THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALISM IN TANZANIA, 1967 - 1983

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the thesis titled:
"The Theory and Practice of Socialism in Tanzania, 1967 - 1983"
submitted to the School of Postgraduate Studies, University of Lagos, for the award of degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science is a record of original research carried out by Matilda Adedayo OLUYEMI in the Department of Political Science.

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ABSTRACT

The thesis relates theory to practice in the effort to construct a socialist society in Tanzania. An attempt is made to reconcile the situation in Tanzania (between 1967 and 1983) with the stipulations of the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) guidelines.

A critique of the political economy of Tanzania makes for an under-standing of the relationship between theory and practice. This is effectively done by concentrating on two problem areas: rural development and socialist industrialisation.

The study shows that inspite of rhetoric, the country is still dependent on foreign aid and the much-desired goal of self-reliance remains a dream. The following modes of production were found to co-exist in Tanzania among others: the petty-commodity mode, the private capitalist mode, the patriachal mode and the socialist mode.

The work is unique in the sense that it focuses on Tanzania as a country in the process of transition to socialism with a view to identifying the characteristics of the political economy of similar societies in Africa. The conclusions reached in this case study of Tanzania lead to generalisations about similar attempts at transition to socialism in African countries. Deciphering the exact nature of the political economy of such countries is a major contribution of this thesis to the literature on the political economy of Africa.

Field work in Tanzania in May 1983, December 1984, January 1986 and March 1987 furhter enriched the authors input into this case study.

DEDICATION

To all those by whose sweat we eat, and on whose labour our very existence depends.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Throughout its life as a doctoral degree thesis, this script had the good fortune to be subject to the constant advice of my supervisor, Professor Alaba Ogunsanwo. Hardly a page of what remains lacks his imprint and much of what went by the wayside did so under the weight of his firm criticism.

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Dayo Oluyemi

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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION	MEANING
ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party.
ATC	Air Tanzania Corporation.
CC	Central Committee.
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MECCO	Mwananchi Engineering and Construction Company
NDC	National Development Corporation.
NEC	National Executive Council
NESP	National Economic Survival Programme.
OCC	Overseas Construction Company.
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme.
STC	State Trading Company.
TANU	Tanganyika Africa National Union.
TCM	Tanzania Colt Motors.
TES	Tanzania Elimu Supplies.
TIB	Tanzania Investment Bank.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The thesis addresses itself to problems arising out of the attempt to construct a socialist society in Tanzania between 1967 and 1983.

The problems have been formulated in the following way: first the question is posed as regards the relationship between the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) formerly Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU) guidelines and the practice of Socialism in Tanzania. Secondly, we specifically assess the extent to which policies in the two areas of rural development and socialist industrialisation are consistent with the CCM guidelines.

In looking at this particular problem, the thesis analyses the country's villagisation policy in the area of rural development and selected policies relating to socialist industrialisation between 1967 and 1983.

These two problem areas have been chosen for consideration not only because data on them are readily available, but also because socialism in Tanzania during the period 1967 to 1983 was defined in terms of rural socialism and self-reliant development.

A rational and planned programme of rural development is particularly necessary in Tanzania because its population is predominantly rural and agriculture remains the major sector of the economy. Though encompassing an area almost equal to that of Nigeria, and roughly equal to the total for France, Belgium and Italy, Tanzania contains only 24 million people, separated by an underdeveloped transport system, and concentrated in the periphery. The villagisation policy, the mass purchase of machinery for rural farmers, and the marketing of farm produce through co-operatives are some of the steps taken in the effort to develop the rural areas in Tanzania.

Parastatals complement the efforts at the village level to build a self-reliant Tanzania. A basic problem lies in the country's continued dependence on primary commodity exports for obtaining the capital and foreign exchange it needs for economic development projects.

This means that external circumstances and demands for these exports place constraints on the pace of the country's economic growth. The major alternative available is rapid industrialisation guided by the policy of self-reliance. This is why in this thesis we shall study the activities of parastatals like the National Development Corporation (NDC) and the State Trading Company (STC).[2] The NDC and STC were designed to ensure that commodities reach the ultimate consumer.

As a result of the nationalisation programme outlined in the Arusha Declaration, the parastatal system replaced foreign firms as the primary instrument for the acquisition of external goods and services at the non-governmental level. This corresponds to theincreased role of the public sector in capital formulation and, in general, economic growth.[3] With due regard to the imperatives of self-reliance, the parastatal institutions must still utilise certain external resources. They lack easy access to the international market, are relatively powerless to significantly influence activities in that market, and are not independent centres of technological innovations. In addition, their state of data collection, capacity for data analysis, and the expertise and experience of their managerial personnel are grossly inadequate for the efficient and successful performance of their tasks.[4]

In response to these deficiencies, the public enterprises have, in general, entered into partnership of one kind or another with foreign private firms, utilised the services of foreign fact-finding missions, and employed the services of highly skilled individuals in managerial and advisory capacilties. Of these, the most significant of external resource procrement is the use of foreign firms. Their operations are potentially of great advantage to their local counterparts, but equally potentially degerous. Their role in the nation's socialist reorganisation of society has therefore been a source of intense controversy.[5]

Through these foreign firms, the public enterprise was able to enjoy the benefits of a team of managerial and technical personnel. In addition, the firms remedy the inadequate manpower situation, and provide patents, trademarks, brands and production processes, which are expected to facilitate the export of local products. Other expectations from them include technological transfer, especially through the training of local personnel, increased capital, and greater profits. For example, several reasons caused the Mwananchi Engineering and Construction Company (MECCO), in which the NDC held 60% of the shares until December 1970, to enter into partnership with the Overseas Construction Company (OCC) of the Netherlands. Among them were the following: the desire to increase the scale of the company in order to make it more competitive for complex building and engineering contracts; the need to save foreign exchange expended on foreign contracts, the training of skilled craftsmen and technicians at all levels of the industry; and the utilisation of foreign capital for increasing profitable investments.[6]

The foregoing shows that parastatals are expected to complement the efforts made through the villagisation programme to develope the rural areas in Tanzania. The next section is an articulation of the purpose of the thesis that is, what outcomes are envisaged from the issues discussed in this work.

II

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The aim of this thesis is to ascetain to what extent theory (according to the CCM guidelines), is refelcted in the practice of socialism in Tanzania. In doing this, we concentrate on the two areas of rural development and socialist industrialisation between 1967 and 1983.

The socio-economic structure in Tanzania is primarily heterogeneous, comprising several different socio-economic systems, and by nature, changing.[7]

By the socio-ecnomic structure of society we mean the aggregate of the various types of social production comprising the economy, their mutual inter-connections and the classes and social groups corresponding to them.

The economy of a country like Tanzania is characterised by the existence of many socio-economic sectors including the socialist, petty-commodity, the private capitalist, the patriachal and state capitalist modes of production.

The major concern of this thesis is the identification of the economic sectors present in a country like Tanzania which purports to have a "socialist" programme.

This is done with a view to identifying the extent to which each sector is developed in the light of the CCM guidelines.[8] We therefore use development in the rural areas and socialist industrialisation through parastatals as case studies.

In this thesis we see the situation in Tanzania through the eyes of the dialectical materialist.[9] Focus is on factors (both structural and institutional), which have affected the interactions of the substructure with the superstructure in Tanzania's political economy.[10]

Dialectical materialism places emphasis on the material basis and objective yardstick of knowledge. Unlike the Agnostics and the Kantians, the dialectical materialists affirm that the world is cognisable. Rather than reason about how far sensations, representations and conceptions are consistent with the things in themselves they reflect, dialectical materialism concentrates on finding out how sensations, representations and conceptions appear, and how knowledge contained in them enables man to act and find his bearings in the surroundings and so shape them to his needs.

Thus, the cardinal position of the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge is thus: Cognition of the external world stems from experimentation carried out by man with the aid of tools, instruments and other devices. If our knowledge of the most essential properties of the things involved in these experiments helps us to reproduce or produce certain material objects or work out certain desirable changes, then it is regarded as valid.

In this thesis therefore, cognition of the Tanzanian world stems from experimentation carried out by man as regards socialism. The aim here is to identify the tools, instruments and other devices used in the socialist experiment in Tanzania.

Have the tools used in the socialist engineering within Tanzania led led to desirable changes (in this case socialism?).
Have the tools helped to reproduce or produce certain material objects which are desirable? The dialectical materialist world view used in this thesis will help us to find this out.

The experimentation in question is called practice (Greek praxis, doing, action). There are basically three components of practice, namely;

(i) the objective basis of cognition and simultaneously the yardstick showing to what extent knowledge of this or that thing is far-reaching and true;

(ii) mobile, indefinite and changeable aspect which could prevent knowledge from freezing up, and is the chief factor in the progress of knowledge;

(iii) the aspect which is definite enough to separate true from false knowledge, the materialist from the idealist approach, and to affirm the truth of the materialist theory of knowledge.

The aim in this thesis is to study the theory and praxis of socialism in Tanzinia through the dialectical materialist's eye as explained above.

A basic epistemological assumption is that an understanding of Tanzania's socialist experiment between 1967 and 1983 is best facilitated by focusing on how this interaction of base and superstructure has been mediated by the pattern of the country's integration into the world economy. This has affected the socialist experiment in the sense that the nature of the economy has peripheralised Tanzania vis-a-vis the world economy.[11]

• The two specific policy areas chosen rural development and socialist industrialisation highlight policy input and output and how these affect the sociliast experiment. Dialectical materialism makes it comparatively easy to assess the progress made as regards the ultimate aims of the socialist experiment in Tanzania.

On the whole, dialectical materialism has made it possible for the study to concern itself with the mutual impact of structures, basically economic and institutional, (that is cultural, social and political factors) which affect the socialist experiment in Tanzania. The world view complements the methodological goals enumerated in the next section, hence making it possible to avoid a purely economic deterministic approach to the two problem areas studied.[12]

IV

METHODOLOGY

The techniques used in this study include review of relevant literature through library research, interviews carried out during the many field trips to Tanzania, collection of documents from secondary sources especially parastatals in Tanzania etc.

The approach could be said to be eclectic in the sense that quite a number of techniques were used in the research in order to achieve a viable methodology.

Field work in Tanzania in May 1983, December 1984, January 1986, August 1986, March 1987, September 1988 and June 1989 enabled me to obtain first-hand information about Tanzania as a country, especially her policies on rural development and parastatals.[13]

The major theoretical concern in this thesis is to identify the economic sectors present in Tanzania. This is with a view to making generalisations about the political economies of countries similar to Tanzania.

The theory of dialectical materialism, (aided by field studies, literature review and oral tradition) has advantages over functionalism,[14] for example, because it brings out in bold relief the interplay of the substructure and the superstructure of the economy with a view to identifying, albeit approximately,[15] the stage at which various sectors of the economy are.

V

MAJOR VARIABLES AND LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

The concern in this thesis is wiht policy outcome. Using the CCM guidelines as the reference point, policy outcome in the area of rural development and socialist industrialisation is assessed. However, we also take account of policy choice and policy environment among others, before arriving at conclusions. The implication of this is that policy outcome is the dependent variable, while policy environment and policy choice are the independent variables.

It follows from this that for the two chosen areas viz., rural development and socialist industrialisation, the dependent variables are the outcomes of specific policies on rural areas and parastatals respectively.

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

Socialism in Tanzania is viewed within the wider framework of Marxist-Leninist theory. Since the reference points for socialism in Tanzania are the CCM guidelines, a critique of the CCM stipulations in relation to rural development and socialist industrialisation is the subject matter of Chapter IV of this thesis. This is with a view to relating theory to practice in Chapters V and VI.

It follows that there are two levels of analysis here; Maxism-Leninism and the CCM guidelines. The former has wider applicability beyond Tanzania whereas the latter is peculiar to The theory and practice of socialism Tanzania via the CCM guidelines.

VI

ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter I introduces us to what the thesis is all about. Here, issues like the nature of the problem, statement of purpose, theoretical framework, methodology, level of analysis etc are clearly formulated.

Chapter II is an overview of extent literature. Here, we selectively review the existing write-ups on Tanzania. The literature review is divided into three sections namely: theories of socialism-classical and modern, socialism in the middle East and African socialism.

Chapter III traces the history of Tanzania from colonial times.

The political economy of Tanzania during that era is analysed. The basic dependent nature of the economy has its roots in the structure of the colonial economy and this has made self-reliance in the area of rural development and policies relating to socialist industrialisation diffcult. In the first two sections, we try to decipher the African viewpoint as regards socialism and the implications of this for the socialist experiment in Tanzania.

The subject matter of Chapter IV is the critique of the CCM guidelines and how policies on rural development and socialist industrialisation are related to the guidelines.

Chapters V and VI are case studies of Rural Development and Socialist Industrialisation the light of the CCM guidelines. The relationship between theory and practice is clearly articulated.

Chapter VII is the conclusion, where generalisations are made about the nature of the political economy of countries like Tanzania, undergoing the socialist experiment. The findings in our study of Tanzania inform such wider application.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. The CCM, formerly TANU gauidelines, from the blueprint for the transformation of Tanzania to a socialist country.

   (a) Karl Marx, Capital, vols. I, II and III Moscow, 1974, entire.

   (b) Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Economy, (Moscow, 1970), entire.

   (c) L. Kolakowski and S. Hampshire (eds), The Socialist Edia - Reappraisal, (London, Quartet Books Limited, 1977).

(d) Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (The Chancer Press Britain, 1985).

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(f) K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (London, Penguin Books, 1979).

(g) V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?, (People's Publishing House Peking, 1971).

(h) Leon Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution (1928) - Results and Prospects (1906), (London, New York Publications Limited, 1976).

(i) Mao Tse Tung, Poems Peking, (Foreign Languages Press, 1976).

2. For a further elaboration of the role of parastatals in building a self-reliant Tanzania, see Chapter VI of this thesis.

3. For an indication of the increase in the public sector with regard to capital formation, refer to the Economic Survey, 1970 - 1977, (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1970).

4. All these deficiencies stem from the low level manpower situation of the country. See the United Republic of Tanzania, Established Circular Letter No. 2, of 1971, on file in the Ministry of Establishment, Dar-es-Salaam.

5. For aspects of this controversy, see Micheal Romnicianu, "Management Agremments: Are the Necessary?" in Jenga, a magazine of the NDC, No. 9. 1971, pp. 28 - 31; Peter Temu, "The Employment of Foreign Consultants in Tanzania: Its Values and Limitations", in "The African Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1983, page 69 - 84; Andrew Coulson, "Blood-Sucking Contracts", (Mimeo), Issa Shivji,

"Capitalism Unlimited; Public Corporations in Partnership with Multinational Corporations", a paper presented at the conference on public corporations in Africa, Accra, Ghana, May 28 - June 1, 1983.

6. Andrew Coulson, op. cit; page 2 -3.

7. The Socio-Economic Sector of such a country is necessarily heterogenous because it is moving from an agarian setting towards socialism. This implies that feudal and semi-capitalist characteristics are present side by side with some form of socialist re-construction.

8. Assessment of the development of each economic sector in the transition to socialism in Tanzania has to be done in the light of the CCM guidelines because these are the stated objectives of an eventual socialist transformation.

9. For an understanding of the term: "dialectical materialism", see Lenin Ilitslaya, ABC of Dialectical and Historical Materialsm, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, Chapters 7, 8 and 10.

10. For further clarification on how the economic base affects the superstructure in any economy, see op. cit. (a)

11. For further discussion of the centre-periphery theory as regards the world economy, see Gunder Frank, op. cit.

12. See Chapter II, Section IV for literature review.

13. (a) May 1983 - I met Felix Mujemula, the Officer-In-Charge of Tanzania Agricultural Machinery Testing Unit (TAMTU). He explained the role of government in the manufacture of equipment for the rural farmer.

(b) December 1984 - R.A. Lyatuu, the Regional Development Director, Arusha, gave me valuable data on the progress made as regards the rural areas.

(c) January 1986 - Mzee Hau, a local "Ten-House-Call leader, and enterprising peasant farmer, demonstrated the use of machinery supplied by government. He intimated me with the problems confronting the average farmer in the rural areas. The Ujamea villages in the Usambaras made my one month stay with them very useful. I learnt quite a lot of what is used in this dissertation from them.

(d) August 1986 and March 1987 - Data were collected from various ministries and parastatals on the activities of the following:-

MECCO - Mwanachi Engineering and Construction Company

OCC - Overseas Construction Company

STC - State Trading Company

14. For further discussion of the functionalist approach, see J.E. Dougherty and R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, (J.B. Lippincott Company, New York, 1971), pp. 310 - 311.

15. For a clear understanding of the differences between method and methodology, see: Sellitz, Wrightsman and Cook, Research Methods In Social Relations, (Third Edition, New York, Holt Sanders International Editions), Chapters. 1, 7, 10 and 11.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

> By 1840 the term "socialism" was commonly used throughout Europe to connote the doctrine that the ownership and control of the means of production - capital, land, or property - should be held by community as a whole and administered in the interest of all. Within 120 years after the term became known in Europe, the doctrine had spread so widely that one could find regimes in Sweden, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, eastern Europe, Cuba, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Guinea, Kenya, Tanzania, India, Burma, and Ceylon calling themselves socialist, and the labels Arab socialism, African Socialism, and Asian Socialism used to describe the grafting of indigenous traditions onto ideological doctrine. Rarely in the history of the world has an idea taken hold so deeply and dispersed so quickly.
>
> Bell (1968: 506)

This literature review is predicated on three fundamental beliefs held by the writer. The first is that Socialism is a body of thought which reflects a number of identifiable strands in its historical evolution and systematization. The second is that, contrary to the generally held opinions, Socialism, like other major "-isms", is not just a theory of social organization and power structure, but also an ideology of political action as well as prescribed guide or strategy for a movement towards establishing a particular type of society. The third is that the theory and practice of Socialism cannot be considered in isolation. Hence African countries like Ghana and Tanzania which have attempted to establish political economies based on Socialism derive their ideas, inspirations, and strategies, howbeit in modified forms from classical and modern Socialism.

The excellent exposition by Cole, Bernstein, and others clearly support the first two propositions; while in the writings of Friedland and Rosberg, as well as Apter, Geertz, Cliffe and Saul, we encounter the inescapable linkages between socialist ideas and praxis.

Accordingly, this literature review is organized in four sections. Section I is a critical examination of the theory of Socialism in its classical and modern varieties.

Section II.

examines the theory and practice of Socialism from the perspective of comparative history, with a focus on Arab and non-Arab countries. In Section III, the theory and practice of African Socialism in Ghana and Tanzania, gleaned from major primary and secondary literature, are analysed. Section IV is a general critique of writings on Tanzania.

This approach has a number of advantages that facilitate empirical research. It enables the student, for instance, to establish the fundamental principles and parameters of Socialist theory of the state. We shall, therefore, be in a vantage position to answer the basic questions: What is Socialism? To what extent has Tanzania's theory and practice of socialism been reflected in her political economy and transformation policies? Furthermore, the approach fosters our understanding of the various strands of Socialism. Apart from enhancing our general knowledge of the history of Socialist thought and practice, the three levels of literature review as hereby presented will enable us to pin down the specificities of our paradigm or framework of analysis, and in this way enhance the explanatory powers of our research methodology.

I

THEORIES OF SOCIALISM: CLASSICAL AND MORDERN

In an important article on "What is Socialism?"[1], Cole not only defines the concept, but also opens up the debate over the history of socialist thought and as to what constitutes the essential doctrines of various strands of Socialism. Bell uses the same historical approach in his extensive article on Socialism in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.[2] In these and similar introductory writings, Socialism is defined as the theory or system of the ownership and operation of the means of production and distribution by the society as a whole rather than by private individuals, with all members of the society sharing in the productive and the distributive activities.

The systematization and elevation of this theory into a full-blown political ideology and movement for establishing such society-based political organizations and communities are due largely to the writings of Karl Marx and Friederich Engels. Thus, in the Marxist theory, especially as reflected in The Communist Manifesto (1848) of Marx and Engels,[3] Socialism represents the stage of society in transition from capitalism to communism, in which private ownership of the means of production and distribution has been eliminated and the production of goods and services is sufficient to permit realisation of the principle of social equity based on the slogan: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work".

Classical Theories of Socialism:

The classical literature on Socialism, that is, the 19th and early 20th century writings, focused mainly on establishing its origins, its thought systems, its various strands, its expansion, its impacts both on European ideas and societies and the process of its disintegration as unified internationalist movement. The writings of Cole,[4] Durkheim,[5] Bernstein,[6] Gray,[7] Haradie,[8] Joll,[9] to mention just a few, fall into this category.

For some classical writers, the fundamental theoretical paradigm postulates socialism as a broad stream of ideas, which evolved from the "Utopian" thinkers such as Sir Thomas More, or the ideas of Saint-Simon, or the stirrings of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. To these are added a wide variety of modern active socialists, of whom Lenin,[10] Rosa Luxemburg[11] and the Webbs[12] may be cited as among the most prominent examples. It is also important to note that in the classical literature, the concept Socialism seemed to have been used in the second half of the 1820s and to have passed quickly into general political parlance to describe radical political theories or tyrannical systems of political organization. Halevy's The Era of Tyrannies links Socialism to war,[13] while Landauer's history of European Socialism[14] traces socialist ideas and movements from the politics of Industrial Revolution and Hitler's seizure of power in Germany to the relentless struggle against capitalism.

In The Communist Manifesto (1848), Marx and Engles (also in the latter's treatise on Socialism [15]) distinguished between 'Utopian' Socialism and 'Scientific' Socialism. Added to these variants are libertarian or anarchist Socialist strands, of which in their several ways Proudhon (1809-1865) and Bakunin (1814-1876) are the pioneers. There was also in the classical literature, Fabian or evolutionary Socialism, which, as is clear from the writings of Bernarad Shaw [16] and Margaret Cole, [17] differs from 'Utopian' 'Anarchist', and 'Scientific' Socialism, by its belief in "evolutionism" or "gradualism". [18] The common elements is these strands of Socialism consisted as much in their hostility to laissez - faire and economic competition as in their belief in some sort of collective or co-operative action as a means of improving the conditions of the masses.

In terms of its theory of the State, 'Utopian' Socialism proposes a land of freedom, of equality, and of happiness or felicity. Thus, Utopian socialists were essentially moralists. Their main concern was to prescribe the conditions needed for the establishment of a good society", since they held that the existing societies were corrupt and that the possibility of living a good life depended on constucting and establishing the right structure of social relations with emphasis on 'human knowledge' and growth of 'consciousness'.

The leading theoreticians were Henri Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Robert Owen (177-1856), and Charles Fourier (1772-1837). They believed that progress was "natural" and that the prevailing level of social change was due to human knowledge. They thus reasoned that men tended to become more rational in action as their knowledge increased and as they applied reason to revolutionize human welfare and social relations. 'Utopian Socialism' then made its debut as a plan for a system of social political organization designed to enhance human happiness and well-being by fostering political education and good behaviour. If such a plan was not realised in the 19th century, it would not be too fanciful to argue that the plan had not been abandoned but had become part of the major aspirations of present-day governments.

Marx's Scientific Socialism, by contrast, was an attempt to demonstrate that through 'class struggle' culminating in a revolution, the working-class (or the proletariat) would wrest political power from the bourgeoisie, the owners and controllers of the means of production and distribution. Thus, the power of the working class, according to Marx, is manifested in class conflict and in a revolution from below. Theoretically, both class struggle and revolution rested on "historical materialism". According to Marx, revolution, which would sweep away class exploitation, class privilege, and class monopoly was bound to occur, because of the inexorable movement of economic forces.[19]

This 'scientific' doctrine rested on Marx's materialist conception of history, a law of social evolution which evolved as men's knowledge of productive techniques advanced, a growing socialization of the process of production, which carried with it a corresponding evaluation in social relations, and destined to result in the achievement of a classless society.[20]

The early Russian Marxists, particularly Axelrod, Plekhanov, and Lenin, argued that Socialism in Russia depended on the maturity of capitalism, on the heightening of imperialism, and on the consequent emergence of a sizeable working class.[21] 'Parvus' (A.L. Helfond) and Trotsky thought otherwise, believing that the existence of a 'revolutionary situation' could trigger socialist revolution.[22] In The Accumulation of Capital (1913), Luxemburg refined and extended Marx's economic doctrine of Socialism. According to her, in the post-imperialism phase, in which capitalists would seek to export capital surpluses, the capitalist system could inevitably crack and produce a series of crisis.[23]

The Revolutions of 1848 and After:

After 1848, Marx's Socialist theory and predictions gradually conquered the greater part of the Socialist movement, as reflected in the Sicilian and German Revolutions of 1848, which foreshadowed the calibre of revolutions and national liberation movements after 1914.

