the semiconductor device used in building binary logic can be biased to operate on the two levels of “0” and “1”. Today the field of semiconductor devices is one of the fastest developing areas as microelectronics records tremendous development with the ever-increasing frequency of occurrence continuously enhancing the performance of integrated circuits. New materials, innovative processes, novel device structure, better modelling and simulation techniques are announced virtually on daily basis. The construction of powerful microprocessors is made possible by the astonishing breakthrough in Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) VLSI circuit technology. In order to maintain consistency with Moore’s law [23 - 27] the microelectronics industry cramps billions of transistors into a small area by physical down scaling of the transistor size.

However, the increasing demand for higher performances in the emerging secure and trusted communication system puts a heavy burden on semiconductor device technology. Down scaling reduces wire capacitances at the sub micron level, below sub-micron level system inter wire capacitances increases greatly and becomes problematic both for power consumption and signal propagation delay [26 - 28]. By continued down scaling of the transistor, the gate-oxide region of Metal Oxide Field Effect Transistors

(MOSFET) shrinks and thus, causing gate leakage current flow. The presence of gate leakage current causes degradation in drain-source current quality which in turn adversely affects circuit performances. Also with several millions of transistors crammed into a small area, the bulk of individual semiconductor devices vanishes and the heat generated as a result of the numerous high-speed switching devices need to be quickly and effectively evacuated. Other problems with binary logic systems include: difficulty in realizing high speed array multipliers, complex device layout and large interconnection area [27]. Binary logic systems are also known for low information content per line, relatively low data processing capability [28], reduced reliability, and long carry propagation chain during arithmetic operations due to the small number of processing logic thresholds "0" and "1" [29].

In practical terms, these problems in binary logic VLSI circuits transform into bigger surface chip area, longer waiting or turn-around time at the ATM, longer delay time in making and receiving calls with the mobile phone and higher connection error rate. The implication is that the binary CMOS VLSI circuit at very high level of semiconductor devices integration is approaching a limit of performance and there is now a scramble for MOS VLSI circuit performance boosters in the semiconductor industry [21]. It has been predicted [24] that by the year 2016 the present binary logic CMOS VLSI circuit would be extinct. One such performance boosters is the MVL system which has been proved to provide a better insight into digital logic processing by displaying phenomena that are never possible in binary logic system. Working in binary is almost similar to

working with black and white colour. Whereas working with the full spectrum of white light improves performance if one uses optical analogy.

Consequently, for a long term solution the international scientific community is now directing its efforts on three major areas namely, i) to develop new materials for VLSI circuits, ii) to find alternative system architecture and iii) to formulate a new processing logic level threshold values [24 - 25]. The last of these three areas is also the focus of this study. Finding alternative processing threshold logic with high enough information per line capacity that will render semiconductor devices continued down scaling a non-issue to tomorrow's secure and error-free communication system's VLSI circuit designer.

1.2.1.3 The operational challenges

A properly implemented cryptosystem is a good security mechanism for governance, defence, commerce and industry. However, absolutely secure and trusted communication in practical terms is utopian. Information can only be theoretically secure and the cryptosystems are just hard to crack or are based on some computational notion of security. That is, cryptography-based service delivery systems like any other critical service delivery system also fails, though seldom publicized, such failures, however minutiae, may involve either loss of human lives or loss of very large sum of money. Studies of bank ATMs [30] showed that ATM failures, to a very large percentage, are as a result of the software implementation of the cryptosystem. Examples of failures in the banking and other customer-driven sectors include: i) banks issuing PIN codes through their branches and bank employees gaining access to

customers PIN number, ii) Fake ATM or service Engineers modifying ATM with a view to recording customers account numbers and PIN iii) programming errors resulting in the issuance of the same PIN numbers to several customers. The conclusion of the study of bank ATM is another grey area in this study. A hardware-implementable cryptosystem protocol algorithm will no doubt reduce frauds in ATM and the unthinkable damages incurred when secure communication and other critical service delivery systems fail.

1.2.2 Foci of this work

Arising from section (1.2.1) are the following three foci of the study.

i) Already there is a deluge of publications on various theoretical studies and practical design implementations of PKC arithmetic operations but they are all based on binary CMOS VLSI circuit techonolgy. Hence, the MVL system is considered as an appropriate alternative processing threshold logic.

ii) The Signed Digit Number System (SDNS) and the Residue Number Systems (RNS) both supporting efficient arithmetic, are two MVL processing threshold number systems. The RNS, though presents absolute carry-free arithmetic but because of the exigencies of complex conversion procedure had to be dropped for the SDNS which limits carry propagation one position to the left.

iii) ECC which provides an acceptable security level and confidentiality of transmitted message for a comparatively small key size was taken as the appropriate cryptosystem for this study.

The choice of SDNS and the ECC require the need for an appropriate algebraic structure in which the related signed digit arithmetic can be executed. Hence, the statement of the problem of this thesis is to investigate the arithmetic operations on EC defined over RR7SQSD finite fields and examine implementation issues of an ECC arithmetic unit VLSI circuit that will sustain the present human society increasing reliance on secure communication and information technology system gadgets. These foci facilitated the formulation of the following aims and objectives.

1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

1.3.1 The aim

The aim of this work is to develop a Symmetrical Multiple Valued processing Logic (SMVL) based elliptic curve arithmetic unit VLSI circuit for secure communication systems.

1.3.2 The Objectives

The objectives of this study are to:

- i) Formulate an appropriate strategy for performing Restricted Radix-7 Symmetrical Quaternary Signed Digit (RR7SQSD) based big integer operands parallel addition and multiplication operations.

-
- ii) Establish the necessary basis of efficient arithmetic operations on EC defined over RR7SQSD element finite fields suitable for secure communication systems and prove that RR7SQSD element field based ECC is message-degradation and repudiation free using a particular cryptosystem protocol as a case study.
 - iii) Establish the architectural organization of the RR7SQSD based ECC arithmetic VLSI circuit.
 - iv) Design the VLSI circuit's basic building block and derive the exact LSI circuit diagram of the main functional logic units using the basic building block.

1.4 SCOPE OF STUDY

The research study covers:

- i) The principle of the RR7SQSD arithmetic and methods of developing appropriate schemes for performing big integer arithmetic operations in compute constrained environments.
- ii) Verification of the RR7SQSD number system as an algebraic structure or field suitable for cryptosystem application and suggestion of appropriate strategies for the realization of the relevant cryptosystem arithmetic operations.
- iii) Encryption and decryption procedures of plain text messages on tested cryptosystem protocols on EC defined over RR7SQSD finite fields.

- iv) Experiments /simulation procedures for testing the VLSI basic building block's circuit and the functional logic unit's conformity with design specifications i.e. the electrical parameters, correct function and operational accuracy.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The practical significance of this study is that, it will provide a basis for the design and implementation of MVL cryptosystems based secure and trusted state-of-the-art communication gadgets. In addition, the hitherto only software based cryptosystem protocols can be converted to hardware implementable algorithms thereby reducing failures and frauds in cryptographic based customer service delivery systems such as the ATM.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The pertinent research questions are:

- i) Which type of strategy can be employed to ensure fast and error-free RR7SQSD arithmetic on integer operands with the cryptographic significant length of about 160 to 512 decimal digits?
- ii) What should be the description of an EC defined over RR7SQSD finite field that will guarantee message degradation and repudiation-free encryption and decryption operations in an RR7SQSD based ECC?
- iii) What should be the constituent functional subunits of the RR7SQSD based ECC arithmetic unit VLSI circuit and the design specifications of the basic building block?

- iv) Which engineering tool(s) should be best employed for the several simulation experiments?

1.7 DEFINITION OF TERMS

Plaintext: This is the original intelligible message or unencrypted text.

Cipher Text: This is the end product of encrypting a plaintext.

Code: This is an algorithm for transforming an intelligible message into an unintelligible form.

Discrete Logarithm Problem: Given an element of a group, find the power n of the group generator g , such that g to the power of n , is an element of that group.

Elliptic Curve Cryptography: This is a type of cryptography based on group theory that provides a harder to solve discrete logarithm problem.

Transposition ciphers: A type of cipher that hides the message contents by rearranging the order of the letters

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this study a very extensive search for previous works on the problem statement presented in section 1.2 revealed little or nothing. This perhaps, can be attributed to the fact that hitherto, only two categories of finite fields have been in use; the binary Galois fields $GF(2)$ and the prime fields $GF(P)$. The elements of these fields are positive character digits sets thus; ECC arithmetic operations have been only on positive character digit set number systems. In addition, the related VLSI circuits are mainly binary logic CMOS VLSI circuits. There has been no work on RR7SQSD element finite field based ECC as far as the archival literature search of previous works in this study is concerned. However, since the work of this study encompasses MVL/SD arithmetic, finite fields, elliptic curve cryptography and VLSI circuit design; this literature review begins with MVL circuits basic building blocks in section 2.1 and followed with signed digit arithmetic in section 2.2. Survey of finite fields, Elliptic curve basics and elliptic curve cryptosystems are presented in sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. In section 2.6, secure and trusted communication systems' VLSI circuit organization is presented. Finally section 2.7 presents the summary and conclusion of the literature review.

2.1 MVL circuits basic building block

MVL circuit systems process signal voltage levels represented in higher processing logic thresholds in such manners as to facilitate direct performances of arithmetic operations in higher radices ($r > 2$). MVL VLSI circuits have already found applications in digital signal processing, arithmetic and logic units design, digital control and robotics, and high-speed

image processing [31 - 35]. The basic building blocks of MVL VLSI circuits are different from the binary logic circuit basic building blocks.

One traditional basic building block of MVL VLSI circuits is the Bi-Direction Current Mode (BDCM) circuit. The current mode nature enables BDCM circuits to realize linear arithmetic operations by simple-internal wiring thereby greatly reducing circuit interconnections and so provides small signal delay time [30, 32 - 33]. However, today's emerging VLSI circuits are fabricated with semiconductor devices that operate in voltage mode thus, rendering BDCM circuits obsolete. One other traditional MVL VLSI circuits' design building block that constructs any arbitrary function of n variables is the Tree-type Universal Logic Module (T_ULM), popularly referred to as the T-gate. This is naturally voltage mode multiple-valued signals switching multiplexer circuits [35 - 36]. A method of synthesizing T-gate network and the necessary conditions for its use in combinational and sequential logic circuits has been developed. The theoretical work study of [37] on the necessary conditions for a static-hazard-free T-gate eventually resulted in the practical realization of a static-hazard-free T-gate on the level of ternary NAND gates using Emitter Connected Logic (ECL) techniques. T-gate modules have been used to construct arithmetic and memory elements in [38] and quaternary 10- μm NMOSFET integrated circuits for systematic image processing without encoding and decoding and MVL dynamic shift registers for pattern matching cells in [35].

A typical T-gate circuit comprises a pair of NMOS transistors of different threshold literal voltages, realized by multiple ion implants, as inverters and a pair of pass transistors as analogue switches to multiplex the MVL input signal. T-gate circuits greatly reduce chip interconnections; transistor count and signal delay time but suffer from greater power dissipation relative to the make-and-break circuits of [37 - 38]. On the other hand, Complementary Pass (CP) gates circuits [39-40] are known to exhibit extreme compactness, smaller signal propagation time and very low power dissipation. CP-gate circuits consist of a 'down literal and the traditional analogue switch of N-type Metal Oxide Semiconductor (NMOS) and P-type Metal Oxide Semiconductor (PMOS) transistor circuits.

Present CP-gates and T-gates circuits function in a manner similar to binary logic circuits. They associate positive signal voltage level with positively signed data or variable. Negatively signed data must be represented in some radix compliment form of representation. Consequently, existing MVL VLSI circuits' voltage utilization is restricted to half of the supply voltage rail thereby resulting in supply voltage under utilization. For example, a 5-valued logic system requires 0V,1V,2V,3V and 4V signal voltage levels to correspond to the character digit set of $L = \{0,1,2,3,4\}$. In the course of this study, a new MVL circuit's basic building block is developed to utilize both positive and negative signal voltage rails thus maximizing supply voltage utilization.

2.2 SIGNED DIGIT ARITHMETIC

The SDNS is one of a four-member family of number systems referred to in [41 - 42] as ‘unconventional fixed-radix number system’ and proven to have very high redundancy level and of special application potentials. Other members of this family are the: negative radix number system, sign-logarithm number system and residue number system. The SDNS in particular, presents very efficient carry-free arithmetic as it limits carry propagation chains to only one digit position to the left and enhances parallel system architecture. Some features of SDNS include: no separate sign digit for a negative number, unique representation of ‘0’, each number within the range has two representations while addition is independent of operand length but on two neighbouring digits. Archival search on SDNS [35, 44] revealed two categories namely the unrestricted SDNS and restricted SDNS. This section begins with the general discussion on the natures of SDNS. It will be followed with numerical examples on the SD arithmetic and an epilogue of SD arithmetic applications. It is also noted in literatures that $\bar{i}$ denotes $-i$ however, in this study either of them will be used.

2.2.1 Nature of the SDNS

In a radix- r positional number system the character digits are described by the set $L \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, r-1\}$ however, in an unrestricted symmetrical SDNS, the character digits are described by $L \in \{\overline{(r-1)}, \overline{(r-2)}, \dots, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, \dots, (r-2), (r-1)\}$ with a unique representation for “0” and require no separate sign digit. Thus for a 2-digit number in the range $\overline{99}_{10} \leq X \leq 99_{10}$ in radix-10 SDNS where $L \in \{-9, -8, \dots, -1, 0, 1, \dots, 8, 9\}$, there are

199 numbers. If 2 digits represent a radix-10 character digit then each of these character digits is capable of 19 possible representations. This is a total of 361 representations of L and an 81% redundancy level. Each number in the range $\overline{99}_{10} \leq X \leq 99_{10}$ has two representations e.g. $03 = 1\overline{7} = 3; 01 = 19; 0\overline{2} = 1\overline{8} = -2$ and $-04 = \overline{1}6 = -4$. The attendant problem with high redundancy level is cost intensive hardware implementation. Restricting the character digit set reduces redundancy level and thus reduces cost.

In the restricted radix- r symmetrical SDNS, the character digits are restricted to a value α , such that $\left\lceil \frac{r-1}{2} \right\rceil \leq \alpha \leq r-1$. A minimum of r different digits are required to represent a number x_i , in such manner that $\overline{\alpha} \leq x_i \leq \alpha$ that is, $x_i \in \{\overline{\alpha}, \overline{(\alpha-1)}, \dots, \overline{1}, 0, 1, \dots, (\alpha-1), \alpha\}$. For $r=10, 5 \leq \alpha \leq 9$. Let $\alpha=8$ and for $n=2$ then, there will be 177 numbers all in the range $\overline{88} \leq X \leq 88$. With 17 values for each digit, there are a total of 189 representations which represent a 39% redundancy. 1 has one representation .i.e. $01 = 1\overline{9}$. Over reduction of the redundancy level could resurrect the long carry propagation chains.

2.2.2 Numerical examples of SD addition

Generally, the carry-free arithmetic is executed in two phases [33 – 36,42]. Let x, y be some signed digit operands just as u_i and c_i are the interim sum and carry digits respectively in the r -nary symmetrical SDNS. A carry-free SD addition operation of the

type $x \pm y = s \equiv (x_{n-1}, x_{n-2}, \dots, x_1, x_0) \pm (y_{n-1}, y_{n-2}, \dots, y_1, y_0) = (s_n, s_{n-1}, s_{n-2}, \dots, s_1, s_0)$, **can be**
described by equation (2.1) or (2.2) and exemplified numerically as in Table 2.1.

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} x_i \pm y_i = rc_i + u_i \\ s_i = u_i + c_{i-1} \end{array} \right\} \quad (2.1)$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} u_i = x_i + y_i - rc_i, \\ c_i = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \bar{1} & ; \text{if } (x_i + y_i) < \bar{a} \\ 1 & ; \text{if } (x_i + y_i) > a \\ 0 & ; \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right\} \quad (2.2)$$

and the final sum, $s_i = u_i + c_{i-1}$

where: $L \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$, $x_i, y_i, s_i \in L$, $c_i \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$, $u_i \in \{-2, -1, 0, 1, 2\}$ **and**

$$\left\lceil \frac{r-1}{2} \right\rceil \leq \alpha \leq r-1.$$

Table 2.1 Numerical examples on archival signed digit addition.

Unrestricted signed digit arithmetic		Restricted signed digit arithmetic	
Radix-10 signed digit (general concept)	Radix-4 signed digit [40]	Radix-10 symmetrical signed digit [38] ($r = 10, h = 7, a = 6$)	
$1356 + (-580)$ $1356 = 1356$ $-580 = \bar{5}\bar{8}0$ $= 776$	$182 + (-83) = 99$ $X = 182 = 2\ 3\ 1\ 2$ $+) Y = -83 = -1\ -2\ 3\ 1$ $x_i + y_i = 4c_i + u_i = 0101101\ \bar{1}$ $s_i = c_{i-1} + u_i = 121\ \bar{1}$	$x = 3645_{10}$ $y = 1456_{10}$ $u_i; 40\bar{1}1$ $c_i; \underline{111}$ $s_i; 5101_{10}$	$1356_{10} = 3645_7$ $580_{10} = 1456_7$ $u_i; 40\bar{1}1$ $c_i; \underline{111}$ $s_i; 5101_7$

P
o
s
t
e
r

$$c_1 = \begin{cases} \bar{1} & ; \text{if } x_i + y_i < -a \\ 1 & ; \text{if } x_i + y_i > a \\ 0 & ; \text{if otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$u_i = x_i + y_i - rc_i$$

$$s_i = u_i + c_{i-1}$$

2.2.3 Signed digit arithmetic applications

Since the invention of the SDNS [42] signed digit arithmetic has been deployed in various areas of scientific research. For example, the work in [33] employed radix 4 Signed Digit (SD) arithmetic to propose a 4 x 4 signed digit multiplier for digital filters. In another related work [32], an interconnection of radices 2 and 5 SD adders' were used to propose a radix 10 SD parallel adder for use in MVL image processing. This use of multi- or mixed radices requires complex interconnections that bring about reduced system speed, additional

hardware and cost. Hence, most circuit designers settle for the radix-2 application. For example, in [34] radix-2 SD adders are used to implement the arithmetic circuits of a MVL processor for digital control while in [35] radix-5 SD Full Adders (SDFA) are used to realize convolution operations in the design of image processing in robot vision. The high speed compact multiplier on multiple-valued bidirectional current mode circuits in [31] uses a radix-4 SDFA.

However, in all the enumerated applications of SD arithmetic, the operands are coded in the full signed character digit set $L = \{\overline{(r-1)}, \overline{(r-2)}, \dots, \overline{2}, \overline{1}, 0, 1, 2, \dots, (r-2), (r-1)\}$ [31,35,41]. For large values of r , the arithmetic operations are executed at correspondingly high radices or processing logic thresholds. High processing logic threshold values mean large signal and so supply voltage which in turn needs complex and cost intensive in-circuit generated heat evacuation arrangements. Thus, although the full character digit set coding brings out the high redundancy property necessary to limit the carry propagation however, there is need to perform the associated higher radices arithmetic operations at reduced or restricted processing logic thresholds in practical applications.

The work in [43] used symmetrical quaternary signed digit number system to design a Symmetrical Quaternary SD Coded Decade Adder (SQSDCDA) similar to that of a binary decade adder. To realize the strategy of decimal addition, each radix-10 SD $x_i \in \{-9, -8, \dots, -1, 0, 1, \dots, 8, 9\}$ is represented by two components (u_{i0}, u_{i1}) where the

components: $u_{i0} \in \{-2, -1, 0, 1, 2\}$ and $u_{i1} \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ such that the character digits of the radix-10 SD set are as shown in table 2.2

Table 2.2 Symmetrical quaternary signed digit equivalent of radix 10 digits

Decimal	-9	-8	-7	-6	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
U_{i0}	-2	-2	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	2
U_{i1}	-1	0	-3	-2	-1	0	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	0	1	2	3	0	1

This is essentially restricting the normal radix-10 signed character digit value. Restricting character digit magnitude though reduces the SDNS redundancy level but is still found useful in certain very special areas. This is evident in the works of [41] and [44] that separately presented different versions of SDNS with reduced character digit set are compatible with equation (2.1). The version in [41] can also be used to convert any radix-10 positional number to a restricted radix-10 symmetrical 7-nary signed digit number and vice versa. It must also be noted that the algorithm there-in presents some implementation difficulties in the binary signed digit domain. Long carry signal propagation chains resurface at the second stage in multi-digit addition operations. Very reliable solutions to the problem have been proffered [41,44 - 46] and several others [47 – 48] on how to avoid carry generation in restricted radix-r signed digit arithmetic. This work will also present the RR7SQSD version of this addition process and give the corresponding solution as part of contribution to knowledge in the next chapter.

2.3 FINITE FIELDS

The starting point of most combinatorial structures is finite fields hence exegesis of finite field's basic theory can be found in most abstract algebra and vector space texts such as [49 - 54]. Consequently, only certain basic axioms and formulae that can facilitate understanding of the work of this study are reviewed here.

2.3.1 The fundamentals of finite fields

2.3.1.1 Basic Axioms

Axiom 2.1 A finite field F_p , has a definite prime number of elements p , called the Galois order of the field with addition and multiplication operations closed.

That is, if $a, b, c \in F_p$ then i) $c = a \pm b \in F_p, c = ab \in F_p$. ii) The fundamental laws of algebra: Commutative, Associative and Distributive holds true. iii) Identity elements 0 and 1 exist such that $a + 0 = a$ and $a \cdot 1 = a$. iv) for any field element $a \neq 0$, there exists a multiplicative inverse a^{-1} such that $a \cdot a^{-1} = 1$. Furthermore the elements of a finite field form an Abelian group under addition operation. Similarly, all non-zero elements also form an Abelian group under multiplication operation.

Axiom 2.2 A Galois order p finite field F_p , is always designated $GF(p)$ and for any $GF(p)$, there is a $GF(q = p^k)$, where $k \geq 1$ and p a prime and the field elements are isomorphic. For cases of q being a prime there exists only one order $GF(q)$ that is the elements of such a field are $0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, q-2, q-1$.

Axiom 2.3 All $GF(q)$ have order q which is a power of a prime and every element β in $GF(q)$ has an order that is the smallest positive integer m such that $\beta^m = 1$.

2.3.1.2 Ground, Extension, Composite and Optimal extension finite fields

These are further classifications of finite fields. If $\psi \in \{p, p^k, (p^n)^m, (p^n + \phi)^m\}$ then, equations (2.3) and (2.3a) define explicitly, the most common types.

$$GF(\Psi) = \begin{cases} \text{a ground field ; if it is of the type } GF(p), \\ \text{an extension field; if it is of the type } GF(p^k), \\ \text{a composite field; if it is of type } GF((p^n)^m), \\ \text{an optimal extension field; if it is of the type } GF((p^n + \phi)^m) \end{cases} \quad (2.3)$$

$$\text{where } p = \begin{cases} 2 ; \text{ for binary fields} \\ \text{a prime } \geq 3 ; \text{ prime fields} \end{cases} \quad (2.3a)$$

The binary Galois field $GF(2^k)$ and prime $GF(q = p^k)$ are larger versions of the corresponding much lower or ground fields $GF(2)$ and $GF(p)$. Such subfields exist for every large field and the number of elements or order of the

$GF(p) < GF(p^k) \equiv GF((p^n)^m) < GF((p^n + \phi)^m)$. Field construction as well as arithmetic operations of higher field can be executed using its immediate lower or ground field

operations. For example, in binary composite fields $GF((2^n)^m)$, where $k = m.n$, $GF((2^n)^m)$ can not only be constructed from $GF(2^n)$ but also the $GF((2^n)^m)$ arithmetic operations can be executed through the $GF(2^n)$ arithmetic operations as shown in the work of [54]. Similarly the optimal extension fields $GF((2^n \pm \theta)^m)$, introduced in [60 - 62] enable field elements to be represented in k – word sequences. This fact is also employed in [54] to study “elliptic curve cryptosystems over optimal extension fields for computationally constrained devices”.

2.3.1.3 Finite field elements representation

The method of representing the elements of a finite field, most often bit or r-nary string pattern, does have an important bearing on the arithmetic of the field. Any finite field element $a \in GF(\xi \in \{2^k, p^k\})$, can be represented as a radix- ξ or a ξ – nary vector $(a_{k-1}a_{k-2}a_{k-3}.....a_1a_0)$ known as polynomial basis. The terms a_i are the coefficients of the polynomial $a_{k-1}x^{k-1} + a_{k-2}x^{k-2} + a_{k-3}x^{k-3} + + a_1x + a_0 \in GF(\xi)$. It is also the practice to view the elements of $GF(\xi)$ as a k-dimensional vector space over $GF(\xi)$ so that, there exists a set of k elements $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3,, \alpha_{k-1} \in GF(\xi)$, referred to as the vector basis. however, if $\alpha_i \in GF(\xi)$ are known in advance then, it is sufficient to uniquely express the element a , of any finite field as in equation (2.4)

$$a = \begin{cases} a_{k-1}x^{k-1} + a_{k-2}x^{k-2} + \dots + a_1x + a_0 = \sum_{i=k-1}^0 a_i x^i ; \text{ if polynomial basis} \\ a_0\alpha_0 + a_1\alpha_1 + \dots + a_{k-1}\alpha_{k-1} = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} a_i \alpha_i ; \text{ if vector space basis} \end{cases} \quad (2.4)$$

2.3.1.4 Monic, Irreducible and primitive polynomials

If the element $\gamma \in GF(q)$ then the order of γ is the smallest positive integer m such that $\gamma^m = 1$. An element with order $(q-1)$ in $GF(q)$ is called the primitive element in $GF(q)$ and every $GF(q)$ has at least one primitive element α so that all non-zero elements a_i can be represented as $(q-1)$ consecutive powers of α as in equation (2.5)

$$a_i = \begin{cases} 1, \alpha, \alpha^2, \alpha^3, \dots, \alpha^{q-2}, \alpha^{q-1} = 1, \alpha^q = \alpha, \dots ; \text{ if } a_i, \alpha \in GF(q) \\ 0, 1, \alpha, \alpha^2, \alpha^3, \dots, \alpha^{p^m-2} ; \text{ if } a_i, \alpha \in GF(p^k) \end{cases} \quad (2.5)$$

Similarly if $F[X]$ is a $m+1$ degree polynomial then, $f(x) \in F[X]$ can be defined as:

$$(2.6) \quad f(x) = \begin{cases} \text{a monic polynomial ; if the coefficient of the highest power in } x \text{ is unity.} \\ \text{an irreducible polynomial ; if } (f(x) \in F[X]) \text{ is a polynomial of } m \text{ degree} \\ \text{that cannot be factored further as a product of two polynomials in } F[X]. \\ \text{a primitive polynomial that is, the minimal polynomial of a primitive} \\ \text{element } \in GF(p^k). \end{cases}$$

Arithmetic operations on elements in polynomial basis representation are reduced to modulo the irreducible polynomial. The polynomial basis representation is suitable for the coordinate-wise addition operation in $GF(q)$, multiplication operation is better off with chosen primitive element. A table of translation between polynomial and primitive is needed to perform both operations.

2.3.1.5 Finite field construction

Constructing a field is essentially reducing a degree $m+1$ polynomial $F[X]$ by the irreducible polynomials $f(x)$ i.e. $F[X]/f(x)$. All primitive elements are generators of finite fields, hence the following steps constitute a simple procedure for constructing finite fields [55].

- i) List all monic polynomials of the field $GF(q)$
- ii) Obtain the irreducible polynomials that is, those polynomials with constant terms in the above list.
- iii) Obtain the irreducible monic polynomials by taking each in turn and evaluating the polynomial by substituting all field elements for x . A polynomial that evaluates to zero in an element of x is not irreducible.
- iv) Determine the primitive element that is a generator of a cyclic group of the highest order, i.e.; order $q-1$

The binary Galois field $GF(2^k)$, and the prime field $GF(q = p^k)$ with distinguishing properties were indeed the only two categories of finite fields hitherto have been widely studied. During the course of this research, a third category of finite fields that

combines the two properties was presented in [57]. A synopsis of this work is presented in section (3.1.2).

2.3.2 FINITE FIELDS' BASIC ARITHMETIC OPERATIONS

Finite fields' arithmetic comprises addition, multiplication, squaring and inversion operations. Field arithmetic can be performed either in Polynomial or vector space basis representation of field elements [55 – 64]. However, while the polynomial basis representation of elements in $GF(2^k)$ enhances component-wise modulo 2 additions or bit-wise XOR operation [52-53] non-zero elements of vector space basis are expressed as consecutive powers of the field generator element α . This approach particularly renders polynomials basis presentation suitable for prime fields where addition operation is performed coordinate wise and multiplication/ exponentiation with reduction of the exponent $\text{mod } q-1$. When the elements of a field are represented in vector basis, a careful choice of basis type i.e.; normal, binomial or trinomial simplifies squaring and multiplication operations.

2.3.2.1 Computing field element inverse

Field element inverse computation has found indispensable applications in cryptography and code theory in the detection of errors such as Reed Solomon and other BCH error correcting codes [50]. Computing the inverse of the elements of a field is characteristically slow and cost intensive yet the operation is an indispensable component procedure in finite field arithmetic operations. Division operation can only be executed through field inversion precisely, by multiplying the dividend with the field

inverse of the divisor ($c = a/b \equiv a.b^{-1} \in F_p$). Several very efficient methods of computing field element inverse have been proposed in the past. In [58] five basic methods are suggested namely: reciprocal, Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA), Lagrange representation, repeated squaring, and Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) methods of performing field inversion operation. The comparative speed test conducted in [58] (with a Pentium IV processor), on the various methods using $GF(2^{155})$ concluded that the EEA method is faster than the Lagrange method. Efficient EEA based inversion algorithm using multiply instructions and factorization of exponents to compute field inversion operations have been presented in [59] and [60] respectively. In [60] only ten multiplication operations are required to compute an inverse in $GF(2^{155})$.

2.3.2.2 Computing field: addition, multiplication and squaring

Let a, b represent two distinct elements and let the members of the set $\{c, d\}$, be such that, c represents the result of either addition, multiplication or squaring operation and d , represents the result of inversion operation, for any $a \neq 0, d = a^{-1}$ in any of the fields: binary or prime, $a, b, c, d \in \{GF(2^k), GF(p^k)\}$. Now using the polynomial basis representation and establishing the format that [54-55]:

a) For the binary field:

i) an irreducible polynomial $w(x) \in F_{2^k}$ of degree k , is described by equation (2.7)

$$w(x) = x^k + w_{k-1}x^{k-1} + w_{k-2}x^{k-2} + w_{k-3}x^{k-3} + \dots + w_1x + w_0 : w_i \in \{0,1\} \quad (2.7)$$

ii) $GF(2^k)$ consisting of all polynomials of degree less than k can be expressed as

$$GF(2^k) = \mathcal{G}_{k-1}x^{k-1} + \mathcal{G}_{k-2}x^{k-2} + \dots + \mathcal{G}_2x^2 + \mathcal{G}_1x + \mathcal{G}_0 : \mathcal{G}_i \in \{0,1\} \quad (2.8)$$

iii) a field element a , is also a polynomial of degree $k-1$ can be denoted by the binary string $(a_{m-1}a_{m-2}\dots a_2a_1)$; $a \in \{0,1\}$ is equally describable as

$$a(x) = a_{k-1}x^{k-1} + a_{k-2}x^{k-2} + \dots + a_1x + a_0 \quad (2.9)$$

such that $GF(2^k) = \{(a_{k-1}a_{k-2}\dots a_1a_0) : a_i \in \{0,1\}\}$. The multiplicative identity '1' is represented as $1 = (000\dots 01)$ and the additive identity '0' as $0 = (000\dots 00)$.

b) For the prime field:

if in a Prime field, $g(x)$ and $h(x)$ are two integer coefficient polynomials such that

$$g(x) = a_lx^l + a_{l-1}x^{l-1} + \dots + a_1x + a_0,$$

$$h(x) = b_mx^m + b_{m-1}x^{m-1} + \dots + b_1x + b_0$$

and their product $c(x)$, also an integer coefficient polynomial be represented as in equation (2.10)

$$c(x) = g(x).h(x) = c_{i+m}x^{i+m} + \dots + c_1x + c_0 \quad (2.10)$$

then their coefficients product can be equally described as

$$(a_la_{l-1}\dots a_1a_0)(b_mb_{m-1}\dots b_1b_0) = (c_{i+m}c_{i+m-1}\dots c_1c_0) \quad (2.11)$$

This implies that elements of the finite prime field $GF(p^k)$ comprising the set of integers $\{0,1,2,3,\dots, p-1\}$ can be represented in normal basis polynomials of degree less than k , in $GF(p)[x]$ just as the field $GF(p^k)$ is represented with respect to an irreducible polynomial $w(x)$ of degree k , over $GF(p^k)$. Any element A of $GF(p^k)$ can then be expressed as a polynomial $A(x)$ of degree $\leq (k-1)$ with coefficients as in equation (2.12)

$$A(x) = a_{k-1}x^{k-1} + a_{k-2}x^{k-2} + \dots + a_2x^2 + a_1x + a_0 \quad (2.12)$$

where $a_i \in \{0,1,2,3,\dots, p-1\}$.

Consequently, if $\xi \in (2, p)$ then the basic field operations may be generalized as in table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Basic field arithmetic operations formulae

arithmetic operation	$GF(2^k)$ or $GF(p^k)$ field
Addition	$\sum_{i=m-1}^0 c_i x^i = \sum_{i=m-1}^0 ((a_i + b_i) \bmod \xi) x^i$
Multiplication	$\left(\sum_{j=m-1}^0 a_j x^j \left(\sum_{i=m-1}^0 b_i x^i \right) \right) \bmod w(x)$
Squaring	$\left(\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} a_i x^i \right)^2 \bmod w(x)$

The coefficient polynomial representation will be used to design a finite field element multiplication LSI circuit in chapter 3.

2.4. Elliptic curve basics

2.4.1 Introduction to Elliptic curves

Elliptic curves [1,3 - 9,13,15 - 17,22 - 23,61 - 76] ranks 3rd after straight lines and conics in the family of curves. In the generalized model of Weierstrass [4,12,22,31,60], elliptic curves can be represented by the expression

$$E : y^2 + a_1xy + a_2y = x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_4x + a_6 \quad (2.13)$$

with the coefficients $\{a_i\}$, $i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6$ as elements of a finite field F . It is customary [15,31,64 – 70] to describe an elliptic curve either defined either $GF(2^k)$ with the parameters $a, b \in GF(2^k), b \neq 0$ or over $GF(p^k)$ with $a, b \in GF(p^k)$ as the set of all solutions $(x, y) \in GF(2^k)$ or $(x, y) \in GF(p^k)$ by the system of equations (2.14) together with a point O , the point at infinity.

$$E : \begin{cases} y^2 = x^3 + ax + b & \text{;for prime fields } p \geq 3; a, b, (x, y) \in GF(p^k) \text{ and} \\ & 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0 \\ y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b & \text{; for binary Galois fields and } a, b, (x, y) \in GF(2^k) \end{cases} \quad (2.14)$$

In elliptic curves defined over the binary fields $GF(2^k)$, the elements are represented by k-bit binary code words making arithmetic operations binary VLSI implement friendly.

The prime

field expression in equation (2.14) can equally represent an EC defined over real numbers. Calculations with real numbers are prone to round-off errors. Cryptographic arithmetic is required to be error free. EC defined over real numbers are not suitable for implementation in cryptosystems. Restricting $a, b, x, y \in F_q$ such that q is a prime or at least power of a prime p , i.e., $q = p^h$ where $h = 1, 2, 3, \dots$, does not only obviate this bottle neck but turns around prime field EC to elliptic curve cryptosystems software implementation friendly. Software based cryptosystem protocol deployed in secure and trusted communication system though small and potable but is venerable to fraud particularly in the banking service. Another part of the contribution to knowledge in this study is making the prime field ECC hardware implementation friendly.

2.4.2 Elliptic curve arithmetic operations

Elliptic curve arithmetic operations comprise elliptic points' addition, elliptic curve point doubling and elliptic curve scalar or point multiplication. The third operation is supported by the first two operations which are in turn supported by finite field: addition, multiplication, squaring and inversion operations. Efficiency of elliptic curve arithmetic thus, depends on the manner of the underlying field element representation. Similarly, the major run time contributing operations are: the finite field multiplication and inversion however, the most run time consuming operation in elliptic curve cryptosystem implementations like ECDHA and ECDSA is the point multiplication. Consequently, elliptic curve point multiplication determines the overall efficiency of elliptic curve cryptosystems. Elliptic curve cryptosystem arithmetic is big integer operand arithmetic and most emerging secure and trusted

communication systems are elliptic curve cryptography supported. These are the constrained environment devices like pocket size laptop computers, PDA, mobile phones, pagers, handheld or Palm OS that connect to the internet over electronic data channels to handle electronic data, voice and picture (3G) signals. They do this by performing several millions of big integer EC points addition, point doubling and point multiplication operations per second. What follows is a brief explanation of these operations obtainable in [4-5,7-9,11,15-17,22,26-26,31,67 -76].

2.4.2.1 Elliptic curve points' addition and point doubling

Points' addition and point doubling can be performed either geometrically or analytically. If $P(x_1, y_1)$ and $Q(x_2, y_2)$ are two points on an EC elliptic curves over (F_{2^k}) or $E(F_{p^k})$, then $P + Q = R = (x_3, y_3)$. When $Q = 0$, $P^* = (x_1^*, y_1^*)$ and $R^* = P^* + P^* = 2P^* = (x_3^*, y_3^*)$ that is $2P^* = R^*$. The geometrical method is as shown in figure 2. 1. The analytical method is as summarised in table 2.4. The derivation of the formulae of table 2.4 can be found in [24,31,70 - 71,73].




Figure 2.1: Elliptic curve geometric point addition and point doubling

Table 2. 4 Addition rules for $\{(x, y), x, y\} \in E(F_{2^k}), E(F_{q_k})$

Field	$(x, y), x, y \in GF(2^k)$	$(x, y), x, y \in GF(p^k)$
Equation	$y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$	$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b; 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$
	$O + O = O$	$O + O = O$
	$(x, y) + O = O + (x, y) = (x, y)$	$(x, y) + O = O + (x, y) = (x, y)$
	$(x, y) + (x, x + y) = O; (x, y) \in E(F_{2^k})$	$(x, y) + (x - y) = O; (x, y) \in E(F_{p^k})$
λ	$\frac{y_2 + y_1}{x_2 + x_1}$; if addition i.e. $P \neq Q$ $x_1^* + \frac{y_1^*}{x_1^*}$;if doubling i.e., $P = Q$	$\frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1}$; if addition i.e.; $P \neq Q$ $\frac{3(x_1^*)^2 + a}{2y_1^*}$; if doubling i.e.; $P = Q$
x_3	$\lambda^2 + \lambda + x_1 + x_2 + a$; if addition $\lambda^2 + \lambda + a$; if doubling	$\lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$; if addition $\lambda^2 - 2x_1^*$; if doubling
y_3	$\lambda(x_1 + x_2) + x_3 + y_1$; if addition $(x_1^*)^2 + (\lambda + 1)x_3$; if doubling	$\lambda(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$; if addition $\lambda(x_1^* - x_3) - y_1^*$; if doubling

Computing EC points ‘addition and point doubling operations, most often is either in affine or in projective coordinate systems [7,9,11,31,64,71 - 73], the choice being determined by the ratio ξ [77], the duration of one inversion to one multiplication i.e.;

$$\xi = \frac{\text{time to compute an inverse}}{\text{time to multiply}}. \quad (2.15)$$

$$\text{Thus, the choice } C = \begin{cases} \text{affine points coordinate system; if } \xi < 1 \\ \text{projective points coordinate system; if } \xi \gg 1 \end{cases} \quad (2.16)$$

That is, only large values of this ratio ξ , attract projective point's coordinate system implementation. On the other hand in terms of inter field operations' relationship, in [4] this ratio is placed at 3 to 8 for binary field and 30 to 80 for a prime field. Similarly, while squaring operation in binary fields is negligible, in the prime field, it is considered to be 0.8 of one multiplication operation. The duration of addition operation in both binary and prime fields, is assumed to be negligible.

Consequently, in using EC arithmetic consideration must be given to the following: i) field and the field representation i.e.; normal basis or polynomial basis, ii) implementation strategies, iii) efficiency of the underlying field operations i.e.; the number of field: inversion, multiplication m , squaring s and addition a , operations required to execute the elliptic curve points' addition operation and point doubling operations. Usually the number of inversions is far greater than the number of multiplication operations which is in turn by far greater than the number of addition operations, iv) field generating polynomial i.e.; trinomial or pentanomial and v) implementation i.e.; the speed of realizing these basic field operations in the underlying field [74].

2.4.2.2 Elliptic curve point multiplication $W = mP$

Elliptic curve point multiplication is analogous to modular exponentiation in non-ECC domain. and it is essentially scaling a point $P = (x, y)$ with a scalar quantity m , in such manner that the product $W = mP = (x_w, y_w)$, also lies on the given EC as earlier stated

in section 2.4.2. Elliptic curve point multiplication is a strictly error free repeated addition section 2.4.2. Elliptic curve point multiplication is a strictly error free repeated addition of two points and doubling of a point on the elliptic curve operation. Furthermore, elliptic curve point multiplication is performed in the affined coordinate systems [69]. The affined coordinate system require a minimum of one field inversion operation to evaluate a basic arithmetic operation thus, making elliptic curve point multiplication in affined coordinates a costly exercise. Hence, there is a need for EC point multiplication operation's speed-up schemes.

The search for a cost effective and fast EC point multiplication otherwise speed-up schemes [4, 5, 24] continues. Some suggested methods include: i) the formulation of specific strategies that would enable the base point P , to be represented in affine and projective coordinates systems so that EC point multiplication operation can be performed in a combine affine and projective coordinates system environment. Or on the alternative, perform all necessary arithmetic operations except inversion in projective coordinate system and return to execute just a single inversion in the initial affine coordinate system. A problem of circumstances in the migration is the compute intensive nature, resulting in a slow computational procedure. ii) Developing high-speed EC arithmetic operations strategies such as several: doublings $2P$, additions $2P + Q$, tripling $3P$ and quadrupling $4P$ [75]. iii) The use of Double Base Number System (DBNS) [4] (for prime field elliptic curves) . iv) The use of addition chains, addition-subtraction or binary chains as well as differential or special addition chains [70-71] has

been presented. For the last two suggestions the scalar quantity k is represented in either binary, ternary or Near Adjacent Form (NAF) forms with a view to discouraging the use large numbers of EC point addition operations. However, all the four suggestions focuses on EC defined over positively elements finite fields. There have been no major contributions on point multiplication operation for elliptic curves defined over RR7SQSD elements' finite fields. In this study contribution to knowledge will be made on: i) RR7SQSD addition/subtraction based very big integer operands multiplication/modular exponentiation scheme. ii) RR7SQSD based EC point multiplication peed-up scheme.

2.4.2.3 Order of computational complexity

This is a computational cost (timing) analysis of EC arithmetic operations in an underlying field. It is essentially a figure of merit for adjudging the degree of efficiency of EC: points' addition, point doubling and point multiplication algorithms or formulae. Practically, the order of complexity of the given algorithm is determined by calculating the total numbers' of field: addition, multiplication, squaring and inversion operations. An EC arithmetic operation algorithm or formular with fewer number of the various field operations is considered efficient. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 where A,M,S and I denotes Addition, Multiplication, Squaring and Inversion operations respectively show extracts from the results' [31,76] of such complexity cost computations for points' addition, point doubling and point multiplication operations. In this study these values will be used as bench marks.

Table 2.5 Computational complexity cost analysis of EC operations

Authors	Curve operation	F_p								F_{2^m}							
		Affine				Projective				Affine				Projective			
		A	M	S	I	A	M	S	I	A	M	S	I	A	M	S	I
[34]	Addition	*	3	*	1	*	16	*	*	*	2	1	1	*	15	5	*
	Doubling	*	4	*	1	*	10	*	*	*	2	1	1	*	14	4	*
[72]	Addition	5	2	1	1	*	*	*	*	9	2	1	1	*	*	*	*
	Doubling	4	5	2	1	*	*	*	*	4	2	2	1	*	*	*	*

Table 2.6 Computational complexity analysis for fast EC point multiplication

Author	Designation	EC operation	Prime field				Binary field			
			A	M	S	I	A	M	S	I
[1]	A	P+Q	*	2	1	1	*	2	1	1
	D	2P	*	2	1	1	*	2	1	1
	DA	2P+Q	*	9	2	1	*	9	2	1
	T	3P	*	7	4	1	*	7	4	1
	TA	3P+Q	*	9	4	2	*	9	3	2
	Q	4P	*	9	5	1	*	9	3	2
	QA	4P+Q	*	11	4	2	*	10	6	2
[6]	Several	2P	*	5	5	1	*	5	5	1
		4P	*	9	9	1	*	*	*	*
	Doublings	8P	*	13	13	1	*	*	*	*
		16P	*	17	17	1	*	*	*	*

2.4.3 EC point multiplication and ECC

It is a known fact that EC point multiplication operation is the centre point of ECC. ECC can be constructed on group of points on an EC defined over a finite field and the arithmetic is error free. A high-speed point multiplication scheme means a highly efficient EC based cryptographic protocol. The work in [8] while proposing an efficient elliptic curve

exponentiation in $GF(p)$ observed that there is a considerable level of advantage of the affine coordinate system over the projective. Comparing the ratio of computational amount of division in $GF(p)$ to that of multiplication as in equations (2.15) - (2.16), he found this ratio to be greater than 9. The significance of this study is that in recent times speed-up schemes such as performing direct computation in affine coordinate with several doublings have continued to capture researchers' attention. Several novel works such as [8, 57, 67, 70, 72] show-cased efficient algorithms for direct $3p, 4p, 18p, 16p$ computation on EC over $GF(2^k)$ but all without exception are binary CMOS VLSI implementation friendly. To do the same in non-binary or higher radix processing logic threshold systems requires the incorporation of relevant interfacing units. (In the course of the present study, the existing binary or Galois field ECC concept is modified into a higher radix otherwise Multiple-Valued Logic (MVL) ECC implement capability.

2.5 Elliptic curve cryptography in practice

2.5.1 The Domain parameters

For cryptographic applications an EC defined over $GF(2^k)$ or $GF(p^k)$ is described by the seven-parameter single quantity Γ , called the domain parameters [36, 48].

$$\Gamma = (q, FR, a, b, G, n, h) \quad (2.17)$$

These parameters strictly control and ensure the cryptographic compliance of the EC. The member elements of the domain parameters may be defined as follows: q is a prime or 2^k that defines the field; FR is the field elements representation: i.e., polynomial normal basis,

normal vector space. a, b : are the curve coefficients. Their values depend upon the security requirement; a base point $G = (x_G, y_G) \in E(F_q)$ that has the largest order n , usually a large prime. The quantity h is the ratio of the elliptic curve's total number of rational points $N = \#E(F_q)$ to the order of the base point n . One necessary condition for cryptographic compliance is that n divides N without a remainder that is, $h = E(F_q)/n$ is an integer [73]. The Domain parameters enable a member in a PKC communication community to generate his/her public and private keys by selecting a random integer d , such that $1 < d < n-1$ and computes the public key $Q = dG$. A validation process is required of every public key's legitimacy.

2.5.2 Popular ECC protocols

A glossary of the various public key elliptic curves, cryptosystem protocols can be found in [4, 63]. These protocols, though differ in presentation and application, do have some common basic features particularly in the cases of Diffie-Hellman and ElGamal's. Assuming a communication community of two users A and B who have will agree on a very large prime n . Both parties are expected to select privately, random integers (d_A, d_B) from the interval $[1, n-1]$ and publish the same in an insecure channel, the corresponding products $(Q_A = d_A G, Q_B = d_B G)$ with a view to interchanging their public keys. Assuming A wants to send a secret message to B over the insecure channel. User A then codes his plain text message, encrypts the coded message m using the formular $(d_A G, (d_A Q_B)_x + m)$ and sends this cipher text to B over the insecure channel. User B on receipt of the message decrypts it by computing

$m + (d_A Q_B)_x - d_B d_A G_x = m + (d_A d_B G)_x - (d_B d_A G)_x = m$. The process of plain message text embedment, encryption and decryption has never been done with elliptic curves defined over $RR7SQSD$ elements finite field.

2.6 Secure and trusted communication systems' VLSI circuits

Cryptosystems widely used in today's secure and trusted communication gadgets concentrate on systems of elliptic curves defined over binary Galois fields $GF(2^k)$. Elliptic curve cryptographic processor architectures [64] often consist of program memories, an arithmetic unit that performs points addition and point doubling operations, the arithmetic unit controller and a main controller as basic components. Major components for the arithmetic unit VLSI are field element: adders, multipliers, squaring and inversion units. The design of these units, particularly high performance multipliers and inversion circuits has also continued to arrest the attention of the scientific community over the years. For example: The work of [77] presented two Systolic Multipliers that perform product-sum computation $AB + C$ in finite fields $GF(2^m)$. Before then in 1981, Massey and Omura in a paper titled "Computational method and apparatus for finite field arithmetic" presented the maiden design for multiplication in finite fields using normal basis. Others works such as [76] following the same suite presented finite field multiplier based on self-dual Normal Basis using only $2(m^2 - m)$ XOR gates. The work of [79] equally followed a similar path by suggesting an efficient Optimal Normal base Type II multiplier that requires $1.5(m^2 - m)$ XOR gates. The time complexities of both Massey-Omura and [79] are

similar. Again the work in [80] constructed an efficient gate circuit for computing multiplicative inverses over $GF(2^m)$ based on a recursive algorithm superior to conventional algebra for computing multiplicative inverses. The work in [81] uses a serial-in parallel-out multiplication strategy to realize fast inversion in $GF(2^m)$ algorithm for VLSI implementation. This algorithm required a computational time of $O(m \log_2 m)$. A bit-serial architecture for efficient addition and multiplication in binary finite fields using polynomial basis representation implemented with low-voltage/low-power properties presented in [82] requires an equivalent of 28 gates and it is scalable.

There have been similar implementations based on prime field VLSI circuits. Other works worthy of mention include: [83] that proposes a systolic Gaussian Elimination over $GF(p)$ with partial pivoting for the triangularization of large dense $n \times n$ matrices over prime Galois fields. An AT^2 -Optimal Galois Field multiplier VLSI circuit for error detection and error correction as presented in the work of [84] is based on Discrete Fourier Transformation (DFT). This work is asymptotically optimal with respect to area A and time T with a lower bound of $AT^2 = \Omega(n^2)$ and a matching computation time T in the range of $[\Omega(\log n), O(\sqrt{n})]$. The works of [82,85] discussed a multiply/accumulator elliptic curve arithmetic unit that combines integer and polynomial arithmetic into a single functional unit for $Gf(p)/GF(2^m)$. These works showed that dual field multipliers have less power in polynomial mode than in integer mode. A number of EC cryptosystems have also been proposed over the years using either field

programmable Level System Circuits (FPLSC) [86] or Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) [87] or T1 MSP430x33 family microcontrollers [88]. Again no work has been done as far as archival search can vet, on either SMVL ECC or on implementing EC cryptosystems based on RR7SQSD finite fields. In this study, an overview of EC point multiplication SMVL VLSI circuit organization, synthesis of the functional logic circuits and the design implementation of the basic building block for such circuits are very necessary.

2.7 Summary and conclusion of the literature review

The literature survey has been wide and broad based but it is acknowledged that is by no means exhaustive. For the entire archival search it has not been possible find previous works on the following areas (though it is possible that they exist in the far-reach):

- i) Suggestions on the RR7SQSDNS as an alternative processing threshold logic system and its arithmetic.
- ii) RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chains formulation and its application to big integer operands multiplication/modular exponentiation Scheme.
- iii) Arithmetic operations on EC defined over RR7SQSD element finite fields or the implementation of RR7SQSDNS base ECC.
- iv) Design and implementation of a MVL circuit basic building block to function on RR7SQSD signal processing threshold voltage profile.

Their formulation and realizations for the first time will be implemented in this study.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Preamble

This chapter presents in section 3.1, the theoretical frameworks of the formulated research objectives detailed in section 1.3.2 and in section 3.2, the methods used to realize them. Experiments were conducted on the various formulated concepts to ascertain their correctness. Similarly, circuits designed were (by way of simulation) subjected to near-real-life conditions to evaluate their performances.

3.1 Theoretical frame work

In section 3.1.1 the basis of an RR7SQSD arithmetic operation of practical significance is presented. The proof that the RR7SQSDNS is an appropriate SMVL algebraic structure and the description of EC defined over such an RR7SQSD element finite fields is presented in section 3.1.2. This will facilitate the design of a hardware implementable algorithm for the arithmetic operations on EC defined over RR7SQSD fields. In section 3.1.3, the architectural organisation of the SMVL ECC arithmetic unit VLSI circuit layout is presented. Formulation of the mathematical model of the SMVL arithmetic unit VLSI circuits' basic building block and the synthesis of the constituent functional logic circuits are presented in section 3.1.4. Numerical examples are given to validate the correctness of the various mathematical models in each case

3.1.1 RR7SQSD based big integer operands arithmetic

The primary objective here is to show that the RR7SQSD number system indeed supports error-free arithmetic operations on very big word length integer operands and at constant

time. It is therefore pertinent to present the generalized nature of Restricted Radix-h Symmetrical r-nary ($h, r > 2$), signed digit number system in section 3.1.1.1. The reason for the choices of radix-7, symmetrical radix-7 Signed Digit Number System (SDNS), and the restriction imposed on the radix-7 SDNS that transformed it into quaternary SDNS are given in sections 3.1.1.2 and 3.1.1.3 respectively.. Section 3.1.1.4 establishes the fact that RR7SQSDNS arithmetic is not only a SMVL analogous to the binary logic modulo-2 arithmetic but also do support very efficient arithmetic operation strategies similar to those in [33, 35 - 36, 38]. A scheme for RR7SQSDNS parallel addition/multiplication is presented in section 3.1.1.5. Section 3.1.1.6 shows that even the fool-hardy multiplicative inverse calculation process can be computed in RR7SQSD domain. The principle of an RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain is presented in section 3.1.1.7. The section ends with a numerical example to prove the formulated addition/subtraction chain.

3.1.1.1 The Restricted Radix -h Symmetrical r-nary signed digit number system axioms

In a given list of radix-h ($h > 2$), character digits, reshuffling the order of appearance of any member-character digits does not change the significant value of that character digit. For example, the digit sets $L = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\}$ and $L' = \{1, 0, 3, 6, 2, 4, 5, 9, 8, 7\}$ are all 10-valued, radix - 10 character digit sets. The significant value of figure '5' in set L does not change due to its change of position in set L' . Similarly, the elements of the set of an h-valued positive thresholds processing logic system are the character digits of a radix – h number system with one to one correspondence. Arithmetic operations on the set of the h-valued logic threshold elements are modulo-h arithmetic operations. Thus, if

the h -valued member elements are (symmetrical or non-symmetrical) signed digits then, the corresponding h -valued processing logic threshold system is an h -valued (symmetrical or non-symmetrical) signed-digit processing threshold logic system and the arithmetic operations on such systems are equally radix- h (symmetrical or non-symmetrical) signed-digit arithmetic operations.

Definition 3.1 A SDNS is said to be symmetrical if and only if for every positive character digit θ_i there is a corresponding negative character digit $-\theta_i$ except the digit '0', otherwise it is non-symmetrical.

Axiom 3.1 For every radix- h positional number system with the character digit set $L = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, (h-1)\}$ there exist a $(2h-1)$ -valued symmetrical radix- h signed-digit number system with the character digit set $L' = \{\overline{(h-1)}, \overline{(h-2)}, \dots, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, (h-2), (h-1)\}$ where $\bar{i} = -i$

The character digits set, L and L' are both higher radix number systems and thus are Multiple Valued processing threshold Logic (MVL) systems [88 – 95]. The difference between the two sets is that L' is a symmetrical signed digit number system and as such supports very efficient arithmetic. Corresponding Symmetrical Multiple Valued Logic (SMVL) system's VLSI circuits could utilize both rails of the signal voltage for processing of information, miniaturized size, high compactness, greater reliability and very high processing speed. However, for large values of h and where the elements of $L' = \{\overline{(h-1)}, \overline{(h-2)}, \dots, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, (h-2), (h-1)\}$ directly represent signal voltage levels then, such SMVL VLSI circuits will radiate large amount of heat. Replacing the large

character digit elements of the set $L = \{0,1,2,\dots,(h-1)\}$, with smaller values in a symmetrical radix- r ($r = \left(\frac{h+1}{2}\right)$) signed character digit set, reduces the processing logic threshold signal voltage level. The reduced processing threshold values enable higher radix- h symmetrical signed digit arithmetic operations to be performed in the new radix- r signed digit number system platform. Consequently, the corresponding SMVL VLSI circuits sustain the miniature, compact, high-speed properties and acquire low in-circuit heat radiation ability required of today's emerging secure and trusted communication systems.

Axiom 3.2 For any radix- h ($h > 2$), positional number system with the character digit set $L = \{0,1,2,\dots,(h-1)\}$, there is a restricted radix- h symmetrical $r = \left(\frac{h+1}{2}\right)$ -nary signed-digit number system with the restricting value a and of character digit set $L'' = \{[r-k]\}$ where $k \in \{h, (h-1), \dots, 2, 1\}$ if and only if

$$\text{i) } \frac{h}{2} \neq \left\lceil \frac{h}{2} \right\rceil \quad \text{ii) } a \leq \left(h - \left(\frac{h+1}{2} \right) \right) \equiv \left(\left(\frac{h+1}{2} \right) - 1 \right)$$

For example, in the radix-9 number system where the character digit set $L = \{0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8\}$, the SD set $L'' = \{0,1,2,3,-5,-4,-3,-2,-1\}$ is not symmetrical but the set $L''' = \{0,1,2,3,4,-4,-3,-2,-1\} = \{-4,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,4\}$ is symmetrical. Not-with-standing both L'' and L''' are examples of the restricted radix-9 symmetrical r -nary SDSN with the delimiters $a = 5 > \left(h - \left(\frac{h+1}{2} \right) \right)$ and $a = 4 = \left(h - \left(\frac{h+1}{2} \right) \right)$ respectively. It is observed

that redundancy level reduces drastically for values of $a < \left(\left(\frac{h+1}{2} \right) - 1 \right)$ and the character digit set of the restricted radix-h symmetrical r-nary SDNS is an Abelian group in which arithmetic operations are closed.

3.1.1.2 The choice of “radix-7” and the nature of RR7SQSDNS

In this study, the value of, h is taken as 7 and the following reasons informed the choice of “7”;

- i) The character digit-set $L = \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ simplifies conversion to binary logic (if need be) procedures as shown in table 3.1.


Table 3.1 Decimal-Binary-RR7SQSD equivalents

Unsigned decimal	4	5	6	0	1	2	3
Binary coding	100	101	110	000	001	010	011
RR7SQSD coding	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3


- ii) The processing signal threshold voltage levels of $-3V, -2V, -1V, 0V, 1V, 2V$ and $3V$ are compatible with most emerging semiconductor devices’ [86 - 93] supply voltages and thus can directly represent the SMVL thresholds of $\{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$
- iii) The primitive root of $p = 7$ is applicable to a set of cryptographically friendly prime moduli that will be elucidated later in this study.
- iv) The information per line richness of the RR7SQSD system as depicted in the plots of figure 3.1 meets the required cryptosystem standards. For example, figure 3.1a shows the RR7SQSD-bit equivalent relationship. The plot is linear with a small

rise at 239 bits which means numbers of less than 239 bits in length attract less RR7SQSD


- v) suggesting greater information density with operands of smaller magnitude. This fact is further substantiated by figure 3.1b where the same is compared with the binary number system. Figure 3.1c is a tripartite Decimal-RR7SQSD-Binary comparison. Figure 3.1d is a projection of RR7SQSD ECC key size to that of the conventional number system ECC under the background of other or non-EC cryptosystems.




a) RR7SQSD characters versus Bits



b) Binary versus RR7SQSD



c) Decimal/RR7SQSD/binary



d) Comparative equivalent security level Key sizes in bits

Figure 3.1: Plots of RR7SQSD number system information and cryptographic content

The plot also show that an RR7SQSD based ECC will not contradict the widely acknowledged statement that ECC provides less key size for the same level of security than other non EC cryptosystems.

3.1.1.3 Nature of radix – 7 SDNS and the restriction

The nature of the radix-7 SDNS can therefore be described as follows. Any integer X

expressible as

$$X \in \{x_{m-1}, x_{m-2}, \dots, x_0\} = \begin{cases} \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} x_i r^i ; \text{ if } X \geq 0 & \text{or} \\ \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} -x_i r^i , \text{ if } X < 0 \end{cases}$$

can be adequately represented within the symmetrical r -nary signed-character-digit set $L = \{\overline{r}, \overline{(r-1)}, \overline{(r-2)}, \dots, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, \dots, (r-2), (r-1), r\}$. For example, If $|X| = 89$ and $r = 7$ such that $L = \{-6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$ then $89 = 155_7$ while $-89 = \overline{1} \overline{5} \overline{5}$. Thus the radix - 7 symmetrical SDNS represented by the symmetrical digit set $L = \{-6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$ providing a range of numbers from $-48_{10} \leq x \leq 48_{10} \equiv -66_7 \leq x \leq 66_7$ gives 97 distinct numbers. Each number is possible of 13 different ways of representation if each element in the symmetrical digit set is replaced by two SD components $(\alpha_{0j}, \alpha_{1j})$. With a total of 169 ways of representing any number that lie in the range $-48_{10} \leq x_{10} \leq 48_{10} \equiv -66_7 \leq x_7 \leq 66_7$, the radix- 7 symmetrical SDNS fronts a redundancy percentage of 74% to provide an efficient carry-free radix - 7 or higher radix symmetrical signed digit arithmetic capability. However, owing to the reasons enunciated in section 3.1.1.3, in order to realize high speed efficient radix-7 signed digit arithmetic circuits with low power consumption and thus small in-circuit heat generation, it is necessary to embed the radix-7 signed digit arithmetic in lower radix-r signed digit arithmetic. Hence, in line with the discussion in section 2.2.1 and with $h = 7$, $r = \left(\frac{h+1}{2}\right) = 4$ and taking $a = \left(\left(\frac{h+1}{2}\right) - 1\right) = 3$ the system thus obtained is referred to in this as the Restricted Radix-7 Symmetrical Quaternary Signed Digit Number System (RR7SQSDNS). Consequently, the RR7SQSDNS is an appropriate SMVL processing threshold system.

3.1.1.4 RR7SQSDNS arithmetic schemes

It was observed that the signed digit arithmetic schemes suggested in [41, 61] can be slightly modified for the RR7SQSD domain. Consequently, in this study, it is considered that with addition and multiplication operations as the major runtime consumers in secure communication systems and other compute constrained environment devices, a single circuit capable of performing either addition or multiplication operation will be of immense benefit. Formulation of such a scheme is presented next.

Let α_i and β_i be two one-RR7SQSD operands and τ_i, δ_i be the result of an arithmetic operation and the carry digit, then similar to equation (2.2) in section (2.2.2), equation (3.1) holds true.

$$\delta_i = \begin{cases} \bar{1} & ; \text{If } (\alpha_i \ominus \beta_i) < \bar{a} \\ 1 & ; \text{if } (\alpha_i \ominus \beta_i) > a \\ 0 & ; \text{if otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.1)$$

$$\tau_i = (\alpha_i \ominus \beta_i) - 7\delta_i$$

where: the operator $\ominus \in \{+, -, *, /\}$, $\alpha_i, \beta_i, \tau_i \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and $\delta_i \in \{\bar{1}, 0, 1\}$. The evaluation of equation (3.1) is as presented in appendix CH3.1. Equation (3.1) can also be used to convert decimal numbers to RR7SQSD compatible number systems and vice versa. For example, the entire 19 value radix-10 SDN system representation of the symmetrical digit set $L \in \{\bar{9}, \bar{8}, \dots, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, \dots, 8, 9\}$ can be RR7SQSD coded as $L \in \{\bar{1}\bar{2}, \bar{1}\bar{1}, \bar{1}0, \bar{1}1, \bar{1}2, \bar{1}3, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3, \bar{1}3, \bar{1}2, \bar{1}\bar{1}, 10, 11, 12\}$ correspondingly, which of course

included the 13-value radix – 7 SDN system symmetrical digit set of $\{\bar{6}, \bar{5}, \bar{4}, \bar{3}, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$. One drawback of equation (3.1) is that it did not take cognisance of carry-in from previous RR7SQSD arithmetic operation. Thus, equation (3.1) in terms of addition operation is an RR7SQSD XOR or an RR7SQSD half adder and in terms multiplication it is a one RR7SQSD multiplier.

3.1.1.5 Arithmetic operations in an RR7SQSD multi-digit environment

To carter for the short fall of equation (3.1) and thus in multi RR7SQSD environment, carry-in from previous operation into the i^{th} character digits operation has to be considered. If (α_i, β_i) , (δ_i, δ_{i-1}) and (z_i, τ_i, γ_i) are the i^{th} digit pair of a radix r input operands, the carry-out and carry-in pairs and the linear, interim and final result digits set respectively, then the three operand arithmetic operations (RR7SQSD full adder) can be adequately described by equation (3.2).

$$\delta_i = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} z_i = \alpha_i \oplus \beta_i \\ \bar{1} \text{ ; if } z_i < \bar{a} \\ 1 \text{ ; if } z_i > a \\ 0 \text{ ; if } \bar{a} \leq z_i \leq a_i \\ \tau_i = z_i - 7 \delta_i \\ \gamma_i = \tau_i + \delta_{i-1} \end{array} \right\} \quad (3.2)$$

provided i) $\alpha_i, \beta_i, \tau_i, \gamma_i \in \{\bar{3}, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and ii) $\delta_i, \delta_{i-1} \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$. The computation process is two-phase and its successful execution automatically means a carry-free addition operation in the second phase. Carry to the next stage is generated only in the first phase. Unfortunately, equation (3.2) does not ensure no-carry generation in the

second phase for certain combination of input operands a problem similar to that enunciated in section 2.2.3.

For example, restricting to addition and multiplication operations such that $z_i = \alpha_i + \beta_i$ or $\alpha_i * \beta_i$:

Case I. $z_i = 4$ and $\delta_{i-1} = \bar{1}$, Expected result is $\delta_i = 0$ and $\gamma_i = 3$. However, $\alpha_i \ominus \beta_i = 4 > 3$ $\delta_i = 1$. $\tau_i = z_i - r$ $\delta_i = \bar{3}$ and $\gamma_i = \tau_i + \delta_{i-1} = \bar{3} + \bar{1} = 3$ to give a carry out in the 2nd phase.

Case II. $z_i = \bar{3}$ and $\delta_{i-1} = \bar{1}$;what is expected are: $(\delta_i, \tau_i) = (\bar{1}, 3)$ and $\gamma_i = \tau_i + \delta_{i-1} = 3$ result but what is obtained is: $(\delta_i, \tau_i) = (0, \bar{3})$ and $\gamma_i = \tau_i + \delta_{i-1} = \bar{3} + \bar{1} = 3$. The carry-out $\delta_i = \bar{1}$, comes in the second phase of the operation where it cannot be accounted for.

Case III. $z_i = \bar{4}$ and $\delta_{i-1} = 1$. The desired is: $(\delta_i, \tau_i) = (0, 3)$ and a $\gamma_i = \tau_i + \delta_{i-1} = 3 + 1 = \bar{3}$ result but since $\alpha_i \ominus \beta_i = \bar{4}$ so what one obtain is a $(\delta_i, \tau_i) = (\bar{1}, 3)$ and a $\gamma_i = \tau_i + \delta_{i-1} = 3 + 1 = \bar{3}$.

Case IV. $z_i = 3$ and $\delta_{i-1} = 1$. The expectation is a $(\delta_i, \tau_i) = (1, \bar{3})$ and a $\gamma_i = \tau_i + \delta_{i-1} = 0 + \bar{3} = \bar{3}$ but what one observed is a $(\delta_i, \tau_i) = (0, 3)$ and a $\gamma_i = \tau_i + \delta_{i-1} = 3 + 1 = \bar{3}$. These cases are summarized in table 3.2

It can be seen that one is either trying to stop a false “-1” or “+1” propagating carry or re-instating an annulled “-1” or “+1” carry propagation. To identify potential carry generating operand pairs one have to consider the magnitudes of the previous operand

pair $(\alpha_{i-1}, \beta_{i-1})$ and not just its carry-out, while performing the addition operation on the current digit pair (α_i, β_i) . On a positive identification, the propagation of the fictitious-carry $\in (\bar{1}, 0, 1)$ is

stopped or encouraged to generate a desired carry $\in (\bar{1}, 0, 1)$ by injecting error correcting signal digits $(\tau'_{ii}, \tau''_{ii}) \in \{\bar{3}, 0, 3\}$. The choice of a “-3” or a “+3” is determined by the sign of the interim sum τ_i . A zero choice means no correction is necessary. Consequently, a unified algorithm for large RR7SQSD parallel addition and multiplication operation can be developed. In deed equation (3.3) describes the multi-RR7SQSD addition/multiplication operation. The realization of a dual RR7SQSD full adder/multiplier circuit based on equation (3.3) will be explained later.

Table 3.2 Summarised analysis of the RR7SQSD Addition/Multiplication scheme.

Input	Desired result	Obtained Result	Suggested remedy $(\delta_i, \delta_{i-1}, \gamma_i)$	Action taken	
				Particular (δ^f_i, γ_i)	Generalized (δ^f_i, γ_i)
z_i, δ_{i-1}^f	$(\delta_i, \tau_i), \gamma_i$	$(\delta_i, \tau_i), \gamma_i$	$\delta_i, \delta_{i-1}, \tau_i$	(δ^f_i, τ_i)	$(\delta_{i-1} + \delta_i, \tau^f_i + \delta_{i-1})$
$4, \bar{1}$	$(0, 3), 3$	$(\bar{1}, \bar{3}), 3$	$0, 1, 3$	$(\bar{1}, 3)$	$(\delta_{i-1} + \delta_i, \tau^f_i + \delta_{i-1})$
$\bar{3}, \bar{1}$	$(\bar{1}, 3), 3$	$(0, \bar{3}), 3$	$\bar{1}, 0, 3$	$(\bar{1}, 3)$	$(\delta_{i-1} + \delta_i, \tau^f_i + \delta_{i-1})$
$\bar{4}, 1$	$(0, \bar{3}), \bar{3}$	$(\bar{1}, 3), \bar{3}$	$0, 1, \bar{3}$	$(1, \bar{3})$	$(\delta_{i-1} + \delta_i, \tau^f_i + \delta_{i-1})$
$3, 1$	$(1, \bar{3}), \bar{3}$	$(0, 3), \bar{3}$	$1, 0, \bar{3}$	$(1, \bar{3})$	$(\delta_{i-1} + \delta_i, \tau^f_i + \delta_{i-1})$

$$\left. \begin{aligned}
 \delta_{1i} &= \begin{cases} \bar{1} & ; \text{if } \alpha_i \ominus \beta_i < \bar{a} \\ 1 & ; \text{if } \alpha_i \ominus \beta_i > a \\ 0 & ; \text{if otherwise} \end{cases} \\
 \tau_{1i} &= \alpha_i \ominus \beta_i - r \delta_{1i} \\
 \delta_{2i} &= \begin{cases} \bar{1} & ; \text{if } \tau_{1i} + \tau'_{1i} + \delta_{1i-1} < \bar{a} \\ 1 & ; \text{if } \tau_{1i} + \tau'_{1i} + \delta_{1i-1} > a \\ 0 & ; \text{if otherwise} \end{cases} \\
 \tau_{2i} &= \tau_{1i} + \tau'_{1i} + \delta_{1i-1} - r \delta_{2i} \\
 \delta_{3i} &= \begin{cases} \bar{1} & ; \text{if } \tau_{2i} + \tau''_{1i} + \delta_{2i-1} < \bar{a} \\ 1 & ; \text{if } \tau_{2i} + \tau''_{1i} + \delta_{2i-1} > a \\ 0 & ; \text{if otherwise} \end{cases} \\
 \tau_{3i} &= \tau_{2i} + \tau''_{1i} + \delta_{2i-1} - r \delta_{3i} ; \{ \tau'_{1i}, \tau''_{1i} \} \in \{\bar{3}, 0, 3\} \\
 \gamma_i &= \tau_{3i} + \delta^f_{i-1} ; \quad \delta^f_i = \delta^f_{3i} + \delta^f_{i-1} \\
 &\text{In all other cases} \\
 \delta_i^{ff} &= \begin{cases} \bar{1} & ; \text{if } \alpha_i \ominus \beta_i < \bar{a} \\ 1 & ; \text{if } \alpha_i \ominus \beta_i > a \\ 0 & ; \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \\
 \tau^{ff}_{1i} &= \alpha_i \ominus \beta_i - r \delta_i^{ff} \\
 \gamma_i &= \tau^{ff}_{1i} + \delta^{ff}_i
 \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (3.3)$$

The following example further elucidates the above explanation conveyed in equation(3.3)

Numerical Example 3.1 Let $A = 54708330621626_{10}$, $B = 56845529339651_{10}$ such that in the RR7SQSD number system $\alpha = 2\bar{2}\bar{3}\bar{2}\bar{2}\bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}\bar{3}0\bar{2}\bar{3}0\bar{2}\bar{3}\bar{2}\bar{2}$ and $\beta = 2\bar{2}0\bar{1}\bar{2}0\bar{2}\bar{2}\bar{1}3\bar{2}0\bar{3}\bar{2}0\bar{2}\bar{3}$. The addition processes using equation (3.2) and the algorithm of equation (3.3) are shown side-by-side in figure 3.2




Figure 3.2: Solution to numerical example on RR7SQSD multi-digit addition

It can be seen from figure 3.2 that while 8 steps are required to arrive at the final solution when using the un-compensated method of equation (3.2) only four steps are required to arrive at the final result when using our algorithm of equation (3.3). In the later case from the right the first two columns do not satisfy the specified conditions so equation (3.2) is used to compute their sums.

However, a “1” carry generated from the 2nd column into the 3rd column where $\alpha_i + \beta_i = 3$ triggering a carry propagation chain made the 3rd column to qualify for action. The same condition applies in 4, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 and 17. With a ratio of 8 to 4 there is a saving of almost 50% in speed.

3.1.1.6 Multiplicative inverse computation in RR7SQSD domain

The RR7SQSD number system equally supports the computation of non-zero element's multiplicative inverse using either the prime modulus p approach that employs Fermat's last theorem $b^{-1} = b^{p-2} \mod p$ provided $(p, b) = 1$ or the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) approach [56]. However, in an RR7SQSD domain the EEA is more suitable. For example, working in RR7SQSDNS domain, to find $110^{-1} \mod 2\bar{1}\bar{2}$ using Fermat's last theorem is to compute $110^{223} \mod 2\bar{1}\bar{2}$. This is by far scarier than using the EEA method in [58]. This is evidenced in the solution to the numerical example 3.2 presented in figure 3.3.

Numerical example 3.2. To find $110^{-1} \mod 2\bar{1}\bar{2}$ the using EEA in [64].

Solution: The computation is presented under the following headings

The Euclidean algorithm. The extended Euclidean algorithm The Checking

	1	0	
$2\bar{1}\bar{2} = (1)110 + 1\bar{2}\bar{2}$	0	1	
$110 = (1)1\bar{2}\bar{2} + 32$	1	$\bar{1}(1)$	$\bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{3}(2\bar{1}\bar{2}) = 11\bar{1}\bar{1}1$
$1\bar{2}\bar{2} = (2\bar{1})32 + \bar{2}0$	$\bar{1}$	$2(\bar{2}\bar{1})$	$\bar{1}01(110) = \bar{1}\bar{1}110$
$32 = (2)\bar{2}0 + 2$	$\bar{2}0$	$\bar{3}1(2)$	$R(x) = 1$
$\bar{2}0 = (\bar{1}3)2 + 1$	$\bar{3}\bar{1}$	$\bar{1}0(\bar{1}3)$	
	$\bar{3}\bar{1}3$	$\bar{1}01$	

Hence $\bar{1}01 = 110^{-1} \mod 2\bar{1}\bar{2}$.

Figure 3.3: Solution to numerical example on EEA

The EEA approach shall be adopted in all RR7SQSD finite field element inverse computations.

The methodology of such computational process is presented in section 3.2.2.2 .

3.1.1.7 An RR7SQSDN application:-A multiply-by-7 Addition/subtraction chain

It has been reiterated that one way of speeding up EC point multiplication is to use addition-subtraction chain. Addition/ subtraction chains compute the product of two integers in an unconventional manner. The foregoing starting with brief explanation of conventional addition chain shows that RR7SQSDNS also support addition- subtraction chain computation.