One of the significant outcomes of these revolutions was that in the realm of Socialist ideas and movement, Utopianism was driven away from the centre of the political stage, and found refuge, for the most part, in various forms of anarchism, particularly in the anarchist communism of Pierre Joseph, Proudhon (1809-1865) and Mickarl Bakunin (1814-1876). Prodhon wrote a book, What is Property?, in which he defined accumulation of property as theft, arguing that the main concern of organized government was to protect private property of the few and deny the masses of both decent life and freedom. In his own work, God and the State, Bakunin denounced in very strong terms organized religion, government, and social privileges. He advocated revolution as an objective strategy for sweeping away the oppressive state and replacing it with a truly independent and free society.[24] Although Utopianism later came back into the syndicalist movements of France and Italy and in the anarcho-syndicalist movement of Spain, the difference was that, instead of working out models of equalitarian political communities, the syndicalists usually refused to offer any blue-prints of the future, and contended themselves with saying that when the state had been destroyed and the power of the workers established by "direct action", the creative genius liberated by emancipation from class oppression would result in a new and better socio-political order.

Another significant outcome of the revolutions of 1848 was reflected in disputes between Marx and the anarchists, especially Bakunin. It was one phase of the doctrinal struggle that divided socialism between 1848 and 1894. An attempt to achieve some kind of political accommodation failed with The First International (1864-1872). The critical doctrinal issues in the dispute had been analysed in volume 2 of Cole's magnum opus.[25]

Marxist - anarchist antagonism fostered new varieties of socialism, one of the most important of which was syndicalism, whose spokesman was the Frenchman Georges Sorel (1847-1922). The syndicalists believed that the transformation of society would come through violent general strike staged by strongly organized labour unions. The other varieties of Socialism were British, namely Guild and Fabian Socialism.

Both have been analysed in what Parkinson has aptly described as the Left Luggage.[26] Like Syndicalism, the Guild socialists believed in the labour unions as the foundation of the new society. But syndicalism, Guild Socialism believed in peaceful change towards union-centred society. Founded in 1884, Fabian Socialists, whose name came from the Roman general, Fabius Cunctator, who ultimately defeated Hannibal by procrastinating tactics, urged gradual change through the election of pro-labour government. Denying the need for class conflict on a violent scale, they agreed with Marx that capitalism was doomed and would be succeeded by socialism. The British Labour Party was formed in 1990 "out of the bowels of the trade union movement"

Pelling[27] traces the origins of the party to 1880. Its objectives were: the progressive elimination from the control of industry by the private capitalists and the setting free of all who work for the service of the community. Other objectives included guaranteed social welfare, planning to ensure "fair shares for all", and nationalization.

On the European continent, especially in Germany, the impact of Socialism grew with the rise of industrialism. The early hero of German Socialist movement was not Marx but rather Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864), who, according to Morgan and others, laid down the foundation of the German Social Democratic Party which came into being in 1863. The most significant doctrinal and strategical features of the German Social Democratic Party under Lassalle were, as Morgan has tried to show,[28] its refusal to abide by the prompting of Marx and Engels to join forces with the Prussian Liberals vis-a-vis Bismark. Lassalle spurned Prussian liberalism for lacking revolutionary potentialities. Instead, he joined forces with Bismark to press for such socialist demands as manhood suffrage and freedom of the press and of association, as well as the establishment of co-operative factories owned and operated by the workers in the event of Bismark's victory. Although Bismark became victorious, he made the "fatal mistake", as Schumpeter has put it,[29] of denying the Social Democrats of some of their most essential demands, thus allowing the party to grow and to retain both its socialist ideology and revolutionary rhetoric.

II

SOCIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ARAB AND NON-ARAB

The history of Socialism and socialist movement in the Third World, including the Middle East dates to the early 20th century.[30] In the Arab Middle East, Salama Massa of Egypt, in 1913 published a pamphlet entitled Socialism in which he advocated ideas akin to those of the Fabian Socialists. To put his ideas into practice, Massa helped to found an "Egyptian Socialist Party". But the party was without following and its organization and membership atrophied in a matter of months. In Iraq, a movement known as al-Ahali Group, which took part in the formation of Hikmat Suleiman's government in 1936, drew its inspiration from Socialism. When the Group was removed from government prior to World War II, its influence waned.

In their studies of the evolution of contemporary Middle East, Pfaff, Rivlin and Szyliowicz[30(a)] argued that the rise of the Socialist movement tended to be fostered by what appeared to them as combination of two factors, namely the failure of liberalism and the quest for modernity among both Arab and non-Arab nations. According to them, the generation that assumed leadership after World War I was imbued with Wersten liberal ideas and institutions. Socialism assumed a new importance as a slogan in the programmes of Middle East thinkers, public figures, and political parties. Such concepts and ideas as redistribution of wealth, planned development, progressive taxation, expansion of social services, and free trade unionism were widespread.

The most significant liberal institution was parliamentary government based upon a semi-*laissez faire* economic order. However, this appeared to have been a period when the parliaments were corrupted and the liberal institutions were twisted out of shape to maintain the *status quo*. Parliaments became mere facades and tools in the hands of the upper classes for maintaining themselves in power instead of instrumentalities for social change and progress. According to this genre of literature, the bell tolled the demise of Western liberalism with the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. The studies seemed to arrive at the conclusion that the Arab defeat of 1948 shook their faith in liberal institutions and ideology; so that Arab advocacy of socialist ideology after 1948 must be viewed against this background.

Thus, Socialism in the Middle East in the aftermath World War II, especially during the decades 1950s and 1960s, became protest movements against the terrible conditions of the common man, the stagnant economies, and the backward social, economic, and political order that prevailed. In 1949, for instance, Ahmad Hessein's 'Young Egypt" (Misr-al-Fatat), with its "green shirts", changed its name to "Democratic Socialist Party".

Two attempts at disengagement from traditionalism in the quest for modernity, according to this group of writers, are represented by Turkey and Iran.

In TURKEY, an attempt was made by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the inter-war years (1919-1939) to change the stagnant traditionalism through a palace revolution into a new phase of progress and modernity. Hence, Turkish socialism was characterized by its emphasis on State control and political responsibility and was held up as the most lasting legacy of Ataturk to his successors, especially Ismet Inonu and Recep Peker.

But, as Herslag has shown in his admirable studies,[31] Kemalist ideology described as etatisme, only partly came to grips with the enormous problems facing post-World War Turkey. He argues, for instance, that with about 80 per cent of the population in rural areas, the urban socialist ideology of etatisme was deemed to failure before it began. Furthermore, the Kemalist faith in liberal parliamentary institutions suffered a terrific shock in 1960 and in the abortive coup of 1962. The execution of Prime Minister Menderes in 1961 reflected in the eyes of intellectual historians and social scientists the failure of liberalism in the Middle East.

In the case of IRAN, an attempt to introduce modernity under Reza Shah was, like the Turkish experiment, a "revolution from above". This is because Iran's so-called Socialist ideology of Pahlevism was at best a benevolent dictatorship with no frame of reference and no ideology. Even if it was an ideology, it was both surrogate and capitalist-oriented rather than Socialist in all ramifications of the world. Pfaff[32] has shown that Muhammed Reza Pahlevi's commitment to modernism was backed by American military power and the secret police known as the SAVAK. The monarch's pretentions to modernism, argues Pfaff revealed its internal contradictions before it was swept by a "revolution from below".

The Arab Socialists and Their Doctrines

Prominent among the Arab Socialists Parties were the following: the Ba'ath Parties in Syria and Iraq, the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt, the National Liberation Front in South Yemen, Lebanon's Progressive Socialist Party, led by Kamal Jumblat, and the small circles of Maoist-Castroist intellectuals that have evolved around, or out of, the Arab Nationalist Movement. The belief in the positive role of government to induce political and economic development appeared, in the eyes of most writers, as the common denominators among Arab Socialists. For example, all the parties listed above appeared to adhere to the idea of a vigorous governmental role in the social, economic, land political spheres. The most significant elements in their Socialist policies included, as Mabro[33] has ably shown in the Egyptian case study, land reform, progressive scale of income tax, highly developed social legislation in matters of health, education, and labour union, nationalization of basic industries, central banking and foreign trade, a planned economy, and state monopoly of major economic enterprises.

One of the three main currents of Arab thought is represented by the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, founded in 1943, and fully elaborated in Syria and Iraq. According to the Party, the entire Arab world is a unity of cultures and aspirations. The major problem is how to reconstruct Arab unity. Hence, its programme of action is based on the slogan: "Unity, Liberty and Socialism".

The Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon represented another strand of Arab Socialism. The essence of its doctrine was an attempt to base action upon prevailing possibilities of socialist theory. Socialism was, therefore, advocated more as an instrumentality to satisfy the ambitions of leaders than as a systematized body of action-oriented ideas. This was true of Kamal Jumblatt, who, in one place was described as "an idealist" and in another place as "a pragmatist" ready to align himself with the political right or left when it suited him. Arab modernist critics have argued that Jamblatt failed because he was one of the most feudal and sectarian leaders in Lebanon. The National socialist Party of Jordan, also led by a feudal leader, Suleiman al-Nabulsi, they argue, was similar to the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon.

Egyptian and Algerian Socialisms are cited as the third strand of Arab Socialism. Defined in the "National Charter" of 1962, Arab Socialism became the official doctrine of Nasser's Egypt. Thus, the regime's single-party mass organization was renamed, in May 1962, the Arab Socialist Union. The National Charter (al-Mathag al-Watani) and Nasser's reorganization speech of March 31, 1968, emphasized a new base of support for Egyptian Socialist Revolution under the aegis of the intelligentsia, national capital, soldiers, workers, and peasants. According to Massannat, Nasser's Socialism was to bridge the gap between classes until a classless society emerged. He cited the 1964 Constitution as an attempt to put these ideas into practice.[34]

In the case of Algeria, the national liberation war with France left the Algerian economy in shambles. When the conflict was resolved in 1962, the Constitution which professed Islam as the national religion also committed Algeria to a Socialist programme. Land reform was instituted, as well as the nationalization of all foreign trade and major domestic enterprised. The architect of these programmes was Ben Bella. His inability to sustain socialist momentum led, in part, to his overthrow by Col. Houari Boumedinne, who headed Algerian Socialism emphasized decentralized authority and de-emphasized complete nationalization of the means of production.

III

AFRICAN SOCIALISM

So much has been written on African Socialism[35] that we can do justice to this literature review by focusing on the most important and relevant writings to demonstrate the distinctive elements of the theory which informs the organization, policies and actions of African Socialist States.

Paradoxically, two of the leading students, Friedland and Rosberg,[36] dismiss the use of the concepts 'theory and practice' of African Socialism. They argue that, as an ideology, African Socialism lacks unified systematization, being the product of diverse leaders operating within a variety of exigencies in their own countries, which helps to account for the lack of development of a unified theory. They likened African Socialism to some kind of "unanalyzed abstractions" with which Philip Selznick characterized the Tennessee Valley Authority, an analogy which, in the opinion of of the present writer, is wide off the mark. For the foremost African Socialists like Nkrumah, Senghor, Toure, and Nyerere,[37] drew their ideas and inspirations from the main streams of classical and modern European Socialism, whether utopian and scientific (Franco-German) or syndicalist and Fabian (Anglo-American). Furthermore, all four protagonists of African Socialism are theoreticians as well as men of action. They not only documented their ideas of African social and political organization, but also tried as statesmen and leaders of their own countries to put into practice what they believed was the correct path to African emancipation, true independence, and socio-economic transformation.

Thus, despite its alleged lack of unified systematization, at least three main themes may be discerned as the dominant features in the large corpus of writings on African Socialism.[38] The first theme is that of "continental identity and unity". As a theory, African Socialism represents both a reaction against imperialist Europe and a search for autonomous progress and political community. The paradigms and strategems of imperialism and neo-colonialism are outlined and delineated in Nkrumah's influential writings on the subjects.[39] Leopold Senghor's negritude and Nkrumah's African Personality' are indications of the search for continental identity.[40]

Thus, the theory of African Socialism came increasingly to be systematized as political leaders sought both a doctrine and a strategy to complement and ultimately to serve as the nationalist rationalisation for anti-colonialism, decolonization and independence. These forces have been analysed by Legum, Wallerstein, Nye, Mazrui.[41] While emphasizing the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies at work, their analyses indicate the key elements of the theory and of the concept "we are all Africans".[42] Mazrui's anatomy of this concept has become a starting point for students of pan-African anthropology.[43]

The search for African identity and unity consists in part of discovering the roots of African Socialism in indigenous society. Among various elements of traditional socialism cited include at least the following, namely (a) communal or village form of socio-political organisation, (b) egalitarian character of society, and (c) extensive network of social obligations that is reproduced in co-operatives and the principle of self-help, as opposed to a system of 'statuses' and 'physical forms' of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard[44] who sought to distinguish 'state' and 'stateless' African traditional societies with a view to facilitating imperial control of the restive colonies.

The second is the theme of progress or the reconstruction and transformation of the post-colonial African political economies.[45] Thus, one of the most significant features of African Socialism is its identification with socio-economic development. Both in theory and practice, protagonists hold that the development strategy is not only man-oriented, but must also be predicted on 'self-reliance' and the fullest development and utilisation of African human and material resource capabilities.[46] In practice, however, some nuances and fluidity have occurred with regard to the policies that African governments adopt in achieving the goals of economic growth and development. Nkrumah's Ghana and Nyerere's Tanzania may be cited as constituting case illustrations.

Furthermore, among those espousing African Socialism, indigenous African entrepreneurs have tended to be regarded as self-interested rather than as selfless contributors to the general welfare. The accumulation of capital, so ably analysed by Samir Amin,[47] is seen as primarily a responsibility of government. Thus, although both African Socialist and non-socialist governments encourage foreign private investment, the protagonists of scientific socialism among them, like Nkrumah's Ghana, insist upon greater limitations, than do the African non-socialists. Ghana is an illustrative case because here private investors are seen in rigorously defined sectors of the economy and in partnership with government.

Most African socialist governments envisage considerable control over the areas within which foreign capital could be welcome, although there is less agreement on partnerships between foreign investors and governments in various sectors of economic activities. More importantly, most African socialist statesmen's writings reflect another common perceptive thinking. They recognise that a major dilemma of African political economies arises from their dependence on the export of primary products and on both capital and manufactured goods and services from industrialised countries.[48] They heriting in many respects monocultural economies linked to external metropolitan consumers. African Socialism stresses in theory and practice the need for self-reliant industrialization strategy aimed at reducing dependency and strengthening self-reliance in domestic structure and foreign policy. The conflict over the scale of inter-territorial markets for products of import substitution industrialization and the means of lessening dependency on exports is underscored.

Thus, in virtually all their writings, African Socialist statesmen argue that only through African integration culminating in either African Common Market and/or African supranational political organisation can a real basis be laid for self-reliant industrialization and autonomy in foreign policy.[50]

The third major theme in the theory and practice of African Socialism is the problem of controller and class formation. The dual problem is informed by the populist content of the theory and of obtaining the enthusiastic co-operation' of the populace for sustained economic activities that will aid the accumulation of capital while promoting social equity and eliminating socio-economic inequalities as well as imbalances in the distribution of national income. Also, on the theoretical plane, African societies are dichotomised into antagonistic groups of 'haves' and 'have nots', the 'bourgeoisie' and the working class (or proletariat), the 'elites' and the 'masses'. These antitheses are brought out clearly in Nkrumah's writings. While he and most African socialist writers postulate that class formation in Africa was not only evident in the colonial political economy and the structure of the national liberation movements,[51] Western bourgeois critics deny the thesis and maintain that African societies have not transformed beyond the pre-capitalist stage to permit the emergence of classes with self-awareness and the accompanying political consciousness was manifest in their political behaviour; the same is true of the studies of labour unions, of which the theory of 'labour aristocracy'[53] is perhaps the most acknowledged evidence of the certainty and pervasiveness of "class problem" in African development process and the struggle to capture state power as vantage instrumentalities for resource and control distribution.

Rather than dismiss the theory and practice of African Socialism on the alleged ground that African Socialism itself lacks 'systematization', which is tantamount to saying that it is non-existent, it is more meaningful, at least from the standpoint of this literature review, to stress the differences between African Socialism as is normally understood in the Western world. Five distinguishing characteristics may be described.

Firstly, the view of human nature underlying African Socialism rejects the individualistic philosophy of the West.[54] The African Socialist holds a view of human nature which, he believes, rests on the fundamental characteristics of traditional society of transmutation as Western capitalist mode of production impinges on African political economies. Although the age of individualism was succeeded in the West by the Enlightenment and later by Industrialism,[55] in so far as African societies were concerned, the impacts were both traumatic and far-reaching. Dike's classic work[56] remains an enduring landmark interpretation and analysis of the interplay of forces in the transmutation process. Such perspicacious interpretations are rare; but the succeeding African historiography as reflected in the works of Ajayi,[57] Ki-Zerbo,[58] Ikime[59] and Afigbo[60] clearly transcend the somewhat discriptive and apocalyptic writings of twentieth century economic historians.[61]

Secondly, the African society takes on a collective animus of intentions, aspirations, and fears unlike Western society which basks in the glory of goal institutionalisation, which makes government intentions and political behaviour predictable. In Africa the failure of individuals to adhere to State stance in these areas gives to the State the right of compulsion to force the individuals to conform. This may be the source of 'authoritarian' and/or 'totalitarian' tendencies attributed to African States.[62] Thus, unlike the Western majoritarian conception of 'democracy', the African socialist States have been denounced, unfortunately without reasoned and empirical justification, for rejecting the "will of all" and for substituting it with Rousseau's "general will" and playing the role of Rousseau's "legislator".[63]

Thirdly, although in African perception the antonym "socialist" is frequently "capitalist", the African Socialist theoretician tends to define capitalism not so much as private ownership of the means of production and distribution as the kind of human and/or social relation that individual ownership and productive means tends to reproduce, fostser and sustain replete with all forms of inequities and class privileges.[64]

Fourthly, like many utopian socialists, African Socialists are fundamentally suspicious of modern large scale economic organizations; but unlike orthodox utopians, African Socialists tend to accommodate such organizations as long as they foster progress and stability and at the same time preserve the advantages of atomistic specialised groups.

Among the disadvantages of 'specialisation' as expressed in the capitalist classical theory of "comparative costs"[65] is that it tends satisfaction of his craft. Thus, private ownership results in "collective alienation",[66] as opposed to mere individual "alienation" postulated by bourgeois social science.[67] Although, according to the tenets of African Socialism, the exigencies of rapid economic development require the economies of scale of large organizations the resulting conflict between utopian aspirations and the most efficient use of scarce resources as dictated by the 'African situation' constitutes a critical dilemma for the socio-economic transformation of the continent and a break from neo-colonial bondage and hence the vicious circle of poverty.[68]

Fifthly, African Socialism performs objective functions for the African statesmen and political leaders.[69] For example, as they find themselves involved in the international system characterised by war, hegemonism, and interventionism,[70] the ideology of African Socialism provides them with an analytic map of international images and scenarios, enabling them to distinguish themselves from both the East and West. It accomplishes this by delineating their role in the international arena as 'non-aligned', independent actors,[71] although the degree of 'non-alignment' of individual countries reviews a matter of both context and aspirations.[72] Thus, African Socialism has come to be equated with "neutralism" or "non-alignment"[73] and other ideologies that reject political domination by either the East or the West.

GHANA: NKRUMAH'S'S SOCIALISM

In analysing the theory and practice of Nkrumah's Socialism, most writers have tended to examine its points of deviation from Socialism as conceived by Marx. Nkrumah himself seemed to have set the yardstick for, in his own writings, he has made it explicit that he leans more towards Marx's 'scientific' socialism than to other variants.

Nkrumah's Socialism in Theory

According to Marx,[74] the transition from capitalism to socialism could be achieved only through the conscious, aggressive efforts of the organized working class or the "proletariat", which had been brought into existence by the factory system. While agreeing with Marx's basic postulation, Nkrumah asserts that in practice the the transition can also be achieved by putting in place and utilising a set of techniques and institutions which foster rapid socio-economic transformation and economic independence in the face of colonial spoliation rather than the mode of operation characteristic of a workers' and peasants state.[75] The theory and practice of Nkrumah's socialism flows from this modification of Marx's model to fit the specific context of Ghana.[76] Thus, Nkrumah's conception of Socialism is broad: Socialism assumes the public ownership of the means of production, the land and its resources, and the use of those means and a single political party - the Convention People's Party (CPP) - in meeting the challenges of post-colonial Ghanaian economic development and social change.

Nkrumah's objectives were predicated on his analysis of the Ghanaian post-colonial situation, namely to abolish poverty, ignorance, illiteracy and improve health services; to achieve industrial development and economic independence; and strictly to follow the socialist path to progress. The socialist path to progress, according to Nkrumah, had as its goal; full employment, good housing and equal opportunity for education and cultural advancement for all the people up to the highest level possible.[77]

Nkrumah's Socialism in Practice

As has been pointed out above, practice flows from theory. The literature on Ghana validates this. Thus, whereas Marx had contended that the transition from capitalism to socialism could be achieved through the conscious and aggressive efforts of the organised working class or the "proletariat" politically aroused by the success and accompanying decadence of the capitalist system, Nkrumah's conception of the transition in Ghana was predicated upon four assumptions namely:

i) that state ownership of the means of production necessarily leads to socialism;

ii) that the state sector can overcome the private sector without engaging it in a cut-throat struggle;

iii) that foreign private capital will let itself be used to build socialism; and

iv) that the CPP has a catalytic role in the promotion process.[78]

As regards State ownership and Socialism, the main interventions in the private sector were paradoxically neither in manufacturing nor in agriculture nor even in mining, but in the spheres of trade and marketing - the distribution side. Although the Nkrumah government progressively expanded considerably the state-owned infrastructure, it was not the size of the state sector that determined whether Nkrumah's Ghana was capitalist or socialist, but the use to which the state sector was put. It was here that the roles both of the CPP and of Nkrumah himself have been given prominence by his critics and admirers.[79]

Both critics and admirers stress the peaceful co-existence between sectors. First, they noted the character of interventions in the trading sector. The main areas that have received in-depth analysis have been the regulation of import licences, the character of quantitative control over imports, and the State acquisition of AG Leventis and the floating of the Ghana National Trading Corporation (GNTC),[80] with as many as 43 branches. These agencies, it is argued, were needed as instrumentalities for redressing the adverse balance of payments situation and for addressing the problems of arbitrary pricing and inflation.

Second, both critics and admirers discuss the character of State intervention in the manufacturing sector. The Government became an active investor, with complete interests in about 32 state enterprises.

Although the Government seemed to lack both the financial base and the managerial skills needed to establish the hagemony of the State in this sector, intervention was considered imperative in order to steer the path of socialist industrialization. Bienen has characterized this chosen path as "structural transformation" in contrast to the "gradualist" approach of the neighbouring Ivory Coast.[81]

As regards the role of the Party, CPP, Nkrumah asserts that the objective of socialism cannot be achieved without decisive party leadership.[82] The Convention People's Party, he claims, is based on the support of the over-whelming majority of the people, is best able to carry through Ghana's economic plans and to build a socialist state. This, according to Nkrumah, is possible because of the CPP's organization structure, mass membership, and an African ideology of Socialism. It is not just the role of the party to steer the path of socio-economic transformation; it is also the controller of the administrative apparatus, the civil service. The civil service, in Nkrumah's view, must be adapted to the aims of the new socialist goals in a most pragmatic manner. This means that changes which are made today may themselves call for further change tomorrow. No condition is permanent; men, situations and events are perpetually undergoing one type of change or another.[83] Thus, according to Nkrumah, every avenue of <u>education</u> and <u>information</u> must be used to stir and nourish the "political consciousness" of the people and to keep them aware of the welfare objectives of the government's planning and development priorities.

But it is Nkrumah and the CPP leaders who do the planning and define the priorities. Socialism needs socialists to build it, argues Nkrumah. Accordingly, Nkrumah ensures that positive steps are taken to make the Party and the country produce men and women who can handle, foster, and sustain the socialist programme, as defined by Party leaders. The building of a socialist Ghana, according to Nkrumah, is the greatest mission of the CPP. It alone represents the most important pre-condition and instrumentality for laying the foundations for the political and economic unification of Africa.[84]

TANZANIA: THE SOCIALISM OF JULIUS NYERERE

Since the subject of this thesis is Tanzania's experience under Julius Nyerere, it is only natural that an overview of the most relevant literature and themes most preface our subsequent in-depth research and analysis. The key figure and the moving force in the Tanzanian experiment during the period 1963-1983 was, of course, Julius Nyerere.

A cardinal element in Nyerere's ideology of Socialism is his argument about the "brotherhood of man".[85] This is reflected in his approval and acceptance of non-racial co-operation as is demonstrated in the 1958 elections to the Legislative Council. It is also reflected in Nyerere's rebuff of bitter criticisms from his African members of the National Assembly in October 1961 over the question of the eligibility of non-Africans for Tanganyikan citizenship. This rests, as Nyerere himself has argued, on the fact that the duties and rights of citizenship of the country are to be based on loyalty to Tanganyika. In 1964, Nyerere applied the same argument when he announced that preference for Africans in the civil service would cease immediately and that skill and experience would determine qualifications for service, since the skin in which this skill is encased is completely irrelevant.[86] The fact that this policy helped to spark off army mutiny in 1964 was a reflection not just of Nyerere's desire to put his ideas into practice; it was as well a reflection of the extent that Nyerere staked the life of his government on his socialist principle of non-racialism.

Two other basic strands in Nyerere's socialist ideology concern his re-interpretations of socialism and democracy. These re-interpretations involved an endeavour to systematize an amorphous body of beliefs and values into a form with recognizable claims to African origins and appropriate to the solution of African problems. As Harvey Glickman puts it: "His task is to infuse dignity and worth

in the way Africans are and to demonstrate that what they are doing reflects what they are".[87]

Nyerere's Socialism in Theory

According to Nyerere, socialism, like democracy, is "an attitude of mind".[88] He traces its origin to traditional relations of African society, which, in his view, are communal and egalitarian. The structure of African society, he argues, is classless while its characteristic institution is the family with its extended relationships.

This, Nyerere's socialism in theory means "familyhood". The basic feature of familyhood is egalitarianism, which is expressed in a rejection of individual acquisitiveness and the desire for domination over other people. These traits, in Nyerere's views, are a direct product of the capitalist system. According to him, the man who uses wealth for the purpose of dominating any of his fellows is a capitalist. Acquisitiveness for the purpose of gaining power and prestige, he maintains, is unsocialist.[89] By focusing on these traits, observes Glickman, Nyerere is raising moral and psychological issues with normative implications rather than issues of objective structure and reality.[90]

Africa's traditional society, according to Nyerere, is socialist-oriented because it is concerned, among other things, with the problem not only of production but of distribution as well. Its maxim, "that those who sow reap a fair share of what they sow",[91] resembles the familiar Marxist slogan: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work". Nyerere even went so far as to suggest that the reason why there were no African millionaires at the time he wrote (1967) was that the social organization did not permit private accumulation. Social justice and equity are thus emphasized. Justice, according to Nyerere, implies equality; and equality means sharing in one another's concerns. This, in practice, implied that individuals did not have to hoard material wealth for themselves because African communal ethos secured everyone against the hazards of life. For, as an African maxim puts it: "We took care of the community and the community took care of us".

One of the fundamental tenets of Nyerere's socialist theory is that of "co-operatives". The economic organization which truly reflects traditional African principles, according to him, is the "co-operative".[92] Hence, Ujamaa also means "co-operation". Thus interpreted, "co-operatives" become an instrument of African Socialism just as commercial companies are the instruments of capitalism. Equality existed in the relative uniformity of labour and in a classless social structure. According to Nyerere, classes have arisen as a result of the intrusion of the capitalist mode of production in pre-colonial Africa. For aristocracy, he argues, is something foreign to Africa.[93]

Even in the state societies studies by Fortes and Evans-Prichard, neither in the Zulu kingdom nor among the Neur did aristocratic tendencies, as opposed to a system of statues and obligations, manifest themselves.[94] "Tribes without rulers", like the Ibo, the Tallensi, and the Tiv clearly manifest democratic and and egalitarian tendencies in their social structure as well as political culture and behaviour beyond degrees of sophistication that surprised colonialist social anthropologists and social scientists.[95] In his classic study of background to nationalism in Nigeria, Coleman[96] found among the Ibo intellectual and traditional elites powerful instruments of anti-colonial domination that tended to controvert the established order of freedom and equality.

The cornerstone of Nyerere's socialism is the extended family. This, according to him, is the "foundation and the objective of African socialism". Therefore, the true African Socialist regards all Africans, and, indeed, all men, as his brethren and as constituting members of his ever extended family. Ujamaa is, therefore, the indigenous concept that Nyerere has chosen and elaborated into a theory to fit the African conception of the good and just society.[97] Within the ambit of this theory, individual ownership of land is singled out as an institution for special condemnation.[98] The traditional African belief recognises communal ownership but permits individual or personal use. A member of society will be entitled to a piece of land on condition that he uses it, he argues, and the only way to guarantee this is to eliminate private propriety rights.

According to Nyerere, it was the foreigner who introduced a completely different concept, namely "the concept of land as a marketable commodity". However, Nyerere does not argue against individual sale of property, but the irrationality of variable market values which are reflected in rent and in fluctuating sale prices. The possibility that the British colonial administration might begin the transformation of customary tenure into freehold tenure in 1958 provided an occasion for Nyerere's extended introspection on the institution of property. It was wrong, he argued, to grant individual property right to land because it was a licence for people to charge rent and to capitalise on artificial values that were created by man-made shortages. The solution to the 'diseases' of freehold ownership, according to Nyerere, was to permit leasehold arrangements under specified conditions.[99] It is important to point out that this desire to abolish freehold ownership has been described by Glickman[100] as a specific example of a theory which led directly to policy consequences. For, in 1963, the Tanganyika government dissolved freehold titles and provided guidelines for converting to leasehold arrangements. In 1964, the Government confiscated 37 leasehold farms because, as Nyerere justified it, they did not conform with the requirements of land tenure.

Thus, Burke[101] is correct in asserting that Nyerere's Socialism may be viewed from several perspectives ranging from a mass ideology to a strand of African socialism to a programme of action, and to an *ex post facto* justification for Tanzania's unique post-colonial development strategy. Burke suggests that one of the reasons that led to the various interpretations of *Ujamaa* was the absence of a corps of leasers with a protracted period of nationalist agitation in Tanganyika, unlike the situation in Kenya, which has been both blessed and plagued by many competing leaders. In the circumstance, concludes Burke, the central role of Nyerere as the political theoretician and philosopher of Tanyanyika had been reinforced.

Practice: Ideology and Policies

Nyerere's theory of Socialism provides the practical guide to his sense of priorities. Tanzania's social, economic and political development under him bear the imprint of his philosophy. In practice, Nyerere's theory of *Ujamaa* in government programmes is most manifest in:

1. the development and utilisation of "co-operatives",
2. various self-help schemes and projects,
3. villagization and rural development, using the Tanzania African Union (TANU), the only political party, as an instrument of mobilization and national integration,
4. land policy and general socio-economic transformation, and
5. the ingenous linking of domestic capabilities and weaknesses in foreign policy.

The co-operative movement is perhaps the most practical demonstration of the linkage between theory and practice. By 1962, for instance, hundreds of co-operatives and unions had been established and had joined together to form the Co-operative Union of Tanganyika (CUT). A year later, in 1963, there were more than 800 societies with membership exceeding 300,000. These "co-operatives" were tied directly to the national capital through the Ministry of Co-operatives and Community Development and the Co-operative Union. Burke commends this strategy in his study of Tanzania's development process,[102] asserting that Ujamma assists in the construction of national unity through the development of new and nationally-oriented forms of community organization which reflect the diffuse rural pluralism of Tanganyika. Under British colonial domination, there were no co-operatives, but instead agricultural marketing organizations regarded as financial and economic institutions.[103] Nyerere's post-independence theory and policies witnessed the establishment and institutionalization of the co-operative movement, and its extension to nearly every important sector of the economy.

More importantly, as Cliffe and Saul have shown,[104] the co-operative movement has become a great social force in the modernization of Tanzania. With advice and technical assistance from Israel, the co-operatives moved into the wholesale, retail, and import business sub-sectors, with the Co-operative Supply Association of Tanganyika (COSATA) acting as a catalytic agent. In 1962 the Co-operative Bank of Tanganyika was established, followed in 1963 with the founding of the national insurance company.

Villagization, rural development and self-help formed the core tripod on which Tanzania's unique experiment under Nyerere rested. These programmes have been analysed by Cliffe, Saul, Coulson, Rweyemawi, and Ingle, to name a few.[105] According to this body of literature, there was no distinction between the political and the economic. Simultaneous changes in both spheres were undertaken. The entire administration was revamped, with TANU officials replacing expatriate administrators. Local government was reorganised along party lines and tightly controlled by the relevant Ministry and TANU-Government Area Commissioner. The most fundamental change of all occurred in the institution of Chieftaincy. This traditional vestige of feudal and colonial epochs was abolished almost overnight. Chiefs were replaced by divisional executive officers responsible to the single party Government administration.

Cliffe and Saul, in their two volume studies.[106] focused, among others, on self-help schemes. The schemes were launched by local party functionaries and government administrators in collaboration with community development officials. Village development committees were established throughout Tanzania; and a combination of traditional sanctions and TANU coercion was employed to ensure a high level of involvement and conformity to guidelines established in advance. Critics[107] admit that despite instances of poor planning and plan co-ordination, phenomena characteristic of most developing countries, the contribution of peasants was seen as extraordinary. Friedland and Rosberg[108] found that in Njombe District alone, for instance, 28 new roads of 572 miles were completed in 1962, as well as 8 dispensaries, 17 schools, 58 community centres, and 151 boreholes. Practically, everywhere in Tanganyika, thousands of men and women as well as children swing jembes (hoes) and carry rock and earth.

IV

CRITIQUE OF RESEARCH ON TANZANIA

There have been many studies of the interactions between government/parastatal bureaucracies and peasant villagers in Tanzania.[109] These studies have tended to concentrate on such factors as the anti-participatory tendencies of local level officials, the manipulation of co-operative institutions, as well as the alleged collaboration between government staff and "Kulaks".[110] Questions arising from conceptual frameworks other than participation vs. bureaucracy, and socialism vs. capitalism have received comparatively slight treatment.

One result of this dominant tendency, which has recently been noted,[111] is that we know relatively little about social relations and local politics <u>within</u> peasant villages. Another weak area is the process of group formation and interest articulation at national and local levels, which underpin the anti-agricultural biases in established institutions and policies.

To the extent that the major literature touches upon this issue, it tends to employ reductionist formulae which are questionable in empirical and theoretical groups, and beg some of the most important questions.[112] Most especially, these works provide a weak basis for predictions about the dynamics of social and political alliancaes in a context of policy changes which affect sectoral more than traditional Marxist class relationships.

The political science literature on Tanzania's national and local institutions is also large, and has been somewhat less absorbed in in the socialism/capitalism "problematic". However, the bulk of the work done relates to the early 1970's or before,[113] and much of it avodis addressing explicitly, the relationship between partterns of political institutionalisation and behaviour on the one hand, and development policy patterns on the other.

Changes of obvious relevances, such as the political eclipse of Tanzania's elite peasant farmers after independence, the subsequent demise of the co-operative movement, and the "decentralisation" of the mid - 1970's, have been adequately documented and discussed in their own terms, but the connections with other policy issues have not always been made.[114] In sum, the "politics of agriculture" in Tanzania still awaits the kind of exploration to which Bates has subjected the wider African experience.

Most of the research referred to in the preceding paragraphs was completed in the 1970's. Since the 1980's ideological disenchantment and the institutional consequences of chronic foreign exchange shortages have taken their toll on social science research in Tanzania, which have become less abundant, and more narrowly specialised.

Several observers have noted a growing tendency for the demands of technical rigour in economics to be interpreted in a way that excludes the kind of interdisciplinary co-operation that characterised the Tanzanian intellectual scene in the 1970's.[115] The wish in this thesis is to return to some extent, to the older research tradition.[116]

In Chapter three, we shall articulate the African viewpoint on socialism and how this has affected the socialist experiment in Tanzania.

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112. Issa Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania, (London: Heinemann, 1976), Michel Von Freyhold, "The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version", Review of African Political Economy (No. 8, January - April, 1977. Jannik Boesen, "Tanzania; from Ujamaa to Villagisation", (in Nwansasu and Pratt, 1979) Joel Samoff "Crises and Socialism in Tanzania", Journal of Modern African Studies, (Vol. 19, No. 2, 1981).

113. See for example the work of Tordoff, Bienen, Hopkins, Ingle, Cliffe, Saul, Samoff, Firucane and Pratt etc. (See Bibliography for these references).

114. Jeannette Haitmann, Development Policy - Making in Tanzania, 1962 - 1982 (University of Hill, University Press, 1983) Goram Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress; African Development Management in Perspective, (London: Heinemann, 1983).

115. Ibid.

116. See Part 1, Section 4 for some clarification on methodological issues.

CHAPTER III

SOCIALISM IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

SOCIALISM: THE AFRICAN VIEWPOINT

While the historic importance of the October 1917 revolution in Russia and the subsequent institutionalisation of socialism in that country are generally acknowledged, the origins of socialism as well as the meaning of the term itself are still subject to intense debate among scholars. Although it is not necessary for the purpose of this study to trace the genesis of socialism[1] (much has already been written in the field), it cannot be overemphasised that the theoretical content of socialism as an ideology or as a set of institutions and strutures cannot be divorced from the circumstances of its birth, as though it were a timely protest against inequality or injustice which accidentally took on flesh at one particular moment. In essence, therefore, socialism came into being as a result of dislocations following the modern bourgeois economic and political revolutions, partly to develop, and partly to oppose the forces unleashed in this period.[2] It is necessary to point out the importance of this historical development because it informs Nyerere's understanding of the development of modern socialism, and therefore it affects the institutionalisation of socialism in Tanzania. In a clear, if over-simplified statement on the development of modern socialism Nyerere writes:

> European Socialism was born of the Agarian Revolution and the Industrial Revolution which followed it. The former created the "Landed" and the landless in society the latter produced the modern capitalist and the Industrial proletariat.

> These two revolutions planted the seeds of conflict within society, and not only was European socialism born of that conflict, but its apostles sanctified the conflict itself into a philosophy. The European socialist cannot think of his Socialism without its father-capitalism![3]

The theoretical content of socialism cannot be divorced from the circumstances of its birth. Thus socialism or "African socialism", in its most popularised form, was born of the post-colonial cirsis of economic development and national identity.[4] In this sense, like the classical varieties of socialism, African socialism also underscores the primacy of the economic element in socialism. Thus, in their introduction to African Socialsm Friedland and Rosberg conclude: "One of the most significant features of African socialism is its identification with economic development".[5] In much the same vein, Mohan writes; "And when they talk of 'socialism', the African leaders mean economic development, many of them use 'development' and 'socialism' interchangeably. That there is a 'capitalist' as well as 'socialist' way of development receives but little recognition in their rhetoric; most African leaders appear to acknowledge only the 'socialist' way.[6] More concretely, Nkrumah, for example, argued that the presuppositions of capitalism were contrary to those of the African society, and that 'with little or no investment capital of our own, with a very small core of technical men, we have to point out to our people that the fastest rate of development accompanied with a humane distribution of the largesse of progress could be achieved only by following the socialist path of development'.[7] A President of the Central African capitalism Republic, the same sentiments when he commented: "There is no African capitalism . . .

Thus, by the very force of things, we are proceeding towards a socialist economy, with the state more and more forced to intervene".[8]

But behind the facade of consensus in the economic primacy of African socialism lies a seemingly gaping divide in the interpretationsor or renderings of the term itself.

In their various formulations the adherents of African socialism stress the existence in African societies of an organic relationship between the individual and community.
Thus, an organic relationship, interalia, is then acclaimed as the traditional foundation of African socialism.
Nyerere asserts:

> In primitive African society, this question of the limits of responsibility as between the individual and society in which he lives was not very clearly defined. The traditional African community was a small one, and the African could not think of himself apart from that community in which he lived. He was an individual; he had his wife - or wives - and children so he belonged to a family. But the family merged into a clan or tribe. Thus, he saw himself all the time as a member of a community, but he saw no struggle between his own interests and those of his community, for his community to him was an extension of his family. He might have seen a conflict between himself and another individual member of the same community, but with the community itself, he saw no struggle... He is not a member of a "commune", some artificial unit of human beings, he is a member of a genuine community or a brotherhood.[9]

In our traditional African society we were individuals within the community. We took care of the community, and the community took care us. We neither needed, nor wished to exploit fellow men.[10]

But while these leaders see virtue in a fuzzy definition of the limits of responsibility between the individual and society, as being conducive to the establishment of socialism and therefore "rapid economic development", on the contrary the lack of "structural differentiation" has been pointed out by the proponents of structural - functionalism, as being one of the prime indicators of "under-development". What seems clear, however, is that the attempt to differentiate African socialism from its more general variety has to be seen as another indicator of the search for original concepts and the general distrust towards theories which do not take into account the different socio-economic conditions in Africa. Foreign solutions cannot be adopted and imposed over African reality.[11]

More fundamentally however, by attempting to paint an idyllic traditional African society to the extent that it meant common ownership of the means of production (that is land)[12] and the existence of an organic relationship between the individual community, the advocates of African socialism were implying a classless society. In fact, it was a justificatory theory for the uniqueness of African socialism that centres around the recognition of classes in a socialist society rooted in the relations of production. Little wonder then that the search for African socialism has meant the rejection by most of its advocates of classical Marxism.

If we consider the fact that the nineteenth century pioneers of socialism were labelled Utopian by Marx and Engels, primarily as a result of their failure to appreciate the fact that human social development proceeded through certain stages, and because their model socialist societies did not take cognisance of the reality of class struggles,[13] African socialism too is Utopian in "its refusal to come to grips with the class relations in which Africans are enmashed, and in its romanticised ignorance of the stages of African historical development".[14]

To be sure, to identify areas of consensus in the conceptualisation of African socialism (for example, on class and the common ownership of land) by its proponents, is not to deny the existence of a plurality in the meaning of the term itself. Quite the contrary: we also find considerable degree of ambiguity in the meaning of the term "socialism", not unlike that which exists among both the adherents and opponents of the classical varieties of socialism. Let us look at a few representative examples of the definition of "socialism" in Africa:

> We stand for a middle course (between communism and capitalism), for a democratic socialism, which goes so far as to integrate spiritual values, a socialism which ties in with the old ethical current of the French socialists.[15]
>
> When I talk of African socialism, I refer to those proved codes of conduct in the African societies which have, over the ages, conferred dignity on our people, and afforded them security regardless of their station in life. I refer to universal charity which characterised our societies, and I refer to the African's thought processes and cosmological ideas which regard man, not as a social means, but as an end and entity in the society.[16] And finally,

"Ujamaa" then, or "familyhood" describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalsm, which seeks to build a happpy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man.[17]

What clearly emerges from our discussion is the palpable fact that "African socialism", in contrast to most other movements of socialism, has not been the product of a single thinker. The history of socialist thought is marked by fairly clear relationships between individual thinkers and the idealogical movements to which they gave birth. African socialism differs in that no single leader has been distinctively and uniquely associated with the idealogy. Rather, the ideology of African socialism has been the product of diverse leaders operating within a variety of exigencies in their own countries, which helps partly to acocunt for the lack of development of a unified theory.[18]

Let us take a closer look at what has been referred to as the absence of congruence between officially proclaimed ideology and actual practice.

There is a considerably body of evidence (especially in the growing literature on the political economy of contemporary Africa) that most of the economies in Africa are neo-colonial in character and dependencies of international capitalism.[19]

One of the characteristic manifestations of under-development, writes Clive Thomas, is the present nature of the structural dependence of the small under-developed economies on international capitalism.[20] He defined structural dependence as the extent to which the economic structure of these economies depends on foreign trade, payments, capital, technology and decision making to generate domestic economic processes.[21] In this thesis there is no intention to deviate from this definition. Although we will not explore in detail the economic aspects of dependence and underdevelopment what interests us is the fact that most of the "self-styled" socialist States of Africa have economic structures no different from those which have cearly opted for a non-socialist economic system; this in spite of the loud criticism levied against the material and moral excesses of capitalsm which depend upon the "exploitation of man by man". Indeed, capitalist forms of production and organisation have grown in scope and significance within thses countries partly, of course, in response to the growth of international capitalism. Commenting on this existential duality, Jitendra Mohan writes: "... the actual economic and social polities followed by many African 'socialist' leaders differ but slightly from the policies followed by those who do not feel themselves in need of the socialist label.[22] Thus the Kenyan government white paper on African socialism and its application to planning states in no unclear terms that, '...unlike many countries that have eliminated many successful economic machanics on narrow ideological grounds, Kenya is free to pick and choose those methods that have been proven in practice and are adaptable to Kenya conditions regardless of the ideologies that others may attach to it'.[23]

But beneath the seemingly conflicting dichotomy between theory and practice lurks a basic congruence.[24] It is the existence of the socialist leaders (who in practice are non-socialist) and their political economies (again non-socialist in practice) authenticated by stamp of colonialism and patented by neo-colonialism. The emergence of such a situation was not unexpected, given the uncritical decision of these post-independence 'socialist' leaders to maintain exploitative relations and a stratification system that they inherited. Equally significant is the fact that they are unable or rather, unwilling to 'change existing relations of production and to redistribute available resources in a radically egalitarian direction'.[25]

In short, they have maintained an essentially non-socialist socio-economic systems reminiscent of the pre-independence era.

But our agreement with Ake stops here. For to go on form here as Ake has done, to argue that the differences that do exist between 'progressive' socialist leaders such as Julius Nyerere and Sekou Toure, and 'conservative' non-socialist leaders such as Senghor, Mobutu, Houghuet-Boigny and, Kenyatta, are not real then we can safely conclude that there are no 'progressive' leaders or countries in the world. Ake states that;

> Because in all African countries, the leaders have held tenaciously to power, change of government is brought about only by force... the political systems of Africa have become uniformly monolithic ... power has become centralised, and opposition to those in power is illegitimate... All African countries are now de facto one party systems in which the masses have been effectively depoliticised in the sense that their political participation has been reduced to choices which are totally inconsequential.[26]

Yet leaders such as Mao-Tse-Tung and Fidel Castro, (widely acclaimed as progressive and socialist in commitment, in the sense that they have conciously struggled to end the exploitation of man by man) have ruled countries which fit his description almost perfectly. As a further proof, Ake continued his indictment of these two camps by saying that the States they rule are all undemocratic because:

> Top party positions are not effectively elective, they are rather 'effectively co-optive' and only 'formally effective'; ... party elections are not free in the sense that not any party member cannot offer himself as a candidate for office and in the sense that members of the party are not free to choose between the candidates who offer themselves for elective office.[27]

Again we may ask whether this is not largely true of China or Cuba or for that matter any other socialist country? But in anticipation of possible critisms of his position, since he had earlier maintained that the objective forces in Africa are essentially identical and hence it will be difficult to'explain why some countries will prefer the appearance of a particular ideological complexion, while others prefer another... (Ake argues that) if the thoughts we have and the images we seek to project are merely epi-phenomenal, African leaders should seek to project the same image?[28] The answer to this paradox, he continues, is that far from contracdicting the thesis (on congruecy) the difference in question corroborates it.

It corroborates it in the sense that the difference is not due to caprice or choice; it is determined by objective conditions. The difference reflects social forces that are for the moment more potent in the African countries that we call 'progressive'. Every prognostication indicates that these social forces are likely to become stronger in the 'reactionary' countries so that the difference in ideological posture will be obliterated.[29]

Now, if these social forces are correctly identified as (i) desperate poverty and (ii) the consciousness of the burden of poverty and the injustice of economic inequality of the masses more in Tanzania than in these countries or even in Nigeria? The answer, of course, is 'no'. For one thing, the UN study lists Tanzania and these countries as the 25 poorest countries in the world.

THE SOCAILIST EXPERIENCE IN TANZANIA AS A VARIETY OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM

It is pertinent to ask at this stage whether Tanzania is different from other African countries. The position in this thesis is that Nyerere, and therefore Tanzania,[30] has evolved a clearer conceptualisation of socialism than any other African leader during the period under study. He has demonstrated a conscious determination and commitment to transform Tanzania on the basis of his formulations of socialism. Thus the crucial theroretical differences lie in the fact that whereas Julius Nyerere's erstwhile 'socialist' counterparts (for example Senghor, Kenyatta and late Tom Mboya), have been merely satisfied with the 'banal' and 'idyllic' cnceptualisation of African socialism, even in the face of glaring internal contradictions, Nyerere has actually 'advanced from the ideal to the real[31] and in his conceptualisation of Ujamaa, moved to a more rigorous theoretical understanding of socialism.[32] From 'socialism being first an 'attitude of mind',[33] partly reflecting his growing convictions and partly as a response to national, to African and international developments.

To be sure, the differences are evident not only in the theoretical formulations, but also in the actual development strategy. Thus on the economic front, while Nyerere's other erstwhile counterparts of African socialism see a permanent coexistence between the private capitalist sector and a fledging 'public' sector - euphemistically dubbed the 'mixed economy' - Nyerere sees it as a temporary stage to be phased out in the future. Hence the conscious deemphasis on both private or foreign capital in post - Arusha Tanzania consistent with the spirit of Arusha as self reliance. For it was clearly understood that the continued reliance on private capital meant the perpetuation of foreign control of the economy, since there was hardly any indigenous capital to speak of. Hence the key notion of self-reliance.[35]

One of the key policy statements of the Arusha Declaration was the theme of self-reliance. The documents' emphasise on self-relaince and the insufficiency and shortcomings of extenal'aid' was partly a constructive response to the unreliability of external sources of aid, as vividly demonstrated by the unexpected withdrawal of aid by both British and West Germany in the mid-1960s. These two incidents perhaps more than anything else, exposed the vulnerability of a policy that indiscriminately encouraged the continued reliance on external aid for economic development. The emphatic orientation toward self-reliance in the Declaration was therefore a negation of the pervasive belief that aid was essential to development. Self-reliance had to be seen and appreciated as a crucial adjunct to the process of building a socialist society in Tanzania within the context of the Arusha Declaration. It meant that since Tanzanian society was too poor to provide the government with the much needed capital base, the people of Tanzania had to be self-reliant in their struggle against the unholy trinity - poverty, ignorance and disease. Rather than rely on money as the indicator of advancement, the Declaration argued that Tanzanians needed to reorient themselves to depend on the resources already in their command. Land and labour, not money, were Tanzanian's assets, these were bound to be the cornerstone upon which the country's socialist development would be based.[36] In short, the call, if it meant anything at all, was aimed at the mobilisation of the people's forces for carrying out the much needed social transformations, as well as the increases in production, vital for a socialist reconstruction.[37]

Although self-reliance implies the ability to improvise out of one's own resources, it remains essentially a collective concept. Therefore, the application of self-reliance to a lower level - that of the family or the individual - must be viewed as counter-

productive, although in practice it is possible that it may still occur.[38] The dangers in individualising self-reliance are fairly obvious, for very often the failure to 'respond with programmes of social justice in capitalist countries, for example, has been attributed to, or cited as evidence for a traditional and enduring commitment on the part of its citizenry to individual self-reliance or 'rugged individualism'.[39]

Inspite of the differences between Nyerere and his erstwhile counterparts, the inadequacies of his 'theory' of socialism are recognised in this thesis. We shall not strain ourselves in the manner of Walter Rodney to prove the identity of Ujamaa ('African socialism') as scientific socialism.[40]

The next section introduces us to the country, Tanzania through her colonial history and political economy.