Definition 3.3. An addition chain [72 - 73,94 - 100] is a sequence of integers $B_0, B_1, B_2, \dots, B_l, \dots, B_{n-1}$ starting from B_0 and ending with $B_{n-1} = K_r$ such that B_l is the sum of two previous members B_i and B_j of the chain.

That is, If the sequence $B_0, B_1, B_2, \dots, B_l, \dots, B_{n-1}$; with $B_l \in \{b_0, b_1, \dots, b_\mu, \dots, b_\lambda\}$ and $b_\mu \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, r-1\}$ is an addition chain of the integer K_r in the radix-r positional number system and (B_i, B_j) are two earlier elements of the sequence $\{B_l\}$, then

$$B_l = \begin{cases} B_0 & ; \text{if } l = 0 \\ B_i + B_j & ; \text{if } 0 < l, i, j < n-1 \\ B_{n-1} = K_r & ; \text{if } l = n-1 \end{cases} \quad (3.4)$$

The integer K_r , may present several lengths of different addition chains in the same radix r number system. For example if $K = 67$ and $r = 10$ then some of the chains are:

1,2,3,5,7,10,11,21,31,52,62,67

1,2,3,4,6,9,10,16,25,29,54,64,67

1, 2, 4, 8,16,33,67 and

1,2,3,5,8,11,19,30,49,60,65,67.

Addition chains provide a method for computing mP exponentiation. Thus given the integer $m = 67$ then mP becomes

P 2P 3P 5P 8P 11P 19P 30P 49P 60P 65P 67P

When m and P are both scalar quantities, then B_{n-1} in equation (3.4) is their product and the length of the addition chain gives the number of operations required computing the product mP . There had been very good works on binary, octal, ternary or binary signed-digit, sliding window, factor, power tree and other forms of conventional addition-subtraction chains [72-73] but none on RR7SQSD addition chains.

Definition 3.4: Let the string $\alpha_{n-1}, \alpha_{n-2}, \alpha_{n-3}, \dots, \alpha_j, \dots, \alpha_0$ be the RR7SQSD representation of the integer K and the sequence $\psi_0, \psi_1, \psi_2, \dots, \psi_j, \dots, \psi_{\lambda-1}$ its RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain then an RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain can be represented by equation (3.5)

$$\psi_j = \begin{cases} \psi_0 \in \{1,2,3\}; & \text{if } j = n-1 \\ 7\psi_{j-1} + \alpha_{n-j} & ; \text{if } n-2 \leq j \leq 0 \end{cases} \quad (3.5)$$

where: $\alpha_i \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and $\alpha_{n-j} \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ being the value to be added or subtracted from $7\psi_{j-1}$ base on the RR7SQSD analyzed. Equation (3.5) in effect means that RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain is an addition/subtraction chain based on a principle of multiplying a previous element of a sequence by 7 and adding or subtracting RR7SQSD

multiples of the multiplicand. The RR7SQSD multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chains require fewer number of operations compared to [72] or [73] and can be used for a wide variety of applications such as the multiplication of operands of very long word length in a data word constrained compute environments and for computing elliptic curve point multiplication.

3.1.1.8 Numerical example on RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain computation

The numerical example 3.3 in figure 3.4 further explains the principle of the proposal.

Numerical example 3.3. It is required to compute the shortest addition chains of the following numbers 92,155, 3038,7985 and 434679.

Solution: Using equation (3.5), the chains are as shown in figure 3.4

K	α_k	Multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain
93	2,-1, 2	2, 13, 93
155	3, 1, 1	3, 22,155
3038	1, 2,1,0,0	1, 9,65,434,3038
7985	3, 2,2,02	3, 23, 165, 1141, 7985
434679	1,-3,-2,-1, 0,2,0,0	1, 4,26,181,1267,8871,62097,434679
142897	1, 2,-3,-3,-3, 0,-1	1,9,60,417,2916,20414,142897
6984572	1, 1, 3, 3,-3, 0,1,2,0	1,59,413,2909,30363,142542,997796,6984572

Figure 3.4: Solution to numerical examples on RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chains.

Having formulated the principle and illustrated by way of the numerical example 3.1 to 3.3, that the RR7SQSDNS supports very efficient the arithmetic the proof of its ability to extend this property to arithmetic operations of practical significance is presented in section 3.2.1

3.1.2 Mathematical model of the algorithm for arithmetic operations on EC defined over

$$SGF(7^m + \psi_i)$$

The presentation of this section is aimed at establishing the theoretical model for the design and testing of a hardware-implementable algorithm that will withstand the mathematical rigour of tested PKC protocols and in particular those cryptosystem protocols that can be used on elliptic curves defined over RR7SQSD element finite fields. To achieve this objective it is necessary to: i) show that RR7SQSDNS is equally an algebraic structure or field (referred to as the RR7SQSD elements finite field), ii) outline the principle of constructing an RR7SQSD finite field and iii) define the various field arithmetic operations. These points are presented in sections 3.1.2.1 to 3.1.2.3 respectively.

3.1.2.1 RR7SQSD finite field basic axioms

Definition 3.2: RR7SQSD finite field. An RR7SQSD finite field $F_{RR7SQSD}$, designated $SGF(7)$ is an order-7 Galois field with elements in $L \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ complete with addition and multiplication operations defined.

Axiom 3.3. The elements of $SGF(7)$: The character digit set $L \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ is an RR7SQSD domain or a multiple-valued logic variable recoded rearrangement of the elements of the prime field $GF(7)$. Recoding the elements of $GF(7)$ in the RR7SQSD character digit set does not in any way adversely affect the finite field arithmetic properties.

Axiom 3.4. The basic arithmetic operations in $F_{RR7SQSD}$, are similar to those of conventional binary Galois fields, closed and obey the commutative, associative and distributive laws.

Axiom 3.5 *RR7SQSD field basic arithmetic operations:* All basic arithmetic operations of the RR7SQSD ground field $SGF(7)$, addition, subtraction, multiplication, multiplicative and thus division are closed and can be executed using equation (3.1) where '0' and '1' are the respective additive and multiplicative elements.

This is the foundation basis of all subsequent larger RR7SQSD finite field arithmetic hence, for convenience reproduced as in equation (3.6).

$$\delta_i = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \bar{1} & ; \text{if } (\alpha_i \ominus \beta_i) < \bar{a} \\ 1 & ; \text{if } \alpha_i \ominus \beta_i > a \\ 0 & ; \text{if otherwise} \end{array} \right\} \quad (3.6)$$

$$\tau_i = (\alpha_i \ominus \beta_i) - 7\delta_i$$

where: the operator $\ominus \in \{+, -, *, /\}$, $\alpha_i, \beta_i, \tau_i \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and $\delta_i \in \{1, 0, \bar{1}\}$. The evaluation of the basic arithmetic functions of $SGF(7)$ using equation (3.6) is as shown in appendix CH3.1

Axiom 3.6 If x is a generator set of a conventional prime finite field $GF(q)$, the generator set y of $SGF(q)$ is x re-coded in the RR7SQSD character digit set. Alternatively, a generator set $\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_i, \dots, \alpha_n\}$ for $GF(q)$ is also the generator set but recoded for $SGF(q)$.

For example, the generators of $GF(7)$ are 3 and 5 are the same for $SGF(7)$ but recoded in the SMVL variables as 3 and -2 respectively.

Axiom 3.7 RR7SQSD Extension fields $SGF(p^k)$: If an $SGF(q)$ exist for any ground field $GF(q)$ then the extended $SGF(p^k)$ p a prime, also exist for every $GF(p^k)$ and the RR7SQSD string word elements are direct recoding using the RR7SQSD arithmetic scheme for the elements of $GF(p^k)$ just as all nonzero elements of $SGF(p^k)$ are generated by a primitive element α where α is the root of a primitive irreducible polynomial

$$F(x) = x^k + \sum_{j=k-1}^0 f_j \alpha^j \dots\dots\dots(3.7)$$

Axiom 3.8 $SGF(p^k)$ elements representation: All nonzero elements of the field $SGF(p^k)$ are points on the field and therefore can be represented as:

i) **Vector basis i.e.;** as powers of α that $\alpha^k = \sum_{j=k-1}^0 f_j x^j$ provided $F(\alpha) = 0$.

ii) **in polynomial or normal basis form, for example the element point**

$$p(x, y) = (1\bar{2}31\bar{2}, 23\bar{1}0\bar{2}) = (x^4 - 2x^3 + 3x^2 + x - 2, 2x^4 + 3x^3 - x^2 - 2)$$

iii) **in integer representation as** $= p(1867, 5780)$

Axiom 3.9 RR7SQSD Optimal extension fields $SGF(7^k+\psi)$: If the normal prime field $GF(p)$ exists and there are two integers $\alpha, \beta \in p$ such that $\alpha + \beta = p$ and $\alpha\beta < 2p$ then, there is a restricted radix – h symmetrical $\left\lceil \frac{h-1}{2} \right\rceil$ -nary signed digit element optimally extended finite field $SGF(h)$ over the ground field $GF(p)$ where h is any prime from the sequence $\{p^k \pm i\alpha\beta\}$. Alternatively it can be said that, $\forall GF(p), \exists SGF(p^k \pm i\alpha\beta) = SGF(h)$ provided $\alpha, \beta \in p, \alpha + \beta = p$ and $\alpha\beta < 2p$ and for $j < i$ $SGF(h_i)$ is concentric to $SGF(h_j)$.

$SGF(h)$ is essentially a vector space and higher order h hardware circuits can be realized by simple cascading of the circuits of lower order h . For example, the fields $SGF(h \in \{13,37,61,79,109,157,181,241,\dots\})$ are concentric. That is blocks of $SGF(7)$ can easily form a block of $SGF(13)$. Similarly, blocks of $SGF(13)$ in turn can form a block of $SGF(37)$ which in turn can form a block of $SGF(61)$ and so on. Some 134 special primes generated, are as shown in appendix CH3.2.

3.1.2.2 Principles of constructing RR7SQSD elements finite fields

The existence of SD element Galois fields can be demonstrated by constructing $SGF(7^m)$ as follows: Let x and l , in the RR7SQSD number system be a single independent variable and coefficient respectively such that

$x, l \in \{(\overline{a-1}), (\overline{a-2}), \dots, \overline{2}, \overline{1}, 0, 1, 2, \dots, (a-2), (a-1)\}$ with $a \geq \left\lceil \frac{h-1}{2} \right\rceil$ then the following can

be define thus

i) A degree m SD polynomial $Q(x)$ as

$$Q(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} l_i x^i. \quad (3.8)$$

ii) A primitive SD polynomial is the least SD polynomial primitive element α , in $SGF(p^m)$ provided $\alpha \in \{(\overline{a-1}), \dots, \overline{2}, \overline{1}, 0, 1, 2, \dots, (a-1)\}$.

- iii) If a_i is an element and a_i a root of $SGF(p^m)$, then a_i can be represented as $\{\overline{\alpha}^{p^{m-2}}, \dots, \overline{\alpha}^2, \overline{\alpha}, \overline{1}, 0, 1, 2, \dots, \alpha^{p^{m-2}}\}$. Reducing these elements by a reduction modulo polynomial help to represent elements of $SGF(p^m)$ in polynomial basis.
- iv) A SD irreducible or monic polynomial is any non-constant SD polynomial that cannot be factored.

Thus, taking $p(x)$ as an irreducible (monic) signed digit polynomial [55] of degree m over F_7 such that

$$p(x) = x^m + \sum_{i=1}^m a^{m-i} x^{m-i} : |a_i \in \{\overline{3}, \overline{2}, \overline{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3\} \text{ for } i=0, 1, 2, \dots, m-1 \} \quad (3.9)$$

And referring to the universal set of such polynomials $p(x)$ of degree less than m over F_7 as a signed digit element finite field F_7^m , designated with $SGF(7^m)$, it can be proved that:

$$SGF(7^m) = \{a_{m-1}x^{m-1} + a_{m-2}x^{m-2} + \dots + a_2x^2 + a_1x^1 + a_0 : a_i, x \in \{-3, \overline{3}, \overline{2}, \overline{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3\}\} \quad (3.10).$$

Similar to positive element finite fields, the elements of $SGF(7^m)$ are represented by strings of length m RR7SQSD so that $SGF(7^m)$ can be alternatively represented as

$$SGF(7^m) = \{(a_{m-1}a_{m-2}a_{m-3}\dots\dots\dots a_1a_0) : a_i \in \{\overline{3}, \overline{2}, \overline{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3\}\} \quad (3.11)$$

Consequently, It can be said that a $SGF(7^m)$, $m > 0$ contains 7^m elements each of which can be uniquely represented with a degree up to $m-1$ RR7SQSD polynomial $p(x)$ in the form:

$$p(x) = a_{m-1}x^{m-1} + a_{m-2}x^{m-2} + \dots\dots\dots + a_2x^2 + a_1x^1 + a_0 : a_i, x^i \in \{\overline{3}, \overline{2}, \overline{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3\}.$$

The methodology for constructing $SGF(7^m)$ is presented in section 3.2.2.2

3.1.2.3 RR7SQSD elements finite field $SGF(7^m)$ arithmetic

For design compatibility the scheme of arithmetic operations in an RR7SQSD element finite field is made to follow the similar pattern of conventional prime Galois fields and are as formulated thus. Let $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ be two RR7SQSD finite field elements in the polynomial basis representation and $w(x)$ be a monic irreducible polynomial, such that

$$a(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{k-2} a_j x^j, \quad b(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{l-1} b_i x^i \text{ and } w(x) = \sum_{\tau=0}^n w_\tau x^\tau \text{ where } : k, l < n$$

$a(x), b(x), w(x) \in SGF(7^m)$ then;

(a) $SGF(7^m)$ addition

RR7SQSD finite field elements addition is performed RR7SQSD coefficient component coefficient-wise with ignored carries as described in equation (3.12)

$$a(t) + b(t) = c(t) = \left(\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} c_i t^i \right) \text{mod } w(t) \quad (3.12)$$

where $c_i = a_i + b_i - 7\delta_i$ and δ_i as earlier defined.

(b) $SGF(7^m)$ multiplication:

RR7SQSD finite field multiplication is described as in equation (3.13) where the multiplier $a(t)$ and multiplicand $b(t)$ element operands are represented in RR7SQSD polynomial basis.

$$a(t) * b(t) = a(t) \cdot b(t) \text{mod } w(t) = \left[\sum_{i=0}^{k-1} a_i \cdot b(t) \right] \text{mod } w(t) \quad (3.13)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= (a_{k-1}t^{k-1}(b_r t^r + b_{r-1}t^{r-1} + \dots b_1 t + b_0) + a_{k-2}t^{k-2}(b_r t^r + b_{r-1}t^{r-1} + \dots b_1 t + b_0) \\
&+ \dots + a_1 t(b_r t^r + b_{r-1}t^{r-1} + \dots b_1 t + b_0) + a_0(b_r t^r + b_{r-1}t^{r-1} + \dots b_1 t + b_0)) \bmod w(t) \\
&= \left\{ \sum_{n=0}^{k-1} a_n t^{k-n} (b_{r-1} t^{r-1} + \dots + b_1 t + b_0) \bmod w(t) \right\} \bmod w(t) \tag{3.14}
\end{aligned}$$

From equation (2.4) in section 2.2.1

let $d_i = a_{k-n}b_{r-m} - 7\rho_h^0$ then

$$\begin{aligned}
a(t) * b(t) &= \left\{ \sum_{i=0}^{k+r-1} d_i t^i \bmod w(t) \right\} \bmod w(t) \\
&= \left\{ \sum_{i=0}^{k+r-1} \left(\sum_{n=0, m=0}^{k-1, r-1} a_{k-n} b_{r-m} - 7\rho_{nm}^0 \right) \bmod w(t) \right\} \bmod w(t) \tag{3.15}
\end{aligned}$$

where $\rho_{nm}^0 = \rho_{ij}^0$ as defined in equation (3.4).

The operands are multiplied RR7SQSD component wise with ignored product digit carry ρ_{nm}^0 and computing the residue modulo some given irreducible polynomial $w(t)$.

The design of an RR7SQSD field element multiplication circuit will be presented in section 3.6.1.3.

(c) $SGF(7^m)$ squaring

Polynomial squaring operation is linear and is modulo-RR7SQSD

$$\left(\sum_{j=0}^{m-1} b_j x^j \right)^2 = \left(\sum_{j=0}^{2(m-1)} b_l x^{2(l)} \right) \bmod w(x) \tag{3.16}$$

(d) $SGF(7^m)$ exponentiation

A Field exponentiation operation is multiplying copies of the element. i.e.;

$$(b_{j-1}b_{j-2}....b_1b_o)^t = \{(b_{j-1}b_{j-2}.....b_1b_o)_1.(b_{j-1}b_{j-2}....b_1b_o)_2.....(b_{j-1}b_{j-2}.....b_1b_o)_t\} \text{ mod } w(x) \quad (3.17)$$

(e) $SGF(7^m)$ multiplicative inverse and field element inversion

A multiplicative inverse $b^{-1}(x)$ of $b(x) \in SGF(7^m)$ must satisfy the equation $b(x).b^{-1}(x) = 1$. The efficient algorithm presented in [60] can equally be adopted for RR7SQSD finite field's element inverse computation. If $a \in SGF(7^k)$ and $a \neq 0$ then by

factorization $a^{-1} = a^{7^k-7} = a^{7[7^{k-1}-1]} = [a^{7^{k-1}-1}]^7$ such that

$$7^{k-1} - 1 = \begin{cases} [7^{(k-1)/2} - 1][7^{(k-1)/2} + 1] & ; \text{ If k is odd} \\ 7[7^{(k-2)/2} - 1][7^{(k-2)/2} + 1] & ; \text{ If k is even} \end{cases} \quad (3.18)$$

Since $SGF((7^{23})^{19}) = SGF(7^{667})$, the number of field multiplication operations necessary to compute the inverse of an element in $SGF((7^{23})^{19})$ may be determined as shown in figure 3.9. It can be deduced from this figure that if a "+1" signify RR7SQSD field multiplication operation and "+6" signify a 'multiply-by-7 operation then only $8+4 = 12$ multiplication operations are required as against 14 when doing the same calculation in $GF(2^{667})$.

$$\begin{aligned}
7^{667} - 7 &= 7(7^{333} - 1)(7^{333} + 1) \\
7^{333} - 1 &= 7(7^{166} - 1)(7^{166} + 1) + 6 \\
7^{166} - 1 &= (7^{83} - 1)(7^{83} + 1) \\
7^{83} - 1 &= 7(7^{41} - 1)(7^{41} + 1) + 6 \\
7^{41} - 1 &= 7(7^{20} - 1)(7^{20} + 1) + 6 \\
7^{20} - 1 &= (7^{10} - 1)(7^{10} + 1) \\
7^{10} - 1 &= (7^5 - 1)(7^5 + 1) \\
7^5 - 1 &= 7(7^2 - 1)(7^2 + 1) + 6
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 3.5: Application of RR7SQSDNS in finite field element inverse computation

Procedure for computing of RR7SQSD element finite field multiplicative inverse computation is presented in section 3.2.2.3.

3.1.3 Formulation of the VLSI's basic building block circuit

The formulation of the SMVL VLSI circuit basic building block circuit begins with its design specification is presented in section 3.1.3.1. The SMVL processing threshold signal profile and the control lines are presented in section 3.1.3.2 while the mathematical formulation of the SMVL ECC arithmetic unit VLSI functional logic circuits' basic building block is presented in section 3.1.3.3. Positive and negative literal CP – gate circuits are presented in section 3.1.3.4. The characteristic equation of the basic building block is presented in section 3.1.3.5.

3.1.3.1 The basic building block circuits design specifications

Expectations of the basic building block is that, it must operate on voltage mode and be capable of multiplexing 7- RR7SQSD input profile signals to a single output point based on an RR7SQSD input control signal without signal voltage degradation, signal distortion, and fidelity tamper. Precisely, it is to functions as a SMVL signal voltage multiplexing circuit. The circuit in view can be formulated using the principle of tree-type universal logic modules and complementary pass gates.

3.1.3.2 The RR7SQSD logic system's processing signal's profile and control line

This study proposes the RR7SQSD logic system in which the processing logic threshold values lie in the range $L \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ as an alternative to binary logic which can replace it in all applications where binary logic holds sway. The RR7SQSD Logic is a Symmetrical Multiple-Value Logic (SMVL) system of the form $20\bar{1}3211\bar{3}\bar{1}0\bar{2}123\bar{1}\bar{1}02103\bar{3}$.




Figure 3.6: Processing logic signals' profiles

Fig.3.6 shows comparatively the signal profiles of binary or 2-valued logic, an asymmetrical 4-value otherwise quaternary logic (AMVL) and the 7-valued otherwise RR7SQSD logic (SMVL). The richness of the SMVL processing threshold logic is also depicted in the nature of the corresponding control lines necessary to address a given number of input variables. Consider the number of control lines required to implement 7 arbitrary input functions as shown in figure 3.7. A binary logic system requires an 8 to 3 lines encoder to adequately address the 7 input signals; a quaternary system requires a 2-strand wire bus width for the same purpose. The RR7SQSD system needs just a single strand wire.




Figure 3.7: Comparison of processing logic threshold control signal lines

3.1.3.3 The restricted radix - h symmetrical r-nary Tree-type Universal Logic Module

A Tree-type Universal Logic Module (T_ULM) generalizes the principle of operation of a MVL basic building block [37]. In a T_ULM , let $L = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, h-1\}$ be the

finite set of h logic threshold values in the h -valued logic system and the sequence $\{x_k\}$ be the set of elements of a control variable X with h^k distinct states. If $A = (a_0, a_1, a_2, \dots, a_i, \dots, a_{h^k-1})$ be some set of residue input functions, then the T-ULM output as shown in figure 3.8 is described by the expression

$$T_{ULM\ out} = \Phi(A; X) = \Phi(\{a_i\}; \{x_j\}) = \{a_i\}; \text{ if } x_j = i \quad (3.19)$$

where $i = 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, h^k - 1$ and $j = 1, 2, 3$




Figure 3.8: Functional block of the T-ULM

When the control sequence $\{x_j\}$, of a T-ULM is just a single variable MVL signal such that $x_1 = x_2 = \dots = x_k = x$, then the T-ULM is simply referred to as an h -valued T-gate defined by equation (3.20)

$$T_{OUT} = T_{ULM} = \Phi(\{a_i\}; x) = a_i; \text{ if } x = i \quad (3.20)$$

Axiom 3.11 If the finite set of the logic threshold values $L = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, h - 1\}$ transforms into a new set $L' = \{\overline{r-k}\}$ and $k \in \{h, h-1, h-2, \dots, 1\}$; such that $\{a_i\}, \{x\}, i \in \{\overline{(r-1)}, \overline{(r-2)}, \dots, \overline{2}, \overline{1}, 0, 1, 2, \dots, (r-2)(r-1)\}$ then the T_{ULM} is referred to as an h -valued restricted symmetrical r -nary signed-digit T_{ULM} otherwise called the h -valued restricted symmetrical r -nary signed digit T_{gate} .

3.1.3.4 Positive and negative literal complementary pass gate transistor circuits

RR7SQSD CP-gate derived T-gate is a concatenation of positive literal threshold CP gate tree-type network [41] and negative literal threshold CP gate tree-type network into one integration. A positive CP pass gate is of positive logic threshold voltage, responding if and only if there is a positive input control voltage to pass r-valued negative or positive input data/address/ system control signal voltages to output. Similarly, a negative CP gate is of negative logic threshold voltages responding if and only if there is a negative r- valued input control signal and transmit the r-valued positive or negative data/ address/control signal voltages to output. The positive and negative CP gates are fabricated of CMOS pass transistors (the transmission gates) with differently signed thresholds voltages obtained by virtue of surface dopant control through selective ion implant and correspondingly literal circuits. An interconnection of the positive and negative CP gates, made into a single integration will result in a new device with positive and negative CP gates characteristics and inheritance very wide spectrum of application. Fig. 3.9 shows the various aspects of positive and negative CP-gates.

The parallel connected transistors $Q_{1(a \text{ and } b)}$, $Q'_{1(a \text{ and } b)}$ constitute the respective pass transistors and the series connected $Q_{2(a \text{ and } b)}$, $Q'_{2(a \text{ and } b)}$ make up for the required down and up literals for the positive and negative CP gates. If the magnitude of x is lower than the threshold of the literal circuit, then transistor Q_{1a}/Q'_{1a} switches ON and Q_{1b}/Q'_{1b} is OFF and p is transmitted from input to output, on the contrary Q_{1b}/Q'_{1b} is ON while Q_{1a}/Q'_{1a} is switched OFF and q is passed to the output. Thus, the analogue

switch transistor circuits of both CP gates switch alternatively, according to the sign and magnitude of the control signal x , at the common gates of the literal circuits connected in series to the power supply V_{DD} or $-V_{DD}$. The modes of their respective operations are as described in the definitions of literal and CP-gate equations of (3.21) and (3.22).

Definition 3.5 The down literal $D_i(x)$ and the CP -gate CP_i are defined as

$$D_i(x) = \begin{cases} r-1 & ; \text{if } 0 < x < i \\ 0 & ; \text{if } (i+1) < x < (r-1) \end{cases} ; CP_i(p,q;x) = \begin{cases} p & ; \text{if } x < i \\ q & ; \text{if } x > (i+1) \end{cases} \quad (3.21)$$




Figure 3.9: Mono polar CP-gates.

Definition 3.6 A negative literal $D_i(-x)$ and its corresponding CP- gate CP_{-i} , circuits may be defined as follows:

$$D_{-i}(-x) = \begin{cases} 0; & \text{if } \bar{i} < |x| < 0 \\ -(r-1); & \text{if } -(r-1) < |x| < \bar{i} \end{cases} \quad CP_{-i}(p,q,-x) \equiv \begin{cases} p; & \text{if } -i < |x| < i \\ q; & \text{if } -(r-1) < |x| < (r-1) \end{cases} \quad (3.22)$$

Where p, q are input signals and x is a control. Besides, $i = \{0,1,2,\dots,r-2\}$ and $p, q, x \in L = \{0,1,2,\dots,r-1\}$.

CP – gates are mono-polar voltage mode operating multiplexer units that meet the required electrical parameters in section 3.1.3.2.1. Consequently, a parallel interconnection of the positive literal CP-gate and the negative literal CP-pass gate will function according to the specification required of a SMVL VLSI circuit.

3.1.3.5 The RR7SQSD CP-gate derived T – gate equation

An RR7SQSD CP – gate derived T – gate may be described as follows:

Rewriting equation (3.19) in standard multiplexing function (conditioned disjunction)

form for values of $h = 7$ such that $L = \{0,1,2,3,4,5,6\} \equiv L' = \{-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3\}$

Then $T_{out} = T(a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6; x)$

$$\equiv T'(a_{-3}, a_{-2}, a_{-1}, a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3; x) = a_i; \text{if } x = i \quad (3.23)$$

where $i, \{a_i\}, x \in \{\bar{3}, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$

Equation(3.23) represents the functional description of the 7-valued or Restricted Radix -7 Symmetrical Quaternary Signed Digit (RR7SQSD) T – gate. An alternative form of equation (3.23) depicting the quaternary nature of the T-gate is as presented in equation (3.24)

$$T(p_a, q_b, r_c, l_d; x) = \psi_m \quad ; \text{ if } x = m \quad (3.24)$$

such that $m \in \{a, b, c, d\}$, $\psi \in \{p, q, r, l\}$ and $p, q, r, l, x \in \{\bar{3}, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and in particular, $a \in \{\bar{3}, 3\}$, $b \in \{\bar{2}, 2\}$, $c \in \{\bar{1}, 1\}$ and $l \in \{0\}$

Definition 3.7 Let $a_i \in \{a_{-3}, a_{-2}, a_{-1}, a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3\}$ be some SMVL residue input functions and x , a single SMVL control signal variable such that $a_j, x, j \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$. Let T, T_{OUT} be the multiplexing function and the T-gate output functions respectively. Then the operation of an RR7SQSD T-gate is described by equation (3.25).

$$T_{out} = T(a_{-3}, a_{-2}, a_{-1}, a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3; x) = a_j \quad \text{if } x = j \quad (3.25)$$

Or

$$T\{p_a, q_b, r_c, l_d; x\} = P_m \quad ; \text{ if } x = m \quad (3.26)$$

such that $m \in \{a, b, c, d\}$; p, q, r, l and $x \in L = \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ where in particular, $a \in \{-3, 3\}$, $b \in \{-2, 2\}$, $c \in \{-1, 1\}$ and $l = \{0\}$.

Now expressing equation (3.25) or (3.26) with respect CP-gates, the following axioms and theorem suffices:

Axiom 3.12 (About number of CP gates) If the integer $h = 4i - 1$; $i \in \{1, 2, 3, \dots\}$ represents a number of logic values, then an h -valued symmetrical r-nary signed-digit arbitrary MVL

function $f(x)$ of n variables and control variable x , where $f(x)$, $x \in \{-(r-1), -(r-2), \dots, -2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, (r-2), (r-1)\}$, can be completely expressed and constructed using a combination of $r^n - 1$ negative threshold literals and r^n positive threshold literal r -nary CP gates.

Theorem 3.1 If $F_1 = \{f_i(x^-)\}$ and $F_2 = \{f_j(x^+)\}$ are $\frac{h+1}{2}$ -valued negative and positive signed threshold literal $r = \frac{h+1}{2}$ -nary CP gate derived T-gate networks respectively, then their parallel interconnection F , terminating with a common zero literal CP gate is an h -valued symmetrical $r = \frac{h+1}{2}$ -nary signed-digit CP gate derived T-gate.

$$F = F_1 + F_2 = CP_0(\{f_i(x^-)\}, \{f_j(x^+)\}; x) \quad (3.27)$$

Corollary If $F_1 = f(-x)$ and $F_2 = f(x)$ are two dissimilar mono polar CP gates expressible MVL functions, then the concatenation of F_1 and F_2 is a CP gate derived T gate expressible MVL function, $F(x)$.

Theorem 3.2 If $f_3(x)$, $f_2(x)$, $f_1(x)$, $f_0(x)$, $f_1(x)$, $f_2(x)$ and $f_3(x)$ are some non-symmetrically signed literal MVL variable functions then a 7-value symmetrical Quaternary signed digit CP gate derived T-gate otherwise RR7SQSD T-gate can be constructed using the expression

$$\begin{aligned} & CP_0(CP_2(CP_3(f_3(x), f_2(x); x), CP_1(f_1(x), f_0(x); x), CP_1(CP_0(f_0(x), f_1(x); x), \\ & \quad CP_2(f_2(x), f_3(x); x); x); x) \\ & = CP_0(CP_2(CP_3(-3, -2; f(x)), CP_1(-1, 0; f(x)); f(x)), CP_1(CP_0(0, 1; f(x)), CP_2(2, 3; \\ & \quad f(x); f(x)); f(x))) \end{aligned}$$

$$= CP_0 CP_{-2} CP_{-3} (-3, -2; x), CP_{-1} (-1, 0; x); x, CP_1 (CP_0 (0, 1; x), CP_2 (2, 3; x); x); x \quad (3.28)$$

As an example, figure 3.10 shows the CP-gate layout of an 11-valued symmetrical hex-nary signed digit T-gate.




Figure 3.10: Layout of an 11-valued symmetrical hex-nary signed-digit CP-gate derived T-gate.

3.2 Method

This section explains the methods used to implement the various mathematical models formulated in section 3.1, to achieve the set objectives of this study. These methods come in form: algorithms, simulations and experiments. The simulations conducted with specific goals and objectives were performed on Pentium IV and Intel Core 2 Duo processors using Quick Basic version 4.5 (QB 4.5) source code while the experiments were performed on electronic work bench Multisim. Hence in section 3.2.1 the method used to prove the ability of RR7SQSNS to support addition/multiplication operation of integers of word lengths that are of ECC interest is presented. Section 3.2.2 presents the step by step account of how the theory of section 3.1.2 is used for the design of the hardware-implementable point multiplication on EC defined over RR7SQSD finite fields' algorithm.

3.2.1 Procedure for computing big integer multiplication

This section presents the proof that RR7SQSDNS supports fast arithmetic computations that are of very practical application significance. Some of these arithmetic operations are modular exponentiation $G = P^k \bmod h$ and computing the product of big integers in a word length compute constrained environments without truncation. Both are critical arithmetic operations in secure communication and critical service delivery systems. The use of addition chains and thus, the prospect of using the RR7SQSD multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain for the execution of these operations have been presented in section 3.1.1.7. Consequently, this section in addition develops the relevant algorithms.

3.2.1.1 Computing modular exponentiation $G = P^k \bmod h$

To compute modular exponentiation, the RR7SQSD form $f_\lambda = \{e_{k-1}, e_{k-2}, \dots, e_i \dots e_1, e_0\}$, of the exponent k , is obtained. Next the value of P is raised to the power of the most significant RR7SQSD of the exponent e_{k-1} that is $P^{e_{k-1}}$. This is a ‘jump starting’ value. The remaining RR7SQSD e_i are scanned one at a time, the jump-start value/previous partial exponentiation result are raised to power 7 i.e. $(P^{e_{k-1}})^7$ and multiplied by the scanned RR7SQSD multiple of the jump-start value $(P^{e_{k-1}})^{e_i}$, to obtain a current partial modular exponentiation $Q = (P^{e_{k-1}})^7 * (P^{e_{k-1}})^{e_i}$. Exponentiation is at the count of every RR7SQSD that is $\{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ but the ‘0’ RR7SQSD scan does not attract a multiplication by $(P^{e_{k-1}})^{e_i}$. Algorithm code named AM1A in figure 3.11 describes this approach. A problem countered here is overflow of the system data word length as a result of the partial exponentiation’s fast divergence due to the raising to powers 7 at every count of an RR7SQSD. This problem was contained by representing 7 in binary (111_2) so that H^7 decomposes to a three consecutive self multiplications followed by a reduction with the last iteration step result and then updating with $(P^{e_{k-1}})^{e_i}$. The self multiplication operations are respectively doubling and adding in non-modular arithmetic. Doubling is relatively cheaper than adding hence efficiency was further improved by representing ‘7’ in the Near Adjacent Form (NAF) $00\bar{1}$. This way the triple double-and-add becomes three consecutive self multiplications.

C: Algorithm **AM1A**

Input M, k, h, r

Output: $G = M^k \bmod h$

Obtain RR7SQSD form e_k of k

1. $H = H_0 = M^{e_{\lambda-1}} \in \{M, M^2, M^3\}$

; if $e_{\lambda-1} \in \{1, 2, 3\}$

$H = 0$; otherwise

$Q = H$

2. for i from $\lambda - 1$ down to 0 step -1 do

$Q = Q^7 \bmod h$:

$H = H_0^{e_i} \bmod h$

3. $T = Q * H \bmod h$

$Q = T$

4. $G = Q$

Output G

End

Example 3.4 : To compute 5^{29} .

Output: $G = 5^{29} = 186264514923095703125$

Solution: $M = 5$; $k = 29$

$\{e_k\} \equiv (1, \bar{3}, 1)_{RR7SQSD}$: when $l = 1: e_{start} = 1$

$M^{start} = 5^1 = 5$; $QL = 5$; $H = M^{start} = 5^1 = 5$

And when $i = 2; e_i = \bar{3}$: $y = e_i = -3$: $Q = H = QL = 5$

For $j = 2$: $l = 0$: $Q = Q * Q = 25$

$j = 1$: $l = 0$: $Q = 25 \cdot 25 = 625$

$J = 0$: $l = -1$: $Q = (625) \cdot (625) = 390625$

$Q = Q * QL^{-1} = 390625 / 5 = 78125$

$Q = Q * H^y = 78125 * 5^{-3} = 625$: $QL = Q = 625$

$l = 3$: $y = e_3 = 1$

$J = 2$: $l = 0$: $Q = Q * Q = 625 * 625 = 390625$

$J = 1$: $l = 0$: $q = Q * Q = 390625 * 390625$

$J = 0$: $l = -1$:

$Q = Q * Q = 23283064365386962890625$

$Q = Q * QL^{-1} = Q / 625 = 37252902984619140625$

$Q = Q * H^l = Q * 5 = 186264514923095703125$

$G = 186264514923095703125$

(a) RR7SQSD exponentiation algorithm.

b) Computation process sketch

Figure 3.11: RR7SQSD modular exponentiation

The numerical example 3.4 shown in figure 3.11b further elucidates the computation steps. For operands of very large word length even with NAF representation speed of operation execution can still be of great concern hence speed up strategies are very necessary. Figure 3.12 shows some speed up strategies. The speed up Algorithm AM1A was also further improved upon when the RR7SQSD form of K is partitioned into groups of τ RR7SQSD for multiple RR7SQSD scanning. The procedure is as described in algorithm AM2.

C: Algorithm AM1B Input M, k, h Output: $G = M^k \bmod h$ Obtain RR7SQSD form ff_λ of K Partition ff_λ into m groups of $\tau (= 3)$ RR7SQSD i.e. $(\alpha_{mi}, \beta_{mi}, \gamma_{mi})$ Obtain the decimal equivalent ϕ, of the first partition $(\alpha_{m\lambda-1}, \beta_{m\lambda-1}, \gamma_{m\lambda-1})$ 1. $H = M^{(\alpha_{mk-1}, \beta_{mk-1}, \gamma_{mk-1})}$; if $\phi \neq 0$: else $H = M^0$ 2. for i from $\lambda-2$ downto 0 step -1 do $Q = H^\phi \equiv \{M^{(\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i)}\}^\phi$ 2b. $Q = Q * M^{(\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i)} = \{M^{(\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i)}\}^\phi * (\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i)$ 2c. $H = Q$ 3. $G = Q$:output G 4. End	C: Algorithm AM2 Input: K, P Output: $W = kP$ 1. Obtain RR7SQSD equivalent $f_{k_{RR7SQSD}}$, of k 1a. Partition $f_{k_{RR7SQSD}}$ to m groups of τ_s RR7SQSD 2. For Tt from 1 to m do: $\psi_{Tt} = \alpha_{mTt} \beta_{mTt} \lambda_{mTt}$ 2a. Obtain decimal equivalent of ψ_{Tt} 3. $H_0 = \psi_1 : Q_0 = \psi_1$ 3a. for $z = 2$ to m do : $H_{trim} = \psi_z$ 4. For d from $\tau_s - 1$ downto 0 step -1 do : $Q = Q_0$ 4a. for l from 1 to 3 do: $Q = Q + Q$ 4b. $Q_0 = Q - Q_0$ 4c. $H = Q_0 + H_{trim} : Q_0 = H$ 5. $W = H$:output W 6. End
--	--

Fig. 3.12 Speed up strategies for RR7SQSD modular exponentiation

Numerical example 3.5 below summarizes procedure for using RR7SQSD for modular exponentiation computation.

Numeric Example 3.5: To compute: $M^{6984572} \pmod{h}$ Using: i) Single RR7SQSD scan ii) Multiple RR7SQSDs scan and iii) Hardware implement-friendly multiple RR7SQSDs scan with NAF coding.

Solution: For the purpose of clarity, no numerical value shall be assigned to M .

$k = 6984572_{10} \equiv f_\lambda = \{113, 3\bar{3}0, 120\}_{RR7SQSD}$. This is partitioned into groups of three RR7SQSD $(\alpha, \beta, \gamma) = (113, 3\bar{3}0, 120) \equiv (59, 126, 63)$. The first partition being

$e_{\lambda-1}^l = 113 \Rightarrow H = M^{59}$. The numerical example 3.5 in figure 3.13 sketches the computation procedures for each case. As it can be seen that where as a one RR7SQSD at a time scan would yield an addition/subtraction chain of $1P, 8P, 59P, 416P, 2909P, 20363P, 14252P, 997796P, 6984572P$. However, using algorithm AM2 a 3-RR7SQSD at a time scan example (2iii) yields the very short addition/subtraction chain of $59P, 20363P, 6984572P$ which drastically reduces the number of operations.

i) Direct single RRSQSD scan (Algorithm AM1) $e_{i-1} = 1 \Rightarrow H = M^1$									
H			Q				H		
$M^2 \rightarrow M^4 \rightarrow M^8$			$M^8 M^{-1}$				$M^7 M^1 = M^8$		
$M^{16} \rightarrow M^{32} \rightarrow M^{64}$			$M^{64} M^{-8} \rightarrow M^{56}$				$M^{56} M^3 = M^{59}$		
$M^{118} \rightarrow M^{236} \rightarrow M^{472}$			$M^{472} M^{-59} \rightarrow M^{413}$				$M^{413} M^3 = M^{416}$		
$M^{832} \rightarrow M^{1664} \rightarrow M^{3328}$			$M^{3328} M^{-416} \rightarrow M^{2912}$				$M^{2912} M^{-3} = M^{2909}$		
$M^{5818} \rightarrow M^{11636} \rightarrow M^{23272}$			$M^{23272} M^{-2909} \rightarrow M^{20363}$				$M^{20363} M^0 = M^{20363}$		
$M^{40726} \rightarrow M^{81452} \rightarrow M^{162904}$			$M^{162904} M^{-20363} \rightarrow M^{142541}$				$M^{142541} M^1 = M^{142542}$		
$M^{285084} \rightarrow M^{570158} \rightarrow M^{1140336}$			$M^{1140336} M^{-142542} \rightarrow M^{997794}$				$M^{997794} M^2 = M^{997796}$		
$M^{1995512} \rightarrow M^{3991184} \rightarrow M^{7982363}$			$M^{7982363} M^{-997796} \rightarrow M^{6984572}$				$M^{413} M^0 = M^{6984572}$		
ii) Multiple RRSQSD scan Modular exponentiation (Algorithm AM1B)									
m		eem		H		Q		H	
1		330		$(M^{59})^{343} \rightarrow M^{20237}$		$M^{20237} M^{126} \rightarrow M$		$M M^{20363}$	
0		120		$(M^{20363})^{343} \rightarrow M^{6984509}$		$M^{6984509} M^{63} \rightarrow M$		$M M^{6984572}$	
iii) Implement friendly multiple RRSQSD scan with NAF coding (AM2)									
$\alpha_{m-1} \beta_{m-1} \gamma_{m-1} = 113 \Rightarrow Q = H = 59 \equiv 7 [(1*7) + 1] + 3 \equiv 2[3[D] + 2[A]] = 6[D] + 4[A]$									
m	$\alpha_m \beta_m \gamma_m$	H	Q	j	l_j	Q	Q	H	
1	330	59	59	2	0	$59 \rightarrow 118$	472		
					0	$118 \rightarrow 236$	- 59		
					1	$236 \rightarrow 472$	413		
				1	0	826	3304		
					0	1652	- 413		
					1	3304	2891		
				0	0	5782	23128	20237P	
					0	11564	- 2891		+ 126P
					1	23128	20237		20363
0	120	20363	20363	2	0	40726	162904		
					0	81452	- 20363		
					1	162904	142541		
				1	0	285082	1140328		
					0	570164	- 142541		
					1	1140328	997787		
				0	0	1995574	7982296	6984509P	
					0	3991148	- 997787		+ 63P
					1	7982296	6984509		6,984572P

Figure 3.13 Solution to numerical Example 3.5 on speed up strategies.

3.2.1.2 Experiment on RR7SQSD non-finite field application:- Big integer multiplication

The principle of RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain as demonstrated in algorithm AM2 is extended to find the product of two very big integer operands in a word length compute constrained environment. The results of this experiment will prove that the RR7SQSD multiply-by-7 addition/ subtraction chain scheme is a powerful tool for computing the product of integer operands word lengths of cryptographic significance. Operands of length 15 decimal character digits (47 bits) and up to those of length 160 decimals character digits (501 bits) as permitted by the simulating software, which would ordinarily attract scientific presentation or rounding-off in Pentium III and IV were used as specimen test values for k and P data.

In performing the experiment as explained in section 3.2.1.1, these scary and weary decimal digit strings of the multiplicand p were partitioned into m groups of word length v where v , is a character digit less than the computing system data word length. A Buick basic version 4.5 source code programme used to simulate the process of multiplication is as presented in Appendix CH 3.3. The program automatically transforms the full decimal digits length of the multiplier k into the RR7SQSD form for the sequential scanning. The multiply-by-7 procedure (algorithm AM2) is then executed on each partition of the multiplicand P . This is followed immediately, by the addition or subtraction operation of the scanned RR7SQSD digit multiple of the multiplicand

$e_i P$, to obtain a partial product. The process then is repeated till all RR7SQSD have been scanned and treated accordingly. The raw results of this experiment are as shown in Appendix CH4.1. A summary of these results are presented and discussed in section 4.1.

3.2.2 Methodology on the design and testing of the hardware friendly algorithm for arithmetic operations on EC defined over $SGF(7^m + \psi_i)$

This section presents the methods for implementing of the various theoretical formulation proposed in section 3.1.2.

3.2.2.1 Procedure for constructing RR7SQSD finite fields

The goal of here is to show that RR7SQSD element finite fields and in particular the type of $SGF(7^m)$ can be constructed using any of the existing methods in literature. For the purpose of demonstrating this assertion in this study, the method discussed in section 2.3.1.5 is followed.

To construct $SGF(7^m)$ is to find monic irreducible RR7SQSD polynomials $q(x) \in SGF(7^m)$ of degree $m \geq 1$ with coefficients in $SGF(7^m)$. A list of all the SD monic Polynomials of degree m in $SGF(7^m)[x]$ with constant terms was made and for each one of the signed digit polynomials listed, substitute the value of $x \in \{\bar{3}, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$. The reducible Polynomials becomes zero, otherwise the Polynomial is irreducible. Thus, using this brute force method 21, 112 and 57580 RR7SQSD monic irreducible polynomials corresponding for degrees 2, 3

and 7 were found. The result of constructing the 21 irreducible polynomials and thus the elements of $SGF(7^2)$ is presented and discussed shown in section 4.2.1.

3.2.2.2 Procedure for computing multiplicative elements in RR7SQSD finite field of type $SGF(7^m)$

It has been explained in section 3.1.2.3 the algorithm presented in [60] can be used to compute RR7SQSD finite field's inverse elements. It is also observed that the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) based polynomial multiply method in [22,54,58] is VLSI implement friendly and the nature of RR7SQSD finite fields finds it more appropriate.

Given an element $b(x) = b_{m-1}(x^{m-1}) + b_{n-2}(x^{m-2}) + \dots + b_1(x) + b_0$ and the irreducible prime modulus $w(x) = x^{n-1} + w_{n-2}(x^{n-2}) + w_{n-3}(x^{n-3}) + \dots + w_1(x) + w_0$ such that $b(x), w(x) \in SGF(7^k \pm \psi)$, $b_i, w_i \in \{\bar{3}, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and $n > m$. To find $b^{-1}(x)$, one need to multiply the highest coefficients of $b(x)$ b_{m-1} with $\chi_i(x) \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}x^{n-m}$ and check for simultaneous coalescences with the highest coefficient of w_{n-1} and the degree or power of the modulo $w(x)$. This is subtracted from highest degree of $w(x)$. Record of all coalescence values of $\chi_i(x)$ are kept while at each iteration step, $w_i(x)$ becomes $b_{i-1}(x)$ and $b_i(x)$ becoming $R_{i-1}(x)$, the process of computing the Greatest Common Divisor (GCD) continues while the remainder $R(x) \neq +1$ with $p = i_{\max}$. At end, starting with four initializing variables say $D_0(x) = 1, H_0(x), D_1(x) = 0, H_1(x) = 1$ the row elements of a $2 - by - p$ dimensional matrix: $\{\{D_0(x) - \chi_k(x).D_1(x)\}, w(x), b(x), \{H_0(x) - \chi_k(x).H_1(x)\}\}$ are computed. For $k = p$ down to 1 step -1. The multiplicative inverse

$b^{-1}(x) = \{\{H_0(x) - \chi_k(x)H_1(x)\}\}$ **provided**
 $v_k(x) = \{\{D_0(x) - \chi_k(x)D_1(x)\}.w(x) \pm b(x).\{H_0(x) - \chi_k(x)H_1(x)\}\} = +1$. **On condition of**
 $v_k(x) = 0$, $b(x)$ and $w(x)$ are not co prime. In all other cases, it simply implies the
 existence of an error in calculation. The method is exemplified in figure 3.14 with the
 numerical example 3.6 directly, in RR7SQSDNS domain and a simulation experiment
 that source input operands from the sequence $H \in \{37, 79, 241, 17011, 117721, \dots\}$.

i) Direct RR7SQSD domain multiplicative inverse computation

Numerical example 3.6 Compute $(-2x-2)^{-1} \bmod (x^2-3x-2)$ which are field element
 and irreducible polynomial in $SGF(7^2)$ respectively.

Solution; i) Classical Euclidean Algorithm ii) the EEA

$2x-2$		
$-2x-2 \overline{) x^2-3x-2}$		
x^2-2x-3		
$-x+1$		
2		
$-x+1 \overline{) -2x-2}$	1	0
$-2x+2$	0	$1(3x-2)$
3	1	$-3x+2(2)$
$2x$	-2	$-[-(-3x+2)2]+1$
$3 \overline{) -x+1}$	1	$-[x-3]+1$
$-x$	-2	$-x-3(2x)$
1	-2	$-[2x(-x-3)]-3x+2$
	$-3x+1$	$-[-2x^2+x]-3x+2$
		$2x^2-x-3x+2$
		$2x^2+3x+2$

iii) Checking:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (-3x+1)(x^2-3x-2) &= -3x^3+3x^2+3x-2 \\
 (-2x-2)(2x^2+3x+2) &= 3x^3-3x^2-3x+3 \\
 \hline
 R(x) &= +1
 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, $(-2x-2)^{-1} \bmod x^2-3x-2 = 2x^2+3x+2$.

Figure 3.14: Solution to numerical example on computing inverse in $SGF(P^k)$.

The EEA method is used to compute all the inverses of all the elements in $SGF(7^2)$ using the irreducible polynomial $x^2 - 3x - 2$. The complete set of multiplicative inverse of the elements of $SGF(7^2)$ thus obtained is presented and discussed section 4.2.2.1 figure 4.3.

ii) Experiment on field element multiplicative inverse computation in the indirect RR7SQSD domain

The EEA method is also used to compute the multiplicative inverses of a few special primes presented in appendix CH3.2. In this particular case the computation process is performed in decimal digit domain but with RR7SQSD finite field representable moduli. The purpose of this experiment was to ascertain the accuracy of EEA on RR7SQSD finite field multiplicative inverse computation even with certain special primes from the number sequence $H \in \{7^m + \alpha\beta i\}$ that is, $H \in \{37, 79, 241, 17011, 117721, \dots\}$ as discussed in section 3.2.1.1 axiom 3.9. The QB 4.5 source code program for the experiment is presented in appendix programs CH3.5 and the output of the experiment is presented and discussed in section 4.2.2.2. This experiment is a necessary integral module in all future computations in this study.

3.2.2.3 Design and testing of a hardware-implementable EC point multiplication algorithm

In this study the algorithm in view is based on the multiply-by-7 addition subtraction chain thus, it is an extension of the algorithm AM2 enunciated section 3.2.1.1. Thus some necessary components of the algorithm are a unified EC point's addition and

point doubling module, a jump-start module , a $7P$ realization module and an updating module. The process of computing the x, y components were made autonomous in section 3.1.2.5. Therefore the design of the algorithm starts with the derived formulae integrity testing. The section ends with the methods for testing the algorithm.

3.2.2.3.1 Equation of an EC defined over RR7SQSD finite fields

This section introduces the nature of elliptic curves defined over RR7SQSD element finite fields. Precisely, elliptic curves defined over RR7SQSD finite field in this study, are those elliptic curves defined over $SGF(7^m + \psi)$ hence, it is therefore sufficient to describe these curves by the same normal prime Galois field elliptic curve equation presented in equation (3.19).

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b, 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0 \text{ with } a, b, x, y \in SGF(7^m + \psi) \quad (3.29)$$

Where: $m = 1, 2, 3, \dots, \psi = i\alpha\beta; i = 0, 1, 2, \dots; \alpha + \beta = 7$ and $\alpha\beta < 2P$

3.2.2.3.2 Autonomous EC points' addition and point doubling X and Y component equations and their accuracy

It was stated in section 1 and subsequently in the opening paragraph of section 2.4.2 that EC arithmetic operations comprises EC point's addition, EC point doubling and EC point multiplication. The elliptic curve point addition and point doubling equations described in table 2.4 sections 2.4.2.1 can also be used to compute points' addition and point doubling on EC defined over RR7SQSD fields. These equations are very efficient. However, it can be seen that y_3 computes if and only if x_3 is known. In this study using the concept of slope-intercept and co-linearity of three points lying on a straight

line determinant equations in [101], the x and y components' computations (x_w, y_w) , are made autonomous in order to make the implementation parallel architecture friendly. The modified formulae are as presented in equation (3.30).

a) Point addition; $U \neq V$ and let $\nabla x = x_v + x_u$; $\Delta x = x_v - x_u$; $\Delta y = y_v - y_u$ and

$$\Delta_{xy} = x_v y_u - x_u y_v$$

$$\left. \begin{aligned} x_w &= \frac{\Delta^2 y - \Delta^2 x \nabla x}{\Delta^2 x} ; y_w = \frac{\Delta^2 x [\Delta y \nabla x - \Delta_{xy}] - \Delta^3 y}{\Delta^3 x} \\ \text{b) Point doubling} \\ x_w &= \frac{\left((3x_u^2 + a)^2 - 8x_u y_u^2 \right)}{(2y_u)^2} ; y_w = \frac{\left((3x_u^2 + a) [12x_u y_u^2 - (3x_u^2 + a)^2] - 8y_u^4 \right)}{(2y_u)^3} \end{aligned} \right\} (3.30)$$

3.2.2.3.3 Projective versus Affine coordinate system

In order to establish the appropriate coordinate system (affine or projective), the order of complexity for computing equation (3.30) was calculated. Table 3.3 shows the summary of the computation.

Table 3.3 EC point addition/doubling complexity in the projective and affine

Coordinate	Projective					Affine				
Operation type	A	M	S	I	Total	A	M	S	I	Total
Addition	7	18	5	1	31	7	10	3	1	21
Doubling	4	12	5	1	22	4	19	5	1	20
$\Delta(\sum A - \sum D)$					9					1

It can be seen that: i) While in the projective coordinate system, the number of addition operations >> the number of doubling operations in the affine coordinates both addition and doubling operations approximately have equal number of operations. ii) The difference in the total number of operations i.e.; $\Delta(\sum A - \sum D)$ in projective is by far greater than $\Delta(\sum A - \sum D)$ in affine coordinate. iii) In either projective or affine coordinate system the number of addition operation is always less than the number of multiplication operations. On this basis all future calculations in this study were carry out on the affine coordinate system.

3.2.2.3.4 Integrity of points' addition and point doubling formulae

The SMVL ECC arithmetic unit VLSI circuit being proposed in this study is expected to function directly on threshold voltage levels in the range $-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3$ and the arithmetic of $SGF((7^m + \psi_l)^n)$ must be capable of being performed in a ground field of type $SGF(7)$ or lower extension field of type $SGF(7^l); l < m.n$ as well as in the decimal domain. It is necessary to affirm that there is no degradation of the computed results in both domains. Consequently, two numerical examples were used to provide the confirmation.

- i) the corresponding formulae in table 2.4 are compared with the modified in 3.3.1.1 using numerical example 3.7 and
- ii) An embedded arithmetic operation on EC defined over $SGF(7^m + \psi_l)$ will be executed using numerical example 3.8.

Numerical example 3.7: Let the elliptic curve E, be defined as the solution of $y^2 = x^3 + x + 1$ over the Galois field GF (23). The group E has the following 28 points

including O [68].

$(0,1), (0,22), (1,7), (1,16), (3,10), (3,13), (4,0), (5,4), (5,19), (6,4), (9,19), (7,11), (7,12), (9,7), (9,16), (11,3), (11,20)$
 $, (12,4), (12,19), (13,7), (13,16), (17,3), (17,20), (18,3), (18,20), (19,5), (19,18)$

It is required to perform EC point's addition of the two points: $(3,10), (9,7)$ and EC point doubling of the point $(3,10)$ using: i) the formulae of table 2.4 and ii) the present effort as described in equation (3.20). The computation is as shown in figure 3.13 and the results are the same in all the two options.

Addition:	<u>$(3,10) + (9,7) = (17,20)$</u>
Using table 2.2	using the present effort, equation (3.30)
$m = (7 - 10)(9 - 3)^{-1} = (-3)(6)^{-1} = 11$	$x_w = \frac{9 - 36(12)}{36 \bmod 23} = \frac{9 - 18}{13} = -9(13^{-1})$ $= -9(16) = -6 \equiv 17$
$x_w = 11^2 - 3 - 9 \equiv 17$	$y_w = \frac{6^2[(-3.12) - [9.10 - 3.7]] - (-3)^3}{6^3}$ $= -4(9^{-1}) = -4(18) = -3 \equiv 20$
$y_w = 11(3 - 17) - 10 = 20$	
Doubling:	<u>$(3,10) + (3,10) = (7,12)$</u>
Using Table 2.2	using the present effort, equation (3.30)
$m = (3(3^2) + 1)(20)^{-1} = 6$	$x_w = \frac{(3(3)^2 + 1)^2 - 8(3)(10^2)}{4(10)^2} = -16 = 7$
$x_w = 6^2 - 6 = 7$	$y_w = \frac{(3.3^2 + 1)[12.3.10^2 - [(3.3^2 + 1)^2] - 8.10^4]}{(2.20)^3} = -11 \equiv 12$
$y_w = 6(3 - 7) - 10 = 12$	

Figure 3.15: Comparative solutions to numerical example on EC arithmetic formulae

3.2.2.3.5 A unified EC points addition and point doubling operations computation scheme

For efficient arithmetic and parallel hardware-implement-friendly architecture equation (3.21) was further transformed into the system of equations (3.31a) to (3.31f) so that a point's addition or point doubling operation can be executed in a single module:

$$\left. \begin{aligned} x_w &= GC^{-2} \\ y_w &= HC^{-3} \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (3.31)$$

$$\Delta x = x_v - x_u; \Delta y = y_v - y_u; \nabla x = x_v + x_u$$

$$C = \begin{cases} \Delta x & ; \text{If addition} \\ 2y_u & ; \text{If doubling} \end{cases} \quad (3.31a)$$

$$B = \begin{cases} \Delta^2 x \nabla x & ; \text{If addition} \\ x_u y_u & ; \text{if doubling} \end{cases} \quad (3.31b)$$

$$A = \begin{cases} \Delta y & ; \text{if addition} \\ 3x_u^2 + a & ; \text{if doubling} \end{cases} \quad (3.31c)$$

$$F = \begin{cases} y_u x_v - y_v x_u & \text{if addition} \\ 1 & ; \text{if doubling} \end{cases} \quad (3.31d)$$

$$G = \begin{cases} A^2 - C^2 \nabla X & ; \text{if addition} \\ A^2 - 8B & ; \text{if doubling} \end{cases} \quad (3.31e)$$

$$H = \begin{cases} C^2 [A \nabla X - F] - A^3 & \text{if addition} \\ A[12B - A^2] - \frac{C^4}{2} & ; \text{if doubling} \end{cases} \quad (3.31f)$$

The corresponding computation flow diagram is as shown in figure 3.16.




Figure 3.16: Computation flow diagram of the unified EC addition/doubling scheme

Variables are batched and elements of a batch are computed in parallel. For example, the elements of the set variables $\{A, B, C, F\}$ are computed in parallel just as $\{G, H\}$ are computed in parallel. This way the order of complexity in any batch equals only that of the element with the highest complexity order. Inversion is done only once in the course of the

entire calculations. The x, y coordinates of a batch element is computed simultaneous as shown in figure 12. Consequently, the order of complexity was calculated for the transformed equation (3.20) as shown in table 3.4. The transformation brought slight improvement in the order of complexity as compared with the previous order of complexity in table 3.3. A total of 22 operations for addition and just 17 doubling operations, as against 21 additions and 20 doubling are required. Table 3.5 shows a comparative analysis of the results. It includes data from similar computation in [22] for comparison. The first two rows show the total number of the arithmetic operations in binary and prime and the third row is that of the RR7SQSD finite fields. There is slight reduction in the number of addition operations. This shall be part of the considerations when designing the VLSI circuit later in this study.

Table 3.4 Transformed equation order of complexity

Operation	Addition operation				Doubling Operation			
Variables	A	M	S	I	A	M	S	I
A	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
B	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
G	1	1	2	-	1	-	1	-
H	2	3	1	-	2	1	3	-
C^{-1}	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
C^{-2}	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
C^{-3}	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
X	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-
Y	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-
Total	6	11	4	1	4	6	6	1
	$\Sigma = 22$				$\Sigma = 17$			

Table 3.5 Implementation factors' comparative operation cost summary

Field types	Point addition	Point Doubling
Binary fields [74]	9 addition, 2 multiplication, 1 squaring, 1 inversion	4 addition, 2 multiplication, 2 squaring, 1 inversion
Prime fields	5 addition, 2 multiplication, 1 squaring, 1 inversion	4 addition, 5 multiplication, 2 squaring, 1 inversion
RR7SQSD fields	6 addition, 11 multiplication, 4 squaring, 1 inversion	4 additions, 6 multiplications, 6 squaring, 1 inversion.

Numerical example 3.8 Given the elliptic curve $y^2 = x^3 - 5x + 8$ defined over $GF(37)$, and its' scattered 45 points (not shown) on the x, y plane:

(1,2), (1,35), (5,21), (5,16), (6,3), (6,34), (8,6), (8,31), (9,27), (9,10), (10,25), (10,12), (11,27), (11,10),
 (12,23), (12,14), (16,19), (16,18), (17,27), (17,10), (19,1), (19,36), (20,8), (20,29), (21,5), (21,32),
 (22,1), (22,36), (26,8), (26,29), (28,8), (28,29), (30,25), (30,12), (31,9), (31,28), (33,1), (33,36),
 (34,25), (34,12), (35,26), (35,7), (36,7), (36,30), 0.

Compute EC:

- i) $(1,2) + (11,2)$
- ii) $(5,21) + (33,1)$
- iii) $(17,27) + (3,19)$

in $SGF(\bar{122})$

Solution: The given elliptic curve in the normal prime number domain is defined over the finite field $GF(37)$ with its elements $x \in \{0,1,2,3,4,5,6,\dots,36\}$ which on the given (x, y) coordinate system is of type I as shown in figure 3.15. To execute the embedded arithmetic that is, to perform arithmetic operations on EC defined over the Restricted Radix-37 Symmetrical $18 = \frac{37-1}{2}$ -nary Signed Digit (RR37S18SD) element finite field EC, the x, y plane is transformed into a x', y' plane as shown in fig. 3.15. In this new plane, the range of possible values now ranges between $\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{2}\bar{3}, \bar{2}\bar{2}, \dots, \bar{3}, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, 22, 23, \bar{3}\bar{3}$ that is $-18, -17, -16, \dots, -1, 0, 1, \dots, 18$ in the x', y' plane and the elliptic curve defined over $SGF(7^2 - 12 = 37 \equiv \bar{1}\bar{2}\bar{2})$ became the trace of type II. The operand values and point coordinates are correspondingly coded in RR37S18SD domain that is, in the character digit set of $\{\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{2}\bar{3}, \bar{2}\bar{2}, \dots, \bar{3}, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots, 22, 23, \bar{3}\bar{3}\}$. The transformation facilitates the execution of the EC point addition and doubling operations of $SGF(37)$ on RR7SQSD strings. In the now RR7SQSD finite field of $SGF(\bar{1}\bar{2}\bar{2})$, the given elliptic curve equation $y^2 = x^3 - 5x + 8$ also becomes $y^2 = x^3 - \bar{1}\bar{2}x + 11$. Similarly, the given points transform into $(01, 02), (\bar{2}\bar{3}, \bar{1}\bar{3}), (\bar{1}\bar{2}, \bar{2}\bar{2}), (\bar{1}\bar{3}, 01), (23, \bar{1}\bar{3}), (\bar{1}\bar{1}, 12)$.respectively.

For convenience rewriting equation (3.30) in the form of equation (3.32)

$$\left. \begin{aligned} x &= \frac{\Delta^2 y - \Delta^2 x \nabla x}{\Delta^2 x} \\ y &= \frac{\Delta^3 y - \Delta^2 x [\Delta y \nabla x + \Delta xy]}{\Delta^3 x} \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (3.32)$$

The detailed computations of the EC point's addition operations using equation (3.22) are as




Figure 3.17: Embedding the RR37S18-narySD EC into a normal prime field elliptic curve.

shown in table 3.6. Although it was also noticed that the computation may need correction due to the carries ignored which is characteristic of finite field arithmetic operations. An ignored or thrown away carry is essentially an addition or subtraction of '4' hence a necessary and sufficient correction action is to iteratively, for a maximum of seven times, either subtract or add '4' from or to the computed value of x_c or y_c . However, all computed values are indeed points on the given elliptic curve thereby proving that equation (3.31) provides efficient arithmetic on elliptic curves defined over RR7SQSD finite fields.

Table 3.6 Solutions to numerical example on $SGF(7^2 - 12)$

Points	x - variables	y -variables	Δxy	x	y
$(1,2) + (11,27) \equiv$ $(01,02) + (2\bar{3},\bar{1}\bar{3})$	$\nabla x = \bar{2}\bar{2}$ $\Delta x = 23$ $\Delta^2 x = \bar{1}\bar{1}$ $(\Delta^2 x)^{-1} = 1\bar{1}$ $(\Delta^3 x)^{-1} = \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{2}$ $\Delta^2 x \nabla x = 02$	$\Delta y = \bar{1}\bar{2}$ $\Delta^2 y = \bar{2}\bar{2}$ $\Delta^3 y = \bar{2}\bar{0}$ $\Delta y \nabla x = 20$	$\Delta xy = 11$	$\frac{\bar{2}\bar{2} - \bar{1}\bar{1} \cdot \bar{2}\bar{2}}{\bar{1}\bar{1}} =$ $x = \bar{2}\bar{3} \equiv 20_{10}$ $x_c \equiv x = 20_{10}$ $(x_w, y_w) = (28,8)$	$\frac{\bar{2}\bar{0} - \bar{1}\bar{1} \cdot \bar{3}\bar{3}}{\bar{1}\bar{1}} =$ $y = 1\bar{3} \equiv 04_{10}$ $y_c = y + 1\bar{3}$ $= 11 \equiv 8_{10}$
$(5,21) + (33,1) \equiv$ $(1\bar{2},\bar{2}\bar{2}) + (1\bar{3},01)$	$\nabla x = 01$ $\Delta x = \bar{2}\bar{2}$ $\Delta^2 x = 123$ $(\Delta^2 x)^{-1} = 21\bar{3}$ $(\Delta^3 x)^{-1} = \bar{2}02$ $\Delta^2 x \nabla x = 23$	$\Delta y = 23$ $\Delta^2 y = \bar{1}\bar{1}$ $\Delta^3 y = 20$ $\Delta y \nabla x = 23$	$\Delta xy = 11$	$\frac{\bar{1}\bar{1} + \bar{2}\bar{3}}{23} = 22$ $\equiv 16_{10}$ $(x_w, y_w) = (16,19)$	$(20 + \bar{1}\bar{0}) \cdot \bar{2}02$ $= \bar{2}\bar{1} \equiv 24_{10}$ $y_c = y + 1\bar{3} + 1\bar{3}$ $+ 1\bar{3} + 1\bar{3} + 1\bar{3} + 1\bar{3}$ $= \bar{3}\bar{3} \equiv 19_{10}$
$(17,27) + (31,9) \equiv$ $(2\bar{3},\bar{1}\bar{3}) + (\bar{1}\bar{1},12)$	$\nabla x = 1\bar{3}$ $\Delta x = \bar{3}\bar{2}$ $\Delta^2 x = 20$ $(\Delta^2 x)^{-1} = \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{2}$ $(\Delta^3 x)^{-1} = 3\bar{1}\bar{2}$ $\Delta^2 x \nabla x = \bar{2}\bar{3}$	$\Delta y = \bar{2}\bar{2}$ $\Delta^2 y = 03$ $\Delta^3 y = \bar{1}\bar{1}$ $\Delta y \nabla x = 33$	$\Delta xy = 00$	$\frac{03 - \bar{2}\bar{3}}{20} =$ $20 \cdot \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{2} =$ $01 \equiv 01_{10}$ $(x_w, y_w) = (01,35)$	$\frac{\bar{1}\bar{1} - 20 \cdot 32}{\bar{2}\bar{2}} =$ $= \bar{3}\bar{3} \cdot 3\bar{1}\bar{2}$ $= 0\bar{2} \equiv 35_{10}$

3.2.2.3.6 Optimal method for 7P realization

The conventional way to realize 7P or a multiply by-7 operation is to perform 7

consecutive elliptic curve addition operations: i.e. $7P = P + P + P + P + P + P + P$. This is time consuming and a better strategy is very necessary. Hence it is imperative to find an optimal method of realizing $7\psi_{j-1}$ if an RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain is to be used to compute EC point multiplication. Table 3.7 shows some options of realizing $7P$; [A] for Addition operation and [D] for a Doubling operation). Criteria for choosing the optimal option shall be based on least number of addition operations and order of complexity of computation. For example in case I, initially a copy of point p is made and then the original copy of point p is doubled to obtain $2p$. This was added to the copy previously made to obtain $3p$ which was in turn doubled to obtain $6p$. Finally to obtain $7p$, a copy of point p is added to $6p$. It can be observed that in all the cases the first step is to double p . In case VI, values of $3p, 4p$ are directly computed before adding together. Bearing in mind that addition is a binary operation and in terms of computer instruction sequencing, two operands have to be fetched from main/auxiliary memory or CPU general purpose registers in order to execute this operation successfully it then follows that the fewer the number of addition operations the faster the system could be. From table 3.7, the following three variants out of the seven were of interest.

- i) Case II; '7' is represented in NAF so that only one addition operation follows three relatively cheap doubling operations to give $7P = 8P - P$.
- ii) Case V; $2P$ is computed first before computing $7P = 3P + 4P$. This option shall be referred to as the indirect computation

Table 3.7 Methods of realizing the multiply-by-7 operation

CASES	I		II		III		IV		V		VI		VII	
OPERATIONS	2P	D	2P	D	2P	D	2P	D	2P	*	*	*	*	*
	3P	A	4P	D	3P	A	4P	D	3P	*	3P	*	*	*
	6P	D	8P	D	5P	A	6P	A	4P	D	4P	*	*	*
	7P	A	7P	A	7P	A	7P	A	7P	A	A	A	7P	DR
TOTAL	2D+2A		3D+1A		1D+3A		2D+2A		1D+1A		0D+1A		0D+0A	

- iii) Case VI; Direct 3P, 4P (elliptic curve point Tripling [T] and Quadrupling [Q]) operations are before performing a single point addition operation of $7P = 3P+4P$. This shall be referred to as the semi direct computation.

These cases separately require the availability of: {2P, 4P, 8P, 7P}, (2P,(3P,4P)), {3P,4P} multiples of P to implement $7P$.

3.2.2.3.7 Comparative cost analysis

The computational order of complexity was computed for cases II, V and VI as analyzed above. The summary of the computation is as presented in figure 3.18 where ST and GT denote subtotal and Grand Total respectively. It is observed that the cost of $7P$ formation is minimal with the indirect approach. It requires only a total of 137 operations. One needs to compute 2P (Doubling operation) straight from the given point's coordinates and use this to form $3P+4P=7P$. This option formed the basis for a 'One-stop multiply-by-7' algorithm for computing the elliptic curve point multiplication operation $W = kP$

	a) Case II (NAF) 2P,4P,8P; 7P = 8P - P				
Coordinate	X		Y		
Operation	A M S I	ST	A M S I	ST	GT
2P	2 4 7 -	13	3 8 6 -	17	30
4P	2 8 5 -	15	3 8 6 -	17	32
8P	2 8 6 -	16	3 10 6 -	19	35
7P	4 10 5 1	20	7 13 4 1	25	45
TOTAL	10 30 23 1	74	16 39 22 1	78	142

	b) Case V indirect 2P Start, 7P=3P+ 4P				
Coordinate	X		Y		
Operation	A M S I	ST	A M S I	ST	GT
2P	2 6 6 -	14	3 10 7 -	20	30
3P	4 8 3 -	15	5 13 2 -	20	32
4P	2 7 4 -	13	3 12 4 -	19	35
7P	3 10 3 1	17	3 13 2 1	19	45
TOTAL	11 31 16 1	59	14 48 15 1	78	137

	c) Case VII Direct 3P, 4P start; 7P=3P + 4P				
Coordinate	X		Y		
Operation	A M S I	ST	A M S I	ST	GT
3P	7 15 10 -	27	11 21 10 -	42	69
4P	6 15 11 -	32	9 21 12 -	42	74
7P	4 10 3 1	18	7 14 3 1	25	43
TOTAL	17 38 21 1	77	21 51 24 1	136	186

Figure 3.18. Comparative cost analysis of 7P operation formation.

3.2.2.3.8 The One-stop multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction algorithm

The one-stop multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain algorithm for computing elliptic curve point multiplication $W = kP_G = k(x_G, y_G)$ in affine coordinate system is as shown in figure 3.19. The algorithm requires neither intermediary addition nor doubling EC operations to compute $7P$. With k in RR7SQSD number system, the scheme simply establishes the appropriate initial condition $\psi_0 \in \{1P, 2P, 3P\}$ for the multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain in the selector module, compute the $7P$ using $7P = 4P + 3P$ and update $7\psi_{j-1} + \alpha_{n-j}$, as appropriate. The set of variables (B_i, E_i, C_i) corresponds to the (x, y) components and the denominator in the course of the elliptic curve point: doubling $2P$, tripling $3P$, quadrupling $4P$, and sextupling $7P$ operations. Similarly, the set of variable names D_j, F_j, H_j represents intermediary quantities obtained during the course of the arithmetic operations. For example, $(B_0, E_0, C_0), (B_1, E_1, C_1), (B_2, E_2, C_2), (B_{UD}, E_{UD}, C_{UD})$ represent the $1P, 2P, 3P$ module outputs that establish the starting point for the addition chain and the update after a multiply-by-7 operation. In likewise manner, $A_{17}, C_{27}, D_{37}, E_{77}, B_{UD}$ are names of variables whose values are computed during the course of computing the point doubling, tripling, quadrupling, sextupling ($2P, 3P, 4P, 7P$) and α_{n-j} . Inversion is only at the end of the multiply-by-7 step hence the method is very efficient.

	Selector Modules	
1P Module	2P Module	3P Module
$B_0 = X_G$	$A_1 = 3X_G + A$	$A_2 = Y_G C_1^3 - E_1$
$E_0 = Y_G$	$B_1 = A_1^2 - 8X_G Y_G^2$	$B_2 = A_2^2 - F_1 D_1^2$

$$\begin{array}{lll}
C_0 = 1 & C_1 = 2Y_G & C_2 = C_1 D_1 \\
X_{UD} = B_0 & D_1 = X_G C_1^2 - B_1 & H_2 = B_1 D_1^2 - B_2 \\
Y_{UD} = E_0 & F_1 = X_G C_1^2 + B_1 & E_2 = A_2 H_2 - E_1 D_1 \\
W_{UD} = C_0 & E_1 = A_1 D_1 - 8Y_G & X_{UD} = B_2 \\
& X_{UD} = B_1 & Y_{UD} = E_2 \\
& Y_{UD} = E_1 & W_{UD} = C_2 \\
& W_{UD} = C_1 &
\end{array}$$

2P module

$$\begin{aligned}
A_{17} &= 3X_{17P}^2 + A \\
B_{17} &= A_{17}^3 - 8X_{17P}Y_{17P}^2 \\
C_{17} &= 2Y_{17P} \\
D_{17} &= X_{17P}C_{17}^2 - B_{17} \\
F_{17} &= X_{17P}C_{17}^2 + B_{17} \\
E_{17} &= A_{17}D_{17} - 8Y_{17P}^4
\end{aligned}$$

3P module

$$\begin{aligned}
A_{27} &= Y_{17P}C_{17}^3 - E_{17} \\
B_{27} &= A_{27}^2 - F_{17}D_{17}^2 \\
C_{27} &= C_{17}D_{17} \\
D_{27} &= X_{17P}C_{27}^2 - B_{27} \\
F_{27} &= X_{17P}C_{27}^2 + B_{27} \\
H_{27} &= B_{17}D_{17}^2 - B_{27} \\
E_{27} &= A_{27}H_{27} - E_{17}D_{17}^3
\end{aligned}$$

4P module

$$\begin{aligned}
A_{37} &= Y_{17P}C_{17}^3 - E_{17} \\
B_{37} &= A_{37}^2 - F_{27}D_{27}^2 \\
C_{37} &= C_{17}D_{17}D_{27} \\
F_{37} &= B_{27}C_{37}^2 + B_{37}C_{27}^2 \\
H_{37} &= B_{27}D_{27}^2 - B_{37} \\
E_{37} &= A_{37}H_{37} - E_{27}D_{27}^3
\end{aligned}$$

7P Module

$$\begin{aligned}
A_{77} &= E_{27}C_{37}^3 - B_{37}C_{27}^3 \\
B_{77} &= A_{77}^2 - F_{37}D_{37}^2 \\
C_{77} &= C_{27}C_{37}D_{37} \\
H_{77} &= B_{37}(C_{27}D_{37})^2 - B_{77} \\
E_{77} &= A_{77}H_{77} - E_{37}(C_{27}D_{37})^3
\end{aligned}$$

Update module

$$\begin{aligned}
A_{UD} &= E_{77}W_{UD}^3 - Y_{UD}C_{77}^3 \\
D_{UD} &= B_{77}W_{UD}^2 - X_{UD}C_{77}^2 \\
F_{UD} &= B_{77}W_{UD}^2 + X_{UD}C_{UD}^2 \\
B_{UD} &= A_{UD}^2 - F_{UD}D_{UD}^2 \\
C_{UD} &= C_{77}W_{UD}D_{UD} \\
H_{UD} &= X_{UD}(C_{77}D_{UD})^2 - B_{UD} \\
E &= A_{UD}H_{UD} - Y_{UD}(C_{77}D_{UD})^3
\end{aligned}$$

Output module

$$\begin{aligned}
x_{7P} &= \frac{B_{77}}{C_{77}^2} + \frac{B_{UD}}{C_{UD}^2} \\
y_{7P} &= \frac{E_{77}}{C_{77}^3} + \frac{E_{UD}}{C_{UD}^3}
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 3.19. One-stop multiply-by-7 EC point multiplication Algorithm.

3.2.2.3.9 Testing the one-stop multiply-by-7 EC point multiplication algorithm by simulation

The aim of this experiment is to prove that point multiplication on elliptic curves defined over RR7SQSD finite fields can be computed using the one-stop multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain algorithm. Although to test the algorithm we need the corresponding elliptic curve group generating point $P_G(x_G, y_G)$ however, for the purpose of this experiment an arbitrary curve point $P(x, y)$ believed to be a point on a given elliptic curve was chosen. Let $P(1, 14564)$ be a point on the elliptic curve $y^2 = x^3 - 53x + 218$. It is assumed for now that $P(1, 14564) \in E_{17011}(-53, 218)$ and it is desired to multiply the point $P(1, 14564)$ by the scalar quantity k . To ensure accuracy of the computed result, the naïve method of computing $kP = P + P + P + \dots + P$ was used to find the value of $k = k_{\text{Break}}$ at which $kP = 0$ and this was found to be at $k = 3414$ when $W = kP = 3414(1, 14564) = (1, 2447)$. The implication of this point is that accurate results are obtainable in the EC point multiplication operation $k(1, 14564) \in E_{17011}(-53, 17011)$ only for values of $0 < k \leq 3414$. For a generator point of $P(1, 14564)$. Consequently, the testing of the multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain algorithm as a means of computing EC point multiplication commenced. A wide range of specimen values of the scalar quantity k for example ($k \in \{29, 156, 375, 1379, 2340, 2983, 3399, 3408, 3414, 1289, 873, 6085, 2713, 619, 1191\}$) were used. Table 3.8 shows the manual sequence of the computation for $k = 3399$. The experiment presents the computed results in this manner for any input value of k particularly the

various multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain nodes of the corresponding value of k .

For example, the multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain for $k = 3399$ is 1,10,69,486,3399. Hence at these nodes of $k \in \{1,10,69,486,3399\}$, the points on the curve

are $P(x, y) \in \{(1,14564), (12998,8269), (5142,11411), (3929,15851), (1,2447)\}$ correspondingly.

Table 3.8 Sequence of RR7SQSD addition/subtraction based EC point multiplication

I	e_k	Add/Subtraction chain		EC Point multiplication	
4	1	$1P$	$1P$	$1P(x_G, y_G)$	$1P(x_G, y_G)$
3	3	$7(P)$	$7P + 3P = 10P$	$7 * (1P(x_G, y_G)) + 3P(x_G, y_G)$	$10P(x_G, y_G)$
2	$\bar{1}$	$7(10P)$	$70P - 1P = 69P$	$7(7 * (1P(x_G, y_G)) + 3P(x_G, y_G)) - 1P(x_G, y_G)$	$69P(x_G, y_G)$
1	3	$7(69P)$	$483P + 3P = 486P$	$7(7(7 * (1P(x_G, y_G)) + 3P(x_G, y_G)) - 1P(x_G, y_G)) + 3P(x_G, y_G)$	$486P(x_G, y_G)$
0	$\bar{3}$	$7(486P)$	$3402P - 3P = 3399P$	$7(7(7(7 * (1P(x_G, y_G)) + 3P(x_G, y_G)) - 1P(x_G, y_G)) + 3P(x_G, y_G)) - 3P(x_G, y_G)$	$3399P(x_G, y_G)$

The EC point multiplication process was simulated on the Intel Core 2 Duo processor using Quick Basic (QB) version 4.5. Appendix CH 3.6 shows the QB 4.5 source code. The details of the raw results of the simulation are as shown in appendix CH4.4 while a summary of the simulation output is presented and discussed in section 4.4.

3.2.2.4 Methodology for RR7SQSD elliptic curve cryptography

The traditional art of ECC is as represented by the flow chart of fig. 3.20. It entails embedding a given plain text message on the points of an elliptic curve, encrypting the embedded message into a cipher, transmitting the cipher and decrypting the cipher at the receiving end. This section presents the procedures for practical implementation of the art of RR7SQSD ECC that is, the methods for realizing text embedment, message ciphering and message deciphering




Figure 3.20: Procedure for realizing elliptic curve cryptography

The section begins with the method for implementing plain text message embedment in section 3.2.2.4.1. Coded message encryption and decryption procedure methods are presented in sections 3.2.2.4.2 and 3.2.2.4.3 respectively. An experiment encompassing all the facets of RR7SQSD based ECC is presented in section 3.2.2.4.4. In particular the Diffie- Hellman key exchange protocol is used.

3.2.2.4.1 The Procedure for embedding plain text message on elliptic curves defined over $SGF(7^m \pm \psi_i)$

The procedure for message embedment consists of three phase. The first is to determine the domain parameters' so as to establish the exact elliptic curve equation and field. The second stage computes: the quadratic residues, the group of rational points $E_q(a,b)$, and its order which is essentially constructing the EC. The third stage encodes the plain text message with the alphabets. Embedding the coded message into the group of rational points $E_q(a,b)$ constitutes the final stage of this experiment. The procedures for the first and second phases are presented next. The third phase will be presented in section 3.2.2.4.2.

The following steps will suffice for constructing the elliptic curve $Eq(a,b): y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \mod q$, defined over $SGF(7^m \pm \psi_i)$

1a. Select curve coefficients (a,b) and compute the curve order.

1b. Determine a base point $P_G(x_G, y_G)$ often referred to as the generator point which must be of a sufficiently large order such that for the smallest value of $k, kP = 0$

1c. Determine the status of each value of x i.e., quadratic residue or not, to ensure that

the point is in the elliptic group $E_q(a, b)$

1d. Generate the group $E_q(a, b)$ that will serve as our reference

Choose an alphabet with N letters to establish an RR7SQSD coding system.

2a The characters of the alphabet are assigned the numbers $0, 1, \dots, N-1$

2b. Obtain the RR7SQSD form of each number

2c Identify characters of the message with the corresponding number codes of the alphabets

2d. Partition very long messages into m blocks of l RR7SQSD and obtain bisection between the m plain text blocks and the numbers. That is for any m_i partition block, coded x_{m_i} is given as:

$$x_{m_i} = (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_{l-1}) = \sum_{j=l}^1 \alpha_{l-j} N^{j-1} \quad (3.33)$$

for $0 \leq x_m \leq N^l$

3. Choose an appropriate k with a high success probability and that $q > kN^l$.

4. Obtain an elliptic group $P_{i,M}$ element for each encoded plain text message block.

5. Recover the plain text blocks from the point by $x_{i,m} = \left\lfloor \frac{x}{k} \right\rfloor$

a) Determination of the domain parameters

The optimal extension RR7SQSD element finite field $SGF(7^n \pm \psi)$ is particularly chosen for this experiment so that the working elliptic curve is of the form

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \mod q ; \quad a, b, x, y \in F_q \\ q = 7^k \pm \psi ; \text{ a prime} \\ \psi \in (\alpha\beta^*i + 1) \end{array} \right\} \quad (3.34)$$

$$i = 0, 1, 2, \dots, \quad k = 1, 2, 3, \dots$$

This study ensure cryptographic compliance by avoiding two or more roots of equation (3.35) do not coalesce to give a cusp or non smoothness i.e.; the discriminate

$$\Delta = 4a^3 + 27b^2 \mod q \neq 0 \quad (3.35)$$

The pair of values (-53,218) corresponding to a and b satisfy this requirement to guarantee minimum cryptographic security while the prime modulo q , was fix at $q = (7^5 + i\alpha\beta) = 17011$ for $(\alpha, \beta, i) \equiv (3, 4, 17)$. These parameters placed the working elliptic curve equation of this study as presented in equation (3.36)

$$y^2 = x^3 - 53x + 218 \mod 17011 \quad (3.36)$$

This in the RR7SQSD domain can be written as

$$y^2 = x^3 + \bar{1}\bar{1}\bar{3}x + \bar{1}\bar{2}\bar{3}\bar{1} \mod 101\bar{3}11 \quad (3.37)$$

It is now clear that all finite field arithmetic operations are possible in the RR7SQSD domain and since the study is about the organization of a SMVL ECC VLSI circuit, this report continues in the decimal notation to facilitate easy understanding.

b) Computing the quadratic residues

The rational points of the EC group $E_{17011}(-53,218)$ are generated according to the method outlined in [1,22,45,67,69-70]. Choose $x \in F_{17011}$ for which there is a corresponding value of y in the curve. To do this it is necessary to determine the quadratic residues by computing $x^3 + ax + b$ for each $p = 0,1,2,3,\dots,p-1$ and use quadratic reciprocity theorem to check if it is a square. For this purpose the Legendre symbol $\left(\frac{\lambda}{p}\right)$ which says that for an integer λ and prime $p > 2$

$$\left(\frac{\lambda}{p}\right) = \lambda^{(p-1)/2} \bmod p = \begin{cases} 0 & ; \text{if } p \mid \lambda \\ 1 & ; \text{if } \lambda \text{ is quadratic residue modulo } p \\ -1 & ; \text{if } \lambda \text{ is not a quadratic residue modulo } p \end{cases} \quad (3.38)$$

was employed. Each rational point $\mathcal{G}_i$, of the elliptic curve group $E_{17011}(-53,218)$ was eventually computed using the relation described in equation (3.39).

$$y_i = \mathcal{G}_i^{(p-1)/4} \quad (3.39)$$

Finally for this stage the order $\#E(F_q)$, of the EC group $E_{17011}(-53,218)$ was calculated using equation (3.49) [74]

$$\#E(F_q) = \begin{cases} p+1 + \sum_{x \in F_q} \left(\frac{x^3 + ax + b}{q} \right) & ; \text{ if } q < 10^4 \\ (q+1) - 2\sqrt{q} \leq \#E(F_q) \leq (q+1) + 2\sqrt{q} & ; \text{ if otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3.40)$$

3.2.2.4.2 Plain text coding and embedment experiment

The purpose of this experiment is to test the procedure of message embedment as outlined in section 3.2.2.4.1 Having identified the domain parameter, determined the exact EC equation determined, established the alphabet to be used and the message was coded, the calculation of the EC rational points and final message embedment is done in accordance with the theory presented in section 3.2.2.4.1. The specimen plain text message used is

“THE QUICK BROWN FOX JUMPS OVER THE LAZY DOG”

The choice of alphabets, the decimal number code as well as the RR7SQSD code are as follows:

i) in RR7SQSD domain the message corresponds to

1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 3 1 0 1 2 2 3 0 3 2 0 2 2 1 3 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 3 2 0 1 3 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 3 2 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 1 3 0 1 1 0

ii) and in decimal code (for the purpose of clarity we shall work in decimal) corresponds to:

“200805271721091127021815231414270615242710211316192715220518272008052712012625041507”.

The elements of this code were grouped into blocks of four decimal digits from the right. Table 3.9 shows the alphabet and the corresponding RR7SQSD code in the second column and that of the decimal in the third column. A QB 4.5 source code program was then used to generate the quadratic residues, compute the appropriate rational group of points in $E_{17011}(-53,218)$ using equations (3.33) to (3.34) and perform the embedding.

The QB version source is presented in section Appendix CH 3.4. Manual calculation of all the message points on the EC was also done and was used as a reference. These are shown in table 3.10. Each message block m_i in Table 3.9 represents a point on the elliptic curve $E_{17011}(-53,218)$ such that the message m is seen as an element in F_{17011} .

Taking a block of message $x = m_i$ at a time, the program evaluates $\lambda = f(x) = x^3 + ax + b \bmod q$ and tests for quadratic residue modulo 17011 of λ by

computing Legendre's symbol, $\left(\frac{\lambda}{q}\right) \equiv \lambda^{\left(\frac{q-1}{2}\right)} \bmod q$. Where a particular block fails the

test by evaluating to none other than 1 the numeric code of such a block is increased by 1 and the checking process is repeated until x now m'_i returns a positive check that is ,

$\left(\frac{\lambda}{q}\right) \equiv \lambda^{\left(\frac{q-1}{2}\right)} = 1$. For example, coding of the fourth block representing the message

“LA” = $0221_{RR7SQSD} \cong 1201_{10}$ and taking $x = 1201$, went as follows:

$\lambda = (1201)^3 - 53 * 1201 + 218 \bmod 17011 = 13025$. Checking for quadratic residue,

$\delta = 13025^{8505} \bmod p \neq 1$. The value of x was increased in steps of 1 till the value 1204;

$\lambda = 1204^3 - 53 * 1204 + 218 = 13514$; $\delta = 13514^{8505} \bmod 17011 = 1$. Consequently, the

square root is given as $\gamma = 13514^{4252} \bmod 17011 = 15324$. Hence, the plain text code for the 4th block containing the part of the message “LA” is (1204, 15324). Table 3.10 shows in its last column, the result of manual calculation of the entire message.

Table 3.9 Alphabet assignment

Symbol	Decimal code	RR7SQSD code
Space	27	$\overline{20}$
A	1	$\overline{21}$
B	2	$\overline{22}$
C	3	$\overline{23}$
D	4	$\overline{13}$
E	5	$\overline{12}$
F	6	$\overline{11}$
G	7	$\overline{10}$
H	8	$\overline{11}$
I	9	$\overline{12}$
J	10	$\overline{13}$
K	11	$0\overline{3}$
L	12	$0\overline{2}$
M	13	$0\overline{1}$
N	14	00
O	15	01
P	16	02
Q	17	03
R	18	$1\overline{3}$
S	19	$1\overline{2}$
T	20	$1\overline{1}$
U	21	10
V	22	11
W	23	12
X	24	13
Y	25	$2\overline{3}$
Z	26	$2\overline{2}$

Table 3.10 Coded plain text points $P_{M,i}$

S/N0	Plaintext P_M		$(x, \gamma) \equiv P(x, y)$ Expected
	LETTER	CODE	
1	OG	1507	(1507, 16417)
2	SpD	2704	(2704, 393)
3	ZY	2625	(2628, 2950)
4	LA	1201	(1204, 15324)
5	Esp	0527	(528, 12647)
6	TH	2006	(2006, 9629)
7	Rsp	1827	(1828, 1936)
8	VE	2205	(2205, 14215)
9	spO	2715	(2715, 13735)
10	PS	1619	(1619, 915)
11	UM	2113	(2113, 10350)
12	SpJ	2710	(2710, 401)
13	OX	1524	(1525, 4095)
14	SpF	2706	(2708, 11651)
15	WN	2314	(2314, 12327)
16	RO	1815	(1816, 6343)
17	SpB	2702	(2702, 11279)
18	CK	0311	(0311, 4188)
19	UI	2109	(2109, 15967)
20	spQ	2717	(2718, 3716)
21	HE	0605	(610, 3309)
22	T	0020	(0021, 08175)

3.2.2.4.3 The Encryption and Decryption operations

The following scenario considered in this study is that a point-to-point communication involves the community of users Michael and Lilian. Michael [M] wants to send a message to Lilian [L] using Diffie-Hellman's protocol [11,22,25,31,68] . Note that followings; equation (3.33) , the arbitrary base point $P_G(x_G, y_G) = (1, 14564)$ and the message already in the form of Table 3.9 has been defined . That is, Michael wants to send the plain text message: "THE QUICK BROWN FOX JUMPS OVER THE LAZY DOG " to Lilian, which, he has successfully encoded as in Table 3.9 and embedded in Table 3.10. Michael generates his key pair as follows: He selects a random integer $1 \leq k \leq 17011$ (precisely in this case $1 \leq k \leq 3414$) as his private or secret key. Let this be say $k_M = 1289$. He computes his public key by performing elliptic curve point multiplication $Q_M = k_M G = 1289(1, 14564)$. He obtained $Q_M = (1517, 9225) \in E_{17011}(-53, 218)$. Lilian does the same, she picks a random integer $k_L = 873$ (say) and computes her public key $Q_L = k_L G = 873(1, 14564)$, $Q_L = (16739, 3829) \in E_{17011}(-53, 218)$. Thus, in this communication $Q_M = (1517, 9225)$, $Q_L = (16739, 3829)$ are public domains. Michael, with Lilian's public key $Q_L = (16739, 3829)$, encrypt, all the plain text message points $\{P_{M,i}\}$, in Table 3.9, 3rd column , into cipher pair of points using the formular

$$Q_C = \{(k_M G), (\{P_{M,i}\} + k_M Q_L)\} \quad (3.41)$$

$$= \{(1289 * (1, 14564)), (\{P_{M,i}\} + 1289 * (16739, 3829))\}$$

For example, for the 4th message point $P_{M,4}$, cipher text is computed to be

$$\begin{aligned} C_{M \rightarrow L,10} &= \{(1517,9225), (1204,15324) + 1289 * (16739,3829)\} \\ &= \{(1517,9225), (1204,15324) + (7741,10018)\} = \{(1517,9225), (3081,14317)\} \end{aligned}$$

The transmitted cipher text to Lilian by Michael is therefore $\{(1517,9225), (3081,14317)\}$.

When Lilian receives this message she uses her private key $k_L = 873$ to compute the plain text point, $P_{M,i}$ in this manner:

$$\begin{aligned} (P_{M,10} + k_L Q_M) - [k_L (k_M G)] & \quad (3.42) \\ &= (3081,14317) - [873(1517,9225)] \\ &= (3081,14317) - [(7741,10018)] \\ &= (3081,14317) + [(7741,-10018)] \\ &= (3081,14317) + [(7741,6993)] \\ &= (1204,15324) \end{aligned}$$

This point in table 3.9, row 5, 3rd column contains the plain text “LA”. The complete message encoding, encrypting and decrypting experiment will be presented in the next paragraph and the corresponding results in chapter 4 Table 4.2. An eavesdropper cannot do what Lilian does because her secret key is not known to him. To do otherwise, he has to solve the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) that will take him a very long time to solve with all available cutting edge computing

technology systems working simultaneously in parallel.

3.2.2.4.4 An encryption/decryption procedure experiment.

Point multiplication, message embedment, computing the multiplicative inverse of field elements are constituent component operations in the El-Gamal or Diffie-Hellman's key exchange elliptic curve cryptographic protocols. The experiment is a one-all-encompassing simulation program to confirm proper transition of all the various aspects of the presented arithmetic operations necessary to encrypt and decrypt messages with elliptic curves defined over the $RR7SQSD$ element finite field in either of these protocols. Consequently, components of the experiment consist of a quadratic residues and the relevant rational elliptic curve group points generation module, a plain text message embedment module, modules for computing the appropriate public keys of the community of users (Michael and Lilian) in the secured and trusted communication system, modules for encryption by the message sender and a module for decrypting the received cipher message by the authorized receiver. The modules for computing the public keys do multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain elliptic curve point multiplication operations. The computed public keys and ciphered blocks are confirmed as true points of the chosen elliptic curve using a curve point's checker module. The input variables were the formal generator point $G(x_G, y_G) = (8360, 14564)$ and the secret keys 1289 and 873 for the sender and message recipients respectively. Again a QB version 4.5 source code program was executed on an Intel CoreTM2 Duo processor. The program first generate elliptic curve group as it was explained in section 3.2.2.4.1 and

embed the plain text message “THE QUICK BROWN FOX JUMPS OVER THE OVER THE LAZY DOG” after the encoding process. It then computes the public keys of Michael and Lilian, encrypted the embedded message using the public key of Lilian, verify that the cipher nodes are all points of the elliptic curve group. Next the program assume the role of the message recipient Lilian, verifies the received message (believed to have been transmitted over an in-secure communication channel) by ensuring that all message nodes are elements of the mutually agreed elliptic curve group and decrypts the cipher using Michaels pubic key. The raw results of this experiment are as shown in Appendix CH 4.5 while a summary of them is presented and discussed in section 4.5.

3.2.3 The VLSI, its basic building block circuit design and synthesis of the functional logic circuits

The methods of realizing the basic building block of the VLSI circuit and the synthesis of the functional logic circuits formulated in section 3.1.3 are presented in this section. In addition the various tests and experiments conducted on the circuits are also presented. Thus, the layout organization of the SMVL ECC arithmetic unit VLSI circuit is presented in section 3.2.3.1 and the multiply-by-7 LSI circuit organization in section 3.2.3.2. The realized transistor circuit of the basic building block herein called the RR7SQSD T-gate circuit is presented in section 3.2.3.3. Testing the building block working according to design specification is presented in section 3.2.3.4 while the simulation experiment to confirm the building block circuit’s multiplexing ability is presented in section 3.2.3.5. Synthesis of the functional logic circuits of the multiply-by-7 LSI circuit is presented in section 3.2.3.6. Specific simulation tests conducted to confirm the proper

operation of certain synthesized arithmetic circuits namely, the RR7SQSD full adder and The quasi multiplier are presented in section 3.2.3.7.

3.2.3.1 Organizational layout diagram of the SMVL ECC arithmetic unit VLSI circuit

The block diagram of the proposed VLSI circuit architecture is shown in fig.3.21 with the functions of each block as indicated. The architectural organisation is such that the circuit perform either a one-stop points' addition or point doubling operation on input point(s) $P_u(x_u, y_u)$ /and $P_v(x_v, y_v)$ or a one-stop multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain based point multiplication operation $kG = kP(x_G, y_G)$. Hence the organizational layout consist of an EC point's addition/ point doubling block, a field element inversion block and a multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain base point multiplication block. All functional logic circuits in any of these subunits were realized using either an RR7SQSD finite field's element parallel multiplication LSI or an RR7SQSD parallel addition LSI circuit.




Fig 3.21 Block diagram of the RR7SQSD EC arithmetic unit VLSI

It can be seen that the outputs of the points addition/point doubling or base point generation and the element inversion blocks are all necessary inputs to the multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain based point multiplication block. This block thus, is the heart of the VLSI circuit in view hence it was necessary to examine it in detail from the onset. The simplest realization of the type of processor in view is one with the lesser order of computational complexity. Consequently, the presentation starts with the criteria for trading multiplication for addition in section 3.1.3.1. The multiply-by-7 computation unit data flow diagram is presented in section 3.1.3.2. Operation execution speed and number of general purpose registers estimate computations are presented in section 3.1.3.3.

3.2.3.2 Trading multiplication for addition

It has earlier been stated that the order of simplicity in computing elliptic curve arithmetic operations and in particular elliptic curve point multiplication operation is finite field; addition followed by multiplication and then inversion. A fast VLSI circuit is realizable if the design is based on the simplest arithmetic operation. Several efficient strategies for implementing EC point multiplication exist namely, the triple-double-add scheme in [12]. Choosing a particular strategy is often based on a comparative analysis of cost of forming kP . Hence it was necessary to compare the cost of forming kP using the one-stop multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain scheme with the triple-double-add scheme using the following numerical example 3.9 as a case study.

Numerical example 3.9 If P is a point on an elliptic curve and $k > 0$, make a comparative analysis on the cost to form $314159P$ using the one-stop RR7SQSD multiply-by-7

addition/subtraction chain approach and the triple –double–add order of complexity cost computation presented in [12] as reference.

To perform the analysis it was necessary to recall the order of complexity costs of the transformed EC addition/doubling operations and the $2P, 3P, 4P$ together with the jump starting $P_{sel} / 2P_{sel} / 3P_{sel}$ modules in tables 3.5, 3.6 in section 3.3.1.2 and table 3.8 in section

3.3.3.5. Consequently, with R representing one multiply-by-7 operation the two options are presented side-by side.

The method as in [12]	The present effort of one-stop 7P
$314159 = 6.52360 - 1$; triple, double-subtract	$314159 = 7.44880 - 1$ 1R, 1P
$52369 = 8.6545$; 3 doublings	$44880 = 7.6411 - 3$ 1R 3P
$6545 = 5.1091 - 1$; Triple, double-subtract	$6411 = 7.916 - 1$ 1R 1P
$109 = 12.91 - 1$; Triple, double, double-subtract	$1916 = 7.131 - 1$ 1R 1P
$91 = 18.5 + 1$ triple, triple, double-add	$131 = 7.19 - 2$ 1R 2P
$5 = 6-1$ triple, double-subtract	$19 = 7.3 - 2$ 1R 2P
	$3 = 3P$ 3P
Total 5 Triple, 4 doublings, 5 double-add	$6R, 2(\pm 3P_{sel}), 2(-2P_{sel}), 3(1P_{sel})$

A similar calculation in [12] gave- 22 doubling and 9 double-add³

Also in [12]:

3P or tripling takes 7 [M], 5 [S] and 1[I] on the GF(p) field and 7[M], 4[S]and 1[I] on a binary field,

2P or doubling takes 2[M], 2[S] and 1[I] for GF(p) fields and 2[M], 1[S] and 1[I] on the binary field,

2P + Q or Double-Add [DA] takes 9[M], 2[S] and 1[I] on GF(p) and 9[M], 2S and 1[I] for binary field.

Therefore the comparative total cost can be summarized as in table 3.11

Table 3.11 Comparative analysis of cost of forming $314159P$

	Combined ternary/binary mod 6 approach [12]		RR7SQSD 'one-stop' multiply-by-7 approach
	GF(p)	GF(2)	SGF(7)
2P+Q	5(N/A, 9,2,1)	9(N/A, 9,2,1)	N/A
2P	4(N/A, 2,2,1)	22(N/A, 2,1,1)	N/A
3P	5(N/A,7,4,1)	0(N/A,7,4,1)	N/A
R=7P	N/A	N/A	6[R]+ 1[3P _{sel}]/2[2P _{sel}]/31[P _{sel}]
Total	N/A[A],95[M],42[S],15 [I]	N/A[A],97[M],41[S],17[I]	{ 168[A], 306[M],102[S],12[I]} + {(5[A],4[M],3[S]) or (2[A],5[M],4[S])+1[I]}

From the above illustration it can be seen that

- a) the number of multiplication and squaring in [12] are by far less than those of the ‘one-stop’ multiply-by-7 approach
- b) number of inversion in the ‘one-stop’ approach is less than those in [12].
- b) Total number of add/subtraction in ‘one-stop’ is $168 + 5$ but the number of add/subtraction was not computed hence not available (N/A) in [12].

Further observations:

- a) The aim of this study is to develop a SMVL ECC arithmetic unit VLSI circuit, The approach in [12] had a similar objective but for binary processing threshold logic circuits.
- b) While in this study inversion is traded for inversion in the work in [12] traded inversion for multiplications.
- c) Hence the common ground is inversion and the total number of inversions in the ‘one-stop’ scheme is 12. The work in [12] had 17 inversions thus there is a saving of up to 29%.
- d) With 1 squaring operation = 0.8 multiplication operation [4], the “one-stop” approach attract a total of 173 additions and 248.8 multiplications.

It can therefore be concluded that the SMVL ECC arithmetic unit VLSI circuit is better off based on finite field addition, inversion and multiplexing units. For this purpose a data flow diagram of the RR7SQSD EC point multiplication procedure is very necessary.

3.2.3.3 One-stop multiply-by-7 point multiplication operation computation data flow

It has already been established that computation shall be carried out in affine coordinate and that the processing unit that will make the bulk of the functional circuits shall be RR7SQSD addition circuit. Fig.3.22 shows the computation data flow organization of multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain based point multiplication on EC defined over RR7SQSD finite fields. On component level it consist essentially of $j - RR7SQSD$ finite field parallel adders, multiplexers and multiplicative inverters, where j is the number of RR7SQSD of the x, y coordinates of the elliptic curve base or generator point $P(x_G, y_G)$. The multiplexer units MUX, inversion circuits and the RR7SQSD finite field adders are directly SMVL threshold voltage switching to obviate signal level compatibility problems.




Figure 3.22: Data flow diagram of the point multiplication operation on EC defined over

RR7SQSD finite fields using multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain

All units are realizable using RR7SQSD Complementary Pass (CP) gate derived T-gate circuits hence the speed of the VLSI is a function RR7SQSD adder and field element inversion units.

3.2.3.4 Speed of operation execution and the total number of general purpose registers

The VLSI circuit in view is essentially an arithmetic co-processor and parameter used in judging such a VLSI circuits includes its speed of operation execution and the total number of general purpose registers. These two parameters determine or influence the type of system clock speed and the nature of instruction set respectively to be employed. Since at any given time t the coordinate components x, y of a point are computed in parallel as shown in the diagram of figure 3.23, in these study rough estimates of the circuit speed and total number of the processor registers were estimated using this data flow diagram.




Figure 3.23: Parallel computation of coordinate components x, y

3.2.3.4.1 Estimated speed

If $t_{\Sigma}, t_{INV}, t_m, m$ are the RR7SQSD adder, multiplicative inverse, multiplexer circuits' MVL signal propagation times and the length of m in the RR7SQSD representation respectively then the speed of the point multiplication can be estimated as in equation (3.43).

$$\begin{aligned} T &= 3t_{\Sigma} + t_{INV} + t_{\Sigma} + (m-1)[3t_{\Sigma} + t_{INV} + t_{\Sigma}] \\ &= m[4t_{\Sigma} + t_{INV}] \end{aligned} \quad (3.43)$$

3.2.3.4.2 Total number of general purpose registers

The next question is the total number of general purpose registers required.. For purpose of this exercise the method outlined in [12] is followed and the worst scenario is considered. That is the entire variable are in separate registers.

a) The modified EC points addition and point doubling system of equation (3.33) require a total number of 10 registers i.e.; $A, B, C, G, H, x, y, \Delta x, \Delta y, \nabla x$.

b) The number required for the one-stop multiply-by-7 EC point multiplication is determined as follows:

i) Selector module: the total number variables are made up of any of these combinations:

$$\begin{pmatrix} A_0 & A_1 & A_2 \\ B_0 & B_1 & B_2 \\ C_0 & C_1 & C_2 \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{pmatrix} X_{UD} \\ Y_{UD} \\ W_{UD} \end{pmatrix} + \{[D_1 \ E_1 \ F_1] \text{ or } [E_2 \ H_2]\} = 3 + 3 = 6$$

ii) For one-stop multiply-by-7 EC point multiplication;

Let $\Psi_{ij} \in \{A_{ij}, B_{ij}, C_{ij}, D_{ij}, E_{ij}, F_{ij}, x, y\}$ represent the variables, and $T_{ij} \in \{T_{17}, T_{27}, T_{37}, T_{77}\} \equiv \{2P, 3P, 4P, 7P\}$ denotes the modules while T_{UD} , denote the update module. Also let a ‘+’ denotes that a particular variable operation exist and a ‘–’ denotes that it does not exist in the specified module of the one-stop multiply-by-7 EC point multiplication. Then the variable-module relation can be described by the presentation on table 3.12

Table 3.12 Determination of number of registers required

	T_{17}	T_{27}	T_{37}	T_{77}	T_{UD}	$7P$
A_{ij}	+	+	+	+	+	–
B_{ij}	+	+	+	+	+	–
C_{ij}	+	+	+	+	+	–
D_{ij}	+	–	–	–	+	–
E_{ij}	+	+	+	+	+	–
F_{ij}	+	+	+	–	+	–
H_{ij}	–	+	+	+	+	–
X	–	–	–	–	–	+
Y	–	–	–	–	–	+
Total number of registers for the main module $7 \times 5 - 5 + 2 = 32$						

Hence while only 10 registers are required to compute point's addition or point doubling a total of $32 + 6 = 38$ registers are required to compute EC point multiplication using RR7SQSD multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain. The points addition/point doubling registers are free the moment a points addition or point doubling operation is completed hence, only a maximum of 38 registers are required for the VLSI circuit. Furthermore, the set of registers for the $2P$ module T_{17} , can be recycled for the update process set T_{UD} and with a base addressing mode of instructions the total number of registers could be reduced to one digit.

3.2.3.5 The block diagram of the one-stop multiply-by-7 point multiplication subunit.

From the data flow analysis of section 3.2.3.3 figure 3.23, three major functions indisputably stand out i.e.; the jump-start selection module generator, multiply-by-7 maker unit and the result update unit as shown in figure 3.24. The $1P, 2P, 3P$ generator unit determines the required multiple $\in (1P, 2P, 3P)$ of the base point $P_U(x_U, y_U) = P_G(x_G, y_G)$ based on the RR7SQSD character digit of the scalar k . The generated multiple serves as one input to the update unit. The $3P$ and $4P$ components for the multiply-by-7 calculation ($7P = 3P + 4P$) are




Figure 3.24 Block diagram of the point multiplication unit organization.

computed per ordinate (figure 3.24) in parallel in the $7P$ maker unit whose output serve as the second input to the update adder Σ_{ud} . Feeding back the iterated output P^* of this

unit through the MUX to the input points of Σ_{ud} perform the $\left(\prod_{j=0}^{n-1} 7^j\right)P$ operation. The

circuit require no structural modification to perform $\left(\prod_{j=0}^{n-1} 2^j\right)P$. Remembering that

the modification of the traditional EC point's addition and doubling equations explicitly showed that: a) RR7SQSD EC point multiplication is better computed in affine coordinates. b) RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain EC point multiplication scheme

arithmetic unit is better adder based. Consequently, the major the functional logic circuits for the subunits are: i) RR7SQSD parallel field adders, ii) RR7SQSD multiplexers, iii) RR7SQSD registers, iv) RR7SQSD sign detector/inverter and v) an $SGF(7^m)$ field element inverter. The mathematical model of the basic circuit for the design of these function logic circuits has been formulated in section 3.1.3.5. The design implementations of the j -RR7SQSD finite field parallel adders, multiplexers and multiplicative inverters are based on this basic logic component. The practical realization of the mathematical model and thus its transistor circuit shall now be presented

3.2.3.6 The RR7SQSD T-gate transistor circuit diagram

The processing signal voltage profile has been demonstrated in section 3.1.3.2. Section 3.1.3.3 fully explained the possibility of implementing a practical circuit of a restricted radix-h symmetrical r-nary signed digit T-gate using CP- gates. The constituent components of the building block circuit are the positive literal and negative literal CP-gates presented circuits in section 3.1.3.4. Their parallel interconnection, giving rise to the RR7SQSD T-gate is given in section 3.1.3.5. All these showed that design implementation of an RR7SQSD T-gate circuit using CP- gates is a reality. Consequently, the circuit diagram, the CP-gates layout, the symbol and the truth table of the RR7SQSD T-gate are as shown in figure 3.25. In figure 3.25(a), the inputs p^- , q^- , r^- , l , r , q and p are symmetrical signed -digit functions corresponding to $f(-3)$, $f(-2)$, $f(-1)$,

$f(0), f(1), f(2)$ and $f(3)$ while $\{PT_i\}$ are the outputs of the various CP_i gates. The enhancement mode transistors $T_{jm}, j = 2, 4, 6, 7$ and their literal $DT_{jm}, i = 1, 3, 4$ while $m = a$ or b , realizes the various positive CP gates. The depletion mode transistors T_{jm} circuits ($j = 1, 3, 5$) and $DT_{im}, (i = 2, 4, 6)$ provide the negative CP gates. The voltages $-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2$ and 3 represent the symmetrical quaternary logic values $-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2$ and 3 respectively, while V_{DD} and $-V_{DD}$ correspond to $+5$ and -5 volts. A negative control signal x at the common gates of the literal circuits formed by transistors DT_{2a} and DT_{2b} will turn ON T_{1a} and OFF T_{1b} , if smaller in magnitude, than the threshold value i . T_{1a} is OFF and T_{1b} ON if x is greater in magnitude. Positive control signal x of similar magnitude to the literal circuits of DT_{1a} and DT_{1b} transistors turns ON T_{2a} and OFF T_{2b} , if $x < i$ and T_{2a} OFF T_{2b} ON if $x > i$, thereby transmitting p^+ and q^+ to point PT_2 . Corresponding control signals at the literals: DT_{3a}, DT_{3b} and DT_{4a}, DT_{4b} will pass l^-, r^- and l^+, r^+ to the points PT_3 and PT_4 respectively. Either of the signals at points PT_1 or PT_2 and either of those at nodes PT_3 or PT_4 will be pass to nodes PT_5 and PT_6 and subsequently to the T-gates output according to sign and magnitude of the signal at the various literal circuits. The multiple value logic signal propagation time for the RR7SQSD T-gate is $3t_{MOST}$ where t_{MOST} , is the switching speed of the MOSFET. In [40], signal propagation of a CP gate is placed at 100 ns and 200 [pW] - power consumption. This would mean a speed of 300 nanoseconds for the radix – 7 restricted symmetrical quaternary signed digit T-gate.. On transistor count, twenty-eight transistors are required to construct the module, with very remarkable reduced power consumption as against 34 transistors with normal CMOS circuits [102].




Figure 3.25: Transistor circuit diagram of the RR7SQSD T-gate

3.2.3.7 Experiments to test the RR7SQSD T-gates parameters and multiplexing ability

Having formulated, designed and realized the basic building block for the function circuits of the arithmetic unit of a SMVL ECC VLSI circuit, this critical block was also tested for electrical parameter conformity. The corresponding results will be presented and discussed in section 4.6.

3.2.3.7.1 Testing for Electrical parameter conformity-Analogue simulation

In this experiment the transfer impedance, transfer function, level of transient, device parameter sweep or input signal propagation time, output signal distortion level measurements and frequency analysis were performed on the RR7SQSD T-gate circuit of figure 3.25. The experiment was conducted on Electronic workbench, Multisim 9 and for this purpose, a special circuit based on the following axiom, was again developed.

Axiom 3.13 If the sets $I = \{a, b, c, d\}$, $O = \{e, f, z, \gamma\}$ and $X = \{x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4\}$ are some MVL input, output functions and control signal variables correspondingly, such that

1. $\forall (a, b, c) \exists (\bar{a}, \bar{b}, \bar{c})$, $\forall (e, f, z) \exists (\bar{e}, \bar{f}, \bar{z})$ and $\forall (x_1, x_2, x_3) \exists (\bar{x}_1, \bar{x}_2, \bar{x}_3)$ while the MVL elements of set $U = \{d, \gamma, x_4\}$ are unsigned then a 7-valued symmetrical quaternary-signed threshold MVL T-gate can be constructed to function according to equation:

$$\gamma = T((\bar{z}, z); X(x_4)) = \begin{cases} \bar{z} & ; \text{if } x \leq \bar{x}_4 \\ z & ; \text{if } x = x_4^+ \end{cases} \quad (3.44)$$

provided:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \bar{z} = T_{-2}((\bar{e}, \bar{f}); X(x_2)) &= \begin{cases} \bar{e} & ; \text{if } x \leq \bar{x}_2 \\ & ; z = T_1((f, e); X(x_2)) = \\ \bar{f} & ; \text{if } x = x_2^+ \end{cases} \quad \begin{cases} f & ; \text{if } x \leq \bar{x}_2 \\ & ; \\ e & ; \text{if } x = x_2^+ \end{cases} \\
 \bar{e} = T_{-3}((\bar{a}, \bar{b}); X(x_3)) &= \begin{cases} \bar{a} & ; \text{if } x \leq \bar{x}_3 \\ & e = T_2((b, a); X(x_3)) = \\ \bar{b} & ; \text{if } x = x_3^+ \end{cases} \quad \begin{cases} b & ; \text{if } x \leq \bar{x}_3 \\ & ; \\ a & ; \text{if } x = x_3^+ \end{cases} \\
 \bar{f} = T_{-1}((\bar{c}, \bar{d}); X(x_1)) &= \begin{cases} \bar{c} & ; \text{if } x \leq \bar{x}_1 \\ & ; f = T_0((d, c); X(x_1)) = \\ \bar{d} & ; \text{if } x = x_1^+ \end{cases} \quad \begin{cases} d & ; \text{if } x \leq \bar{x}_1 \\ & ; \\ c & ; \text{if } x = x_1^+ \end{cases}
 \end{aligned} \tag{3.45}$$

where $\forall T_j; j \in \{-3, -1, 0, 2, -2, 1, 0\}$ is the literal of corresponding complementary pass gate.

Figure 3.26 shows the circuit diagram arising from this axiom constructed with real MOSFETs.

The various complementary pass gates' literal circuits and pass transistors interconnections are

realized as follows. CP_{-3} by transistors Q_1, Q_2, Q_9 and Q_{17} ; CP_{-1} , by transistors Q_{16}, Q_{18}, Q_3 , and

Q_4 ; CP_0 by $Q_{22}, Q_{11}, Q_{13}, Q_{24}$; and the set of transistors: Q_{27}, Q_{25}, Q_{28} , and Q_{26} at the output

Similarly, CP_2 is realized by Q_{19}, Q_7, Q_8, Q_{23} ; and CP_{-2} by Q_{10}, Q_5, Q_6 and Q_{15} . DC sources are

used to accomplish the necessary literals values of the complementary pass gates. The circuit

was then tested for logical accuracy, Similarly, transfer function, transient, d.c transfer sweep

, and ac analysis were conducted.





Figure 3.26: Circuit for electrical parameters simulation of the RR7SQSD T-gate.

3.2.3.7.2 Testing for the multiplexing property- Digital simulation

Figure 3.27a shows the schematic diagram of the RR7SQSD T-gate . Its ability to function as a SMVL signals multiplexing circuit was modelled on the hardware description language styled algorithm A2 of figure 3.27b and simulated with a QB 4.5 source code program. A large number, and of varying degrees of complexity test data and control signals: $\{d_i(x_j)\}$, $\{x_j\}$ samples were used in the investigation. The input data $D_i \in \{D_o, D_1, D_2, D_3, D_4, D_5, D_6\}$ selectivity property was monitored at the output node X_6 . The simulation source code program is as presented in Appendix CH4. 7 while the results shall presented and discussed in section 4.6.2.



Input : $\{f_j(x)\}_{j \in \{8,7,6,\dots,1\}}, x \in \{-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3\}, lit(x) \in \{-3,-1,0,2,-2,1,0\}, h$

Output: xx

P=3:do while $hh = 8$ downto 1 : $d(p, hh) = f_{hh}(x)$: $lm(p, hh) = lit(hh)$: loop

do while $c = \left\lceil \frac{h+1}{2} \right\rceil - 1$ downto 1: $g = 2^{c-1} + 1$: $t = 2^{c-1}$: $k = 2^c$

NXT: $g = g - 1$: if $g < 1$: then NTC:

else if $x < lm(x, g)$ then $d(c-1, t) = d(c, k)$: goto LL:

else $d(c-1, t) = d(c-1, k-1)$

LL: $k = k - 2$: if $k < 1$ then NTC:

else $t = t - 1$: if $t < 1$ then NTC

Goto NXT:NTC: loop

$x = d(0,1)$.return

b) The layout algorithm

Figure 3.27: Modelling the RR7SQSD T-gate

3.2.3.8 Synthesis of the functional logic circuits

The following functional circuits of the VLSI circuit were synthesized on RR7SQSD T-gate level and tested for specification conformity. Namely:

- i) Dual RR7SQSD addition/multiplication circuits
- ii) Multiplexer
- iii) RR7SQSD registers
- iv) RR7SQSD sign inverter
- v) RR7SQSD parallel addition/multiplication LSI circuit.

Brief description of the design implementations and the testing by way of simulation is now presented.

3.2.3.8.1 RR7SQSD addition/multiplication circuits

- a) A dual half or one-RR7SQSD adder/multiplier circuit

The formulation of this circuit has been presented in section 3.1.2.1, equation (3.1) . The circuit performs RR7SQSD $\alpha_i + \beta_i$ or $\alpha_i * \beta_i$ operations on two one-RR7SQSD input operands $\alpha_i, \beta_i \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ The operation of this circuit is as described by equation (3.46)

$$\delta = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \bar{1} & ; \text{ if } \alpha \ominus \beta < \bar{a} \\ 1 & ; \text{ if } \alpha \ominus \beta > \bar{a} \\ 0 & ; \text{ if otherwise} \\ \lambda = z - 7\delta \end{array} \right\} \quad (3.46)$$

where $\delta \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$, $\lambda \in \{-3, -2, -1, -0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and $\Theta \in \{\oplus, *\}$. The circuit require no separate control signal x , to select the either of the two operations the except appropriate input to the T-gates which are the entries of the corresponding truth tables as presented in tables 3.13 and 3.14.


Table 3.13 Half or one- RR7SQSD adder truth table

α/β	Sum digit λ							Carry digit δ						
	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
-3	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0
-2	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0
-1	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
3	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1

Table 3.14 Transition table of the half or one-RR7SQSD multiplier

a/b	product digit λ							product Carry digit δ						
	$\bar{3}$	$\bar{2}$	$\bar{1}$	0	1	2	3	$\bar{3}$	$\bar{2}$	$\bar{1}$	0	1	2	3
$\bar{3}$	2	$\bar{1}$	3	0	$\bar{3}$	1	$\bar{2}$	1	1	0	0	0	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{1}$
$\bar{2}$	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{3}$	2	0	$\bar{2}$	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{1}$
$\bar{1}$	3	2	1	0	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{2}$	$\bar{3}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	$\bar{3}$	$\bar{2}$	$\bar{1}$	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	1	3	$\bar{2}$	0	2	$\bar{3}$	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{1}$	0	0	0	1	1
3	$\bar{2}$	1	$\bar{3}$	0	3	$\bar{1}$	2	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{1}$	0	0	0	1	1

The circuit realization of equation (3.38) on RR7SQSD T-gate level is as shown in figure 3.28.



Use the entries of the corresponding truth table as inputs here

Figure 3.28 Profile of the half or one-RR7SQSD T-gate dual adder/multiplier

Only a total of 10 RR7SQSD T-gates are required for the circuit's realization. The input operands α and β for the operation are applied to the control points of the T-gates as shown and can be interchange. Inputs to the first 6 out of the 7 T-gates dedicated for the formation of the RRSQSD result digit λ , are the sum/product digit column entries from the respective

truth tables. The 7th T-gate is a crystal selector. Similarly, the first 2 of the carry digit generator obtain their inputs from the respective truth table carry digit columns while the 3rd is the crystal selector. The sum/product and carry digits are formed simultaneously. The signal delay time of the circuit was found to be $0.6\mu sec$.

b) A full RR7SQSD dual adder /multiplier circuit

The operation of a full RR7SQSD dual adder/multiplier scheme is as presented by equation (3.2) of section 3.1.3.1. Tables 3.15 and 3.16 shows the corresponding truth tables of a full RR7SQSD adder and a full RR7SQSD multiplication schemes. In the addition mode the circuit is analogous to the full binary adder. The corresponding truth table similar to the truth tables of the half or one-RR7SQSD dual adder/Multiplier circuit, are also identical but differ only in the nature of the set of inputs operands therefore a single circuit on RR7SQSD T-gate level was realized as shown in figure 3.29 to implement the two operations. The implementation requires just 50 RR7SQSD T-gates: 25 for the formation of the sum/product γ_i^f and 25 for the formation of the carry-out δ_i^f . In the ‘sum/product’ formation section the first 8 T-gates per carry-in $\delta_{i-1} \in \{-1,0,1\}$ situation, giving a total of 24 RR7SQSD T-gates forms the corresponding intermediary ‘sums/product digits’ and the 25TH serve as the chip selector. The inputs to the first 21 of the 25 intermediary ‘sums’ forming T-gates is the add-end/multiplicand α_i . The outputs of these feeds into the next set of 3 T-gates: one per carry-in situation. The aug-end/multiplier β_i serves as the SMVL control signal for the entire 24 T-gates. The outputs of this set of 3 T-gates in turn feeds the $\{-1,0,1\}$ inputs

of the 25TH gate that uses the carry-in signal as its control. Similar organization can be seen in the carry-out δ_i^f section except that the inputs for the first 21 gates as shown in design truth table comprises $-1,0,1$ only. These variables are generated simultaneously during the course of the addition operation. Experiments shall be conducted to confirm the circuit's functional capability later in the next section.

Table 3.15

Truth table of the RR7SQSD full adder

$\begin{array}{c} \text{carry} \\ \text{out} \\ \hline \text{carry} \\ \text{in} \end{array}$	γ^f_i								δ^f_{i+1}							
	β_i/α_i	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	
$\delta^f_{i-1} = -1$	-3	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	
	-2	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	
	-1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	
	0	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	1	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	2	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	3	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
$\delta^f_{i-1} = 0$	-3	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	
	-2	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	
	-1	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	0	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	1	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
	3	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	
$\delta^f_{i-1} = 1$	-3	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	
	-2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	-1	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	0	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
	1	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
	2	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	
	3	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	

Table 3.16

Truth table of the RR7SQSD quasi-multiplier

α_i / β_k		Product digit ρ^1_j							Product carry-out ρ^o_j						
		-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	2	1	0	1	2	2
$\rho^o_{j-1} = -1$	-3	1	-2	2	-1	3	0	-3	1	1	0	0	-1	-1	-1
	-2	-2	3	1	-1	-3	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	-1	-1
	-1	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	-1
	0	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	0	2	-3	-1	1	3	-2	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	1
	3	-3	0	3	-1	2	-2	1	-1	-1	-1	0	0	1	1
$\rho^o_{j-1} = 0$	-3	2	$\bar{1}$	3	0	$\bar{3}$	1	$\bar{2}$	1	1	0	0	0	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{1}$
	-2	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{3}$	2	0	$\bar{2}$	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{1}$
	-1	3	2	1	0	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{2}$	$\bar{3}$	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	$\bar{3}$	$\bar{2}$	$\bar{1}$	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	1	3	$\bar{2}$	0	2	$\bar{3}$	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{1}$	0	0	0	1	1
	3	$\bar{2}$	1	$\bar{3}$	0	3	$\bar{1}$	2	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{1}$	0	0	0	1	1
$\rho^o_{j-1} = 1$	-3	3	0	-3	1	-2	2	-1	1	1	1	0	0	-1	-1
	-2	0	-2	3	1	-1	-3	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	-1
	-1	-3	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	2	2	-3	-1	1	3	-2	0	-1	0	0	0	0	1	1
	3	-1	2	-2	1	-3	0	3	-1	-1	0	0	1	1	1




Figure 3.29: RR7SQSD T-gate dual full adder/multiplier

c) RR7SQSD non-finite field parallel addition LSI architecture

The RR7SQSD Half Adder (HA) otherwise the RR7SQSD XOR and the RR7SQSD Full Adder (FA) circuits have been presented in sections 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2 respectively. A cascade of the RR7SQSD FA performs parallel addition but such circuits are always berserk with long carry propagation chain and the RR7SQSD parallel addition circuit is no exception. In extremely long word length operands the carry chain propagates horizontal and vertical such that the horizontal component results in device slow speed and the vertical component results in expensive hardware in order to sustain accuracy of computed results. In section 3.1.4, this problem was adequately analyzed and an efficient solution in the form of equation (3.3) was equally proffered. The numerical example 3.1 was also used to exemplify the algorithm's accuracy however; the hardware realization was then deferred. For the purpose of continuity the example is reproduced here in figure 3.30.

It can be seen that in figure 3.30 only 4 steps as against 9 in the previous case, are required to arrive at the final solution when using the algorithm of equation (3.3). From the right, the first two columns do not satisfy the specified conditions so equation (3.2) is used to compute their sums. However, a "1" carry generated from the 2nd column into the 3rd column where $\alpha_i + \beta_i = 3$ triggering a carry propagation chain, made the 3rd column to qualify for action. The same condition applies in 4, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 and 17. With a ratio of 4:8 there is a saving of almost 50% in speed.

$\alpha = 2\bar{2}, \bar{3}\bar{2}\bar{2}, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}, 302, \bar{3}0\bar{2}, 332$		$\alpha = 2\bar{2}, \bar{3}\bar{2}\bar{2}, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}, 302, \bar{3}0\bar{2}, 332$	
$\beta = 2\bar{2}, 0\bar{1}\bar{2}, 0\bar{2}\bar{2}, 132, 0\bar{3}\bar{2}, 023$	(I)	$\beta = 2\bar{2}, 0\bar{1}\bar{2}, 0\bar{2}\bar{2}, 132, 0\bar{3}\bar{2}, 023$	
$\underline{33, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, 3\bar{2}\bar{2}}$		$\underline{= 33, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, 3\bar{2}\bar{2}}$	
$\underline{1\bar{1}0, 0\bar{1}0, 0\bar{1}\bar{1}, 010, 0\bar{1}0, 11}$	(II)	$\underline{1\bar{1}0, 0\bar{1}0, 0\bar{1}\bar{1}, 010, 0\bar{1}0, 11}$	
$\underline{133, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}}$		$\underline{0\bar{3}0, 0\bar{3}0, 0\bar{3}\bar{3}, 030, 0\bar{3}0, 300}$	
$\underline{0, \bar{1}00, \bar{1}00, \bar{1}\bar{1}0, 100, \bar{1}01}$		$\underline{103, \bar{3}03, \bar{3}00, \bar{3}0\bar{3}, \bar{3}03, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}}$	
$\underline{033, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, 333, \bar{2}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}}$	(III)	$\underline{\bar{1}00\bar{1}00\bar{1}\bar{1}0100\bar{1}0100}$	
$\underline{000\bar{1}, 00\bar{1}, 100, 00\bar{1}, 01}$		$\underline{030, 030, 0\bar{3}\bar{3}, 0\bar{3}0, 0\bar{3}0, 000}$	
$\underline{32, 332, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{2}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}}$		$\underline{033, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{2}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}}$	
$\underline{000, 001, 000, 0\bar{1}0, 10}$	(IV)	$\underline{00\bar{1}, 00\bar{1}, 100, 00\bar{1}, 110, 00}$	
$\underline{32, 333, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{2}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}}$		$\underline{000, 001, 000, 001, 000, 000}$	
$\underline{000, 000, 000, \bar{1}01, 00}$		$\underline{032, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{2}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}}$	
$\underline{32, 333, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{2}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}}$	The process levels		
$\underline{000, 000, 000, 010}$			Correction action
$\underline{32, 333, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}}$	These "+1"s propagates to the next column		
$\underline{000, 000, 000, 10}$	To neutralize the "-1"s		
$\underline{032, 333, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{2}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{3}\bar{3}, \bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}}$			
Eight steps are required		with the present algorithm only four steps are	
required			

Figure 3.30: RR7SQSD multi-digit addition numerical example reproduced

The circuit designed to realize this achievement functioned, by analyzing two neighbouring pairs of input operands (a_i, b_i) to either generate an expected carry out to ensure result accuracy or neutralize an undesired carry out leading to improves system speed. The

RR7SQSD conventional parallel addition LSI circuit architecture is as shown in figure 3.31. With two signed digits δ_i α_i per character digit ε_i the length of an operand is doubled and the necessary vertical stages of large operand parallel addition schemes increases. The circuit proposed arises from the dual RR7SQSD full adder/multiplier scheme presented in equation (3.2) hence in principle it is similar to the parallel transfer's schemes advocated in [103] and repeated transfer in [48]. It considers the three-in-one carry status of the previous operation: δ_{1i-1} , δ_{2i-1} and δ_{3i-1} , and generate their corresponding new status δ_{1i} , δ_{2i} , and δ_{3i} to the $(i+1)^{th}$ digit in the i^{th} digit stage, while evaluating the i^{th} digit grand final sum digit γ_i .

The scheme is implemented with four levels of addition operation in two phases. The first phase comprising levels 1 to 3, identify potential error generating input operand pairs and formulate correction signals sets $\{\tau'_{1i}, \tau''_{1i}\} \in \{(a, \bar{a}), (\bar{a}, a)\}$ on identification and $\{(0,0)\}$ on a negative search. Identification of error prawn input pairs and the formulation of the appropriate correction set $\{\tau'_{1i}, \tau''_{1i}\}$ are carried out in the Filtra block where the magnitudes of two neighbouring input operand pairs (α_i, β_i) , $(\alpha_{i-1}, \beta_{i-1})$ are analyzed simultaneously to generate the appropriate combination of $\{\tau'_{1i}, \tau''_{1i}\} \in \{(3, \bar{3}), (\bar{3}, 3), (0,0)\}$. Adding τ'_{1i} to the interim sum τ_{1i} in the second phase to temporarily nullify the interim sum, generate and send a carry neutralizing signal to the next level to counter the already propagating carry δ_{1i} . The interim sum now appearing as τ_{3i} is re-established at the third level by the adding τ''_{1i} to τ_{2i} .

The final carry out δ^f_i , at any *iteration* is the sum of the third level carry δ_{3i} and the ultimate carry-in δ^f_{i-1} . Simultaneously, at this level the final sum $\gamma_i = \tau_{3i} + \delta^f_{i-1}$ is processed.




Figure 3.31: A 3-RR7SQSD parallel addition LSI circuit





Figure 3.32: The filtra unit of an RR7SQSD parallel addition LSI circuit

Figure 3.32 shows the design of the LSI circuit's Filtra unit. The corrected carryout δ_{i-1}^f delay is $0.3 \mu\text{sec}$. The computed time to form a digit's final sum γ_i , is $1.8 \mu\text{sec}$; as against $0.9 \times m \text{ sec}$ where m , is the count of the i^{th} digit from the right. Speed of an addition operation is given by $(1.8 + 0.3l_n) \mu\text{sec}$, where l_n , is the radix 7 SD input operands length.

3.2.3.8.2 Dual one- $SGF(7)$ field element addition/multiplication unit

The half or one-RR7SQSD adder/multiplier scheme presented in section 3.6.1.1 is capable of performing a one- $SGF(7)$ field element addition/multiplication operation provides the carry-out digit is ignored. Thus, in the addition mode the operation is essentially an RR7SQSD XOR analogous to the binary XOR operation. Consequently, the behaviour of the circuit can be once again summarized in the manner of equation (3.47) and the diagram of figure 3.33.

$$\begin{aligned}
 z_i &= x_i \oplus y_i \\
 \delta_i &= \begin{cases} \bar{1} & ; \text{if } z_i < \bar{a} \\ 0 & ; \text{if } |z_i| < a \\ 1 & ; \text{if } z_i > a \end{cases} \\
 z_i'' &= z_i - r \cdot \delta_i
 \end{aligned} \quad (3.47)$$



where $(a, r) = (3, 7)$, $\oplus$ denotes RR7SQSD XOR/multiplication and $x, y \in SGF(7)$


a) Formular

b) schematic diagram

Figure 3.33: $SGF(7)$ field elements dual XOR/multiplication scheme.

Table 3.17 $SGF(7)$ field element addition/multiplication truth table.

a_i/b_i	Addition operation							Multiplication operation						
	$\bar{3}$	$\bar{2}$	$\bar{1}$	0	1	2	3	$\bar{3}$	$\bar{2}$	$\bar{1}$	0	1	2	3
$\bar{3}$	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	2	$\bar{1}$	3	0	$\bar{3}$	1	$\bar{2}$
$\bar{2}$	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{3}$	2	0	$\bar{2}$	3	1
$\bar{1}$	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	2	1	0	$\bar{1}$	$\bar{2}$	$\bar{3}$
0	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	$\bar{3}$	$\bar{2}$	$\bar{1}$	0	1	2	3
2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	1	3	$\bar{2}$	0	2	$\bar{3}$	$\bar{1}$
3	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	1	$\bar{2}$	1	$\bar{3}$	0	3	$\bar{1}$	2



Use the entries of the $SGF(7)$ truth table as inputs here

a) circuit diagram

b) add/Multiply circuit symbol

Figure 3.34: $SGF(7)$ elements add/multiply circuit.

The combined truth table of the circuit is as shown in table 3.19 and the circuit's realization is as presented in figure 3.34. The circuit is a basic component for high speed RR7SQSD addition and multiplier LSI circuit's implementation.

3.2.3.9 High speed $SGF(7^m)$ field element addition and multiplication LSI circuits

3.2.3.9.1 Parallel $SGF(7^m)$ field element addition circuit

An $SGF(7^m)$ or multi-RR7SQSD finite field element adder is an n -string $SGF(7)$ field elements or word adder consequently, the $SGF(7^m)$ field element addition operation is a parallel RR7SQSD component-wise addition $\lambda_i = \alpha_i \oplus \beta_i$ operation and its realization is simply a row of n one- $SGF(7)$ field element dual addition/multiplication units or RR7SQSD XOR/multiplier modules connected in tandem with un-utilized carry-ins/out so that $SGF(7^m)$ field element addition operation can therefore be done at constant time.




Figure 3.35: $SGF(7^m)$ field element addition circuit.

$s_i = \alpha_i \oplus \beta_i$ where $\oplus$ denotes RR7SQSD addition or XOR. Figure 3.35 shows the realization on the one-RR7SQSD Field Element Addition/Multiplication (FEAM) circuit

level. It can be observed that the signal delay period of the circuit is just twice the signal propagation time of an RR7SQSD T-gate.

3.2.3.9.2 The $SGF(7^m)$ field elements multiplication LSI circuit

It has been established that if α_j, β_j are two RR7SQSD such that $\alpha_j, \beta_j \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ then the product $\lambda_j = \alpha_j \beta_j$, of their multiplication operation, consisting of two RR7SQSD digits $\rho_j^0 \rho_j^1$ may be described as in equation (3.48)

$$\rho_j^0 = \begin{cases} \bar{1} & ; \text{if } \lambda_j < \bar{a} \\ 1 & ; \text{if } \lambda_j > \bar{a} \\ 0 & ; \text{if otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \rho_j^1 = \lambda_j - 7\rho_j^0 \quad (3.48)$$

where $\rho_j^0 \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ and $\rho_j^1 \in \{-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$. It is also a known fact it is true if $\alpha_j, \beta_j \in SGF(7)$ and extended the above method to $SGF(7^m)$. Hence, let the field elements $a(t), b(t) \in SGF(7^m)$ and the prime modulo $w(t)$ be represented in RR7SQSD polynomial basis i.e. $a(t) = a_3 t^3 + a_2 t^2 + a_1 t + a_0$, $b(t) = b_3 t^3 + b_2 t^2 + b_1 t + b_0$ and $w(t) = t^5 + w_4 t^4 + w_3 t^3 + w_2 t^2 + w_1 t + w_0$ besides $w(t) \in SGF(7^m)$. Then the field multiplication operation $a(t) * b(t)$ can be represented by equation (3.49):

$$\begin{aligned} a(t) * b(t) &= \left\{ \sum_{i=0}^{k+r-1} \left(\sum_{n=0, m=0}^{n=k-1, m=r-1} a_{k-n} b_{r-m} - 7\rho_{mn}^0 \right) \bmod w(t) \right\} \bmod w(t) \\ &= \left\{ \sum_{i=0}^{k+r-1} d_i t^i \bmod w(t) \right\} \bmod w(t) \end{aligned} \quad (3.49)$$

where $d_i = a_{k-n}b_{r-m} - 7\rho_h^0$ as earlier explained .

Basic steps involved in executing any multiplication operation are partial product generation and partial product accumulation [102]. Speed-up strategies particularly necessary for very long operands are reduction of number of partial products and/or development of very fast techniques to accumulate the partial products [63,104]. Hence, high-speed conventional multipliers circuits are either, parallel [104 - 105] or array [106-107], sequential [108-110] in organization. In implementing the RR7SQSD field elements multiplication architecture, a ‘parallel multiply-simultaneous addition-and-subtraction’ strategy is employed to avoid the expensive polynomial division. This is done by simply writing the coefficients of the multiplicand $b(t)$ in rows that terminate with corresponding coefficients of the multipliers $a(t)$. The process repeated for all multiplier coefficients forming a 2-dimensional array of k -rows and $r+1$ - columns as shown in equation (3.50) on figure 3.36.




Fig.3.36 High speed $SGF(7^m)$ element multiplication operation organization

Next each multiplier-coefficient-column element a_{k-z} , ($z = 1, 2, \dots, k$) RR7SQSD-wise multiplies all its corresponding multiplicand-coefficient-row elements $\{b_{r-v}\}$, $v = (r, (r-1), (r-2), \dots, 2, 1)$.

Repeating this, for all the rows of equation (3.50) produces the second 2-dimensional partial product-coefficient matrix of equation (3.51). The interim – product coefficients p_{k+r-i} , are obtained by RR7SQSD XOR operation of the diagonal elements of the matrix in equation (3.46) from the left. The sum total is finally reduced modulo $w(t)$ to obtain the product of $a(t) * b(t)$ field multiplication operation product. The multiplier coefficient-column element positioning may start with the junior coefficient a_0 and end with the senior, a_{k-1} . In this case, the summation of diagonal elements starts from the right. However, in either case the same number of diagonal elements adds up to form

any particular interim-product coefficient p_{k+r-i} , i.e.;
$$p_{k+r-i} = \left(\sum_{i=0} (a_{k-n} \cdot b_{r-m} - 7p_{nm}^o) \right)$$

where $n = 0, 1, 2, \dots, k-1$ and $m = 0, 1, \dots, r-3$.(3.52)

Figure 3.37 shows the RR7SQSD element finite field parallel multiplication LSI circuit. In realizing this circuit the FEAM circuits are used either as field element multiplier or field element adders. The $SGF(7^m)$ element parallel addition circuits are used to implement the combinational field parallel addition block. A slide-and-repeated subtraction modulo reduction technique is employed in the design. This is accomplished by repeatedly RR7SQSD component-wise subtraction operation of the reduction modulo $w(t)$, from the interim product coefficients in the power term of the independent variable t , of the interim product $IP(t)$ polynomial with gradual sliding of the reduction polynomial $w(t)$, to the right until $IP(t) < w(t)$. This unit realization is simply an arrangement of $n = k + r$ number of RR7SQSD field adders in a parallel $SGF(7^m)$ field element addition circuit. . The subtraction starts with the highest row with sum outputs

feed back into the third input such that the speed T of the operation depends greatly on the signal delay times of the adder t_{SD} and t_{MD} , multiplier units. T may thus be deduced using the expression $T = t_{mr} + t_{SD}((k-1) + u)$; where u is the number of subtractions, $t_{mr} = t_{SD} = \text{radix} - 7$ SD full adder/ multiplier delay period.




Fig.3.37. RR7SQSD element finite field parallel multiplication LSI circuit

3.2.3.10 RR7SQSD information transfer logic circuit

3.2.3.10.1 Multiplexer unit design

From the data flow diagram of figure 3.22 in section 3.5.1.2, the parallel inputs to the multiplexers are streams of RR7SQSD strings hence the circuit sought for can be considered as a data selector and be described by the functional diagram of figure 3.38 performing input data stream type selection and the transmission of the same to the output.




Figure 3.38: Functional block diagram of $SGF(7^m)$ multiplexer

An RR7SQSD multiplexer may be nomenclatured as a $7n-by-n$ multiplexer where n is the number of RR7SQSD consequently; the synthesis of a $21-to-3$ multiplexer may be described as follows. Let the RR7SQSD string input data type A, B and the selector output ψ be represented as

$$A = \alpha_{10}, \alpha_{11}, \alpha_{12}, \dots, \alpha_{1n-1}, \quad B = \beta_{20}, \beta_{21}, \beta_{22}, \dots, \beta_{2n-1}, \quad C = \psi_{30}, \psi_{31}, \psi_{32}, \dots, \psi_{3n-1}$$

Similarly let the input data stream and T-gate crystal selection addresses be

$x_0 \in \{\bar{3}, \bar{2}, \bar{1}, 0, 1, 2, 3\}$ and $x_1 \in \{\bar{1}, 1\}$ then the operation of the multiplexer can be described by equation (3.53)

$$\begin{aligned} \psi &= T(T(A; x_0), T(B; x_0); x_1) \\ &= T(T(\alpha_{10}, \alpha_{11}, \alpha_{12}, \dots, \alpha_{1n-1}; x_0), T(\beta_{20}, \beta_{21}, \beta_{22}, \dots, \beta_{2n-1}; x_0); x_1) \quad (3.53) \end{aligned}$$

And any particular output selection can be expressed in Boolean algebra as in equation (3.54)

$$\psi_{i,j} = x_1(x_0\alpha_{i,j} + x_0\beta_{i,j}) \quad (3.54)$$

The RR7SQSD T-gate realized circuit of the multiplexer unit is as shown in fig. 3.39




Figure 3.39: A 21-to-3 RR7SQSD T-gate based $SGF(7^m)$ multiplexer

3.2.3.10.2 The RR7SQSD registers




Figure 3.40: A Four-RR7SQSD universal Register

The circuit diagram of a 4-RRSQSD left/right/cyclic shift register is as shown in figure 3.40a. The organization in principle is similar to the concept of designing a bilateral shift register using B master-slave Flip-Flap-Flop (FFF) presented in [39]. The T-gates are first wired to function as a D-type flip-flap-flop and then cascaded to form the register. The duty assignment of the control signal threshold values are as indicated in the duty assignment table of figure 3.40b.

3.2.3.11 RR7SQSD inverter

Figure 3.41 shows one-RR7SQSD sign inversion logic. Sign inversion occurs in gate G_1 . With RR7SQSD data word $-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3$ at the inputs of gate G_1 , the data to be inverted is applied simultaneously to G_1, G_2 . A “-1” gate control causes the RR7SQSD at the input to be inverted and sent to the output through gates G_1, G_2 and a “0” routes the input data through G_3, G_4 to G_5 , output un-inverted.




Figure 3.41: An RR7SQSD sign inverter.

3.2.3.12 Experiments on the designed RR7SQSD T-gate dual full adder/multiplier circuit

The operation of a full RR7SQSD T-gate based dual adder/multiplier operation circuit has been presented in section 3.1.2.1, equation (3.2) and later in section 3.6.1.2 fig 3.32. The goal of this experiment therefore is to confirm that figure 3.32(i)a will be capable of:

- i) adding two RR7SQSD α_i, β_i and the carry-in δ_{i-1} from the previous addition process together to produce a sum γ_i and carry out δ_i and
- ii) Multiplying two RR7SQSD α_l, β_k together, reports a carry-out ρ^o_{lk} to the next operation and adds the interim product digit λ_{lk} to a carry-in from previous operation digit δ_{lk-1} to obtain a final product digit ρ^l_{lk} as described in equation (3.6.1.2).

In the light of the above the device functional capability was experimented upon as follows:

3.2.3.12.1 Testing the RR7SQSD full Adder

Although the test specimen operands: $x_i = 0211200022\bar{3}\bar{1}2\bar{3}2\bar{1}012\bar{3}23$ and $y_i = 0330220\bar{2}2\bar{1}3\bar{3}2120\bar{3}232\bar{3}02$ are equally appropriate for a parallel addition mode however, the device was simulated on sequential addition mode as shown in figure 3. 42. The RR7SQSD pulse trains of the operands are applied simultaneously two first input terminals of the adder and resulting carry-out is fed into the third input terminal along with the next input RR7SQSD pulse train. Thus the i^{th} sum $s_i = x_i + y_i + \delta_{i-1}$ digit and the corresponding carry-out δ_i , are available at the adder's output terminals at the extinct of each pulse.




Figure 3.42 Testing the RR7SQSD full adder circuit for sequential addition mode

3.2.3.12.2 Testing the RR7SQSD quasi- multiplication ability

As earlier stated the different between an RR7SQSD fuller adder and a multiplier is in the voltage potentials sitting at the various RR7SQSD T-gate inputs, right at the point of fabrication. External input operands do no determine type of operation (addition or multiplication) thus figure 3.42 configuration can adequately satisfy a quasi-RR7SQSD multiplication operation provided the device is wired for multiplication. That is, what is done here is component-wise multiplication with addition of reported carry at each pulse train. The input operands used for RR7SQSD multiplication experiment are:

$$x = 32\bar{3}210\bar{1}2\bar{3}2\bar{1}\bar{3}2200021120 \text{ and } y = 20\bar{3}232\bar{3}0212\bar{3}3\bar{1}2\bar{2}022033$$

Both experiments were carried out by modelling the device functional capability using QB 4.5 hardware-description-language styled source code programs as presented in appendices CH 3.8 for the addition mode and CH 3.9 for the multiplication mode. The results are shall be presented and discussed in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The raw results, as presented in Appendices CH4.1 to CH4.4 and Appendices CH4.5 to CH4.8, comprise:

- i) Application of RR7SQSD arithmetic for computing product of operands with lengths by far greater than the computing systems word length.
- ii) Computing $SGF(17011)$ element multiplicative inverses using the extended Euclidean algorithm.
- iii) Method of embedding plain text on the points of The EC $y^2 = x^3 - 53x + 218 \text{ mod } 17011$
- iv) Computing elliptic curve point multiplication using the one-stop multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain algorithm.
- v) Art of message encryption and decryption on EC defined over RR7SQSD finite fields.
- vi) Modelling the electrical parameters of the RR7SQSD CP-gate derived T-gate.
- vii) Simulation of the correct operation of the T-gate
- viii) Simulating Dual RR7SQSD full adder/multiplier unit on T-gate level

It is observed that the volume of raw results generated in each of these experiments is quite enormous particularly for cases (i) to (v). However, it is also worthy of note that only exact number of character digits of a given code word makes meaning in cryptography. Similarly, it is an exact length without approximation of a given cipher that can present the true

information at a deciphering stage. Thus there is the tendency to present a large volume and intimidating report with the appendices occupying a greater percentage. To avoid this problem, only the first three and the last three pages plus certain particular nodes of interest are presented in the appendices.

4.1 RR7SQSD big integer multiplication

This all-very important arithmetic operation in image processing and cryptography when executed in general purpose computing systems most often is berserk with result truncation or presentation in scientific notations, either of which is not cryptography compliance. This simulation experiment was conducted in section 3.2.1.2 to show that RR7SQSD arithmetic can be used to solve this problem. The assembled program of the experiment based on algorithm AM2 of figure 3.12 automatically converts input operands of any length to the RR7SQSD form and accumulates the multiples of the multiplicand based on the RR7SQSD scanned. Appendix CH 4.1 shows the raw results of the multiplication operation for operand lengths: 14 by 14 , 32 by 32, 88 by 88 and 160 by 160 decimal digits (limit of Basic language environment). Summary of the program output is presented in figure 4.1 for discussion. In specimen i) operands word length is within the systems data word length limit hence the operation is not subject to round-up error or truncation however, in specimens ii), iii) and iv) operands lengths are by far longer than the processor data word length. Executing the 160 by 160 decimal digit multiplication took less than 1 second in the Pentium IV processor. The experiment proved that multiplication of integer operands of any length can be executed in a non-expensive general purpose computing system truncation of results.

$$i) (7^{16} + 74) \times (7^{16} + 74) \equiv (3323293.5696775) \times (3323293.5696775)$$

$$= 1104427674248839120029605625$$

$$ii) (7^{37} = 1856,2115,9210,1757,4302,4531,6367,1207) \text{ by}$$

$$(7^{37} = 18562115,9210,1757,4302,4531,6367,1207) \quad (32 \times 32 \text{ digits})$$

$$= 344552147465294110719732986332367243247925798357729806000836849$$

iii)

1856,2115,9210,1757,4302,4531,6367,1207,7895,2313,7945,8679,4030,4589,6354,4756,8523,9
546,8671,7477,7532,1596 (88 decimal digit) by

1856,2115,9210,1757,4302,4531,6367,1207,7895,2313,7945,8679,4030,4589,6354,4756,8523,9546,
8671 7417 7532 1596 (88 decimal digits)

=

344,5521,4746,5294,1107,1973,2986,3323,9655,3687,9435,5186,7658,4286,6565,2934,3207,35
06,8585,9607,0473,0306,0181,6756,6776,9375,8457,1450,2068,9394,9751,1918,8714,0811,934
8,5623,9305,3194,3585,6606,5560,8492,2398,7216

iv) 1856 2115 9210 1757 4302 4531 6367 1207 7895 2313 7945 8679 4030 4589 6354 4756
8523 9546 8671 7417 7532 1596 7894 4562 3216 4756 2346 7894 4562 7417 3216 1596 7895
4896 5643 1459 2587 3694 1002 7777 (160 digits) X

1856 2115 9210 1757 4302 4531 6367 1207 7895 2313 7945 8679 4030 4589 6354 4756 8523
9546 8671 7417 7532 1596 7894 4562 3216 4756 2346 7894 4562 7417 3216 1596 7895 4896
5643 1459 2587 3694 1002 7777 (160 digits)

=

344 5521 4746 5294 1107 1973 29863323 9655 3687 9435 5183 7628 4286 6565 2394 3207
8585 9687 0475 0306 3112 4319 0206 6212 5169 21470 9578 9340 2381 4333 3222 2442 1109
5351 1824 9035 1320 7474 1145 8850 2040 8256 0203 6672 1000 6553 9676 9795 6445 5619
8679 6448 7754 4747 9881 7224 4197 4580 4089 6943 3712 1435 0234 1419 5569 2433 4493
4172 7302 1661 0250 3598 1966 8034 6820 2039 1156 1729.