III

TANZANIA: BRIEF COLONIAL HISTORY

The area now known as Tanzania was claimed by agents of the Imperial German Government in the 1880s and the territory officially became known as German East Africa in 1890. German rule introduced to the area rail roads, tarred roads, a white settler community and heavy-handedness of German officials also resulted in a series of resistance movements to colonial rule. This resistance culminated in the Maji Maji war of 1905, in which a of indigenous peoples -- some formely hostile to one another -- in the south-eastern portion of the territory banded together and attempted to drive out German officials and settlers. The Germans reacted by systematically destroying villages and fields in areas. The revolt was finally put down at an estimated cost of 120,000 African lives.[41]

McViewPlusII 2.0 printout of image : femi1, printed at 27/2/91 12:46 pm.
Output size 100%; Effective resolution : 100 dpi.

For user : scanning. On printer : LaserWriter II NTX.

POLITICAL MAP OF TANZANIA



World War I brought an end to German colonial rule. The exhausted population accepted the less active (perhaps less skilled and restrained) British adminisration (without major incident). Thus began the era of British rule.

Students of colonialism and anti-colonial nationalism have argued that the institutions of colonialiam planted the seed of their own destruction. They contend that colonial adminisrators created an unstable paradox. For example, it imported modern educational systems, and nationalised the bureaucratic systems of their territories, introduced taxes, exported cash crops, and introduced a cash economy. At the same time, the expatriate administrators ruled indirectly through traditional institutions, while upholding racial and social discrimination, unfulfilled hopes, mass frustration and anger.

Though, every summary of human affairs and events risks gross over-simplification, the major factors leading to Tangayikan independence were as follows: From 1954 to 1958, the Tangayikan liberation struggle wasa fought on four main fronts. The first and most important was the Tangayikan countryside itself. The political party's (then TANU) organisers travelled, setting up branches in almost every village, exhorting the people that change was conceivable and possible, asking them to join the movement. A second front was the colonial legislative council and the administra tive offices in the territorial capital, Dar es Salaam. Here, Nyerere and other party leaders, worked to overcome the administrative barriers against the nationalist movements set up by the British.

TANU's third front was diplomatic. Specifically, Nyerere appealed before the committee on colonialism of the United Nations in New York. Nyerere appeared before this body in 1955 and again in 1956 and 1957. On the first two occasions, Nyerere's statements were rather moderate in tone and content. However, by 1957, the tone of argument had changed, and on the htird appearance before the UN, Nyerere stated that he regarded TANU's policies and time table for independence as gradualist, since, he said, he could have demanded indepence at once. The fourth nationalist front was before the British cabinet in London and in constitutional conferences with colonial policy makers and administrators.

This brief sketch of the road to independence in Tanzania shows that apart from the "Maji Maji" resistance to the Germans, resistance against the British colonisers was NOT carried out through armed struggle. Independence from the British was attained through negotiations at "round table conferences".

The next section is a conceptualisation of the political economy of the colonial period in Tanzania and how the legacy of a dependent economy, (facilitated by colonial institutional structures), has persisted till today.

CLASS FORMATIONS DURING THE COLONIAL ERA

By the time of independence, Dar es Salaam was a "sub-satellite", Nairobi being the submetropolis for the whole of the East African region.[43] The implication of this was that when Tanzania became independent, it had considerable potential for further integration as an entity in the world capitalist system. See figure 1 below.

Fig. 1

```
                  /\
                 /  \
        Imports /    \ Metropolis
               /      \
              /        \
             /__________\
              ///     \\\
             ///       \\\
            ///Commer-  \\\
Exports    ///cial Sector\\\  Satellite
          ///____________\\\
         /     SUBSISTENCE   \
        /____________________\
```

Fig. 1: The Colonial Economic Structures

Source: Class Struggles In Tanzania, (by ISSA G. Shivji, p. 35).

There was, at independence, a predominantly export-oriented primary sector which had a monocultural base, an extremely weak and lopsided secondary sector, which was geared mainly to the production of luxury consumer goods for import-substitution and a disproportionate tertiary sector.

In the literature, these are the characteristics of under-developed economies. The basic relationship between these sectors continue well after independence. One can conclude the obvious. That before independence, Tanzania's economy was non-socialist.

An analysis of class formation in Tanzania faces the same problems as regards the theory of class that emerges whenever we use class analysis in third world situations. Frantz Fanon was aware of this when he began to analyse the situation in Algeria, and sensibly entered a caveat with respect to orthodox categories. "Marxist analysis", he wrote, "should be slightly stretched every time we have to deal with the colonial problem".[44] Fanon was making the first statement of what he has since become the "school" of non-Marxism. But neo-Marxiam is not, however, a settled doctrine, but simply a way of orthodox analysis that finds it necessary to depart from the categories of orthodox Marxism.

The fact that so many treatments of third world situations share this need is a reflection of the fact that orthodox class categories and class analysis are ill-equipped to describe the realities of the un-developed, or peripherally developed situation. This is particularly true for most African countries, where at independence, the degree of dependency made necessary the use of curiously adapted categories. The absence of a national bourgeoisie of a ruling class within these countries meant that power ceded to the heterogeneous nationalist parties, the leadership of which was drawn from the intelligentsia, e.g. teachers, lawyers, doctors and civil servants. Amilcar Cabral's assertion that it was thus to the petty-bourgeoisie that political power was ceded at independence[45] has become one of the milestones of African class analysis. But problems clearly exist in the categorisation of the personnel involved as petty-bourgeois. The issue of defining the ruling calss proper, given the dependence of the economic formations, the term "metropolitan bourgeoisie" has been used as the one claimed to be most expressive of this situation.

The utility of this term lies in the fact that it enables an investigation the relationship between the indigenous ruling stratum and the otherwise nebulous outside influences to take place, in an attempt to specify the precise character of the indigenous ruling group.

But no attempt has been made to delineate the characteristics of the metropolitan bourgeoisie itself. Indeed, it is such an imprecise term that one must be forgiven for suspecting that no such delineation is, in fact, possible. The absence of a numerically large proletariat, and migrant workers in urban centres gives rise to its own problems. Cabral's term of "declasse" for the latter group[46] produced, as Worseley noted, by "urbanisation without industrialisation"[47] is certainly preferrable to Fannon's rather confusing use of the category: lumpen - proletariat. While descriptively apt, Fanon's term is less than precise analytically. The final problem relates to the peasantry that makes up the mass of the active economic population in African countries. In a situation where various levels of capitalisation of agriculture co-exist with continuing forms of petty production, there are real barriers to precise class analysis.

It is clearly beyond the scope of this research to attempt to find a final solution to these problems. The issue of definition has been raised only to demonstrate that the difficulties attendant in describing class formation in Tanzania are not peculiar to that country, and that some of the problems related to precise definition reside inthe nature of the terms themselves. In addition, difficulties are engendered by the very complexity of the situation.

In the process of demonstrating the effects on indigenous class formation of capitalist penetration, two features of Tanzanian development have recieved special attention. They are the emergence of a "Kulak" class in the rural areas, and the creation of a bureaucratic elite/ ruliung class in charge of the state mechinery.

The appearance of a "Kulak" class is held to have been the result the increasimg differentiation of the peasantry. A "class" of better-endowed peasants, it is argued, has emerged. They have been able to gain superior benefits from the introduction of cash crop production. H.V.E.Thodan Van Velzan distinguishes two main groups in rural areas, "the wealthy farmers who own most of the land, and the poor peasants".[48] The former he labels "Kulaks".

> By "Kulaks", I simply mean the "better-off", whose position in rural areas has become controversial since Tanzania committed itself to socialism, as "better-off" is a relative concept, it has to be operationally defined anew for every rural community. Arbitrarily, I choose to call the "wealthy" 20 per cent of the population of Kulak.[49]

Van Valzon argues that these "Kulaks" are participants in the political structures, together with the "penetrators", the name he gives to the bureaucratic elite group. The wealthy peasants and penetrators form a coalition to further their own interests against the mass of the peasantry. In an analysis of what he terms official functions, a term that denotes government or party functions, he provides evidence to show that the Kulaks have a near monopoly. Thus, he depicts the rural situation as one of domination by two elite groups, where the peasantry plays the role of the "suffering third".[50]

This correlation between wealthy peasants and a Kulak calss is a leitmotif that underlies other treatments of the penetration of capitalism into the rural areas of Tanzania. R.L. Raikes has used the term: "Kulak Ujamaa", which denotes the way in which "far signted rich farmers can turn Ujamaa to their own advantage".

Groups of wealthy farmers have formed "Ujamaa villages" which are closer in nature to joint-stock companies, such villages have been used to get hold of land previously used for other poeple or purposes.[51]

Shivji,[52] in his extensive treatment of class formation in Tanzania, also argues that the introduction of cash crop agriculture has resulted in a differentiation within the peasantry, and the emergence of a kulak class of "richer peasants". He follows Van Valzen in stating that: "in practice therefore, the kulaks protect their interests by fraternising with the bureaucracy and controlling the local level organisation".[53]

John Saul, in his discussion of rural class formation, also uses the term "kulak" in a similar sense to refer to the wealthier peasants engaged in capitalist farming, although, his mention of the employment of labour introduces the crucial criterion.[54] The existence of a richer stratum of peasants, with a closer linkage with the bureaucracy than the relatively disadvantaged poor peasants, is not denied. Ample evidence has been collected to support such characterisations.[55]

But what is being described is an increasing differentiation of the peasantry in terms of income attendant on the "capitalisation of agriculture".

In this context, the use of the term was with reference to a specific group within the already clearly differentiated peasantry of Tsarist Rusisa, in size of holdings, and income but, if we insist on a precise use of terms, then it is confusing and misleading to use the term "kulak" with its precise implication of a set of labour relationships.[56] To do so is to suggest that class formation in rural Tanzania had advanced much faster than is, in fact, the case. If the capitalisation of agriculture continues, or indeed accelerates, as would appear to be likely, then the emergence of widespread wage labour relationships in the rural areas is to be expected, with a consequent differentiation of the peasantry that would make more sense of the term "kulak".[57]

In efforts to develop a morphology of the Tanzanian class struggle, a great deal of attention has been focused on the ruling stratum of Tanzanian society, that is, the party officials and bureaucrats who control the apparatuses of state and party. The occupants of these official positions are clearly privileged, in a relative sense within Tanzania. It is a privilege that is conferred by their monopoly of state power and official positions, and is manifest in their access to, and consumption of much higher levels of luxury goods and services.[58] Thus, that a relatively privileged stratum, centred on the bureaucracy, exists, is not in question. What is a moot point is the extent to which they can be characterised as a ruling class. It is to be noted that all the attempts to develop a class analysis of this bureaucratic stratum accept that the true ruling class remains the metropolitan bourgeoisie, who, it is argued, continue to exert their control through the imperial nexus.

This is accepted even by Shivji who also claims, somewhat incongruously in the circomstances, that the bureaucrats have themselves assumed the character of an indigenous ruling class.[59] In the next section, we shall analyse the post-colonial,situation, specifically the post-Ujamaa class formations in Tanzania. The aim is to demonstrate that the classes formed during the colonial era inform further development along class lines. The existence of these colonially-derived classes has affected policy issues viz; rural development and parastatals.

POST COLONIAL "MODIFICATIONS" OF CLASS STRUCTURE

The problems of defining the precise character of the ruling stratum post-colonial society are not peculiar to Tanzania. It is a common African experience to have the "petty-bourgeoisie", as defined by Cabral, inherit political power at independence. The The question then emerges as to what extent they have achieved substantial existence a capitalist in the post-colonial period. Are they a national bourgeoisie, or have they basically a comprador character? To what extent are they capable of independent economic and social initiatives, and thus perhaps capable of performing to some extent as a ruling class in their own right? While such questions are always problematic, they are made much easier in a case such as that of Kenya, which has pursued a relatively uncomplicated path of capitalist development, and has been happy to serve as a rational centre for capitalist penetration. Here, we can readily identify an African capitalist class, although questions still arise as to their autonomy Colin Leys has used the term "Auxilliary Bourgeoisie" to describe them.[60] Compared to the Tanzanian case, however, the situation is relatively simple.

Given that Tanzania is part of the system of peripheral capitalism, it is faced with the problems of class formation. How then are we to characterise the dominant class/stratum, the "petty-bourgeoisie" who enjoy a position of dominance by virtue of their control over the state and party apparatuses? Early approaches were content to label them as a "staff elite" or as a "new class" of state managers.[61] The interpretations are important here. On the one hand, there is Issa Shivji's attempt to advance a ruling class thesis,[62] on the other is the attempt, notably by Micheal Von Freyhold,[63] and John Paul[64] to describe the class defined as Nizer's (for Africanizers) while Saul's analysis can be commended for its acceptance of contradictions and divergent tendencies in the ruling class. Shivji and Von Freyhold, however, are both open to criticism. While they adopt very different approaches, both theories are essentially reductionist, and give simplistic accounts of class and politics in Tanzania.

(i) THE RULING CLASS THESIS:

Issa Shivji in his Class Struggle In Tanzania, advances the thesis that the ruling group in Tanzania have in fact established themselves in a class in their own right. At the same time, he argues that the true ruling class is the metropolitan bourgeoisie, and there is a consistent emphasis on Tanzania as a dependent social formation.[65]

However, he is also desirous of arguing for the autonomous status of the ruling class in Tanzania itself, which he called the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie". To do this, he uses a variant of the post-colonial state theory, and, in so doing, deserts class analysis for elite theory.

A key role is played in Shivji's analysis by the idea of the "overdeveloped" post-colonial state. This idea was developed by Hamza Alavi in his article on the post-colonial state in Pakistan and Bangladesh.[66] Alavi also argued that, due to the balance of forces between the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous and the landed classes, the post-colonial state has to assume a mediatory role, thereby acquiring an important degree of relative autonomy. Shivji adopts this key notion of the relative autonomy of the post-colonial state, but as distinct from Alavi's account, he relates it to the over-developed nature of the state rather than to the state's mediatory role in class relations. By detatching the post-colonial state from the balance of class forces, Shivji is able to confer upon it a crucial degree of autonomy that gives the state itself an active role in the process of class formation. Shivji argues that, for the petty bourgeoisie in Tanzania, it is control of the political state that is crucial in their transformation into a bourgeoisie proper. Using their control of the state, they are able to create a property base for themselves by nationalising property, and with this property base they can be said to be an established class. The benefits they, the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" receive from this "ownership" flow from the position of the members of this class in relation to the distribution of benefits, privileges, prestige and so on. Clearly, the parameters for the definition of class have been moved from a direct relationship with the means of production, to an indirect relationship, mediated by access to political power and the distribution process. In short, there is a great deal in common between Shivji's ideas and those of Djilas, since they both have a common tendency towards elite theory.[67]

Apart from these specific shortcomings there is a general point that is important for our current discussion. Tanzania, in the grip of the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie", is held to present an unusual, but undifferentiated model of peripheral capitalism, in other words, the Arusha Declaration, Ujamaa villagisation, nationalism and so on, and other seemingly progressive aspects of the Tanzanian experience are held to be simply the particular ways in which the bureaucratic bourgeoisie have established themselves in power and maintained their dominance over classes. Shivji's treatment of the leadership code is a perfect illustration of this. Rather than seeing in the introduction of the code any anomaly or contradiction, Shivji argues that it was contrary to the interest of the class as a whole, for individual members to aggrandise themselves.

(ii) THE NIGER THESIS

The term "Niger" (for Africanizer) is simply a convenient way of labelling those members of the party and the bureacracy who have risen to power and prestige in Tanzania. It is a convenient way of avoiding the problems of defining the ruling group, while, at the same time, distinguishing them from the workers and peasants. It is also a term that enjoys a certain vogue among Tanzanians themselves. Certainly, it is a less than precise term, and Von Freyhold has attempted to remedy this by using it within the framework suggested by Samoff's distinction between a ruling class and a governing class.[68] The advances the proposition that while the metropolitan bourgeoisie have always been the ruling class, the governing class is made up of the Nizers who have taken control of the state and its apparatuses in the post-colonial period. As in Shivji's analysis, Tanzania is again portrayed as a model of undifferentiated peripheral capitalism, which necessitates a rationalisation of the various seemingly progressive policies.

They exist, it is asserted, simply because they are the mechanisms by which the governing class has extended its control over the country in general, and over rival classes in particular. There is some similarity to Shivji's explanation in the latter assertion. Thus, what appears as socialist initiatives, are only the particular ways in which the bureaucratic governing class consolidate their position.

> Seen over a longer period, the socialism of the Nizers was in practice a set of strategies which expanded their power vis-a-vis the submerged class... and put them in a position that made them a viable partner to the metropolitan bourgeoisie.[69]

The problem with both these approaches is that by starting with the premise that Tanzania is, and always has been, a capitalist state, they are forced to explain away apparently inconsistent behaviour by the petty - bourgeoisie in control of the state, by rather tortuous means.

An evaluation of the available evidence strongly suggests that influence of capitalist penetration is leading to an increasing differentiation of the peasantry and to an aggradisement of power and privilege by an indigenous ruling stratum. It must be noted, however, that the level of privilege is not as high as that enjoyed by the ruling stratum in other African countries. Many contraditions remain in Tanzania. They can be taken as expressing contradictions within th ruling section of the society as John Saul suggests.

It is true that the Tanzanian petty bourgeoisie has not behaved quite as they should from the point of view of Marxist theory, but to argue that they are really working for the metropolitan ruling class or themselves all the time is surely simply not just to miss the point, but to pervert. It is preferable to start from the assumption that Tanzania is different from other examples of capitalist development on the African continent, than to start from the dubious assumption that she is really the same and then to explain away anomalies and contradictions by an appeal to a complicated chain of logic, if that is not too flattering a term. If we accept the different terms.

If we accept that there are progressive elements in the petty-bourgeoisie that formed the political leadership in Tanzania in the post-independence period, then we are accepting only what Amilcar Cabral suggested with reference to Guinea Bissau.[70] He held that after seizing power, the petty-bourgeoisie would be faced with a choice as a class by dedicating themselves to socialist revolution. While the latter course of action seems unlikely, and was held to be so by Cabral, nevertheless, the characterisation adequately expressed the contradictions and struggle that can exist within the petty-bougeoisie itself.[71] On this account, Tanzania presents us with a country where progressive factions of the petty-bourgeoisie have initiated policies and created institutions with a genuine radical content. The fact that the dominant fractions of the class have, in pursuit of their alliance with international capital, been able to use many of these institutions, to further their control of the country and to infiltrate capitalist practices, does not remove the contradictions they represent. There are easier ways of embarking on a path of capitalist development than the Arusha Declaration.

The situation in Tanzania continues to reflect these contradictions. While the country increasingly imports both capitalist and non-capitalist practices, it still preserves features that are usual in a peripheral capitalist country. The difficulties in analysis are located precisely here. It is because there is an attempt to liquidate these contradictions and use Tanzania as an example of simply another model of capitalist penetration and imperialistic control that problems, inconsistencies and inadequacies arise. The task is surely not to try to affix a label on Tanzania, nor liquidate contradictions in some over-arching explanatory theory, but to continue identifying the parameters and indices of change and to accept the contradictions. The question of identifying the ruling class, or governing class is not then such a problem because it is no longer a priority. Inevitably, the power of international capital is increasingly important within the Tanzanian economy, and its influence is exercised through the ruling group within the country, those who control the party and state apparatus. But the focus must be on the historical process and not on the abstraction from it of a concrete model that does less than justice to the complexities of social reality. The acceptance of contradictions in the Tanzanian situation is the acceptance of the transitional character of the present society.

In this chapter, we have tried to show that the economic set up in present-day Tanzania is related to the class structures. The latter have their roots in the colonial period, and the capitalist penetration of the country has led to the dependent nature of the economy.

The nature of this "peripheralisation" of the Tanzanian economy due to dependence has affected the implementation of policy issues affecting the rural areas and parastatals as stated in the CCM guidelines. We shall show the relationship between dependence and implementation of policy issues in chapters IV an V, when we discuss rural development and policies related to parastatals.

The next chapter is a critique of the CCM guidelines. The nature of the relationship, between the state and the party is critical to this type of critique. The analysis is of the Party-State relationship here informs what we perceive as the shortcomings in the implementation of the CCM guidelines as regards the rural areas and socialist industrialisation.

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10. Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 166.
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19. In consonance with Colin Leys' views I have no need in this thesis to depart from the definition of neo-colonialism offered by Kwame Nkrumah which essentially is: the survival of the colonial system in spite of the formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries which became victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military and technical means. Cited in Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism (London: Heineman, 1975), p. 26.

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23. Replic of Kenya, African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya, 1965, p. 8. Indeed, Colin Leys' searching inquiry into the economic structure of post-independence Kenya confirms this progmatic approach to economic development and reveals more than ever before the increasing dependence of its economy on international capitalism and hence the "development of underdevelopment".

24. We have benefitted greatly from AKe's article on the "Congruence of Political Economies and Ideologies in Africa" in The Potical Economy of Contemporary Africa, ed. by Peter Gutkind and I. Wallerstein (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1976).

25. Ibid., pp. 205 - 206.

26. Ibid., p. 207

27. Ake, "Congruence of Political Economies and Ideologies in Africa" in The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, ed. by Gutkind and Wallerstein, p. 207.

28. Ibid, p. 209.

29. Ibid

30. This is especially true when judged against the criteria (based on key socialist principles) of the common ownership and control of the means of production, equality and democratic participation. In these, there is strong evidence to show that both Kenya and Senegal, for example, have demonstrated far less resolve vis-a-vis Tanzania (to put is mildly) to achieve these objectives.

31. Rodney, "Tanzania Ujamaa and Scientific Socialism", p. 62.

32. To be sure, this development has not been easy. It has been marked by an ongoing struggle based on actual study of the interplay between theory and practice, particularly in the context of Tanzania. Even after the Arusha Declaration in 1967, Nyerere is known to have raised doubts in his own mind about socialism. "It is not easy to say what socialism in our condition means.

I have frequently thought and written about this. Up to this moment, I am still not sure we have exactly understood what is meant by socialism and building of socialism in African conditions ..." Interview granted by Nyerere to A. Prija, correspondent of the Belgrade newspaper Politika and published July 18, 1968. Cited in "Evolution of Socialist Thought in African Countries" by Ivan Ivekovic, Socialist Thought and Practice, Vol. XVIV, No. 1 (January 1977), p. 22.

33. "Socialism - like democracy - is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society, it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that people care for each other's welfare". Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, p. 1.

34. "Socialism is a way of life, and a socialist society cannot simply come into existence. A socialist society can only be built by those who believe in, and who themselves practise, the principles of socialism. A committed member of TANU will be a socialist, and his fellow socialists - that is, his fellow believers in this political and economic system - are all those in Africa or elsewhere in the world who fight for the rights of peasants and workers". Ibid., p. 17.

35. The part foreign capital plays in ensuring the continuation of economic underdevelopment has been demonstrated by Colin Leys in Kenya (in his work, Underdevelopment in Kenya) and attested to by others in Senegal, Ivory Coast, et. al.

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68. Joel Samoff in his article on decentralisation and class makes a similar criticism, although Shivji is surely correct in identifying the use of the access to state power, control and wealth.

69. Samoff uses a similar formulation in the above article. "The bureaucratic class, I would agree, is not the dominant class in the ruling class alliance in Tanzania, but it is the governing class op. cit. p.48.

70. M. Von. Freyhold, op. cit. 88

71. Socialist Register, 1974, op. cit.

III

TANZANIA: BRIEF COLONIAL HISTORY

The area now known as Tanzania was claimed by agents of the Imperial German Government in the 1880s and the territory officially became known as German East Africa in 1890. German rule introduced to the area rail roads, tarred roads, a white settler community and western-style education. But the very presence of invaders, and the heavy-handedness of German officials also resulted in a series of resistance movements to colonial rule. This resistance culminated in the Maji Maji war of 1905, in which a number of indigenous peoples - some formely hostile to one another - in the south-eastern portion of the territory banded together and attempted to drive out German officials and settlers. The Germans reacted by systematically destroying villages and fields in the areas. The revolt was finally put down at an estimated cost of 120,000 African lives.[41]

World War I brougth an end to German colonial rule. The exhausted population accepted the less active (perhaps less skilled and restrained) British administration (without major incidents). Thus began the era of British rule.