Figure 4.1 Summarized result of the RR7SQSD big integer operand multiplication .

4.2 Results of the experiments to test the hardware implement friendly algorithm

4.2.1 Results of $SGF(7^2)$ construction

The elements of this field may be viewed as the elements of the restricted radix - 49 symmetrical radix - 25 signed digit number system. Figure 4.2 shows the 21 degree - 2 *monic irreducible polynomials* in their coefficient value form and the corresponding finite field elements, in vector form of the field $SGF(7^2)$, using the irreducible polynomial $x^2 - 3x - 2$. The following numerical example certifies the accuracy of the computation

For example, $\mu^{23} * \mu^{32} = \mu^{55 \bmod 48} = \mu^7$ and $\mu^{23} * \mu^{32}$ is also $= 2 * (3\mu - 2) = -\mu + 3 = \mu^7$.

Similarly, $\mu^{27} + \mu^{19} = (3\mu + 1) + (2\mu + 3) = \bar{2}\mu + \bar{3} = \mu^{43}$.

Monic degree 2 irreducible polynomials for sign digit element characteristic 7 finite field

1 -1 -3	1 0 -3	1 1 -3	1 -3 -2	1 -2 -2	1 2 -2	1 3 -2
1 -3 -1	1 -1 -1	1 1 -1	1 3 -1	1 -3 1	1 0 1	1 3 1
1 -2 2	1 0 2	1 2 2	1 -2 3	1 -1 3	1 1 3	1 2 3

Elements of $SGF(7)$ in their vector form of representation using the basis $\{1, \mu\}$

(0 1)	(1 0)	(3 2)	(-3 -1)	(-3 1)	(-1 1)	(-2 -2)	(-1 3)	(0 -2)
(-2 0)	(1 3)	(-1 2)	(-1 -2)	(2 -2)	(-3 -3)	(2 1)	(0 -3)	(-3 0)
(-2 1)	(2 3)	(2 -3)	(3 -3)	(-1 -1)	(3 -2)	(0 -1)	(-1 0)	(-3 -2)
(3 1)	(3 -1)	(1 -1)	(2 2)	(1 -3)	(0 2)	(2 0)	(-1 -3)	(1 -2)
(1 2)	(-2 2)	(3 3)	(-2 -1)	(0 3)	(3 0)	(2 -1)	(-2 -3)	(-2 3)
(-3 3)	(1 1)	(-3 2)	(0 1)					

Figure 4.2 Irreducible polynomials and field elements of the signed digit $SGF(7^2)$

4.2.2 Results of the multiplicative inverse computation

Field element multiplicative inverse computation as discussed in section 3.1.1.6 is a complex yet indispensable operation in all finite field arithmetic operations. With the EEA in section 3.1.2.3(e) as an efficient and hardware implement friendly method of computing multiplicative inverse of field elements, the experiment in section 3.2.2.2 was set to ascertain the accuracy of EEA computation even with the special primes from the number sequence $H \in \{7^m + \alpha\beta i\}$ and in RR7SQSD element finite fields as discussed in section 3.2.1.1 axiom 3.9. The experiment was conducted in two areas. The EEA was used to compute (manually) the inverse elements of $SGF(7^2)$ in the RR7SQSD domain. Then, a QB 4.5 source code program as shown appendix programs CH3.5 was assembled to compute specimen data set $H \in \{37, 79, 241, 17011, 117721, \dots\}$ in the decimal number system domain.

4.2.2.1 The inverse element computation of $SGF(7^2)$

The result of inverse element computation for $SGF(7^2)$ is as shown in figure 4.3.

S/N0	$b(x)$	$b(x)^{-1} \in SGF(7^2)$
1	1	1
2	x	$3x^2 + 2x + 3$
3	$3x+2$	$-3x^2 + 3x$
4	$-3x-1$	$-2x^2 + 3x$
5	$-3x+1$	$-2x + 3$
6	$-x+1$	$-2x^2 - 3x + 1$
7	$-2x-2$	$2x^2 + 3x + 2$
8	$-x+3$	$-3x^2 - 2x - 1$
9	-2	$-3x^2 + 2x + 2$
10	$-2x$	$3x^2 + 3x$
11	$x+3$	$-3x^2 - 2x + 2$
12	$-x+2$	$2x^2 - x - 2$
13	$-x-2$	$x + 2$
14	$2x-2$	$2x^2 + 2x + 1$
15	$-3x-3$	$-3x^2 + x + 3$
16	$2x+1$	$3x^2 + 1$
17	-3	$-2x^2 - x - 1$
18	$-3x$	$3x^2 - x - 2$
19	$-2x+1$	$-3x^2 - 3x + 1$
20	$2x+3$	$2x^2 + 2x + 2$
21	$2x-3$	$3x-1$
22	$3x-3$	$-3x^2 - 2x$
23	$-x-1$	$-3x^2 - x - 3$

S/N0	$b(x)$	$b(x)^{-1} \in SGF(7^2)$
24	$3x-2$	$-x$
25	-1	$x^2 - 3x - 2$
26	$-x$	$3x^2 + x - 1$
27	$-3x-2$	$-3x^2 + x - 2$
28	$3x+1$	$-3x^2 - 2x + 3$
29	$3x-1$	$2x^2 + 3x$
30	$x-1$	$-2x^2 + x$
31	$2x+2$	$2x^2 - x - 3$
32	$x-3$	$-2x^2 + 3x - 3$
33	2	$-3x^2 + 2x + 3$
34	$2x$	$3x^2 + 2$
35	$-x-3$	$3x^2 + 2x - 2$
36	$x-2$	$2x^2 + 3x + 1$
37	$x+2$	$2x^2 + 1$
38	$-2x+2$	$-2x^2 - 2x - 1$
39	$3x+3$	$-2x + 1$
40	$-2x-1$	$3x^2 + 3x + 1$
41	3	$2x^2 + x + 1$
42	$3x$	$3x^2 - 3x - 3$
43	$2x-1$	$-3x^2 - 3$
44	$-2x-3$	$-2x^2 - 2x - 2$
45	$-2x+3$	$-3x + 1$
46	$-3x+3$	$x^2 + x - 3$
47	$x+1$	$-2x^2 + 2x - 1$
48	$-3x+2$	$3x^2 - x + 1$

Figure 4.3: $SGF(7^2)$ multiplicative inverses using the irreducible polynomial

$$w(x) = x^2 - 3x - 2$$

4.2.2.2 Indirect RR7SQSD domain mode

The goal of this experiment as earlier stated in section 3.2.2.2(ii) is to consolidate the fact that EEA based inverse calculation can be accurately executed for any prime modulo in the number sequence

$H \in \{7^m + 12j\}$ where $m, j \in \{1, 2, 3, \dots\}$. The raw results for $H \in \{37, 79, 241, 691\}$ and fragments of $H = 17011$ are presented in appendix CH 4.2. The entry in any even column represents the multiplicative inverse of the corresponding odd column entry. The accuracy of the results can be easily verified using the fact that $b(x) * b(x)^{-1} \mod p = 1$ for values of $x \in p$ as shown in fig. 4.4 for some random values of x in prime moduli 37, 79, 241, 691 and 17011.

Prime modulo P	$b(x)$	$b^{-1}(x)$	$b(x).b^{-1}(x) \mod P$
37	8	14	$(8 * 14) \mod 37 = 1$
	23	29	$(23 * 29) \mod 37 = 1$
	30	21	$(30 * 21) \mod 37 = 1$
79	11	36	$(11 * 36) \mod 79 = 1$
	39	77	$(39 * 77) \mod 79 = 1$
	64	21	$(64 * 21) \mod 79 = 1$
241	75	45	$(75 * 45) \mod 241 = 1$
	145	123	$(145 * 123) \mod 241 = 1$
	211	8	$(211 * 8) \mod 241 = 1$
691	53	339	$(53 * 339) \mod 691 = 1$
	301	427	$(301 * 427) \mod 691 = 1$
	599	353	$(599 * 353) \mod 691 = 1$
17011	9506	13602	$(9506 * 13602) \mod 17011 = 1$
	14636	6919	$(14636 * 6919) \mod 17011 = 1$
	16995	11695	$(16995 * 11695) \mod 17011 = 1$

Figure 4.4: Checking accuracy of RR7SQSD multiplicative inverse computation

It is seen that the result is accurate as the product of $b(x) * b(x)^{-1} = 1$ in all values of x . The experiment thus confirmed that the RR7SQSDNS supports multiplicative inverse computation.

4.3 Embedding plain text message on elliptic curves defined over RR7SQSD finite fields experiment.

The experiment generates the quadratic residues, computes the elliptic curve group rational points and embeds the given message points into this group of rational points. The experiment, using the established procedure described in section 3.5.4 codes the message in the given alphabets, generated 21223 rational points of the elliptic curve group $E_{17011}(-53,218)$ to embed the coded message. To accomplish this process the program using the Legendre symbol identified the set of quadratic residues for the prime modulo 17011 and with Fermat's little theorem computed the corresponding square roots that constitutes the rational points. The QB 4.5 source code of the experiment is as presented in appendix program CH 3.4. The raw result of the experiment showing the 21223 rational points and the embedded message is as presented in Appendix output CH 4.3. A summary of the result in part I, II and III is presented in figure 4.5. Part I shows the encoded message. Part II shows a random sample of the generated curve rational point and part III shows the embedded message. All the 22 blocks of the specimen plain text message i.e. "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog" in decimal numeric coded were fully embedded in to the rational group of points of the elliptic curve $E_{17011}(-53,218)$.

THE PLAN TEXT MESSAGE TO BE SENT IS

'THE QUICK BROWN FOX JUMPS OVER THE LAZY DOG'

THE CORRESPONDING NUMERIC CODE IS (Part I)

1507	2704	2625	1201	527	2006
1827	2205	2715	1619	2113	2710
1524	2706	2314	1815	2702	311
2109	2717	605	20		

AND THE ELLIPTIC CURVE CONSTANTS ARE-53 218 17011

WHILE THE RATIONAL CURVE POINTS ARE (Part II)

2 4835	4 16541	7 3799	8 2632	10 9691
12 10031	13 16051	15 12516	16 12088	18 13186
19 9968	21 8173	22 7965	24 12986	25 12332
27 12618	29 4603	30 11849	33 5600	37 3030
42 1188	43 14253	44 10474	45 15296	46 4691
47 9130	55 7007	56 143	58 13948	59 5048
60 4832	62 10629	63 841	66 8655	67 15587
1490 14972	1491 387	1494 13071	1495 5549	1498 1641
1507 16417	1509 4862	1510 13380	1514 13193	1515 10031
1517 2462	1519 8714	1525 4099	1529 8000	1530 11752
1532 15911	1537 8718	1540 513	1543 2573	1544 15455
16936 7524	16938 5608	16939 10327	16943 14764	16945 14621
16946 126	16948 6523	16953 4931	16954 3916	16955 816
16958 5004	16960 10592	16961 1553	16967 3442	16976 2660
16979 9335	16980 11794	16982 772	16983 11642	16985 2714
16987 16091	16989 12166	16990 792	16996 3300	17001 7136
17003 16350	17004 14102	17005 15111	17008 620	17010 14564

THE ORDER OF FIELD = 21223

(Part III)

THE PLAN NUMERIC TEXT EMBEDDED INTO THE ELLPTIC CURVE GROUP OF POINTS

S/N0 RAW MESSAGE CURVE POINTS EMBEDDED Reference values (4th, column)

1	1507	1507	16417
2	2704	2704	393
3	2625	2628	2950
4	1201	1204	15324
5	527	528	12647
6	2006	2006	9629
7	1827	1828	1936
8	2205	2205	14215
9	2715	2715	13753
10	1619	1619	915
11	2113	2113	10358
12	2710	2710	401
13	1524	1525	4099
14	2706	2708	11651
15	2314	2314	12327
16	1815	1816	6343
17	2702	2702	11279
18	311	311	4188
19	2109	2109	15967
20	2717	2718	3716
21	605	610	3309
22	20	21	8173

s/n	text	code	(x, y)
1	OG	1507	(1507, 16417)
2	SpD	2704	(2704, 393)
3	ZY	2625	(2628, 2950)
4	LA	1201	(1204, 15324)
5	Esp	0527	(528, 12647)
6	TH	2006	(2006, 9629)
7	Rsp	1827	(1828, 1936)
8	VE	2205	(2205, 14215)
9	SpO	2715	(2715, 13735)
10	PS	1617	(1619, 915)
11	UM	2113	(2113, 10350)
12	SpJ	2710	(2710, 401)
13	OX	1524	(1525, 4095)
14	SpF	2706	(2708, 11651)
15	WN	2314	(2314, 12327)
16	RO	1815	(1816, 6343)
17	SpB	2702	(2702, 11279)
18	CK	0311	(0311, 4188)
19	UI	2109	(2109, 15967)
20	SpQ	2717	(2718, 3716)
21	HE	0605	(610, 3309)
22	T	0020	(0021, 08175)

Figure 4.5 Summarized result of the $E_{17011}(-53, 218)$ message embedment

The box on the right contains the reference data manually computed with the embedded points in the 4th, column. The simulation outputs coincide with the reference data. In both cases it is also observed as experienced in the manual checking, 12 message code points such as 20,605 and 1815 are not direct curve points and have to be stream lined i.e. 21,610 and 1816 into points of the EC.

4.4 Summarized result of the one-stop multiply-by-7 EC point multiplication $W = kP$, experiment

The purpose of the experiment is to test the accuracy of the multiply-by-7 EC point multiplication algorithm as presented in figure 3.15 described in section 3.4.3. The result presented consists of two parts: the simulation output and the order of computation complexity analysis of the algorithm. The inferences from the two parts simply indicate that the algorithm is accurate and efficient.

4.4.1 Simulation output

The QB 4.5 source code program is as presented in appendix CH 3.6 and the corresponding raw output is as presented in appendix 4.4. The traditional method of computing point multiplication that is $kP = P + P + P + \dots + P$ was incorporated as an autonomous reference module for instant comparison of the computed results. The reference module used equation (3.34) for the computation. About 21 different values of k to match $19 \in \{E_{17011}(-53, 218)\}$ curve points as shown in Appendix Output CH 4.4 were used as specimen test data in this experiment. Although the QB 4.5 compiler could not permit the use of near practical sizes of k to enable determine meaning full speed recording, the various combinations of k and $p(x, y)$ as input operands all returned very accurate results. Table 4.1 shows in part, the points of the computation for when $k = 3414$. The algorithm was subjected to a large number of test data but the purpose of clarity, 15 output nodes of the 21 values of

$k \in \{29, 156, 375, 1379, 2340, 2983, 3399, 3408, 3414, 1289, 873, 6085, 2713, 619, 1191\}$ for the curve point $P(1, 14564)$ are reproduced in table 4.2. It can be seen that all computed

values fully coincide with the corresponding reference program values. This shows that the algorithm can be used to comfortably compute point multiplication on elliptic curves defined over RR7SQSD element finite fields.

Table 4.1 Points of the elliptic group $E_q(a,b) = E_{17011}(-53,218)$

k	$P(x,y)$	k	$P(x,y)$	k	$P(x,y)$	k	$P(x,y)$
1	(1, 14564)						
2	(15649, 10379)						
3	(13200, 6763)	.	.	408	(13767,16437)	1510	(15050, 16697)
4	(14518, 16806)	.	.	409	(977,10989)		
5	(7344, 5815)	...					
6	(11612, 10163)					1512	(1617, 16470)
7	(2941, 1752)						
8	(14555, 11667)	59	(13987, 16567).				
9	(14085, 13514)	.60	(3436, 3266)	425	(2093,12621)		
10	(12998, 8269)*	61	(1456, 14033)	426	(16076, 13970)		
11	(11434, 3219)	62	(6065, 2275)	427	(9723, 12634)	2456	(3109, 12190)
12	(9652, 1119)	63	(11571, 2044)	428	(12311, 13510)	2457	(8323, 14060)
13	(10461, 4649)	64	(68, 11841)	429	(8479, 9817)		
14	(9312, 4353)	65	(12667, 13995)	430	(4441, 10796)		
15	(2104, 13362)					2983	(227,7210)
16	(12674, 11834)	68	(10817,13328)				
17	(3594, 1974)	69	(5142,11411)*	485	(6407,16992)		
18	(2229, 1784)	70	(10591,12081)	486	(3929,15851)*		

Table 4.1 Points of the elliptic group $E_q(a, b) = E_{17011}(-53, 218)$ (continued)

19	(9209, 13394)			487	(2549, 3083)		
20	(12477, 10210)						
21	(16851, 6472)	99	(3377, 397)				
22	(16035, 6472)	100	(809, 10554)				
23	(15650, 10141)	101	(2281, 8878)				
24	(2689, 2111)	102	(14669, 6139)				
25	(8334, 784)	103	(13047, 1857)				
26	(14325, 13210)						
27	(10758, 14373)						
28	(1367, 7829)	298	(8840, 1480)				
29	(3788, 10521)						
30	(7726, 14993)	300	(16505, 2930)				
31	(9970, 7654)					3398	(11069, 13047)
32	(3680, 2702)			823	(6663, 16229)	3399	(12674, 5172)*
						3400	(1337, 92)
				829	(4812, 16961)		
							
						3414	(1, 2447)

Table 4.2 One-stop Multiply-by-7 Simulation Algorithm

SCALAR	k	POINTS				
Dec	RR7 SQSD	COORDINATES OF THE POINTS OBTAINED FROM THE SIMULATION PROGRAM USING THE ONE-STOP MULTIPLY-BY-7 ALGORITHM				
29	131	$1P$ (1,14564)	$(10P)$ (12998,8269)	$29P$ (3788,10521)	-----	-----
156	312	$3P$ (13200,06763)	$22P$ (16035,6472)	$156P$ (14475,13287)	-----	-----
375	$11\bar{2}\bar{3}$	$1P$ (1,14564)	$8P$ (14555,11667)	$54P$ (1573,9892)	$375P$ (2950,1521)	-----
1379	$1\bar{3}010$	$1P$ (1,14564)	$4P$ (14518,16806)	$28P$ (1367,7829)	$197P$ (2116,2787)	$1379P$ (6624,12964)
2340	$10\bar{1}\bar{2}\bar{2}$	$1P$ (1,14564)	$7P$ (2941,1752)	$48P$ (4261,16193)	$334P$ (1823,4794)	$2340P$ (8419,13367)
2983	$12\bar{2}\bar{1}\bar{1}$	$1P$ (1,14564)	$9P$ (14085,13514)	$61P$ (1456,14033)	$426P$ (16076,13970)	$2983P$ (227,7210)
3399	$13\bar{1}\bar{3}\bar{3}$	$1P$ (1,14564)	$10P$ (12998,8269)	$69P$ (5142,11411)	$486P$ (13929,15889)	$3399P$ (12674,5177)
3408	$130\bar{3}\bar{1}$	$1P$ (1,14564)	$10P$ (12998,8269)	$70P$ (8796,6309)	$487P$ (7105,3192)	$3408P$ (2941,15259)
3414	$130\bar{2}\bar{2}$	$1P$ (1,14564)	$10P$ (12998,8269)	$70P$ (8796,6309)	$488P$ (5750,5025)	$3414P$ (1,2447)
1289	$1\bar{3}\bar{2}\bar{2}1$	$1P$ (1,14564)	$4P$ (12998,8269)	$26P$ (1692,2470)	$184P$ (9428,12144)	$1289P$ (2360,5160)
873	$3\bar{3}\bar{1}\bar{2}$	$3P$ (3879,14802)	$18P$ (7621,12502)	$125P$ (14738,29)	$873P$ (14025,9684)	-----

Table 4.2 One-stop Multiply-by-7 Simulation Algorithm (contuned)

6085	$\overline{33212}$	$3P$ (3879,14802)	$18P$ (7621,12502)	$124P$ (6209,7547)	$869P$ (4390,10292)	$6085P$ (5194,15749)
2713	$11\overline{133}$	$1P$ (1,14564)	$8P$ (14555,11667)	$55P$ (4258,10914)	$388P$ (8846,8783)	$2713P$ (12276,11096)
619	$2\overline{133}$	$2P$ (3004,11971)	$13P$ (15817,3948)	$88P$ (9808,6045)	$619P$ (14735,8922)	-----
1191	3332	$3P$ (3879,14802)	$8P$ (7621,12502)	$24P$ (8789,6539)	$1191P$ (9471,6243)	-----

4.4.2 The order of complexity of point multiplication on EC defined over RR7SQSD finite fields using the one-stop multiply-by-7 algorithm

The operation execution complexity analysis was carried out on the multiply-by-7 algorithm by computing the order of complexity of all the variables. Table 4.3 shows the summary of the computation

Table 4.3 Summary of the order complexity for the One-stop multiply-by-7 algorithm

Arithmetic Functions	Select Module			Main module						Total
	$1P_{sel}$	$2P_{sel}$	$3P_{sel}$	$2P$	$3P$	$4P$	$7P$	$Update$	$x_w y_w$	
A	-	5	4	5	6	4	5	6	2	37
M	-	4	7	4	8	8	10	13	6	60
S	-	3	4	4	2	1	3	5	2	24
I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
Total	-	12	15	13	16	13	18	24	12	123

It can be seen from this summary that, whereas in the selection module:

- i) 5 addition, 4 multiplication and 3 squaring are required to form $2P_{sel}$
- ii) 4 addition, 7 multiplications and 4 squaring are required for the $3P_{sel}$.

Similar, the main module required 28 additions, 49 multiplications, 17 squaring and 2 inversion operations to arrive at a final result. This gives a total of 37 additions, 60 multiplications, 24 squaring and 2 inversions or a grand total of 123 arithmetic operations as against the 137 in section 3.3.3.2, which means an improvement of about 11 % in speed.

4.5 Message encryption/decryption procedure experiment

The QB 4.5 source code and the raw results of the simulation obtained are as presented in Appendices CH 3.7 and CH4.5 respectively. The main objective of this simulation experiment is to ascertain the non-existence of message /data repudiation using the multiply-by-7 algorithm on elliptic curves defined over SGF (7^m). The results terminate with a tabular output to facilitate comparative analysis. The output of the experiment shows the coded message blocks as input data, the embedded message, and its encryption at the sending end and the decryption at the receiving end as the ultimate output. This portion is reproduced in Table 4.4. It can be seen that the input and output information coincide. Thus confirming the non- repudiation of the transmitted message and that a message encrypted using RR7SQSD field principles can be fully recovered.

Table 4.4 Example of encryption and decryption of message

S/N0	Input symbols	Input Numeric Code	Plain text Code	Cipher text Code	Deciphered text Code	Output message symbols
1	OG	1507	1507,16417	7842,2346	1507,16417	OG
2	SpD	2704	2704,0393	11750,16	2704,0393	SpD
3	ZY	2625	2628,2950	1608,12565	2628,2950	ZY
4	LA	1201	1204,15324	12555,9185	1204,15324	LA
5	Esp	0527	0528,12647	6926,12655	0528,12647	Esp
6	TH	2006	2006,9629	13202,9812	2006,9629	TH
7	RSp	1827	1828,1936	8918,7380	1828,1936	RSp
8	VE	2205	2205,14215	1253,4343	2205,14215	VE
9	SpO	2715	2715,13735	13617,9536	2715,13735	SpO
10	PS	1619	1619,0915	14606,2515	1619,0915	PS
11	UM	2113	2113,10358	954,8446	2113,10358	UM
12	SpJ	2710	2710,0401	9041,12792	2710,0401	SpJ
13	OX	1524	1525,4099	12250,259	1525, 4099	OX
14	SpF	2706	2708,11651	10761,42	2708,11651	SpF
15	WN	2314	2314,12327	8380,10376	2314,12327	WN
16	RO	1815	1816,6343	3664,11782	1816,6343	RO
17	SpB	2702	2702,11279	11786,16088	2702,11279	SpB
18	CK	0311	0311,4188	4520,7286	0311,4188	CK
19	UI	2109	2109,15907	12668,11909	2109,15967	UI
20	SpQ	2717	2718,3716	7545,8423	2718,3716	SpQ
21	HE	0605	0610 3309	1926,8348	0610,3309	HE
22	T	0020	0021 08173	13933,2298	0021,8173	T

4.6 The results of the experiment on the RR7SQSD T-gate

4.6.1 Electrical parameters

The main objective of this experiment is to confirm that this MVL circuit basic building block fully conforms to the design constraints i.e. it is signal voltage loss, oscillations, distortion - free and functions as a multiplexer circuit during operation. The circuit diagram of figure 3.25 as explained in section 3.2.3.7.1 was analogue simulated on transistor level using Multisim Electronic workbench that automatically converts all readings into a graphical outputs as presented in figures 4.6 to 4.10. The plots for transfer impedance and transfer function are as shown in figure 4.6 portraits the signal voltage loss-free nature. The next eight plots presented in figure 4.7 are the results of the transient analysis by tracking the ""-3", ""-2", ""-1", "0", "1", "2" and "3" information input signals from the input to the output of the T-gate. The 8th plot on this row is the case of no information signal input. The plots figures 4.8 and 4.9 are the results of the frequency and distortion tests. The last seven plots in figure 4.10 are the measurements of the time it takes an input signal to travel from any of the 7 input points to the output of the T-gate. It is observed that at any of the inputs, the threshold logic value voltage instantly rises to its nominal value (the y-axis) at less than zero microseconds. Frequency drifts and output signal distortion are practically absent as the output signal remains at 0° phase as frequency increases from zero Hertz to GigaHertz. Transients are non-existent except at no load (the case of no input signal) condition. It is seen that this was as a result of transistor type miss-match. The noise level stood at 9.44p db at all inputs and 994.44 m db at the output.








Fig. 4.6 Transfer functions analysis parameters




i) Tracking from “-3” input to T-gate output (bottom line:- “-3” input)




ii) Tracking from “-2” input to T-gate output (bottom line:- “-2” input)




iii) Tracking from “-1” to T-gate Output (bottom line: - “-1” input)




iv) Tracking from “0” input to T-gate output (bottom line coinciding with X-axis “0” input)




v) Tracking from “1” input to T-gate output (bottom line:- “1” input)



vi) Tracking from “2” input to T-gate output (bottom line: - “2” input)





vii) Tracking from “3” input to T-gate output (Top line:- “3” input)




Case at “0” input tag

Fig 4.7 Transient Analysis of the information inputs of RR7SQSD T-gate


**Fig. 4.8 AC analysis****Fig. 4.9 Signal distortion plot**

Device Parameter Sweep:




Plot at “-3” input

Device Parameter Sweep:




Plot at “-2” input


Device Parameter Sweep:




Plot at “-1” input

Device Parameter Sweep:

Plot at "0" input

Device Parameter Sweep:

Plot at "1" input

Device Parameter Sweep:

Plot at "2" input




Fig 4.10 Devices parameter sweep – time duration from input to output

4.6.2 Results on the proof of multiplexing ability test

The corresponding raw results are presented in Appendix CH4.6 as the program's discrete outputs were also transferred to Microsoft excel column charts for the various inputs, control signal x , and the T-gate output. The charts are summarized by randomly selecting seven nodes for discussion. The T-gate dynamic output (Appendix CH 4.6) was equally videoed with an N6151 Nokia mobile phone camera and is presented in figure 4.11. In the column chart plots while the first seven column plots show the test data pulse train at inputs $\{-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3\}$, Plots 8 and 9 are the control x and T-gate final output. At least 17 input pulse trains of different profiles are sent to the seven input pins simultaneously. A separate pulse train of different profile was also placed at the control input pin. Table 4.5 below shows the output of the seven randomly selected moments of the input pulse train RR7SQSD T-gate for some randomly selected control signal instants.

Table 4.5 Proof of multiplexing ability of the RR7SQSD T-gate

Pulse Train	Control X	Information signal at the inputs							T-gate Output	
		-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	observed	Desired
1	3	2	0	1	0	2	-2	1	1	1
8	0	-3	2	-1	2	-3	3	3	2	2
3	1	0	2	1	1	-1	-3	0	1	1
10	3	1	1	-1	2	-2	2	3	3	3
5	0	1	0	-1	2	-2	1	-3	2	2
2	-1	-3	0	-1	2	3	1	-2	-1	-1
15	-3	2	3	-1	1	2	2	1	2	2

For example, at pulse train count '1' the control signal x is "3" and the information signals: 2,0,1,0,2,-2,1 are sitting at the -3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3 terminals respectively. Since control x is "3", the information signal at the input terminal "3" which is "1" is selected and sent to the output of the T-gate, hence observed is "1" and desired is "1". At pulse train count '8', $x=0$, and information signals -3,2,-1,2,-3,3,3 sits at the terminals corresponding to -3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3 and the selected output is '2'.




Figure 4.11: Video snapshot of RR7SQSD CP-gate derive T-gate output

The same output behaviour of the RR7SQSD multiplexer circuit is seen in the video image thus once again confirming that the circuit of figure 3.25 perfectly exhibits the multiplexing property.


4.6.3 Results of the experiments on the RR7SQSD T-gate based full adder/multiplier

4.6.3.1 Addition mode


The objective of the experiment is to confirm that the circuit of figure 3.26 performs RR7SQSD addition operation as explained in section 3.2.3.7.2 based on the input data to the various T-gates in circuit. The circuit was simulated using the hardware styled QB4.5source code

program of appendix CH3.9. The Microsoft excel column charts plots of the input operands and the adders output versus input pulse trains are as shown in figure 4.12 while the video image snapshot with an N6151 Nokia mobile phone camera of the adder's output photo is as shown in figure 4.13


In the plots, the X-axis shows the input operands: x and y pulse trains and the Y-axis show the magnitude of the logic threshold. The third plot shows the sum of the RR7SQSD addition operation as enunciated in section 3. 6.1.2 Equation (3.47). Twenty-three pulse trains are shown. Pulse 23 is the first input pulse and pulse 1 is the last input pulse. Six random column readings are presented in table 4.6 for discussion. In the 23rd (the first from the right) input pulse train which is the least significant digit, the values of x and y are respectively 3 and 2. There is no carry-in from a previous addition so $\delta_{i-1} = 0$ and by equation (3.4) $z = -2$. At the 20th pulse train $x = y = 2$, $\delta_{i-1} = 0$; $z = -3$. In the 18th pulse train $x = 0$ $y = 2$ and $\delta_{i-1} = 1$, hence $z = 3$. At pulse train 10: $x = 2$ $y = -1$ and $\delta_{i-1} = 1$ to give $z = 2$. In the 2nd pulse train $x = 0$ $y = 3$ and $\delta_{i-1} = 1$ therefore $z = -3$. At the 1st pulse train (MSD) $x = y = 0$. $\delta_{i-1} = 1$ and $z = 1$.



$$X = 0, 0, 2, 1, 1, 2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, -3, -1, 2, -3, 2, -1, 0, 1, 2, -3, 2, 3$$



$$Y = 0, 3, 3, 0, 2, 2, 0, -2, 2, -1, 3, -3, 2, 1, 2, 0, -3, 2, 3, 2, -3, 0, 2$$



$$Z = x_i + y_i + \delta_{i-1} = 1, -3, -2, 2, -3, -3, 0, -2, 2, 2, -3, 1, 1, 3, -1, 1, 3, 3, -3, 3, 1, 3, -2$$

Figure 4.12: Input /output pulse trains of the RR7SQSD dual full adder column charts

Table 4.6 Sample results of the RR7SQSD full adder circuit simulation

variables/ value	Pulse train count					
	1 st	2 nd	10 th	18 th	20 th	23 rd
X	0	0	2	0	2	3
Y	0	3	-1	2	2	2
δ_{i-1}	1	1	1	1	0	0
$Z=x+y+\delta_{i-1}$	1	-3	2	3	-3	-2

$$x_i = 0211200022\bar{3}\bar{1}2\bar{3}2\bar{1}012\bar{3}23$$

$$y_i = 0330220\bar{2}2\bar{1}3\bar{3}2120\bar{3}232\bar{3}02$$

$$z = 1\bar{3}2\bar{2}3\bar{3}0\bar{2}2\bar{2}3\bar{1}1\bar{3}\bar{1}13\bar{3}3\bar{1}3\bar{2}$$




Figure 4.13: Video snap shot of RR7SQSD full adder output

The above explanation is also collaborated by the video of the circuits output as shown in figure 4.13. The result fully coincides with expectation hence it can be seen that the device function perfectly as an RR7SQSD full adder circuit.


4.6.3.2 The Multiplication mode

In this mode, the device multiplies two RR7SQSD α_i, β_k together, reports a carry ρ^o_{lk} to the next operation and adds the interim product digit λ_{lk} to a carry-in from previous operation digit δ_{lk-1} to obtain a final product digit ρ^i_{lk} . The tabular description of the operation of the device in this mode has been presented in the truth of table 3.16 and in figure 3.28 of section 3.2.3.8.1. Replacing the threshold voltages serving as input to the 21 sum/product digit forming T-gates with the appropriate entries of this table switches the device in figure 3.28 from addition mode to the multiplication mode. The circuit therefore computes the component-wise product of input operand pairs. The device was similarly simulated using the hardware styled QB 4.5 source code program of appendix program CH 3.10. The result of the simulation was transformed into Microsoft excel column chart plots are as shown figure 4.14 but summarized and presented in table 4.8. Figure 4.15 shows the dynamic trace of the same result as was video-captured with a Nokia N6115 mobile phone. The three column charts correspond to the two independent variables X_i, Y_k and the dependent output $Z_i = x_j * y_k + \delta_{i-1}$. When $x = -3$ and $y = -1$, the interim product RR7SQSD is +3 and with a previous product carry-in of "1", the final product becomes -3 and the carry-out is 1. Similarly, when $x = 1$ and $y = 3$, the RR7SQSD product of x and y for a zero previous product carry is 3. At pulse train 14 when $x = -3$ and $y = -3$ their RR7SQSD multiplication produces an interim product digit of 2 and with the previous operation carry forward digit of 1 the final product digit after the 14th pulse train is 3. The results confirm with expectations. Consequently, the figure 3.18 performs component-wise


quasi-RR7SQSD full multiplication as shown both in the captured video output of figure 4.15 and the Microsoft excel column charts.



$$X_i = -3, 3, 2, -3, 2, 1, 0, -1, 2, -3, 2, -1, -3, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 1, 1, 2, 0$$



$$Y_k = -1, 2, 0, -3, 2, 3, 2, -3, 0, 2, 1, 2, -3, 3, -1, 2, -2, 0, 2, 2, 0, 3, 3$$



$$Z = x_i * y_i + \delta_{i-1} = 1\bar{1}3\bar{3}303\bar{1}\bar{1}213\bar{1}\bar{2}001\bar{3}21\bar{1}0$$

Figure 4.14: Input/output pulse trains of the RR7SQSD quasi-serial multiplier column charts

Table 4.7 Sample output of the quasi component-wise RR7SQSD multiplier .

variables/ value	Pulse train count					
	2 nd	7 th	11 th	14 th	20 th	23 rd
X_l	-3	1	-3	-3	2	2
Y_k	-1	3	2	-3	2	3
δ_{i-1}	1	0	0	1	0	0
$z_i = x_j * y_k + \delta_{i-1}$	-3	3	1	3	-3	-1

$$x = 32\bar{3}210\bar{1}2\bar{3}2\bar{1}\bar{3}2200021120$$

$$y = 20\bar{3}232\bar{3}0212\bar{3}3\bar{1}2\bar{2}022033$$

$$z_i = 1\bar{1}13\bar{3}303\bar{1}12\bar{1}3\bar{1}\bar{2}001\bar{3}21\bar{1}0$$




Figure 4.15: Video snapshot of RR7SQSD quasi multiplier output

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This final chapter of the study presents: a summary of the research objectives, a summary of the research findings, concluding remarks, contributions to knowledge of importance and possible extensions of the work.

5.1 Summary of the research objectives

5.1.1 Research objective 1

Formulate appropriate strategy for performing Restricted Radix-7 Symmetrical Quaternary Signed Digit (RR7SQSD) based big integer operands parallel addition and multiplication operations.

Based on the reasons advanced in section 3.1.1.2 on the choice of radix-7 , the following numerical examples were presented:

- i) numerical examples 3.1 in section 3.1.1.5 on RR7SQSD parallel addition operation with large integer operands
- ii) numerical example 3.2 in section 3.1.1.6 on multiplicative inverse computation in the RR7SQSD domain
- iii) numerical example 3.3 in section 3.1.1.8 on RR7SQSD addition chain calculation and
- iv) numerical examples 3.4 and 3.5 in section 3.2.1 on RR7SQSD modular exponentiation computation;

These collectively exemplify clearly the potentials of RR7SQSD arithmetic. The result of the RR7SQSD multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain big integer multiplication experiment presented in section 4.1 figure 4.1 also clearly consolidate the realization of the research objective 1.

5.1.2 Research objective 2

Establish the necessary basis of efficient arithmetic operations on EC defined over RR7SQSD element finite fields suitable for secure communication systems and prove that RR7SQSD element field based ECC is message degradation and repudiation free using a particular cryptosystem protocol as a case study.

This second objective is partially established with the help of solution to the:

- i) numerical example 3.6, figure 3.14 in section 3.2.2.2 on RR7SQSD finite field element inverse computation and**
- ii) numerical example 3.7 figure 3.15 in section 3.2.2.3.4 and example 3.8 table 3.6 in section 3.2.2.3.5 all on integrity of the points' addition and point doubling operations on EC defined over RR7SQSD finite fields.**

The objective is fully established with the results of the:

- a) $SGF(7^2)$ construction in section 4.2.1 figure 4.2, field inverse element computation in section 4.2.2.1 figure 4.3 and section 4.2.1.2 figure 4.4.**
- b) Experiments on: message embedment in section 4.3 figure 4.5, point multiplication using the one-stop multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain algorithm on EC defined**

over RR7SQSD finite fields in section 4.4 table 4.19 and table 4.2. Others are the computation order of complexity calculation in section 4.4.2 table 4.3 and the combined message encryption and decryption experimental result in section 4.5 table 4.4.

5.1.3 Research objective 3

Establish the architectural organization of the RR7SQSD based ECC arithmetic unit VLSI circuit.

This objective is collectively established by the followings:

- i) **Solution to numerical example 3.9 on the cost of forming 314159P using the multiply-by-7 algorithm in section 3.2.1.1 table 3.11 and the resultant data flow diagram in section 3.2.3.3 figure 3.22.**
- ii) **The operation speed and total number of the co-processor's general purpose registers estimation in section 3.2.3.4 table 3.12 and**
- iii) **The ensuing final block diagram of the point multiplication VLSI circuit in section 3.2.5 figure 3.24.**

5.1.4 Research objective 4

Design the VLSI circuit's basic building block, derive the exact LSI circuit diagram of the main functional logic units using the basic building block and show where possible, how they operate to design specification.

The realization of this objective consists of three parts namely: i) building block design, ii) synthesis of the functional logic units and iii) the conduction of tests to confirm their

proper function. The design of the building block (RR7SQSD T-gate) started with its formulation in section 3.1.3. Through section 3.1.3.1 on design specification, section 3.1.3.5 on RR7SQSD CP-gate derived T-gate equation to the realization of RR7SQSD T-gate transistor circuit diagram in section 3.2.3.6.

Derivation of the VLSI's various functional logic units' LSI circuit diagrams is accomplished in section 3.2.3.8. For example, in section 3.2.3.8.1 the synthesis of the one- RR7SQSD dual XOR/multiplier circuit tables 3.13 , 3.14 and figure 3.28 metamorphosed into the RR7SQSD full adder circuit design as depicted in tables 3.15 , 3.16 and figure 3.29. The section ends with the presentation of the RR7SQSD parallel addition LSI circuit in figure 3.31 to 3.32. Similarly, synthesis of Field Element Addition Multiplication circuit (FEAM) in table 3.17 and figure 3.34 facilitated the design implementation of the LSI circuits: $SGF(7^m)$ field element parallel adder as shown in fig. 3.35 section 3.2.3.9.1 and the $SGF(7^m)$ field elements parallel multiplication as shown in figure 3.38 in section 3.2.3.9.2. The RR7SQSD: multiplexer LSI circuit, 4-RR7SQSD universal register and RR7SQSD sign inverter MSI circuits are presented in sections 3.2.3.1 to 3.2.3.3.

The experiments in section 3.2.3.7.1 and 3.2.3.7.1 tested the building block's conformity to design specifications and operational expectations. Similarly, the experiments in sections 3.2.3.12.1 and 3.2.3.12.2 respectively tested the accuracies of the RR7SQSD full adder circuit and quasi-multiplier in serial modes. The plots of fig. 4.6 to fig. 4.10 in section 4.6.1 are the results of the building block's electrical parameters test. The results in table 4.5 and the trace of fig. 4.11 are proves of its multiplexing ability.

confirmed the building block's operating to specification. Also the results discussed in section 4.6.3.1 and 4.6.3.2 separately showed the accuracies of the RR7SQSD full adder and multiplier.

5.2 Summary of findings

The main findings of the research efforts described in this presentation are as follows:

- i) The RR7SQSD number system which has been shown here to support fast and efficient integer arithmetic has also been shown to have the capability of performing big integer operand multiplication operation in word length-compute- constrained environments without truncation.
- ii) High speed point multiplication and thus cryptographic protocol operations can be executed on EC defined over RR7SQSD element composite finite fields using a multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain.
- iii) The one RR7SQSD addition operation logic circuit is the equivalent of RR7SQSD XOR operation and thus can be used to design RR7SQSD field element parallel adders and multiplication circuits.
- iv) The RR7SQSDNS is a SMVL system - appropriate as an alternative processing threshold logic system to the binary logic. Consequently, a SMVL ECC arithmetic unit VLSI circuit can be implemented using RR7SQSD element finite field inverters, registers, and parallel adders and multiplexers LSI circuits. The basic building block of these circuits can be designed to operate directly on the RR7SQSD processing logic signal threshold.

5.3 Concluding Remarks

The results of this research study have brought into the fore the potentials of the RR7SQSDNS for application in conventional and RR7SQSD element finite field ($SGF(7^k)$) arithmetic and thus for hardware implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystem protocols. The results also serve as a proof that the RR7SQSDNS is an appropriate SMVL processing threshold signal profile as the implemented arithmetic LSI circuits demonstrated the ability to execute specified operations accurately and independent of operands' word length. Consequently, RR7SQSDNS based high performance processors can be designed and implemented for the emerging secure and trusted communication gadgets.

5.4 Contributions to knowledge

The main contributions claimed by the thesis to knowledge of importance are as follows

During the period of this research activity the following contributions to knowledge are made.

- i) Development for the first time, of two efficient RR7SQSD number system based big integer arithmetic operation algorithms: one for performing carry-free large integer parallel addition operation and the other, for multiplying big integer operands in word length compute constrained environments without truncation.
- ii) The novel design of an efficient multiply-by-7 addition/subtraction chain based hardware-implementable algorithm, for performing fast point multiplication operation on EC defined over RR7SQSD element finite fields.
- iii) Acceptance by the International Scientific Community, of a completely new algebraic structure, the RR7SQSD element finite field, its attendant arithmetic

and the realization of a RR7SQSD T-gate based $SGF(7)$ field element dual addition/multiplication (FEAM) circuit as the basic component for performing $SGF(7^m)$ field element parallel addition and multiplication operations.

iv) **Demonstration of the:**

- a) **viability of the RR7SQSDNS (otherwise herein referred to as the SMVL system) as an appropriate alternative to the binary processing logic threshold system,**
- b) **formulation and design implementation, using CP-gate derived 7-valued (or RR7SQSD T-gate) as a basic building block for SMVL ECC arithmetic unit VLSI circuits design, and**
- c) **methods of synthesizing the VLSI's constituent arithmetic, data transfer and information storage LSI circuits on the building block's level/.**

5.5 Possible extensions

The unavailability of staple digital design flow component tools, namely:

- i) **The Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Description Language (VHDL) and HSPICE softwares**
- ii) **Parallel computing facility**

made it correspondingly difficult to:

- a) **Simulate the more complex functional logic circuits of the SMVL ECC arithmetic unit VLSI in parallel mode.**
- b) **Perform real time analogue simulation of the basic building block circuit.**
- c) **Use practical or large modulo prime values of $p = 7^m \pm \psi_i$ for example,**

$$p = 785963102379428822376694789446897396207495868951$$

It is therefore recommended that:

- i) The VLSI circuit is VHDL simulated with a view to evaluating specific performance.**
- ii) carry out real time analogue simulation using HSPICE, of the RR7SQSD T-gate circuit for a bench-marked result analysis.**
- iii) Conduct crypto analysis with more practical values of p that will enable the measurement of coding breaking times of messages encrypted on elliptic curves defined over RR7SQSD finite fields.**

CHAPTER 6

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CHAPTER 7

APPENDICES

Basic $SGF(7)$ arithmetic operations

Appendix CH3.1

i) Addition $a_i + b_i$

	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
-3	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0
-2	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1
-1	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2
0	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
1	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3
2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3	-2
3	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1

ii) Subtraction $a_i - b_i$

	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
-3	0	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1
-2	1	0	1	2	3	-3	-2
-1	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	-3
0	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
1	3	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2
2	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0	-1
3	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1	0

iii) Multiplication $a_i * b_i$

	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
-3	2	-1	3	0	-3	1	-2
-2	-1	-3	2	0	-2	3	1
-1	3	2	1	0	-1	-2	-3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
2	1	3	-2	0	2	-3	-1
3	-2	1	-3	0	3	-1	2

iv) Division $a_i / b_i = a_i * b_i^{-1}$

	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3
-3	1	-2	3	0	-3	2	-1
-2	3	1	2	0	-2	-1	-3
-1	-2	-3	1	0	-1	3	2
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	2	3	-1	0	1	-3	-2
2	-3	-1	-2	0	2	1	3
3	-1	2	-3	0	3	-2	1

v) Multiplicative inverse

a	1	2	3	-3	-2	-1
a^{-1}	1	-3	-2	2	3	-1

Appendix CH3.2

Table of special primes

Some 134 special primes H , of the sequence $H \in \{q^m + \psi_i\}$ where $\psi_i = j\alpha\beta; j\{0,1,2,3,\dots\}$, $\alpha + \beta = q, \alpha.\beta = 2q$ and $q = 7$ for elliptic curves defined over the RR7SQSD elements finite fields

7	13	19	31	37
43	61	67	73	79
97	103	109	127	139
151	157	163	181	193
199	211	223	229	241
271	277	283	307	313
331	337	349	367	373
379	397	409	439	463
487	499	523	547	571
607	619	631	643	691
2053	2089	2113	2137	2161
2221	2269	2281	2293	2341
2377	2389	2437	2473	2521
2557	2593	2617	2677	2689
2713	2749	16447	16519	16567
16603	16651	16699	16747	16759
16831	16843	16879	16903	16927
16963	16987	17011	17047	17107
17167	117361	117373	117517	117529
117541	117577	117673	117709	117721
117757	117841	117877	117889	117937
117973	823183	823219	823231	823243
823351	823399	823447	823483	823519
823591	823651	823663	823723	823747
823759	823819	823831	823843	832903
5764501	5764609	5764621	5764741	5764873
5764897	5764909	5765041	5765077	

Appendix CH3.3 RR7SQSD number system based big integer multiplication

```

2 CLS : REM USE OF THE RR7SQSD MULTIPLY-BY-7 AADITION/SUBTRACTION CHAIN
3 REM FOR BIG INTEGER MULTIPLICATION
4 LPRINT : LPRINT " Appendix CH 3.3                                QB 4.5 CODE"
6 LPRINT : LPRINT " _____";
7 LPRINT " _____": PRINT
8 LPRINT : LPRINT " THIS PROGRAM CONVERTS A 160 DECIMAL DIGIT NUMBER ";
9 LPRINT "TO RR7SQSD"
10 LPRINT " AND AUTOMATICALLY COMPUTES ITS SQUARE"
14 DIM XX7F(80), FR(193), XS0(80), GS(80), LST(80), GF(80), MV(80), FSLT(80)
15 DIM B1(80), B2(80), CVH(80), D(80), D0(80), D1(80), D2(80), E(192)
16 DIM LMDA(192), Q(192, 80), R(192, 80), X0(80), X(192, 80), XX1(80)
17 DIM XXA7F(80), XS(80), XX(80), XXF(80), XXB7F(80), Z(193), ZP(193), ZF(193)
18 DATA 320,6,10,7,3: F = 0
19 READ N, TC, RN, RQ, AD
20 REM F = F + 1: READ GAG: IF GAG = 7777 THEN PRINT F: STOP
22 REM GOTO 20
26 DATA 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000
28 DATA 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000
30 DATA 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000
32 DATA 1856,2115,9210,1757,4302,4531,6367,1207,7895,2313,7945,8679,4030
34 DATA 4589,6354,4756,8523, 9546,8671,7417,7532,1596,7894,4562,3216,4756
36 DATA 2346,7894,4562,7417,3216,1596,7895,4896,5643,1459,2587,3694,1002,7777
40 TP = TC - 2: M1 = INT(N / TP): IC = 0
42 LMDA(0) = 0: D(0) = 0: R(0, 0) = 0: Q(0, 0) = 0
44 LPRINT : LPRINT " _____ BELOW IS THE VALUE OF THE OPERAND _____"
48 FOR TAU = 1 TO M1: REM READING FROM THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PARTITION
52 READ X0(TAU): XS0(TAU) = X0(TAU): X(IC, TAU) = X0(TAU): Q(IC, TAU) = X0(TAU):
53 REM PRINT X(IC, M1 + TAU), Q(IC, M1 + TAU): NEXT TAU: PRINT : STOP: PRINT
54 LPRINT Q(IC, TAU); : NEXT TAU: LPRINT : : P = 1: REM STOP
56 REM NEXT TAU: P = 1
63 REM PRINT : PRINT " THEY SHALL BE TAKEN IN THIS ORDER ": REM PRINT
64 LPRINT : REM RESTRUCTURING THE INITIAL DATA FOR COMPUTATIONAL ACCURACY
68 FOR TY = M1 TO 1 STEP -1: XS(P) = XS0(TY): P = P + 1: NEXT TY: REM STOP
70 REM GENERATING THE RADIX 7 DIGITS/START OF CONVERSION PROCESS
72 LPRINT : LPRINT " _____ GENERATING THE RADIX-7 DIGITS _____"
: PRINT : REM STOP
80 LPRINT : R(IC, 0) = 0
90 IC = IC + 1
100 FOR JC = 1 TO M1
104 fg = (R(IC, JC - 1) * RN ^ TP + Q(IC - 1, JC)): REM PRINT fg
110 R(IC, JC) = fg MOD RQ: REM PRINT R(IC, JC); : REM STOP

```

Appendix CH3.3 RR7SQSD number system based big integer multiplication

```

158 Q(IC, JC) = INT(fg / RQ): REM PRINT Q(IC, JC); : REM PRINT fg, q(ic, jc)
170 NEXT JC: FR(IC) = R(IC, JC - 1): REM PRINT :
172 REM PRINT "FINAL RADIX 7 DIGIT FOR IC="; IC; "IS FR(C)="; FR(IC): REM STOP
182 REM IF IC >= 2 * M1 + 4 OR Q(IC, JC - 1) <= 0 THEN 190
183 IF Q(IC, JC - 1) <= 0 THEN 190
185 FOR PR = 1 TO M1: X(IC, PR) = Q(IC, PR): NEXT PR: GOTO 90:
186 REM PRINT X(IC, PR); : NEXT PR: PRINT : PRINT : GOTO 90
190 REM PRINT : PRINT " THE RADIX 7 DIGIT OBTAINED WHEN IC ="; IC; "IS"; FR(IC): REM STOP
200 REM PRINT " TOTAL NUMBER OF RADIX 7 DIGITS OBTAINED IS ="; IC: REM STOP
210 REM PRINT " LISTING THE RADIX 7 DIGIT THUS OBTAINED FROM THE LEAST ";
212 REM SIGNIFICANT DIGIT": REM STOP
300 REM PRINT : FOR KC = 1 TO IC: Z(KC) = FR(KC): PRINT FR(KC); : NEXT KC:STOP: PRINT
302 REM PRINT " LISTING THE RADIX 7 DIGIT THUS OBTAINED FROM THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DIGIT"
308 FOR KC = IC TO 1 STEP -1: Z(KC) = FR(KC): LPRINT FR(KC); : NEXT KC: REM STOP: PRINT :
400 REM START OF THE CONVERSION TO RR7SQSD MODULE
402 LPRINT " _____ CONVERTING TO THE RR7SQSD DOMAIN _____";
403 LPRINT " _____": REM STOP
406 LMDA(0) = 0: LPRINT
410 IF Z(VC) = AD AND LMDA(VC - 1) = 1 THEN LMDA(VC - 1) = -LMDA(VC - 1):
LMDA(VC) = 1: ZP(VC) = -(Z(VC) - 1): GOTO 430
414 IF Z(VC) > AD THEN LMDA(VC) = 1: GOTO 420
416 LMDA(VC) = 0
420 ZP(VC) = Z(VC) - RQ * LMDA(VC): REM PRINT ZP(VC);
430 ZF(VC) = ZP(VC) + LMDA(VC - 1)
440 NEXT VC: LPRINT
450 REM PRINT " _____ RADIX-7 DIGITS OBTAINED _____ FROM THE MSD"
460 REM FOR V1C = IC TO 1 STEP -1: PRINT Z(V1C); : NEXT V1C: REM PRINT : REM RADIX 7 DIGIT ARRAY
476 REM PRINT " RESTRICTED RADIX-7 SYMMETRICAL QUATERNARY SIGNED-DIGITS OBTAINED.."
480 FOR LC = IC TO 1 STEP -1: LPRINT ZF(LC); : E(LC) = ZF(LC): NEXT LC: REM RR7SQSD DIGITS ARRAY
482 REM PRINT : REM PRINT " _____": PRINT : STOP
500 REM pointmulti2
520 LPRINT " _____ NOW PERFORMING RR7SQSD MULTIPLICATION _____": REM STOP: PRINT
530 REM PRINT : PRINT " _____ ONCE AGAIN YOUR INITIAL VALUES ARE _____"
540 FOR ROP = 1 TO M1: GS(ROP) = XS(ROP): NEXT ROP: REM PRINT XS(ROP);
542 REM NEXT ROP: PRINT : REM STOP: PRINT
550 REM PRINT " _____ INITIAL DATA RADIX 7 EQUIVALENT _____"
556 REM FOR V1P = IC TO 1 STEP -1: PRINT Z(V1P); : NEXT V1P: PRINT : REM RADIX 7 DIGIT ARRAY
570 REM PRINT " .....AND THE RR7SQSD EQUIVALENT .....":PRINT
574 REM FOR LP = IC TO 1 STEP -1: PRINT E(LP); : NEXT LP: REM RR7SQSD DIGITS ARRAY

578 REM PRINT : REM PRINT

580 REM PRINT " .....BELOW COMPUTES THE VALUES OF Q.....":
REM COMPUTING THE START Q = F(K)*P

```

Appendix CH3.3 RR7SQSD number system based big integer multiplication

```
582 FOR JOP = 1 TO M1: GS(JOP) = XS(JOP): NEXT JOP: REM PRINT XS(JOP);
583 REM NEXT JOP: PRINT : PRINT : REM STOP
588 KP = IC: G = KP: D0(0) = 0
590 IF E(KP) = 1 THEN ST = 1: GOTO 620
600 IF E(KP) = 2 THEN ST = 2: GOTO 620
610 IF E(KP) = 3 THEN ST = 3: GOTO 620
612 IF E(KP) = 0 THEN ST = 0
620 D0(0) = 0: REM PRINT "WWEEEEEEEE"; ST: REM STOP:
630 FOR J1P = 1 TO M1
640 XX(J1P) = GS(J1P) * ST + D0(J1P - 1)
670 IF XX(J1P) > 9999 THEN D0(J1P) = INT(XX(J1P) / RN ^ TP): GOTO 690:
672 REM WRAPPING INTO WORD LENGTH
680 D0(J1P) = 0
690 XX1(J1P) = XX(J1P) - D0(J1P) * RN ^ TP
700 XXF(J1P) = XX1(J1P): REM PRINT XXF(J1P);
710 NEXT J1P: REM STOP:
720 REM PRINT "....HERE BELOW IS MULTPLICATION BY 7 USING 'NAF'....."
730 FOR IP = IC - 1 TO 1 STEP -1: REM THIS IS WHERE THE RRSQSDs ARE PICKED
740 G = IP
770 FOR TT = 1 TO 3
776 D1(0) = 0:
810 FOR J2P = 1 TO M1
820 XX7F(J2P) = XXF(J2P) + XXF(J2P) + D1(J2P - 1)
830 IF XX7F(J2P) > 9999 THEN D1(J2P) = 1: XX7F(J2P) = XX7F(J2P) MOD RN ^ TP: GOTO 850
840 D1(J2P) = 0
850 REM PRINT XX7F(J2P); : XXF(J2P) = XX7F(J2P): XXB7F(J2P) = XX7F(J2P): NEXT J2P: PRINT
852 XXF(J2P) = XX7F(J2P): XXB7F(J2P) = XX7F(J2P): NEXT J2P:
900 NEXT TT: REM PRINT : REM STOP
910 REM COMPUTING THE 'NAF' FINAL STEP OF THE MULTIPLICATION PROCEEDURE USING 'NAF'
920 B1(0) = 0: REM PRINT ".....HERE BELOW IS OPERATION 8P-P ....."
921 REM FOR IC="; IP: REM
922 REM PRINT : FOR TKP = 1 TO M1: PRINT XXB7F(TKP); : NEXT TKP:
: PRINT : PRINT ".....CURRENT Q OR 8P.....": PRINT : REM STOP
924 REM FOR G3P = 1 TO M1: PRINT XX1(G3P); : NEXT G3P: PRINT :
925 REM PRINT ".....PREVIOUS Q.....": REM STOP
928 REM PRINT
930 FOR J3P = 1 TO M1
940 FTR = XXB7F(J3P) + B1(J3P - 1)
942 IF FTR < XX1(J3P) THEN B1(J3P) = -1: CVH(J3P) = (RN ^ TP + FTR) - XX1(J3P): GOTO 960:
943 REM PRINT CVH(J3P); : GOTO 960
950 B1(J3P) = 0
952 CVH(J3P) = FTR - XX1(J3P): REM PRINT CVH(J3P);
960 NEXT J3P: REM STOP
```

Appendix CH3.3 RR7SQSD number system based big integer multiplication

```

990 REM PRINT "----HERE BELOW IS REMOVING RR7SQSDs OF-----FOR I="; " "; E(IP): REM STOP
1000 IF E(IP) = 0 THEN LPH = 0: GOTO 1070
1010 IF E(IP) = 1 THEN LPH = 1: GOTO 1070
1020 IF E(IP) = -1 THEN LPH = -1: GOTO 1070
1030 IF E(IP) = 2 THEN LPH = 2: GOTO 1070
1040 IF E(IP) = -2 THEN LPH = -2: GOTO 1070
1050 IF E(IP) = 3 THEN LPH = 3: GOTO 1070
1060 IF E(IP) = -3 THEN LPH = -3
1070 B2(0) = 0: MV(0) = 0
1071 IF LPH < 0 GOTO 1080
1072 FOR ZP = 1 TO M1: GF(ZP) = GS(ZP) * LPH + MV(ZP - 1)
1073 IF GF(ZP) > 9999 THEN MV(ZP) = INT(GF(ZP) / RN ^ TP): GOTO 1075
: REM WRAPPING INTO WORD LENGTH
1074 MV(ZP) = 0
1075 GF(ZP) = GF(ZP) - MV(ZP) * RN ^ TP
1076 NEXT ZP: GOTO 1122: REM PRINT GF(ZP); : NEXT ZP: GOTO 1122
1080 FOR ZN = 1 TO M1: GF(ZN) = GS(ZN) * LPH + MV(ZN - 1)
1090 IF ABS(GF(ZN)) > 9999 THEN MV(ZN) = -INT(ABS(GF(ZN)) / RN ^ TP): GOTO 1093
1092 MV(ZN) = 0
1093 GF(ZN) = -(ABS(GF(ZN)) MOD RN ^ TP)
1094 NEXT ZN: GOTO 1122: REM PRINT GF(ZN); : NEXT ZN: GOTO 1122
1100 REM IF GF(Z) > 0 THEN GF(Z) = GF(Z) MOD RN ^ TP
: MV(Z) = INT(GF(Z) / RN ^ TP): GOTO 1120
1110 REM MV(Z) = -INT(GF(Z)): GF(Z) = -(ABS(GF(Z)) MOD RN ^ TP)
1120 REM PRINT GF(Z); : NEXT Z:
1122 B2(0) = 0: REM PRINT "FOR WHEN LPH= "; LPH: B2(0) = 0: REM PRINT
1130 FOR J4 = 1 TO M1
1140 IF CVH(J4) < ABS(GF(J4) + B2(J4 - 1)) AND (GF(J4) + B2(J4 - 1)) < 0 THEN B2(J4) = -1:
FSLT(J4) = CVH(J4) + RN ^ TP + GF(J4) + B2(J4 - 1): GOTO 1160
1142 IF GF(J4) + CVH(J4) + B2(J4 - 1) > 9999 THEN FSLT(J4) = (CVH(J4) + GF(J4) + B2(J4 - 1)) MOD RN ^ TP
: B2(J4) = 1: GOTO 1160
1150 FSLT(J4) = CVH(J4) + GF(J4) + B2(J4 - 1): B2(J4) = 0
1160 XXF(J4) = FSLT(J4): XX1(J4) = FSLT(J4): NEXT J4: REM PRINT FSLT(J4); : NEXT J4: PRINT : PRINT
1164 REM XS(J4) = FSLT(J4): XXF(J4) = FSLT(J4): XX1(J4) = FSLT(J4): PRINT FSLT(J4);
: NEXT J4: PRINT : PRINT
1170 IF IP <> 1 THEN 3090
1172 FOR J5 = M1 TO 1 STEP -1: LPRINT FSLT(J5); : NEXT J5: LPRINT
3080 REM PRINT : PRINT " HENCE END OF THE ..."; G; " TH ITERATION OF THE POINT MULTIPLICATION
... ": PRINT : REM STOP: PRINT
3082 LPRINT : LPRINT " _____ END OF THE LAST ITERATION _____ "
: PRINT : REM STOP: PRINT
3090 NEXT IP
3092 LPRINT " _____ ": PRINT : REM STOP

3094 LPRINT " QB 4.5 CODE "
3500 END

```


Appendix CH 3.4**PLAIN TEXT MESSAGE EMBEDMENT**

```

10 CLS : PRINT : PRINT " Appendix CH 3.4 QB 4.5 CODE ": PRINT
12 PRINT " _____ ": REM STOP
14 PRINT : PRINT : REM THIS PROGRAM GENERATOR THE CURVE POINTS AND PERFORM MESSAGE
EMBEDDMENT
20 DIM CD(23), XCBP(22), YCBP(22)
50 ZX$ = " 'THE QUICK BROWN FOX JUMPS OVER THE LAZY DOG'"
60 PRINT " THE PLAN TEXT MESSAGE TO BE SENT IS "; ZX$: PRINT
100 PRINT " THE CORRESPONDING NUMERIC CODE IS": PRINT
110 DATA 1507,2704,2625,1201,527,2006,1827,2205,2715,1619,2113,2710,1524,2706,2314
120 DATA 1815,2702,311,2109,2717,605,20,99: LN = 1
130 READ CD(LN): IF CD(LN) <> 99 THEN PRINT CD(LN), : LN = LN + 1: GOTO 130
140 LN = LN - 1: REM STOP: REM 99 IS END OF MESSAGE
150 DATA -53,218,17011
160 READ AE, BE, P: PRINT "AND THE ELLIPTIC CURVE CONSTANTS ARE"; AE; BE; P; : PRINT
170 PTR = 1: PRINT : PRINT "WHILE THE RATIONAL CURVE POINTS ARE": PRINT : PTR = 1: GOSUB 360
180 PRINT : PRINT " THE ORDER OF FIELD = "; INT(DORR): REM STOP
182 PRINT " _____ "
: REM STOP
184 PRINT : PRINT " THE PLAN NUMERIC TEXT EMBEDDED INTO THE ELLPTIC CURVE
GROUP OF POINTS IS "
186 PRINT : PRINT " S/NO RAW MESSAGE CURVE POINTS EMBEDDMENT"
190 PRINT : PTR = 2: GOSUB 600
192 PRINT " _____ "
: REM STOP
194 PRINT : PRINT " QB 4.5 CODE "
200 END
360 REM
362 XD = -1: DORR = P + 1: REM QUADRATIC RESIDUE AND CURVE POINTS COMPUTATION MODULE
:REM BQ=1
364 XD = XD + 1: IF XD > P - 1 THEN 456
366 YS = (((XD ^ 2) MOD P) * XD - 53 * XD + 218) MOD P:
367 IF YS < 0 THEN YS = YS + P
368 SLK = 0: GOSUB 400:
369 IF SLK <> 1 THEN PRINT USING " ##### " ; XD; QE1;
370 GOTO 364
372 RETURN
400 REM
404 DSQ = (YS ^ 2) MOD P:
405 DCB = (DSQ * YS) MOD P:
406 DQD = (DSQ ^ 2) MOD P
408 DCT = (DQD ^ 2) MOD P
409 D12 = (DCT * DQD) MOD P
410 D60 = (((((D12 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * D12) MOD P
412 D68 = (D60 * DCT) MOD P:
414 D5 = (((((D68 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * D68) MOD P

```

Appendix CH 3.4 Plain text message embedment

```

416 DD5 = (((((D5 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * D5) MOD P
418 DDD5 = (((((DD5 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * DD5) MOD P:
420 DEX = (DSQ * DCB) MOD P:

422 PHJ = (DEX * DDD5) MOD P: REM PRINT PHJ;
424 IF PHJ <> 1 THEN SLK = 1: GOTO 456
432 DORR = DORR + YS / P
433 VT2 = (YS ^ 2) MOD P
434 VT4 = (((YS ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P:
436 VT5 = (((((YS ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * YS) MOD P
440 VT30 = (((((((VT5 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * VT5) MOD P) * VT5) MOD P
441 VT34 = (VT30 * VT4) MOD P
444 VTT1 = (((((VT34 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * VT34) MOD P:
446 VTT2 = (((((VTT1 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * VTT1) MOD P:
448 VTT3 = (((((VTT2 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * VTT2) MOD P
450 QE1 = (VTT3 * VT2) MOD P
456 RETURN

600 REM EMBEDDING THEN PLAN TEXT MESSAGE INTO THE ELLIPTIC CURVE GROUP
602 KP = -1: KQ = 1: GASO = CD(KQ): CV = 0
604 KP = KP + 1:
606 D1 = ((KP * ((KP ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - 53 * KP + 218) MOD P:
607 IF D1 < 0 THEN D1 = D1 + P
608 YS = D1: SLK = 0: PTR = 2: GOSUB 400: BR = 0:
610 IF SLK = 1 THEN 604
612 IF KP = CD(KQ) THEN CV = CV + 1: XCBP(CV) = KP: YCBP(CV) = QE1:
PRINT USING " ## #####          ##### "; KQ; CD(KQ); XCBP(CV); YCBP(CV): GOTO 630
614 IF KP < P - 1 THEN 604:
616 BR = CV:
618 GASO = GASO + 1: GASO = GASO MOD P:
620 IF GASO = XCBP(BR) THEN 618:
622 BR = BR - 1: IF BR > 0 THEN 620
624 KP = GASO: D1 = ((KP * ((KP ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - 53 * KP + 218) MOD P: IF D1 < 0
THEN D1 = D1 + P
626 YS = D1: SLK = 0: GOSUB 400:
627 IF SLK <> 1 THEN CV = CV + 1: XCBP(CV) = KP: YCBP(CV) = QE1:
PRINT USING " ## #####          ##### "; KQ; CD(KQ); XCBP(CV); YCBP(CV): GOTO 630
628 GOTO 616
630 KQ = KQ + 1
632 IF KQ > LN THEN 636
634 GASO = CD(KQ): KP = -1: BR = 0: GOTO 604: REM STOP
636 RETURN
1000 REM TO FIND THE MULTIPLICATIVE INVERSES

```

```
1010 DIM T(20)
1020 IF BINV = 1 THEN LS = 1: GOTO 1150
1030 LA = AST: LB = BINV
1040 AA = LA: LK = 0: LC = 1: LD = 0: LE = 0: LF = 1
1050 LK = LK + 1
1060 T(LK) = INT(LA / LB): U = LA - LB * T(LK)
1070 IF ABS(U) = 1 OR U = 0 THEN 1090
1080 LA = LB: LB = U: GOTO 1050
1090 FOR LJ = 1 TO LK
1100 LG = LE * T(LJ): LH = LF * T(LJ)
1110 LL = LC - LG: LS = LD - LH
1120 LC = LE: LD = LF: LE = LL: LF = LS
1130 NEXT LJ
1140 IF LS < 0 THEN LS = P + LS
1150 INV = LS: XC = LS
1160 RETURN
```

Appendix CH3.5 RR7SQSD FINITE FIELD ELEMENT INVERSE COMPUTATION

```

1 CLS : REM THIS PROGRAM COMPUTE MULTIPLICATIVE INVERSE USING EXTENDED
2 REM EUCLIDEAN ALGORITHM. 241,691,17011,17107,117721,5764873 ARE GIVEN AS
3 PRINT : PRINT "    Appendix CH 3.5                                QB 4.5
CODE": REM STOP
5 PRITN: PRINT " _____ ": PRINT :
7 DIM T(30)
10 DATA 37,79,241,691,17011,17107,117721: REM ,5764873
12 PRINT "LHS IS THE NUMBER AND THE RHS IS THE MULTIPLICATIVE INVERSE"
14 FOR YT2 = 1 TO 7
15 READ AST: REM AST = 17011: REM INPUT "MODULO "; AST
16 XX = AST: LV = 0: FG = 0: GOSUB 300
18 IF CH = 0 THEN PRINT "YOU CAN NOT FIND THE MULTIPLICATIVE INVERSE OF A NON-PRIME"
: GOTO 192
19 Z = 0
20 FOR B = 1 TO AST - 1
22 A = AST:
24 IF B = 1 THEN INV = 1: GOTO 172
26 W = B: AA = A: K = 0
40 C = 1: D = 0: E = 0: F = 1
50 K = K + 1
60 T(K) = INT(A / W): U = A - W * T(K)
70 IF ABS(U) = 1 OR U = 0 THEN 100
80 A = W: W = U: GOTO 50
100 FOR J = 1 TO K
110 G = E * T(J): H = F * T(J)
120 L = C - G: M = D - H
130 C = E: D = F :E=L:F=M
150 NEXT J
160 IF M < 0 THEN M = AA + M
162 INV = M
172 ON YT2 GOTO 174, 174, 174, 174, 176, 176, 178, 178
174 PRINT B; INV, : GOTO 190
176 PRINT USING " ##### " ; B; INV; : GOTO 190
178 PRINT USING " ##### " ; B; INV;
190 NEXT B: PRINT : PRINT " _____ END OF MODULO "; AST; " _____ "
: REM STOP
192 NEXT YT2
194 PRINT : PRINT " _____ "
196 PRINT : PRINT "    QB 4.5 CODE                                "
200 END
300 LV = LV + 1: IF LV = 1 THEN LV = LV + 1
310 IF CDBL(FIX(XX / LV)) = CDBL(XX / LV) THEN 350
320 IF LV < CDBL(XX - 1) THEN 300
350 RETURN

```

Appendix CH 3.6 ONE-STOP EC POINT MULTIPLICATION

```

2 CLS : PRINT : PRINT " Appendix CH 3.6 QB 4.5 CODE"
4 PRINT : PRINT " _____ ": REM STOP
6 REM RR7SQSD ARITHMETIC OPERATIONS. ONE-STOP MULTIPLY-BY-7 CERIFIED CORRECT8 REM
ELLIPTIC POINT MULTIPLICATION BASED ON THE VLSI CIRCUIT DESIGN ABSOLUTELY CORRECT
10 DIM ED(21, 10), KS(21), NT(21), XP(25), YP(25), MR(21), X(16000), Y(16000)
12 DATA -53,218,17011
14 READ AE, BE, P: PRINT " CURVE CONSTANTS ARE "; AE; BE; P: AST = P: PRINT
16 DATA 822,4,761,4,900,4,1191,4,1289,5,873,4,29,3,156,3,375,4,1379,5,2340,5,2983
19 DATA 5,3399,5,3408,5,3414,5,6085,5,7985,5,5690,5,8387,5,2713,5,619,4
20 PRINT " SET OF SPECIMEN MULTIPLIERS": PRINT :
22 FOR QL = 1 TO 21: READ MR(QL), NT(QL): PRINT MR(QL); NT(QL), : NEXT QL: PRINT : PRINT "
SPECIMEN GENERATOR POINTS": PRINT
24 DATA 8360,14564,10,9691,4,16541,7,3799,12,10051,1,14209,5,4843,11,2893,23,1029
25 DATA 30,8895,38,5491,60,3457,68,9024,78,3457,88,2689,91,1785,92,9878,96,3457,18,2408
26 FOR DL = 1 TO 19: READ XP(DL), YP(DL): PRINT XP(DL); YP(DL), : NEXT DL: REM STOP
27 PRINT : PRINT " _____ ": REM STOP
28 FOR ZL = 1 TO 19: XOP = XP(ZL): YOP = YP(ZL): AXGP = XP(ZL): AYGP = YP(ZL): PRINT XP(ZL);
YP(ZL): PRINT
30 CC0 = 0: BBO = XOP: EE0 = YOP: XIP = XOP: YIP = EE0: YOPR = EE0
32 FOR QQ = 1 TO 21: N = NT(QQ): KS = MR(QQ)
34 REM PRINT "FOR THE GENERATOR POINT = "; BBO; EE0: PRINT
40 REM PRINT " THE RESULTS OF THEMULTIPLY-BY-7 POINT MULTIPLICATION OPERATION ARE
AS FOLLOWS:-": PRINT
42 DATA 2,3,-2,3,2,2,-3,-2,3,-3,3,-3,3,2,1,1,-3,-2,2,1,3,-3,-1,-2,1,-3,1,3
43 DATA 1,2,1,1,-2,-3,1,-3,0,1,0,1,0,-1,-2,2,1,2,-2,-1,1,1,3,-1,3,-3,1,3,0,-3,-1,1,3,0,-2,-2
44 DATA 3,-3,-2,1,2,3,2,2,0,-2,2,3,-3,1,-1,3,3,3,1,1,1,1,-1,3,-3,2,-1,-3,3
46 REM XOP7 = 0: YOP7 = 0:
48 FOR JK = N - 1 TO 0 STEP -1: READ ED(QQ, JK): PRINT ED(QQ, JK); : NEXT JK: PRINT : REM
STOP: REM NEXT QQ: STOP
50 FOR PK = N - 1 TO 0 STEP -1: REM 1 TO N
56 REM XOP7 = 0: YOP7 = 0
58 REM N = NT(QQ)
60 REM FOR JK = N - 1 TO 0 STEP -1
62 EE0 = YOPR: REM PRINT ED(QQ, PK); : STOP:
64 IF ED(QQ, PK) < 0 THEN EE0 = -EE0
66 REM PRINT BBO; EE0; "INPUT TO UPDATE MODULES": REM STOP
68 IF ABS(ED(QQ, PK)) = 0 THEN XI7P = BBD7: YI7P = EED7: GOSUB 6000: CUD = C77: BUD = B77:
EUD = E77: GOTO 310
70 ON ABS(ED(QQ, PK)) GOTO 72, 80, 90
72 GOSUB 1000
76 WUD = COP0: XUD = XOP0: YUD = YOP0
78 GOTO 100
80 GOSUB 2000
84 WUD = COP1: XUD = XOP1: YUD = YOP1
88 GOTO 100
90 GOSUB 3000
94 WUD = COP2: XUD = XOP2: YUD = YOP2
100 REM PRINT WUD; XUD; YUD; " 1P,2P,3P SELECTING MODULES OUTPUT ": REM