Students of colonialism and anti-colonialsm have argued that the institutions of colonialism planted the seeds of their own destruction. They contend that colonial administrators created an unstable paradox. For example, it imported modern educational systems, and nationalised the bureaucratic systems of their territories, introduced taxes, exported cash crops, and introduced a cash economy. At the same time, the expatriate administrators ruled indirectly through traditional institutions, while upholding racial and social discrimination.

This contradictory arrangement invariably led to high expectations, unfulfilled hopes, mass frustration and anger.

Though, every summary of affairs and events risks gross over-simplification,[42] the major factors leading to Tangayikan independence were as follows: From 1954 to 1958, the Tangayikan liberation shruggle was fought on four main fronts. The first

CHAPTER IV

THE CCM GUIDELINES: A CRITIQUE

This Chapter is a critique of the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) guidelines.
Emphasis is laid on what the document says about rural development and parastatals.

Section I is a general overview of the CCM guidelines, while section II assesses how the implementation of the guidelines has affected workers in parastatals. Section III appraises the impact of self-help projects on rural development.

An examination of the relationship between the Party (CCM), which formulated the guidelines and the Stat machinery which implements the contents of the document is also important. This forms the subject matter of Section IV.

I

THE CCM GUIDELINES AND SOCIALISM IN TANZANIA

The CCM (formerly TANU) guidelines of 1971, deal with, among other issues, the attitude, and subsquent re-orientation of the people in Tanzania. Specifically, paragraph[15] discusses the desirability of closer cooperation between the leaders and the ordinary citizen thus:

> Together with the issue of involving the people in solving their problems, there is also the question of the habits of leaders in their work and in day-to-day life. There must be a deliberate effort to build equality between the leaders and those they lead.
>
> For a Tanzanian leader, it must be forbidden to be arrogant, extravagant, contemptous and oppressive. The Tanzanian leader has to be a person who respects people, scorns ostentation, and is not a tyrant ... Similarly, the party has the responsibility to fight the vindictiveness of some of its agents. Such actions do not promote socialism, but drive a wedge between the party and the government on the one side, and the people on the other.

In the same vein, paragraph[28] concludes that decisions should not just be handed down to the people. Rather, leaders and experts should only implement plans that have been agreed upon by the people. The relevant paragraph reads:

> The duty of the party is not to urge the people to implement plans which have been decided upon by a few experts or leaders. The duty of our party is to ensure that the leaders and experts implement the plans that have been agreed upon by the people themselves. When people's decision requires information which is only available to the leaders and experts, it will be the duty of the leaders and experts to make such information available to the people. But is it correct for leader and experts to usurp the people's right to decide on an issue just because they have the expertise?.[1]

Bland enough formulations in some ways, but there can be no mistaking their importance. In the months which followed their publication (and widespread distribution as a pocket-size booklet), aspects of the Guidelines, and paragraph 15 in particular, were avidly seized upon by workers, students and others, and genuine assaults from below, in some instances overtly supported by leaders, were launched upon bureaucratic and authoritarian methods of work.[2]

The nature of the yawaning qap between the urban abd rural areas has been stressed in Tanzanian pronouncements, indeed, the felt need to close the gap was one of the most important (and most discussed) motives which underlie various socialist intiatives of 1967.[3] This, in turn, has brought an increased emphasis upon rural development, broadly on Ujamaa Vijijini and on regional planning, including decentralisation of the decision-making process.

Morover, even the principle of decentralisation from Dar es Salaam of industrial development - to regional centers and even, where possible, to the new collective villages themselves - is actively canvassed.[4]

Moves have been made to decentralise the centralised planning systems. An assessment of the progress in this direction can be seen from the following statement:

> The purpose of both the Arusha Declaration and of Mwonogozo was to give the people power over their lives and their own development. We have made great progress in seizing power from the leaders of the capitalists, and the traditionalists, but we must face the fact that, to the masses of the people, power is still something wielded by others-even if on their behalf.
>
> Thus, it has gradually become obvious that, in order to make a reality of our policies of socialism and self-reliance, the planning and control of development in this country must be exercised at the local level to a much greater extent than at present. ....[5]

A further feature of Mwongozo has been beginnings of a people's militia

> In order that they may be able to oppose our enemies, the people must know that it is they who are the nation's shield. This means that defence and security must be placed in the hand of the people themselves .... Therefore, it is imperative to start training a militia for the whole country.

The people's militia was formed as a result of the militia in 1964 (a situation only salvaged at the time by the summoning of British troops!). Tanzania cleaned house meaning the army had a new rank and file drawn from the CCM (then TANU) Youth, League.

Since that time, the latter group has been consistently coopted into official circles. Political commissars and political education have been made features of the military structure.

The foregoing represents a bird's eye view of the CCM guideliens. In the next section, we shall see how the provisions in the guidelines have affected workers in parastatals.

II

WORKERS IN PARASTATALS

Here we shall examine the condition of workers in Tanzania in general with emphasis on those in parastatals.

Workers are a formidable force to be reckoned with in any society. In African countries in particular, they represent the most politically conscious segment of the national society whose interests are antagonistic to those of foreign and national private capital.

The Presidential Circular of February 1970 urged all public institutions to set up workers' councils consisting of the CCM (them TANU) chairman at the enterprise, the manager, the heads of all departments and representatives of the workers. The purpose is to give the workers in the parastatals and other public institutions access to, and influence over major decisions in those establishments.

The system has become significant since the publications of Mwonogozo Wa TANU guidelines in January 1971. The document is still being revised, and consequently, is essentially invoved with the problem of the establishment of the councils, particularly in the absence of any experience by the workers with this kind of participation.

The attempts to implement Mwongozo's call for participatory democracy at all levels failed primarily because opportunities for the pre-requisite education were severely limited. Some of the media of education, such as the press, tended to dwell on the decisions already made, rather than being forward-looking and anticipating them in order to increase their readers' influence over them.

Another source of possible difficulties is the predictable opposition of the managerial segement of the public enterprises who view the experiment and the budding power of the workers as a threat to their own authority and powers.[6]

Similarly, during the post - Mwongozo period, workers have been encouraged to establish and operate consumer cooperative shops in order to be able to control the prices and distrbution of goods which they need. Serveral of these stores have since been established. The policy conforms with the goal of effective citizen participation in the processes of both production and distribution in the society.

The political elite within the Party use the Party machinery to stiffle worker's uprisings like the Mwongozo and post - Mwonogozo prolectarian struggles.[7] An example will suffice. Workers in the "Hotel Afrique" were making preparations to take over "hteir factory" making preparations to take over "their factory".

The government statement issued on the occasion warned the workers against "the habit of unilaterally taking over factories" and that it would not "tolerate such unruly behaviour on the part of the workers". The statement triumphantly declared that "early yesterday moring, the government re-instated the owner of the firm in his factory, and opposed the workers' demands to take it over.[8] As usual, the "Daily News" joined in the celebaration. Ironically, the editor commented on the dismissal thus: "Socialism is coming, this, no one can prevent...." .[9]

The state thus asserted its class character regardless of ideology. But in so doing, it laid bare the fundamental contradiction between the exploited and the explotiter.

That is an example of what happened between workers and management in some hotels in Tanzania.

Similar post - Mwongozo proletarian struggles took place in parastatals. For example, in November 1973 workers in MECCO (Mwananchi Engineering Construction Company) heard that their Company was to enter into partnership with the Overseas Construction Compnay (DCC) of the Netherlands.

The reasons given for the proposed partnership were tenable enough: (a) the desire to increase the scale of the company in order to make it more competitive for complex building and engineering contracts.

(b) to save foreign exchange expended when foreign contractors secure these contracts,

(c) to train skilled craftsmen and technicians at all levels of the industry, and

(d) to utilise foreign capital for increasing profitable investments.[10]

However, the workers in MECCO were not amused. They demonstrated for two days against what they called the "imminent take-over of their company by a foreign firm". It took the intervention of management to nib the demonstration in the bud as was the case when workers in Hotel Afrique demonstrated.

These two instances show that though the guidelines say there should be close cooperation between workers and management, in practice, it is inevitably an unequal partnership, with management having the upper hand, of course.

We have identified the genesis of the Mwongozo and post - Mwongozo proletarian struggles and the provisions of the CCM guidelines. The effects of the struggles on the lives of workers are also evident. In the next Section, we shall examine how the provisions of the CCM guidelines as regards rural development are traslated into practice.

SELF-RELIANCE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Among the abundant local resources identified by the Arusha Declaration as valuable for development is land. It is the most basic resource that can be used by man for his well-being. It provides the starting point for the hardwork that precedes economic growth, and contains other resources which, if properly used, would increase man's welfare. Land is necessary for agriculture, the most widespread activity of the population, and therefore, the most significant basis for national development.[11]

Since the bulk of the land and people of Tanzania are found in the rural areas and self-reliance implies the full mobilisation of these factors of production, rural development is an essential aspect of self-reliance. By bringing the most abundant local resources into the mainstream of development efforts, it facilitates the maximisation of domestic resource mobilisation; "most of our latent wealth lies in our under-utilised land in the energies of the rural people".[12] Unless agricultural output increases, progress in the sectors of the economy are bound to be limited.

A rational and planned program of rural development is particularly necessary in Tanzania because of its sparse population. While encompassing an area almost equal to that of Nigeria, and roughly equal to the total for France, Belgium, and Italy, it contains only 24 million people, separated by an underdeveloped transport system, and concentrated in the nation's periphery.

As the 1967 census shows, 35 per cent of the rural population lived in only 5.5 per cent of the land, allowing for an average cultivable land of about 1.2 acres per person.[13] The various regions of the country also differ in natural and human resources. This is in part why the better endowed and historically privileged regions of Kilimanjaro, West Lake, Mwanza, and Mbeya have made much greater social and economic progress than the rest. A successful program of rural development should minimise such inter-regional differences. It should also correct the adverse effects of the isolated family homesteads in the rural areas. In general, villages in the ordinary sense of a compact settled community do not exist. Families are widely separated miles apart. This makes it difficult to provide social services for the rural population.

Tanzania's commitment to socialist development which was marked most dramatically by the Arusha Declaration of 1967, implies that it is not enough for development to be rural for it to be good. A privileged capitalist rural elite is just as undesirable as a privileed urban elite. Hence, an emphasis has been placed on socialist forms of rural development, particularly through Ujamaa villages.

The immediate overall objective is to gradually increase the material and social welfare of the rural population through its expansion of output and improvement of productivity. The core of the program may be termed modernised communalism. It seeks to improve production through the reorganisation of life in the rural area along the same principles of familyhood as those which permeated the traditional extended family. The basic and immediate objective is to own and farm the land collectively.[14] It therefore differs fundamentally from the colonial and early post-independence programs of rural development based on the individual farmer.

The approach, as stated in the CCM guidelines, emphasises the control of rural development by the population. The initiative for cooperative living, ownership, production, and marketing of goods and services must come from the rural people themselves, with the government and party offering education and advice. All the projects of the earlier approaches were controlled from Dar-es-Salaam. The peasants were merely expected to work according to plans drawn up there. This, of course, was difficult. The differences in outlook between the administrator from the capital, and the peasant in the rural area made it impossible for the former to understand the problems of the latter. Officials in the capital city frequently lack an understanding of what rural life and, therefore, rural development are all about.[15] Oftentimes, their presence in the rural areas acts against rural mobilisation. It stimulates the peasant to seek fortunes similar to those of his urban adviser by leaving the villages for the city.

Another shortcoming of the earlier approaches to rural development concerned their neglect of equity in rural mobilisation. In fact, during the colonial period, emphasis was placed on the creation of a class of Kulaks, prosperous and dependent on the land, who would maintain law and order, and the system of individual capitalist farming.[16] These "colonial class formations" persist even today, and form one class of problem faced when trying to develop the rural areas.

Even the cooperative societies failed to promote equality. Instead, their activities helped to foster a class of rural leaders and activists of the cooperative movement who were part of the money economy, and for whom the acquisition of wealth and status was agreeable.[17]

These were separeted from the larger rural group of apathetic subsistence farmer outside the money economy. The farmers' wealth and status depended on the exploitation of the latter. Under such conditions, it was difficult to obtain the cooperation for increasing production in the rural areas. The policy of Ujamaa villages seems to remedy this deficiency.

Activities other than those connected with Ujamaa villages have also been intensified and rationalised to increase production and rural development. The CCM guidelines de-emphasise extension services in non-Ujamaa villages.

Although the pre-Arusha emphasis on extension services in non-Ujamaa villages and marketing cooperatives has been withdrawn, these activities have become more extensive and better organised than those of the earlier periods. Until the Ujamaa villages constitue at least half of the population of the rural areas, non-Ujamaa activities must remain the basis for development. Therefore, the provision of rural water supply, health centers and foodstuffs to all the sections of the rural areas is important. Extension services are widely maintained in order to encourage individual production of agricultural products. However, more and more emphasis is placed on converting the non- Ujamaa villages into Ujamaa ones by a stress on the Ujamaa rather than the villa-gisation aspect of the program. Villagers are encouraged to expand ownership of farms and other goods and services, and to increase cooperative farming and other activities. The foregoing shows that the stipulation in the CCM guidelines that extension services to non-Ujamaa villages should be de-emphasised is premature, since such villages out-number the more organised villages.

Therefore, if the farmers do not get the necessary infrastructure, then the whole program of rural development may, indeed, be paralysed.

The encouragement given to self-help projects in other than Ujamaa villages has continued. The name of self-help project" (Kazi Za Kujitolea) has now been changed to "nation-building project" (Kazi Za Kujengtaifa). In 1967, the Regional Development Fund was started to complement the self-help fund for financing village self-help projects. In 1969, the Ward Development Committee Act was passed, requiring people to participate in self-help schemes, and authorising the local leaders to apply sanctions where people shirk their role in these projects. Projects would be carried out after the majority of the people agreed on their worthiness, and punishment which should not be more severe than necessary would be imposed on the basis of traditional law.

In addition , there are publicity farms. The production division of the Ministry of Agriculture runs some of there farms. The National Agricultural and Food Corporation is also active in this field. It has ranches and farms. Among the crops grown are rice, sugar, tea, lime and maize. Dairy farming is also carried out in some of them. "In at least one case, indeed, state farms are at present getting a lower yield per acre than the nearby peasants, despite the amount of machinery, and so on which they have".[18] However, it is clear that development in Tanzania's multidimensional facets has changed gradually from the colonial times through the early post-independence period to the present day, when the emphasis is on the spread of Ujamaa villages.

There exists an impressive array of policy papers and institutions for the implementation of rural development programs. It addition, guidelines for rural development are clearly embodied in the CCM guidelines and the its numerous offsprings, such as "Socialism and Rural Development", and "Party Policy on Agricultural Production".

One important thing about the Second Five Year Development plan is that it brings together all the principles contained in these policy papers into a comprehensive planning document. Unlike the earlier plans, it gives priority to be rural sector and accordingly allocates most of the resources for the plan period to this sector. It endorses the transformation approach to agriculture, and suggests' frontal attack on the problems of Ujamaa villages, in which most of the government political institutions are concentrated behind the principle of Ujamaa, particularly in ares of low rainfall and average population density. However, since the areas of low rainful embrace a substantial proportion of the country, the intentions of the plan lack any genuine operational specificity.

Develpoment-oriented instutions of particular relevance for rural development include the Cooperative Movement, the National Agricultural Products Board, the National Development Bank and District Development. Coporations, Regional Development Committees and a Fund were set up in 1967 to disburse a total of Shs. 1million a year for rural development projects. In addition, the appointment of regional economic secretaries, the reorganisation of activities of the ministry of agriculture, and the policy establishing nine poles of industrial growth were meant to promote rural development.

A short-coming of the CCM guidelines as regards rural development is the limited emphasis on applied research and the use of new resources which are linked with technological innvations. The prevailing view seems to be that the application of existing knowledge of agriculture and farm management can substantially increase output. The major task, therefore, is to extend the existing knowledge to farmers. Where necessary, simple implements that can be made domestically should be used to faciliate production. Increased use of such elements as fertilisers, pesticides improved seeds, and so forth, which are likely to modernise agriculture, receive very limited emphasis. Similarly, there is very little emphasis on intermediate products, such as butter and cheese, that are linked to technological advancement.[19]

In order ensure the success of rural development in Tanzania, this short-term perspective of trying to maximise existing resources through reorganisation of rural life along Ujamaa must give way to a long view in which Ujamaa villages become the social and institutional framework through which indigenous science and technology are developed and applied to agricultural and other forms of production.[20]

The villages must emphasise the establishment of local links between resource ownership and use and consumer demands. This has been played down in the CCM guidelines. The villages must start with a focus on the exploitation of domestic demands for high protein foods, such as milk, eggs, butter and meat. These products have displayed the highest universal tendency to be consumed more and more at intermediate levels of income.[21] Another group of products includes cereals, which can be used directly as food, or indirectly through their role as feed for animals.

Finally, Ujamaa villages must aim at producing goods which can be used in local industries. These villages must aspire to operate at such a level of increasing efficiency that their role in agricultural production will steadily decline as their role in industrial manufacture correspondingly increases.[22]

Probably more than any other African country, Tanzania has accepted the reality of the centrality of rural development for overall national emancipation and consequently has a very active and comprehensive program of rural transformation. However, the full benefits of the shift from the colonial and early post-independence institution of rural development cannot be realised until it abandons its emphasis on agricultural production geared primarly towards improving the receipts from export corps. This does not differ from the perspective of the programs, and will therefore suffer a similar fate. A more valid approach must encourage the rural population to control their environments directly and successfully for their own benefit. Its raison d'etre must be to contribute in a significant way to the elimination of the gap between domestic resource use and domestic demand.

The interpretation of the concept of rural development and self reliance as contained in the CCM guidelines cannot be complete unless we relate the State (which functions through the government) to the guidelines. This relationship is more direct when we note that it is the State that formulated the CCM guidelines. The relationship between the state and the CCM guidlines is the subject matter of the next section.

IV

THE IMPACT OF THE CCM GUIDELINES ON THE STATE SINCE 1976.

This period is important in the analysis of the politics and the development of the Party in Tanzania. TANU, the Party was the source of what we now call the CCM (formerly TANU) guidelines for the socialist transformation of Tanzania.

However, the Party which wrote the TANU guidelines is not the CCM as we know it today. The period since 1976 has significantly and clearly marked the beginning of the end of the ideological and political heydays of the ruling class and its legitimacy in the country. It has now become evident even to the Party itself, that it has lost its popularity and acceptance among the people, notwithstanding the politicking that has continued all along.

During this period, the State has found itself in deep economic crisis, with no hope of immediate recovery. This economic crisis traces its visible appearance to 1973/74 but it grew more acute in 1977. This was more compounded by the intra-class contradiction at the East African Region level, leading to the collapse of the East African Community (EAC). Ideologically, the collapse of the EAC was exploited by the ruling class to show the callousness of capitalism that was being pursued by the "Nyang'au" in Kenya (the ruling class with capitalist policies) and the humane nature of socialism - "Ujamaa".

During the same period, TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) and ASP (the dominant political party in Zanzibar), merged to form one political Party - Chama Cha Mapinduzi. The implication of this is that the CCM as we know it today, is a combination of two parties - TANU and ASP (Afro-Shirazi Party).

The merger between TANU and ASP was a major landmark in the development of the political party, and its relationship with the state in Zanzibar. The birth of CCM was popularly and enthusiastically received by the people in Zanzibar where ASP's popularity had ebbed. ASP was associated with the revolutionary Council which was popular.

Since 1976, Tanzania has faced economic crises which have squeezed the people. This has gone hand in hand with the enactment of more oppressive laws implementing Party policies. This growing authoriterianism of the State has forced it to use the historical legitimacy of the Party to justify its actions. On the other hand the Party has extensively used the state apparatus to entrench itself more in the civil society.[23]

Reasons which were given, and are being given by the ruling class and the current political situation are ridiculos and populist. They say the present economic situation is exterally caused, and as such out of their control. They say the present political situation is inevitable.

The ruling class has used its tussle with the IMF (International Monetary Fund) to impress the people and harp on their sentiments. This rhetorical war against the IMF forced the class to sacrifice some of its members who defended IMF policies openly.

In times of peace, but especially in difficulty, the ruling class in Tanzania has favoured a populist line, and pursued a petty bougeois ideology. Under the guise of being independent it was intolerable for it to show the public that it was openly supporting the IMF conditions. It organised moth rallies in support of the Party decision to refuse to bow to the IMF. However, before the enthusiasm of the people had waned, the ruling class began to concede to IMF conditions silently. A good example was the devaluation of the currency.

Further populist steps were taken by the ruling class during this time. It sacrificed its members so as to boost its image among the people. Economic problems aggravated more problems inherent in it. There was embezlement and corruption and due to complaints and cynicism in the strets, the ruling class was forced to take steps that were aimed at bolstering its image and raising its popularity.
These steps were also aimed at appeasing the messes and the petty bourgeoisie who form the majority of the middle leadership of the Party. This hook was swallowed by the radicals in the leadership who have all along been advocating the transformation of the Party into a vanguard party that is led by committed leaders and cadres. To them, this was to be preceded by purging all uncommited and anti-socialist leaders. Hence, when the party announced a special campaign to purge these "corrupt" elements within the ruling class, it was taken to be a progressive step.

The campaign started after the special meeting of NEC (National Executive Council) which was called by the President. The purposes of the meeting as given in the government statement were:

(1) To consider failures in the implementaion of that government policy which is directed at securing the fair distribution of goods throughout the country, together with the associated problem of magendo and blackmarket.

(2) To consider the manner in which certain operations of government and parastatal institutions have been carried on with particular reference to some actions which have led to great losses of public money and foreign exchange.[24]

The statement went on to say that at the end of the meeting, NEC reiterated the Party's commitment to a distribution based on the principle of fair share for all. It (NEC) also instructed the Central Committee (CC) to carry out further investigations into certain other matters and afterward make recommendations for action.

The CC had a series of meetings. It had begun its work with a consideration of a number of public contracts involving millions of shillings in Tanzanian currency and foreign exchange. The committee interviewed a number of government and parastatal leaders, and received written documents. The government statement emphasised that:

> who have been entrusted with responsibility for carrying on the people's business in the public interest. These individuals are accountable to the people and have to accept responsibility for their failures.[25]

It was due to that reasoning that a number of leaders were dismissed. We shall deal with the cases of the leaders of three parastatals who were dismissed: Air Tanzania Corporation (ATC), Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) and Tanzania Elimu Supplies (TES).

In relation to ATC, it was due to the contract between ATC and George Hallack, a Beirut - based owner of the Caledonia Airline. The CC was satisfied that there had been at the very least, a massive mishandling of an international business arrangement, which had resulted in loss of much public money, and had damaged the reputation of ATC as a reliable carrier. The statement issued by the CC said that some aspects of the contract had shown a lack of elementary business prudence and competence. It also said that no consultation was undertaken with other organs of government which might have led to early correction of the fault. As a result of this, the President removed Augustine as Minister and Chairman of ATC Board of Directors and Laurence Mmasi as ATC General Manager.

The TIB scandal involved the selling of its ship MV. Jitegemee to a private company, Tanzania Colt Motors (TCM) for shs. 39 million. The company was owned by A.M Rajpar. TCM only paid shs. 14 million and then christened the ship Lord Rajpar. This resulted in the firing of the Chairman and Managing Director, G. Mbowe and the General Manager, Tibesigwa.

The buyer was also detained, together with Abdul Haji, under presidential orders because of their suspected connection with economic actions prejudicial to the security and well-being of the States. The government statement issued on 23rd January, 1981 said that the two were detained on 10th January, 1981.

It said that certain actions by each of these two had undermined or endangered the good reputation of Tanzania in its foreign transactions and called to question the integrity of certain public institutions. The ship later reverted to TIB after a consent judgement given in early March, 1982,[26] by the High Court. This judgement was given after the parties, that is TIB and TCM, had agreed that the ship should be delivered to the bank upon repayment of sh 14 million to Colt Motors. In case, the Attorney General had filed a suit on behalf of the government against TCM on grounds that the ship was irregularly sold to TCM by TIB.

The Daily News of 27th February, 1981 carried a banner headline "TES FRAUD UNEARTHED". The CC said that greedy individuals within the TES had taken advantage of the current acute shortage of stationery and school equipment to enrich themselves in collaboration with capitalist businessmen. As a result, retail stationery shops owned by TES had empty shelves purportedly as a result of the non-availability of items, while shops belonging to individual businessmen were fully stocked with the same items selling at higher prices. CC cited Family Stationery and Sherali as examples of such capitalist firms that had collaborated with TES in exploiting a purported shortage of school equipment and stationery supplies. It said that some people in TES had used the company to enrich themselves under various pretences including non-availability of material.

This led to mushrooming of lucrative business in printing, and stationery equipment, while TES shelves remained empty, the excuse being shortage due to economic hardship.

It was no wonder, therefore, that on 12th March, 1981, President Nyerere dismissed the TES General Manager, Gervas Chilipweli.[27] He also directed the Ministry of National Education, which happens to be the parent ministry, to take appropriate actions against some TES workers found to have acted contrary to national interests. The firing of those men was therefore seen as punishment following the unearthing of the business scandal by the CC. It should be pointed out that the cleansing exercise which was carried out by the CC was under the Chairmanship of the Vice Chairman of the Party, Aboud Jumbe. The exercise did not last long. The Chairman of the Party in an address to the nation indicated that in the exercise, some innocent people may have been punished, and therefore, they should not be surprised if some of them were re-appointed to take other posts.[28] Indeed, that is what happened. No sooner had these people been dismissed, and settled down, than they were given other posts.[29] For example, Augustine Mwingira (also was fired as Minister of Communication and Transport) was appointed Regional Commissioner, a post which carries the status of a ministerial appointment.

The government, during this period, took some emergency measures to try to solve the economic problems. The earlier liberalisation policy which was initiated by the de-confinement policy in the earlier period was abandoned. Instead, new steps were taken. These outlined in the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) and structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).

All these documents were prepared by the Tanzania Advisory Group which was formed by the World Bank and Tanzania. Interestingly, even the NEC was informed about on NESP after the government had already begun implementing it.

It was during the discussion of NESP in the NEC that "Leftists" in the Party were finally able to moot the idea of a need for the Party to have its programme instead of always taking ad hoc measures. A special committee of NEC was formed to work out a programme. The committee included both the "Leftists" and "rightists". The programme was later approved by NEC, and the decision was taken to call it "The CCM Guidelines 1981". Definitely, the programme in its final version has a lot of idealogical overtones found in similar documents of socialist countries.[30] This was even clear in the Party structure proposed and later fully adopted in the constitution.

The adoption of the 1981 Guidelines was crucial and important to the ruling class in Tanzania. It hoped to invoke the historical legitimacy of the 1971 TANU Guidelines and the Arusha Decleration. Thus, in the 1981 CCM guidelines, the party itself says as much: "Inspite of the historical legitimacy which is very much based on heritage, CCM must establish its own legitimacy".[31]

However, this time, unlike in 1967 when the Arusha Declaration was promulgated, people did not flock into the streets. Also, it did not receive the same response as that of 1971 Guidelines which stands till today as a monumental work of the "leftists" in the Party.

It is evident that when the ruling class has been rocked by crisis, it has utilised the services of the "leftists", using their populist rhetoric that appeals to the sentiments of the people, to temporarily made it popular. But after the ruling class has weathered the storm, and consolidated its position, it has unceremoniously discarded the "leftists".

It is clear that in the 1981 CCM Guidelines, the State bourgeoisie envisaged the use of the Party to further consolidate its hegemonic position in the ruling class. This time, not only ideologically but even organisationally. The Party has been restructured in order to assune that leading role. A strong secretariat headed by a strong secretary general who is number three in the state hierarchy has been created. In its various departments headed by members of the Central Committee the NEC was formed.

The Party now has every bureaucracy that competes with that of the government to oversee the day to day activities of the State. It even has a full-time secretary to the secretariat who is also the Chief of service in the Party. This is equivalent to the Head of the Civil Service, who is also Principal Secretary to the President's Office.

Organisationally, the state bourgeoisie has consolidated its hagemonic position after the 1982 Party elections. For example, now the membership of the Central Committee has been trimmed down from 40 to 18. If one looks at the individuals in the Central Committee, it is crystal clear that all of them are either top or former top members of the government, especially the cabinet.[32]

The Central Committee comprises the Chairman of the Party, who is also the head of the executive as the President, Vice Chairman of the party who is also the head of the executive in Zanzibar. The Secretary General of the Party is also a Cabinet Minister, and not more than 15 members elected by NEC from among its members.[33]

There is an overlapping of functions between top government and Party posts. For example, 11 members of CC of NEC are also in the cabinet and the remaining are former cabinet members who are likely to be re-appointed.[34] In the list of Regional Commissioners who were appointed soon after the Party elections, among the 19 on the Mainland, 10 were members, and among the 5 in Zanzibar, was a NEC member.[35] Livingan and Van Donge have correctly concluded that:

> Those who dominate government machinery appear to be in the leadership position of CCM. CCM does not owe its leadership position to those directly engaged in production.[36]

This means that the State bourgeoisie has ensured and that it is only a small number in the ruling class in gerneral which is in decision-making positions in the highest hierarchy of the Party. In addition, deliberations of both the Central Committee and the NEC are held in camera, denying the public any information about what is happening at the NEC level which is supposed to be representative.

Some writers like Pratt[37] have potrayed the NEC to be a place where deliberations are more frank and lively than Parliament. But an analysis of the National Conference of the Party, done by Mfupe shows that usually, there is little diversity of ideals at that level.[38] The same is reflected at the NEC level.

This is proved by the fact that although constitutionally, the Central Committee is a subordinate body to the NEC, in acutal practice it is the Central committee which decides most of the issues, and NEC endorses them. In the Party structure, the position of chairman is dominant and central. He appoints the Secretary-General, and heads the Department in the Secretariat. His influence is more proved by the fact that two members of the Central Committee who are also cabinet ministers entered the NEC from the list of members nominated by the Chairman.[39]

Also, so long as the discussions are not made in the glare of the public, that in itself makes the body lack one of the important attributes of democracy.

Recently, Party decisions have led to enactment of very harsh oppressive and draconian pieces of legislation. These are the Human Resources Deployment Act 40 and the Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act.[41]

The CCM guidelines, 1981, had made an analysis of the economic crimes in Tanzania, and suggested enactment of a special legislation to deal with the problem.

This was done after the crackdown on the alleged economic saboteurs had already begun. Initially, when the capmpaign began, it was received with enthusiasm and processions were staged. But it did not take long before the masses discovered that the whole campaign was a mere hullabaloo. Cynically, the masses began to say that only viggogo (the big fish) had been left untouched.

The enactment of the two legislations clearly shows that once the ruling class is facing a major crisis, and it can no longer bury itself in ths populist ideological cocoon, it will resort to the only alternative - the use of the repressive state apparatus. Thus, it will use the logic of force rather than the force of logic.

This has happened hand in hand wit another interesting trend in the Party, the militarisation of the Party. Soon after the 1964 Army mutiny, the trend which was taken by the ruling class as regards the army was that of politicising it. An entirely new army was formed which recruits mainly from the TANU Youth League who were throughly screened by the Party. The army mutiny taught the ruling class in the country that is no longer needed an apolitical army. That was impossibe when the material conditions necessitated is not to be apolitical but prone to mutiny. Thus, politicisation of the army was aimed at creating a loyal army.
The task of politicisation of the army was handled by loyal and trusted politicians who were transferred to the army and commissioned as officers.

However, this trend was somehow reversed after 1971. In response to the mercenery invasion of Guinea and a coup d'etat in Uganda, the 1971 TANU Gudelines recommended the formation of a people's militia. This was an emulation of the principle of people's defence which had shown success when Guinea was invaded. With it, the trend was reversed to that of militarisation of the Party. Most of the party leaders and functionaries had to attend officers cadet courses at the Tanzanian Military Academy at Monduli, Arusha. After the course, they were commissioned, and most of them remained in the Party service, while others remained in the army on special assignment. The Party also has a system of party structure in the army. However, unlike in ordinary working places, the army has a special system. Under the system, it is laid down categorically that the chairman of a Party branch at compnay level is the company commander. This affects all other Party organs at other levels.

At the level of a battalion, it is the Battalion Commander, at the Brigade level the Brigade Commander, at the Division level the Division Commander and at the National level, the Chief of Defence Forces. The reason given for this peculiar Party leadership system was the need to maintain discipline by having one source of command.

In subsequent Party elections, a new quota systen was introduced in order to ensure that there was group representation of some sectors. Among them was the armed forces, or to be precise, the repressive apparatus of the State, the army, police and prisons. However, the results showed that it was mainly those from the army and not police or prisons who were elected. In that list, the total number of candidates from the repressive apparatus of the State was 20.

Out of these, 11 were from the army and 9 from the police and prisons. Out of 20, only 10 were to be elected, and 8 out of he list of the army were elecred. This amounts is 73 per cent, and only 2 from the list of police and prison were elected, amounting to only 22 per cent.

This ia an indication of the development of militaration of the Party at the organisational level. The same is reflected in the bio-data of contestants who mentioned mgambo, or their participation in the war against Idi Amin's regime in Uganda as a qualifying item, for Party leadership.[42] But the new mgambo, which was regarded as people's force, and therefore under the Party when it began in 1971, has now become totally part of the regular army. Mgambo now forms a whole division of the army under a Major General. During times of peace, the mgambo plays the role of police and para-military force.

After the 1982 elections, under a new Party structure, a new post of Regional Party Secretary was eastablished. All the regional Party Secretaries were appointed from the NEC. Of all appointed, 32 per cent were from the armed forces, and two of them popular senior officers, who were division commanders of the army.

The militarisation of the Party at the organisational level cannot be properly explained without taking account of the economic crisis which now persists in Tanzania. The economic crisis which has continued unabated, has made the ideology of the ruling class hollow; hence its resort to militarisation.

The important propositions in this section are that:

(1) The Party and the State in Tanzania are closely related all to the extent that it is very difficult to make a distinction between them.

(2) There is a yawning gap between Mwonogozo (the CCM guidelines) and practise in Tanzania.

(3) In the post - Mwongozo period, workers have been encouraged to establish and operate consumer cooperative shops in order to enable them control prices and distribution of goods which they need.

(4) Mwongozo corrected some of the inadequacies of earlier development plans. Specific guidelines were laid for project selection. This led to mass participation in the implementation of development plans.

(5) The "leftists" in the Party have all along been used to bail the regime out of crisis by producing "revolutionary" documents such as the TANU guidelines of 1981.

(6) The crisis in the country has made the ideology of the ruling class hollow, hence, there has been a tendency towards militarisation of the Party at the organisational level.

In the next Chapter, we shall examins rural development in Tanzania, and see to what extent theory (according to the CCM guidelines) informs practice in the rural areas.

PREFERENCES AND NOTES

(1) Mwongozo/The TANU Guidelines (Dar es Salaam, 1971).

(2) See Nick Asili, "Strikes In Tanzania," in Majimaji (September 1971).

(3) It was this theme (as expressed in False Start In Africa) which attracted the president to the ideas of Rene' Dumont during this period, rather than anything Dumont had to say about development in the rural areas per se. Another document influential in setting the tone of the period was the Turner Report (Government Paper No. 3, 1967, "Report to the Government of the United Republic on Tanzania on Wages, Income, and Prices Policy by International Labour Office"), with its heavy emphasis on the negative features or rural - urban inequalities.

(4) For a useful perspective on this subject, see W.L Luttrell, "Location Planning and Regional Development In Tanzania," in Uchumi Editoral Board, Towards Socialist Planning (Tanzanian Studies No. 1, Tanzania Publishing House, P.O.Box 2138, Dar es Salaam, 1972).

(5) The substance of this policy is spelt out in the TANU paper, Decentralisation (Dar es Salaam, 1972), which was reprinted in full in Daily News (Tanzania, 17 May 1972; the quotations in the text are taken from this document. Significantly, one additional point which is made in the document is that "there is .... one danger which must be guarded against.

The transfer of power to the regions and districts must not also mean the transfer of a rigid and bureaucratic system from Dar-es-Salaam to lower levels. Nor is it the intention of these proposals to create new local tyrants in the persons of the regional and district development officers ... It is essential that this should be understood by everyone, for those who cause the new system to become enmeshed in procedures, will, as they are discovered, be treated as if they were to be saboteurs".

(6) See Henry Mapolu, "The Organisation and Participation of workers in Tanzania" University of Dar-es-Salaam, Economic Research Bureau Paper, No. 72.1 1972, pp. 16 - 37.

(7) See Section IV of this Chapter, which discusses "the impact of the CCM Guidelines on the State for further discussion of this issue.

(8) Daily News, 21 June, 1973.

(9) Daily News, 22 June, 1973, quoted in Mapolu "Workers' Movement ..."

(10) Andrew Coulson, "Blood-Sucking Contracts", a paper presented at the confrence on public corporation in Africa, Ghana, May 28 - June 1, 1973.

(11) "The Arusha Declaration", in Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa (Dar-es-Salaam; OUP, 1968), pp. 17 - 18.

(12) The second Five Year Plan, vol. 1, p. 26.

(13) See William Luttrell, "Villagisation, Cooperative Production, and Rual Cadres: Strategies and Tactics in Tanzanian Development", University of Dar es Salaam, Economic Research Bureau paper (mimeo), pp. 7 - 8.

(14) The Second Five Year Plan, op cit., Vol. 1 p. 26

(15) David Abernethy, "North-East Nzoga Planning Project," a research report of the Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use planning" (university of Dar es Salamm, 1970, p. 6).

(16) See P. M. Lindell - Mills, "Village Settlements in Tanzania: An Economic Commentary," paper No. 2, presented at the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, Economic Seminar, December 1965 to January 1966, p. 2.

(17) John Seul, "Marketing Cooperative in a Developing Country: The Tanzanian Case" in Lional Cliffe and John Saul, eds; Socialism in Tanzania (Nairobi: East African Publication House, 1973), Vol 2, pp. 146 - 150.

(18) Ten Years After Independence, op. cit.

(19) Refer to Montague Yudelman, "Agricultural Development In Tanzania, "in Foreign Aid and Rural Development, proceedings of a seminar held at the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, January 19 - 23, 1970, a publication of the Economic Research Bureau of the University College, Dar-es-Salaam, pp. 115 - 116.

(20) See Clive Thomas, op. cit.

(21) Ibid.

(22) TANU Guidelines, 1971 reprinted in The African Review; Vol. 1, No. 4 April 1972, pp 1 - 8.

(23) I am greatly indebted to my guide (on my visit to Tanzania in 1984) for most of the comments in this section.

(24) Daily News, 20 January, 1981

(25) Daily News, 24 January, 1981

(26) Daily News, March 15, 1982

(27) Daily News, March, 13 1981

(28) Daily News, April 16, 1980

(29) Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Guidelines of 1982.

(30) Compare the CCM Guidelines 1981 with the Manual of the CPSU of the Soviet Union.

(31) Article 70 (2) of the CCM Constitution, 1982.

(32) For the substantiation of this fact, see "Who is Who in Tanzanian Government" paper presented at Conference on the socialist experment in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 1982.

(33) This observation was made during my trip visit to Tanzania in 1983.

(34) Ibid.

(35) Liviga A. and Van Donge, J., "The 1982 Elections of the National Executive Committee of CCM - A Case Study of Political Recruitment in Tanzania, Seminar Paper Presented to Department of Political Science Seminars, p. 27 (mimeo, Dar-es-Salaam).

(36) Those elected were Cleopa Msuya and Salim Ahmed Salim.

(37) Act No. 6 of 1983.

(38) Act No. 6 of 1983.

(39) op. cit., 35, p. 7

(40) See "Human Resources Deployment Act" (Government Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, 1984).

(41) See "Economic Sabotage (Special Provisions) Act (Government Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, 1984)

(42) I obtained most of the information in this section during my many visis to Tanzania.

CHAPTER V

SOCIALISM AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

I

RURAL TANZANIA IN PERSPECTIVE

Tremendous changes have taken place in rural Tanzania since Independenc. After experimenting with a variety of "rural policies in the first ten years of independence, the authorities in 1973/1974 launched a gigantic "villagisation" programme for the entire mainland countryside. Basically, the programme consisted of abolishing the traditional system of rural settlements by which households are located in small isolated pockets, and its replacement by the creation of large villages. Millions of people were thus moved into new ares in a relatively short period.

There has been considerable debate on the merits and demerits of the programme, and particularly on the forceful manner in which it was implemented.[1] The stated purpose of the programme was to facilitate the provision by government of essential social infrastructure to the rural areas, particularly water, medical/health services, and primary education. Whether large settlements are a necessary pre-reequsite for the provision of these facilities and whether Tanzania had the resources to provide them any way are obviously different and debatable questions.

But at least there has not been much disagreement on the performance of rural production ever since "villagisation". In many cases, agricultural output has been declining over time, and only in a few cases has output shown some minor increase.

For this poor performance, of course, there are many causes, the weather, world commodity prices, and so on, being some of them. It can be argued, however, that too much blame has often been put on weather conditions.

As Coulson has indicated, shortages of food for instance, cannot really be ascribed to drought conditions as rainfall figures for the decade do not bear this out.[2] In any case, Tanzania - by African standards - is a vast territory with diverse ecological zones capable of complementing each other in terms of variety of output.

> Virtually every crop known to agriculturists will grow in one or more ot these (ecological) areas. Wheat, coffee, tea, potatoes, and pyrethrum grow in the cool mountains. On the inland plateau grow mazie, rice, sorghum, verieties of millet, cotton and tobacco, as well as sisal ... Coconuts, cashew-nuts, rubber, cocoa, cloves and a wide variety of spices grow on the Coastal strip or on Zanzibar and Pemba. Each ecological unit produces its own fruits and vegetables.[3]

In such a situation, one cannot but expect abundance as far as agricultural output is concerned. Yet, not only has food import been rising, but even production for export - on which emphasis by the authorities is usually heaviest - has also been declining over the years. In the years 1972 - 1980, over-all growth of food crops was at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, that of export crops was a negative 3 per cent per annum.[4] When related to rural population, both food and export have been on a steady decline over the years.

We have examined some of the comments made in the literature about the villagisation policy in Tanzania with special reference to the policy on rural development) the pivot of which is the villagisation policy.

In the next section, we shall delve into the unending "development debate" as it relates to the socialist experiment in Tanzania.

II

TANZANIAN SOCIALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT DEBATE:

The basic questions at issue are, firstly whether Tanzania is progressing towards socialism. Secondly, if the latter is the case, then what sort of society is emerging?

The most frequent Tanzaphiles have not clamied that Tanzania is already a socialist country. As Julius Nyerere has always admitted with disarming frankness, Tanzania is not now a socialist country, it is only a country whose people have firmly committed themselves to building socialism.[5] It is this proposition that has increasingly come under attack in recent years, the spearhead of the critique being the publications of a group of Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars who were active at the University of Dar-se-Salaam in the 1970s regularly debating in MAJI-MAJI, the journal of the University branch of the then TANU Youth League.[6]

The issues raised by the ensuing debate are important for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Tanzanian experiment is interesting in itself, as perhaps one example of an attempt to erect a new basis of a utopian socialist theory that echoes romantic primitivism. Socialism as an "attitude of mind"[7] is part of Nyerere's vision of a future ideal society. For him, it is an attitude of mind that would make equality the paramount value, and eschew competition and social hierarchy. The exigencies of development and implementation have over the years impelled Nyerere towards a more pragmatic version of socialism with some recognition of the problems of class formation.[8]

Secondly, the Tanzanian experiment is one genuine attempt to put into practice the precepts of African socialism. African socialism is based on the essentially anthropological notion that African, prior to the incursion of European colonialism, was a cooperative, sharing, communitarian society of manfiest equality. This idyllic version is one that is asserted independentaly of any notion of a pre-capitalist mode of production, and is held to be the birthright of the African people, which was wrested from them by European capitalists. Marxism is rejected as a Eurocentric theory applicable only to those countries where class struggle is indigenous. Since African society is held to be naturally classless, then both class struggle and capitalism are seen as European imports. On this account, the task of the political leadership was to lead their people toward the promised land of communitarian peace and plenty by reconstituting the past.[9]

As a vision, it had a tremendous vogue at the time of independence in the early 1960s and, as an idealogy that advanced genuine African values against inherited European norms, it was used in many countries to cloak the advent of neo-imperial structures. In Kenya, for example a thorough going capitalist system was introduced in the name of African socialism in sessional paper No. 10.

But in Tenzania, for example, was an attempt to implement the precepts of this political theory. It is this fact that accounts for the hold Tanzania has exercised over the minds of intellectuals with a sympathetic view in Africa. Tanzania under the leadership of Nyerere, has embarked on a set of policies that, whatever scepticism may be entertained regarding their effectiveness, appear to have been motivated by a desire for social change in the direction of greater equality.

It is also an attempt at development without undue reliance on external resources, and a desire to create institutions based on an African model of communitarian village society. But perhaps more important than motivation and ideals is the fact that a number of radical policies have, in fact, been implemented in Tanzania over the last decade.

The Arusha Declaration and related pamphlets of 1967, outlined the main prongs of Nyerere's attack on Tanzaian society as it existed. There was to be a massive emphasis on rural development[10] with the accent placed on communal living in villages organised on the principle of Ujamaa[11]; foreign capital was to be nationalised[12]; leaders were to dispossess themselves of wealth[13]; the people were to be educated for development[14]; and equality promoted in general[15]. The surprising thing about Tanzania is that these broad ideals have been in part implemented. Nyerere claimed in 1980 that compared with the 1967 figure of 825,000 in primary schools, the comparable figure for 1975 was 1,532,000.[16]

Nationalisations, beginning in 1967 with the banking institutions and key companies, have continued, including the acquisition of the Anglo-American firm, Lonrho. The pronouncements of 1970 nationalised all buildings, the value of which exceeded Shs. 100,000. Mwongozo, the TANU guidelines published in 1971, encouraged workers' participation and criticism of management. There has been an attempt through fiscal regulation, and through control of public salaries, to equalise wealth. In 1967, Nyerere wrote in the Arusha Declaration:

> Ten Years After, the top salary of the economy was 29 times as much as the minimum wage. After direct tax taken into account, the proportion was 20:1 ... By the end of 1975 this degree of inequality had been greatly reduced. After direct tax was deducted, the highest paid employee in the public sector took home nine times as much as the minimum wage earner did.[17]

Serious problems still in Tanzania.[18] But the Tanzanian experiment cannot be curtly dismissed as only idealist fantasy. Tangible achievements do exist. There is a case to be answered. Here lies the fascination of the Tanzanian experiment. It lies in this attempt by an independent, weak and valuable African state - one of the poorest 25 countries in the world - to develop on a socialist theory that while opposing capitalism, eschews Marxism.

It is not sufficient, in rebutting Tanzanian claims to have charted an original and successful socialist course, simply to point to capitalist influence or neo-colonial element in the development mix. Roger Munray with regard to Ghana:

> Perhaps we should honestly admit that the field of pregant alternative is merely obscured, by schemes of the "Socialism or Neo-Colonialism" type. What is needed now is a much finer discrimination of the variant forms of "neo colonialism" which embraces much of the worlds; and which therefore has to be definitively liquidated as an autonmous category.

> The starting point for a lucid understanding of contemporary counter-revolutionary dynamics is a recongnition that the historically necessary should not be confounded with the historically possible.

Thus, it is within the ackowledged, inevitable[19] framework of neo-colonialism that an assessment of Tanzania must be made. Given her position that some involvement with the world market and consequent capitalist penetration could be avoided, the question is really that of whether, despite this influence, Tanzania is as Nyerere suggests, advancing toward some sort of socialism, or whether the trend is basically towards capitalism.

In the latter case, it is important to raise the ancillary question as to what sort of capitalist society we are referring when we analyse Tanzania. In all cases the issues are complex.

In evaluating the success or failure of Tanzania, on its own terms, that of establishing the basis for a sucessful socialist society, we need to decide on our key criteria. It can be accepted that Tanzania has performed excellently in terms of the provision of health, welfare and education facilities for its people. Yet, however commendable such achivements are, they not sufficient conditions for socialism, although they must be seen as necessary ones. The major plank of the Arusha Declaration and its related documents was the principle of self-reliance, of development fuelled, not by foreign aid or external capital, but by the efforts of the Tanzanian people themselves.

It was recognised that although some dependence was invitable, this must be kept to a minimum and eradicated at an early date if Tanzania was to be free to build its projected socialist society.

> Independence means self-reliance. Independence cannot be real if a nation depends upon gifts and loans from another for its development. Even if there was a nation, or nations, prepared to give us all the money we need for our development, it would be improper for us to accept such assistance without asking how this would affect our independence and our very survival as a nation ... The same applies to loans ... You have to give consideration to the ability to repay. When we borrow money from other countries, it is the Tanzanian who pays it back .. To burden the people with big loans, the repayment of which will be beyond their means, is not to help them out, but to make suffer ..... Had we been able to attract investors from America and Europe to come and start all the industries and all the projects of economic development that we need in this country, could we do, without questioning ourselves? Could we agree to leave the economy of our country in the hands of foreigners who could take the profits back to their countries? or supposing they did not insist upon taking their profits away, but decided to reinvest them in Tanzania, could we really accept this situation without asking ourselves what disadvantages our nation suffers? Would this allow the socialism we have said it is our objective to build?[20]

If this assessment of the problem was unusual in itself, the projected plan for the avoidance of unacceptable levels of dependence really set Tanzania apart from other African nations. The emphasis was to be on rural development, and on this as the basis for industrial development. "The mistake we are making" it was clearly asserted, is to think "development begins with industries".[21] Agriculture was to be the basis for development, and therefore the emphasis was to be on the production of cash crops and food. "And because the main aim of development is to get more food, and more money for other needs, our purpose must be to increase production of ... agricultural crops.[22] An obvious objection must be met at this point clearly, capitalist development and penetration of Thrid World countries has as its aim nothing less than inceased, efficent cash crop production for consumption by the developed world at prices dominated by the latter. But in Tanzania, rural development was to be geared to the programme of Ujamaa villages, the establishment of village communities where socialism and communitarian relations of production would be established.