```

Appendix 3.6 ONE-STOP EC POINT MULTIPLICATION

```

102 IF PK = N - 1 THEN XI7P = XUD: YI7P = YUD: BUD = XUD: EUD = YUD: CUD = WUD: GOTO 310:
REM INV = 1: GOTO 330
116 REM XI7P = BBD7: YI7P = EED7: REM ; "INPUT TO 7P":
120 GOSUB 6000: REM MULTIPLYING -BY - 7"
122 GOSUB 4000: REM UPDATE MODULE
310 IF CUD < 0 THEN CUD = CUD + P
320 BINV = CUD: AST = P: GOSUB 1500
330 BBD7 = (BUD * ((INV ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P:
332 IF BBD7 < 0 THEN BBD7 = BBD7 + P
334 EED7 = (EUD * ((INV * ((INV ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P:
336 IF EED7 < 0 THEN EED7 = EED7 + P
338 XI7P = BBD7: YI7P = EED7: PRINT BBD7; EED7; : REM PRINT : REM STOP
340 NEXT PK: PRINT : PRINT " END OF MULTIPLIER MR="; MR(QQ); "AND BASE POINT ="; BBO; "; ";
EEO; : PRINT :
342 GOSUB 8000: REM STOP
344 NEXT QQ:
345 PRINT : PRINT " _____ END OF GENERATOR POINT"; XP(ZL); YP(ZL); ____ ": REM STOP:
346 RESTORE 42: PRINT
348 NEXT ZL
349 PRINT : PRINT " _____ ": REM STOP
350 PRINT : PRINT " QB 4.5 CODE "
360 END

1000 REM 1P MODULE
1010 XOP0 = BBO
1020 YOP0 = EEO
1030 COP0 = 1
1040 RETURN

1500 REM TO FIND THE MULTIPLICATIVE INVERSES
1510 DIM T(30)
1520 IF BINV = 1 THEN LM = 1: GOTO 1650
1530 LA = AST: LB = BINV
1540 AA = LA: LK = 0: LC = 1: LD = 0: LE = 0: LF = 1
1550 LK = LK + 1:
1560 T(LK) = INT(LA / LB): U = LA - LB * T(LK)
1570 IF ABS(U) = 1 OR U = 0 THEN 1590
1580 LA = LB: LB = U: GOTO 1550
1590 FOR LJ = 1 TO LK
1600 LG = LE * T(LJ): LH = LF * T(LJ)
1610 LL = LC - LG: LM = LD - LH
1620 LC = LE: LD = LF: LE = LL: LF = LM
1630 NEXT LJ
1640 IF LM < 0 THEN LM = AA + LM
1650 INV = LM: REM LMDA = LM
1700 RETURN

```

Appendix 3.6 ONE-STOP EC POINT MULTIPLICATION

```

2000 REM 2P MODULE
2010 A1 = ((3 * (BB0 ^ 2) MOD P) MOD P + AE) MOD P
2020 B1 = ((A1 ^ 2) MOD P - (8 * ((BB0 * ((EE0 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
2022 REM IF B1 < 0 THEN B1 = B1 + P
2030 C1 = (2 * EE0) MOD P
2040 D1 = (((C1 ^ 2) MOD P) * BB0) MOD P - B1) MOD P
2050 E1 = ((A1 * D1) MOD P - (8 * (((EE0 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
2052 F1 = (((C1 ^ 2) MOD P) * BB0) MOD P + B1) MOD P
2054 REM PRINT A1; B1; C1; D1; E1: REM STOP
2056 COP1 = C1: XOP1 = B1: YOP1 = E1
2100 RETURN
3000 REM 3P MODULE
3010 GOSUB 2000
3020 A2 = ((EE0 * ((C1 * ((C1 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P - E1) MOD P
3052 B2 = ((A2 ^ 2) MOD P - (F1 * ((D1 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
3060 C2 = (C1 * D1) MOD P
3070 D2 = (((B1 * ((D1 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P - B2) MOD P
3080 E2 = ((A2 * D2) MOD P - (E1 * ((D1 * ((D1 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
3082 COP2 = C2: XOP2 = B2: YOP2 = E2
3130 RETURN
4000 REM UPDATED MODULE
4010 AUD = (((E77 * ((WUD * ((WUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P - (YUD * ((C77 * ((C77 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P
4020 DUD = ((B77 * ((WUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - (XUD * ((C77 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
4030 FUD = ((B77 * ((WUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P + (XUD * ((C77 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
4040 BUD = ((AUD ^ 2) MOD P - (FUD * ((DUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
4050 CUD = (C77 * ((WUD * DUD) MOD P)) MOD P
4060 LUD = (C77 * DUD) MOD P
4070 HUD = ((XUD * ((LUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - BUD) MOD P
4080 EUD = ((AUD * HUD) MOD P - (YUD * ((LUD * ((LUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
4084 REM PRINT CUD; BUD; EUD; "CENTRAL UPDATE MODULE OUPUT UN-INVERTED": REM
4086 XI7P = BUD: YI7P = EUD
4090 RETURN
6000 A17 = ((3 * ((XI7P ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P + AE) MOD P
6010 B17 = ((A17 ^ 2) MOD P - (8 * ((XI7P * ((YI7P ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
6020 C17 = (2 * YI7P) MOD P
6030 D17 = ((XI7P * ((C17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - B17) MOD P
6040 F17 = ((XI7P * ((C17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P + B17) MOD P
6050 E17 = ((A17 * D17) MOD P - (8 * (((YI7P ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
6052 REM E17 = ((A17 * D17) MOD P - (8 * ((YI7P ^ 4) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
6060 REM PRINT A17; B17; C17; D17; E17; F17; H17; "FROM MODULE 2P": REM STOP
6100 A27 = ((YI7P * ((C17 * ((C17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P - E17) MOD P
6110 B27 = ((A27 ^ 2) MOD P - (F17 * ((D17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
6120 C27 = (C17 * D17) MOD P
6130 H27 = ((B17 * ((D17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - B27) MOD P

```

Appendix 3.6 ONE-STOP EC POINT MULTIPLICATION

```

6140 D27 = ((X17P * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - B27) MOD P
6150 F27 = ((X17P * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P + B27) MOD P
6160 E27 = ((A27 * H27) MOD P - (E17 * ((D17 * ((D17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
6170 REM PRINT A27; B27; C27; D27; E27; F27; H27; "FROM MODULE 3P": REM STOP

6200 A37 = ((Y17P * ((C27 * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P - E27) MOD P
6210 B37 = ((A37 ^ 2) MOD P - (F27 * ((D27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
6220 C37 = (C17 * ((D17 * D27) MOD P)) MOD P
6230 H37 = ((B27 * ((D27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - B37) MOD P
6240 D37 = ((B27 * ((C37 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - (B37 * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
6250 F37 = ((B27 * ((C37 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P + (B37 * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
6260 E37 = ((A37 * H37) MOD P - (E27 * ((D27 * ((D27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
6270 REM PRINT A37; B37; C37; D37; E37; F37; H37; "FROM MODULE 4P": REM STOP

6300 A77 = (((E27 * ((C37 * ((C37 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) - (E37 * ((C27 * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P) MOD P
6310 B77 = ((A77 ^ 2) MOD P - (F37 * ((D37 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
6320 C77 = (C27 * ((C37 * D37) MOD P)) MOD P
6340 H77 = ((B37 * (((C27 * D37) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - B77) MOD P
6344 HJ = (C27 * D37) MOD P
6350 E77 = ((A77 * H77) MOD P - (E37 * ((HJ * ((HJ ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
6360 REM PRINT A77; B77; C77; D77; E77; F77; H77; "FROM MODULE 7P": REM PRINT : REM STOP
6400 RETURN

8000 AST = P
8002 J = 1: X(J) = AXGP: Y(J) = AYGP: REM PRINT X(J); Y(J)
8004 FOR J = 2 TO KS
8008 IF J = 2 THEN 8022
8010 BINV = (AXGP - X(J - 1)):
8012 IF BINV < 0 THEN BINV = P + BINV
8014 GOSUB 1500
8016 LMDA = ((AYGP - Y(J - 1)) * INV) MOD P: IF LMDA < 0 THEN LMDA = P + LMDA
8018 X(J) = (LMDA ^ 2 - X(J - 1) - AXGP) MOD P: IF X(J) < 0 THEN X(J) = X(J) + P
8020 GOTO 8032
8022 BINV = 2 * Y(J - 1): IF BINV <= 0 THEN BINV = P + BINV
8026 GOSUB 1500
8028 LMDA = ((3 * (X(J - 1) ^ 2) MOD P + AE) * INV) MOD P: IF LMDA < 0 THEN LMDA = P + LMDA
8030 X(J) = ((LMDA ^ 2) MOD P - 2 * X(J - 1)) MOD P: IF LMDA < 0 THEN LMDA = P + LMDA
8032 Y(J) = (LMDA * (X(J - 1) - X(J)) - Y(J - 1)) MOD P: REM PRINT J;
8034 IF Y(J) < 0 THEN Y(J) = P + Y(J):
8036 REM PRINT X(J); Y(J)
8052 NEXT J: PRINT "AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR"; J - 1; "IS "; X(J - 1);
Y(J - 1): PRINT : REM STOP
8200 RETURN

```


Appendix CH 3.7 MESSAGE ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION

```

2 CLS : PRINT : PRINT " Appendix CH 3.7 QB 4.5 CODE"
4 PRINT : PRINT " _____ ": REM STOP
5 CLS : REM PLAIN TEXT ENCRYPTION PROGRAM SOURCE CODE (FINAL ALL UNIFYING PROGRAM)
DIM JEP(8505), ED(21, 10), NT(17), XP(9), YP(9), MR(17), CD(23), YC1(22), YC2(22), CDC1(22),
CDC2(22), PSK(2, 22), XCBP(22), YCBP(22), WW(22), CCYA1(22), CCYA2(22), CY1(22), CY2(22), CYA1(22),
CYA2(22), DC1(22), DC2(22), X(16000), Y(16000)
7 PRINT : PRINT " THE PLAN TEXT MESSAGE FOR THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC EXERCISE IS": PRINT
8 PRINT " 'THE QUICK BROWN FOX JUMPS OVER THE LAZY DOG'": REM STOP
16 LN = 1: PRINT " THE CORRESPONDING NUMERIC CODE OF THE MESSAGE TO BE TRANSMITTED"
: PRINT : REM STOP
18 DATA 1507,2704,2625,1201,527,2006,1827,2205,2715,1619,2113,2710,1524,2706,2314
20 DATA 1815,2702,311,2109,2717,605,20,99
22 READ CD(LN): IF CD(LN) <> 99 THEN PRINT CD(LN), : LN = LN + 1: GOTO 22
23 LN = LN - 1: REM 99 IS END OF MESSAGE
25 DATA -53,218,17011
26 READ AE, BE, P: PRINT : PRINT " CURVE CONSTANTS ARE"; AE; BE; P; : PRINT
27 PRINT " _____ ": REM STOP
30 FOR BQ = 1 TO 11
32 ON BQ GOTO 34, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 130, 150, 200
34 REM PRINT : PRINT " THE ELLIPTIC CURVE POINTS FOR ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION OPERATION ARE
:-"
35 GOSUB 6500: GOTO 270: REM BQ=1:REM CURVE POINTS GENERATOR
40 REM BQ=2:REM DATA CURVE POINTS SELECTOR /PROCESSOR
42 LN = 22: GOSUB 9800: PRINT "CODED INPUT MESSAGE"; " THE CURVE EMBEDDMENT"
44 FOR FTO = 1 TO 22: PRINT USING " ## ##### " FTO; CD(FTO); XCBP(FTO);
YCBP(FTO)
46 NEXT FTO:
47 PRINT " _____ ": REM STOP
48 GOTO 270
50 REM LN = 1: KS = MSK: XGP = XOP: YGP = YOP:
51 LN = 1: N = 1: GOSUB 1300: PM1 = BBD7: PM2 = EED7
55 PRINT " THEREFORE MICHAEL'S PUBLIC KEY IS "; PM1; PM2; : REM STOP: REM BQ=3
56 YC1(LN) = PM1: YC2(LN) = PM2: W = 0: GOSUB 8600: REM FOR CHECKING
57 IF W <> 0 THEN PRINT " MICHAEL'S CONFIRMED PUBLIC KEY IS "; CPM1; CPM2; PM2: REM STOP
: GOTO 270
58 PRINT : PRINT " _____ ": GOTO 270
59 PRINT " FAILED MISSION": STOP: GOTO 262
60 KS = LSK: XGP = FXGP: YGP = FYGP: GOSUB 1300: REM BQ=4
61 PL1 = BBD7: PL2 = EED7: PRINT " THEREFORE LILIAN'S PUBLIC KEY IS"; PL1; PL2: REM STOP
62 LN = 1: YC1(LN) = PL1: YC2(LN) = PL2: W = 0: GOSUB 8600: REM CROSS CHECKING
64 IF W <> 0 THEN PRINT " LILIAN'S CONFIRMED PUBLIC KEY IS "; CPL1; CPL2; PL2: REM STOP
: GOTO 270
65 PRINT : PRINT " _____ ": GOTO 270
68 PRINT " FAILED MISSION": STOP: GOTO 262

```

Appendix CH 3.7 MESSAGE ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION

```

70 REM BQ=5
72 GOSUB 1300: CPLT1 = BBD7: CPLT2 = EED7: PRINT "  LILIAN'S TRANSFORMED PUBLIC KEY IS"
; CPLT1; CPLT2: REM STOP
74 LN = 1: YC1(LN) = CPLT1: YC2(LN) = CPLT2: W = 0: GOSUB 8600: REM FOR CHECKING
80 KS = LSK: XGP = CPM1: YGP = CPM2: BB0 = CPM1: EE0 = CPM2: REM BQ=6
81 GOSUB 1300: CPMT1 = BBD7: CPMT2 = EED7: PRINT "  MICHAEL'S TRANSFORMED PUBLIC KEY IS "
; CPMT1; CPMT2: REM STOP
82 LN = 1: YC1(LN) = CPMT1: YC2(LN) = CPMT2: W = 0: GOSUB 8600: REM 9000: REM FOR CHECKING
84 IF W <> 0 THEN PRINT "  MICHAEL'S TRANSFORMED AND CONFIRMED PUBLIC KEY IS "; CCPMT1
; CCPMT2; CPMT2: REM GOTO 270
86 PRINT : PRINT " _____ ": GOTO 270
88 PRINT "  FAILED MISSION": STOP: GOTO 262
90 LN = 22: GOSUB 7200: PRINT "  BELOW IS YOUR SCRAMBLED MESSAGE": PRINT : REM BQ=7
91 PRINT "  BLK/N0  ENCODED MESSAGE  EMBEDDED MESSAGE  ENCRYPTED MESSAGE ": PRINT
92 FOR VV = 1 TO 22: PRINT USING " ##  #####  #####  #####  "
; VV; CD(VV); XCBP(VV); YCBP(VV); CYA1(VV); CYA2(VV)
94 NEXT VV: PRINT " _____ END OF ENCRYPTION _____ ": REM STOP
96 GOTO 270
100 LN = 22: REM BQ = 8: REM CROSS CHECKING CIPHER
102 FOR FTJ = 1 TO LN: YC1(FTJ) = CYA1(FTJ): YC2(FTJ) = CYA2(FTJ): NEXT FTJ
104 GOSUB 8600: FOR FTK = 1 TO 22: PRINT USING " ##  #####  "; FTK; CCYA1(FTK); CCYA2(FTK);
106 IF WW(FTK) <> 0 THEN PRINT "A HIT": GOTO 110
108 PRINT " A MISS"
110 NEXT FTK: PRINT
112 PRINT "  STATE OF CIPHER TEXT IN RELATION TO THE POINTS ON THE ELLIPTIC CURVE"
: REM STOP
116 GOTO 270
REM ALIGNMENT
130 LN = 22: GOSUB 7200: REM DECRYPTING CIPHER: REM BQ=9
134 FOR TV = 1 TO 22: PRINT USING " ##  #####  #####  #####  "
; TV; CD(TV); XCBP(TV); YCBP(TV); CYA1(TV); CYA2(TV); DC1(TV); DC2(TV)
136 NEXT TV: PRINT : PRINT : PRINT "  -----THE DECIPHERED MESSAGE----- ": REM STOP
138 GOTO 270
150 LN = 22: FOR TJI = 1 TO LN: YC1(TJI) = DC1(TJI): REM BQ=10
152 YC2(TJI) = DC2(TJI): NEXT TJI
156 GOSUB 8600: REM CROSS CHECKING DECIPHERED MESSAGE: REM
158 FOR TJO = 1 TO 22: PRINT USING " ##  #####  #####  "; TJO;
DC1(TJO); DC2(TJO); CDC1(TJO); CDC2(TJO);
160 IF WW(TJO) <> 0 THEN PRINT , "A HIT": GOTO 164
162 PRINT " A MISS"
164 NEXT TJO: PRINT "  CONFIRMING THE DECODED TEXT TO BE THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE ": REM STOP
166 PRINT : PRINT : GOTO 270

```

Appendix CH 3.7 MESSAGE ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION

```

200 PRINT : REM
202 PRINT " BLK/NO ENCODED MESSAGE EMBEDDED MESSAGE ENCRYPTED MESSAGE
DECRYPTED MESSAGE ": PRINT
220 FOR FCK = 1 TO 22: REM BQ = 11
224 PRINT USING " ## #####          #####          #####          #####          "
; FCK; CD(FCK); XCBP(FCK); YCBP(FCK); CYA1(FCK); CYA2(FCK); DC1(FCK); DC2(FCK)
226 NEXT FCK: PRINT "          FINAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN SUMMARY": REM STOP
230 GOTO 270
262 PRINT : PRINT " FAILED MISSION DO NOT MOVE FURTHER": STOP: GOTO 300
270 NEXT BQ: PRINT : REM STOP
272 PRINT "          MISSION ACCOMPLISHED THANK YOU LORD          ":
274 PRINT : PRINT "          _____          ": REM STOP
276 PRINT : PRINT "          QB 4.5 CODE          "
300 END
1000 REM TO FIND THE MULTIPLICATIVE INVERSES
1010 DIM T(20)
1020 IF BINV = 1 THEN LS = 1: GOTO 1150
1030 LA = AST: LB = BINV
1040 AA = LA: LK = 0: LC = 1: LD = 0: LE = 0: LF = 1
1050 LK = LK + 1
1060 T(LK) = INT(LA / LB): U = LA - LB * T(LK)
1070 IF ABS(U) = 1 OR U = 0 THEN 1090
1080 LA = LB: LB = U: GOTO 1050
1090 FOR LJ = 1 TO LK
1100 LG = LE * T(LJ): LH = LF * T(LJ)
1110 LL = LC - LG: LS = LD - LH
1120 LC = LE: LD = LF: LE = LL: LF = LS
1130 NEXT LJ
1140 IF LS < 0 THEN LS = P + LS
1150 INV = LS: XC = LS
1160 RETURN
1300 REM POINT MULTIPLICATION CONTROLLER MODULE
1310 ON BQ GOTO 1320, 1320, 1387, 1389, 1332, 1346, 1320, 1320, 1320, 1320, 1320, 1320
1320 GOTO 1528: REM UN-USED PIN CODE-READING AND CHECKING
1332 XP(1) = PL1: YP(1) = PL2: QQ = 1: N = 1: MR(1) = 1289: NT(1) = 5: VEGA = 1: RESTORE 1464
: GOTO 1450
1346 XP(1) = PM1: YP(1) = PM2: N = 1: QQ = 2: MR(2) = 873: NT(2) = 4: VEGA = 2: RESTORE 1464
: GOTO 1450
1387 VEGA = 1: GOTO 1400
1389 VEGA = 2
1400 DATA 1289,5,873,4: REM 2713,5,619,4:
1410 PRINT : PRINT "SET OF SPECIMEN MULTIPLIERS":

```

Appendix CH 3.7 MESSAGE ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION

```
1420 FOR QL = 1 TO 2: READ MR(QL), NT(QL): PRINT MR(QL); NT(QL), : NEXT QL: PRINT : PRINT
1430 DATA 8360,14564:
1440 FOR DL = 1 TO 1: READ XP(DL), YP(DL): NEXT DL:
1450 FOR ZL = 1 TO 1: X0P = XP(ZL): Y0P = YP(ZL): : REM AXGP = XP(ZL): AYGP = YP(ZL)
1454 CC0 = 0: BB0 = X0P: EE0 = Y0P: XIP = X0P: YIP = EE0: YOPR = EE0
1458 FOR QQ = 1 TO VEGA: N = NT(QQ): KS = MR(QQ)
1460 PRINT "FOR THE GENERATOR POINT ="; BB0; EE0: PRINT
1462 PRINT " THE RESULTS OF THE MULTIPLY-BY-7 POINT MULTIPLICATION OPERATION ARE AS
FOLLOWS:-": PRINT
1464 DATA 1,-3,-2,2,1,3,-3,-1,-2: REM 1,1,-1,3,-3,2,-1,-3,3
1466 REM X0P7 = 0: Y0P7 = 0:
1468 FOR JK = N - 1 TO 0 STEP -1: READ ED(QQ, JK): PRINT ED(QQ, JK); : NEXT JK: PRINT
: PRINT : REM STOP:
1470 FOR PK = N - 1 TO 0 STEP -1: REM 1 TO N
1472 EE0 = YOPR: REM PRINT ED(QQ, PK); : STOP:
1474 IF ED(QQ, PK) < 0 THEN EE0 = -EE0
1476 REM PRINT BB0; EE0; "INPUT TO UPDATE MODULES": STOP
1478 ON ABS(ED(QQ, PK)) GOTO 1480, 1486, 1494
1480 GOSUB 1700
1482 WUD = C0P0: XUD = X0P0: YUD = Y0P0
1484 GOTO 1498
1486 GOSUB 2000
1490 WUD = C0P1: XUD = X0P1: YUD = Y0P1
1492 GOTO 1498
1494 GOSUB 3000
1496 WUD = C0P2: XUD = X0P2: YUD = Y0P2
1498 REM PRINT WUD; XUD; YUD; " 1P,2P,3P SELECTING MODULES OUTPUT ": REM
1500 IF PK = N - 1 THEN XI7P = XUD: YI7P = YUD: BUD = XUD: EUD = YUD: CUD = WUD: GOTO 1508:
INV = 1: GOTO 1512
1502 REM XI7P = BBD7: YI7P = EED7: REM ; "INPUT TO 7P":
1504 GOSUB 5000: REM MULTIPLYING -BY - 7"
1506 GOSUB 4000: REM UPDATE MODULE
1510 BINV = CUD: AST = P: GOSUB 1000
1512 BBD7 = (BUD * ((INV ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P:
1514 IF BBD7 < 0 THEN BBD7 = BBD7 + P
1516 EED7 = (EUD * ((INV * ((INV ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P:
1518 IF EED7 < 0 THEN EED7 = EED7 + P
1520 XI7P = BBD7: YI7P = EED7: PRINT BBD7; EED7; : REM PRINT : REM STOP
1522 NEXT PK: PRINT : PRINT " END OF MULTIPLIER MR="; MR(QQ); "AND BASE POINT ="
; BB0; " "; EE0;
: PRINT : PRINT : REM RESTORE 44
1523 GOSUB 10000: REM STOP: REM TO INSERT ADDER
1524 NEXT QQ: RESTORE 42: PRINT
1526 NEXT ZL
```

Appendix CH 3.7 MESSAGE ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION

```

1527 REM PRINT " _____ "
:   REM STOP
1528 RETURN
1700 REM 1P MODULE
1710 XOP0 = BB0
1720 YOP0 = EE0
1730 COP0 = 1
1740 RETURN

2000 REM 2P MODULE
2010 A1 = ((3 * (BB0 ^ 2) MOD P) MOD P + AE) MOD P
2020 B1 = ((A1 ^ 2) MOD P - (8 * ((BB0 * ((EE0 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
2022 REM IF B1 < 0 THEN B1 = B1 + P
2030 C1 = (2 * EE0) MOD P
2040 D1 = (((C1 ^ 2) MOD P) * BB0) MOD P - B1) MOD P
2050 E1 = ((A1 * D1) MOD P - (8 * (((EE0 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
2052 F1 = (((C1 ^ 2) MOD P) * BB0) MOD P + B1) MOD P
2054 REM PRINT A1; B1; C1; D1; E1: REM STOP
2056 COP1 = C1: XOP1 = B1: YOP1 = E1
2100 RETURN

3000 REM 3P MODULE
3010 GOSUB 2000
3020 A2 = ((EE0 * ((C1 * ((C1 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P - E1) MOD P
3052 B2 = ((A2 ^ 2) MOD P - (F1 * ((D1 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
3060 C2 = (C1 * D1) MOD P
3070 D2 = (((B1 * ((D1 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P - B2) MOD P
3080 E2 = ((A2 * D2) MOD P - (E1 * ((D1 * ((D1 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
3082 COP2 = C2: XOP2 = B2: YOP2 = E2
3130 RETURN

4000 REM UPDATED MODULE
4010 AUD = (((E77 * ((WUD * ((WUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P - (YUD * ((C77 * ((C77 ^ 2) MOD P)
MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
4020 DUD = ((B77 * ((WUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - (XUD * ((C77 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
4030 FUD = ((B77 * ((WUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P + (XUD * ((C77 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
4040 BUD = ((AUD ^ 2) MOD P - (FUD * ((DUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
4050 CUD = (C77 * ((WUD * DUD) MOD P)) MOD P
4060 LUD = (C77 * DUD) MOD P
4070 HUD = ((XUD * ((LUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - BUD) MOD P
4080 EUD = ((AUD * HUD) MOD P - (YUD * ((LUD * ((LUD ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
4084 REM PRINT CUD; BUD; EUD; "CENTRAL UPDATE MODULE OUPUT UN-INVERTED": REM
4086 XI7P = BUD: YI7P = EUD
4090 RETURN

```

Appendix CH 3.7 MESSAGE ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION

```

5000 A17 = ((3 * ((X17P ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P + AE) MOD P
5010 B17 = ((A17 ^ 2) MOD P - (8 * ((X17P * ((Y17P ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
5020 C17 = (2 * Y17P) MOD P
5030 D17 = ((X17P * ((C17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - B17) MOD P
5040 F17 = ((X17P * ((C17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P + B17) MOD P
5050 E17 = ((A17 * D17) MOD P - (8 * (((Y17P ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
5052 REM E17 = ((A17 * D17) MOD P - (8 * ((Y17P ^ 4) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
5060 REM PRINT A17; B17; C17; D17; E17; F17; H17; "FROM MODULE 2P": STOP
5100 A27 = ((Y17P * ((C17 * ((C17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P - E17) MOD P
5110 B27 = ((A27 ^ 2) MOD P - (F17 * ((D17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
5120 C27 = (C17 * D17) MOD P
5130 H27 = ((B17 * ((D17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - B27) MOD P
5140 D27 = ((X17P * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - B27) MOD P
5150 F27 = ((X17P * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P + B27) MOD P
5160 E27 = ((A27 * H27) MOD P - (E17 * ((D17 * ((D17 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
5170 REM PRINT A27; B27; C27; D27; E27; F27; H27; "FROM MODULE 3P": STOP
5200 A37 = ((Y17P * ((C27 * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P - E27) MOD P
5210 B37 = ((A37 ^ 2) MOD P - (F27 * ((D27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
5220 C37 = (C17 * ((D17 * D27) MOD P)) MOD P
5230 H37 = ((B27 * ((D27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - B37) MOD P
5240 D37 = ((B27 * ((C37 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - (B37 * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
5250 F37 = ((B27 * ((C37 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P + (B37 * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
5260 E37 = ((A37 * H37) MOD P - (E27 * ((D27 * ((D27 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
5270 REM PRINT A37; B37; C37; D37; E37; F37; H37; "FROM MODULE 4P": STOP
5300 A77 = (((E27 * ((C37 * ((C37 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) - (E37 * ((C27 * ((C27 ^ 2) MOD P))
MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P
5310 B77 = ((A77 ^ 2) MOD P - (F37 * ((D37 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
5320 C77 = (C27 * ((C37 * D37) MOD P)) MOD P
5340 H77 = ((B37 * (((C27 * D37) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - B77) MOD P
5344 HJ = (C27 * D37) MOD P
5350 E77 = ((A77 * H77) MOD P - (E37 * ((HJ * ((HJ ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P)) MOD P) MOD P
5360 REM PRINT A77; B77; C77; D77; E77; F77; H77; "FROM MODULE 7P": PRINT : REM STOP
5400 RETURN

6500 REM QUADRATIC RESIDUE AND CURVE POINTS COMPUTATION MODULE:REM BQ=1
6502 DORR = P + 1: REM QUADRATIC RESIDUE AND CURVE POINTS COMPUTATION MODULE
:REM BQ=1
6503 PRINT " THE QUADRATIC RESIDUES OF THE ELLPTIC CURVE EQUATION ARE:-": PRINT
6504 FOR XD = 1 TO (P - 1) / 2
6506 IF (XD ^ 2) MOD P <> ((P - XD) ^ 2) MOD P THEN 6510
6508 JEP(XD) = (XD ^ 2) MOD P: PRINT USING " ##### "; JEP(XD);
6510 NEXT XD: PRINT : REM STOP
6512 FOR XD = 0 TO P - 1
6514 YS = (((XD ^ 2) MOD P) * XD - 53 * XD + 218) MOD P: IF YS < 0 THEN YS = YS + P

```

Appendix CH 3.7 MESSAGE ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION

```
6516 SLK = 0: GOSUB 9400: IF SLK = 0 THEN PRINT USING " ##### " ; XD; QE1;
: REM STOP
6518 NEXT XD:
6536 PRINT : PRINT : PRINT " ORDER OF FIELD IS"; INT(DORR): PRINT
6537 PRINT " _____ ": REM STOP
6540 RETURN
7200 REM SCRAMBLING CODED MESSEGE WITH EC ADDITION FORMULAR
7220 ON BQ GOTO 7230, 7230, 7230, 7230, 7230, 7230, 7240, 7230, 7250, 7230
7230 GOTO 7270: PRINT : REM NOT ASSIGNED HERE
7240 FOR AT7 = 1 TO 22: XC1 = XCBP(AT7): XC2 = PLT1
7242 YC1 = YCBP(AT7): YC2 = PLT2: GOSUB 7500
7244 CYA1(AT7) = XWC: CYA2(AT7) = YWC:
7245 PRINT USING " ## ##### " ; AT7; CYA1(AT7); CYA2(AT7)
7246 NEXT AT7: GOTO 7270
7250 FOR AT10 = 1 TO 22: XC1 = CYA1(AT10): XC2 = PMT1:
7252 YC1 = CYA2(AT10): YC2 = P - PMT2: GOSUB 7500
7254 DC1(AT10) = XWC: DC2(AT10) = YWC:
7256 PRINT AT10; CYA1(AT10); CYA2(AT10); DC1(AT10); DC2(AT10):
7258 NEXT AT10: GOTO 7270
7270 REM STOP:
7280 RETURN

7500 REM ELLIPTIC CURVE POINT ADDITION MODULE
7502 DYX = YC2 - YC1: IDXC = XC1 + XC2: DCX = XC2 - XC1: IF DCX < 0 THEN DCX = DCX + P
7506 BINV = DCX: AST = P
7520 GOSUB 1000: REM CALLING INVERSE MODULE
7530 LCM = (DYX * XC) MOD P: LCM2 = (LCM ^ 2) MOD P
7540 XWC = (LCM2 - IDXC) MOD P: IF XWC < 0 THEN XWC = P + XWC
7550 YWC = ((LCM * ((XC1 + XC1 + XC2 - LCM2) MOD P)) - YC1) MOD P: IF YWC < 0 THEN
YWC = P + YWC
7560 REM PRINT XWC; YWC
7570 RETURN
8600 REM CHECKER MODULE: REM LIST TO BE CHECKED IS SUPPLIED AT THE CALLING
MODULE POINT
8602 FOR RT = 1 TO LN: PSK(2, RT) = 0: NEXT RT: CT = 0
8603 FOR H2 = 0 TO P - 1
8604 Y0 = ((H2 * ((H2 ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - 53 * H2 + 218) MOD P: IF Y0 < 0 THEN Y0 = Y0 + P
8605 DV = 0: YS = Y0: PTR = 2: GOSUB 9400:
8606 ON BQ GOTO 8607, 8608, 8608, 8608, 8608, 8608, 8608, 8607, 8608, 8607, 8608
8607 PRINT USING " ##### " ; H2; QE1; : GOTO 8610
8608 GOTO 8648: REM UN-USED PIN CODE:
8610 DV = DV + 1:
```

Appendix CH 3.7 MESSAGE ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION

```

8612 IF H2 = YC1(DV) AND (QE1 = YC2(DV) OR P - YC2(DV)) THEN CT = CT + 1: VAP1 = H2: VAP2 = QE1
: VAP3 = P - YC2(DV): PSK(2, DV) = 1: GOTO 8617: REM PRINT H2; QE1; YC2(DV); "A HIT ": GOTO 8618
8613 REM IF H2 = YC1(DV) AND QE1 = YC2(DV) THEN CT = CT + 1: VAP1 = H2: VAP2 = QE1
: VAP3 = P - YC2(DV): PSK(2, DV) = 1:
PRINT H2; QE1; H2;P-QE1;:"A HIT ": GOTO 8618
8614 IF DV < LN THEN 8610: REM LENGTH OF ARRAY TO BE CHECKED
8616 PSK(2, DV) = 0: GOTO 8642: REM NEXT XF:
8617 IF BQ <> 3 OR BQ <> 4 OR BQ <> 5 OR BQ <> 6 THEN PRINT H2; QE1; YC2(DV); "A HIT "
REM GOTO 8618
8618 ON BQ GOTO 8619, 8620, 8622, 8624, 8626, 8628, 8630, 8632, 8634, 8636, 8637
8619 GOTO 8648: REM QQ=1:REM UN-USED PIN CODES-CURVE PARAMETERS
8620 GOTO 8648: REM QQ=2: REM UN-USED PIN CODE- DATA CURVE POINTS GENERATOR
8622 W = 1: CPM1 = VAP1: CPM2 = VAP2: GOTO 8642: REM BQ=3
8624 W = 1: CPL1 = VAP1: CPL2 = VAP2: GOTO 8642: REM BQ=4
8626 W = 1: CCPLT1 = VAP1: CCPLT2 = VAP2: GOTO 8642: REM BQ=5
8628 W = 1: CCPMT1 = VAP1: CCPMT2 = VAP2: GOTO 8642: REM BQ=6
8630 GOTO 8648: REM BQ=7 NOT IN USE PN CODE -ENCRYPTOR-CYA
8632 WW(DV) = 1: CCYA1(DV) = VAP1: CCYA2(DV) = VAP2: GOTO 8642: REM BQ=8
8634 GOTO 8648: REM BQ=9 NOT IN USE PIN CODE ENCRYPTION CURIATOR
8636 WW(DV) = 1: CDC1(DV) = VAP1: CDC2(DV) = VAP2: GOTO 8642: REM BQ=10
8637 GOTO 8648: REM QQ=12 NOT IN USE PINCODE DECRYPTOR CURIATOR
8642 NEXT H2: PRINT : PRINT
8644 PRINT " TOTAL NUMBER OF HITS="; CT; "AND THE ORDER OF THE GROUP IS ="; RDR
: REM STOP
8645 REM PRINT :
PRINT " _____": STOP
8646 GOTO 8648: REM UN-USED PIN CODES FOR ENCRYPTION,DECRYPTION AND THEIR CURES
8648 RETURN
9400 REM
9402 DSQ = (YS ^ 2) MOD P:
9405 DCB = (DSQ * YS) MOD P:
9406 DQD = (DSQ ^ 2) MOD P
9408 DCT = (DQD ^ 2) MOD P
9409 D12 = (DCT * DQD) MOD P
9410 D60 = (((((D12 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * D12) MOD P
9412 D68 = (D60 * DCT) MOD P:
9414 D5 = (((((D68 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * D68) MOD P
9416 DD5 = (((((D5 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * D5) MOD P
9418 DDD5 = (((((DD5 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * DD5) MOD P:
9420 DEX = (DSQ * DCB) MOD P:
9422 PHJ = (DEX * DDD5) MOD P
9424 IF PHJ <> 1 THEN SLK = 1: GOTO 9460
9426 DORR = DORR + YS / P

```


Appendix CH 3.7 MESSAGE ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION

```

9428 VT2 = (YS ^ 2) MOD P
9429 VT3 = (VT2 * YS) MOD P
9440 VT30 = ((((((VT5 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * VT5) MOD P) * VT5) MOD P
9441 VT34 = (VT30 * VT4) MOD P:
9444 VTT1 = (((((VT34 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * VT34) MOD P:
9446 VTT2 = (((((VTT1 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * VTT1) MOD P:
9448 VTT3 = (((((VTT2 ^ 2) MOD P) ^ 2) MOD P) * VTT2) MOD P
9450 QE1 = (VTT3 * VT2) MOD P
9452 REM PRINT XD; QE1, : REM STOP
9460 RETURN
9800 REM DATA CURVE POINTS BY SELECTION/PROCESSING
9802 KQ = 0: KP = -1: KQ = 1: GASO = CD(KQ): CV = 0
9804 KP = KP + 1:
9806 D1 = ((KP * ((KP ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - 53 * KP + 218) MOD P: IF D1 < 0 THEN D1 = D1 + P
9808 YS = D1: SLK = 0: PTR = 2: GOSUB 9400: BR = 0:
9810 IF SLK = 1 THEN 9804
9812 IF KP = CD(KQ) THEN CV = CV + 1: XCBP(CV) = KP: YCBP(CV) = QE1:
PRINT USING " ## #####      ##### "; CV; CD(KQ); XCBP(CV); YCBP(CV): GOTO 9830
9814 IF KP < P - 1 THEN 9804:
9816 BR = CV:
9818 GASO = GASO + 1: GASO = GASO MOD P:
9820 IF GASO = XCBP(BR) THEN 9818:
9822 BR = BR - 1: IF BR > 0 THEN 9820
9824 KP = GASO: D1 = ((KP * ((KP ^ 2) MOD P)) MOD P - 53 * KP + 218) MOD P
: IF D1 < 0 THEN D1 = D1 + P
9826 YS = D1: SLK = 0: GOSUB 9400: IF SLK <> 1 THEN CV = CV + 1: XCBP(CV) = KP
: YCBP(CV) = QE1:
PRINT USING " ## #####      ##### "; CV; CD(KQ); XCBP(CV); YCBP(CV): GOTO 9830
9828 GOTO 9816
9830 KQ = KQ + 1
9832 IF KQ > LN THEN 9836
9834 GASO = CD(KQ): KP = -1: BR = 0: GOTO 9804: REM STOP
9836 RETURN
10000 AST = P
10002 J = 1: X(J) = XP(ZL): Y(J) = YP(ZL): REM PRINT X(J); Y(J)
10004 FOR J = 2 TO KS
10008 IF J = 2 THEN 10022
10010 BINV = (XP(ZL) - X(J - 1)):
10012 IF BINV < 0 THEN BINV = P + BINV
10014 GOSUB 1000

```

Appendix CH 3.7 MESSAGE ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION

```
10016 LMDA = ((YP(ZL) - Y(J - 1)) * INV) MOD P: IF LMDA < 0 THEN LMDA = P + LMDA
10018 X(J) = (LMDA ^ 2 - X(J - 1) - XP(ZL)) MOD P: IF X(J) < 0 THEN X(J) = X(J) + P: REM PRINT X(J);
10020 GOTO 10032
10022 BINV = 2 * Y(J - 1): IF BINV <= 0 THEN BINV = P + BINV
10026 GOSUB 1000
10028 LMDA = ((3 * (X(J - 1) ^ 2) MOD P + AE) * INV) MOD P: IF LMDA < 0 THEN LMDA = P + LMDA
10030 X(J) = ((LMDA ^ 2) MOD P - 2 * X(J - 1)) MOD P: IF X(J) < 0 THEN X(J) = P + X(J)
: REM PRINT X(J);
10032 Y(J) = (LMDA * (X(J - 1) - X(J)) - Y(J - 1)) MOD P: REM PRINT J;
10034 IF Y(J) < 0 THEN Y(J) = P + Y(J):
10036 REM PRINT X(J); Y(J)
10052 NEXT J: PRINT "AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR"; J - 1; "IS "; X(J - 1)
; Y(J - 1)
: REM STOP
10200 RETURN
```

Appendix CH 3.8 RR7SQSD T-gate Multiplexing property Test QB 4.5 CODE

```
2 CLS : SCREEN 1: COLOR 6 : RR7SQSD multiplexing property Test
4 DIM X6(18), D0(18), D1(18), D2(18), D3(18), D4(18), D5(18), D6(18), X(18)
6 DATA -3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3
10 READ LM3, LM2, LM1, L0, L1, L2, L3
12 DATA 2,-3,1,0,2,-2,1,3,-3,0,-1,2,3,1,-2,-1,0,2
14 DATA 1,1,-2,-3,0,1,-2,1,1,2,-1,2,2,3,1,0,-1,2
16 DATA -2,1,-3,0,1,0,-2,3,3,1,2,2,3,-2,-2,1,3,-3
20 DATA 0,3,-3,2,-1,2,-3,3,3,0,0,1,2,3,1,1,-2,3
22 DATA 1,1,-1,2,-2,2,3,3,3,-3,-3,-3,2,-2,2,3,1,-3
24 DATA -3,2,1,0,-1,2,1,-1,1,2,3,0,1,3,2,0,1,0
26 DATA 3,2,1,1,2,3,-1,1,2,2,1,-3,3,2,-1,3,1,1
28 DATA 2,-3,-1,0,1,-2,3,0,2,1,2,-3,1,2,0,3,-2,-1
30 L = 0: GOSUB 200: REM STOP: REM DRAW "BL160": DRAW "BD60": DRAW "M+10,00"
32 PRINT : PRINT : PRINT " Appendix CH 3.8 QB 4.5 Code"
34 PRINT " _____ ": PRINT
36 FOR P = 1 TO 18
40 READ D0(P), D1(P), D2(P), D3(P), D4(P), D5(P), D6(P), X(P)
48 GOSUB 2000: REM CIRCUIT SIMULATION
50 GOSUB 8000: REM OUTPUT PROCESSOR
55 NEXT P: REM VIEW PRINT 1 TO 10: COLOR 8, 4
58 PRINT " D3"; " "; "D2"; " "; "D1"; " "; "D0"; " "; "D-1"; " "; "D-2"; " "; "D-3"; " "; "X"; "
"; "O/P"
60 FOR K = 1 TO 6
64 PRINT D0(K); " "; D1(K); " "; D2(K); " "; D3(K); " "; D4(K); " "; D5(K); " "; D6(K); " "; X(K);
"; X6(K)
66 NEXT K: REM COLOR 6
68 FOR TY = 1 TO 9: PRINT : NEXT TY: PRINT
70 PRINT : PRINT " CP-gate derived RR7SQSD T-gate "
76 PRINT " Multiplexing ability simulation ": REM STOP
120 END
200 COLOR 8: DRAW "BD45"
210 DRAW "L150": DRAW "NR280": DRAW "BR140": DRAW "BD50": DRAW "BU100"
220 DRAW "D100": DRAW "U50": DRAW "BL100"
230 RETURN
2000 REM CIRCUIT SIMULATION
2010 L = L + 1
3400 IF X(P) <= LM3 THEN X0 = D0(P): GOTO 4060
4050 X0 = D1(P)
```

Appendix CH 3.8 RR7SQSD T-gate Multiplexing property Test QB 4.5 CODE

```
4060 IF X(P) <= LM1 THEN X1 = D2(P): GOTO 6000
5065 X1 = D3(P)
6000 IF X(P) < L1 THEN X2 = D3(P): GOTO 6280
6075 X2 = D4(P)
6280 IF X(P) <= L2 THEN X3 = D5(P): GOTO 7090
6485 X3 = D6(P)
7090 IF X(P) <= LM2 THEN X4 = X0: GOTO 7100
7095 X4 = X1
7100 IF X(P) <= L1 THEN X5 = X2: GOTO 7310
7205 X5 = X3
7310 IF X(P) <= L0 THEN X6(L) = X4: GOTO 7220
7315 X6(L) = X5
7220 RETURN
```

8000 REM OUTPUT PROCESSOR

```
8202 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8204 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "D10": GOTO 8900
8206 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8208 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8210 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8212 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8214 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D60": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
```

8300 REM PHASE 0

```
8302 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8304 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8306 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8308 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8310 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8312 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8314 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
```

8400 REM PHASE 1

```
8402 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8404 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8406 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8408 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "F10": GOTO 8900
8410 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8412 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8414 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
```

Appendix CH 3.8 RR7SQSD T-gate Multiplexing property Test QB 4.5 CODE

8500 REM PHASE 2

8502 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8504 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8506 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8508 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8510 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8512 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8514 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8600 REM PHASE 3

8602 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8604 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8606 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8608 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8610 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8612 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8614 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8700 REM PHASE 4

8702 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8704 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8706 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8708 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8710 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8712 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8714 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8800 REM PHASE 5

8802 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U60": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8804 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8806 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8808 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8810 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8812 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8814 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "R10"

8900 SLEEP 1: RETURN

```

5  CLS : REM FULL ADDER :SCREEN 1: REM COLOR 4
10 DIM ALPHA(22), BETA(22), DL(3, 7, 7), CL(3, 7, 7), GAMA(23), DELT(23), XL0(3, 7), XC0(3, 7)
, XL1(3), XC1(3), X6(23)
20 DATA 0,1,2,3,-3,-2,-1, -1,-1,-1,-1,0,0,0
30 DATA 1,2,3,-3,-2,-1,0,-1,-1,-1,0,0,0,0
40 DATA 2,3,-3,-2,-1,0,1,-1,-1,0,0,0,0,0
50 DATA 3,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,-1,0,0,0,0,0,0
60 DATA -3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
70 DATA -2,-1,0,1,2,3,-3,0,0,0,0,0,1
80 DATA -1,0,1,2,3,-3,-2,0,0,0,0,0,1,1
82 REM
90 DATA 1,2,3,-3,-2,-1,0,-1,-1,-1,0,0,0,0
92 DATA 2,3,-3,-2,-1,0,1,-1,-1,0,0,0,0,0
94 DATA 3,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,-1,0,0,0,0,0,0
96 DATA -3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
98 DATA -2,-1,0,1,2,3,-3,0,0,0,0,0,1
100 DATA -1,0,1,2,3,-3,-2,0,0,0,0,0,1,1
102 DATA 0,1,2,3,-3,-2,-1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1
104 REM
106 DATA 2,3,-3,-2,-1,0,-1,-1,-1,0,0,0,0,0
108 DATA 3,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,-1,0,0,0,0,0,0
110 DATA -3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
114 DATA -1,0,1,2,3,-3,-2,0,0,0,0,0,1,1
116 DATA 0,1,2,3,-3,-2,-1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1
118 DATA 1,2,3,-3,-2,-1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1
120 REM DATA -3,-2,2,-1,1,3,3,-2,2,-2,2,1,1,2
122 DATA 3,2,2,0,-3,-3,2,2,1,3,0,2,-1,-3,2,0,-3,2,2,1,-1,2,-3,-3,2,3,2,-1,0,2,0,-2,0,0,2,2,1,2,1,0,2,3,0,3
124 DATA -3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3
130 FOR L = 1 TO 3
132 FOR G = 0 TO 6
140 FOR I = 0 TO 6
150 READ DL(L, G, I): PRINT DL(L, G, I); : NEXT I: PRINT ,
160 FOR I = 0 TO 6
170 READ CL(L, G, I): PRINT CL(L, G, I); : NEXT I
172 PRINT : PRINT
178 NEXT G: PRINT "L="; L - 1: REM STOP
180 NEXT L
182 REM FOR Y = 6 TO 0 STEP -1
183 FOR Y = 21 TO 0 STEP -1
184 READ ALPHA(Y), BETA(Y)
186 PRINT ALPHA(Y); BETA(Y); : NEXT Y: PRINT : REM PRINT : STOP
187 READ LM3, LM2, LM1, L0, L1, L2, L3
188 DELT(7)=0
190 REM FOR Y = 6 TO 0 STEP -1
191 FOR Y = 21 TO 0 STEP -1
192 C = 0: P0 = -3

```

Appendix CH 3.9 RR7SQSD full adder circuit simulation QB 4.5 CODE

```
194 C = C + 1
196 IF C = 1 THEN X = ALPHA(Y): GOTO 340
220 IF C = 2 THEN X = BETA(Y): GOTO 300
230 X = DELT(Y + 1)
270 T = -1: TT = 0: P0 = -1
280 T = T + 1: TT = TT + 1
282 IF T > 2 THEN PRINT "ERROR3": GOTO 440
284 P = P0 + T
290 IF X = P THEN XL2 = XL1(TT): XC2 = XC1(TT): GAMA(Y) = XL2: DELT(Y) = XC2: PRINT , GAMA(Y)
; DELT(Y); X; P; T; TT: GOTO 440
292 GOTO 280
300 FOR L = 1 TO 3
302 T = -1: P0 = -3: T=T+1
310 IF T > 6 THEN PRINT "ERROR2": GOTO 336
320 P = P0 + T
330 IF X = P THEN XL1(L) = XL0(L, T): XC1(L) = XC0(L, T): PRINT XL1(L); : GOTO 336
332 GOTO 304
336 NEXT L: PRINT : GOTO 194
340 P0 = -3: FOR L = 1 TO 3
350 FOR G = 0 TO 6
354 T = T + 1
356 IF T > 6 THEN PRINT "ERROR1": GOTO 380
358 P = P0 + T
360 IF X = P THEN XL0(L, G) = DL(L, G, T): XC0(L, G) = CL(L, G, T): PRINT XL0(L, G); : GOTO 380
370 GOTO 354
380 NEXT G: PRINT
390 NEXT L: PRINT "Y="; Y
400 GOTO 194
440 REM DELT(7) = DELT(6)
442 DELT(12) = DELT(11)
450 NEXT Y: GAMA(23) = DELT(0): X6(23) = DELT(0): PRINT GAMA(23);
: FOR Y = 0 TO 22: PRINT GAMA(Y); : NEXT Y
452 X6(1) = GAMA(23): FOR L = 2 TO 23: X6(L) = GAMA(L - 2): NEXT L: PRINT : PRINT
: FOR T = 1 TO 23: PRINT X6(T); : NEXT T
455 GOSUB 10000:PRINT " Appendix CH 3.9          QB 4.5 Code"
456 PRINT " _____ ": PRINT
457 FOR K = 0 TO 21: REM 21 TO 0 STEP -1
459 IF K < 9 THEN 462
460 PRINT ALPHA(K);
464 IF K < 9 THEN 468
466 PRINT BETA(K);
468 NEXT K: PRINT : K = 24: L = 0
500 GOSUB 8000: PRINT : PRINT : SCREEN 1: COLOR 1: REM FOR Y = 23 TO 1 STEP -1
: PRINT X6(Y); : NEXT Y
502 FOR TY = 1 TO 10: PRINT : NEXT TY: PRINT
504 PRINT : PRINT " Dual RR7SQSD full adder/multiplier"
505 PRINT " simulation (addition mode) ": REM STOP
600 END
```

Appendix CH 3.9 RR7SQSD full adder circuit simulation QB 4.5 CODE

```
8000 SCREEN 1: COLOR C2: REM OUTPUT PROCESSOR
8001 PRINT
8002 L = L + 1: IF L = 1 THEN X6(L - 1) = 0: GOTO 8202
8004 IF L > 23 THEN RETURN
8006 X6(L) = GAMA(L - 2): REM PRINT X6(L);
8202 PRINT X6(L); : IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8204 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "D10": GOTO 8900
8206 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8208 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8210 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8212 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8214 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D60": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8300 REM PHASE 0
8302 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8304 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8306 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8308 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8310 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8312 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8314 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8400 REM PHASE 1
8402 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8404 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8406 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8408 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "F10": GOTO 8900
8410 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8412 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8414 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8500 REM PHASE 2
8502 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8504 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8506 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8508 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8510 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8512 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8514 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8600 REM PHASE 3
8602 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8604 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "E10": GOTO 8900
8606 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8608 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8610 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8612 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8614 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
```


Appendix CH 3.9 RR7SQSD full adder circuit simulation QB 4.5 CODE

8600 REM PHASE 3

8602 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8604 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "E10": GOTO 8900

8606 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8608 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8610 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8612 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8614 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8700 REM PHASE 4

8702 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8704 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8706 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8708 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8710 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8712 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8714 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8800 REM PHASE 5

8802 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U60": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8804 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8806 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8810 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8812 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8814 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "R10"

8900 SLEEP 1: GOTO 8002

10000 SCREEN 1: COLOR 9

10002 DRAW "BD15"

10010 DRAW "L150": DRAW "NR280": DRAW "BR140": DRAW "BD50": DRAW "BU100"

10020 DRAW "D100": DRAW "U50": DRAW "BL100"

10030 RETURN

Appendix CH3.10 Quasi-RR7SQSD T-gate based multiplier circuit simulation QB 4.5 CODE

```
2 REM PRINT "SIMULATION OF RR7SQSD FULL MULTIPLIER CORRECTED VERSION"
5 CLS : REM SCREEN 1: COLOR 4
10 DIM ALPHA(22), BETA(22), DL(3, 7, 7), CL(3, 7, 7), GAMA(23), DELT(23), ZGA(23), X6(23)
20 DATA 1,-2,2,-1,3,0,-3,1,1,0,0,-1,-1,-1
30 DATA -2,3,1,-1,-3,2,0,1,0,0,0,0,-1,-1
40 DATA 2,1,0,-1,-2,-3,3,0,0,0,0,0,0,-1
50 DATA -1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,0,0,0,0,0,0
60 DATA 3,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,-1,0,0,0,0,0
70 DATA 0,2,-3,-1,1,3,2,-1,-1,0,0,0,1
80 DATA -3,0,3,-1,2,-2,1,-1,-1,-1,0,0,1,1

82 REM
90 DATA 2,-1,3,0,-3,1,-2,1,1,0,0,0,-1,-1
92 DATA -1,-3,2,0,-2,3,1,1,1,0,0,0,-1,-1
94 DATA 3,2,1,0,-1,-2,-3,0,0,0,0,0,0
96 DATA 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
98 DATA -3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
100 DATA 1,3,-2,0,2,-3,-1,-1,-1,0,0,0,1,1
102 DATA -2,1,-3,0,3,-1,2,-1,-1,0,0,0,1,1

104 REM
106 DATA 3,0,-3,1,-2,2,-1,1,1,1,0,0,-1,-1
108 DATA 0,-2,3,1,-1,-3,2,1,1,0,0,0,-1
110 DATA -3,3,2,1,0,-1,-2,1,0,0,0,0,0
112 DATA 1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0
114 DATA -2,-1,0,1,2,3,-3,0,0,0,0,0,1
116 DATA 2,-3,-1,1,3,-2,0,-1,0,0,0,1,1
118 DATA -1,2,-2,1,-3,0,3,-1,-1,0,0,1,1,1

120 REM
130 FOR L = 1 TO 3
132 FOR G = 0 TO 6
140 FOR I = 0 TO 6
150 READ DL(L, G, I): PRINT DL(L, G, I); : NEXT I: PRINT ,
160 FOR I = 0 TO 6
170 READ CL(L, G, I): PRINT CL(L, G, I); : NEXT I
172 PRINT : PRINT
178 NEXT G: PRINT "L="; L - 1: REM STOP
179 NEXT L
180 REM DATA 3,2,2,0,-3,-3,2,2,1,3,0,2,-1,-3,2,0,-3,2,2,1
REM ,-1,2,-3,-3,2,3,2,-1,0,2,0,-2,0,0,2,2,1,2,1,0,2,3,0,3
181 DATA 0,3,2,3,1,0,1,2,2,2,0,0,0,-2,0,2,2,-1,2,3,-3,-3,-1
182 DATA 2,2,1,-3,2,2,0,-1,-3,0,2,1,3,2,2,-3,-3,2,0,3,2
183 FOR Y = 1 TO 22
```

Appendix CH3.10 Quasi-RR7SQSD T-gate based multiplier circuit simulation QB 4.5 CODE

```
184 READ ALPHA(Y), BETA(Y)
192 Z = ALPHA(Y) * BETA(Y)
194 IF Z < -3 OR Z = -3 AND DELT(Y - 1) = -1 THEN DELT(Y) = -1: GOTO 220
196 IF Z > 3 OR Z = 3 AND DELT(Y - 1) = 1 THEN DELT(Y) = 1: GOTO 220
198 DELT(Y) = 0
220 ZGA(Y) = Z - 7 * DELT(Y)
221 GAMA(Y) = ZGA(Y) + DELT(Y - 1)
223 X6(Y) = GAMA(Y)
225 NEXT Y: GAMA(Y) = DELT(Y - 1): X6(Y) = GAMA(Y):
228 READ LM3, LM2, LM1, L0, L1, L2, L3
230 DATA -3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3
453 GOSUB 10000:
454 PRINT " Appendix CH4.8B      QB 4.5 Code"
456 PRINT " _____ ": PRINT
458 FOR K = 1 TO 22: REM 22 TO 1 STEP -1
459 REM IF K < 9 THEN 462
460 PRINT ALPHA(K);
462 NEXT K: PRINT : FOR K = 1 TO 22
464 REM IF K < 9 THEN 468
466 PRINT BETA(K);
468 NEXT K: PRINT : L = 0
500 GOSUB 8000: PRINT : PRINT : SCREEN 1: COLOR 1:
502 FOR TY = 1 TO 8: PRINT : NEXT TY: PRINT
504 PRINT : PRINT " Dual RR7SQSD full adder/multiplier"
505 PRINT " simulation (multiplication mode) ": REM STOP
600 END

8000 SCREEN 1: COLOR C2: L = 0: REM OUTPUT PROCESSOR
8001 PRINT
8002 L = L + 1: IF L > 23 THEN RETURN
8202 PRINT X6(L);
8203 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8204 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "D10": GOTO 8900
8206 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8208 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8210 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8212 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8214 IF X6(L) = LM3 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D60": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900

8300 REM PHASE 0
8302 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8304 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8306 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8308 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8310 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8312 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8314 IF X6(L) = LM2 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
```

Appendix CH3.10 Quasi-RR7SQSD T-gate based multiplier circuit simulation QB 4.5 CODE

```
8400 REM PHASE 1
8402 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8404 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8406 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8408 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8410 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8412 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8414 IF X6(L) = LM1 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8500 REM PHASE 2
8502 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8504 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8506 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8508 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8510 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8512 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8514 IF X6(L) = L0 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8600 REM PHASE 3
8602 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8604 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8606 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8608 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8610 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8612 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8614 IF X6(L) = L1 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8700 REM PHASE 4
8702 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8704 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8706 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8708 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8710 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8712 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8714 IF X6(L) = L2 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "D10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8800 REM PHASE 5
8802 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM3 THEN DRAW "U60": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8804 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM2 THEN DRAW "U50": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8806 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = LM1 THEN DRAW "U40": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8808 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = L0 THEN DRAW "U30": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8810 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = L1 THEN DRAW "U20": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8812 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = L2 THEN DRAW "U10": DRAW "R10": GOTO 8900
8814 IF X6(L) = L3 AND X6(L - 1) = L3 THEN DRAW "R10"
8900 SLEEP 1: GOTO 8002
10000 SCREEN 1: COLOR 9
10002 DRAW "BD15"
10010 DRAW "L150": DRAW "NR280": DRAW "BR140": DRAW "BD50": DRAW "BU100"
10020 DRAW "D100": DRAW "U50": DRAW "BL100"
10030 RETURN
```


Appendix CH 4.2 Result of the multiplicative inverse computation (mod 37, 79,241)

LHS IS THE NUMBER AND THE RHS IS THE MULTIPLICATIVE INVERSE

1	1	2	19	3	25	4	28	5	15	6	31
7	16	8	14	9	33	10	26	11	27	12	34
13	20	14	8	15	5	16	7	17	24	18	35
19	2	20	13	21	30	22	32	23	29	24	17
25	3	26	10	27	11	28	4	29	23	30	21
31	6	32	22	33	9	34	12	35	18	36	36
END OF MODULO 37											

1	1	2	40	3	53	4	20	5	16	6	66
7	34	8	10	9	44	10	8	11	36	12	33
13	73	14	17	15	58	16	5	17	14	18	22
19	25	20	4	21	64	22	18	23	55	24	56
25	19	26	76	27	41	28	48	29	30	30	29
31	51	32	42	33	12	34	7	35	70	36	11
37	47	38	52	39	77	40	2	41	27	42	32
43	68	44	9	45	72	46	67	47	37	48	28
49	50	50	49	51	31	52	38	53	3	54	60
55	23	56	24	57	61	58	15	59	75	60	54
61	57	62	65	63	74	64	21	65	62	66	6
67	46	68	43	69	71	70	35	71	69	72	45
73	13	74	63	75	59	76	26	77	39	78	78
END OF MODULO 79											

1	1	2	121	3	161	4	181	5	193	6	201
7	69	8	211	9	134	10	217	11	22	12	221
13	204	14	155	15	225	16	226	17	156	18	67
19	203	20	229	21	23	22	11	23	21	24	231
25	135	26	102	27	125	28	198	29	133	30	233
31	70	32	113	33	168	34	78	35	62	36	154
37	228	38	222	39	68	40	235	41	194	42	132
43	213	44	126	45	75	46	131	47	200	48	236
49	182	50	188	51	52	52	51	53	191	54	183
55	149	56	99	57	148	58	187	59	192	60	237
61	162	62	35	63	88	64	177	65	89	66	84
67	18	68	39	69	7	70	31	71	129	72	77
73	208	74	114	75	45	76	111	77	72	78	34
79	180	80	238	81	122	82	97	83	151	84	66
85	224	86	227	87	205	88	63	89	65	90	158
91	98	92	186	93	184	94	100	95	137	96	118
97	82	98	91	99	56	100	94	101	105	102	26
103	117	104	146	105	101	106	216	107	232	108	212
109	199	110	195	111	76	112	170	113	32	114	74
115	197	116	214	117	103	118	96	119	160	120	239
121	2	122	81	123	145	124	138	125	27	126	44
127	167	128	209	129	71	130	165	131	46	132	42
133	29	134	9	135	25	136	140	137	95	138	124
139	215	140	136	141	147	142	185	143	150	144	159
145	123	146	104	147	141	148	57	149	55	150	143
151	83	152	176	153	178	154	36	155	14	156	17
157	175	158	90	159	144	160	119	161	3	162	61
163	207	164	169	165	130	166	196	167	127	168	33
169	164	170	112	171	210	172	234	173	202	174	223
175	157	176	152	177	64	178	153	179	206	180	79
181	4	182	49	183	54	184	93	185	142	186	92

Appendix CH 4.2 Result of the multiplicative inverse computation (mod 241,691)

187	58	188	50	189	190	190	189	191	53	192	59
193	5	194	41	195	110	196	166	197	115	198	28
199	109	200	47	201	6	202	173	203	19	204	13
205	87	206	179	207	163	208	73	209	128	210	171
211	8	212	108	213	43	214	116	215	139	216	106
217	10	218	220	219	230	220	218	221	12	222	38
223	174	224	85	225	15	226	16	227	86	228	37
229	20	230	219	231	24	232	107	233	30	234	172
235	40	236	48	237	60	238	80	239	120	240	240

END OF MODULO 241

1	1	2	346	3	461	4	173	5	553	6	576	7	395
8	432	9	384	10	622	11	377	12	288	13	319	14	543
15	645	16	216	17	122	18	192	19	291	20	311	21	362
22	534	23	661	24	144	25	387	26	505	27	128	28	617
29	143	30	668	31	535	32	108	33	356	34	61	35	79
36	96	37	635	38	491	39	567	40	501	41	118	42	181
43	225	44	267	45	215	46	676	47	544	48	72	49	550
50	539	51	271	52	598	53	339	54	64	55	490	56	654
57	97	58	417	59	82	60	334	61	34	62	613	63	351
64	54	65	202	66	178	67	526	68	376	69	681	70	385
71	146	72	48	73	142	74	663	75	129	76	591	77	350
78	629	79	35	80	596	81	273	82	59	83	358	84	436
85	439	86	458	87	278	88	479	89	132	90	453	91	243
92	338	93	639	94	272	95	611	96	36	97	57	98	275
99	349	100	615	101	130	102	481	103	530	104	299	105	487
106	515	107	155	108	32	109	336	110	245	111	442	112	327
113	159	114	394	115	685	116	554	117	189	118	41	119	511
120	167	121	474	122	17	123	500	124	652	125	492	126	521
127	185	128	27	129	75	130	101	131	211	132	89	133	239
134	263	135	302	136	188	137	575	138	686	139	174	140	538
141	642	142	73	143	29	144	24	145	305	146	71	147	644
148	677	149	320	150	410	151	270	152	641	153	551	154	175
155	107	156	660	157	669	158	363	159	113	160	298	161	588
162	482	163	496	164	375	165	624	166	179	167	120	168	218
169	184	170	565	171	493	172	229	173	4	174	139	175	154
176	585	177	488	178	66	179	166	180	572	181	42	182	467
183	472	184	169	185	127	186	665	187	388	188	136	189	117
190	651	191	568	192	18	193	401	194	374	195	528	196	483
197	228	198	520	199	566	200	653	201	636	202	65	203	514
204	586	205	300	206	265	207	227	208	495	209	529	210	589
211	131	212	603	213	279	214	423	215	45	216	16	217	570
218	168	219	508	220	468	221	222	222	221	223	471	224	509
225	43	226	425	227	207	228	197	229	172	230	688	231	347
232	277	233	605	234	440	235	247	236	366	237	242	238	601
239	133	240	429	241	324	242	237	243	91	244	354	245	110
246	250	247	235	248	326	249	580	250	246	251	457	252	606
253	437	254	438	255	607	256	359	257	406	258	383	259	683
260	396	261	323	262	451	263	134	264	390	265	206	266	465
267	44	268	477	269	280	270	151	271	51	272	94	273	81

Appendix CH 4.2 Result of the multiplicative inverse computation mod 691

274	633	275	98	276	343	277	232	278	87	279	213
280	269	281	541	282	321	283	398	284	382	285	434
286	360	287	313	288	12	289	373	290	498	291	19
292	381	293	408	294	322	295	431	296	684	297	577
298	160	299	104	300	205	301	427	302	135	303	504
304	666	305	145	306	621	307	682	308	433	309	407
310	399	311	20	312	330	313	287	314	680	315	623
316	527	317	497	318	402	319	13	320	149	321	282
322	294	323	261	324	241	325	455	326	248	327	112
328	533	329	670	330	312	331	405	332	435	333	608
334	60	335	658	336	109	337	447	338	92	339	53
340	628	341	614	342	592	343	276	344	460	345	689
346	2	347	231	348	415	349	99	350	77	351	63
352	638	353	599	354	244	355	582	356	33	357	631
358	83	359	256	360	286	361	379	362	21	363	158
364	579	365	443	366	236	367	450	368	430	369	397
370	409	371	542	372	678	373	289	374	194	375	164
376	68	377	11	378	404	379	361	380	671	381	292
382	284	383	258	384	9	385	70	386	546	387	25
388	187	389	556	390	264	391	486	392	587	393	531
394	114	395	7	396	260	397	369	398	283	399	310
400	672	401	193	402	318	403	679	404	378	405	331
406	257	407	309	408	293	409	370	410	150	411	422
412	478	413	604	414	459	415	348	416	593	417	58
418	610	419	597	420	640	421	540	422	411	423	214
424	647	425	226	426	485	427	301	428	557	429	240
430	368	431	295	432	8	433	308	434	285	435	332
436	84	437	253	438	254	439	85	440	234	441	445
442	111	443	365	444	456	445	441	446	581	447	337
448	600	449	454	450	367	451	262	452	558	453	90
454	449	455	325	456	444	457	251	458	86	459	414
460	344	461	3	462	519	463	494	464	484	465	266
466	648	467	182	468	220	469	470	470	469	471	223
472	183	473	523	474	121	475	675	476	646	477	268
478	412	479	88	480	560	481	102	482	162	483	196
484	464	485	426	486	391	487	105	488	177	489	626
490	55	491	38	492	125	493	171	494	463	495	208
496	163	497	317	498	290	499	673	500	123	501	40
502	574	503	555	504	303	505	26	506	564	507	522
508	219	509	224	510	649	511	119	512	525	513	625
514	203	515	106	516	537	517	552	518	687	519	462
520	198	521	126	522	507	523	473	524	571	525	512
526	67	527	316	528	195	529	209	530	103	531	393
532	578	533	328	534	22	535	31	536	584	537	516
538	140	539	50	540	421	541	281	542	371	543	14
544	47	545	620	546	386	547	667	548	662	549	618
550	49	551	153	552	517	553	5	554	116	555	503
556	389	557	428	558	452	559	602	560	480	561	590
562	616	563	664	564	506	565	170	566	199	567	39
568	191	569	674	570	217	571	524	572	180	573	650
574	502	575	137	576	6	577	297	578	532	579	364
580	249	581	446	582	355	583	659	584	536	585	176
586	204	587	392	588	161	589	210	590	561	591	76

Appendix CH 4.2 Result of the multiplicative inverse computation (mod 691)

592	342	593	416	594	634	595	655	596	80	597	419
598	52	599	353	600	448	601	238	602	559	603	212
604	413	605	233	606	252	607	255	608	333	609	632
610	418	611	95	612	656	613	62	614	341	615	100
616	562	617	28	618	549	619	643	620	545	621	306
622	10	623	315	624	165	625	513	626	489	627	637
628	340	629	78	630	657	631	357	632	609	633	274
634	594	635	37	636	201	637	627	638	352	639	93
640	420	641	152	642	141	643	619	644	147	645	15
646	476	647	424	648	466	649	510	650	573	651	190
652	124	653	200	654	56	655	595	656	612	657	630
658	335	659	583	660	156	661	23	662	548	663	74
664	563	665	186	666	304	667	547	668	30	669	157
670	329	671	380	672	400	673	499	674	569	675	475
676	46	677	148	678	372	679	403	680	314	681	69
682	307	683	259	684	296	685	115	686	138	687	518
688	230	689	345	690	690						

END OF MODULO 691

Appendix CH 4.2 Result of the multiplicative inverse computation (mod 17011)

1	1	2	8506	3	11341	4	4253	5	13609
6	14176	7	14581	8	10632	9	15121	10	15310
11	3093	12	7088	13	14394	14	15796	15	15877

1041	13465	1042	10889	1043	14483	1044	277	1045	1286
1046	3464	1047	13924	1048	1120	1049	12065	1050	3386
1051	11864	1052	11594	1053	5218	1054	11572	1055	9739
1056	1627	1057	5842	1058	16191	1059	9140	1060	12341
1061	7776	1062	8057	1063	5665	1064	9161	1065	6453

9491	10702	9492	15278	9493	2093	9494	10050	9495	16203
9496	6114	9497	11924	9498	15537	9499	2380	9500	2523
9501	6707	9502	8083	9503	14308	9504	3961	9505	6978
9506	13602	9507	15839	9508	7831	9509	4560	9510	15453
9511	10413	9512	8121	9513	15770	9514	6435	9515	14694
9516	4621	9517	1337	9518	13592	9519	3231	9520	15133
9521	10813	9522	1799	9523	861	9524	7875	9525	5865
9526	12752	9527	13772	9528	4808	9529	4313	9530	5139
9531	8576	9532	11302	9533	5571	9534	8766	9535	3156
9536	8229	9537	1946	9538	4885	9539	9168	9540	14602
9541	13939	9542	12071	9543	15314	9544	1335	9545	4623
9546	10872	9547	98	9548	10998	9549	864	9550	8477

14596	13320	14597	1656	14598	11766	14599	134	14600	127
14601	7842	14602	9540	14603	3073	14604	16276	14605	3825
14606	290	14607	14966	14608	15489	14609	4922	14610	15927
14611	645	14612	16933	14613	2873	14614	220	14615	14164
14616	3665	14617	5379	14618	6739	14619	10831	14620	5898
14621	5630	14622	13408	14623	9111	14624	7041	14625	11671
14626	9636	14627	1106	14628	5825	14629	14790	14630	2522
14631	7512	14632	15538	14633	1538	14634	2698	14635	1167
14636	6919	14637	9566	14638	6932	14639	6562	14640	452
14641	9051	14642	10771	14643	11458	14644	9968	14645	5342
14646	2201	14647	10067	14648	9157	14649	2960	14650	15570
14651	15937	14652	16362	14653	12733	14654	7542	14655	14520

16956	9588	16957	315	16958	8345	16959	4907	16960	10340
16961	13949	16962	14928	16963	15239	16964	11220	16965	1849
16966	378	16967	11985	16968	1978	16969	405	16970	4149
16971	4678	16972	12213	16973	15668	16974	1839	16975	8978
16976	486	16977	15510	16978	15980	16979	14353	16980	14816
16981	567	16982	7039	16983	9113	16984	630	16985	9814
16986	10887	16987	13467	16988	3698	16989	6959	16990	810
16991	9356	16992	14325	16993	945	16994	14009	16995	11695
16996	1134	16997	1215	16998	2617	16999	9923	17000	13918
17001	1701	17002	1890	17003	6379	17004	2430	17005	2835
17006	3402	17007	12758	17008	5670	17009	8505	17010	17010

END OF MODULO 17011									

Appendix CH4.3 Result of the EC group $E_{17011}(-53,218)$ and message embedment

THE PLAN TEXT MESSAGE TO BE SENT IS

'THE QUICK BROWN FOX JUMPS OVER THE LAZY DOG'

THE CORRESPONDING NUMERIC CODE IS

1507	2704	2625	1201	527	2006
1827	2205	2715	1619	2113	2710
1524	2706	2314	1815	2702	311
2109	2717	605	20		

AND THE ELLIPTIC CURVE CONSTANTS ARE-53 218 17011

WHILE THE RATIONAL CURVE POINTS ARE

2 4835	4 16541	7 3799	8 2632	10 9691
12 10031	13 16051	15 12516	16 12088	18 13186
19 9968	21 8173	22 7965	24 12986	25 12332
27 12618	29 4603	30 11849	33 5600	37 3030
42 1188	43 14253	44 10474	45 15296	46 4691
47 9130	55 7007	56 143	58 13948	59 5048
60 4832	62 10629	63 841	66 8655	67 15587
72 13994	73 14948	74 16998	76 3339	77 10711
78 1959	80 10575	81 13609	83 9230	85 12119
88 13594	90 14153	92 10123	94 11914	95 9634
97 8804	99 9924	101 16674	107 5996	108 14893
109 682	111 5328	112 4525	115 3883	120 14043
121 5789	124 3938	125 11383	126 1629	127 11618
129 5936	132 11640	133 8916	134 10066	140 9048
141 15295	142 14068	143 14046	145 8922	146 11350
149 3948	150 4928	151 13385	152 13877	157 14503
159 6276	162 4225	163 11877	165 6676	166 7629
167 4881	169 3970	171 6117	173 3588	175 9700
176 2179	177 15572	180 10650	183 4108	184 16561
186 14819	188 342	189 1779	193 11651	194 11168
196 6187	199 10962	201 6837	204 6711	208 1398
209 3201	212 12396	214 5649	215 897	218 14209
226 606	234 2647	235 8469	237 10601	243 6211
245 434	246 8513	247 13022	248 8612	250 7835
252 3856	258 11130	260 15862	261 11060	263 4855
264 11142	266 4691	267 16992	270 14767	271 5308
273 9443	274 15473	275 1542	276 14734	278 8813
279 9984	281 6	282 11984	283 12680	285 8079
286 14814	288 2343	291 3938	293 4167	294 8892
295 14108	296 14681	299 16631	300 11615	301 10259
302 14050	305 16967	307 5906	308 15282	311 4188
313 4403	316 16190	318 3951	320 14439	321 2769
322 13689	323 5656	324 7756	325 8314	327 14469
328 8230	331 11943	333 5874	337 6479	338 15026
339 3355	343 11244	344 7401	345 10474	348 1470
349 7473	351 2793	354 9924	356 12616	357 2465
358 16956	359 16067	366 13609	367 13056	368 1322