> We shall achieve the goals in this country we have set for ourselves if the basis of Tanzanian life consists of rural economic and social communities where people live together and work together in cooperation for the common good of the nation as a whole.[23]

Thus would the evil effects within the world market will be met and defeated.

Two criteria, then, for evaluating Tanzania's progress are the measure of self-reliance, in terms of freedom from dependence on foreign loans, gifts and capital and the success of Ujamaa villagisation. A third and final one can also be drawn from the Arusha Declaration where it is clearly asserted that:

> To build and maintian socialism, it is essential that all the major means of production and exchange in the nation are controlled or owned by peasants through the machinery of their government and their cooperatives. Further, it is essential that the Party should be a Party of peasants and workers.[24]

Thus, our third criterion must involve the nature and the extent of nationalisation in Tanzania, and the success involved in breaking free from the neo-colonial web.

In conjunction with this principle, it was asserted that a State is not socialist simply because the government controls the means of production and exchange, but only if that government is also directly controlled by the workers and peasants. "True socialism", it was noted, "cannot exist without democracy also existing in the society".[25] Thus, an emphasis on the participation of ordinary citizens in the crucial decisions affecting their lives has always been a major part of Tanzanian policy, though in practice the State's bureaucracy has proved, on most occasions, as dirigist as any other.[26]

We shall now examine the issues of self reliance, Nationalisation and Ujamaa Vijijini in Tanzania.

(i) Self-Reliance

An examination of the figure regarding foreign aid, loans and gifts over the period since Arusha suggests an increasing level of dependance rather than self-reliance. The trend has involved the acceptance of large amounts of aid from a number of developed countries, in particular the Scandinavian group, the involvement of USAID, UNDP and other UN agencies in the whole range of activities and, perhaps most significantly, an increasing reliance on the World Bank as a source of development finance. This trend was accencuated by the oil price hike of 1973, and the serious economic difficulties in which Tanzania found itself in 1974. In a speech (introducing the Development Plan in June 1978), Ndugu E.I.M. Mtei, Minister of Finance and Planning, paid tribute to foreign beneficiaries.

> However, here I would like to mention the countries and international organisations which have promised to extend developement assistance to us. They are Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Canada, Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, China, USSR, Romania, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, India, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Australia, USA, Kuwait Fund, Abu Dhabi Fund, Saudi Fund, World Bank, ADB, UNDP, BADLA, OPEC and EEC. I also expect the International Monetary Fund as usual, will continue its cooperation with Tanzania to make our payments easy, and facilitate orderly implementation of our development plan.[27]

An examination of the relevant figures reveals an increasing dependence on foreign grants and loans in the Development budget, in 1971/72, the situation was thus:

Table 1: Increasing Dependence on foreign grants 1971/72 Budget

(a) Development Budget expenditure ..... T.Shs. 771,880,000

(b) Externally financed developmet expenditure ...T.Shs. 386,200,000

(c) Percentage (b) of (a) ..... 49.924.[28]

The projected figures for 1978/79 were as follows:

(a) Development Budget Expenditure ..... T.Shs. 5,823,6 Million

(b) Revenue from interenal sources,

ie. recurrent budget surpus (shs

294 Million), non banking loans (Shs.440 million), miscellaneous sources including donations from individuals, corporations abd companies (Shs. 553 million), bank loans (Shs. 711 million)

(c) Grants from foreign countries ..... T.Shs 1,749,0 million

(d) Loans from abroad ..... T.Shs 1,833,9 million

(e) Shortfall to be met:

OPEC loan ..... T.Shs 123.2 million

Programme assistance EEC..... T.Shs 171.2 million

Stabex ..... T.Shs 70.2 million

(f) Externally financed Development

expenditure ..... T.Shs 3,98.2 million.[29]

It may be argued that although the degree of dependence of foreign countries and institutions implied that these figures run both to the spirit and letter of the Arusha Declaration, however, the figures only give us a single perspective. What about the way in which these funds have been used? Have they been used in a way that sharply marks Tanzania off from the development experience elsewhere? The answer is negative. Broadly speaking, the main features of the Tanzanian economy tally with the model of peripheral development suggested by Samir Amin in, his article: "Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model".[30] In this piece, Amin puts forward a crude but useful scheme for identifying and distinguishing between developed countries on the one hand, and peripherally developed countries on the other. Developed countries he characterises as possessing a self-centred system where the central determining relationship is between mass consumption and the production of capital goods. Peripheral development is characterised, coversely, by a peripheral-dependent relationship between the export sector (minerals and primary products) and the consumption of luxury goods (by an urban based privileged group).

Tanzania is still basically dependent on the production of agricultural goods, namely sisal, coffee, cotton, cashewunts, tea and tobacco, these make up 70 per cent of total exports.

The value of manufactured exports increased from Shs. 116.1 million in 1965 to Shs. 388 million in 1975, that is a percentage of total exports, from 84 per cent in 1965 to 14.2 per cent in 1975.

As a percentage of the total GDP, the value of the industrial share in 1979 was 7.6 per cent and 10 per cent in 1975.[31] Thus, industrialisation in Tanzania has remained low, and the country is basically dependent on the importation of manufactured goods, particularly of capital goods.

The industrialisation that has taken place has been in the area of import substitution of luxury goods, e.g. beer, cigarrettes. As the Minister for Industries, Ndugu C. D. Msuya candidly admitted in a speech:

> While the share of GDP has risen over the last 10 years, the structure of industrial output has not shifted radically from its pre-independence orientation towards agro-processing and light manufacturing which are dependent on imported raw materials, with little or no internal linkages to domestic raw materials.[32]

This is a familiar picture of peripheral development or rather dependence, with the country reliant on a bouyant level of world prices for economic health, and with a countinuing necessity for the import of manufactured goods. Tanzania shares one other feature of this peripheral model, but this has only recently become significant She is a net importer of food. The country has, of course, always been a net importer of food; but this was negligible to the crisis in agricultural production that developed dramatically from 1972 to 1974. Indeed, Michael Lofchie has asserted with regard to this problem that "Tanzania's food crisis was so severe that its population .... was in imminent peril of widespread famine."[33] Since then mazie has been imported on a large scale and imports continue to be necessary for domestic production. As the Minister of Finance reported in June 1978:

> The food situation which has started to improve in 1976/77 continued to be better in 1977/78 although we had to import cereals worth Sh. 230 million to bridge the gap between demand and local production and in particular in the case of rice and wheat. This grain import bill consumed 5.3 per cent of our total expenditure on imports.[34]

Tanzania, of course, differs in a number of significant ways from Samir Amin's model. The concious policy of rural development has involved the peasantry in the day-to-day running of the villagisation programme. There have been deliberate policies aimed at diminishing the divergence between urban and rural standard, and those privileged to indulge in luxury goods consumption have had to do so; by virtue of the prevailing ideology, somewhat more circumspectly and in fewer number than, say in neighbouring Kenya. The existence of substantial Chinese aid, signigicant in two areas, textiles (Friendship Textile Mills) and transport (Tanzania Rail Link) also serves to distinguish Tanzania's developmental experience from her neighbours, but without providing any strong claim for her to be considered as a distinct and separate model. In fact, Tanzania's economy shares enough features with other examples of peripherally developed economices, sufficient to make us start thinking about the effectiveness of her "socialist" policies.

Yet, it is also important to note that this problem appears to be recognised by the CCM.

> As regards projects for implementation, emphasis will be placed on industries which will cater for essential consumer goods e.g. clothing, leather products and so on. During this period, a foundation will be laid for the development of metal products, chemicals, paper, construction and building materials, textile and leather industries.[35]

It is also emphasised that, where possible, intermediate and basic technology will be used in order to establish small and meduim scale industries at the district and village levels.

Clearly, however, this industrial strategy faces many constraints. If self-reliance is the aim, then the capital for this strategy must be generated by rural development and peasant production. The problems encountered by the Ujamaa programme make this an impossibility. Thus, such a programme will inevitably be dependent on foreign capital and loans subject to the influence of institutions such as the World Bank, which is already making its presence felt in the area of agricultural production.[36]

Overall, it can be seen that Nyerere's statement in January 1977, that "although our nation is not by any means economically independent; we are not becoming more dependent on others with time"[37] must be viewed with more than healthy criticism.

(ii) Nationalisation

Nationalisation has been a key feature of Tanzania's programme. It has been implemented to the point where the State Trading Corporation (STC) and the National Development Corporation (NDC) are involved in all important industrial and commerical projects. Nyerere's claim in his review of the Arusha Declaration that "no able-bodied person lives on an unearned income"[38] was based partly on the nationalisation programme. Certainly, it is true that there is no clearly identifiable class of African capitalists of either a comprador or national bourgeois character in Tanzania. However, it is by no means true that the nationalisation programme has given the government complete control over the commanding heights of the economy or excluding the penetration of foreign capital. Although firms have been nationalised, this has meant not a complete take-over, but a partnership arrangement between the NDC and a foreign firm. To give some outstanding examples:

TABLE TWO

COMPANY	NDC HOLDING	FOREIGN PARTNER
Williamsons Diamonds Ltd.	50%	Wilcroft Co. (Bermuda) (Openheimer/De Beers)
Portland Cement Co. Ltd.	50%	Cementia Hodg. Zurich and Associates. Portland Cement, Zambia.
Mental Box Co. of Tanzania Ltd.	50%	Metal Box Co. (U.K.)
Tanzaina Public House	50%	McMillan and Co.
B.A.T. Tanzania Ltd.	60%	British/American Tobacco Co. Ltd.
Tanzania Breweries	51%	East African Breweries Ltd. (Associated with Allied Breweries) U.K.
Tanganyika Packers	51%	Brooke Bond Liebig Gp.

SOURCE: Issa Shivji. The Silent Class Struggle, pp. 51 - 60.[39]

The Nationalisation Programme in Tanzania

Thus, while ownership nominally rests with the Tanzanian Government, foreign capital is still heavily involved in current and future developments. As with similar situations eleswhere, firms frequently find these partnership arrangements congenial. Among the benefits derived are the respectability conferred by State involvement, and the underwiting, by the State, of infrastructure costs, such as the provision of adequate power, transport and financial facilities.

The point here is not that these figures indicate a massive penetration of Tanzania. As a percentage of GDP, the value of the industrial share was only 10% in 1975,[40] so no matter the level of penteration, it was within a strict and limited boundary. But they do show that the nationalisation measures have not deterred capitalist penetration, and on their own terms, have not achieved levels of ownership and control commensurate with a socialist programme.

(ii) Ujamaa Vijijini

If there is a single touchstone of Tanzanian socialism, it must be the programme for the establishment of Ujamaa villages. It was on the basis of these village communities that in the first instance rural development was to be achieved, leading to sustained self-generating growth. They were to supply food to the people, and provide a surplus of agricultural production in the form of cash from sales overseas. Meanwhile, they would be instrumental in creating socialist relations of production with a democratic control over their own labour processes. To ensure this, the emphasis in the intial stages was on voluntary association. Four phases of Ujamaa villagisation can be discerned in the period from independence to the present time.

(a) Voluntary Association:

In December 1962, in his inaugural address, President Nyerere stated.

> The first and absolutely essential thing to do, therefore, if we want to be able to start using tractors for cultivation is to begin living in proper villages .... For the next few years, the Government will be doing all it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities.[41]

The basic impetus towards Ujamaa villages thus predates Arusha by five years.

Nyerere's Ujamaa, the basis of African Socialism was published in 1962. In the period 1962 - 1963, there was a mass spontaneous settlement of about 1,000 villages. The TANU Youth League was involved in gernerating enthusiasm and commitment, one of the most successful experiments being that the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA). There were villages in the RDA and in their organisation they came close to Nyerere's early ideals. Not only cash crops, but food supplies were communally grown. There were regular meetings experiences and expertise were pooled, and an educational programme was instituted.

(b) Inducement: 1968 to 1973

In the post-Arusha period, an increasing emphasis was placed on the provision of material benefits available to those who moved into villages. In December 1972, a decentralisation of the bureaucracy took place and Regional Development Directorates were created. They supervised the provision of services to the villages that were established. These were the provision of schools, para-medical services, water, aid for village industries, agricultural extension services and, in some exceptional circumstances, electric power.

A problem that clearly emerged at this time was that it was the poorer peasants who to emerged between poorer sections of the country like central Tanzania, and the richer areas such as Iringa and Kilimanjaro, where capitalist farming offered 'substantial' returns.

In Kilimanjaro district in 1975, only 3% of the people lived in Ujamaa villages. It is ironic, therefore, that a by-product of the Ujamma programme was a highlighting of the existence of peasants, disinterested in communitarian farming.

(c) Organised Settlement" 1970 to 1973

This phase overlaps the period of inducement, a fact which reflects the debates that were occuring at the time within TANU as to the merits and demerits of the insistence on the voluntary character of Ujamaa. There was strong pressure exerted for more involvement by the Party and the bureaucracy in the creation of Ujamaa villages. It was suggested that people should be induced to form villages by bureaucratic pressure. Indeed, a vocal minority was in favour of coercion.

In 1969, Nyerere signalled his dis-stisfaction with the voluntary combination of committed individuals as a method of achieving rapid Ujamaa vilagisation by allowing the Ruvuma Development association, the voluntary body per execellence, to be gazetted as an illegal organisation. The new emphasis was to be a frontal approach - the need to involve everyone in the country and, in particular, everyone in TANU, in some move, however small towards socialism.[42]

The new approach can be seen in Operation Rufiji in 1969 in which the peasants of the Rufiji Valley were pressurised by bureaucrats to move to higher ground to avoid flood damage and subsequent famine relief, a recurrent problem since colonial times. In the event, "Operation Rufiji" was a failure, since the peasants, suspicious of offical motives, and fearing nationalisation of the land, refused to cooperate.[43] In "Operation Dodma", mounted in 1971, 30,000 Wagogo families were organised into 190 villages, and in "Operation Kigoma" in 1972, 400,000 people were moved to 192 villages. With the inception of organised settlement, the emphasis on Ujamaa changed. Villagers in the Dodma region interviewed in 1975, did not claim to have achieved Ujamaa. They saw themselves as working at cooperative ventures and aiming at Ujamaa at some future time. At the same time, the cooperative ventures that had been undertaken, chickens, pigs, communal planting and so on, were referred to as Ujamaa project.[44]

This lack of clarity is indicative of the lack of clear direction that existed with regard to Ujamaa villagisation. Obviously, there can be no single ideal model of the Ujamaa village, for the stlye of the different people of Tanzania, and the climatic variations of different regions will enforce their own constraints. But incresingly, it became unclear as to whether Ujamaa was the number one priority, or whether it was villagisation perse, with the emphasis on organisation and production, that had become dominant. The answer was provided in the next phase of Ujamaa.

(d) Enforced Villagisation: 1973 to 1978.

In November 1973, Nyerere announced that "to live in Villages is in order". This move was partly motivated by the slow progress being made in getting people into villages and partly by the need to boost production of cash crops in the face of a worsening economic situation. Following this announcement, it was left to the Regional Development Directorates to enforce and implement the policy. The aim was to have all people in rural areas organised into villages by 1976. It was estimated that by then, well over 90 per cent of these people are so organised. The process met some resistance both active, which necessitated the use of the army, and passive, in the form of planting root crops upside down. There were some errors, and some instances of nepotism and corruption. But, generally speaking, the process of creating and organising the new villages has passed off relatively smoothly.

The emphasis is very clearly on the creation of villages as the key process, for control of the population, the provision of services, and the maximisation of production. Ujamaa is spoken of as something to be aimed at for the future. The emphasis is not so much on collective living as on development per se, that is modernisation and production. Indeed, the villages created after Nyerere's order of 1973 were called "Development Villages". Increasingly, the Ujamaa programme has been dominated by quantitative criteria, which emphasise the number of villages, the amount of crops produced and the like. As Lofchie notes:

> "....As early as December 1974, there was a tacit mutual understanding that policies to restore a high level of agricultural production should take precedence over policies oriented towards the fulfilment of normative social goals."[45]

Production was further emphasised when in 1974, Nyerere introduced a programme called Kilimo na Kufoa (Life and Death Agriculture) in response to the worsening economic and food situation. The resistance to enforced villagisation referred to above, had exacerbated an already bad situation.

Indeed, Lofchie argues further that "there is compelling reason to believe that the programme of collective villagisation was the major cause of a crisis in agricultural production of calamitous proportions".[46] The de-emphasis on collectivisation that followed was carried to the point where not only were peasants allowed to cultivate private plots, as has always been the case, but were actively encouraged to do so. Indeed, in some areas in 1974 to 1975, for example, Teh Dodoma region, peasants were required to cultivate six areas of privately held land. They received a cetificate for this from their village which had to be produced in order to gain entrance to the markets, to ride on trains, and so on.[47]

As the development villages came into existence, there was significant increase in the role played by World Bank finance in agriculture.

Some of the villages became specialised producers of a single crop, backed by World Bank capital. There are now tobacco specialists in Chunya and Tabora, and a tea project in Indiga. There is also a move towards the introduction of hybrid grains with their accompanying needs for fertiliser and other high technology agro-products of the developed World. This is taking palce under the auspices of the National Maize Project, which is financed by the World Bank. In the offing is a twenty-year World Bank-backed project called the National Agricultural Development Project which one commentator believes will rob Tanzania of virtually all control over her food and agricultural production.[48] Clearly, Tanzania have moved a considerable distance from the original conception of Ujamaa villages.

In Section II, we have looked at the literature on development in Tanzania and related same to land-development viz:

* Self reliance as an intergral part of rural development,
* Nationalisation, involving the inclusion of the Trading Corporation (STC) in all industrial and commercial projects, and
* What Ujamaa entails. Here, issues like the formation of voluntary associations, inducement for farmers between 1968 and 1973, organised settlement: 1970 to 1973 and enforced villagisation were discussed.

The impact of all these policies on rural development were always kept in view.

The next Section, III, is a detailed appraisal of the concept of "self-reliance". This is important in view off the fact that the policy of rural development in Tanzania has self-reliance as its pivot. To what extent has the principle of self-reliance informed the direction of rural development in Tanzania? What is the interpretation of Tanzanian's (policy makers and the electorate) as regards what self reliance means. These are some of the issues to be examined in the next section.

THE CONCEPT OF SELF-RELIANCE

Self reliance should be regarded as a process or a deliberate strategy for obtaining a set of objectives, rather than a condition or an end state. The objectives of a strategy of national self-realiance are to aviod dependence and to promote development.[49] The strategy of self-reliance is basically dynamic some discernible phases. At the outset, it involves a partial disengagement of a country from the existing pattern of dominant economic and political relationships pervailing in the international system.

This disengagement initially induces, and is later accompanied by deliberate restructuring of these relationships to alter the basis of international relations. This restructuring of international trade, investment, and monetary relationships is often described as collective self-reliance when many states are involved. There is also a significant domestic component to the restructuring phase, incorporating the alteration of existing class relationships, the modification of consumption values, the development of new (and "appropriate") technologies and institutions, the decentralisation of decision-making, and the increase of political participation. This restructuring of domestic relationships is sometimes discussed as local or individual self-reliance, but it also reinforces the restructring of international relationships.

After the partial disengagement and restructuring phases, a partial reassociation or re-establishment of relations with the industrial countries theoretically takes place.

The specific association such a strategy can be described in greater detail. Disengagement from the international economic system entails the erection of tradebankers to restrict the magnitude and influence of foreign goods. Comprehensive limitations on the amount of foreign investment and expatriate manpower are also an important part of disengagement, as is the deliberate rejection of aid offers from industrial countries. China employed all three of these policies in varying degrees after 1949. Servering ties to existing global political institutions is also an implicit aspect of disengagement. Rejection of multilateral aid offers or IMF financial transfers eliminates the possibility foreign political leverage. Disengagement from global political institutions might also involve a refusal to participaste in UN peacekeeping forces to aviod potentially costly (or embrassing) international involvements.

The disangagement is an intergral part of a strategy of self-reliance, and is intentionally partial and selective. It is not a call for complete autarky or absolute national self-suffiency. Rather disengagement is a call for a partial reduction in the mangnitude of international economic transactions with industrial countries and for the attainment of self-sufficiency only in particular sectors or activities. Self-sufficiency in fulfilling basic needs of the population (such as food, energy or national defense) is a disengagement process.

Agricultural self-sufficiency as the basic need closest to being fulfilled in the provision of other basic needs (such as energy and national defense) varies from country country to country, according to natural and human resource endowments. In a process of selective disengagement, therefore, self-sufficiency would be attained on a sector by sector basis.

The development of new technologies, or the adaptation of existing methods is also an important part of the disengagement process. Foreign expertise is rejected and emphasis is placed on the local design of equipment and methods of production. Ideally, technological modifications are suggested by the workers and lead to more appropriate methods of production that are better suited to local supplies of labour and capital, or based on more locally available supplies of raw materials.

The disengagement process just described induces a restructuring of basic international and domestic relationships, the phase of a strategy of national self-reliance. The restructuring initially induced by disengagement is subsequently extended and implemented as policy by the State in countries pursuring such a strategy.

The restructing of basic international relationships of under-developed countries away from their traditional ties to industrial countries is generally described as "collective self-reliance". Collective self-reliance refers to increased cooperation and exchanges of commodities and still among developing countries, economic integration at the regional level, and the establishment of permanent Thrid World institutions.

Collective self-reliance is induced by disengagement, as transaction with other underdeveloped countries begin to take the place of many of the previous ties to industrial countries. It is subsequently actively pursued in efforts "to promote methods of international economic exchange and cooperation which are different in kind from those at present operating".[50]

Like dependency writers and other critics of the contemporary order, advocates of self-reliance assume that trade and other exchanges between unequal partners are inherently exploitative in favour of the stronger partner. Hence, it is only through the expansion of exchanges with other under-developed countries that the exploitation inherent in the structure of the current world system can be eliminated.

Some of the specific forms of cooperation and exchange that are a part of international restruturing are largely economic, while others are predominantly political and institutional. At base, international restructuring involves an increase in both the frequency and magnitude of economic exchanges between under-developed countries, including increased trade, improved communication links, and the expansion of educational and technical exchanges. Economic intergration of underdeveloped countries, involving traiff reductions, industrial planning, technological acquisition, and the exploitation of natural resourses on a regional basis can also be an important aspect of international restructuring.

Among the types of political and institutional cooperation associated with international restructuring is joint action in UN negotiation, especially on trade and investment issues. The coordination of negotiating position vis-a-vis multinational corporation (on tax rates and investment incentives) is also important along the lines of the policy coordination within the Andean Common Market.
Finally the development of Third World institutions, including a permanent secretariat and organisation designed to co-ordinate research, collect and analyse data, and provide economic consulting services can also be a part of international restructuring.

In addition to reducing a restructuring of international relationship, disengagement also induces a major restructuring of basic relationships, values, and institutions domestically, within a country pursuing self-reliance. The domestic restructuring initially induced by disengagement is subsequently extended and implemented as policy by countries pursuing self-reliance. At the most general level, domestic restructuring theoretically changes what Samir Amin has referred to as a situation common in Third World countries of "producing what we do not consume, and consuming what we do not produce".[51]

One of the best illustrations of domestic restructuring induced by disengagement is provided by an examination of domestic class structure. Disengagement from trade and investment linkages like multinational corporations would undermine the basis of a comrador-class, engaged in export - import trading activities or other pursuits designed to facilitate the access of multinational corporations to the domestic market.

The erection of trade and investment bankers would also provide a basis for domestic production which would not only alter the domestic class structure but also provide locally manufactured products better suited to domestic markets and tastes Rejection of military and other aid offers would also necessarily induce technogical innovations within the country pursuing self-reliance in order to maintain national security.

Although disengagement induces a great deal of domestic restructuring, it is by no means sufficient to effect or sustain the amount of domestic restructuring required for self-reliance. Active State intervention at all levels is also required. For example, though disengagement would severely limit the development of a domestic comprador class, State intervention to eliminate such a class altogether might be accomplished by the nationalisation of all import-export activities. State intervention to alter consumption pattern, change basic consumer value, or redirect domestic production might also be pursued with state subsidies for the production of mass consumer goods or campaigns to encourage the consumption of locally produced goods. Tax incentives and State participation in joint ventures have been used by many countries to expand the domestic production of mass consumer items. The promotion of "individual self-reliance" (the acceptance of responsibility for one's own basic needs) can also assist in the transformation of consumption patterns by instilling self-confidence in, respect for the products of local artisans and manufacturers.

Other aspects of domestic restructuring include the creation of new and "approriate" institutions. Appropriate institutions are defined as those which support the basic principle of relying on local efforts and initiatives and therefore are an important part of domestic restructuring. Tanzania has long been associated with efforts to establish appropriate institutions in the field of education.