Appendix CH4.3 Result of the EC group E₁₇₀₁₁(-53,218) and message embedment

370	12109	372	11155	373	4510	374	13589	375	9100
378	3588	379	9224	380	11350	383	9891	384	8281
385	10375	386	719	387	16922	388	2573	389	3442
391	575	392	10134	393	15627	394	237	395	6881
397	9709	398	2893	399	3001	401	1898	403	5857
406	7040	414	620	418	1723	420	6379	421	13300
422	7671	423	11296	424	14388	425	13156	426	3205
428	9579	429	7341	432	9967	433	11085	434	15579
439	4239	441	16304	442	1460	444	8253	445	3613
447	8034	453	12809	455	15961	457	10251	458	15219
461	15209	465	14601	466	834	467	14555	471	13506
472	14278	474	6485	475	4279	477	15472	480	3653
481	9884	483	6332	485	11127	487	12407	488	14676
490	7425	491	5947	492	8359	493	8159	496	14509
498	13000	499	12521	500	2292	501	4134	505	6623
508	5890	514	12227	515	1755	518	12315	525	14566
526	13960	528	12647	530	3788	532	8494	533	16604
534	4544	535	2413	539	16019	540	1299	543	8086
545	5988	546	15543	548	7955	555	8058	556	2289
558	12411	559	6531	560	5731	563	6420	566	6691
567	10913	569	15423	571	12946	572	8058	574	13876
576	1779	579	8631	582	16382	584	16130	585	2083
590	6699	591	14924	592	5157	593	11489	596	8684
597	4489	602	16569	603	1045	610	3309	615	12835
618	13048	619	11530	620	14954	621	8630	622	16154
623	10387	629	4719	631	12227	632	15291	633	1431
635	13789	639	5983	640	3028	641	4501	643	10231
644	1796	647	10579	652	12027	654	10458	656	14330
658	6102	659	13807	661	3733	662	11433	663	8118
667	8405	670	2946	671	8385	672	11413	674	2477
676	7337	679	8574	680	7145	681	8483	682	9398
683	16547	687	6759	689	729	690	5004	691	10786
692	1641	695	8495	696	14468	697	5883	699	2734
700	11328	701	6882	704	2770	707	4136	708	6171
709	7269	710	16056	714	10028	715	255	720	2258
721	13298	722	790	723	2935	726	6742	727	15657
729	14097	730	14184	732	10893	733	6450	734	3608
736	11932	737	4296	740	9165	744	591	745	11476
747	4680	752	15850	754	12382	757	16619	758	2708
759	3180	760	6242	761	16672	762	16933	763	7056
764	2037	767	8636	769	8655	770	4619	771	10077
776	8477	777	7420	779	4776	781	15698	785	3647
788	13823	789	1603	790	1334	791	3617	792	5486
796	14376	797	16392	798	9529	799	13951	801	11537
803	3246	804	4660	806	7942	808	9237	810	8574
814	6424	819	3298	821	6964	825	13800	828	13771
829	14536	831	5453	832	1570	834	12039	835	14621
836	11694	837	4324	838	14167	840	3389	842	5846
843	7756	847	6199	851	1201	854	6994	855	10410
858	16272	860	14979	864	3943	866	9445	868	2251
869	6208	872	6212	874	6652	875	12125	878	13906
879	15743	880	6549	882	1526	884	1634	886	15470
889	5188	890	16038	892	1286	895	520	898	5230
899	6776	902	5563	903	7416	905	3327	906	14369
907	5409	908	1548	912	16599	913	825	917	5930
918	6832	921	2408	928	11955	929	7577	931	4441
932	7293	934	14158	936	14868	937	8230	938	3896
939	3879	941	8164	944	12938	948	14103	949	14535

Appendix CH4.3 Result of the EC group E₁₇₀₁₁(-53,218) and message embedment

952	6186	953	7169	954	11503	955	2928	956	5363
959	16476	960	7790	962	546	963	9544	966	4236
967	12957	968	11490	970	9992	971	10193	974	6401
980	12028	981	4965	983	10916	985	16537	986	15688
987	11939	991	6604	993	16522	996	3779	997	8823
998	5812	999	12776	1000	8320	1005	14897	1008	5061
1009	15553	1011	10058	1012	9368	1014	1003	1018	16529
1020	3764	1023	8548	1025	3047	1026	7048	1029	14326
1030	9550	1037	9988	1040	12230	1041	15427	1042	14776
1043	10139	1044	13548	1045	7254	1046	4039	1047	5802
1048	10118	1052	10881	1054	12330	1056	11554	1057	12519
1058	9696	1059	16883	1060	9078	1062	15218	1064	9397
1068	10592	1069	12988	1074	3920	1077	8118	1080	6792
1083	8227	1088	1306	1090	10537	1091	9414	1093	13125
1094	12445	1097	13740	1098	12162	1104	3299	1105	14757
1106	6660	1107	12251	1109	4587	1114	2704	1115	9956
1119	10271	1120	11378	1121	6691	1124	11804	1125	10697
1127	1230	1131	3793	1136	8630	1138	16645	1139	5025
1144	8573	1146	724	1148	3740	1151	7125	1153	10878
1154	13902	1155	110	1158	1290	1159	5364	1162	6467
1168	3792	1169	9397	1172	9579	1174	2490	1176	16785
1179	2223	1181	598	1182	319	1186	4300	1187	2182
1188	9208	1189	7874	1190	5001	1191	15651	1193	11556
1194	10609	1195	15269	1199	6634	1200	336	1204	15324
1206	9317	1207	4961	1209	10139	1211	16616	1214	9163
1215	5802	1220	6093	1224	16633	1227	544	1228	8912
1229	13233	1230	5534	1232	12521	1237	6058	1238	9833
1240	2260	1242	13516	1245	4527	1246	13822	1249	3939
1250	6028	1252	9047	1257	4783	1258	16051	1259	6948
1261	10324	1264	2037	1266	2107	1275	9893	1276	6045
1277	7710	1278	7561	1282	13230	1284	5357	1285	10830
1286	14634	1288	8445	1303	12238	1305	16771	1308	8022
1309	12221	1310	9642	1315	332	1321	4239	1322	724
1324	4545	1327	11751	1329	3802	1330	10691	1332	4888
1334	2440	1336	14718	1338	15264	1339	708	1340	1408
1341	10775	1342	6381	1343	3581	1346	13914	1347	1660
1349	15762	1353	16054	1354	9192	1356	8658	1361	1009
1363	6282	1364	5842	1366	6067	1370	15959	1372	9629
1373	7137	1375	16579	1376	7592	1381	16139	1382	7636
1383	890	1384	4795	1385	14204	1387	7031	1389	14367
1390	11008	1391	12737	1394	3530	1395	1873	1397	14184
1401	6039	1403	9136	1404	9696	1409	4181	1410	7280
1411	8073	1412	1274	1414	7667	1418	9258	1423	2866
1424	12546	1427	12262	1432	5651	1434	14191	1435	10099
1437	4052	1438	6610	1441	12846	1443	2551	1444	5167
1445	5057	1451	9743	1452	5083	1453	12433	1457	2224
1459	16658	1461	693	1463	8539	1468	10049	1469	8361

Appendix CH4.3 Result of the EC group E₁₇₀₁₁(-53,218) and message embedment

1473	15335	1475	7350	1476	16791	1479	4053	1480	1611
1481	11534	1483	11416	1484	6144	1485	9575	1489	6355
1490	14972	1491	387	1494	13071	1495	5549	1498	1641
1507	16417	1509	4862	1510	13380	1514	13193	1515	10031
1517	2462	1519	8714	1525	4099	1529	8000	1530	11752
1532	15911	1537	8718	1540	513	1543	2573	1544	15455
1547	16042	1548	3447	1550	12304	1553	3529	1554	11978
1555	2671	1559	1110	1561	1854	1564	1522	1566	1840
1568	7273	1570	4279	1571	4354	1572	12544	1575	676
1580	9625	1582	4420	1585	6530	1591	13658	1592	14474
1594	12170	1597	15286	1598	3962	1599	1042	1602	8919
1603	4294	1608	4734	1611	4055	1612	5651	1613	14778
1614	6742	1615	3123	1616	2229	1617	6470	1618	15451
1619	915	1620	3964	1621	8796	1622	4747	1623	11259
1624	11948	1626	15888	1631	4947	1636	5932	1639	5158
1643	6268	1644	5046	1645	5737	1647	15380	1649	12274
1650	1335	1652	7903	1654	3593	1656	525	1657	2874
1658	13973	1661	11076	1663	15140	1664	6761	1665	9136
1667	1949	1668	4863	1669	5610	1670	15863	1674	8445
16192	6143	16193	7706	16194	16383	16195	9998	16197	6644
16198	11008	16199	6232	16200	3112	16201	6355	16203	8048
16206	14527	16207	3203	16209	12724	16211	9032	16212	5882
16213	16743	16215	4549	16225	5482	16227	2653	16230	4195
16233	14880	16236	3648	16240	16499	16241	1927	16242	14621
16243	740	16246	1779	16249	6482	16253	13347	16254	11267
16256	14593	16257	16343	16262	8299	16263	11102	16265	5850
16268	14771	16269	624	16270	7573	16272	3790	16274	3547
16275	7101	16276	9912	16278	15709	16279	9514	16281	2549
16282	4705	16283	14398	16284	6185	16288	7970	16289	13296
16290	1881	16294	37	16295	8294	16296	6737	16297	4753
16298	5963	16302	3579	16304	4020	16305	13937	16307	7746
16308	16214	16312	2226	16313	16921	16316	383	16317	306
16319	12022	16320	1763	16322	9420	16323	14026	16330	6247
16332	6355	16333	1077	16334	9694	16336	2091	16337	16119
16338	9138	16341	11942	16343	3683	16347	1296	16352	2938
16354	15621	16356	5579	16358	15699	16360	12609	16361	11800
16363	11022	16366	4385	16368	1229	16369	9179	16370	3393
16372	3536	16374	5004	16376	12131	16377	4628	16378	16581
16379	4096	16382	12950	16384	8907	16387	10112	16388	12864
16391	13650	16392	16497	16393	14192	16398	10313	16399	11149
16400	1698	16401	11009	16403	121	16407	7939	16408	11834
16414	5702	16417	3629	16419	13616	16422	5224	16425	13683
16427	11002	16428	13657	16430	2954	16433	14520	16434	11008
16437	13916	16439	1230	16440	11278	16447	9773	16450	1007
16452	3669	16455	9811	16456	1230	16459	14311	16460	3588
16461	16062	16462	12012	16463	6591	16464	3929	16466	13797
16476	11722	16481	5681	16485	11350	16487	1021	16488	13788
16492	8030	16493	2616	16496	3657	16499	138	16500	11548
16503	16301	16504	15532	16505	7230	16506	15860	16508	2754
16509	3986	16510	6378	16511	12741	16513	8743	16515	1510
16517	8943	16521	8601	16523	842	16524	13509	16525	7622
16526	10968	16527	4384	16531	13369	16532	11616	16534	8701
16535	16397	16536	15633	16541	3270	16542	12373	16547	8677
16549	14632	16550	3076	16552	8002	16553	2809	16558	9924
16559	16501	16561	6919	16562	7232	16563	14275	16564	13609
16566	11059	16567	6724	16569	8008	16570	1911	16571	11775

Appendix CH4.3 Result of the EC group E₁₇₀₁₁(-53,218) and message embedment

16576	2530	16578	9630	16580	2033	16581	13714	16584	14417
16585	16418	16587	3279	16588	10552	16590	16308	16592	3248
16594	8636	16596	3938	16598	2971	16600	620	16601	3082
16602	6555	16603	13409	16604	3128	16609	9366	16610	11665
16612	15497	16613	8067	16614	7346	16616	16536	16617	9536
16620	10694	16622	10474	16624	10131	16625	4177	16626	6196
16627	12794	16628	2939	16629	6602	16631	13960	16637	13531
16642	12874	16643	1679	16644	4088	16645	8034	16646	2102
16648	6228	16651	14495	16652	471	16653	4345	16657	12809
16658	7957	16659	9111	16660	6243	16661	8636	16662	3681
16664	12005	16665	14252	16666	3442	16667	11306	16668	14240
16669	2366	16670	2963	16674	2724	16675	2732	16676	5659
16678	7430	16680	13020	16682	8868	16686	12642	16688	1823
16690	14926	16691	8586	16693	1165	16695	15074	16698	6827
16699	4691	16700	5810	16701	6610	16702	6112	16705	3003
16708	3120	16711	5344	16712	8807	16713	14949	16714	13506
16715	15305	16716	14655	16718	574	16719	7685	16723	16225
16726	16733	16727	9877	16728	9243	16730	14567	16731	5189
16733	10277	16735	13998	16738	2948	16740	2983	16744	1023
16746	14813	16747	8771	16748	16143	16750	1133	16751	9181
16752	10237	16753	13336	16754	16564	16758	5669	16760	13905
16763	5975	16764	7017	16767	6030	16768	2933	16769	13174
16770	4227	16772	1410	16773	2216	16775	3192	16776	14916
16778	8386	16779	15431	16784	7131	16785	3269	16787	6268
16791	15911	16792	3380	16794	6233	16795	573	16798	12868
16799	11644	16800	2866	16803	1816	16804	14888	16808	6447
16809	14658	16810	7429	16811	9945	16812	8728	16813	14786
16815	10146	16819	1061	16821	4859	16823	13649	16824	11134
16825	10982	16828	10430	16830	13760	16832	7348	16833	12454
16835	6516	16837	13506	16841	6093	16842	2737	16843	11678
16846	12822	16853	15696	16854	5970	16856	3349	16859	15443
16860	4651	16861	8763	16863	23	16865	13960	16868	1887
16869	15239	16871	4356	16873	14510	16874	1727	16875	5806
16876	3373	16879	4417	16880	1089	16881	2434	16884	14295
16885	2673	16893	1459	16897	8298	16898	9848	16899	13154
16901	16112	16902	3645	16904	8816	16905	12573	16908	371
16911	9937	16912	12809	16913	5161	16918	10323	16919	13887
16920	43	16922	9693	16930	8034	16933	8561	16935	3329
16936	7524	16938	5608	16939	10327	16943	14764	16945	14621
16946	126	16948	6523	16953	4931	16954	3916	16955	816
16958	5004	16960	10592	16961	1553	16967	3442	16976	2660
16979	9335	16980	11794	16982	772	16983	11642	16985	2714
16987	16091	16989	12166	16990	792	16996	3300	17001	7136
17003	16350	17004	14102	17005	15111	17008	620	17010	14564
THE ORDER OF FIELD =				21223					

Appendix CH4.3 Result of the EC group $E_{17011}(-53,218)$ and message embedment

THE PLAN NUMERIC TEXT EMBEDDED INTO THE ELLPTIC CURVE GROUP OF POINTS IS

S/N0	RAW MESSAGE	CURVE POINTS EMBEDDMENT
1	1507	1507 16417
2	2704	2704 393
3	2625	2628 2950
4	1201	1204 15324
5	527	528 12647
6	2006	2006 9629
7	1827	1828 1936
8	2205	2205 14215
9	2715	2715 13753
10	1619	1619 915
11	2113	2113 10358
12	2710	2710 401
13	1524	1525 4099
14	2706	2708 11651
15	2314	2314 12327
16	1815	1816 6343
17	2702	2702 11279
18	311	311 4188
19	2109	2109 15967
20	2717	2718 3716
21	605	610 3309
22	20	21 8173

QB 4.5 CODE

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication

CURVE CONSTANTS ARE -53 218 17011

SET OF SPECIMEN MULTIPLIERS

822 4	761 4	900 4	1191 4	1289 5	873 4	29 3	156 3
375 4	1379 5	2340 5	2983 5	3399 5	3408 5	3414 5	6085 5
7985 5	5690 5	8387 5	2713 5	619 4			

SPECIMEN GENERATOR POINTS

8360 14564	10 9691	4 16541	7 3799	12 10051	1 14209	5 4843
11 2893	23 1029	30 8895	38 5491	60 3457	68 9024	78 3457
88 2689	91 1785	92 9878	96 3457	18 2408		

8360 14564

2 3 -2 3

12321 4459 4719 4691 14865 8849 2454 10939

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 822 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 822 IS 2454 10939

2 2 -3 -2

12321 4459 5751 13213 8843 5660 16672 10659

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 761 AND BASE POINT = 8360 ,-14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 761 IS 16672 10659

3 -3 3 -3

5187 16942 3955 14672 7970 2321 5012 15195

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 900 AND BASE POINT = 8360 ,-14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 900 IS 5012 15195

3 3 2 1

5187 16942 11383 11726 10002 4151 11724 15967

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1191 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1191 IS 11724 15967

1 -3 -2 2 1

8360 14564 5865 16280 4916 3405 13532 13881 978 301

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1289 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1289 IS 978 301

3 -3 -1 -2

5187 16942 3955 14672 16809 13832 16530 5539

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 873 AND BASE POINT = 8360 ,-14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 873 IS 16530 5539

1 -3 1

8360 14564 5865 16280 2336 8654

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 29 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 29 IS 2336 8654

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

3 1 2

5187 16942 14851 7309 800 5192

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 156 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 156 IS 800 5192

1 1 -2 -3

8360 14564 112 16439 2597 4241 1426 6857

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 375 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , -14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 375 IS 1426 6857

1 -3 0 1 0

8360 14564 5865 16280 3659 4256 8311 16533 6033 7999

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1379 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1379 IS 6033 7999

1 0 -1 -2 2

8360 14564 13509 216 12536 6665 3138 12270 5631 10019

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2340 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2340 IS 5631 10019

1 2 -2 -1 1

8360 14564 4864 10562 2001 1170 994 10094 5533 14546

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2983 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2983 IS 5533 14546

1 3 -1 3 -3

8360 14564 11908 5548 15826 1651 15718 9868 9214 14664

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3399 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , -14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3399 IS 9214 14664

1 3 0 -3 -1

8360 14564 11908 5548 2346 9029 11179 3793 461 2991

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3408 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , -14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3408 IS 461 2991

1 3 0 -2 -2

8360 14564 11908 5548 2346 9029 8162 9149 8789 8363

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3414 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , -14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3414 IS 8789 8363

3 -3 -2 1 2 5187 16942 3955 14672 11914 4055 15027 6752 7466 2155

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 6085 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 6085 IS 7466 2155

3 2 2 0 -2

5187 16942 2455 11621 5918 7726 506 3481 6476 4466

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 7985 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , -14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 7985 IS 6476 4466

2 3 -3 1 -1

12321 4459 4719 4691 5077 4704 8691 5269 6241 6985

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 5690 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , -14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 5690 IS 6241 6985

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

3 3 3 1 1

5187 16942 11383 11726 8140 11764 2197 4767 1157 5554

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 8387 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 8387 IS 1157 5554

1 1 -1 3 -3

8360 14564 112 16439 6365 5932 8533 12024 9208 6260

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2713 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , -14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2713 IS 9208 6260

2 -1 -3 3

12321 4459 15964 15641 3267 13379 5792 5742

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 619 AND BASE POINT = 8360 , 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 619 IS 5792 5742

_____ END OF GENERATOR POINT 8360 14564 _____

4 16541

2 3 -2 3

8935 11733 3354 3608 7516 10630 15981 13868

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 822 AND BASE POINT = 4 , 16541

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 822 IS 15981 13868

2 2 -3 -2

8935 11733 7596 12659 13351 5612 15377 10730

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 761 AND BASE POINT = 4 , -16541

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 761 IS 15377 10730

3 -3 3 -3

5331 10050 3312 932 483 6143 8420 11983

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 900 AND BASE POINT = 4 , -16541

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 900 IS 8420 11983

3 3 2 1

5331 10050 10735 6949 15763 10586 3474 11240

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1191 AND BASE POINT = 4 , 16541

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1191 IS 3474 11240

1 -3 -2 2 1

4 16541 411 9968 11641 9975 1848 10144 1624 8933

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1289 AND BASE POINT = 4 , 16541

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1289 IS 1624 8933

3 -3 -1 -2

5331 10050 3312 932 3515 14746 4976 10422

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 873 AND BASE POINT = 4 , -16541

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 873 IS 4976 10422

1 -3 1

4 16541 411 9968 4711 13909

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 29 AND BASE POINT = 4 , 16541

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 29 IS 4711 13909

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

3 1 2
5331 10050 2036 758 15576 5789
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 156 AND BASE POINT = 4 , 16541
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 156 IS 15576 5789

1 1 -2 -3
4 16541 16145 10057 2240 11398 15084 3944
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 375 AND BASE POINT = 4 ,-16541
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 375 IS 15084 3944

1 -3 0 1 0
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 873 AND BASE POINT = 30 ,-8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 873 IS 1395 10257

1 -3 1
30 8895 16994 9778 1521 5115
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 29 AND BASE POINT = 30 , 8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 29 IS 1521 5115

3 1 2
1738 11383 13635 12385 8913 491
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 156 AND BASE POINT = 30 , 8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 156 IS 8913 491

1 1 -2 -3
30 8895 11937 1645 14052 5390 5887 11985
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 375 AND BASE POINT = 30 ,-8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 375 IS 5887 11985

1 -3 0 1 0
30 8895 16994 9778 13053 1393 16997 6849 13396 10294
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1379 AND BASE POINT = 30 , 8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1379 IS 13396 10294

1 0 -1 -2 2
30 8895 2070 13321 10239 14030 450 5033 265 1290
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2340 AND BASE POINT = 30 , 8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2340 IS 265 1290

1 2 -2 -1 1
30 8895 3739 1881 653 14097 5485 12523 7269 11037
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2983 AND BASE POINT = 30 , 8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2983 IS 7269 11037

1 3 -1 3 -3
30 8895 143 15246 14579 10382 6179 7198 4369 3510
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3399 AND BASE POINT = 30 ,-8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3399 IS 4369 3510

1 3 0 -3 -1
30 8895 143 15246 10252 3373 5392 13787 5261 1960
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3408 AND BASE POINT = 30 ,-8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3408 IS 5261 1960

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

1 3 0 -2 -2
30 8895 143 15246 10252 3373 1183 11734 14429 13906
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3414 AND BASE POINT = 30 , -8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3414 IS 14429 13906

3 -3 -2 1 2
1738 11383 10172 12507 1375 6178 13264 418 13612 12252
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 6085 AND BASE POINT = 30 , 8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 6085 IS 13612 12252

3 2 2 0 -2
1738 11383 3550 14240 14322 8748 14901 11573 5961 13507
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 7985 AND BASE POINT = 30 , -8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 7985 IS 5961 13507

2 3 -3 1 -1
4004 16253 2937 2358 3546 5137 1916 12499 3515 2009
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 5690 AND BASE POINT = 30 , -8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 5690 IS 3515 2009

3 3 3 1 1
1738 11383 2457 13057 12403 7402 7390 9771 14431 14474
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 8387 AND BASE POINT = 30 , 8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 8387 IS 14431 14474

1 1 -1 3 -3
30 8895 11937 1645 10744 9530 9518 11740 5410 5348
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2713 AND BASE POINT = 30 , -8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2713 IS 5410 5348

2 -1 -3 3
4004 16253 4760 6484 6444 10939 3412 745
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 619 AND BASE POINT = 30 , 8895
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 619 IS 3412 745

_____ END OF GENERATOR POINT 30 8895 _____

88 2689

2 3 -2 3
5404 15652 3267 16648 8097 6169 11495 2864
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 822 AND BASE POINT = 88 , 2689
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 822 IS 11495 2864

2 2 -3 -2
5404 15652 1172 2340 13295 7807 2812 1352
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 761 AND BASE POINT = 88 , -2689
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 761 IS 2812 1352

3 -3 3 -3
9754 5977 907 11903 16022 10523 8157 666
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 900 AND BASE POINT = 88 , -2689
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 900 IS 8157 666

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

3 3 2 1

9754 5977 8941 8768 7511 15485 5226 392

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1191 AND BASE POINT = 88 , 2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1191 IS 5226 392

1 -3 -2 2 1

88 2689 9730 1127 16393 4567 1249 8649 1473 2555

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1289 AND BASE POINT = 88 , 2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1289 IS 1473 2555

3 -3 -1 -2

9754 5977 907 11903 3774 2011 697 16142

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 873 AND BASE POINT = 88 ,-2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 873 IS 697 16142

1 -3 1

88 2689 9730 1127 8225 578

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 29 AND BASE POINT = 88 , 2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 29 IS 8225 578

3 1 2

9754 5977 209 14395 3559 15805

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 156 AND BASE POINT = 88 , 2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 156 IS 3559 15805

1 1 -2 -3

88 2689 12756 382 14667 5069 1139 16598

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 375 AND BASE POINT = 88 ,-2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 375 IS 1139 16598

1 -3 0 1 0

88 2689 9730 1127 1929 13425 3039 4088 9468 10752

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1379 AND BASE POINT = 88 , 2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1379 IS 9468 10752

1 0 -1 -2 2

88 2689 16274 8968 5831 16684 6134 12008 3821 3101

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2340 AND BASE POINT = 88 , 2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2340 IS 3821 3101

1 2 -2 -1 1

88 2689 5586 16701 3790 16505 6793 10950 4207 6834

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2983 AND BASE POINT = 88 , 2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2983 IS 4207 6834

1 3 -1 3 -3

88 2689 4955 14647 16552 665 12788 4363 7853 12238

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3399 AND BASE POINT = 88 ,-2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3399 IS 7853 12238

1 3 0 -3 -1

88 2689 4955 14647 14671 2501 9379 4115 12107 3603

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3408 AND BASE POINT = 88 ,-2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3408 IS 12107 3603

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

1 3 0 -2 -2

88 2689 4955 14647 14671 2501 7687 7630 7490 10920

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3414 AND BASE POINT = 88 , -2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3414 IS 7490 10920

3 -3 -2 1 2

9754 5977 907 11903 8584 2175 4419 15879 16166 12830

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 6085 AND BASE POINT = 88 , 2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 6085 IS 16166 12830

3 2 2 0 -2

9754 5977 9110 15668 5717 1074 11336 11361 387 3715

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 7985 AND BASE POINT = 88 , -2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 7985 IS 387 3715

2 3 -3 1 -1 5404 15652 3267 16648 13123 8089 11025 6347 14934 12862

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 5690 AND BASE POINT = 88 , -2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 5690 IS 14934 12862

3 3 3 1 1

9754 5977 8941 8768 4748 1245 10675 12032 15996 3822

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 8387 AND BASE POINT = 88 , 2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 8387 IS 15996 3822

1 1 -1 3 -3

88 2689 12756 382 2985 4147 304 13892 6823 16022

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2713 AND BASE POINT = 88 , -2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2713 IS 6823 16022

2 -1 -3 3

5404 15652 10348 5514 14362 11355 7035 2943

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 619 AND BASE POINT = 88 , 2689

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 619 IS 7035 2943

_____ END OF GENERATOR POINT 88 2689 _____

91 1785

2 3 -2 3

1887 8282 7403 15727 2251 10863 296 3149

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 822 AND BASE POINT = 91 , 1785

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 822 IS 296 3149

2 2 -3 -2

1887 8282 16815 8000 9379 6809 7716 13541

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 761 AND BASE POINT = 91 , -1785

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 761 IS 7716 13541

3 -3 3 -3

5930 4115 3969 5254 11111 11159 11191 6136

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 900 AND BASE POINT = 91 , -1785

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 900 IS 11191 6136

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

3 3 2 1
5930 4115 5721 1635 8781 4364 2829 10713
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1191 AND BASE POINT = 91 , 1785
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1191 IS 2829 10713

1 -3 -2 2 1
91 1785 14413 3760 8792 11751 5040 11275 4836 12120
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1289 AND BASE POINT = 91 , 1785
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1289 IS 4836 12120

3 -3 -1 -2
5930 4115 3969 5254 4054 8829 8259 5199
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 873 AND BASE POINT = 91 , -1785
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 873 IS 8259 5199

1 -3 1
91 1785 14413 3760 4811 832
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 29 AND BASE POINT = 91 , 1785
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 29 IS 4811 832

3 1 2
5930 4115 2857 431 10248 11847
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 156 AND BASE POINT = 91 , 1785
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 156 IS 10248 11847

1 1 -2 -3
91 1785 1180 228 8987 14622 12756 4988
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 375 AND BASE POINT = 91 , -1785
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 375 IS 12756 4988

1 -3 0 1 0
91 1785 14413 3760 126 11082 10756 9684 14991 5822
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1379 AND BASE POINT = 91 , 1785
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1379 IS 14991 5822

1 0 -1 -2 2
91 1785 14978 11897 9168 5675 16459 16532 7429 2294
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2340 AND BASE POINT = 91 , 1785
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2340 IS 7429 2294

1 2 -2 -1 1
91 1785 2944 15931 15157 2515 9541 4304 8896 11342
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2983 AND BASE POINT = 91 , 1785
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2983 IS 8896 11342

1 3 -1 3 -3
91 1785 9404 2666 16786 4886 7235 16487 6470 4604
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3399 AND BASE POINT = 91 , -1785
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3399 IS 6470 4604

1 3 0 -3 -1
91 1785 9404 2666 5643 4680 6363 566 12321 7703
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3408 AND BASE POINT = 91 , -1785
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3408 IS 12321 7703

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

1 3 0 -2 -2

91 1785 9404 2666 5643 4680 13064 15065 7917 9912

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3414 AND BASE POINT = 91 , -1785

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3414 IS 7917 9912

3 -3 -2 1 2

5930 4115 3969 5254 10391 1267 13423 12281 5889 1353

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 6085 AND BASE POINT = 91 , 1785

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 6085 IS 5889 1353

3 2 2 0 -2

5930 4115 15662 14927 5553 8846 5717 16835 9464 7829

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 7985 AND BASE POINT = 91 , -1785

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 7985 IS 9464 7829

2 3 -3 1 -1

1887 8282 7403 15727 8111 15307 4169 16689 7883 3198

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 5690 AND BASE POINT = 91 , -1785

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 5690 IS 7883 3198

3 3 3 1 1

5930 4115 5721 1635 2077 11806 9367 2621 15616 13624

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 8387 AND BASE POINT = 91 , 1785

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 8387 IS 15616 13624

1 1 -1 3 -3

91 1785 1180 228 15459 16287 456 13699 10641 12482

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2713 AND BASE POINT = 91 , -1785

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2713 IS 10641 12482

2 -1 -3 3

1887 8282 4548 3770 5936 12716 3476 10501

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 619 AND BASE POINT = 91 , 1785

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 619 IS 3476 10501

_____ END OF GENERATOR POINT 91 1785 _____

92 9878

2 3 -2 3

9503 16340 1908 4216 11126 318 14479 13052

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 822 AND BASE POINT = 92 , 9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 822 IS 14479 13052

2 2 -3 -2

9503 16340 530 10338 51 2482 2857 5214

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 761 AND BASE POINT = 92 , -9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 761 IS 2857 5214

3 -3 3 -3

1251 1229 4851 6852 7928 5280 13826 5924

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 900 AND BASE POINT = 92 , -9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 900 IS 13826 5924

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

3 3 2 1

1251 1229 9763 9457 4956 5326 5010 16494

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1191 AND BASE POINT = 92 , 9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1191 IS 5010 16494

1 -3 -2 2 1

92 9878 13861 4530 14526 8091 10316 4131 14833 11688

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1289 AND BASE POINT = 92 , 9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1289 IS 14833 11688

3 -3 -1 -2

1251 1229 4851 6852 16467 742 16301 2936

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 873 AND BASE POINT = 92 , -9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 873 IS 16301 2936

1 -3 1

92 9878 13861 4530 7124 11261

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 29 AND BASE POINT = 92 , 9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 29 IS 7124 11261

3 1 2

1251 1229 4263 16759 7320 15798

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 156 AND BASE POINT = 92 , 9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 156 IS 7320 15798

1 1 -2 -3

92 9878 826 7662 4213 5132 9413 14815

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 375 AND BASE POINT = 92 , -9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 375 IS 9413 14815

1 -3 0 1 0

92 9878 13861 4530 4519 10066 11144 6602 12179 8925

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1379 AND BASE POINT = 92 , 9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1379 IS 12179 8925

1 0 -1 -2 2

92 9878 5364 8396 9217 9760 7851 13078 858 8979

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2340 AND BASE POINT = 92 , 9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2340 IS 858 8979

1 2 -2 -1 1

92 9878 2059 3245 1833 11475 6663 9120 12251 9335

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2983 AND BASE POINT = 92 , 9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2983 IS 12251 9335

1 3 -1 3 -3

92 9878 2060 10042 409 11553 1832 11108 16111 8105

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3399 AND BASE POINT = 92 , -9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3399 IS 16111 8105

1 3 0 -3 -1

92 9878 2060 10042 13005 5014 16468 6702 11031 16895

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3408 AND BASE POINT = 92 , -9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3408 IS 11031 16895

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

1 3 0 -2 -2

92 9878 2060 10042 13005 5014 16554 13924 9238 16463

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3414 AND BASE POINT = 92 , -9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3414 IS 9238 16463

3 -3 -2 1 2

1251 1229 4851 6852 9851 1762 15375 13311 10374 3460

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 6085 AND BASE POINT = 92 , 9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 6085 IS 10374 3460

3 2 2 0 -2

1251 1229 3803 16884 836 11209 3141 11189 9520 2041

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 7985 AND BASE POINT = 92 , -9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 7985 IS 9520 2041

2 3 -3 1 -1

9503 16340 1908 4216 11748 11191 420 5460 5586 9914

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 5690 AND BASE POINT = 92 , -9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 5690 IS 5586 9914

3 3 3 1 1

1251 1229 9763 9457 1841 15065 7106 6850 852 16027

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 8387 AND BASE POINT = 92 , 9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 8387 IS 852 16027

1 1 -1 3 -3

92 9878 826 7662 6254 4141 7875 9314 2396 8687

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2713 AND BASE POINT = 92 , -9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2713 IS 2396 8687

2 -1 -3 3

9503 16340 8729 6274 844 12794 12626 5416

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 619 AND BASE POINT = 92 , 9878

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 619 IS 12626 5416

_____ END OF GENERATOR POINT 92 9878 _____

18 2408

2 3 -2 3

4236 3689 15176 12584 12005 2759 5155 11287

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 822 AND BASE POINT = 18 , 2408

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 822 IS 5155 11287

2 2 -3 -2

4236 3689 7659 2767 726 11 2177 11993

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 761 AND BASE POINT = 18 , -2408

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 761 IS 2177 11993

3 -3 3 -3

9277 15578 3690 14636 5382 7774 10002 9551

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 900 AND BASE POINT = 18 , -2408

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 900 IS 10002 9551

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

3 3 2 1
9277 15578 4160 14454 15556 15064 12881 12300
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1191 AND BASE POINT = 18 , 2408
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1191 IS 12881 12300

1 -3 -2 2 1
18 2408 4465 789 15758 11849 504 6899 6914 3957
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1289 AND BASE POINT = 18 , 2408
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1289 IS 6914 3957

3 -3 -1 -2
9277 15578 3690 14636 1335 5827 2403 16428
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 873 AND BASE POINT = 18 ,-2408
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 873 IS 2403 16428

1 -3 1
18 2408 4465 789 11125 6856
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 29 AND BASE POINT = 18 , 2408
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 29 IS 11125 6856

3 1 2
9277 15578 8507 3737 9911 6730
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 156 AND BASE POINT = 18 , 2408
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 156 IS 9911 6730

1 1 -2 -3
18 2408 14126 5620 15776 6899 3548 2588
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 375 AND BASE POINT = 18 ,-2408
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 375 IS 3548 2588

1 -3 0 1 0
18 2408 4465 789 16053 8898 15305 14624 1758 15529
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1379 AND BASE POINT = 18 , 2408
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1379 IS 1758 15529

1 0 -1 -2 2
18 2408 13382 4382 16713 8605 16951 15726 14683 1673
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2340 AND BASE POINT = 18 , 2408
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2340 IS 14683 1673

1 2 -2 -1 1
18 2408 12341 5947 8710 11487 1591 7069 3114 8783
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2983 AND BASE POINT = 18 , 2408
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2983 IS 3114 8783

1 3 -1 3 -3
18 2408 13172 12740 4173 7271 10055 13188 10474 10315
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3399 AND BASE POINT = 18 ,-2408
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3399 IS 10474 10315

1 3 0 -3 -1
18 2408 13172 12740 3669 6289 14671 11 12906 6345
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3408 AND BASE POINT = 18 ,-2408
AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3408 IS 12906 6345

Appendix CH4.4 Result of the RR7SQSD addition/subtraction chain based EC point multiplication continued

1 3 0 -2 -2

18 2408 13172 12740 3669 6289 9714 16953 7786 1052

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 3414 AND BASE POINT = 18 ,-2408

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 3414 IS 7786 1052

3 -3 -2 1 2

9277 15578 3690 14636 4625 16613 12875 7899 4573 3182

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 6085 AND BASE POINT = 18 , 2408

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 6085 IS 4573 3182

3 2 2 0 -2

9277 15578 1899 13010 10700 10109 5170 8373 7200 3285

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 7985 AND BASE POINT = 18 ,-2408

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 7985 IS 7200 3285

2 3 -3 1 -1

4236 3689 15176 12584 13437 16727 3858 1908 11906 12931

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 5690 AND BASE POINT = 18 ,-2408

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 5690 IS 11906 12931

3 3 3 1 1

9277 15578 4160 14454 2691 15708 14044 16810 3315 15932

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 8387 AND BASE POINT = 18 , 2408

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 8387 IS 3315 15932

1 1 -1 3 -3

18 2408 14126 5620 11963 8121 15813 554 10108 23

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 2713 AND BASE POINT = 18 ,-2408

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 2713 IS 10108 23

2 -1 -3 3

4236 3689 8738 10024 11493 9021 13694 16032

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 619 AND BASE POINT = 18 , 2408

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 619 IS 13694 16032

_____ END OF GENERATOR POINT 18 2408 _____

QB 4.5 CODE

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

THE PLAN TEXT MESSAGE FOR THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC EXERCISE IS

'THE QUICK BROWN FOX JUMPS OVER THE LAZY DOG'

THE CORRESPONDING NUMERIC CODE OF THE MESSAGE TO BE TRANSMITTED

1507	2704	2625	1201	527	2006
1827	2205	2715	1619	2113	2710
1524	2706	2314	1815	2702	311
2109	2717	605	20		

CURVE CONSTANTS ARE-53 218 17011

THE QUADRATIC RESIDUES OF THE ELLPTIC CURVE EQUATION ARE:-

1	4	9	16	25	36	49	64
81	100	121	144	169	196	225	256
289	324	361	400	441	484	529	576
625	676	729	784	841	900	961	1024
1089	1156	1225	1296	1369	1444	1521	1600
1681	1764	1849	1936	2025	2116	2209	2304
2401	2500	2601	2704	2809	2916	3025	3136
3249	3364	3481	3600	3721	3844	3969	4096
4225	4356	4489	4624	4761	4900	5041	5184
5329	5476	5625	5776	5929	6084	6241	6400
6561	6724	6889	7056	7225	7396	7569	7744
7921	8100	8281	8464	8649	8836	9025	9216
9409	9604	9801	10000	10201	10404	10609	10816
11025	11236	11449	11664	11881	12100	12321	12544
12769	12996	13225	13456	13689	13924	14161	14400
14641	14884	15129	15376	15625	15876	16129	16384
16641	16900	150	413	678	945	1214	1485
1758	2033	2310	2589	2870	3153	3438	3725
4014	4305	4598	4893	5190	5489	5790	6093
6398	6705	7014	7325	7638	7953	8270	8589
8910	9233	9558	9885	10214	10545	10878	11213
11550	11889	12230	12573	12918	13265	13614	13965
14318	14673	15030	15389	15750	16113	16478	16845
203	574	947	1322	1699	2078	2459	2842
3227	3614	4003	4394	4787	5182	5579	5978
6379	6782	7187	7594	8003	8414	8827	9242
9659	10078	10499	10922	11347	11774	12203	12634
13067	13502	13939	14378	14819	15262	15707	16154
16603	43	496	951	1408	1867	2328	2791
3256	3723	4192	4663	5136	5611	6088	6567
7048	7531	8016	8503	8992	9483	9976	10471
10968	11467	11968	12471	12976	13483	13992	14503
15016	15531	16048	16567	77	600	1125	1652
2181	2712	3245	3780	4317	4856	5397	5940
6485	7032	7581	8132	8685	9240	9797	10356
10917	11480	12045	12612	13181	13752	14325	14900
15477	16056	16637	209	794	1381	1970	2561
3154	3749	4346	4945	5546	6149	6754	7361
7970	8581	9194	9809	10426	11045	11666	12289
12914	13541	14170	14801	15434	16069	16706	334
975	1618	2263	2910	3559	4210	4863	5518
6175	6834	7495	8158	8823	9490	10159	10830
11503	12178	12855	13534	14215	14898	15583	16270

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

16959	639	1332	2027	2724	3423	4124	4827
5532	6239	6948	7659	8372	9087	9804	10523
11244	11967	12692	13419	14148	14879	15612	16347
73	812	1553	2296	3041	3788	4537	5288
6041	6796	7553	8312	9073	9836	10601	11368
12137	12908	13681	14456	15233	16012	16793	565
1350	2137	2926	3717	4510	5305	6102	6901
7702	8505	9310	10117	10926	11737	12550	13365
14182	15001	15822	16645	459	1286	2115	2946
3779	4614	5451	6290	7131	7974	8819	9666
10515	11366	12219	13074	13931	14790	15651	16514
368	1235	2104	2975	3848	4723	5600	6479
7360	8243	9128	10015	10904	11795	12688	13583
14480	15379	16280	172	1077	1984	2893	3804
4717	5632	6549	7468	8389	9312	10237	11164
12093	13024	13957	14892	15829	16768	698	1641
2586	3533	4482	5433	6386	7341	8298	9257
10218	11181	12146	13113	14082	15053	16026	17001
967	1946	2927	3910	4895	5882	6871	7862
8855	9850	10847	11846	12847	13850	14855	15862
16871	871	1884	2899	3916	4935	5956	6979
8004	9031	10060	11091	12124	13159	14196	15235
16276	308	1353	2400	3449	4500	5553	6608
7665	8724	9785	10848	11913	12980	14049	15120
16193	257	1334	2413	3494	4577	5662	6749
7838	8929	10022	11117	12214	13313	14414	15517
16622	718	1827	2938	4051	5166	6283	7402
8523	9646	10771	11898	13027	14158	15291	16426
552	1691	2832	3975	5120	6267	7416	8567
9720	10875	12032	13191	14352	15515	16680	836
2005	3176	4349	5524	6701	7880	9061	10244
11429	12616	13805	14996	16189	373	1570	2769
3970	5173	6378	7585	8794	10005	11218	12433
13650	14869	16090	302	1527	2754	3983	5214
6447	7682	8919	10158	11399	12642	13887	15134
16383	623	1876	3131	4388	5647	6908	8171
9436	10703	11972	13243	14516	15791	57	1336
2617	3900	5185	6472	7761	9052	10345	11640
12937	14236	15537	16840	1134	2441	3750	5061
6374	7689	9006	10325	11646	12969	14294	15621
16950	1270	2603	3938	5275	6614	7955	9298
10643	11990	13339	14690	16043	387	1744	3103
4464	5827	7192	8559	9928	11299	12672	14047
15424	16803	1173	2556	3941	5328	6717	8108
9501	10896	12293	13692	15093	16496	890	2297
3706	5117	6530	7945	9362	10781	12202	13625
15050	16477	895	2326	3759	5194	6631	8070
9511	10954	12399	13846	15295	16746	1188	2643
4100	5559	7020	8483	9948	11415	12884	14355
15828	292	1769	3248	4729	6212	7697	9184
10673	12164	13657	15152	16649	1137	2638	4141
5646	7153	8662	10173	11686	13201	14718	16237
747	2270	3795	5322	6851	8382	9915	11450
12987	14526	16067	599	2144	3691	5240	6791
8344	9899	11456	13015	14576	16139	693	2260
3829	5400	6973	8548	10125	11704	13285	14868

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

16453	1029	2618	4209	5802	7397	8994	10593
12194	13797	15402	17009	1607	3218	4831	6446
8063	9682	11303	12926	14551	16178	796	2427
4060	5695	7332	8971	10612	12255	13900	15547
185	1836	3489	5144	6801	8460	10121	11784
13449	15116	16785	1445	3118	4793	6470	8149
9830	11513	13198	14885	16574	1254	2947	4642
6339	8038	9739	11442	13147	14854	16563	1263
2976	4691	6408	8127	9848	11571	13296	15023
16752	1472	3205	4940	6677	8416	10157	11900
13645	15392	130	1881	3634	5389	7146	8905
10666	12429	14194	15961	719	2490	4263	6038
7815	9594	11375	13158	14943	16730	1508	3299
5092	6887	8684	10483	12284	14087	15892	688
2497	4308	6121	7936	9753	11572	13393	15216
30	1857	3686	5517	7350	9185	11022	12861
14702	16545	1379	3226	5075	6926	8779	10634
12491	14350	16211	1063	2928	4795	6664	8535
10408	12283	14160	16039	909	2792	4677	6564
8453	10344	12237	14132	16029	917	2818	4721
6626	8533	10442	12353	14266	16181	1087	3006
4927	6850	8775	10702	12631	14562	16495	1419
3356	5295	7236	9179	11124	13071	15020	16971
1913	3868	5825	7784	9745	11708	13673	15640
598	2569	4542	6517	8494	10473	12454	14437
16422	1398	3387	5378	7371	9366	11363	13362
15363	355	2360	4367	6376	8387	10400	12415
14432	16451	1461	3484	5509	7536	9565	11596
13629	15664	690	2729	4770	6813	8858	10905
12954	15005	47	2102	4159	6218	8279	10342
12407	14474	16543	1603	3676	5751	7828	9907
11988	14071	16156	1232	3321	5412	7505	9600
11697	13796	15897	989	3094	5201	7310	9421
11534	13649	15766	874	2995	5118	7243	9370
11499	13630	15763	887	3024	5163	7304	9447
11592	13739	15888	1028	3181	5336	7493	9652
11813	13976	16141	1297	3466	5637	7810	9985
12162	14341	16522	1694	3879	6066	8255	10446
12639	14834	20	2219	4420	6623	8828	11035
13244	15455	657	2872	5089	7308	9529	11752
13977	16204	1422	3653	5886	8121	10358	12597
14838	70	2315	4562	6811	9062	11315	13570
15827	1075	3336	5599	7864	10131	12400	14671
16944	2208	4485	6764	9045	11328	13613	15900
1178	3469	5762	8057	10354	12653	14954	246
2551	4858	7167	9478	11791	14106	16423	1731
4052	6375	8700	11027	13356	15687	1009	3344
5681	8020	10361	12704	15049	385	2734	5085
7438	9793	12150	14509	16870	2222	4587	6954
9323	11694	14067	16442	1808	4187	6568	8951
11336	13723	16112	1492	3885	6280	8677	11076
13477	15880	1274	3681	6090	8501	10914	13329
15746	1154	3575	5998	8423	10850	13279	15710
1132	3567	6004	8443	10884	13327	15772	1208
3657	6108	8561	11016	13473	15932	1382	3845
6310	8777	11246	13717	16190	1654	4131	6610
9091	11574	14059	16546	2024	4515	7008	9503

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

12000	14499	17000	2492	4997	7504	10013	12524
15037	541	3058	5577	8098	10621	13146	15673
1191	3722	6255	8790	11327	13866	16407	1939
4484	7031	9580	12131	14684	228	2785	5344
7905	10468	13033	15600	1158	3729	6302	8877
11454	14033	16614	2186	4771	7358	9947	12538
15131	715	3312	5911	8512	11115	13720	16327
1925	4536	7149	9764	12381	15000	610	3233
5858	8485	11114	13745	16378	2002	4639	7278
9919	12562	15207	843	3492	6143	8796	11451
14108	16767	2417	5080	7745	10412	13081	15752
1414	4089	6766	9445	12126	14809	483	3170
5859	8550	11243	13938	16635	2323	5024	7727
10432	13139	15848	1548	4261	6976	9693	12412
15133	845	3570	6297	9026	11757	14490	214
2951	5690	8431	11174	13919	16666	2404	5155
7908	10663	13420	16179	1929	4692	7457	10224
12993	15764	1526	4301	7078	9857	12638	15421
1195	3982	6771	9562	12355	15150	936	3735
6536	9339	12144	14951	749	3560	6373	9188
12005	14824	634	3457	6282	9109	11938	14769
591	3426	6263	9102	11943	14786	620	3467
6316	9167	12020	14875	721	3580	6441	9304
12169	15036	894	3765	6638	9513	12390	15269
1139	4022	6907	9794	12683	15574	1456	4351
7248	10147	13048	15951	1845	4752	7661	10572
13485	16400	2306	5225	8146	11069	13994	16921
2839	5770	8703	11638	14575	503	3444	6387
9332	12279	15228	1168	4121	7076	10033	12992
15953	1905	4870	7837	10806	13777	16750	2714
5691	8670	11651	14634	608	3595	6584	9575
12568	15563	1549	4548	7549	10552	13557	16564
2562	5573	8586	11601	14618	626	3647	6670
9695	12722	15751	1771	4804	7839	10876	13915
16956	2988	6033	9080	12129	15180	1222	4277
7334	10393	13454	16517	2571	5638	8707	11778
14851	915	3992	7071	10152	13235	16320	2396
5485	8576	11669	14764	850	3949	7050	10153
13258	16365	2463	5574	8687	11802	14919	1027
4148	7271	10396	13523	16652	2772	5905	9040
12177	15316	1446	4589	7734	10881	14030	170
3323	6478	9635	12794	15955	2107	5272	8439
11608	14779	941	4116	7293	10472	13653	16836
3010	6197	9386	12577	15770	1954	5151	8350
11551	14754	948	4155	7364	10575	13788	17003
3209	6428	9649	12872	16097	2313	5542	8773
12006	15241	1467	4706	7947	11190	14435	671
3920	7171	10424	13679	16936	3184	6445	9708
12973	16240	2498	5769	9042	12317	15594	1862
5143	8426	11711	14998	1276	4567	7860	11155
14452	740	4041	7344	10649	13956	254	3565
6878	10193	13510	16829	3139	6462	9787	13114
16443	2763	6096	9431	12768	16107	2437	5780
9125	12472	15821	2161	5514	8869	12226	15585
1935	5298	8663	12030	15399	1759	5132	8507
11884	15263	1633	5016	8401	11788	15177	1557
4950	8345	11742	15141	1531	4934	8339	11746

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

8133	15384	5626	12881	3127	10386	636	7899
15164	5420	12689	2949	10222	486	7763	15042
5312	12595	2869	10156	434	7725	15018	5302
12599	2887	10188	480	7785	15092	5390	12701
3003	10318	624	7943	15264	5576	12901	3217
10546	866	8199	15534	5860	13199	3529	10872
1206	8553	15902	6242	13595	3939	11296	1644
9005	16368	6722	14089	4447	11818	2180	9555
16932	7300	14681	5053	12438	2814	10203	583
7976	15371	5757	13156	3546	10949	1343	8750
16159	6559	13972	4376	11793	2201	9622	34
7459	14886	5304	12735	3157	10592	1018	8457
15898	6330	13775	4211	11660	2100	9553	17008
7454	14913	5363	12826	3280	10747	1205	8676
16149	6613	14090	4558	12039	2511	9996	472
7961	15452	5934	13429	3915	11414	1904	9407
16912	7408	14917	5417	12930	3434	10951	1459
8980	16503	7017	14544	5062	12593	3115	10650
1176	8715	16256	6788	14333	4869	12418	2958
10511	1055	8612	16171	6721	14284	4838	12405
2963	10534	1096	8671	16248	6816	14397	4969
12554	3130	10719	1299	8892	16487	7073	14672
5262	12865	3459	11066	1664	9275	16888	7492
15109	5717	13338	3950	11575	2191	9820	440
8073	15708	6334	13973	4603	12246	2880	10527
1165	8816	16469	7113	14770	5418	13079	3731
11396	2052	9721	381	8054	15729	6395	14074
4744	12427	3101	10788	1466	9157	16850	7534
15231	5919	13620	4312	12017	2713	10422	1122
8835	16550	7256	14975	5685	13408	4122	11849
2567	10298	1020	8755	16492	7220	14961	5693
13438	4174	11923	2663	10416	1160	8917	16676
7426	15189	5943	13710	4468	12239	3001	10776
1542	9321	91	7874	15659	6435	14224	5004
12797	3581	11378	2166	9967	759	8564	16371
7169	14980	5782	13597	4403	12222	3032	10855
1669	9496	314	8145	15978	6802	14639	5467
13308	4140	11985	2821	10670	1510	9363	207
8064	15923	6773	14636	5490	13357	4215	12086
2948	10823	1689	9568	438	8321	16206	7082
14971	5851	13744	4628	12525	3413	11314	2206
10111	1007	8916	16827	7729	15644	6550	14469
5379	13302	4216	12143	3061	10992	1914	9849
775	8714	16655	7587	15532	6468	14417	5357
13310	4254	12211	3159	11120	2072	10037	993
8962	16933	7895	15870	6836	14815	5785	13768
4742	12729	3707	11698	2680	10675	1661	9660
650	8653	16658	7654	15663	6663	14676	5680
13697	4705	12726	3738	11763	2779	10808	1828
9861	885	8922	16961	7991	16034	7068	15115
6153	14204	5246	13301	4347	12406	3456	11519
2573	10640	1698	9769	831	8906	16983	8051
16132	7204	15289	6365	14454	5534	13627	4711
12808	3896	11997	3089	11194	2290	10399	1499
9612	716	8833	16952	8062	16185	7299	15426
6544	14675	5797	13932	5058	13197	4327	12470
3604	11751	2889	11040	2182	10337	1483	9642

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

14258	7330	404	10491	3569	13660	6742	16837
9923	3011	13112	6204	16309	9405	2503	12614
5716	15831	8937	2045	12166	5278	15403	8519
1637	11768	4890	15025	8151	1279	11420	4552
14697	7833	971	11122	4264	14419	7565	713
10874	4026	14191	7347	505	10676	3838	14013
7179	347	10528	3700	13885	7061	239	10430
3612	13807	6993	181	10382	3574	13779	6975
173	10384	3586	13801	7007	215	10436	3648
13873	7089	307	10538	3760	13995	7221	449
10690	3922	14167	7403	641	10892	4134	14389
7635	883	11144	4396	14661	7917	1175	11446
4708	14983	8249	1517	11798	5070	15355	8631
1909	12200	5482	15777	9063	2351	12652	5944
16249	9545	2843	13154	6456	16771	10077	3385
13706	7018	332	10659	3977	14308	7630	954
11291	4619	14960	8292	1626	11973	5311	15662
9004	2348	12705	6053	16414	9766	3120	13487
6845	205	10578	3942	14319	7687	1057	11440
4814	15201	8579	1959	12352	5736	16133	9521
2911	13314	6708	104	10513	3913	14326	7730
1136	11555	4965	15388	8802	2218	12647	6067
16500	9924	3350	13789	7219	651	11096	4532
14981	8421	1863	12318	5764	16223	9673	3125
13590	7046	504	10975	4437	14912	8378	1846
12327	5799	16284	9760	3238	13729	7211	695
11192	4680	15181	8673	2167	12674	6172	16683
10185	3689	14206	7714	1224	11747	5261	15788
9306	2826	13359	6883	409	10948	4478	15021
8555	2091	12640	6180	16733	10277	3823	14382
7932	1484	12049	5605	16174	9734	3296	13871
7437	1005	11586	5158	15743	9319	2897	13488
7070	654	11251	4839	15440	9032	2626	13233
6831	431	11044	4648	15265	8873	2483	13106
6720	336	10965	4585	15218	8842	2468	13107
6737	369	11014	4650	15299	8939	2581	13236
6882	530	11191	4843	15508	9164	2822	13493
7155	819	11496	5164	15845	9517	3191	13878
7556	1236	11929	5613	16310	9998	3688	14391
8085	1781	12490	6190	16903	10607	4313	15032
8742	2454	13179	6895	613	11344	5066	15801
9527	3255	13996	7728	1462	12209	5947	16698
10440	4184	14941	8689	2439	13202	6956	712
11481	5241	16014	9778	3544	14323	8093	1865
12650	6426	204	10995	4777	15572	9358	3146
13947	7739	1533	12340	6138	16949	10751	4555
15372	9180	2990	13813	7627	1443	12272	6092
16925	10749	4575	15414	9244	3076	13921	7757
1595	12446	6288	132	10989	4837	15698	9550
3404	14271	8129	1989	12862	6726	592	11471
5341	16224	10098	3974	14863	8743	2625	13520
7406	1294	12195	6087	16992	10888	4786	15697
9599	3503	14420	8328	2238	13161	7075	991
11920	5840	16773	10697	4623	15562	9492	3424
14369	8305	2243	13194	7136	1080	12037	5985
16946	10898	4852	15819	9777	3737	14710	8674
2640	13619	7589	1561	12546	6522	500	11491

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

5473	16468	10454	4442	15443	9435	3429	14436
8434	2434	13447	7451	1457	12476	6486	498
11523	5539	16568	10588	4610	15645	9671	3699
14740	8772	2806	13853	7891	1931	12984	7028
1074	12133	6183	235	11300	5356	16425	10485
4547	15622	9688	3756	14837	8909	2983	14070
8148	2228	13321	7405	1491	12590	6680	772
11877	5973	71	11182	5284	16399	10505	4613
15734	9846	3960	15087	9205	3325	14458	8582
2708	13847	7977	2109	13254	7390	1528	12679
6821	965	12122	6270	420	11583	5737	16904
11062	5222	16395	10559	4725	15904	10074	4246
15431	9607	3785	14976	9158	3342	14539	8727
2917	14120	8314	2510	13719	7919	2121	13336
7542	1750	12971	7183	1397	12624	6842	1062
12295	6519	745	11984	6214	446	11691	5927
165	11416	5658	16913	11159	5407	16668	10920
5174	16441	10699	4959	16232	10496	4762	16041
10311	4583	15868	10144	4422	15713	9995	4279
15576	9864	4154	15457	9751	4047	15356	9656
3958	15273	9579	3887	15208	9520	3834	15161
9479	3799	15132	9456	3782	15121	9451	3783
15128	9464	3802	15153	9495	3839	15196	9544
3894	15257	9611	3967	15336	9696	4058	15433
9799	4167	15548	9920	4294	15681	10059	4439
15832	10216	4602	16001	10391	4783	16188	10584
4982	16393	10795	5199	16616	11024	5434	16857
11271	5687	105	11536	5958	382	11819	6247
677	12120	6554	990	12439	6879	1321	12776
7222	1670	13131	7583	2037	13504	7962	2422
13895	8359	2825	14304	8774	3246	14731	9207
3685	15176	9658	4142	15639	10127	4617	16120
10614	5110	16619	11119	5621	125	11642	6150
660	12183	6697	1213	12742	7262	1784	13319
7845	2373	13914	8446	2980	14527	9065	3605
15158	9702	4248	15807	10357	4909	16474	11030
5588	148	11721	6285	851	12430	7000	1572
13157	7733	2311	13902	8484	3068	14665	9253
3843	15446	10040	4636	16245	10845	5447	51
11668	6276	886	12509	7123	1739	13368	7988
2610	14245	8871	3499	15140	9772	4406	16053
10691	5331	16984	11628	6274	922	12583	7235
1889	13556	8214	2874	14547	9211	3877	15556
10226	4898	16583	11259	5937	617	12310	6994
1680	13379	8069	2761	14466	9162	3860	15571
10273	4977	16694	11402	6112	824	12549	7265
1983	13714	8436	3160	14897	9625	4355	16098
10832	5568	306	12057	6799	1543	13300	8048
2798	14561	9315	4071	15840	10600	5362	126
11903	6671	1441	13224	7998	2774	14563	9343
4125	15920	10706	5494	284	12087	6881	1677
13486	8286	3088	14903	9709	4517	16338	11150
5964	780	12609	7429	2251	14086	8912	3740
15581	10413	5247	83	11932	6772	1614	13469
8315	3163	15024	9876	4730	16597	11455	6315
1177	13052	7918	2786	14667	9539	4413	16300
11178	6058	940	12835	7721	2609	14510	9402

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

13056	11792	10530	9270	8012	6756	5502	4250
3000	1752	506	16273	15031	13791	12553	11317
10083	8851	7621	6393	5167	3943	2721	1501
283	16078	14864	13652	12442	11234	10028	8824
7622	6422	5224	4028	2834	1642	452	16275
15089	13905	12723	11543	10365	9189	8015	6843
5673	4505	3339	2175	1013	16864	15706	14550
13396	12244	11094	9946	8800	7656	6514	5374
4236	3100	1966	834	16715	15587	14461	13337
12215	11095	9977	8861	7747	6635	5525	4417
14343	13495	12649	11805	10963	10123	9285	8449
15136	14416	13698	12982	12268	11556	10846	10138
9432	8728	8026	7326	6628	5932	5238	4546
3856	3168	2482	1798	1116	436	16769	16093
15419	14747	14077	13409	12743	12079	11417	10757
10099	9443	8789	8137	7487	6839	6193	5549
4907	4267	3629	2993	2359	1727	1097	469
16854	16230	15608	14988	14370	13754	13140	12528
11918	11310	10704	10100	9498	8898	8300	7704
7110	6518	5928	5340	4754	4170	3588	3008
2430	1854	1280	708	138	16581	16015	15451
14889	14329	13771	13215	12661	12109	11559	11011
10465	9921	9379	8839	8301	7765	7231	6699
6169	5641	5115	4591	4069	3549	3031	2515
2001	1489	979	471	16976	16472	15970	15470
14972	14476	13982	13490	13000	12512	12026	11542
11060	10580	10102	9626	9152	8680	8210	7742
7276	6812	6350	5890	5432	4976	4522	4070
3620	3172	2726	2282	1840	1400	962	526
92	16671	16241	15813	15387	14963	14541	14121
13703	13287	12873	12461	12051	11643	11237	10833
10431	10031	9633	9237	8843	8451	8061	7673
7287	6903	6521	6141	5763	5387	5013	4641
4271	3903	3537	3173	2811	2451	2093	1737
13002	12682	12364	12048	11734	11422	11112	10804
10498	10194	9892	9592	9294	8998	8704	8412
8122	7834	7548	7264	6982	6702	6424	6148
5874	5602	5332	5064	4798	4534	4272	4012
3754	3498	3244	2992	2742	2494	2248	2004
1762	1522	1284	1048	814	582	352	124
16909	16685	16463	16243	16025	15809	15595	15383
15173	14965	14759	14555	14353	14153	13955	13759
13565	13373	13183	12995	12809	12625	12443	12263
12085	11909	11735	11563	11393	11225	11059	10895
10733	10573	10415	10259	10105	9953	9803	9655
9509	9365	9223	9083	8945	8809	8675	8543
8413	8285	8159	8035	7913	7793	7675	7559
7445	7333	7223	7115	7009	6905	6803	6703
6605	6509	6415	6323	6233	6145	6059	5975
5893	5813	5735	5659	5585	5513	5443	5375
5309	5245	5183	5123	5065	5009	4955	4903
4853	4805	4759	4715	4673	4633	4595	4559
4525	4493	4463	4435	4409	4385	4363	4343
4325	4309	4295	4283	4273	4265	4259	4255
4253							

Again the curves rational points

2	4835	4	16541	7	3799	8	2632	10	9691
12	10031	13	16051	15	12516	16	12088	18	13186
19	9968	21	8173	22	7965	24	12986	25	12332
27	12618	29	4603	30	11849	33	5600	37	3030
42	1188	43	14253	44	10474	45	15296	46	4691
47	9130	55	7007	56	143	58	13948	59	5048
60	4832	62	10629	63	841	66	8655	67	15587
72	13994	73	14948	74	16998	76	3339	77	10711
78	1959	80	10575	81	13609	83	9230	85	12119
88	13594	90	14153	92	10123	94	11914	95	9634
97	8804	99	9924	101	16674	107	5996	108	14893
109	682	111	5328	112	4525	115	3883	120	14043
121	5789	124	3938	125	11383	126	1629	127	11618
129	5936	132	11640	133	8916	134	10066	140	9048
141	15295	142	14068	143	14046	145	8922	146	11350
149	3948	150	4928	151	13385	152	13877	157	14503
159	6276	162	4225	163	11877	165	6676	166	7629
167	4881	169	3970	171	6117	173	3588	175	9700
176	2179	177	15572	180	10650	183	4108	184	16561
186	14819	188	342	189	1779	193	11651	194	11168
196	6187	199	10962	201	6837	204	6711	208	1398
209	3201	212	12396	214	5649	215	897	218	14209
226	606	234	2647	235	8469	237	10601	243	6211
245	434	246	8513	247	13022	248	8612	250	7835
252	3856	258	11130	260	15862	261	11060	263	4855
264	11142	266	4691	267	16992	270	14767	271	5308
273	9443	274	15473	275	1542	276	14734	278	8813
279	9984	281	6	282	11984	283	12680	285	8079
286	14814	288	2343	291	3938	293	4167	294	8892
295	14108	296	14681	299	16631	300	11615	301	10259
302	14050	305	16967	307	5906	308	15282	311	4188
313	4403	316	16190	318	3951	320	14439	321	2769
322	13689	323	5656	324	7756	325	8314	327	14469
328	8230	331	11943	333	5874	337	6479	338	15026
339	3355	343	11244	344	7401	345	10474	348	1470
349	7473	351	2793	354	9924	356	12616	357	2465
358	16956	359	16067	366	13609	367	13056	368	1322
370	12109	372	11155	373	4510	374	13589	375	9100
378	3588	379	9224	380	11350	383	9891	384	8281
385	10375	386	719	387	16922	388	2573	389	3442
391	575	392	10134	393	15627	394	237	395	6881
397	9709	398	2893	399	3001	401	1898	403	5857
406	7040	414	620	418	1723	420	6379	421	13300
422	7671	423	11296	424	14388	425	13156	426	3205
428	9579	429	7341	432	9967	433	11085	434	15579
439	4239	441	16304	442	1460	444	8253	445	3613
447	8034	453	12809	455	15961	457	10251	458	15219
461	15209	465	14601	466	834	467	14555	471	13506
472	14278	474	6485	475	4279	477	15472	480	3653
481	9884	483	6332	485	11127	487	12407	488	14676
490	7425	491	5947	492	8359	493	8159	496	14509
498	13000	499	12521	500	2292	501	4134	505	6623
508	5890	514	12227	515	1755	518	12315	525	14566
526	13960	528	12647	530	3788	532	8494	533	16604
534	4544	535	2413	539	16019	540	1299	543	8086

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

3554	9379	3555	1078	3556	7524	3558	6364	3559	15517
3561	1381	3563	587	3564	6233	3572	7599	3574	3691
3576	12628	3577	6391	3580	14030	3582	8229	3585	13181
3586	13627	3587	16365	3591	294	3593	12986	3596	1661
3597	16373	3599	7835	3601	8372	3602	4210	3603	12807
3605	11607	3606	9881	3609	5145	3612	2698	3614	13103
3615	144	3616	778	3617	16091	3618	14796	3619	7745
3621	8159	3622	16257	3623	9931	3624	7919	3628	10914
3629	11678	3631	843	3632	5907	3635	14775	3639	3005
3642	8680	3643	1062	3645	4753	3647	14216	3651	9362
3653	5905	3655	13490	3658	3238	3659	12237	3660	984
3661	4501	3662	14098	3663	3574	3665	9811	3666	5525
3667	14774	3668	3076	3670	16568	3671	14580	3672	13141
3674	15811	3677	6616	3678	7232	3679	16477	3681	4619
3686	4975	3688	15368	3696	3619	3697	2337	3698	11659
3699	9032	3700	8405	3701	9857	3702	8951	3705	23
3707	6090	3709	11768	3711	15029	3712	10746	3713	15094
3715	14655	3718	636	3719	13338	3721	16059	3722	16235
3723	2200	3726	1486	3727	9330	3728	2525	3729	15575
3730	1970	3731	8434	3733	10530	3739	5070	3741	4236
3742	14090	3744	16529	3745	14336	3746	15713	3750	2975
3755	6194	3756	536	3759	14130	3760	5605	3761	3688
3763	12438	3764	5467	3769	3331	3770	8325	3772	361
3774	3795	3776	9478	3778	14632	3779	7629	3782	11804
3783	2650	3785	13574	3789	13514	3794	3028	3795	15496
3797	2065	3798	2200	3799	15868	3800	12468	3807	13001
3809	864	3811	1195	3813	1674	3817	16442	3820	13040
3821	8877	3827	14196	3828	1848	3829	7553	3831	706
3837	15908	3839	16378	3841	9785	3846	1080	3847	14673
3848	10747	3854	4333	3855	11145	3858	2286	3860	1683
3861	10956	3863	10120	3864	2286	3865	16670	3866	3449
3867	10651	3868	1055	3870	4562	3872	16994	3876	9447
3878	1213	3881	13026	3882	987	3885	8604	3886	15402
3887	14628	3890	12771	3891	3546	3892	12406	3895	7762
3897	5432	3900	14426	3901	1221	3903	9059	3906	16025
3907	1553	3911	3032	3918	3929	3921	8731	3922	5978
3923	1021	3924	1009	3925	16418	3926	1600	3927	15266
3928	8098	3929	6799	3932	12736	3934	13396	3935	4320
3937	4613	3938	11190	3939	1626	3942	11017	3943	11562
3947	15968	3951	1507	3952	3939	3956	8199	3958	14673
3959	2021	3960	2086	3961	12993	3962	1154	3965	3671
3966	671	3967	7269	3969	4788	3970	13593	3971	9321
3972	9078	3974	13898	3976	14188	3977	14352	3978	14745
3980	10790	3982	737	3985	14296	3987	9263	3988	1562
3991	2843	3992	4472	3994	6802	3995	4787	3996	9413
3999	10859	4000	13153	4004	13324	4005	6811	4006	14369
4007	6446	4009	10609	4014	14743	4016	14635	4017	3920
4018	9214	4020	4100	4021	11317	4023	2342	4024	3453
4025	11698	4028	15092	4029	4515	4031	13284	4032	9388
4035	10949	4039	14	4040	9530	4042	5074	4046	2519
4050	11269	4051	4084	4054	4641	4055	15778	4057	4893
4059	14088	4060	11711	4061	3913	4063	13056	4064	8050
4065	14435	4066	5161	4070	12751	4072	6071	4073	14739
4074	5747	4075	7421	4078	8096	4079	4709	4080	13603
4085	671	4086	7252	4088	9848	4090	3613	4093	7874
4094	1591	4095	4506	4098	3233	4099	15339	4103	7755
4104	13603	4106	11918	4108	1266	4111	1344	4113	4869

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

4115	6154	4119	2260	4120	4080	4122	5605	4123	14223
4125	16625	4126	748	4128	3794	4129	14906	4130	6798
4134	4190	4136	15908	4137	12001	4140	9956	4144	11562
4145	1345	4146	16921	4148	320	4151	4517	4155	624
4157	113	4158	9099	4160	6356	4161	14404	4167	6357
4168	15427	4170	10606	4172	7177	4173	806	4174	1049
4175	3476	4176	9717	4179	8923	4181	9962	4190	1949
4191	2663	4192	10454	4197	12573	4198	8364	4202	11485
4206	12957	4207	12470	4208	7821	4214	15058	4215	592
4218	6117	4219	11674	4220	5874	4221	11251	4224	12737
4228	9877	4229	16874	4230	496	4231	254	4232	12577
4234	617	4236	5988	4237	2012	4238	13092	4240	8332
4241	15035	4242	7583	4244	11951	4247	1410	4248	3911
4249	13285	4251	12670	4252	8041	4256	1337	4258	16223
4259	1087	4261	9794	4266	14120	4269	5155	4271	14588
4272	6522	4274	654	4275	2025	4277	405	4283	4475
4284	9065	4287	12670	4295	16759	4296	16916	4299	10197
4302	3393	4306	3195	4307	13315	4308	1242	4310	9873
4311	5485	4312	2626	4315	7177	4316	905	4317	9294
4319	1999	4321	2361	4323	6151	4326	7725	4327	3566
4329	1905	4330	14963	4333	10188	4334	11196	4336	7332
4337	2927	4340	9291	4344	7495	4351	14431	4352	7565
4354	1760	4358	7988	4360	17001	4361	9425	4364	13692
4369	7837	4371	4479	4372	12779	4373	16936	4374	11819
4375	6047	4376	7542	4380	3896	4382	8086	4383	5454
4385	15716	4386	16784	4388	16696	4394	4977	4395	8573
4399	8813	4402	14743	4403	7791	4404	6347	4408	15599
4409	6566	4410	15173	4414	11997	4416	8910	4417	15355
4419	2361	4421	682	4422	1841	4423	13781	4428	4283
4429	6334	4430	4088	4431	15821	4432	6635	4435	3607
4439	14828	4440	6271	4441	14474	4442	3693	4443	7493
4444	1909	4445	4928	4447	9	4448	13955	4449	975
4450	13771	4451	1927	4453	12289	4454	14180	4460	4246
4461	5035	4463	13493	4466	15861	4467	13385	4468	6892
4476	9564	4477	486	4478	13663	4480	7220	4481	15770
4485	6796	4486	9091	4488	5466	4489	12327	4490	13368
4491	9111	4492	12073	4493	6084	4494	472	4498	4903
4502	11774	4503	7010	4505	11445	4506	13709	4508	12194
4510	9932	4511	15660	4512	6683	4514	4101	4515	13813
4516	12006	4517	12031	4518	13630	4519	10913	4524	11555
4526	14884	4528	1957	4530	3645	4532	13965	4533	10514
4535	11059	4536	152	4542	9414	4543	9909	4546	2285
4550	6803	4551	6794	4552	5470	4553	7430	4556	851
4558	16210	4559	9445	4560	3131	4562	8205	4563	14693
4567	7071	4568	14618	4573	2073	4579	2874	4580	16095
4582	4136	4584	1285	4587	10538	4588	7020	4591	2009
4594	7183	4595	8763	4599	8912	4600	7305	4602	747
4605	382	4607	13499	4609	1703	4611	10485	4613	13139
4616	7271	4618	4651	4619	9690	4622	12613	4624	4814
4625	11569	4627	11425	4628	8073	4629	16666	4631	15595
4632	10432	4633	14712	4634	3736	4635	11972	4636	11279
4640	15951	4646	15419	4648	3598	4649	975	4650	5859
4652	15534	4655	13991	4656	12926	4662	3466	4663	2384
4666	12169	4667	9931	4668	3156	4671	11430	4674	16870
4675	4324	4676	3579	4677	10277	4679	16758	4680	9180
4682	14960	4683	3426	4684	15951	4685	14770	4688	4986

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

7145	15282	7146	16608	7147	4389	7148	8352	7150	13387
7151	6190	7153	8271	7154	12325	7156	3237	7158	6042
7160	3101	7161	1137	7162	10434	7164	14706	7165	5340
7166	1404	7167	14693	7170	11327	7171	6803	7174	11178
7180	11378	7182	4272	7183	14252	7187	6478	7189	681
7190	11512	7192	4894	7193	8460	7194	13803	7197	10325
7200	12124	7202	10627	7205	14441	7206	15473	7208	14417
7210	4742	7212	4944	7214	10554	7215	11310	7216	6697
7218	5339	7220	12625	7221	5421	7222	7782	7223	3400
7224	12868	7225	6047	7228	3513	7230	1647	7231	15486
7232	1615	7234	1344	7236	15534	7237	820	7238	11942
7242	6153	7244	1701	7245	12004	7248	5244	7249	7270
7250	12345	7254	3389	7255	6124	7256	16414	7257	16569
7260	11095	7262	7747	7263	6478	7265	15372	7266	4838
7267	10396	7268	13942	7270	11613	7273	12864	7274	16062
7279	13079	7280	2176	7281	15158	7283	861	7284	719
7286	10711	7287	6369	7289	5476	7291	16003	7294	2864
7295	16809	7298	15212	7299	5983	7302	9368	7304	4961
7307	16952	7309	10765	7310	11805	7311	15497	7313	2025
7315	7821	7316	572	7317	15294	7320	16327	7322	11101
7323	3816	7324	7903	7326	11116	7330	4793	7333	6718
7337	1404	7338	8303	7341	8363	7342	6461	7344	13594
7347	6723	7348	13698	7349	1205	7350	5406	7351	16533
7352	1823	7354	5827	7356	45	7357	5687	7361	15160
7362	14935	7364	11103	7365	1322	7366	9444	7373	4343
7379	15602	7383	13942	7387	4374	7388	6324	7393	13005
7394	16344	7396	9240	7398	2627	7399	16900	7400	12373
7402	205	7403	3312	7404	2195	7405	16720	7408	2786
7410	45	7411	13222	7414	16270	7415	4509	7418	16858
7419	16289	7420	552	7421	9481	7423	16269	7424	4810
7426	12680	7427	12907	7428	16909	7430	6707	7431	5126
7433	1763	7436	7783	7437	14173	7439	15147	7443	9126
7445	4517	7447	4480	7448	12198	7452	10573	7457	8146
7458	10922	7464	749	7466	11833	7468	8693	7470	12495
7471	14466	7472	5978	7474	14346	7479	7451	7482	3309
7483	10353	7484	2366	7485	6109	7486	1213	7494	12001
7496	9797	7500	11659	7504	8835	7505	5759	7507	12807
7508	4308	7511	15847	7512	8827	7513	3608	7514	15223
7516	14321	7517	5734	7518	6733	7522	14266	7525	7374
7528	2660	7529	4740	7531	8332	7532	14757	7535	484
7537	9849	7539	9325	7540	6214	7541	10464	7542	282
7543	16578	7544	13161	7549	15547	7550	9884	7551	16054
7553	12798	7555	1820	7559	16237	7566	11778	7569	11917
7570	15897	7571	12579	7573	10438	7574	15155	7576	9443
7578	7078	7579	16998	7582	6187	7584	4305	7585	757
7587	13104	7590	13149	7592	8351	7593	15646	7595	12593
7605	6924	7606	8520	7607	8003	7608	15470	7611	8905
7613	4514	7618	4477	7620	12085	7622	4330	7623	11964
7625	4905	7628	5534	7629	5304	7630	4729	7633	1221
7639	13877	7640	2209	7641	11548	7646	13589	7647	2164
7648	16210	7649	6330	7651	15231	7658	9185	7659	6255
7660	11039	7661	8319	7662	5600	7663	9005	7665	2586
7667	15706	7668	3900	7669	4134	7670	4177	7671	14755
7672	3197	7673	3059	7678	14758	7680	11054	7681	8839
7682	16026	7685	14562	7687	15951	7689	864	7693	16929
7694	6522	7698	10416	7699	6199	7700	15923	7701	930
7703	16202	7704	8400	7705	5506	7708	1904	7709	9243
7717	9125	7718	13477	7721	12246	7724	7763	7725	3119

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

7726	2427	7728	8108	7729	6401	7730	10629	7733	1679
7734	16278	7737	12019	7738	1952	7739	5806	7740	2562
7742	15246	7745	10813	7746	12599	7747	13140	7748	10138
7749	7592	7750	206	7751	14854	7752	13600	7753	6271
7755	13242	7759	12993	7760	10936	7761	440	7763	5769
7764	10375	7765	1740	7767	15316	7769	6799	7771	11361
7775	12618	7777	5310	7778	10146	7780	11095	7781	2510
7782	10127	7784	5517	7785	9673	7786	16058	7788	126
7791	15443	7793	4625	7795	13281	7800	15756	7805	2348
7806	11511	7808	11138	7809	7284	7810	11291	7813	5669
7816	16220	7819	7541	7823	8760	7826	7782	7827	1197
7829	15180	7830	12735	7837	16564	7839	6519	7840	15695
7841	11108	7845	3306	7846	12033	7847	794	7848	159
7849	2948	7852	3419	7856	16131	7860	13248	7864	9245
7865	14404	7867	1821	7868	9157	7872	4641	7873	4179
7876	8281	7878	4525	7880	885	7883	14747	7886	7592
7889	7014	7892	709	7894	9349	7897	1548	7899	9668
7901	1019	7902	12509	7903	4309	7905	9425	7907	10991
7908	9809	7909	8649	7910	14690	7912	5087	7913	975
7915	10158	7916	205	7917	3461	7918	5002	7920	965
7923	8173	7925	5846	7926	11414	7930	5680	7932	12826
7933	16956	7934	9517	7935	4780	7936	6147	7938	3536
7941	14595	7944	792	7946	2871	7947	3270	7948	6720
7951	11044	7952	2632	7953	6819	7955	8982	7960	16350
7961	10806	7962	991	7963	13473	7964	12811	7969	14547
7970	935	7980	15333	7985	9200	7986	9660	7989	11096
7990	13154	7991	3779	7993	12962	8000	3986	8001	14523
8002	4423	8007	4148	8009	11862	8010	10344	8011	15235
8012	5013	8014	11609	8015	5100	8017	14550	8020	13531
8022	6311	8024	3779	8025	10164	8026	4642	8027	1280
8030	7295	8033	143	8035	7903	8036	7415	8038	686
8040	14950	8043	6190	8046	3590	8049	1833	8052	1593
8053	15710	8055	4827	8056	12254	8059	7942	8061	452
8067	4558	8068	1889	8070	5836	8074	8533	8078	13628
8081	13379	8086	650	8087	6679	8088	14510	8089	816
8091	13826	8092	11009	8096	4126	8097	3554	8098	2347
8103	8746	8105	148	8106	7405	8107	16054	8112	6942
8113	12679	8118	2624	8119	15063	8124	8967	8125	1121
8126	16918	8127	6639	8128	10510	8129	13954	8130	3207
8135	4028	8142	2269	8144	2292	8145	9057	8146	7942
8147	1382	8149	6196	8151	14215	8153	5534	8154	6074
8157	1154	8162	6561	8163	2789	8165	7764	8169	5400
8170	6378	8171	13727	8172	14752	8175	3662	8177	9061
8179	12013	8181	7918	8184	6372	8185	9241	8188	12232
8189	7657	8190	12872	8191	12217	8192	6078	8195	15386
8200	11415	8204	10965	8206	1548	8207	3139	8209	15686
8210	11046	8211	7967	8212	4220	8213	10487	8214	13629
8215	12549	8216	1762	8218	3759	8219	2824	8220	16496
8221	5604	8225	12804	8226	2993	8227	3791	8230	12961
8233	2785	8234	11500	8236	10389	8237	10889	8238	11444
8242	15824	8244	5846	8248	4764	8250	7711	8251	2392
8252	5075	8260	12794	8262	3457	8266	13948	8267	2976
8269	15796	8271	2361	8274	4510	8276	2705	8278	6192
8279	9923	8282	10121	8283	6426	8284	6032	8285	10225
8289	235	8291	4345	8292	7457	8298	9260	8299	16735
8300	15590	8301	4662	8303	4119	8305	8371	8308	6401
8311	528	8316	6741	8317	10149	8318	15433	8322	5222

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

8323	1535	8324	4931	8325	11768	8328	15532	8331	6391
8332	15537	8333	662	8334	2732	8338	4934	8342	14090
8344	16708	8345	15618	8346	16472	8347	5936	8349	14733
8350	2265	8351	13745	8352	5034	8354	4299	8356	8777
8357	16240	8358	16937	8360	14564	8361	1029	8364	4510
8366	10224	8367	2292	8370	16309	8371	5135	8372	4498
8374	14757	8375	3173	8377	12851	8380	203	8382	4125
8383	5361	8384	1744	8385	274	8388	9934	8392	6435
8397	14775	8398	1910	8399	5919	8400	3756	8401	13485
8402	4881	8403	12704	8406	5885	8408	1284	8410	7081
8411	6189	8414	10519	8416	4507	8421	12612	8424	10877
8426	9693	8427	311	8429	5196	8431	4	8432	8203
8433	15066	8440	11271	8441	669	8442	4881	8443	15831
8447	13429	8449	14195	8450	15746	8451	3884	8453	5864
8454	14887	8455	12260	8456	6535	8458	6280	8460	8796
8462	8581	8465	6199	8466	2421	8467	10605	8469	6842
8470	426	8472	16932	8473	12670	8475	8729	8478	4253
8479	16773	8480	11088	8485	9441	8489	5391	8490	4419
8491	1328	8492	4267	8493	15338	8495	8646	8496	15608
8500	4961	8501	10313	8502	10072	8504	16969	8505	1383
8507	12948	8508	8664	8509	7915	8511	15928	8516	269
8517	15470	8520	7667	8521	5435	8522	5865	8523	6162
8524	7177	8526	6076	8528	12690	8530	12389	8532	11658
8533	13393	8534	12554	8535	5936	8536	12952	8537	13470
8538	5028	8539	1127	8541	13620	8542	7991	8543	3238
8544	14324	8546	13497	8548	554	8551	877	8553	11803
8554	16149	8555	1549	8556	9539	8557	8992	8558	4471
8559	11225	8561	13640	8566	7596	8571	5673	8573	7785
8576	290	8579	15792	8580	4866	8583	5746	8587	6563
8588	2229	8592	16843	8593	1698	8595	14743	8598	15226
8600	1681	8602	12937	8603	416	8604	15967	8605	2214
8607	9435	8610	15043	8612	10574	8613	13447	8614	16364
8615	5385	8616	13783	8619	14082	8620	1920	8621	4068
8622	6069	8623	15152	8627	4560	8628	3191	8632	334
8634	7807	8636	12419	8637	8767	8641	16074	8642	12309
8644	12741	8645	2193	8646	14308	8649	9310	8650	14649
8652	14564	8655	11460	8656	2466	8661	1434	8663	8845
8665	5064	8667	15508	8670	15944	8674	9693	8675	14356
8676	6915	8678	2078	8679	5057	8680	7278	8685	4124
8687	13948	8688	6641	8689	13985	8692	16447	8697	9368
8698	11394	8699	8100	8700	5055	8701	15953	8702	13454
8703	7344	8704	9756	8706	932	8707	14880	8708	6375
8710	10730	8711	11378	8714	8377	8718	13825	8719	7665
8720	16956	8721	9931	8722	12692	8723	14204	8726	716
8727	16819	8730	5275	8732	8736	8734	3023	8736	15892
8738	15388	8739	10311	8740	14800	8741	11882	8745	4931
8746	9121	8749	10716	8751	8281	8754	12867	8756	3742
8758	11742	8761	11721	8762	16801	8763	13199	8764	3608
8766	185	8767	431	8768	1734	8770	14680	8772	12181
8774	8550	8777	5105	8781	11520	8792	12442	8793	657
8795	8121	8796	13866	8797	4488	8798	11051	8802	2296
8803	1840	8806	6781	8808	583	8811	9846	8812	15708
8813	2991	8815	11543	8817	11213	8818	836	8821	14353
8823	10536	8824	83	8825	14154	8827	13603	8829	15132
8832	5293	8834	6702	8836	13214	8837	2002	8838	2378
8841	4134	8842	5886	8843	8080	8848	708	8853	4192
8856	14518	8857	5066	8858	4051	8859	12855	8862	10375

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

8864	15061	8866	15056	8867	12741	8868	9027	8871	8876
8873	7733	8875	4098	8876	6365	8880	6422	8882	13456
8883	3721	8886	13178	8890	1070	8893	14280	8894	6039
8896	6509	8898	7737	8900	1414	8901	10046	8903	4952
8905	3031	8906	3793	8908	10667	8913	7115	8916	4636
8917	3389	8919	3309	8922	143	8924	11562	8926	9774
8936	15211	8938	14871	8942	13203	8944	14994	8948	16760
8950	12120	8951	319	8954	5735	8955	15176	8956	13302
8957	6389	8958	3728	8960	671	8969	9778	8974	10157
8977	5262	8978	816	8980	9884	8981	2755	8983	8895
8984	16939	8986	4959	8987	12669	8988	5330	8991	13589
8992	3125	8994	16723	8995	3224	8997	15636	8998	3975
9000	8000	9007	12051	9013	2732	9014	9386	9015	16566
9016	4251	9017	1620	9019	3659	9020	12669	9021	4525
9025	2630	9027	1194	9029	1698	9030	1757	9031	13614
9033	11904	9036	15645	9038	15908	9039	16560	9041	4180
9042	6564	9045	13976	9047	4101	9049	2422	9050	6322
9051	2632	9053	3115	9055	5315	9057	12376	9058	64
9059	16350	9061	14510	9063	2694	9065	4624	9067	8173
9070	7042	9071	12606	9073	5983	9076	5106	9078	4345
9080	5175	9081	5751	9082	14880	9084	2889	9086	431
9088	792	9091	5418	9092	11481	9093	16488	9094	6087
9095	1726	9098	4997	9099	5549	9100	9743	9103	506
9104	16311	9106	14479	9107	1737	9111	14316	9112	13707
9113	12546	9116	12255	9117	16425	9118	16084	9119	5574
9122	1105	9123	10313	9125	2297	9127	5302	9129	5605
9131	8423	9132	2263	9133	13154	9134	3278	9135	12794
9136	6283	9137	7459	9139	6428	9141	16447	9144	15167
9145	5660	9146	16632	9148	6936	9149	3532	9150	3838
9152	16569	9153	2725	9154	10062	9155	13114	9156	16448
9157	2066	9158	10318	9162	9443	9164	2496	9166	15896
9167	5441	9171	4095	9172	12275	9175	11533	9177	10795
9179	5493	9180	15099	9183	10214	9184	16538	9185	14947
9186	13301	9189	16760	9190	15532	9191	15125	9192	101
9193	6231	9195	7595	9196	7543	9199	836	9200	10929
9201	11982	9202	6834	9203	11660	9204	5045	9205	4714
9206	14673	9207	15521	9209	12618	9210	6353	9217	4052
9218	2171	9219	10629	9220	13877	9222	732	9228	16652
9232	2290	9233	6187	9235	9623	9239	4922	9240	7111
9243	678	9244	5163	9247	6196	9248	6634	9250	9920
9251	4077	9252	381	9254	13685	9255	3036	9260	13190
9261	11358	9262	2297	9264	7511	9270	8416	9271	56
9273	10349	9276	7410	9277	7333	9278	1322	9279	7206
9282	7344	9283	15263	9284	409	9285	4300	9287	12000
9288	126	9289	2286	9290	15390	9291	8939	9292	16883
9294	16888	9295	3549	9296	625	9297	10504	9299	13045
9300	6310	9302	12680	9304	2258	9305	1603	9306	9558
9309	10393	9311	8819	9312	13497	9315	9646	9316	5600
9317	14944	9320	9026	9322	12559	9324	10947	9325	5466
9326	5046	9328	6874	9330	13339	9331	14989	9333	1066
9338	9184	9339	915	9341	719	9342	6378	9345	14207
9350	7921	9353	5737	9357	3700	9358	16998	9359	4922
9361	16543	9362	8426	9364	3979	9365	13531	9368	7932
9369	15125	9371	6643	9372	15443	9373	9288	9375	9501
9376	9121	9378	13365	9383	4051	9384	4116	9385	6430
9387	4283	9388	12291	9389	6619	9390	4724	9398	289
9399	1984	9405	10542	9407	54	9408	5806	9409	8378

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

9413	8638	9415	10808	9419	10010	9421	5863	9423	1299
9424	16582	9425	7182	9429	10146	9431	16564	9435	2948
9438	11307	9441	13972	9442	9953	9444	10749	9445	1208
9450	7650	9451	5669	9452	11968	9455	14396	9456	5125
9458	844	9462	3154	9467	13829	9468	3794	9470	13014
9473	12812	9475	15972	9478	2208	9479	8767	9480	5911
9485	16874	9490	2200	9491	10025	9493	658	9497	16034
9499	5120	9501	4422	9506	7402	9507	14344	9509	3458
9511	5384	9513	3986	9514	9091	9515	4672	9516	13996
9517	11215	9518	2660	9519	5537	9520	13189	9521	7107
9522	12583	9529	11009	9531	15473	9532	14575	9534	3270
9535	16696	9536	3576	9539	5024	9540	1697	9541	14618
9542	9561	9543	14985	9545	15121	9551	15637	9552	14839
9553	10126	9555	2515	9558	15282	9559	13015	9560	10996
9566	2186	9568	333	9569	1228	9572	14940	9575	11464
9576	8621	9578	10786	9579	13594	9580	8656	9583	4846
9584	15208	9585	9243	9586	165	9587	6329	9589	6695
9591	9378	9593	12736	9595	6741	9599	15707	9600	13959
9601	10528	9602	7420	9608	8871	9609	1726	9610	14952
9612	2391	9613	9872	9614	8895	9616	4875	9617	15495
9618	13775	9619	2284	9625	12309	9626	8100	9627	5631
9628	11052	9629	4508	9630	16496	9631	14424	9632	11933
9633	14900	9635	12661	9637	8937	9639	1972	9640	7082
9644	9113	9646	1679	9647	6160	9648	10711	9654	14445
9655	10528	9657	4598	9658	14181	9659	5656	9662	1841
9664	13193	9666	4752	9668	4839	9671	6821	9673	11279
9678	12906	9679	5537	9680	3355	9681	1606	9682	4637
9683	12528	9684	5714	9686	8543	9689	4440	9690	12404
9692	10393	9693	10343	9695	15309	9698	6883	9700	3001
9702	13225	9703	3791	9704	11070	9706	7785	9707	15928
9708	14872	9710	9199	9712	3536	9713	7585	9714	13617
9718	16768	9719	15604	9721	9541	9722	4261	9723	2880
9724	529	9727	4177	9728	459	9729	10670	9731	6990
9732	3181	9733	15226	9735	12544	9738	10387	9739	12575
9740	1266	9741	2887	9742	183	9743	11052	9750	2306
9753	1271	9758	10014	9763	1583	9765	4379	9766	7280
9767	1098	9772	8033	9773	2946	9775	8170	9776	14154
9777	12538	9779	241	9780	10845	9782	3508	9786	2995
9788	3242	9789	14947	9793	350	9794	3962	9796	2231
9797	9597	9799	7652	9801	13469	9802	15637	9804	9541
9809	9990	9812	5658	9817	7335	9818	1826	9820	13873
9823	11463	9825	10670	9826	3795	9829	6467	9831	15590
9832	6904	9834	3286	9836	7923	9837	12525	9838	7286
9841	5282	9843	10066	9844	3040	9846	4426	9848	5009
9853	12304	9854	9575	9855	13107	9856	7330	9857	1825
9858	321	9859	12771	9861	12854	9863	16144	9864	7028
9868	7492	9869	2366	9872	12239	9874	5641	9876	5985
9877	1905	9881	11548	9882	4209	9883	3099	9884	16014
9885	15845	9887	1699	9888	11296	9889	8025	9890	4346
9896	4470	9897	12040	9903	4469	9905	6237	9906	6125
9907	8714	9908	9794	9910	11791	9911	13560	9913	9803
9914	2774	9916	15985	9918	2463	9919	7674	9925	289
9929	3146	9931	15716	9934	1328	9937	17008	9940	9646
9943	12177	9944	16686	9945	2317	9946	12984	9950	14264
9951	361	9955	10992	9956	11314	9958	7036	9960	14074
9965	14885	9966	15750	9969	12221	9975	7531	9976	506
9978	246	9980	13663	9981	2246	9982	1823	9984	10094

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

9987	5194	9992	181	9995	10349	9996	10513	9997	9513
9998	8328	10000	12868	10001	4977	10005	13024	10010	3434
13686	1522	13687	3412	13688	1743	13689	13097	13695	14632
13696	9310	13697	7945	13708	7729	13710	7479	13711	14206
13715	6479	13716	6640	13717	3609	13718	1629	13721	11994
13722	16311	13724	9332	13725	4225	13729	1047	13731	15239
13732	2826	13733	12577	13736	2880	13737	8929	13740	7435
13741	16026	13745	2434	13747	1019	13754	5766	13757	4858
13758	2721	13762	7487	13763	6535	13765	12780	13766	16748
13769	2199	13771	15324	13772	5885	13773	1081	13774	15556
13776	488	13778	4778	13779	6356	13781	789	13782	7232
13783	13800	13784	2755	13786	10117	13787	610	13788	16095
13791	6435	13792	6274	13795	1660	13796	11849	13799	15321
13800	9659	13801	8083	13802	8227	13804	3076	13806	1957
13809	13017	13816	16154	13819	11962	13820	9404	13823	8285
13824	5183	13827	7700	13829	8363	13832	5411	13836	9885
13837	15801	13839	14776	13842	10466	13844	2673	13846	2053
13847	16948	13849	15604	13853	3772	13855	2224	13856	8003
13857	11219	13860	13189	13862	8658	13863	928	13864	2839
13865	12973	13867	9160	13868	10708	13870	10342	13875	3426
13879	7468	13880	13876	13881	3993	13883	3461	13888	6443
13889	5516	13890	6701	13892	11290	13893	16916	13896	11735
13897	5552	13898	13525	13899	6051	13900	6110	13901	8972
13902	9811	13903	15800	13906	479	13907	16185	13909	9869
13913	1454	13917	11985	13920	13919	13924	4921	13925	1224
13927	16621	13929	2137	13930	16358	13933	7552	13936	606
13938	11140	13940	6792	13941	16871	13942	12988	13943	9136
13944	9580	13945	5316	13950	10875	13952	3681	13955	7657
13956	15958	13958	1652	13961	7967	13962	7610	13967	5651
13971	1999	13972	4602	13980	4039	13981	14971	13986	9851
13987	5201	13988	16555	13989	6594	13991	16635	13993	14628
13995	760	13998	5058	14002	3700	14004	6619	14006	16369
14007	424	14010	7710	14013	11219	14014	3756	14016	4363
14017	6903	14018	7106	14020	7435	14023	9496	14028	518
14030	12490	14031	10052	14033	12600	14034	9592	14035	950
14036	8161	14037	7416	14038	4827	14040	1711	14041	14341
14043	1657	14047	11673	14049	8445	14051	14480	14052	2724
14053	654	14054	1097	14057	10705	14058	13324	14059	1284
14061	8035	14062	15425	14066	10790	14067	4365	14069	14341
14070	6659	14071	12293	14072	7577	14075	5741	14076	12652
14080	4753	14082	14111	14083	488	14084	1205	14085	2990
14089	4067	14090	16463	14092	13159	14093	14192	14096	5370
14097	1005	14100	16794	14102	3331	14107	9048	14109	12495
14110	11651	14112	9032	14113	6021	14115	14622	14116	14659
14120	9774	14121	5114	14123	15461	14124	10138	14125	4650
14129	1415	14131	2207	14132	14606	14134	10833	14139	9945
14141	6739	14144	16059	14145	1885	14146	8158	14148	1693
14149	2562	14150	6602	14152	591	14153	13178	14154	11060
14156	709	14158	14786	14162	3269	14165	4419	14169	901
14170	8483	14172	7955	14173	6720	14175	8070	14176	12131
14181	11999	14182	10559	14184	14968	14188	12169	14189	16583
14190	73	14191	9165	14196	13374	14197	13904	14199	14284
14200	12376	14201	10746	14205	5155	14207	13698	14208	8416
14209	11450	14211	7007	14214	11705	14215	12582	14217	6550
14218	2424	14219	12315	14225	13992	14228	6517	14231	10949
14233	2106	14234	15234	14238	12639	14239	1087	14241	2525
14242	6635	14244	8146	14245	11489	14247	4356	14248	6148
14249	13533	14252	13845	14257	15626	14258	5763	14259	13409

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

14260	15262	14261	6796	14262	5577	14263	7334	14265	12722
14267	3224	14269	13772	14271	14662	14273	16265	14274	14070
14836	14915	14839	13011	14842	5183	14843	2075	14844	3723
14845	2424	14846	14302	14847	7358	14848	6025	14849	4975
16042	15325	16043	10299	16048	9521	16049	11536	16051	4033
16053	2525	16054	9892	16055	2643	16056	7638	16057	12577
16060	5406	16061	6158	16063	12410	16064	15870	16066	5148
16067	13287	16068	13315	16071	1837	16075	13487	16077	7100
16081	10577	16083	6356	16086	2175	16087	1572	16090	7267
16092	3791	16093	5907	16094	8276	16095	12365	16097	14182
16100	14451	16105	12114	16107	7174	16109	10746	16111	6741
16112	10527	16114	8842	16115	14884	16119	163	16120	5576
16122	5214	16126	12211	16134	7698	16135	14041	16136	11930
16138	11666	16139	13984	16140	6696	16141	10319	16142	14628
16143	10226	16149	12439	16150	4769	16151	3331	16153	9209
16154	13376	16156	2719	16157	16059	16162	10127	16163	12151
16164	13497	16165	1633	16166	15155	16167	11061	16169	431
16170	11784	16172	16496	16175	13681	16176	8655	16183	16942
16184	13144	16187	13491	16188	11173	16189	16447	16190	4304
16192	6143	16193	7706	16194	16383	16195	9998	16197	6644
16198	11008	16199	6232	16200	3112	16201	6355	16203	8048
16206	14527	16207	3203	16209	12724	16211	9032	16212	5882
16213	16743	16215	4549	16225	5482	16227	2653	16230	4195
16233	14880	16236	3648	16240	16499	16241	1927	16242	14621
16243	740	16246	1779	16249	6482	16253	13347	16254	11267
16256	14593	16257	16343	16262	8299	16263	11102	16265	5850
16268	14771	16269	624	16270	7573	16272	3790	16274	3547
16275	7101	16276	9912	16278	15709	16279	9514	16281	2549
16282	4705	16283	14398	16284	6185	16288	7970	16289	13296
16290	1881	16294	37	16295	8294	16296	6737	16297	4753
16298	5963	16302	3579	16304	4020	16305	13937	16307	7746
16308	16214	16312	2226	16313	16921	16316	383	16317	306
16319	12022	16320	1763	16322	9420	16323	14026	16330	6247
16332	6355	16333	1077	16334	9694	16336	2091	16337	16119
16338	9138	16341	11942	16343	3683	16347	1296	16352	2938
16354	15621	16356	5579	16358	15699	16360	12609	16361	11800
16363	11022	16366	4385	16368	1229	16369	9179	16370	3393
16372	3536	16374	5004	16376	12131	16377	4628	16378	16581
16379	4096	16382	12950	16384	8907	16387	10112	16388	12864
16391	13650	16392	16497	16393	14192	16398	10313	16399	11149
16400	1698	16401	11009	16403	121	16407	7939	16408	11834
16414	5702	16417	3629	16419	13616	16422	5224	16425	13683
16427	11002	16428	13657	16430	2954	16433	14520	16434	11008
16437	13916	16439	1230	16440	11278	16447	9773	16450	1007
16452	3669	16455	9811	16456	1230	16459	14311	16460	3588
16461	16062	16462	12012	16463	6591	16464	3929	16466	13797
16476	11722	16481	5681	16485	11350	16487	1021	16488	13788
16492	8030	16493	2616	16496	3657	16499	138	16500	11548
16503	16301	16504	15532	16505	7230	16506	15860	16508	2754
16509	3986	16510	6378	16511	12741	16513	8743	16515	1510
16517	8943	16521	8601	16523	842	16524	13509	16525	7622
16526	10968	16527	4384	16531	13369	16532	11616	16534	8701
16535	16397	16536	15633	16541	3270	16542	12373	16547	8677
16549	14632	16550	3076	16552	8002	16553	2809	16558	9924
16559	16501	16561	6919	16562	7232	16563	14275	16564	13609
16566	11059	16567	6724	16569	8008	16570	1911	16571	11775
16576	2530	16578	9630	16580	2033	16581	13714	16584	14417
16585	16418	16587	3279	16588	10552	16590	16308	16592	3248

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

16594	8636	16596	3938	16598	2971	16600	620	16601	3082
16602	6555	16603	13409	16604	3128	16609	9366	16610	11665
16612	15497	16613	8067	16614	7346	16616	16536	16617	9536
16620	10694	16622	10474	16624	10131	16625	4177	16626	6196
16627	12794	16628	2939	16629	6602	16631	13960	16637	13531
16642	12874	16643	1679	16644	4088	16645	8034	16646	2102
16648	6228	16651	14495	16652	471	16653	4345	16657	12809
16658	7957	16659	9111	16660	6243	16661	8636	16662	3681
16664	12005	16665	14252	16666	3442	16667	11306	16668	14240
16669	2366	16670	2963	16674	2724	16675	2732	16676	5659
16678	7430	16680	13020	16682	8868	16686	12642	16688	1823
16690	14926	16691	8586	16693	1165	16695	15074	16698	6827
16699	4691	16700	5810	16701	6610	16702	6112	16705	3003
16708	3120	16711	5344	16712	8807	16713	14949	16714	13506
16715	15305	16716	14655	16718	574	16719	7685	16723	16225
16726	16733	16727	9877	16728	9243	16730	14567	16731	5189
16733	10277	16735	13998	16738	2948	16740	2983	16744	1023
16746	14813	16747	8771	16748	16143	16750	1133	16751	9181
16752	10237	16753	13336	16754	16564	16758	5669	16760	13905
16763	5975	16764	7017	16767	6030	16768	2933	16769	13174
16770	4227	16772	1410	16773	2216	16775	3192	16776	14916
16778	8386	16779	15431	16784	7131	16785	3269	16787	6268
16791	15911	16792	3380	16794	6233	16795	573	16798	12868
16799	11644	16800	2866	16803	1816	16804	14888	16808	6447
16809	14658	16810	7429	16811	9945	16812	8728	16813	14786
16815	10146	16819	1061	16821	4859	16823	13649	16824	11134
16825	10982	16828	10430	16830	13760	16832	7348	16833	12454
16835	6516	16837	13506	16841	6093	16842	2737	16843	11678
16846	12822	16853	15696	16854	5970	16856	3349	16859	15443
16860	4651	16861	8763	16863	23	16865	13960	16868	1887
16869	15239	16871	4356	16873	14510	16874	1727	16875	5806
16876	3373	16879	4417	16880	1089	16881	2434	16884	14295
16885	2673	16893	1459	16897	8298	16898	9848	16899	13154
16901	16112	16902	3645	16904	8816	16905	12573	16908	371
16911	9937	16912	12809	16913	5161	16918	10323	16919	13887
16920	43	16922	9693	16930	8034	16933	8561	16935	3329
16936	7524	16938	5608	16939	10327	16943	14764	16945	14621
16946	126	16948	6523	16953	4931	16954	3916	16955	816
16958	5004	16960	10592	16961	1553	16967	3442	16976	2660
16979	9335	16980	11794	16982	772	16983	11642	16985	2714
16987	16091	16989	12166	16990	792	16996	3300	17001	7136
17003	16350	17004	14102	17005	15111	17008	620	17010	14564

ORDER OF FIELD IS 21223

1	1507	1507	16417
2	2704	2704	393
3	2625	2628	2950
4	1201	1204	15324
5	527	528	12647
6	2006	2006	9629
7	1827	1828	1936
8	2205	2205	14215
9	2715	2715	13753

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

10	1619	1619	915
11	2113	2113	10358
12	2710	2710	401
13	1524	1525	4099
14	2706	2708	11651
15	2314	2314	12327
16	1815	1816	6343
17	2702	2702	11279
18	311	311	4188
19	2109	2109	15967
20	2717	2718	3716
21	605	610	3309
22	20	21	8173

CODED	INPUT MESSAGE	THE CURVE	EMBEDDMENT
1	1507	1507	16417
2	2704	2704	393
3	2625	2628	2950
4	1201	1204	15324
5	527	528	12647
6	2006	2006	9629
7	1827	1828	1936
8	2205	2205	14215
9	2715	2715	13753
10	1619	1619	915
11	2113	2113	10358
12	2710	2710	401
13	1524	1525	4099
14	2706	2708	11651
15	2314	2314	12327
16	1815	1816	6343
17	2702	2702	11279
18	311	311	4188
19	2109	2109	15967
20	2717	2718	3716
21	605	610	3309
22	20	21	8173

SET OF SPECIMEN MULTIPLIERS

1289 5 873 4

FOR THE GENERATOR POINT = 8360 14564

THE RESULTS OF THE MULTIPLY-BY-7 POINT MULTIPLICATION OPERATION ARE AS
FOLLOWS:-

1 -3 -2 2 1

8360 14564 5865 16280 4916 3405 13532 13881 978 301
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1289 AND BASE POINT = 8360 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1289 IS 978 301

THEREFORE MICHAEL'S PUBLIC KEY IS 978 301

Appendix CH4.5

Results of the message encryption/decryption program

SET OF SPECIMEN MULTIPLIERS

1289 5 873 4

FOR THE GENERATOR POINT = 8360 14564

THE RESULTS OF THE MULTIPLY-BY-7 POINT MULTIPLICATION OPERATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

1 -3 -2 2 1

8360 14564 5865 16280 4916 3405 13532 13881 978 301
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1289 AND BASE POINT = 8360 14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1289 IS 978 301
FOR THE GENERATOR POINT = 8360 14564

THE RESULTS OF THE MULTIPLY-BY-7 POINT MULTIPLICATION OPERATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

3 -3 -1 -2

5187 16942 3955 14672 16809 13832 16530 5539
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 873 AND BASE POINT = 8360 -14564

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 873 IS 16530 5539

THEREFORE LILIAN'S PUBLIC KEY IS 16530 5539

FOR THE GENERATOR POINT = 16530 5539

THE RESULTS OF THE MULTIPLY-BY-7 POINT MULTIPLICATION OPERATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

1 -3 -2 2 1

16530 5539 3640 11137 15162 8977 174 4371 11027 8726
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1289 AND BASE POINT = 16530 5539

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1289 IS 11027 8726

LILIAN'S TRANSFORMED PUBLIC KEY IS 11027 8726

FOR THE GENERATOR POINT = 978 301

THE RESULTS OF THE MULTIPLY-BY-7 POINT MULTIPLICATION OPERATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

1 -3 -2 2 1

978 301 11556 6722 8533 4987 8903 15679 3516 14281
END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 1289 AND BASE POINT = 978 301

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 1289 IS 3516 14281

Appendix CH4.5

Results of the message encryption/decryption program

FOR THE GENERATOR POINT = 978 301

THE RESULTS OF THE MULTIPLY-BY-7 POINT MULTIPLICATION OPERATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

3 -3 -1 -2

11122 16627 7357 2554 9924 9992 11027 8726

END OF MULTIPLIER MR= 873 AND BASE POINT = 978 -301

AND FROM REFERENCE PROGRAM OPERATION [nP] FOR 873 IS 11027 8726

MICHAEL'S TRANSFORMED PUBLIC KEY IS 11027 8726

1	7842	2346
2	11750	16
3	1608	12565
4	12555	9185
5	6926	12655
6	13202	9812
7	8918	7380
8	1253	4343
9	13617	9536
10	14606	2515
11	954	8446
12	9041	12792
13	12250	259
14	10761	42
15	8380	10376
16	3664	11782
17	11786	16088
18	4520	7286
19	12668	11909
20	7545	8423
21	1926	8348
22	13933	2298

BELOW IS YOUR SCRAMBLED MESSAGE

BLK/N0	ENCODED MESSAGE	EMBEDDED MESSAGE	ENCRYPTED MESSAGE
1	1507	1507 16417	7842 2346
2	2704	2704 393	11750 16
3	2625	2628 2950	1608 12565
4	1201	1204 15324	12555 9185
5	527	528 12647	6926 12655
Appendix CH4.5			QB 4.5 CODE
6	2006	2006 9629	13202 9812
7	1827	1828 1936	8918 7380
8	2205	2205 14215	1253 4343
9	2715	2715 13753	13617 9536
10	1619	1619 915	14606 2515
11	2113	2113 10358	954 8446
12	2710	2710 401	9041 12792
13	1524	1525 4099	12250 259

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

14	2706	2708	11651	10761	42
15	2314	2314	12327	8380	10376
16	1815	1816	6343	3664	11782
17	2702	2702	11279	11786	16088
18	311	311	4188	4520	7286
19	2109	2109	15967	12668	11909
20	2717	2718	3716	7545	8423
21	605	610	3309	1926	8348
22	20	21	8173	13933	2298

END OF ENCRYPTION

Cross checking the points of the cipher

2	4835	4	16541	7	3799	8	2632	10	9691
12	10031	13	16051	15	12516	16	12088	18	13186
19	9968	21	8173	22	7965	24	12986	25	12332
27	12618	29	4603	30	11849	33	5600	37	3030
42	1188	43	14253	44	10474	45	15296	46	4691
47	9130	55	7007	56	143	58	13948	59	5048
60	4832	62	10629	63	841	66	8655	67	15587
72	13994	73	14948	74	16998	76	3339	77	10711
78	1959	80	10575	81	13609	83	9230	85	12119
88	13594	90	14153	92	10123	94	11914	95	9634
97	8804	99	9924	101	16674	107	5996	108	14893
109	682	111	5328	112	4525	115	3883	120	14043
121	5789	124	3938	125	11383	126	1629	127	11618
129	5936	132	11640	133	8916	134	10066	140	9048
141	15295	142	14068	143	14046	145	8922	146	11350
149	3948	150	4928	151	13385	152	13877	157	14503
159	6276	162	4225	163	11877	165	6676	166	7629
167	4881	169	3970	171	6117	173	3588	175	9700
176	2179	177	15572	180	10650	183	4108	184	16561
186	14819	188	342	189	1779	193	11651	194	11168
196	6187	199	10962	201	6837	204	6711	208	1398
209	3201	212	12396	214	5649	215	897	218	14209
226	606	234	2647	235	8469	237	10601	243	6211
245	434	246	8513	247	13022	248	8612	250	7835
252	3856	258	11130	260	15862	261	11060	263	4855
264	11142	266	4691	267	16992	270	14767	271	5308
273	9443	274	15473	275	1542	276	14734	278	8813
279	9984	281	6	282	11984	283	12680	285	8079
286	14814	288	2343	291	3938	293	4167	294	8892
295	14108	296	14681	299	16631	300	11615	301	10259
302	14050	305	16967	307	5906	308	15282	311	4188
313	4403	316	16190	318	3951	320	14439	321	2769
322	13689	323	5656	324	7756	325	8314	327	14469
328	8230	331	11943	333	5874	337	6479	338	15026
339	3355	343	11244	344	7401	345	10474	348	1470
349	7473	351	2793	354	9924	356	12616	357	2465
358	16956	359	16067	366	13609	367	13056	368	1322
370	12109	372	11155	373	4510	374	13589	375	9100
378	3588	379	9224	380	11350	383	9891	384	8281
385	10375	386	719	387	16922	388	2573	389	3442
391	575	392	10134	393	15627	394	237	395	6881
397	9709	398	2893	399	3001	401	1898	403	5857
406	7040	414	620	418	1723	420	6379	421	13300
422	7671	423	11296	424	14388	425	13156	426	3205
428	9579	429	7341	432	9967	433	11085	434	15579

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

439	4239	441	16304	442	1460	444	8253	445	3613
447	8034	453	12809	455	15961	457	10251	458	15219
461	15209	465	14601	466	834	467	14555	471	13506
472	14278	474	6485	475	4279	477	15472	480	3653
481	9884	483	6332	485	11127	487	12407	488	14676
490	7425	491	5947	492	8359	493	8159	496	14509
498	13000	499	12521	500	2292	501	4134	505	6623
508	5890	514	12227	515	1755	518	12315	525	14566
526	13960	528	12647	530	3788	532	8494	533	16604
534	4544	535	2413	539	16019	540	1299	543	8086
545	5988	546	15543	548	7955	555	8058	556	2289
558	12411	559	6531	560	5731	563	6420	566	6691
567	10913	569	15423	571	12946	572	8058	574	13876
576	1779	579	8631	582	16382	584	16130	585	2083
590	6699	591	14924	592	5157	593	11489	596	8684
597	4489	602	16569	603	1045	610	3309	615	12835
618	13048	619	11530	620	14954	621	8630	622	16154
623	10387	629	4719	631	12227	632	15291	633	1431
635	13789	639	5983	640	3028	641	4501	643	10231
644	1796	647	10579	652	12027	654	10458	656	14330
658	6102	659	13807	661	3733	662	11433	663	8118
667	8405	670	2946	671	8385	672	11413	674	2477
676	7337	679	8574	680	7145	681	8483	682	9398
683	16547	687	6759	689	729	690	5004	691	10786
692	1641	695	8495	696	14468	697	5883	699	2734
700	11328	701	6882	704	2770	707	4136	708	6171
709	7269	710	16056	714	10028	715	255	720	2258
721	13298	722	790	723	2935	726	6742	727	15657
729	14097	730	14184	732	10893	733	6450	734	3608
736	11932	737	4296	740	9165	744	591	745	11476
747	4680	752	15850	754	12382	757	16619	758	2708
759	3180	760	6242	761	16672	762	16933	763	7056
764	2037	767	8636	769	8655	770	4619	771	10077
776	8477	777	7420	779	4776	781	15698	785	3647
788	13823	789	1603	790	1334	791	3617	792	5486
796	14376	797	16392	798	9529	799	13951	801	11537
803	3246	804	4660	806	7942	808	9237	810	8574
814	6424	819	3298	821	6964	825	13800	828	13771
829	14536	831	5453	832	1570	834	12039	835	14621
836	11694	837	4324	838	14167	840	3389	842	5846
843	7756	847	6199	851	1201	854	6994	855	10410
858	16272	860	14979	864	3943	866	9445	868	2251
869	6208	872	6212	874	6652	875	12125	878	13906
879	15743	880	6549	882	1526	884	1634	886	15470
889	5188	890	16038	892	1286	895	520	898	5230
899	6776	902	5563	903	7416	905	3327	906	14369
907	5409	908	1548	912	16599	913	825	917	5930
918	6832	921	2408	928	11955	929	7577	931	4441
932	7293	934	14158	936	14868	937	8230	938	3896
939	3879	941	8164	944	12938	948	14103	949	14535
952	6186	953	7169	954	11503	954	11503 8446 A HIT		
955	2928	956	5363	959	16476	960	7790	962	546
963	9544	966	4236	967	12957	968	11490	970	9992
971	10193	974	6401	980	12028	981	4965	983	10916
985	16537	986	15688	987	11939	991	6604	993	16522
996	3779	997	8823	998	5812	999	12776	1000	8320
1005	14897	1008	5061	1009	15553	1011	10058	1012	9368
1014	1003	1018	16529	1020	3764	1023	8548	1025	3047

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

1026	7048	1029	14326	1030	9550	1037	9988	1040	12230
1041	15427	1042	14776	1043	10139	1044	13548	1045	7254
1046	4039	1047	5802	1048	10118	1052	10881	1054	12330
1056	11554	1057	12519	1058	9696	1059	16883	1060	9078
1062	15218	1064	9397	1068	10592	1069	12988	1074	3920
1077	8118	1080	6792	1083	8227	1088	1306	1090	10537
1091	9414	1093	13125	1094	12445	1097	13740	1098	12162
1104	3299	1105	14757	1106	6660	1107	12251	1109	4587
1114	2704	1115	9956	1119	10271	1120	11378	1121	6691
1124	11804	1125	10697	1127	1230	1131	3793	1136	8630
1138	16645	1139	5025	1144	8573	1146	724	1148	3740
1151	7125	1153	10878	1154	13902	1155	110	1158	1290
1159	5364	1162	6467	1168	3792	1169	9397	1172	9579
1174	2490	1176	16785	1179	2223	1181	598	1182	319
1186	4300	1187	2182	1188	9208	1189	7874	1190	5001
1191	15651	1193	11556	1194	10609	1195	15269	1199	6634
1200	336	1204	15324	1206	9317	1207	4961	1209	10139
1211	16616	1214	9163	1215	5802	1220	6093	1224	16633
1227	544	1228	8912	1229	13233	1230	5534	1232	12521
1237	6058	1238	9833	1240	2260	1242	13516	1245	4527
1246	13822	1249	3939	1250	6028	1252	9047	1257	4783
1258	16051	1259	6948	1261	10324	1264	2037	1266	2107
1275	9893	1276	6045	1277	7710	1278	7561	1282	13230
1284	5357	1285	10830	1286	14634	1288	8445	1303	12238
1305	16771	1308	8022	1309	12221	1310	9642	1315	332
1321	4239	1322	724	1324	4545	1327	11751	1329	3802
1330	10691	1332	4888	1334	2440	1336	14718	1338	15264
1339	708	1340	1408	1341	10775	1342	6381	1343	3581
1346	13914	1347	1660	1349	15762	1353	16054	1354	9192
1356	8658	1361	1009	1363	6282	1364	5842	1366	6067
1370	15959	1372	9629	1373	7137	1375	16579	1376	7592
1381	16139	1382	7636	1383	890	1384	4795	1385	14204
1387	7031	1389	14367	1390	11008	1391	12737	1394	3530
1395	1873	1397	14184	1401	6039	1403	9136	1404	9696
1409	4181	1410	7280	1411	8073	1412	1274	1414	7667
1418	9258	1423	2866	1424	12546	1427	12262	1432	5651
1434	14191	1435	10099	1437	4052	1438	6610	1441	12846
1443	2551	1444	5167	1445	5057	1451	9743	1452	5083
1453	12433	1457	2224	1459	16658	1461	693	1463	8539
1468	10049	1469	8361	1473	15335	1475	7350	1476	16791
1479	4053	1480	1611	1481	11534	1483	11416	1484	6144
1485	9575	1489	6355	1490	14972	1491	387	1494	13071
1495	5549	1498	1641	1507	16417	1509	4862	1510	13380
1514	13193	1515	10031	1517	2462	1519	8714	1525	4099
1529	8000	1530	11752	1532	15911	1537	8718	1540	513
1543	2573	1544	15455	1547	16042	1548	3447	1550	12304
1553	3529	1554	11978	1555	2671	1559	1110	1561	1854
1564	1522	1566	1840	1568	7273	1570	4279	1571	4354
572	12544	1575	676	1580	9625	1582	4420	1585	6530
1591	13658	1592	14474	1594	12170	1597	15286	1598	3962
1599	1042	1602	8919	1603	4294	1608	4734	1608	4734
12565	A HIT								
1611	4055	1612	5651	1613	14778	1614	6742	1615	3123
1616	2229	1617	6470	1618	15451	1619	915	1620	3964
1621	8796	1622	4747	1623	11259	1624	11948	1626	15888
1631	4947	1636	5932	1639	5158	1643	6268	1644	5046
1645	5737	1647	15380	1649	12274	1650	1335	1652	7903
1654	3593	1656	525	1657	2874	1658	13973	1661	11076

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

1663	15140	1664	6761	1665	9136	1667	1949	1668	4863
1669	5610	1670	15863	1674	8445	1675	2395	1683	10044
1684	269	1685	2832	1688	13254	1690	14132	1691	12011
1692	4094	1693	205	1696	11363	1697	3731	1699	2224
1701	5841	1703	12787	1705	5391	1707	9785	1709	6343
1714	8984	1716	7737	1717	9224	1722	3245	1723	13646
1724	7710	1725	7665	1728	10716	1730	15139	1732	7891
1735	368	1739	16280	1741	1222	1743	16396	1744	12583
1745	10283	1746	2161	1748	2951	1750	14900	1751	7923
1754	409	1758	15639	1759	2443	1761	1522	1763	1127
1766	5726	1767	8071	1770	5528	1771	9793	1772	16541
1774	7299	1775	4450	1777	13736	1778	1998	1779	8868
1780	4488	1781	9162	1784	13949	1785	1048	1786	8744
1788	7459	1789	8512	1793	8658	1796	11691	1797	11800
1798	16641	1800	7791	1802	6954	1808	7040	1809	15918
1810	5914	1812	692	1816	6343	1817	6190	1820	15117
1823	11037	1824	13868	1825	5105	1826	2417	1828	1936
1830	4677	1831	16363	1836	16474	1838	8612	1840	16668
1842	1513	1843	3839	1846	551	1848	10204	1851	7141
1853	15707	1855	7182	1858	5649	1862	16272	1865	8851
1867	6349	1868	10046	1869	1660	1870	15647	1872	10530
1873	3286	1875	10563	1877	1162	1878	16503	1879	33
1882	10736	1883	15152	1887	900	1888	12829	1892	11504
1893	1017	1895	11757	1896	3465	1899	6	1900	3785
1901	14937	1903	12337	1904	15926	1905	8871	1908	9813
1910	15698	1911	9530	1912	5013	1915	11555	1918	1600
1920	15730	1923	3172	1925	15040	1927	2155	1928	1946
1930	8579	1933	14296	1936	4251	1941	12017	1942	8579
1943	1731	1948	7511	1950	2860	1951	8489	1952	14906
1955	15880	1958	16310	1959	6031	1962	16204	1963	7782
1964	3091	1965	452	1969	10967	1970	13150	1971	11095
1972	9562	1973	12709	1974	11061	1976	12126	1980	15942
1982	3884	1983	14901	1985	4039	1987	3374	1989	12471
1991	6792	1993	1789	1994	1606	1995	324	1997	2395
2000	12988	2002	3856	2003	7548	2004	2378	2005	3120
2006	9629	2008	10345	2009	5194	2010	7577	2011	14756
2012	16373	2013	13119	2014	1873	2017	12525	2022	11807
2023	10149	2024	13538	2025	11658	2027	10736	2030	14872
2032	7644	2034	4713	2035	541	2036	15324	2041	981
2042	3128	2043	3082	2045	15633	2046	3662	2048	4280
2050	2712	2051	10237	2052	10151	2053	8223	2054	14355
2055	4187	2057	8292	2063	11315	2064	15043	2065	14253
2068	9809	2071	7416	2073	15233	2076	10926	2077	873
2080	9165	2082	3321	2086	5975	2088	12980	2091	8393
2095	841	2099	3407	2104	4846	2105	8907	2109	15967
2110	4325	2113	10358	2115	591	2121	1343	2122	13557
2123	7193	2124	9321	2125	14710	2126	8227	2127	2549
2128	11132	2129	16983	2130	14776	2131	13570	2132	14059
2134	3006	2135	1707	2143	10151	2145	15584	2148	14839
2150	4982	2152	909	2154	1013	2155	7908	2156	10023
2158	6523	2159	13657	2160	8483	2161	14458	2163	3324
2164	13813	2165	2950	2167	13502	2168	9063	2169	16380
5112	7740	5116	10451	5118	8555	5119	38	5120	10742
5122	14642	5123	15534	5124	12769	5126	10118	5132	11553
5137	7402	5140	16820	5141	4518	5143	2645	5145	8804
5146	6129	5147	15495	5148	11900	5154	10708	5157	12525
5165	8151	5166	11149	5167	2214	5168	1447	5170	4950
5172	14082	5174	5631	5177	14734	5180	6775	5183	5222

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

5184	2208	5191	8320	5197	9548	5199	16959	5203	10900
5205	10471	5206	8755	5207	15813	5208	1549	5210	14699
5219	4537	5221	8274	5223	16604	5224	369	5226	16555
5228	5472	5230	858	5231	12745	5235	16747	5240	8332
5246	6643	5247	2708	5248	15840	5251	12255	5252	2374
5257	12689	5258	9212	5260	14160	5263	11572	5264	5341
5265	1395	5273	14872	5276	3744	5278	16942	5279	2422
5280	15384	5281	14693	5283	10362	5284	7246	5285	14119
5286	658	5287	2175	5289	4020	5290	6803	5291	12993
5295	2933	5297	6955	5299	12674	5300	8678	5301	3227
5302	14392	5304	3286	5305	15349	5306	3644	5307	8117
5309	7391	5311	14839	5313	6799	5316	5176	5317	10268
5319	5062	5322	13776	5324	4846	5325	15686	5326	16946
5327	12755	5329	13240	5333	2855	5335	1874	5336	1606
5338	605	5341	2141	5342	3345	5344	14356	5352	10254
5354	15899	5355	9998	5356	5183	5357	16139	5358	15425
5359	8015	5363	2855	5366	3702	5367	4485	5371	16545
5380	12001	5384	14153	5389	10697	5390	15699	5392	14209
5393	8764	5394	6521	5398	2530	5399	6074	5402	11982
5405	10847	5407	480	5410	7627	5411	6047	5414	5606
5415	4517	5420	12946	5423	2025	5424	7923	5427	7987
5428	7101	5429	6559	5431	15452	5433	16281	5435	1057
5438	10037	5439	16723	5447	12874	5449	10929	5450	10634
5451	3088	5452	1756	5453	13998	5456	416	5457	7383
5460	14754	5462	15167	5463	2565	5464	6103	5466	2897
5468	6213	5469	8171	5470	4862	5475	13938	5476	6976
5477	1221	5480	4198	5482	3325	5483	156	5484	14111
5486	9584	5488	7821	5490	7594	5491	12629	5492	12103
5493	7551	5496	1401	5497	12867	5498	8871	5505	796
5506	5842	5507	950	5508	6766	5510	5263	5511	1334
5513	864	5514	3647	5515	11439	5519	9914	5521	10506
5522	8377	5526	15177	5527	13525	5529	10186	5532	1888
5535	5370	5538	13825	5539	7926	5540	16190	5542	7405
5545	2311	5549	4798	5554	13301	5555	9006	5556	789
5557	2041	5558	13078	5559	15707	5560	5295	5562	2648
5565	11224	5566	5828	5568	15538	5570	1994	5574	11527
5575	9233	5580	16545	5581	58	5584	1954	5585	8714
5587	1034	5588	5626	5592	16820	5593	13114	5594	37
5598	13955	5601	3783	5603	1760	5604	6963	5605	4366
5607	15772	5608	12304	5609	8480	5611	4714	5612	7562
5615	7888	5617	5978	5618	3683	5619	3962	5620	1542
5622	1353	5624	6955	5625	9077	5626	6108	5627	15399
5628	14900	5631	6068	5632	3085	5634	9152	5635	12629
5636	15088	5637	14954	5638	4126	5640	15765	5642	9546
5644	5435	5645	13822	5646	11657	5647	1213	5649	12419
5650	7487	5652	12110	5653	8038	5659	8794	5663	7856
5665	5882	5666	1344	5668	3469	5670	2137	5672	9575
5673	7223	5676	14672	5683	5791	5684	610	5685	15807
5686	4087	5688	5514	5692	13991	5697	6766	5698	11046
5699	14049	5700	9984	5701	10226	5702	15587	5703	14886
5704	12544	5705	5946	5706	152	5708	11444	5710	11902
6343	13079	6350	4788	6351	752	6352	2016	6356	16276
6357	4052	6363	8769	6364	13995	6366	11181	6367	4575
6371	1443	6375	16442	6376	11466	6377	14480	6379	15333
6382	4330	6383	6963	6387	8513	6389	9878	6393	1863
6394	7869	6395	11383	6396	10164	6397	7737	6400	3668
6401	15664	6407	12500	6409	5105	6411	12047	6415	10465
6417	5549	6419	16312	6420	12803	6425	8428	6429	14143

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

6430 12144	6432 897	6433 10413	6434 4488	6435 12720
6441 12797	6442 11642	6444 12217	6445 4843	6446 14509
6447 5828	6449 10621	6451 11559	6452 9514	6453 12654
6454 11658	6459 1710	6460 9743	6468 10399	6469 9299
6473 5148	6474 12546	6477 575	6479 14130	6480 2606
6482 8000	6484 15921	6485 10898	6486 12781	6489 553
6492 16536	6496 2779	6497 13590	6498 8916	6502 2569
6503 16087	6504 13864	6505 15152	6506 11251	6507 16201
6508 3910	6510 5810	6511 9962	6512 5692	6513 11710
6516 9466	6518 12278	6519 6892	6522 13135	6523 9873
6526 1484	6528 2195	6531 8843	6533 5041	6534 10716
6537 2504	6538 11735	6540 4300	6541 9655	6544 13279
6548 13853	6549 13889	6550 740	6553 16751	6554 15093
6564 6634	6565 11286	6567 7665	6568 2946	6570 8670
6571 5928	6574 8317	6576 10612	6577 10796	6578 3884
6582 11345	6584 3584	6585 122	6587 10962	6589 14294
6593 1523	6594 6143	6597 15660	6600 8720	6601 1280
6602 12312	6605 1444	6606 7265	6608 13092	6610 7155
6617 16257	6618 2403	6621 9850	6623 15646	6624 70
6629 10841	6632 7420	6634 11934	6635 1711	6636 7622
6639 15224	6640 7205	6642 1840	6643 10111	6644 435
6645 9851	6648 12918	6650 10387	6655 14215	6656 4898
6659 9	6660 16883	6661 8417	6663 6408	6664 13991
6666 15221	6667 15063	6668 16792	6669 1487	6670 12865
6671 10149	6673 12244	6676 1614	6679 7358	6680 11162
6682 9723	6686 16798	6687 6120	6688 8810	6689 2586
6692 4788	6693 8274	6696 10626	6698 1931	6700 11296
6701 11674	6702 14779	6704 7523	6706 16053	6708 13433
6709 1127	6713 8419	6715 6739	6716 6039	6718 13196
6719 8436	6721 4804	6731 3481	6733 9444	6735 3010
6739 14321	6740 5681	6742 10786	6745 413	6746 9065
6747 7981	6749 12329	6753 15703	6756 9767	6757 1633
6759 6297	6760 6562	6764 11102	6766 11261	6767 758
6768 15612	6769 152	6770 13196	6772 16257	6773 14130
6774 9948	6776 10597	6778 5691	6779 15133	6780 13371
6782 16250	6786 8728	6787 4711	6789 767	6790 3662
6793 16586	6795 793	6798 2086	6804 758	6807 2229
6811 269	6812 134	6815 15217	6817 5391	6818 9626
6819 16442	6821 2565	6823 15064	6824 708	6826 8330
6827 4304	6829 5933	6830 7961	6831 8514	6834 11623
6835 8126	6836 10152	6838 13007	6840 15452	6842 12356
6843 4114	6846 9723	6848 6386	6850 11496	6851 14012
6856 4303	6858 13308	6860 12065	6861 5979	6863 7428
6864 8127	6866 8064	6867 1273	6868 10694	6870 3729
6871 9864	6872 6675	6878 319	6879 1035	6880 10020
6882 172	6883 7046	6886 4033	6887 5057	6891 10984
6892 8945	6894 15759	6896 20	6897 423	6899 1507
6903 14204	6904 4096	6905 10260	6910 1837	6912 3001
6916 15696	6917 1603	6921 4447	6923 7106	6924 7361
6925 12558	6926 13559	6926 13559 12655 A HIT		
8130 3207	8135 4028	8142 2269	8144 2292	8145 9057
8146 7942	8147 1382	8149 6196	8151 14215	8153 5534
8154 6074	8157 1154	8162 6561	8163 2789	8165 7764
8169 5400	8170 6378	8171 13727	8172 14752	8175 3662
8177 9061	8179 12013	8181 7918	8184 6372	8185 9241
8188 12232	8189 7657	8190 12872	8191 12217	8192 6078
8195 15386	8200 11415	8204 10965	8206 1548	8207 3139
8209 15686	8210 11046	8211 7967	8212 4220	8213 10487

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

8214	13629	8215	12549	8216	1762	8218	3759	8219	2824
8220	16496	8221	5604	8225	12804	8226	2993	8227	3791
8230	12961	8233	2785	8234	11500	8236	10389	8237	10889
8238	11444	8242	15824	8244	5846	8248	4764	8250	7711
8251	2392	8252	5075	8260	12794	8262	3457	8266	13948
8267	2976	8269	15796	8271	2361	8274	4510	8276	2705
8278	6192	8279	9923	8282	10121	8283	6426	8284	6032
8285	10225	8289	235	8291	4345	8292	7457	8298	9260
8299	16735	8300	15590	8301	4662	8303	4119	8305	8371
8308	6401	8311	528	8316	6741	8317	10149	8318	15433
8322	5222	8323	1535	8324	4931	8325	11768	8328	15532
8331	6391	8332	15537	8333	662	8334	2732	8338	4934
8342	14090	8344	16708	8345	15618	8346	16472	8347	5936
8349	14733	8350	2265	8351	13745	8352	5034	8354	4299
8356	8777	8357	16240	8358	16937	8360	14564	8361	1029
8364	4510	8366	10224	8367	2292	8370	16309	8371	5135
8372	4498	8374	14757	8375	3173	8377	12851	8380	203
8380	203	10376 A HIT							
8382	4125	8383	5361	8384	1744	8385	274	8388	9934
8392	6435	8397	14775	8398	1910	8399	5919	8400	3756
8401	13485	8402	4881	8403	12704	8406	5885	8408	1284
8410	7081	8411	6189	8414	10519	8416	4507	8421	12612
8424	10877	8426	9693	8427	311	8429	5196	8431	4
8432	8203	8433	15066	8440	11271	8441	669	8442	4881
8443	15831	8447	13429	8449	14195	8450	15746	8451	3884
8453	5864	8454	14887	8455	12260	8456	6535	8458	6280
8460	8796	8462	8581	8465	6199	8466	2421	8467	10605
8469	6842	8470	426	8472	16932	8473	12670	8475	8729
8478	4253	8479	16773	8480	11088	8485	9441	8489	5391
8490	4419	8491	1328	8492	4267	8493	15338	8495	8646
8496	15608	8500	4961	8501	10313	8502	10072	8504	16969
8505	1383	8507	12948	8508	8664	8509	7915	8511	15928
8516	269	8517	15470	8520	7667	8521	5435	8522	5865
8523	6162	8524	7177	8526	6076	8528	12690	8530	12389
8532	11658	8533	13393	8534	12554	8535	5936	8536	12952
8537	13470	8538	5028	8539	1127	8541	13620	8542	7991
8543	3238	8544	14324	8546	13497	8548	554	8551	877
8553	11803	8554	16149	8555	1549	8556	9539	8557	8992
8558	4471	8559	11225	8561	13640	8566	7596	8571	5673
8573	7785	8576	290	8579	15792	8580	4866	8583	5746
8587	6563	8588	2229	8592	16843	8593	1698	8595	14743
8598	15226	8600	1681	8602	12937	8603	416	8604	15967
8605	2214	8607	9435	8610	15043	8612	10574	8613	13447
8614	16364	8615	5385	8616	13783	8619	14082	8620	1920
8621	4068	8622	6069	8623	15152	8627	4560	8628	3191
8632	334	8634	7807	8636	12419	8637	8767	8641	16074
8642	12309	8644	12741	8645	2193	8646	14308	8649	9310
8650	14649	8652	14564	8655	11460	8656	2466	8661	1434
8663	8845	8665	5064	8667	15508	8670	15944	8674	9693
8675	14356	8676	6915	8678	2078	8679	5057	8680	7278
8685	4124	8687	13948	8688	6641	8689	13985	8692	16447
8697	9368	8698	11394	8699	8100	8700	5055	8701	15953
8702	13454	8703	7344	8704	9756	8706	932	8707	14880
8708	6375	8710	10730	8711	11378	8714	8377	8718	13825
8719	7665	8720	16956	8721	9931	8722	12692	8723	14204
8726	716	8727	16819	8730	5275	8732	8736	8734	3023
8736	15892	8738	15388	8739	10311	8740	14800	8741	11882
8745	4931	8746	9121	8749	10716	8751	8281	8754	12867

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

8756	3742	8758	11742	8761	11721	8762	16801	8763	13199
8764	3608	8766	185	8767	431	8768	1734	8770	14680
8772	12181	8774	8550	8777	5105	8781	11520	8792	12442
8793	657	8795	8121	8796	13866	8797	4488	8798	11051
8802	2296	8803	1840	8806	6781	8808	583	8811	9846
8812	15708	8813	2991	8815	11543	8817	11213	8818	836
8821	14353	8823	10536	8824	83	8825	14154	8827	13603
8829	15132	8832	5293	8834	6702	8836	13214	8837	2002
8838	2378	8841	4134	8842	5886	8843	8080	8848	708
8853	4192	8856	14518	8857	5066	8858	4051	8859	12855
8862	10375	8864	15061	8866	15056	8867	12741	8868	9027
8871	8876	8873	7733	8875	4098	8876	6365	8880	6422
8882	13456	8883	3721	8886	13178	8890	1070	8893	14280
8894	6039	8896	6509	8898	7737	8900	1414	8901	10046
8903	4952	8905	3031	8906	3793	8908	10667	8913	7115
8916	4636	8917	3389	8919	3309	8922	143	8924	11562
8926	9774	8936	15211	8938	14871	8942	13203	8944	14994
8948	16760	8950	12120	8951	319	8954	5735	8955	15176
8956	13302	8957	6389	8958	3728	8960	671	8969	9778
8974	10157	8977	5262	8978	816	8980	9884	8981	2755
8983	8895	8984	16939	8986	4959	8987	12669	8988	5330
8991	13589	8992	3125	8994	16723	8995	3224	8997	15636
8998	3975	9000	8000	9007	12051	9013	2732	9014	9386
9015	16566	9016	4251	9017	1620	9019	3659	9020	12669
9021	4525	9025	2630	9027	1194	9029	1698	9030	1757
9031	13614	9033	11904	9036	15645	9038	15908	9039	16560
9041	4180	9041	4180	12792	A HIT				
9042	6564	9045	13976	9047	4101	9049	2422	9050	6322
9051	2632	9053	3115	9055	5315	9057	12376	9058	64
9059	16350	9061	14510	9063	2694	9065	4624	9067	8173
9070	7042	9071	12606	9073	5983	9076	5106	9078	4345
9080	5175	9081	5751	9082	14880	9084	2889	9086	431
9088	792	9091	5418	9092	11481	9093	16488	9094	6087
9095	1726	9098	4997	9099	5549	9100	9743	9103	506
9104	16311	9106	14479	9107	1737	9111	14316	9112	13707
9113	12546	9116	12255	9117	16425	9118	16084	9119	5574
9122	1105	9123	10313	9125	2297	9127	5302	9129	5605
9131	8423	9132	2263	9133	13154	9134	3278	9135	12794
9136	6283	9137	7459	9139	6428	9141	16447	9144	15167
9145	5660	9146	16632	9148	6936	9149	3532	9150	3838
9152	16569	9153	2725	9154	10062	9155	13114	9156	16448
9157	2066	9158	10318	9162	9443	9164	2496	9166	15896
9167	5441	9171	4095	9172	12275	9175	11533	9177	10795
9179	5493	9180	15099	9183	10214	9184	16538	9185	14947
9186	13301	9189	16760	9190	15532	9191	15125	9192	101
9193	6231	9195	7595	9196	7543	9199	836	9200	10929
9201	11982	9202	6834	9203	11660	9204	5045	9205	4714
9206	14673	9207	15521	9209	12618	9210	6353	9217	4052
9218	2171	9219	10629	9220	13877	9222	732	9228	16652
9232	2290	9233	6187	9235	9623	9239	4922	9240	7111
10484	6851	10485	1425	10486	1654	10491	11383	10494	10120
10495	11763	10497	10697	10499	16680	10500	1846	10501	4188
10503	6366	10506	9934	10507	2342	10515	15523	10518	6637
10519	6881	10520	4675	10522	16516	10525	5167	10526	4668
10529	15235	10533	14759	10534	10694	10536	8030	10539	150
10540	14224	10541	6765	10542	3731	10544	8416	10548	2783
10549	9027	10555	15336	10556	1014	10557	16773	10559	10893
10560	14420	10562	1862	10563	2880	10564	993	10565	1510

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

10570	16791	10572	11555	10574	3972	10577	13629	10578	1292
10581	6222	10582	15069	10583	4951	10584	493	10585	1899
10586	11499	10587	13383	10590	8682	10591	16339	10594	5087
10596	13529	10597	11642	10598	11394	10602	11500	10604	626
10605	4556	10607	5524	10609	6147	10610	12421	10612	5406
10613	15511	10614	12679	10615	4959	10617	16707	10618	6761
10619	828	10621	7640	10622	6220	10626	1935	10627	15388
10628	15939	10629	6619	10630	3894	10631	10095	10632	13614
10633	12768	10634	3977	10637	15298	10639	7752	10640	14077
10642	13189	10644	14809	10645	596	10648	3760	10649	11168
10650	113	10651	13798	10655	16971	10656	5517	10657	10353
10658	9517	10663	3700	10664	16637	10665	5853	10667	6942
10668	3181	10672	7965	10674	13485	10675	6389	10676	11238
10678	11586	10682	4598	10692	1846	10694	12166	10696	4744
10701	1236	10702	2454	10704	7974	10705	828	10708	11085
10709	6821	10710	1334	10712	3647	10714	1661	10715	13388
10716	9970	10719	16314	10725	10500	10726	1457	10730	8685
10731	7833	10733	11754	10737	12260	10739	4096	10740	7078
10741	8824	10742	1185	10743	12682	10747	12198	10750	1791
10751	13805	10752	12137	10753	8409	10754	14954	10756	9912
10757	7922	10759	10911	10760	3224	10761	14518	10761	14518 42 A
HIT									
10762	7587	10763	7408	10764	4159	10765	12376	10766	2861
10767	10939	10770	463	10771	12509	10772	4888	10773	15266
10775	2874	10776	234	10777	11066	10778	10136	10780	8121
10785	15763	10786	7999	10796	5734	10797	3844	10801	5681
10802	4261	10804	5312	10808	7791	10812	5810	10813	2466
10815	5783	10817	6486	10818	9893	10820	8320	10823	9567
10829	10730	10837	10118	10841	1018	10848	1801	10850	3717
10851	16762	10858	2471	10859	5238	10860	14609	10861	7622
10863	14451	10865	11734	10866	7814	10867	10813	10872	3784
10873	13957	10880	10271	10881	12431	10882	4284	10884	11882
10888	652	10889	5308	10891	2248	10892	2919	10895	9953
10896	15729	10897	5001	10899	6162	10900	6052	10904	11567
10905	3108	10911	16979	10914	16536	10916	9321	10918	12087
10920	782	10921	14066	10923	1140	10924	12438	10928	7807
10930	14906	10933	3749	10934	2193	10935	16582	10936	9722
10937	12587	10938	12952	10940	8570	10943	2494	10946	2359
10950	13006	10951	1489	10956	11762	10957	12587	10958	3197
10959	4086	10962	5003	10964	1876	10965	12914	10966	8470
10969	5542	10970	14562	10972	8073	10976	9774	10978	14474
10979	4259	10983	13178	10985	483	10986	3606	10988	5422
10989	9939	10990	13329	10991	4272	10992	16814	10993	3863
10995	11102	10998	9185	11003	16472	11005	4304	11006	2708
11007	16452	11010	4346	11011	9432	11012	314	11013	4627
11014	1964	11015	3725	11017	10938	11020	12946	11025	5784
11026	15750	11028	14955	11029	9317	11032	9984	11039	8503
11041	1837	11043	12461	11044	2487	11046	14989	11047	1941
11048	3349	11049	9364	11056	13799	11057	1977	11059	6447
11060	9530	11062	16781	11064	16468	11066	4140	11068	14592
11074	2936	11075	11968	11078	10061	11080	15279	11084	14796
11085	4033	11089	9722	11090	16711	11093	14296	11094	2916
11675	4793	11676	714	11677	9310	11678	4744	11682	883
11684	10614	11686	2296	11687	16909	11691	13197	11693	3896
11695	12069	11699	14843	11705	16860	11709	7842	11710	1929
11712	5251	11713	8676	11714	14066	11715	8424	11716	6211
11718	15077	11719	2869	11720	381	11722	4136	11725	6733

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

11726	1009	11727	5115	11729	7874	11730	3040	11731	16283
11732	991	11733	13771	11736	13200	11739	13743	11741	7504
11744	10024	11745	3755	11746	15730	11748	4117	11749	2544
11750	9102	11750	9102	16 A HIT					
11751	2505	11753	7438	11756	9956	11757	12403	11758	2146
11762	7082	11764	13347	11765	2209	11766	2453	11769	8804
11771	5911	11773	6386	11775	4552	11782	185	11783	680
11786	10967	11786	10967	16088 A HIT					
11790	7347	11791	12033	11793	3706	11799	3569	11800	6750
11802	15427	11803	6535	11806	9903	11807	9907	11808	10609
11809	1236	11810	3939	11812	4726	11815	6183	11817	8540
11818	7265	11821	15180	11822	13734	11823	1876	11824	2936
11825	10396	11828	13985	11829	1186	11830	5906	11831	3431
11833	874	11834	13998	11835	12356	11838	12957	11839	6435
11841	6033	11842	6878	11844	5885	11848	16352	11850	7967
11853	4777	11854	11178	11857	14756	11858	2443	11860	11883
11861	14429	11862	16203	11863	12128	11864	16344	11868	12048
11870	3296	11874	5759	11878	7657	11880	16851	11881	7569
11885	11990	11886	6351	11887	1254	11888	8170	11889	6059
11896	961	11901	6720	11903	16546	11904	3226	11906	3100
11908	7278	11911	4159	11914	7347	11916	2386	11919	14427
11920	3920	11921	11805	11922	9474	11925	10913	11926	6428
11929	4827	11932	10244	11933	12874	11935	15858	11939	2155
11941	15955	11942	4234	11943	7517	11944	14428	11945	7164
11946	5158	11947	2217	11949	10418	11950	270	11952	14093
11953	5629	11954	2212	11955	13237	11956	2020	11957	12405
11958	6471	11959	2933	11966	14944	11968	6563	11969	12781
11973	14737	11974	709	11975	3030	11976	15955	11977	11889
11978	11283	11979	9078	11980	12047	11984	2958	11985	8772
11986	9644	11987	15939	11991	678	11994	13779	11996	16179
11997	9722	12003	13045	12005	929	12008	165	12013	993
12014	4559	12015	10939	12018	6705	12020	2489	12021	9198
12026	16632	12027	13348	12030	4648	12032	16364	12042	4439
12044	1158	12045	3264	12046	12797	12048	2530	12053	12659
12061	3683	12062	10360	12063	308	12065	14029	12071	1567
12074	16590	12075	11798	12076	9687	12077	13729	12080	13356
12081	10024	12082	11157	12083	12673	12085	14667	12086	8086
12087	15499	12088	6661	12090	2462	12096	7574	12099	14369
12101	9520	12103	4595	12104	6193	12105	11804	12107	5532
12109	1257	12111	2646	12112	8133	12114	3237	12118	13648
12121	2705	12122	11334	12123	427	12125	784	12126	7922
12127	2004	12128	12587	12131	14211	12133	2562	12134	37
12135	9429	12140	4803	12143	9822	12145	5882	12146	10099
12147	13969	12148	4122	12150	10138	12151	8300	12154	12688
12155	9859	12158	2617	12160	10911	12161	4933	12162	2785
12163	13730	12165	8715	12166	7624	12168	3885	12171	9126
12172	11799	12178	10226	12182	5118	12183	692	12184	12119
12185	2832	12186	14367	12187	6038	12195	1059	12199	14837
12200	1101	12203	4094	12204	1852	12212	10554	12213	3604
12218	2950	12220	5318	12221	626	12222	3461	12227	15635
12230	5988	12233	10299	12235	6252	12238	7630	12239	9299
12241	16698	12242	16945	12243	14677	12249	16529	12250	6053
12250	6053	259 A HIT							
12251	15602	12252	8443	12253	10399	12259	9923	12263	16750
12266	14479	12272	4118	12273	284	12274	15699	12276	13433
12278	14399	12279	14434	12282	1863	12283	9040	12284	5323
12285	11115	12287	7677	12288	9778	12289	16478	12290	173
12292	15569	12293	7816	12294	16612	12295	15108	12297	2497
12298	6721	12299	6426	12304	4236	12305	13652	12306	8395

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

12309	13362	12310	3444	12311	11608	12313	10440	12315	11884
12316	12279	12318	6034	12319	7101	12321	8146	12325	8695
12326	1263	12327	10947	12328	16042	12330	8615	12333	10218
12334	8813	12335	7269	12338	10499	12339	13357	12340	1798
12341	16246	12345	3839	12346	15612	12348	9365	12349	2810
12351	1558	12352	1758	12355	16159	12357	14039	12359	8170
12360	16567	12361	6910	12362	4997	12364	10260	12365	4853
12366	15744	12367	3567	12369	6856	12371	10947	12373	12326
12374	1019	12375	8303	12376	13724	12377	13557	12379	6869
12380	3824	12381	2791	12383	12226	12386	756	12389	9323
12390	7722	12391	1423	12392	3660	12393	13385	12394	14229
12395	16157	12396	2955	12399	1598	12401	9937	12402	8727
12403	3273	12404	7953	12405	8393	12406	2282	12407	2564
12408	4952	12409	6756	12410	16601	12413	15129	12414	14988
12415	13786	12416	4928	12418	1383	12419	9705	12421	169
12422	4533	12426	5242	12428	165	12429	4020	12432	7742
12433	4297	12438	6605	12439	1938	12441	2987	12442	4237
12443	12495	12444	8509	12448	3040	12449	14194	12450	14671
12455	3011	12457	11149	12458	5874	12460	16317	12465	6266
12467	13698	12468	859	12472	9998	12473	7262	12474	4447
12476	3613	12479	2438	12480	3874	12481	682	12484	13744
12494	3766	12495	436	12496	7358	12497	12811	12498	14733
12501	8548	12504	7492	12505	2080	12506	1724	12508	7445
12513	14345	12515	902	12516	10702	12517	11488	12518	11719
12521	1884	12526	368	12531	10486	12533	10054	12535	11664
12536	5573	12537	13279	12538	2135	12539	12690	12544	4651
12545	16181	12546	4451	12550	16473	12551	8455	12553	5348
12555	15326	12555	15326	9185	A HIT				
12556	4068	12558	7403	12559	8003	12560	4619	12561	16942
12562	4997	12566	8763	12568	3018	12569	12492	12570	10242
12572	13292	12575	16188	12576	12188	12577	3028	12579	15140
12581	13056	12584	15662	12585	13913	12586	6301	12589	1205
12590	3645	12591	6567	12592	14800	12593	11354	12598	9407
12599	16026	12601	974	12603	2161	12609	4507	12610	16918
12612	10277	12614	6311	12615	5119	12616	7926	12617	4037
12620	7082	12622	6117	12626	1530	12628	5550	12630	7005
12632	1492	12636	2995	12638	12901	12639	11451	12640	1289
12644	8405	12646	15978	12649	2175	12650	14479	12651	11846
12653	3459	12654	4708	12656	1054	12663	6296	12665	10419
12667	4711	12669	3385	12671	3976	12674	105	12676	2341
12677	5443	12680	6464	12681	4003	12688	14059	12690	14800
12691	5482	12693	13224	12694	6708	12695	1731	12697	5422
12698	828	12699	8657	12706	1172	12707	11192	12708	4871
12709	4501	12710	15742	12711	4952	12716	16028	12717	8794
12719	215	12720	13045	12724	5028	12726	2222	12729	9491
12732	14582	12736	6883	12738	11224	12739	14944	12741	7169
12742	8539	12743	2016	12744	15571	12745	7977	12747	8130
12748	7779	12749	14629	12750	901	12754	15759	12756	8780
12760	5028	12761	12535	12765	9778	12767	10676	12768	1740
12769	4113	12771	5911	12774	5632	12775	13797	12777	1370
12778	7573	12779	11503	12781	4968	12784	10892	12786	16366
12787	7888	12788	678	12791	7430	12792	782	12794	5357
12795	13314	12796	16400	12798	5924	12799	1664	12800	16685
12806	14950	12807	10588	12810	15687	12812	14375	12816	10151
12820	744	12826	15903	12827	2860	12829	11902	12830	1846
12831	181	12838	16655	12841	16480	12845	4068	12848	7374
13475	13048	13476	11480	13479	9753	13484	9923	13485	1194
13486	6343	13488	14967	13489	1740	13490	10955	13491	3744

Appendix CH4.5		Results of the message encryption/decryption program							
13492	9242	13495	11968	13496	400	13497	15031	13498	4261
13500	12178	13502	15234	13505	13985	13506	15766	13510	8557
13512	16418	13514	2647	13515	886	13519	7601	13520	14052
13521	5607	13523	12902	13524	9932	13525	16858	13528	12884
13530	7524	13531	16747	13532	4494	13533	12032	13534	2296
13535	3992	13541	13789	13543	9784	13549	11645	13550	11678
13551	14033	13552	14814	13553	5066	13554	777	13556	7012
13558	1237	13561	12811	13563	16921	13564	9782	13572	6812
13573	9242	13580	3256	13582	11408	13585	13258	13587	608
13588	11735	13589	14068	13591	14655	13592	13179	13594	14480
13596	16578	13597	860	13598	624	13599	10916	13602	1873
13603	7473	13610	1400	13612	1021	13618	7709	13619	16884
13621	9127	13622	3181	13623	4249	13625	2705	13626	866
13627	2785	13629	10060	13633	9629	13635	1027	13636	5350
13637	14869	13639	2072	13640	3929	13641	4766	13642	6821
13643	1306	13645	14989	13646	15161	13647	13315	13648	3031
13649	7374	13650	12185	13651	12836	13654	16739	13658	571
13659	8345	13663	16582	13664	6233	13665	887	13666	1395
13669	16933	13670	2167	13672	6697	13675	9233	13676	14469
13678	11206	13680	16967	13681	6334	13682	7409	13683	4598
13685	9953	13686	1522	13687	3412	13688	1743	13689	13097
13695	14632	13696	9310	13697	7945	13708	7729	13710	7479
13711	14206	13715	6479	13716	6640	13717	3609	13718	1629
13721	11994	13722	16311	13724	9332	13725	4225	13729	1047
13731	15239	13732	2826	13733	12577	13736	2880	13737	8929
13740	7435	13741	16026	13745	2434	13747	1019	13754	5766
13757	4858	13758	2721	13762	7487	13763	6535	13765	12780
13766	16748	13769	2199	13771	15324	13772	5885	13773	1081
13774	15556	13776	488	13778	4778	13779	6356	13781	789
13782	7232	13783	13800	13784	2755	13786	10117	13787	610
13788	16095	13791	6435	13792	6274	13795	1660	13796	11849
13799	15321	13800	9659	13801	8083	13802	8227	13804	3076
13806	1957	13809	13017	13816	16154	13819	11962	13820	9404
13823	8285	13824	5183	13827	7700	13829	8363	13832	5411
13836	9885	13837	15801	13839	14776	13842	10466	13844	2673
13846	2053	13847	16948	13849	15604	13853	3772	13855	2224
13856	8003	13857	11219	13860	13189	13862	8658	13863	928
13864	2839	13865	12973	13867	9160	13868	10708	13870	10342
13875	3426	13879	7468	13880	13876	13881	3993	13883	3461
13888	6443	13889	5516	13890	6701	13892	11290	13893	16916
13896	11735	13897	5552	13898	13525	13899	6051	13900	6110
13901	8972	13902	9811	13903	15800	13906	479	13907	16185
13909	9869	13913	1454	13917	11985	13920	13919	13924	4921
13925	1224	13927	16621	13929	2137	13930	16358	13933	7552
13933	7552	2298 A HIT							
13936	606	13938	11140	13940	6792	13941	16871	13942	12988
13943	9136	13944	9580	13945	5316	13950	10875	13952	3681
13955	7657	13956	15958	13958	1652	13961	7967	13962	7610
13967	5651	13971	1999	13972	4602	13980	4039	13981	14971
13986	9851	13987	5201	13988	16555	13989	6594	13991	16635
13993	14628	13995	760	13998	5058	14002	3700	14004	6619
14006	16369	14007	424	14010	7710	14013	11219	14014	3756
14016	4363	14017	6903	14018	7106	14020	7435	14023	9496
14028	518	14030	12490	14031	10052	14033	12600	14034	9592
14594	15598	14595	9194	14596	10554	14597	13525	14600	6162
14601	12412	14602	15425	14603	11291	14604	7271	14605	9027
14606	1821	14606	1821	2515 A HIT					

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

14609	1704	14610	7487	14611	14578	14614	16644	14617	2209
14620	10266	14622	10201	14624	1833	14625	10187	14627	4447
14628	16939	14630	3115	14634	600	14636	7538	14638	905
14641	2520	14643	5759	14644	4468	14645	5665	14651	11052
14652	4012	14653	5763	14656	2093	14657	15388	14659	7543
14667	2000	14669	15637	14671	6742	14672	3806	14673	16472
14676	1775	14678	1071	14685	789	14687	16268	14690	12019
14692	14372	14693	5099	14695	14235	14698	1758	14699	289
14701	6773	14702	15946	14705	1382	14706	186	14710	222
14711	2884	14712	8421	14714	14304	14720	6591	14722	5235
14723	13083	14724	16500	14726	11394	14727	5577	14730	12346
14731	15659	14733	3546	14737	2616	14738	12194	14742	8910
14743	10284	14746	6070	14747	12400	14748	16131	14749	5802
14751	6841	14752	3237	14753	10260	14754	10349	14756	7870
14757	3856	14759	10139	14760	309	14762	9315	14764	16344
14766	10528	14767	9646	14768	11588	14769	7793	14772	9233
14775	14436	14776	12194	14778	9397	14779	6733	14781	4246
14783	3368	14784	11881	14785	9760	14791	11805	14793	13543
14794	10545	14797	7040	14798	16651	14800	15860	14802	7271
14808	16555	14812	4423	14813	757	14814	4787	14815	7346
14816	11511	14817	8465	14819	8434	14820	6151	14821	1641
14822	12969	14823	10846	14824	5537	14825	7157	14826	12799
14827	15325	14830	12260	14831	6	14832	10158	14833	2409
14836	14915	14839	13011	14842	5183	14843	2075	14844	3723
14845	2424	14846	14302	14847	7358	14848	6025	14849	4975
14850	9876	14851	6247	14853	841	14854	13511	14855	5922
14857	9977	14859	5518	14860	5713	14861	7796	14862	9392
14864	8910	14872	1574	14877	5380	14878	10734	14879	6151
14880	6514	14881	9042	14882	15172	14884	14184	14885	2749
14886	9613	14887	4969	14889	3736	14890	13443	14891	5568
14900	14319	14903	14253	14905	11040	14907	16909	14908	15612
14910	6400	14911	13976	14912	11704	14914	1893	14915	9224
14916	6523	14917	13361	14918	11388	14922	12415	14925	8612
14926	8798	14927	2016	14930	10396	14933	2865	14935	6850
14937	5858	14938	7917	14939	5649	14941	13279	14942	4949
14943	506	14944	7664	14945	16730	14947	13485	14948	9960
14952	2104	14956	13695	14961	14138	14962	6267	14965	13214
14966	4279	14970	8861	14974	10754	14976	9465	14977	9843
14978	8386	14979	1209	14983	2037	14985	2702	14986	16773
14991	3289	14994	11178	14997	726	14999	8480	15000	10708
15002	16179	15003	1694	15013	3847	15014	13141	15016	6304
15017	4793	15021	10393	15024	11806	15033	16269	15035	9231
15038	13433	15039	3614	15045	4763	15046	12120	15047	8486
15048	14947	15050	12498	15052	13249	15053	5509	15054	3560
15055	14848	15058	13895	15059	13859	15063	13140	15064	13909
15067	16399	15068	905	15069	16994	15072	12614	15073	3605
15079	14071	15080	2573	15081	16994	15082	13734	15083	4929
15086	1483	15088	3580	15090	13586	15091	1395	15092	15181
15093	8109	15100	5729	15101	4195	15102	4128	15106	3312
15107	3007	15109	16209	15111	1836	15112	14567	15115	10042
15121	270	15122	979	15125	7310	15126	11738	15128	9934
15131	15414	15132	11069	15134	4617	15135	7899	15139	4366
15140	6149	15141	8946	15142	1735	15144	11313	15145	4717
15146	7661	15148	6153	15149	9209	15154	2864	15160	3949
15164	14996	15167	4640	15168	12169	15170	1242	15171	3912
15173	5975	15175	9495	15176	8972	15177	10665	15178	6040
15179	5085	15180	4692	15181	5770	15182	9659	15186	11500

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

15756	10949	15759	16464	15760	7626	15761	7024	15765	10984
15766	8653	15768	7496	15769	3718	15771	8015	15772	11758
15773	10751	15777	5800	15781	4051	15782	14703	15784	3747
15790	4118	15792	14983	15796	16198	15797	13201	15798	9715
15799	2866	15800	16256	15801	2368	15802	4632	15804	15928
15805	6252	15809	16500	15810	10520	15812	5769	15815	13085
15816	11908	15817	10900	15820	8061	15821	15499	15824	2992
15825	2427	15826	14260	15827	12198	15828	14091	15831	11944
15833	16916	15835	5143	15836	3634	15837	13043	15840	9682
15841	6833	15842	5372	15843	9978	15844	7756	15845	11040
15847	8914	15849	4272	15850	1907	15852	8663	15854	7673
15855	14378	15857	4437	15861	7274	15864	11800	15865	9549
15866	12227	15867	7926	15871	9587	15872	6896	15873	16443
15878	9156	15880	148	15881	11061	15882	10353	15883	6610
15884	8058	15885	16760	15888	7866	15891	15590	15899	7716
15900	9121	15901	2958	15902	12096	15903	11300	15904	12435
15905	15016	15906	8767	15907	2870	15908	2590	15909	4014
15912	6334	15913	6956	15916	13836	15923	15659	15928	2749
15929	8905	15933	10640	15935	1391	15936	16814	15940	2975
15941	5318	15946	159	15947	5372	15948	14221	15950	14913
15953	10400	15955	11273	15959	15768	15960	13324	15961	6093
15963	11990	15964	16198	15967	3083	15968	4632	15969	9042
15971	1670	15972	9804	15976	10790	15977	1855	15978	11475
15979	11366	15981	4484	15984	12400	15986	565	15988	9932
15989	2772	15992	4777	15993	2082	15994	10592	15995	4770
15997	12295	15998	5032	16000	9188	16002	988	16003	4336
16004	4312	16005	836	16010	5085	16015	12669	16016	8330
16017	9399	16018	5092	16021	12838	16022	8406	16026	13106
16027	11453	16028	7038	16032	13853	16037	7344	16041	12550
16042	15325	16043	10299	16048	9521	16049	11536	16051	4033
16053	2525	16054	9892	16055	2643	16056	7638	16057	12577
16060	5406	16061	6158	16063	12410	16064	15870	16066	5148
16067	13287	16068	13315	16071	1837	16075	13487	16077	7100
16081	10577	16083	6356	16086	2175	16087	1572	16090	7267
16092	3791	16093	5907	16094	8276	16095	12365	16097	14182
16100	14451	16105	12114	16107	7174	16109	10746	16111	6741
16112	10527	16114	8842	16115	14884	16119	163	16120	5576
16122	5214	16126	12211	16134	7698	16135	14041	16136	11930
16138	11666	16139	13984	16140	6696	16141	10319	16142	14628
16143	10226	16149	12439	16150	4769	16151	3331	16153	9209
16154	13376	16156	2719	16157	16059	16162	10127	16163	12151
16164	13497	16165	1633	16166	15155	16167	11061	16169	431
16170	11784	16172	16496	16175	13681	16176	8655	16183	16942
16184	13144	16187	13491	16188	11173	16189	16447	16190	4304
16192	6143	16193	7706	16194	16383	16195	9998	16197	6644
16198	11008	16199	6232	16200	3112	16201	6355	16203	8048
16206	14527	16207	3203	16209	12724	16211	9032	16212	5882
16213	16743	16215	4549	16225	5482	16227	2653	16230	4195
16233	14880	16236	3648	16240	16499	16241	1927	16242	14621
16243	740	16246	1779	16249	6482	16253	13347	16254	11267
16256	14593	16257	16343	16262	8299	16263	11102	16265	5850
16268	14771	16269	624	16270	7573	16272	3790	16274	3547
16275	7101	16276	9912	16278	15709	16279	9514	16281	2549
16282	4705	16283	14398	16284	6185	16288	7970	16289	13296
16290	1881	16294	37	16295	8294	16296	6737	16297	4753

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

16298	5963	16302	3579	16304	4020	16305	13937	16307	7746
16308	16214	16312	2226	16313	16921	16316	383	16317	306
16319	12022	16320	1763	16322	9420	16323	14026	16330	6247
16332	6355	16333	1077	16334	9694	16336	2091	16337	16119
16338	9138	16341	11942	16343	3683	16347	1296	16352	2938
16354	15621	16356	5579	16358	15699	16360	12609	16361	11800
16363	11022	16366	4385	16368	1229	16369	9179	16370	3393
16372	3536	16374	5004	16376	12131	16377	4628	16378	16581
16379	4096	16382	12950	16384	8907	16387	10112	16388	12864
16391	13650	16392	16497	16393	14192	16398	10313	16399	11149
16400	1698	16401	11009	16403	121	16407	7939	16408	11834
16414	5702	16417	3629	16419	13616	16422	5224	16425	13683
16427	11002	16428	13657	16430	2954	16433	14520	16434	11008
16437	13916	16439	1230	16440	11278	16447	9773	16450	1007
16452	3669	16455	9811	16456	1230	16459	14311	16460	3588
16461	16062	16462	12012	16463	6591	16464	3929	16466	13797
16476	11722	16481	5681	16485	11350	16487	1021	16488	13788
16492	8030	16493	2616	16496	3657	16499	138	16500	11548
16503	16301	16504	15532	16505	7230	16506	15860	16508	2754
16509	3986	16510	6378	16511	12741	16513	8743	16515	1510
16517	8943	16521	8601	16523	842	16524	13509	16525	7622
16526	10968	16527	4384	16531	13369	16532	11616	16534	8701
16535	16397	16536	15633	16541	3270	16542	12373	16547	8677
16549	14632	16550	3076	16552	8002	16553	2809	16558	9924
16559	16501	16561	6919	16562	7232	16563	14275	16564	13609
16566	11059	16567	6724	16569	8008	16570	1911	16571	11775
16576	2530	16578	9630	16580	2033	16581	13714	16584	14417
16585	16418	16587	3279	16588	10552	16590	16308	16592	3248
16594	8636	16596	3938	16598	2971	16600	620	16601	3082
16602	6555	16603	13409	16604	3128	16609	9366	16610	11665
16612	15497	16613	8067	16614	7346	16616	16536	16617	9536
16620	10694	16622	10474	16624	10131	16625	4177	16626	6196
16627	12794	16628	2939	16629	6602	16631	13960	16637	13531
16642	12874	16643	1679	16644	4088	16645	8034	16646	2102
16648	6228	16651	14495	16652	471	16653	4345	16657	12809
16658	7957	16659	9111	16660	6243	16661	8636	16662	3681
16664	12005	16665	14252	16666	3442	16667	11306	16668	14240
16669	2366	16670	2963	16674	2724	16675	2732	16676	5659
16678	7430	16680	13020	16682	8868	16686	12642	16688	1823
16690	14926	16691	8586	16693	1165	16695	15074	16698	6827
16699	4691	16700	5810	16701	6610	16702	6112	16705	3003
16708	3120	16711	5344	16712	8807	16713	14949	16714	13506
16715	15305	16716	14655	16718	574	16719	7685	16723	16225
16726	16733	16727	9877	16728	9243	16730	14567	16731	5189
16733	10277	16735	13998	16738	2948	16740	2983	16744	1023
16746	14813	16747	8771	16748	16143	16750	1133	16751	9181
16752	10237	16753	13336	16754	16564	16758	5669	16760	13905
16763	5975	16764	7017	16767	6030	16768	2933	16769	13174
16770	4227	16772	1410	16773	2216	16775	3192	16776	14916
16778	8386	16779	15431	16784	7131	16785	3269	16787	6268
16791	15911	16792	3380	16794	6233	16795	573	16798	12868
16799	11644	16800	2866	16803	1816	16804	14888	16808	6447
16809	14658	16810	7429	16811	9945	16812	8728	16813	14786
16815	10146	16819	1061	16821	4859	16823	13649	16824	11134
16825	10982	16828	10430	16830	13760	16832	7348	16833	12454
16835	6516	16837	13506	16841	6093	16842	2737	16843	11678
16846	12822	16853	15696	16854	5970	16856	3349	16859	15443
16860	4651	16861	8763	16863	23	16865	13960	16868	1887
16869	15239	16871	4356	16873	14510	16874	1727	16875	5806

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

14918	11388	14922	12415	14925	8612	14926	8798	14927	2016
14930	10396	14933	2865	14935	6850	14937	5858	14938	7917
14939	5649	14941	13279	14942	4949	14943	506	14944	7664
14945	16730	14947	13485	14948	9960	14952	2104	14956	13695
14961	14138	14962	6267	14965	13214	14966	4279	14970	8861
14974	10754	14976	9465	14977	9843	14978	8386	14979	1209
14983	2037	14985	2702	14986	16773	14991	3289	14994	11178
14997	726	14999	8480	15000	10708	15002	16179	15003	1694
15013	3847	15014	13141	15016	6304	15017	4793	15021	10393
15024	11806	15033	16269	15035	9231	15038	13433	15039	3614
15045	4763	15046	12120	15047	8486	15048	14947	15050	12498
15052	13249	15053	5509	15054	3560	15055	14848	15058	13895
15059	13859	15063	13140	15064	13909	15067	16399	15068	905
16876	3373	16879	4417	16880	1089	16881	2434	16884	14295
16885	2673	16893	1459	16897	8298	16898	9848	16899	13154
16901	16112	16902	3645	16904	8816	16905	12573	16908	371
16911	9937	16912	12809	16913	5161	16918	10323	16919	13887
16920	43	16922	9693	16930	8034	16933	8561	16935	3329
16936	7524	16938	5608	16939	10327	16943	14764	16945	14621
16946	126	16948	6523	16953	4931	16954	3916	16955	816
16958	5004	16960	10592	16961	1553	16967	3442	16976	2660
16979	9335	16980	11794	16982	772	16983	11642	16985	2714
16987	16091	16989	12166	16990	792	16996	3300	17001	7136
17003	16350	17004	14102	17005	15111	17008	620	17010	14564

TOTAL NUMBER OF HITS= 13 AND THE ORDER OF THE GROUP IS = 0

1	0	0	A MISS
2	11750	9102	A HIT
3	1608	4734	A HIT
4	12555	15326	A HIT
5	6926	13559	A HIT
6	13202	12559	A HIT
7	0	0	A MISS
8	0	0	A MISS
9	0	0	A MISS
10	14606	1821	A HIT
11	954	11503	A HIT
12	9041	4180	A HIT
13	12250	6053	A HIT
14	10761	14518	A HIT
15	8380	203	A HIT
16	0	0	A MISS
17	11786	10967	A HIT
18	0	0	A MISS
19	0	0	A MISS
20	0	0	A MISS
21	0	0	A MISS
22	13933	7552	A HIT

Appendix CH4.5

Results of the message encryption/decryption program

STATE OF CIPHER TEXT IN RELATION TO THE POINTS ON THE ELLIPTIC CURVE

```
1 7842 2346 1507 16417
2 11750 16 2704 393
3 1608 12565 2628 2950
4 12555 9185 1204 15324
5 6926 12655 528 12647
6 13202 9812 2006 9629
7 8918 7380 1828 1936
8 1253 4343 2205 14215
9 13617 9536 2715 13753
10 14606 2515 1619 915
11 954 8446 2113 10358
12 9041 12792 2710 401
13 12250 259 1525 4099
14 10761 42 2708 11651
15 8380 10376 2314 12327
16 3664 11782 1816 6343
17 11786 16088 2702 11279
18 4520 7286 311 4188
19 12668 11909 2109 15967
20 7545 8423 2718 3716
21 1926 8348 610 3309
22 13933 2298 21 8173
```

-----THE DECIPHERED MESSAGE-----

1	1507	1507 16417	7842 2346	1507 16417
2	2704	2704 393	11750 16	2704 393
3	2625	2628 2950	1608 12565	2628 2950
4	1201	1204 15324	12555 9185	1204 15324
5	527	528 12647	6926 12655	528 12647
6	2006	2006 9629	13202 9812	2006 9629
7	1827	1828 1936	8918 7380	1828 1936
8	2205	2205 14215	1253 4343	2205 14215
9	2715	2715 13753	13617 9536	2715 13753
10	1619	1619 915	14606 2515	1619 915
11	2113	2113 10358	954 8446	2113 10358
12	2710	2710 401	9041 12792	2710 401
13	1524	1525 4099	12250 259	1525 4099
14	2706	2708 11651	10761 42	2708 11651
15	2314	2314 12327	8380 10376	2314 12327
16	1815	1816 6343	3664 11782	1816 6343
17	2702	2702 11279	11786 16088	2702 11279
18	311	311 4188	4520 7286	311 4188
19	2109	2109 15967	12668 11909	2109 15967
20	2717	2718 3716	7545 8423	2718 3716
21	605	610 3309	1926 8348	610 3309
22	20	21 8173	13933 2298	21 8173

Appendix CH4.5

Results of the message encryption/decryption program

2 4835	4 16541	7 3799	8 2632	10 9691
12 10031	13 16051	15 12516	16 12088	18 13186
19 9968	21 8173	21 8173 8173 A HIT		
22 7965	24 12986	25 12332	27 12618	29 4603
30 11849	33 5600	37 3030	42 1188	43 14253
44 10474	45 15296	46 4691	47 9130	55 7007
56 143	58 13948	59 5048	60 4832	62 10629
63 841	66 8655	67 15587	72 13994	73 14948
74 16998	76 3339	77 10711	78 1959	80 10575
81 13609	83 9230	85 12119	88 13594	90 14153
92 10123	94 11914	95 9634	97 8804	99 9924
101 16674	107 5996	108 14893	109 682	111 5328
112 4525	115 3883	120 14043	121 5789	124 3938
125 11383	126 1629	127 11618	129 5936	132 11640
133 8916	134 10066	140 9048	141 15295	142 14068
143 14046	145 8922	146 11350	149 3948	150 4928
151 13385	152 13877	157 14503	159 6276	162 4225
163 11877	165 6676	166 7629	167 4881	169 3970
171 6117	173 3588	175 9700	176 2179	177 15572
180 10650	183 4108	184 16561	186 14819	188 342
189 1779	193 11651	194 11168	196 6187	199 10962
201 6837	204 6711	208 1398	209 3201	212 12396
214 5649	215 897	218 14209	226 606	234 2647
235 8469	237 10601	243 6211	245 434	246 8513
247 13022	248 8612	250 7835	252 3856	258 11130
260 15862	261 11060	263 4855	264 11142	266 4691
267 16992	270 14767	271 5308	273 9443	274 15473
275 1542	276 14734	278 8813	279 9984	281 6
282 11984	283 12680	285 8079	286 14814	288 2343
291 3938	293 4167	294 8892	295 14108	296 14681
299 16631	300 11615	301 10259	302 14050	305 16967
307 5906	308 15282	311 4188	311 4188 4188 A HIT	
313 4403	316 16190	318 3951	320 14439	321 2769
322 13689	323 5656	324 7756	325 8314	327 14469
328 8230	331 11943	333 5874	337 6479	338 15026
339 3355	343 11244	344 7401	345 10474	348 1470
349 7473	351 2793	354 9924	356 12616	357 2465
358 16956	359 16067	366 13609	367 13056	368 1322
370 12109	372 11155	373 4510	374 13589	375 9100
378 3588	379 9224	380 11350	383 9891	384 8281
385 10375	386 719	387 16922	388 2573	389 3442
391 575	392 10134	393 15627	394 237	395 6881
397 9709	398 2893	399 3001	401 1898	403 5857
406 7040	414 620	418 1723	420 6379	421 13300
422 7671	423 11296	424 14388	425 13156	426 3205
428 9579	429 7341	432 9967	433 11085	434 15579
439 4239	441 16304	442 1460	444 8253	445 3613
447 8034	453 12809	455 15961	457 10251	458 15219
461 15209	465 14601	466 834	467 14555	471 13506
472 14278	474 6485	475 4279	477 15472	480 3653
481 9884	483 6332	485 11127	487 12407	488 14676

Appendix CH4.5

Results of the message encryption/decryption program

490	7425	491	5947	492	8359	493	8159	496	14509
498	13000	499	12521	500	2292	501	4134	505	6623
508	5890	514	12227	515	1755	518	12315	525	14566
526	13960	528	12647	528	12647	528	12647	A	HIT
530	3788	532	8494	533	16604	534	4544	535	2413
539	16019	540	1299	543	8086	545	5988	546	15543
548	7955	555	8058	556	2289	558	12411	559	6531
560	5731	563	6420	566	6691	567	10913	569	15423
571	12946	572	8058	574	13876	576	1779	579	8631
582	16382	584	16130	585	2083	590	6699	591	14924
592	5157	593	11489	596	8684	597	4489	602	16569
603	1045	610	3309	610	3309	610	3309	A	HIT
615	12835	618	13048	619	11530	620	14954	621	8630
622	16154	623	10387	629	4719	631	12227	632	15291
633	1431	635	13789	639	5983	640	3028	641	4501
643	10231	644	1796	647	10579	652	12027	654	10458
656	14330	658	6102	659	13807	661	3733	662	11433
663	8118	667	8405	670	2946	671	8385	672	11413
674	2477	676	7337	679	8574	680	7145	681	8483
682	9398	683	16547	687	6759	689	729	690	5004
691	10786	692	1641	695	8495	696	14468	697	5883
699	2734	700	11328	701	6882	704	2770	707	4136
708	6171	709	7269	710	16056	714	10028	715	255
720	2258	721	13298	722	790	723	2935	726	6742
727	15657	729	14097	730	14184	732	10893	733	6450
734	3608	736	11932	737	4296	740	9165	744	591
745	11476	747	4680	752	15850	754	12382	757	16619
758	2708	759	3180	760	6242	761	16672	762	16933
763	7056	764	2037	767	8636	769	8655	770	4619
771	10077	776	8477	777	7420	779	4776	781	15698
785	3647	788	13823	789	1603	790	1334	791	3617
792	5486	796	14376	797	16392	798	9529	799	13951
801	11537	803	3246	804	4660	806	7942	808	9237
810	8574	814	6424	819	3298	821	6964	825	13800
828	13771	829	14536	831	5453	832	1570	834	12039
835	14621	836	11694	837	4324	838	14167	840	3389
842	5846	843	7756	847	6199	851	1201	854	6994
855	10410	858	16272	860	14979	864	3943	866	9445
868	2251	869	6208	872	6212	874	6652	875	12125
878	13906	879	15743	880	6549	882	1526	884	1634
886	15470	889	5188	890	16038	892	1286	895	520
898	5230	899	6776	902	5563	903	7416	905	3327
906	14369	907	5409	908	1548	912	16599	913	825
917	5930	918	6832	921	2408	928	11955	929	7577
931	4441	932	7293	934	14158	936	14868	937	8230
938	3896	939	3879	941	8164	944	12938	948	14103
949	14535	952	6186	953	7169	954	11503	955	2928
956	5363	959	16476	960	7790	962	546	963	9544
966	4236	967	12957	968	11490	970	9992	971	10193
974	6401	980	12028	981	4965	983	10916	985	16537
986	15688	987	11939	991	6604	993	16522	996	3779
997	8823	998	5812	999	12776	1000	8320	1005	14897
1008	5061	1009	15553	1011	10058	1012	9368	1014	1003
1018	16529	1020	3764	1023	8548	1025	3047	1026	7048
1029	14326	1030	9550	1037	9988	1040	12230	1041	15427
1042	14776	1043	10139	1044	13548	1045	7254	1046	4039
1047	5802	1048	10118	1052	10881	1054	12330	1056	11554

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

1057	12519	1058	9696	1059	16883	1060	9078	1062	15218
1064	9397	1068	10592	1069	12988	1074	3920	1077	8118
1080	6792	1083	8227	1088	1306	1090	10537	1091	9414
1093	13125	1094	12445	1097	13740	1098	12162	1104	3299
1105	14757	1106	6660	1107	12251	1109	4587	1114	2704
1115	9956	1119	10271	1120	11378	1121	6691	1124	11804
1125	10697	1127	1230	1131	3793	1136	8630	1138	16645
1139	5025	1144	8573	1146	724	1148	3740	1151	7125
1153	10878	1154	13902	1155	110	1158	1290	1159	5364
1162	6467	1168	3792	1169	9397	1172	9579	1174	2490
1176	16785	1179	2223	1181	598	1182	319	1186	4300
1187	2182	1188	9208	1189	7874	1190	5001	1191	15651
1193	11556	1194	10609	1195	15269	1199	6634	1200	336
1204	15324	1204	15324	15324	A HIT				
1206	9317	1207	4961	1209	10139	1211	16616	1214	9163
1215	5802	1220	6093	1224	16633	1227	544	1228	8912
1229	13233	1230	5534	1232	12521	1237	6058	1238	9833
1240	2260	1242	13516	1245	4527	1246	13822	1249	3939
1250	6028	1252	9047	1257	4783	1258	16051	1259	6948
1261	10324	1264	2037	1266	2107	1275	9893	1276	6045
1277	7710	1278	7561	1282	13230	1284	5357	1285	10830
1286	14634	1288	8445	1303	12238	1305	16771	1308	8022
1309	12221	1310	9642	1315	332	1321	4239	1322	724
1324	4545	1327	11751	1329	3802	1330	10691	1332	4888
1334	2440	1336	14718	1338	15264	1339	708	1340	1408
1341	10775	1342	6381	1343	3581	1346	13914	1347	1660
1349	15762	1353	16054	1354	9192	1356	8658	1361	1009
1363	6282	1364	5842	1366	6067	1370	15959	1372	9629
1373	7137	1375	16579	1376	7592	1381	16139	1382	7636
1383	890	1384	4795	1385	14204	1387	7031	1389	14367
1390	11008	1391	12737	1394	3530	1395	1873	1397	14184
1401	6039	1403	9136	1404	9696	1409	4181	1410	7280
1411	8073	1412	1274	1414	7667	1418	9258	1423	2866
1424	12546	1427	12262	1432	5651	1434	14191	1435	10099
1437	4052	1438	6610	1441	12846	1443	2551	1444	5167
1445	5057	1451	9743	1452	5083	1453	12433	1457	2224
1459	16658	1461	693	1463	8539	1468	10049	1469	8361
1473	15335	1475	7350	1476	16791	1479	4053	1480	1611
1481	11534	1483	11416	1484	6144	1485	9575	1489	6355
1490	14972	1491	387	1494	13071	1495	5549	1498	1641
16417	A HIT					1507	16417	1507	16417
1509	4862	1510	13380	1514	13193	1515	10031	1517	2462
1519	8714	1525	4099	1525	4099	4099	A HIT		
1529	8000	1530	11752	1532	15911	1537	8718	1540	513
1543	2573	1544	15455	1547	16042	1548	3447	1550	12304
1553	3529	1554	11978	1555	2671	1559	1110	1561	1854
1564	1522	1566	1840	1568	7273	1570	4279	1571	4354
1572	12544	1575	676	1580	9625	1582	4420	1585	6530
1591	13658	1592	14474	1594	12170	1597	15286	1598	3962
1599	1042	1602	8919	1603	4294	1608	4734	1611	4055
1612	5651	1613	14778	1614	6742	1615	3123	1616	2229
1617	6470	1618	15451	1619	915	1619	915	915	A HIT

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Results of the message encryption/decryption program

1620	3964	1621	8796	1622	4747	1623	11259	1624	11948
1626	15888	1631	4947	1636	5932	1639	5158	1643	6268
1644	5046	1645	5737	1647	15380	1649	12274	1650	1335
1652	7903	1654	3593	1656	525	1657	2874	1658	13973
1661	11076	1663	15140	1664	6761	1665	9136	1667	1949
1668	4863	1669	5610	1670	15863	1674	8445	1675	2395
1683	10044	1684	269	1685	2832	1688	13254	1690	14132
1691	12011	1692	4094	1693	205	1696	11363	1697	3731
1699	2224	1701	5841	1703	12787	1705	5391	1707	9785
1709	6343	1714	8984	1716	7737	1717	9224	1722	3245
1723	13646	1724	7710	1725	7665	1728	10716	1730	15139
1732	7891	1735	368	1739	16280	1741	1222	1743	16396
1744	12583	1745	10283	1746	2161	1748	2951	1750	14900
1751	7923	1754	409	1758	15639	1759	2443	1761	1522
1763	1127	1766	5726	1767	8071	1770	5528	1771	9793
1772	16541	1774	7299	1775	4450	1777	13736	1778	1998
1779	8868	1780	4488	1781	9162	1784	13949	1785	1048
1786	8744	1788	7459	1789	8512	1793	8658	1796	11691
1797	11800	1798	16641	1800	7791	1802	6954	1808	7040
1809	15918	1810	5914	1812	692	1816	6343	1816	6343 6343 A
HIT									
1817	6190	1820	15117	1823	11037	1824	13868	1825	5105
1826	2417	1828	1936	1828	1936 1936 A	HIT			
1830	4677	1831	16363	1836	16474	1838	8612	1840	16668
1842	1513	1843	3839	1846	551	1848	10204	1851	7141
1853	15707	1855	7182	1858	5649	1862	16272	1865	8851
1867	6349	1868	10046	1869	1660	1870	15647	1872	10530
1873	3286	1875	10563	1877	1162	1878	16503	1879	33
1882	10736	1883	15152	1887	900	1888	12829	1892	11504
1893	1017	1895	11757	1896	3465	1899	6	1900	3785
1901	14937	1903	12337	1904	15926	1905	8871	1908	9813
1910	15698	1911	9530	1912	5013	1915	11555	1918	1600
1920	15730	1923	3172	1925	15040	1927	2155	1928	1946
1930	8579	1933	14296	1936	4251	1941	12017	1942	8579
1943	1731	1948	7511	1950	2860	1951	8489	1952	14906
1955	15880	1958	16310	1959	6031	1962	16204	1963	7782
1964	3091	1965	452	1969	10967	1970	13150	1971	11095
1972	9562	1973	12709	1974	11061	1976	12126	1980	15942
1982	3884	1983	14901	1985	4039	1987	3374	1989	12471
1991	6792	1993	1789	1994	1606	1995	324	1997	2395
2000	12988	2002	3856	2003	7548	2004	2378	2005	3120
2006	9629	2006	9629 9629 A	HIT					
2008	10345	2009	5194	2010	7577	2011	14756	2012	16373
2013	13119	2014	1873	2017	12525	2022	11807	2023	10149
2024	13538	2025	11658	2027	10736	2030	14872	2032	7644
2034	4713	2035	541	2036	15324	2041	981	2042	3128
2043	3082	2045	15633	2046	3662	2048	4280	2050	2712
2051	10237	2052	10151	2053	8223	2054	14355	2055	4187
2057	8292	2063	11315	2064	15043	2065	14253	2068	9809
2071	7416	2073	15233	2076	10926	2077	873	2080	9165

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Results of the message encryption/decryption program

2082	3321	2086	5975	2088	12980	2091	8393	2095	841
2099	3407	2104	4846	2105	8907	2109	15967	2109	15967
15967	A HIT								
2110	4325	2113	10358	2113	10358	10358	A HIT		
2115	591	2121	1343	2122	13557	2123	7193	2124	9321
2125	14710	2126	8227	2127	2549	2128	11132	2129	16983
2130	14776	2131	13570	2132	14059	2134	3006	2135	1707
2143	10151	2145	15584	2148	14839	2150	4982	2152	909
2154	1013	2155	7908	2156	10023	2158	6523	2159	13657
2160	8483	2161	14458	2163	3324	2164	13813	2165	2950
2167	13502	2168	9063	2169	16380	2170	11960	2171	16926
2172	4102	2173	11489	2175	15004	2177	7910	2178	1965
2180	14567	2181	9539	2182	10442	2190	12022	2191	14059
2194	5785	2195	4714	2196	9709	2197	16641	2202	4385
2204	113	2205	14215	2205	14215	14215	A HIT		
2206	3890	2209	16157	2210	5631	2211	6623	2218	2768
2221	3575	2222	10390	2223	8892	2225	15063	2226	2430
2229	16041	2230	8455	2232	658	2233	5372	2234	2860
2237	14418	2238	929	2240	4404	2241	16307	2242	4353
2245	45	2246	13780	2247	15495	2249	6721	2250	4092
2252	4632	2255	5042	2257	1952	2259	13107	2260	16374
2261	12030	2262	16198	2263	13114	2265	8832	2266	8386
2271	13301	2272	9687	2274	12315	2275	13754	2277	6053
2278	14778	2280	1306	2282	7273	2283	10643	2284	11283
2286	1429	2288	8980	2290	16348	2291	7955	2293	8424
2294	16093	2297	3333	2298	10354	2300	4131	2303	4807
2305	12472	2306	15061	2307	14181	2309	14796	2310	562
2311	15266	2312	4514	2314	12327	2314	12327	12327	A HIT
2316	14738	2324	12438	2328	10311	2330	7634	2338	5064
2341	11784	2343	12817	2346	16837	2347	11989	2348	8395
2349	2208	2353	11289	2355	15371	2357	8395	2360	13942
2361	9100	2362	10929	2366	13507	2367	15692	2368	7402
2369	6125	2370	8220	2373	1731	2374	6861	2375	3094
2376	12217	2379	16223	2380	7009	2382	5266	2383	1280
2389	6315	2390	15618	2394	6643	2396	1077	2399	14161
2403	13800	2404	4407	2405	15167	2407	16157	2408	11982
2409	7728	2410	12270	2412	14684	2415	9597	2417	9721
2419	16780	2420	16012	2421	7123	2423	6204	2425	307
2426	8194	2427	2596	2429	10916	2430	16944	2431	5630
2434	5319	2436	16904	2437	1120	2439	13334	2441	10275
2443	7495	2444	6201	2446	11676	2447	10878	2448	10961
2451	12442	2453	4120	2454	4229	2459	12429	2460	14648
2462	10400	2463	8729	2464	6721	2465	10719	2468	9549
2470	5389	2472	2926	2481	2342	2484	6053	2486	10197
2487	5576	2488	2780	2490	6750	2491	9588	2492	1276
2495	10203	2496	12023	2500	15035	2501	12640	2502	5948
2503	967	2507	1086	2508	1404	2512	13557	2513	15821
2515	8393	2516	11628	2519	11929	2520	16289	2521	8487
2523	13116	2526	4459	2528	4662	2529	7905	2533	15761
2536	14894	2539	13076	2541	9512	2545	5625	2549	13660
2551	12851	2553	13663	2554	6645	2555	1537	2557	13876
2558	2618	2561	6478	2564	1762	2567	1434	2568	10224
2573	16154	2574	4609	2575	6878	2576	7993	2577	16636

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

2578	16723	2579	190	2580	16933	2581	16657	2583	3310
2584	11762	2586	5151	2587	14499	2588	1256	2589	12845
2590	10164	2591	15194	2593	7346	2594	6878	2596	11060
2600	15150	2601	13914	2603	333	2604	9498	2605	15111
2607	15809	2611	10196	2613	10123	2616	4977	2617	8403
2619	11933	2628	2950	2628	2950	2950	A HIT		
2630	7659	2631	2534	2632	15508	2633	8131	2635	13400
2640	3661	2641	3323	2643	14962	2644	12255	2645	3712
2646	57	2649	11471	2650	4866	2651	4725	2652	15333
2654	10120	2655	9570	2657	2586	2659	7540	2660	15033
2662	2161	2663	9687	2666	13130	2667	5749	2671	5349
2680	14017	2681	10040	2683	2422	2685	5546	2691	4195
2692	4433	2695	15716	2697	1605	2700	8581	2701	1661
2702	11279	2702	11279	11279	A HIT				
2704	393	2704	393	393	A HIT				
2705	13887	2708	11651	2708	11651	11651	A HIT		
2709	15436	2710	401	2710	401	401	A HIT		
2713	2561	2714	6832	2715	13753	2715	13753	13753	A HIT
2716	15860	2718	3716	2718	3716	3716	A HIT		
2720	9209	2721	6750	2724	4631	2726	12419	2727	3207
2729	7540	2730	11811	2731	8749	2732	1889	2733	6370
2734	2269	2737	322	2740	12839	2742	5999	2745	7007
2747	7489	2748	12954	2749	11283	2750	368	2751	5184
2754	2243	2755	13825	2756	14321	2758	12058	2760	12867
2762	1181	2764	9048	2768	929	2769	15140	2771	11737
2774	11429	2775	8377	2777	10500	2784	13468	2785	13120
2787	352	2789	7206	2791	14002	2792	2616	2794	14042
2795	15646	2797	9097	2798	12038	2799	1089	2805	1905
2806	8539	2808	16608	2810	5563	2814	15228	2816	4571
2819	16495	2821	10154	2823	3839	2830	10100	2831	7905
2833	5085	2835	13789	2836	13112	2838	2694	2839	6591
2841	6247	2842	9794	2845	10211	2846	5435	2849	606
2852	10904	2855	5574	2856	1737	2857	1133	2858	1121
2860	14002	2862	56	2863	10999	2866	4754	2867	6994
2868	5800	2869	9587	2871	14378	2873	54	2874	5405
2877	14544	2879	14851	2881	1456	2882	7201	2883	10951
2884	871	2886	5479	2892	14391	2896	10333	2897	14245
2902	14618	2903	814	2904	4356	2906	7050	2907	6902
2909	14979	2910	51	2911	5670	2912	9444	2916	7018
2917	10671	2918	13048	2919	16471	2920	189	2921	14081
2922	2481	2923	9569	2924	15243	2925	5486	2926	6613
2927	1841	2928	1801	2929	1537	2931	10028	2932	9076
2933	5357	2934	946	2940	16963	2949	7728	2951	10684
2952	416	2954	14846	2955	7626	2959	6479	2960	3977
2962	9808	2967	1291	2968	11234	2969	1032	2973	13302
2978	1472	2979	14838	2980	11030	2983	9293	2985	8385
2986	16212	2988	503	2990	7762	2992	14356	2995	2744
2996	149	2998	5238	3001	11024	3002	15799	3003	8424
3005	5190	3006	7361	3007	4330	3008	14469	3011	9091
3012	15518	3014	6192	3016	692	3018	6208	3019	5489
4786	8512	4787	16414	4789	6087	4790	12500	4793	14302
4794	10005	4797	302	4799	9597	4800	12427	4804	7706
4805	16210	4807	10159	4810	3238	4812	16494	4816	6421
4818	6271	4819	2997	4821	4723	4822	11962	4826	10342
4828	760	4829	9879	4830	3772	4833	2251	4834	7702
4837	2522	4838	12512	4839	15904	4840	333	4841	12695

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

4844	16382	4846	11389	4847	2836	4848	3745	4853	8864
4854	13821	4856	6449	4857	9537	4859	7997	4860	3255
4862	9580	4864	14148	4866	13951	4868	13093	4870	11935
4871	132	4872	7392	4874	5906	4878	56	4879	10685
4880	7589	4883	1232	4884	12340	4888	1532	4889	1159
4892	1154	4893	7776	4895	1714	4896	14657	4897	13107
4899	12677	4900	1031	4901	3170	4902	13833	4903	2326
4904	2328	4905	5016	4907	4888	4908	7231	4910	1781
4912	12114	4913	4663	4917	7772	4918	9893	4920	5746
4924	5001	4927	14090	4936	5611	4937	4041	4940	6716
4942	15500	4943	7206	4944	13017	4945	8972	4949	4554
4954	16376	4958	5795	4959	2424	4962	16245	4964	12229
4965	16791	4967	16597	4968	16414	4969	13862	4971	13428
4972	6574	4974	7573	4975	10173	4977	11768	4978	4657
4979	14775	4980	13144	4981	7708	4982	962	4983	201
4985	14404	4986	12146	4989	9535	4991	7215	4993	13090
4995	1470	4998	5828	4999	3030	5009	3529	5010	15445
5011	811	5012	10271	5014	14454	5015	5194	5016	7256
5017	13863	5021	1157	5022	15944	5024	6963	5026	7994
5030	7003	5033	5577	5034	8869	5037	5574	5038	13244
7504	8835	7505	5759	7507	12807	7508	4308	7511	15847
7512	8827	7513	3608	7514	15223	7516	14321	7517	5734
7518	6733	7522	14266	7525	7374	7528	2660	7529	4740
7531	8332	7532	14757	7535	484	7537	9849	7539	9325
7540	6214	7541	10464	7542	282	7543	16578	7544	13161
7549	15547	7550	9884	7551	16054	7553	12798	7555	1820
7559	16237	7566	11778	7569	11917	7570	15897	7571	12579
7573	10438	7574	15155	7576	9443	7578	7078	7579	16998
7582	6187	7584	4305	7585	757	7587	13104	7590	13149
7592	8351	7593	15646	7595	12593	7605	6924	7606	8520
7607	8003	7608	15470	7611	8905	7613	4514	7618	4477
7620	12085	7622	4330	7623	11964	7625	4905	7628	5534
7629	5304	7630	4729	7633	1221	7639	13877	7640	2209
7641	11548	7646	13589	7647	2164	7648	16210	7649	6330
7651	15231	7658	9185	7659	6255	7660	11039	7661	8319
7662	5600	7663	9005	7665	2586	7667	15706	7668	3900
7669	4134	7670	4177	7671	14755	7672	3197	7673	3059
7678	14758	7680	11054	7681	8839	7682	16026	7685	14562
7687	15951	7689	864	7693	16929	7694	6522	7698	10416
7699	6199	7700	15923	7701	930	7703	16202	7704	8400
7705	5506	7708	1904	7709	9243	7717	9125	7718	13477
7721	12246	7724	7763	7725	3119	7726	2427	7728	8108
7729	6401	7730	10629	7733	1679	7734	16278	7737	12019
7738	1952	7739	5806	7740	2562	7742	15246	7745	10813
7746	12599	7747	13140	7748	10138	7749	7592	7750	206
7751	14854	7752	13600	7753	6271	7755	13242	7759	12993
8987	12669	8988	5330	8991	13589	8992	3125	8994	16723
8995	3224	8997	15636	8998	3975	9000	8000	9007	12051
9013	2732	9014	9386	9015	16566	9016	4251	9017	1620
9019	3659	9020	12669	9021	4525	9025	2630	9027	1194
9029	1698	9030	1757	9031	13614	9033	11904	9036	15645
9038	15908	9039	16560	9041	4180	9042	6564	9045	13976
9047	4101	9049	2422	9050	6322	9051	2632	9053	3115
9055	5315	9057	12376	9058	64	9059	16350	9061	14510
9063	2694	9065	4624	9067	8173	9070	7042	9071	12606
9073	5983	9076	5106	9078	4345	9080	5175	9081	5751

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

9082 14880	9084 2889	9086 431	9088 792	9091 5418
9092 11481	9093 16488	9094 6087	9095 1726	9098 4997
9099 5549	9100 9743	9103 506	9104 16311	9106 14479
9107 1737	9111 14316	9112 13707	9113 12546	9116 12255
9117 16425	9118 16084	9119 5574	9122 1105	9123 10313
9125 2297	9127 5302	9129 5605	9131 8423	9132 2263
9133 13154	9134 3278	9135 12794	9136 6283	9137 7459
9139 6428	9141 16447	9144 15167	9145 5660	9146 16632
9148 6936	9149 3532	9150 3838	9152 16569	9153 2725
9154 10062	9155 13114	9156 16448	9157 2066	9158 10318
9162 9443	9164 2496	9166 15896	9167 5441	9171 4095
9172 12275	9175 11533	9177 10795	9179 5493	9180 15099
9183 10214	9184 16538	9185 14947	9186 13301	9189 16760
9190 15532	9191 15125	9192 101	9193 6231	9195 7595
9196 7543	9199 836	9200 10929	9201 11982	9202 6834
9203 11660	9204 5045	9205 4714	9206 14673	9207 15521
9209 12618	9210 6353	9217 4052	9218 2171	9219 10629
9220 13877	9222 732	9228 16652	9232 2290	9233 6187
9235 9623	9239 4922	9240 7111	9243 678	9244 5163
9247 6196	9248 6634	9250 9920	9251 4077	9252 381
11124 2936	11126 10578	11128 5242	11131 10852	11132 16501
11133 2822	11134 1595	11136 6429	11138 1476	11139 7922
11141 9630	11142 14948	11143 3517	11144 9225	11145 6726
11146 13930	11148 5880	11149 6836	11152 10265	11154 1949
11155 16190	11159 8753	11160 2983	11166 12817	11167 1600
11170 1382	11171 11471	11172 9705	11174 7166	11176 12004
11177 12984	11178 6723	11180 8330	11181 5431	11184 8912
11185 14952	11190 7123	11193 6416	11195 2205	11196 16311
11197 626	11198 5384	11199 181	11200 13202	11201 9409
11203 1465	11205 80	11207 8431	11208 4423	11211 6261
11212 13140	11214 26	11215 5608	11216 15187	11218 8111
11219 221	11220 1501	11221 10325	11224 14134	11227 12555
11228 2265	11229 740	11230 4	11233 6455	11235 1876
11236 6143	11239 11134	11240 10939	11242 15587	11243 2824
11245 484	11247 3492	11249 6285	11253 4056	11255 16604
11257 2755	11258 3567	11259 8018	11261 4378	11263 9316
11264 16949	11265 11490	11274 9276	11275 10158	11276 2455
11277 3101	11281 11150	11288 6779	11289 13334	11290 2806
11291 9514	11295 8111	11297 11301	11299 16708	11310 2251
11314 80	11315 4859	11316 15711	11317 13010	11320 7179
11323 13716	11327 14648	11328 2730	11330 5658	11331 10674
11333 16652	11338 15358	11341 1256	11342 16326	11343 9122
11345 12538	11346 13951	11347 4159	11349 1833	11353 12322
11357 124	11358 9783	11359 109	11360 14002	11362 3173
11363 8783	11365 16673	11366 10984	11367 4419	11369 964
11371 7739	11374 13650	11376 10578	11377 14337	11378 9414
11379 8323	11381 5943	11384 12820	11386 10076	11387 14066
11388 2459	11390 12590	11394 5024	11396 12737	11397 2988
11398 2600	11399 7422	11400 11511	11401 14209	11402 16373
11403 6042	11404 8662	11405 9612	11406 10530	11407 15939
11412 5604	11414 4824	11415 16408	11416 5714	11418 16131
11421 2618	11423 10517	11424 3004	11427 11523	11428 11510
11431 1489	11433 14258	11435 1011	11437 11417	11438 3334
11439 1120	11442 13853	11444 1350	11445 993	11447 14198
11448 8635	11450 13791	11451 3065	11454 11571	11461 16811
11462 7483	11463 9785	11464 5116	11466 15902	11469 3031
11470 16671	11471 15074	11472 8573	11474 9821	11475 16672

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

11479	8366	11482	10706	11483	5148	11488	4914	11494	11173
11496	1944	11498	12559	11499	4324	11501	16288	11503	80
11505	3729	11507	5857	11509	8111	11510	1194	11511	2898
11512	1236	11513	3312	11515	15865	11516	16593	11520	10578
11521	14761	11526	16103	11527	1537	11528	13346	11532	3749
11534	13365	11536	2323	11537	14153	11543	12672	11548	5323
11549	1821	11550	7059	11551	2507	11552	4464	11554	16371
11555	1284	11557	3749	11558	14734	11560	8023	11561	12676
11565	13420	11566	16269	11567	3906	11568	8490	11569	6353
11572	14550	11573	1251	11574	2864	11576	11272	11578	11583
11583	11932	11585	16382	11586	9445	11588	6883	11591	11278
11592	16534	11595	12019	11596	2186	11600	2995	11603	10297
11605	1118	11607	10628	11608	3756	11609	11291	11610	5579
11612	5066	11614	2539	11616	6244	11617	3024	11618	8933
11620	15563	11623	7540	11624	757	11625	1602	11628	5170
11631	11215	11632	6153	11634	8451	11635	15507	11637	2217
11638	11188	11640	1489	11641	4522	11643	1558	11646	9501
11648	4744	11650	7492	11651	7905	11652	2260	11653	7728
11655	16380	11657	96	11659	11392	11660	994	11662	10358
11665	2697	11666	16407	11668	1470	11669	13344	11670	6023
11672	5185	11673	7121	11675	4793	11676	714	11677	9310
11678	4744	11682	883	11684	10614	11686	2296	11687	16909
11691	13197	11693	3896	11695	12069	11699	14843	11705	16860
11709	7842	11710	1929	11712	5251	11713	8676	11714	14066
11715	8424	11716	6211	11718	15077	11719	2869	11720	381
11722	4136	11725	6733	11726	1009	11727	5115	11729	7874
11730	3040	11731	16283	11732	991	11733	13771	11736	13200
11739	13743	11741	7504	11744	10024	11745	3755	11746	15730
11748	4117	11749	2544	11750	9102	11751	2505	11753	7438
11756	9956	11757	12403	11758	2146	11762	7082	11764	13347
11765	2209	11766	2453	11769	8804	11771	5911	11773	6386
11775	4552	11782	185	11783	680	11786	10967	11790	7347
11791	12033	11793	3706	11799	3569	11800	6750	11802	15427
11803	6535	11806	9903	11807	9907	11808	10609	11809	1236
11810	3939	11812	4726	11815	6183	11817	8540	11818	7265
11821	15180	11822	13734	11823	1876	11824	2936	11825	10396
11828	13985	11829	1186	11830	5906	11831	3431	11833	874
11834	13998	11835	12356	11838	12957	11839	6435	11841	6033
11842	6878	11844	5885	11848	16352	11850	7967	11853	4777
11854	11178	11857	14756	11858	2443	11860	11883	11861	14429
11862	16203	11863	12128	11864	16344	11868	12048	11870	3296
11874	5759	11878	7657	11880	16851	11881	7569	11885	11990
11886	6351	11887	1254	11888	8170	11889	6059	11896	961
11901	6720	11903	16546	11904	3226	11906	3100	11908	7278
11911	4159	11914	7347	11916	2386	11919	14427	11920	3920
12515	902	12516	10702	12517	11488	12518	11719	12521	1884
12526	368	12531	10486	12533	10054	12535	11664	12536	5573
12537	13279	12538	2135	12539	12690	12544	4651	12545	16181
12546	4451	12550	16473	12551	8455	12553	5348	12555	15326
12556	4068	12558	7403	12559	8003	12560	4619	12561	16942
12562	4997	12566	8763	12568	3018	12569	12492	12570	10242
12572	13292	12575	16188	12576	12188	12577	3028	12579	15140
12581	13056	12584	15662	12585	13913	12586	6301	12589	1205
12590	3645	12591	6567	12592	14800	12593	11354	12598	9407
12599	16026	12601	974	12603	2161	12609	4507	12610	16918

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

12612	10277	12614	6311	12615	5119	12616	7926	12617	4037
12620	7082	12622	6117	12626	1530	12628	5550	12630	7005
12632	1492	12636	2995	12638	12901	12639	11451	12640	1289
12644	8405	12646	15978	12649	2175	12650	14479	12651	11846
12653	3459	12654	4708	12656	1054	12663	6296	12665	10419
12667	4711	12669	3385	12671	3976	12674	105	12676	2341
12677	5443	12680	6464	12681	4003	12688	14059	12690	14800
12691	5482	12693	13224	12694	6708	12695	1731	12697	5422
12698	828	12699	8657	12706	1172	12707	11192	12708	4871
12709	4501	12710	15742	12711	4952	12716	16028	12717	8794
12719	215	12720	13045	12724	5028	12726	2222	12729	9491
12732	14582	12736	6883	12738	11224	12739	14944	12741	7169
12742	8539	12743	2016	12744	15571	12745	7977	12747	8130
12748	7779	12749	14629	12750	901	12754	15759	12756	8780
12760	5028	12761	12535	12765	9778	12767	10676	12768	1740
12769	4113	12771	5911	12774	5632	12775	13797	12777	1370
12778	7573	12779	11503	12781	4968	12784	10892	12786	16366
12787	7888	12788	678	12791	7430	12792	782	12794	5357
12795	13314	12796	16400	12798	5924	12799	1664	12800	16685
12806	14950	12807	10588	12810	15687	12812	14375	12816	10151
12820	744	12826	15903	12827	2860	12829	11902	12830	1846
12831	181	12838	16655	12841	16480	12845	4068	12848	7374
12849	1752	12850	16632	12851	11955	12852	8363	12858	13144
12859	2726	12860	2186	12861	3218	12863	3343	12864	2473
12867	6679	12868	10267	12869	14553	12870	10848	12872	9111
12873	3879	12874	11215	12880	5658	12881	10917	12882	13859
12883	16578	12888	9729	12890	6408	12892	8015	12894	4069
12895	825	12897	8159	12899	12984	12900	12538	12902	12793
12905	11887	12907	6372	12911	15115	12912	15438	12916	5281
12917	7319	12919	11617	12920	12573	12921	11059	12922	5714
12924	12330	12927	5543	12929	16107	12930	3936	12931	6372
12932	104	12933	10753	12934	7287	12935	1333	12936	12904
12938	5096	12941	8773	12947	4290	12948	4088	12951	11519
12954	15751	12955	12690	12957	6428	12960	2679	12961	15207
12963	9639	12966	1311	12967	11939	12968	5784	12969	6665
12971	5729	12972	5104	12974	17000	12977	5386	12978	14833
12980	7572	12984	13383	12985	5614	12988	13864	12989	8990
12993	14437	12996	4945	12997	4507	13001	9501	13002	10900
13003	1410	13005	12114	13006	16490	13016	16641	13020	15909
13022	9139	13023	11080	13024	8446	13025	7706	13030	15750
13033	7618	13035	8264	13036	9848	13038	1369	13040	4969
13043	5161	13044	3579	13048	14398	13050	381	13052	9825
13053	2348	13054	3743	13056	10580	13057	12199	13060	3717
13062	1444	13063	12278	13064	13914	13065	6242	13066	7629
13067	9877	13068	6679	13069	8413	13074	13645	13075	7249
13079	16858	13081	7106	13083	11072	13085	8109	13086	3205
13087	14119	13089	5024	13090	1784	13096	3325	13099	1383
13100	2248	13101	6398	13102	10736	13106	12182	13107	6217
13109	12729	13110	13365	13111	13162	13117	4553	13120	14778
13122	4346	13124	6208	13125	15828	13127	2360	13134	6697
13138	8359	13139	8579	13140	2904	13141	3903	13143	10059
13144	12236	13146	2439	13150	9358	13151	15037	13154	1553
13157	4935	13159	16135	13161	7273	13162	7835	13164	2348
13165	8162	13166	6739	13168	15785	13169	1533	13171	16249
13175	14733	13176	14950	13179	3733	13182	11501	13185	6972
13186	7664	13190	12491	13191	16433	13192	2133	13196	13815

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

13199	10508	13201	14323	13202	12559	13204	4435	13205	10777
13206	7526	13207	14849	13211	15020	13214	14370	13215	14067
13218	1935	13227	14952	13228	5471	13240	5883	13242	14979
13243	6353	13244	13847	13245	13982	13246	11453	13248	16268
13249	15177	13250	9568	13253	6529	13254	130	13255	7947
13262	5688	13263	11708	13265	5888	13266	2097	13267	2082
13273	11410	13277	7887	13278	4366	13279	3157	13281	2856
13282	14964	13285	3621	13286	16918	13287	10356	13289	14791
13290	6994	13291	9403	13294	5486	13296	14108	13299	5563
13300	505	13304	6458	13305	2628	13307	13723	13313	5384
13321	3800	13327	15795	13328	11994	13329	8555	13330	1927
13338	15434	13339	2395	13340	1084	13343	15209	13344	10357
13345	5961	13346	2289	13347	1711	13349	12160	13350	3393
13351	4896	13355	8385	13356	16422	13357	14208	13359	15829
13362	6863	13363	11687	13364	8020	13366	10028	13368	11375
13369	14416	13371	453	13372	16817	13374	6782	13376	16364
13379	6832	13380	13768	13381	14884	13384	9702	13386	6311
13387	11391	13391	9851	13393	15946	13394	12986	13396	2128
13402	3835	13406	9022	13409	15594	13411	10878	13413	5731
13414	8480	13418	16091	13419	10053	13420	6905	13424	5845
13425	3356	13429	10693	13431	504	13434	7278	13436	14166
13438	4121	13439	12202	13440	6426	13441	6005	13442	16029
13444	5831	13445	7312	13446	2204	13448	12072	13450	5685
13451	15051	13454	23	13459	5350	13460	1708	13461	16652
13462	4493	13463	11402	13464	8254	13467	6563	13468	10995
13470	13947	13474	185	13475	13048	13476	11480	13479	9753
13484	9923	13485	1194	13486	6343	13488	14967	13489	1740
13490	10955	13491	3744	13492	9242	13495	11968	13496	400
13497	15031	13498	4261	13500	12178	13502	15234	13505	13985
13506	15766	13510	8557	13512	16418	13514	2647	13515	886
13519	7601	13520	14052	13521	5607	13523	12902	13524	9932
13525	16858	13528	12884	13530	7524	13531	16747	13532	4494
13533	12032	13534	2296	13535	3992	13541	13789	13543	9784
13549	11645	13550	11678	13551	14033	13552	14814	13553	5066
13554	777	13556	7012	13558	1237	13561	12811	13563	16921
13564	9782	13572	6812	13573	9242	13580	3256	13582	11408
13585	13258	13587	608	13588	11735	13589	14068	13591	14655
13592	13179	13594	14480	13596	16578	13597	860	13598	624
13599	10916	13602	1873	13603	7473	13610	1400	13612	1021
13618	7709	13619	16884	13621	9127	13622	3181	13623	4249
13625	2705	13626	866	13627	2785	13629	10060	13633	9629
13635	1027	13636	5350	13637	14869	13639	2072	13640	3929
13641	4766	13642	6821	13643	1306	13645	14989	13646	15161
13647	13315	13648	3031	13649	7374	13650	12185	13651	12836
13654	16739	13658	571	13659	8345	13663	16582	13664	6233
13665	887	13666	1395	13669	16933	13670	2167	13672	6697
13675	9233	13676	14469	13678	11206	13680	16967	13681	6334
13682	7409	13683	4598	13685	9953	13686	1522	13687	3412
14853	841	14854	13511	14855	5922	14857	9977	14859	5518
14860	5713	14861	7796	14862	9392	14864	8910	14872	1574
14877	5380	14878	10734	14879	6151	14880	6514	14881	9042
14882	15172	14884	14184	14885	2749	14886	9613	14887	4969
14889	3736	14890	13443	14891	5568	14900	14319	14903	14253
14905	11040	14907	16909	14908	15612	14910	6400	14911	13976
14912	11704	14914	1893	14915	9224	14916	6523	14917	13361

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

15069	16994	15072	12614	15073	3605	15079	14071	15080	2573
15081	16994	15082	13734	15083	4929	15086	1483	15088	3580
15090	13586	15091	1395	15092	15181	15093	8109	15100	5729
15101	4195	15102	4128	15106	3312	15107	3007	15109	16209
15111	1836	15112	14567	15115	10042	15121	270	15122	979
15125	7310	15126	11738	15128	9934	15131	15414	15132	11069
15134	4617	15135	7899	15139	4366	15140	6149	15141	8946
15142	1735	15144	11313	15145	4717	15146	7661	15148	6153
15149	9209	15154	2864	15160	3949	15164	14996	15167	4640
15168	12169	15170	1242	15171	3912	15173	5975	15175	9495
15176	8972	15177	10665	15178	6040	15179	5085	15180	4692
15181	5770	15182	9659	15186	11500	15190	3379	15197	12268
15199	760	15201	14769	15204	15283	15209	13844	15212	16685
15213	4787	15216	9580	15218	14320	15219	10237	15221	9431
15225	16101	15227	12446	15230	77	15231	13629	15235	16541
15236	1402	15241	16176	15242	484	15243	6942	15246	10518
15247	15177	15248	16932	15249	2760	15250	11575	15251	4239
15253	7757	15254	8630	15255	3744	15256	16747	15258	13314
15259	4281	15263	5379	15265	15599	15266	16653	15268	2657
15269	13017	15270	6541	15271	8118	15272	5447	15273	16149
15274	9222	15275	9861	15276	6796	15279	6542	15280	12521
15282	9587	15283	3457	15284	14195	15285	8537	15286	7457
15287	11024	15288	14414	15292	15680	15293	1077	15295	12679
15296	14378	15300	9951	15301	10399	15305	17000	15306	5865
15307	7626	15308	7784	15309	3120	15314	9299	15315	49
15318	1726	15320	4168	15324	6691	15325	8582	15326	10342
15327	8646	15328	13449	15329	5573	15331	6373	15336	13141
15337	9808	15339	3772	15343	6105	15345	12356	15346	2556
15347	1863	15348	6635	15349	12509	15350	3887	15352	9370
15354	7742	15356	16605	15366	9185	15367	14562	15369	4255
15372	13258	15374	10557	15376	3128	15377	5800	15378	3082
15380	6407	15381	11962	15382	4976	15383	14704	15384	10408
15385	7114	15386	721	15387	4222	15390	877	15392	3197
15393	9578	15394	8837	15398	3546	15399	2854	15401	6386
15402	6902	15404	16534	15405	15815	15406	9039	15409	8507
15410	10813	15411	9579	15412	13625	15414	11988	15415	5576
16000	9188	16002	988	16003	4336	16004	4312	16005	836
16010	5085	16015	12669	16016	8330	16017	9399	16018	5092
16021	12838	16022	8406	16026	13106	16027	11453	16028	7038
16032	13853	16037	7344	16041	12550	16042	15325	16043	10299
16048	9521	16049	11536	16051	4033	16053	2525	16054	9892
16055	2643	16056	7638	16057	12577	16060	5406	16061	6158
16063	12410	16064	15870	16066	5148	16067	13287	16068	13315
16071	1837	16075	13487	16077	7100	16081	10577	16083	6356
16086	2175	16087	1572	16090	7267	16092	3791	16093	5907
16094	8276	16095	12365	16097	14182	16100	14451	16105	12114
16107	7174	16109	10746	16111	6741	16112	10527	16114	8842
16115	14884	16119	163	16120	5576	16122	5214	16126	12211
16134	7698	16135	14041	16136	11930	16138	11666	16139	13984
16140	6696	16141	10319	16142	14628	16143	10226	16149	12439
16150	4769	16151	3331	16153	9209	16154	13376	16156	2719
16157	16059	16162	10127	16163	12151	16164	13497	16165	1633
16166	15155	16167	11061	16169	431	16170	11784	16172	16496
16175	13681	16176	8655	16183	16942	16184	13144	16187	13491

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

16188	11173	16189	16447	16190	4304	16192	6143	16193	7706
16194	16383	16195	9998	16197	6644	16198	11008	16199	6232
16200	3112	16201	6355	16203	8048	16206	14527	16207	3203
16209	12724	16211	9032	16212	5882	16213	16743	16215	4549
16225	5482	16227	2653	16230	4195	16233	14880	16236	3648
16240	16499	16241	1927	16242	14621	16243	740	16246	1779
16249	6482	16253	13347	16254	11267	16256	14593	16257	16343
16262	8299	16263	11102	16265	5850	16268	14771	16269	624
16270	7573	16272	3790	16274	3547	16275	7101	16276	9912
16278	15709	16279	9514	16281	2549	16282	4705	16283	14398
16284	6185	16288	7970	16289	13296	16290	1881	16294	37
16295	8294	16296	6737	16297	4753	16298	5963	16302	3579
16304	4020	16305	13937	16307	7746	16308	16214	16312	2226
16313	16921	16316	383	16317	306	16319	12022	16320	1763
16322	9420	16323	14026	16330	6247	16332	6355	16333	1077
16334	9694	16336	2091	16337	16119	16338	9138	16341	11942
16343	3683	16347	1296	16352	2938	16354	15621	16356	5579
16358	15699	16360	12609	16361	11800	16363	11022	16366	4385
16368	1229	16369	9179	16370	3393	16372	3536	16374	5004
16376	12131	16377	4628	16378	16581	16379	4096	16382	12950
16384	8907	16387	10112	16388	12864	16391	13650	16392	16497
16393	14192	16398	10313	16399	11149	16400	1698	16401	11009
16403	121	16407	7939	16408	11834	16414	5702	16417	3629
16419	13616	16422	5224	16425	13683	16427	11002	16428	13657
16430	2954	16433	14520	16434	11008	16437	13916	16439	1230
16440	11278	16447	9773	16450	1007	16452	3669	16455	9811
16456	1230	16459	14311	16460	3588	16461	16062	16462	12012
16463	6591	16464	3929	16466	13797	16476	11722	16481	5681
16485	11350	16487	1021	16488	13788	16492	8030	16493	2616
16496	3657	16499	138	16500	11548	16503	16301	16504	15532
16505	7230	16506	15860	16508	2754	16509	3986	16510	6378
16511	12741	16513	8743	16515	1510	16517	8943	16521	8601
16523	842	16524	13509	16525	7622	16526	10968	16527	4384
16531	13369	16532	11616	16534	8701	16535	16397	16536	15633
16541	3270	16542	12373	16547	8677	16549	14632	16550	3076
16552	8002	16553	2809	16558	9924	16559	16501	16561	6919
16562	7232	16563	14275	16564	13609	16566	11059	16567	6724
16569	8008	16570	1911	16571	11775	16576	2530	16578	9630
16580	2033	16581	13714	16584	14417	16585	16418	16587	3279
16588	10552	16590	16308	16592	3248	16594	8636	16596	3938
16598	2971	16600	620	16601	3082	16602	6555	16603	13409
16604	3128	16609	9366	16610	11665	16612	15497	16613	8067
16614	7346	16616	16536	16617	9536	16620	10694	16622	10474
16624	10131	16625	4177	16626	6196	16627	12794	16628	2939
16629	6602	16631	13960	16637	13531	16642	12874	16643	1679
16644	4088	16645	8034	16646	2102	16648	6228	16651	14495
16652	471	16653	4345	16657	12809	16658	7957	16659	9111
16660	6243	16661	8636	16662	3681	16664	12005	16665	14252
16666	3442	16667	11306	16668	14240	16669	2366	16670	2963
16674	2724	16675	2732	16676	5659	16678	7430	16680	13020
16682	8868	16686	12642	16688	1823	16690	14926	16691	8586
16693	1165	16695	15074	16698	6827	16699	4691	16700	5810
16701	6610	16702	6112	16705	3003	16708	3120	16711	5344
16712	8807	16713	14949	16714	13506	16715	15305	16716	14655
16718	574	16719	7685	16723	16225	16726	16733	16727	9877
16728	9243	16730	14567	16731	5189	16733	10277	16735	13998
16738	2948	16740	2983	16744	1023	16746	14813	16747	8771

Appendix CH4.5**Results of the message encryption/decryption program**

16748	16143	16750	1133	16751	9181	16752	10237	16753	13336
16754	16564	16758	5669	16760	13905	16763	5975	16764	7017
16767	6030	16768	2933	16769	13174	16770	4227	16772	1410
16773	2216	16775	3192	16776	14916	16778	8386	16779	15431
16784	7131	16785	3269	16787	6268	16791	15911	16792	3380
16794	6233	16795	573	16798	12868	16799	11644	16800	2866
16803	1816	16804	14888	16808	6447	16809	14658	16810	7429
16811	9945	16812	8728	16813	14786	16815	10146	16819	1061
16821	4859	16823	13649	16824	11134	16825	10982	16828	10430
16830	13760	16832	7348	16833	12454	16835	6516	16837	13506
16841	6093	16842	2737	16843	11678	16846	12822	16853	15696
16854	5970	16856	3349	16859	15443	16860	4651	16861	8763
16863	23	16865	13960	16868	1887	16869	15239	16871	4356
16873	14510	16874	1727	16875	5806	16876	3373	16879	4417
16880	1089	16881	2434	16884	14295	16885	2673	16893	1459
16897	8298	16898	9848	16899	13154	16901	16112	16902	3645
16904	8816	16905	12573	16908	371	16911	9937	16912	12809
16913	5161	16918	10323	16919	13887	16920	43	16922	9693
16930	8034	16933	8561	16935	3329	16936	7524	16938	5608
16939	10327	16943	14764	16945	14621	16946	126	16948	6523
16953	4931	16954	3916	16955	816	16958	5004	16960	10592
16961	1553	16967	3442	16976	2660	16979	9335	16980	11794
16982	772	16983	11642	16985	2714	16987	16091	16989	12166
16990	792	16996	3300	17001	7136	17003	16350	17004	14102
17005	15111	17008	620	17010	14564				

TOTAL NUMBER OF HITS= 22 AND THE ORDER OF THE GROUP IS = 0

1	1507	16417	1507	16417A	HIT
2	2704	393	2704	393A	HIT
3	2628	2950	2628	2950A	HIT
4	1204	15324	1204	15324A	HIT
5	528	12647	528	12647A	HIT
6	2006	9629	2006	9629A	HIT
7	1828	1936	1828	1936A	HIT
8	2205	14215	2205	14215A	HIT
9	2715	13753	2715	13753A	HIT
10	1619	915	1619	915A	HIT
11	2113	10358	2113	10358A	HIT
12	2710	401	2710	401A	HIT
13	1525	4099	1525	4099A	HIT
14	2708	11651	2708	11651A	HIT
15	2314	12327	2314	12327A	HIT
16	1816	6343	1816	6343A	HIT
17	2702	11279	2702	11279A	HIT
18	311	4188	311	4188A	HIT
19	2109	15967	2109	15967A	HIT
20	2718	3716	2718	3716A	HIT
21	610	3309	610	3309A	HIT
22	21	8173	21	8173A	HIT

CONFIRMING THE DECODED TEXT TO BE THE ORIGNAL MESSAGE

Appendix CH4.5

Results of the message encryption/decryption program

BLK/N0	ENCODED MESSAGE	EMBEDDED MESSAGE	ENCRYPTED MESSAGE	DECRYPTED MESSAGE
1	1507	1507 16417	7842 2346	1507 16417
2	2704	2704 393	11750 16	2704 393
3	2625	2628 2950	1608 12565	2628 2950
4	1201	1204 15324	12555 9185	1204 15324
5	527	528 12647	6926 12655	528 12647
6	2006	2006 9629	13202 9812	2006 9629
7	1827	1828 1936	8918 7380	1828 1936
8	2205	2205 14215	1253 4343	2205 14215
9	2715	2715 13753	13617 9536	2715 13753
10	1619	1619 915	14606 2515	1619 915
11	2113	2113 10358	954 8446	2113 10358
12	2710	2710 401	9041 12792	2710 401
13	1524	1525 4099	12250 259	1525 4099
14	2706	2708 11651	10761 42	2708 11651
15	2314	2314 12327	8380 10376	2314 12327
16	1815	1816 6343	3664 11782	1816 6343
17	2702	2702 11279	11786 16088	2702 11279
18	311	311 4188	4520 7286	311 4188
19	2109	2109 15967	12668 11909	2109 15967
20	2717	2718 3716	7545 8423	2718 3716
21	605	610 3309	1926 8348	610 3309
22	20	21 8173	13933 2298	21 8173




FINAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN SUMMARY

MISSION DURATION = 25.53906 seconds




MISSION ACCOMPLISHED THANK YOU LORD

QB 4.5 CODE

Appendix CH4.6 Multiplexing property test of the RR7SQSD T-gate Column Charts



Appendix CH4.6 Multiplexing property test of the RR7SQSD T-gate Column Charts



Appendix CH4.6 Multiplexing property test of the RR7SQSD T-gate Column Charts