Security and national defence is another area in which appropriate institutions can be established. Citizens' militia are important in countries pursuing a national strategy of self-reliance because they encourage reliance on local efforts (an example of "local self-reliance") and also increase mass participation. More important, citizens' militia enhance national security by decentralising national defence and making it virtually impossible to control the country's occupation of its capital city. China has formed citizens' militia to ensure that "neither foreign bases nor bombers coming from afar can tip the scales of war against an army which moves among the people as fish in water"[52] Tanzania, Mozambique and Vietnam have also formed citizens' militia to buttress their security needs.

In theory, these formed newly appropriate institutions should be decentralised to ensure maximum participation and to ensure that self-reliance is implemented at all levels of society. Existing institutions should also be transformed along the same lines. China is often presented as an example of a country that has decentralised industrial production:

Promises, municipalities, and even countries seem to be developing along self-sufficient, autonomous lines under the official injuction to build small but complete industrial systems by self-reliance.

In administrative terms, however, the State retains control over many strategic industries such as oil, power steel transportation and communication. Decentralisation of the State adminstrative bureaucracy is also attempted by many countries pursuing self-reliance. Local or regional control of economic planning, of education, or the distribution of social services are all examples of bureaucratic decentralisation.

One of the objectives of decentralisation is to enhance national security. Decentralisation of the economic and political system makes it more difficult for an enemy to conquer or control a country pursuing self-reliance. Increased public participation is another basic objective of decentralisation.

Decentralisation eventually involves everyone in solving problems and is a mean of "democratising" daily life.

In theory, decentralisation should lead to more worker participation in management, and to student participation in decisions which affect them in their educational institutions. Allowing workers and students to make their own decisions should increse their personal satisfaction, encourage satisfaction, encourage their commitment to local institution building, and enable them to learn from their own mistakes.

Increased decentralisation and mass participation should also enhance "local" or "individual self-reliance". That is, they encourage reliance on one's own efforts at the provincial, district, commune, factory, or individual level. Ultimately, individual and local self-reliance reinforce the strategy of self-reliance at the national level. As the Tanzanians proclaimed in their original statement of self-reliance (in the Arusha Declaration):

> If every individual is self-reliant, the ten-house cell will be self-reliant; if all the calls are self-reliant; the whole ward will be self-reliant; and if the wards are self-reliant, the District will be self-reliant. if the Districts are self-reliant, then the Region is self-reliant, then the whole nation is self-reliant and this is our aim.[56]

John Galtung makes a similar argument, when he stresses that self-reliance is a dynamic movement from the periphery, at all levels, which cannot be led from above.[7]

The international and domestic restructuring intiated by disangagement and sustained by state intervention are mutually reinforcing. For example, the expansion of trade with other underdeveloped countries should reinforce comestic efforts to redirect consumption patterns. In theory, at least, products imported should be more oriented toward fulfilling the basic needs of the mass population than products imported from industrial countries.

Similarly, the elimnation of a comprador class reliant on commercial ties to industrial countries should, in theory, expand opportunities for increased trade cooperation among underdeveloped countries.

Following its disengagement and restructuring of international and domestic relations, a country pursuing a strategy of national self-reliance theoretically begins the reassociation phase, that is, partial re-establishment of previous relations, with the idustrial countries.[54] A new international economic order is thus created in which economic and political relations take place on a "different" basis. The proir basis of dependency relations has been altered. Disengagement and restructuring have transformed countries pursuing self-reliance to such an extent that they can afford to re-estabilish previous economic and political relationships with industrial countries without fear of the consequences of excessive dependence. It is not clear whether any country has yet reached this stage of self-reliance in practice, although some have suggested that China's "opening up" in recent years is a form of partial re-association.

On the whole, a strategy of national self-reliance can be defined as (1) a deliberate policy of selective <u>disengagement</u> from international transactions (trade, aid investment, tecnology, information and manpower exchanges), replaced by reliance on internal capabilities; (2) a conscious <u>restructuring</u> of basic economic and political relationships, values and institutions; (a) internationally between the country pursuing self-reliance and other countries in the international system and (b) domestically, within the country pursuing self-reliance; and (3) <u>reassociation</u>, or partial re-establishment of previous economic and political international transactions with industrial countries on a changed basis.[54] The relationship between these components of national self-reliance is illustrated in figure 2.

FIGURE TWO: SCHEMATIC SUMMARY OF A STRATEGY OF NATIONAL SELF-RELIANCE



The summary statements in figure 2 are gross simplifications of the arguments of many self-reliance advocates. However, they serve to illustrate where the basic components of self-reliance belong in the general usage of the term. They also help to distinguish between the different levels of self-reliance that is, individual, local, national, and collective self-reliance. Figure 2 is a summary of core arguments only.

Both disengagement and restructuring are necessary components of a strategy of national self-reliance.[55] Disengagement without deliberate restructuring cannot be descibed as self-reliance. Reassociation is also a central component, but cannot be assessed empirically for most countries in the current international system. Rather, reassociation is anitcipated as future phase for countreis undergoing the disengagement and restructring process. Finally, the seperation of the restructuring phase into international and domestic components is made for analytical purposes only. In a country pursuing self-reliance, the restructring of domestic relationships will reinforce the restructuring of international relations and vice versa.

In the next Section, we shall examine exactly what is meant by "rural socialism", and whether in Tanzanian there is a particular connotation for the expression. The concept of rural socialism is related to the issue of self reliance which was extensively discussed in Section III.

IV

TANZANIA AND THE AMBIGUTIY OF RURAL SOCIALISM

Policies do not exist in a vacuum. Nations have numerous goals, and on oocasion they conflict. One example of this is the case of Tanzanian "villagisation" policies.

In 1967, President Nyerere published "Socialism and Rural Development", a document which outlined a programme of rural development the government intended to pursue. The central element in this programme was the collectivisation of agriculture, which Nyerere justified on a number of economic, historical and moral grounds. Collectivisation did not get off the ground for two years. Starting in early 1970, however, it accelerated rapidly[56] and large numbers of peasants were resettled, often forcibly,[57] in collective villages. Villagistion was aimed at increasing agricultural output.

For countries like Tanzania, a viable option to dependence is the establishment of rural capital goods industries. Such a policy necessitates the transfer of labour from agriculture to rural industry. This transfer can occur only if there is a labour "surplus" in agriculture, which in turn implies that output is greater than the subsistence level. The question is how villagisation affects output.

Following Mao's ezample, let us divide the peasantry into three groups: poor, middle and rich. Middle peasants are likely to benefit from villagisation: their resources are sufficient to withstand the moving costs, and they farm sufficient land to gain from the increase in capital resources available as a result of villagisation. Poor and rich peasants, however, stand to lose from collectivisation. The poor lack the resources to cope with moving costs, while the latter are "precluded from expanding their fields".[58]

Hence, we should expect that in the early stages of villagisation, it is the middle areas which will "volunteer" to be collectivised. At this stage, total agricultural output will rise. As the state continues to press towards higher levels of villagisation, the supply of "volunteers" is exhausted, and the poor and rich areas (especilly the former) tend to be "drafted". When collectivisation reaches these levels, output will therefore tend to fall. Hence, if we were to plot output against villagisation, we should expect an inverted V-shaped curve- and this, indeed, is what we find in Graph 1, below.

GRAPH 1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VILLAGISATION AND AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT, 1969-1973.



Definitions:

V: Number of Ujamaa villages

A: Net trade (exports-imports) in maize (1,000 metric tons)

Data taken from Lofchie (1978).

We have the analytical tools to relate villagisation to dependence - reduction.

GRAPH 2: THE THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEE VILLAGISATION AND DEPENDENCE-REDUCTION POTENTIAL (Z).



In quadrant B, the hypothesised positive relationship between labour released from agriculture, L_R (measured and leftward) and agricultural output (Q_A) is plotted. Q_A labour is released. In Quadrant C, we have shown the hypothesised positive relationship labour and the labour-intensity of capital goods production (measured downward)

We have depicted this by Z_K since we have shown that Z is production. From these grraphs, it becomes possible to deduce the relationship between Z and villagisation, V. Each level of V is associated with a level of Q_A, which is associated with a level of L_R, which is associated with a level of Z_K, Reading downward from V, and rightward from Z_K, we can then plot the locus of points satisfying the other three relationships. As can be seen in Quadrant D, there appears to be a dichotomous relation between V and ZK. Below V, Z_K increases with V, above that level, it declines. This relationship is in fact borne out by the data as can be seen in Figure 3.

GRAPH 3: THE EMPIRICAL REALTIONSHIP BETWEEN VILLAGISATION (V) REDUCTION POTENTIAL (Z_K), 1969 - 1973.



Definitions:

V: As in figures 1

$$Z_{kf} \frac{(OK)_r / (OK = 1)_r}{(EI)_t / (EI - 1)_t}$$ where O_R is domestic capital goods - output and E_I is total gross fixed capital formation. Q_R is computed by subtracting capital goods imports from E_I.

Data for Z_k taken from UN Year book of National Accounts Statistics and UN Year book of International Trade Statistics.

Given that dependence - reduction is a positive function of Z_K, this is a somewhat gloom finding. For one, Z_K does not exceed Z_K which suggests that there is a ceiling (at least in the short run) to the degree of dependence - reduction that can be expected from collectivisation-induced rural cottage industries. This conclusion is supported by Figure 4, which appears to show a basic long-term level of dependence around 0.62.

GRAPH 4: TIME PATH OF ECONOMIC AUTHONOMY (A), 1964 - 1975



Definition: Q_K and E_I defined and measured as in graph 4

$$A = \frac{Q_K}{EI};$$

Forced collectivisation brings this figure down temporarily as does the drought, but even when the short-term moving costs incurred in collectivisation are amortised, the dependence level only returns to the pre-Arusha period. Second, and more worrisome for the Tanzanian leadership, the goal of rural socialism appears incompatible with the goal of dependence-reduction (assuming V has been exceeded, which the evidence suggests). Ujamaa may counteract Uhuru.

This analysis should not be constructed as sounding the death knell for rural collectivisation, through the Tanzanian regime along with certain observers (e.g Lofchie, 1978) appears to be acting that way. What this discussion does indicates is a need for the government to decide which is more important to it: rural socialism or a reduction in economic dependence. If the former is deemed primary, then a return to forced collectivisation is the alternative.[59]

If dependence-reduction is considered more urgent, then a policy akin to Amin's "let the kulaks run" is logical, since the high agricultural prices it would necessitate would probably release surplus labour quite quickly.

Finally, should the regime rate both goals equal, then a policy combining price incentives, ideological indoctrination, and, perhaps, political payoffs, would be apposite. What is crucial, though, whatever the regime's preference-ordering is to avoid sudden starts and stops. Given the security craved by most peasants,[60] the sheer "transaction costs" of abrupt moves are in most cases too high to be justified.

This analysis, of course, is somewhat preliminary. More work will be needed, both theoretical and empirical, before we can come to any firm conclusions about the relation between rural socialism and economic dependence. Yet, in view of the large number of people who live in peasant communities in highly dependent countries, the topic is an important one.

The next section, V is an overview of the rural policies in Tanzania, especially where they contradict one another, and how these seeming incosistencies have affected the policy of rural development.

V

CONTRADICTIONS IN THE RURAL POLICIES IN TANZANIA.

Soon after independence in 1961, the new government of then Tanganyika emphasised the importance of rural areas in its development efforts. Emphasis was to be placed on increasing production and generally the living standards in the countryside where more than 95 per cent of the population lived. The specific programme adopted for this purpose was actually inherited from the colonial government. As a result of recommendations by a World Bank team, two "approaches" were adopted; the "improvement" and the "transformation" approaches. While the former basically consisted of attempts to gradually raise output within existing rural households through extension services, the latter sought to radically transform agriculture through the resettlement in special schemes of pre-selected villagers who would then engage in "modern" farming under the supervision and direction of officials. By the end of 1965, there were 23 such schemes with some 15,000 acres of crops and about 3,400 farming families.[61]

As regards these early policies, we can observe two important features. First, it is a matter of significance that there was an obvious bias towards export crops in this two-pronged programme for rural development. As far as the "improvement" approach was concerned concentration was almost entirely on the improvement of cash crops that had by then become traditional - cotton, coffee, and so on.[62]

In the settlement schemes, also, emphasis was put on those crops that needed greater technical supervision, especially tobacco, and of course here, there was greater official control of what to plant as everything in the scheme was planned and dictated by government agancies appointed for the purpose. With hindsight, we can easily see that de-emphasis on the production of foodstuffs started then as a result of these two approaches.[63] Greater and greater attention came to be placed on export crops until the country became a net food importing country. Grain imports have been increasing over the years, and now stand at about half a million tons per year.

Second, the basic orientation of "development" as such was always the resettlement of the peasants in new and large villages. It was felt without "villagisation there could not be much progress in the long run. We could argue, however, that the substance of the "villagisation" idea is control.

Tanzania is one of those countries in Africa whose population density is relatively low. According to the population census, there are some 2.28 hectares per capita in the country, and we have an average of 7.27 hectares per capita or 16.97 hectares per household.

From Table 4 it can be clearly seen that there is a great variation of density between the regions.[64] Yet, the vast majority of the people live in areas with relatively low density: 30 per cent live in areas with less than 15 persons per square kilometers, and half of the entire population live in areas with less than 20 persons per square kilometers. This is not to say that there is no population pressure on the land as yet.

Despite the relatively vast landmass, only a small proportion is at the moment habitable. Presently, the entire small - holder cultivation is carried out on only 5 per cent of the landmass, for instance. What this means is that the peasant population is concentracted in small pockets, yet possessing considerable leeway for manoeuvre. Peasants can, and do move a great deal, opening up uninhabited areas for cultivation for many decades during the colonial period, many rural farmers continued to use the shifting method of cultivation despite government attempts to stamp it out. Both colonial and post-colonial governments have laid emphasis on containing the peasantry into designated settlements so as to be able to enforce agricultural policies.

Thus, the first phase in the formulation of rural developemnt polices in Tanzania was a very logical continuation of the colonial efforts to integrate to the furtherest extent possible, the peasantry into the world capitalist market. And this could be done through assembling the peasanty into sufficiently large settlements to facilitate governmrnt supervision and control. Through greater involvement in the cash economy, and greater dependence on the foreign market, both for marketing their produce and for essential inputs, rural dwellers in Tanzania came to be part and parcel of the world-wide economic system.

TABLE 3: IMPORT AND EXPORT OF MAJOR GRAINS IN TANZANIA ('000 TONS)

YEAR	MAIZE	WHEAT	RICE
1970/71	52.4	11.6	-
1971/72	92.3	49.5	(4.2)
1972/73	78.9	8.2	(10.2)
1973/74	183.6	35.8	23.0
1974/75	317.2	109.6	63.0
1975/76	42.3	31.2	20.5
1976/77	48.0	34.0	5.0
1977/78	34.0	45.0	61.0
1978/79	-	60.0	41.0
1979/80	29.0	33.0	43.0
1980/81	249.0	43.0	78.0

(N.B. Brackets denote exports)

Source: Government of Tanzania, Annual Trade Reports

The initial manifestation of this external intergration was the growth of social differentiation in the rural areas. The "transformation" approach was explicitly intended to give birth to a Kulak class with vested interset in the employment of labour. But even the "improvement" approach ultimately was bound to bring about class differentiation in the rural areas through its emphasis on the "progressive" farmer in the provision of extension services, in other words, the end result of this "rural development" policy was the formation of classes that would be the social basis of imperalism in the country.

TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN REGIONS

NO. OF PERSONS PER Sq. Km.		NO OF REGIONS	TOTAL POPULATION ('000)	PER CENT
Less than 10		3	1,544	9.5
	10 - 19	8	6,469	39.9
	20 - 29	2	2,295	14.2
	30 - 39	3	2,771	17.1
	40 - 49	1	772	4.8
	50 - 59	-	-	-
	60 - 69	1	902	5.6
	70 - 79	1	1,443	8.9
Total		19	16,196	100

Source: 1978 Population Census Reports (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer).

It did not take long for this policy to be abandoned. By 1976 it had become clear that the "improvement" was not really bringing about improvement in the countryside. Although the area under cash crops had tended to increase over the years, output continued to fluctuate more as a result of weather conditions than as a result of the extension services provided by the government agencies.

As to the "transformation" approach, government soon realised it was incurring enormous expenses in establishing and running the settlement schemes whose production continued to be mimimal. One of the things found out then was that the resettled peasants tended to see themselves as government employees rather than independent farmers receiving government technical assistance, hence they tended to put in mimimal initiative and creativity.[65]

But this was by no means a question of mere apperance, in fact there was a real change in social relations. As a smallholder on his own farm, the peasant has relative control over resources; land tools, seeds, and above all his own labour. In the settlement scheme, however, all these resources are under the control of the government agency which is responsible for the scheme. What is more in his own small farm, the peasant generally made the decision as regards disposal of the output of his family labour in the scheme. Officials disposed of the harvest and paid the settler peasant whatever remained after deducting costs for all inputs used - social infrastructure, administration, seeds, chemicals, and so on.

Thus, the settleer peasant was more or less a semi-worker. No wonder he often resorted to withdrawal of labour-power as the main form of protest against exploitation whenever he felt he was not paid enough for his toil, he often deserted the settlement, and such desertion often brought about some changes in the deductions made prior to paying the settlers. As was bound to happen in such a situation, some sections of the settlers soon made a break-through and come to accumulate substantial resources in the countryside and employed seasonal labour to greater and greater extent. The bulk of the settlers, however, stagnated and remained small-holder cultivators dependent on family labour.

In general, then, the initial attempts to radically change the rural scene in Tanzania were largely a faliure. It is true that in the sixties, agricultural output generally did register some growth but this could not easily be ascribed to the specific policies or programmes pursued then.

It must be further noted that as a result of many changes in Tanzania as a whole, change in policy was becoming invitable the end of the sixties. At independence, those who took the reins of government in the country largely came from the petty bourgeosie; the inteligentsia, bueaucrats, traders and rich peasants. The aftermath of independence saw ever increasing struggles between these elements on the one hand, and the predominanlly Asian commercial bougeoisie that controlled the wholesale and import - export trade on the other.

The petty bougeoisie had to find a foothold in the economy if its political position was to be consolidated. Steps taken by the petty bougeoisie soon after independence included the replacement of private buyers of agricultural produce by government organs and governmant - controlled co-operative institutions, launching of State trading transport corporations, and so on. The culmination of all these endeavours was the proclamation in 1967 of the Arusha Declaration of Socialism and self-reliance. The declaration led to the nationalisation by the State of all the "Commanding heights" of the economy: wholesale trade, import and export businesses, plantations, banking and institutions; major factors and so on. Thus, by the end of the decade, one could rightly talk about the existence of a state bourgeoisie in Tanzania, a class which - by vitrue of its position in the State apparatus - controlled the major means of production in the country.[66] Needless to say, because of the nature of the economy itself, and its relation to the world capitalist system, this bourgeoisie was - and coutinus to be - a dependent bourgeoisie.

As far as the rural areas were concerned, the efforts of the State bourgeoisie to consolidate its position in the economy with the taking over of the middleman's role: the purchase and sale of agricultural produce. But this could not end at that level - if actual control of the agricutural sector was to be attained, obviously this had ultimately to be at the level of production. Thus, with demise of the "improvement" and "transformation" approches, new methods had to be formulated by the end of the decade: the policies of "State farms" and "Ujamaa Villages". For lack of resoureces by the government, "State farms" were bound to be limited. As for "Ujamaa villages", these were conceived as the basis upon which the entire countryside would ultimately change dramatically from the situation or low level production and poverty to one of high level production and prosperity. Basically, the Ujamaa village was conceived as an agricultural produce cooperative unit, managed by his members with State institutions playing a catalytic role providing technical advice, assistance and so on.

The policy of Ujamaa villages appeared novel at the time, and a great deal of resources were put at the disposal of the Ujamaa village programme. The political campaign to implement this particular programme was much more far-reaching than any previous exercise for the rural areas. A substantial number of Ujamaa villages was launched in each region in the late sixties. The Party and government machinery were absolutely mobilised toward "Ujamaa" and the President personally spent weeks in villages. BY 1974, according to official reports, there were more than 5,000 such villages with 2.5 million people.

While there was considerable enthsiam as regards this policy intially, after some five years there were not many convincing signs that soon, a break-through would take place in the rural areas as a result of the Ujamaa villages. To begin with, the growth of these villages left much to be desired; while some showed signs of economic growth and expansion, others were completely mismanaged and it was clear that in time they would collapse.[4] In any case, the Ujamaa sector constituted a very small proportion of the total rural economy, and there was not much indication that this would in due course change since as the new villages were started, a considerable number of the old ones died. The villages themselves differed a great deal in organisation, leadership, and degree of communality. In some cases, Ujamaa villages were mere front organisation for Kulak operations.[67]

Cooperatives in themslves cannot garantee rapid socio-economic development in the rural areas. Unless they are part of a programme of both rural transformation and industralisation, producer cooperatives in underdeveloped countries simply become another instrument for the countinued domination of the country by imperialism. Thus, by 1973/74, interest in the Ujamaa programme began to waver not only among the people, but even in oficial circles. While the earlier policy of "improvement" and "transformation" was officially and publicly withdrawn in 1966, the Ujamaa policy is officially still in force. Yet, since 1974, emphasis has radically changed from communal production to village settlement. In 1974, the Tanzania Government launched the most ambitious and gigantic programme for rural moblisation ever undertaken in the country. Its impact has been greater and more far-reaching than other previous programmes.

TABLE 5: LAND USE IN TANZANIA	SQUARE KILOMETERS	PERCENTAGE
A. Agricultural Use:		
1. Rough grazing	442,450	50.1
2. Smallholder cultivation	46,733	5.3
3. Large Scale cultivation	5,850	.7
4. Total non-agricultural use.	495,033	56.1
B. Non-Agricultural Use:		
1. Common Woods/Forests	369,054	41.7
2. High altitude forest	3,900	.4
3. Others (urban, rocky, etc)	16,000	1.8
4. Total non-agricultural use	388,954	43.9
C. Total land use:	883,989	100

SOURCE: D. McHenery, Tanzania's Ujamaa villages, (Berkeley: institute of international studies, 1979,) p.52.

TABLE 6: DEVELOPMENT OF UJAMAA VILLAGES

YEAR	NUMBER OF VILLAGES	TOTAL POPULATION (MILLIONS)	AVERAGE MEMBERSHIP
1969	809	n.a	n.a
1970	1,956	.53	272
1971	4,484	1.55	345
1972	5,556	1.98	357
1973	5,628	2.02	360
1974	5,008	5.56	511

SOURCE: I.L.O. Towards Self-Reliance. (Addis Ababa: 1978) p. 43.

TABLE 7: VILLAGISATION PROGRAMME

YEAR	NUMBER OF VILLAGES	TOTAL POPULATION
1973	5,628	2,028,164
1974	5,008	2,560,472
1975	6,944	9,140,229
1976	7,684	13,087,220

SOURCE: R. M. Mayaya, Public Policy Implementation In Tanzania (M. A. Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam,) p. 90.

The villagisation programme aimed at re-settling the entire rural population into large and "planned" settleements. Instead of the traditional practice whereby peasant households lived in scattered and at times isolated pockets - frequently shifting from area to area in order to balance resources and requirements - the aim was now to create fairly large settlements of at least some 250 families each. Between 1973 and 1975, as many as 9 million rural inhbitants were shifted and by 1976 it was declared that practically all rural Tanzanians were living in these new "development" villages.

This does not mean, however, that every single villager was affected. Those peasant areas in which large settlement was already a way of life, and those areas in which there was already a land shortage and thus no available place to which to move people were unaffected by this exercise. But because of the settlement pattern in the country, such areas were few and far between. When, therfore the tally of "registered villages" - encompassing new as well as old but newly designated settlements - was done in June 1979, there were 8,299 villages with a total population of 14,9 million, that is 87 per cent of the country's population.

The manner in whic the programme was implenented left a lot to be desired. In some cases, violence was unduly used, in other cases the planning process was most deficient.[69] Above all, the whole exercise was done most hurriedly. All the above factors brought about widespread resentment among the rural population and in a few cases open opposition to the Party and government.[79] Still the over-all result was that tremendous change occured in the rural areas: millions of people had to be re-settled, old homes were destroyed and new ones built, people used to living in isolated homesteads now found themselves in mini-towns with - in many cases - houses built in straight lines and close to each other. All this meant a great deal of change in rural life, whether the change was for the better or worse is of course a different question.[71]

The costs of operation, however, were undoubtedly very high. Apart from the social dislocation that resulted, the effect of the exercise on rural production was very big - there was a decline in rural output in practically all areas.[72] Thus, although there had been disagreement as to the merits and demerits of the programme, its costs are beyond doubt. In Coulson's words:

> .... What is not in dispute is that marketed production of almost all crops fell, leading to a deficit of over a million tonnes of cereals spread over the years 1974 - 1977 ... The cotton crop also declined, from 77,000 tones in 1972/76. Cashew nut production fell by a third.

This declines were associated with villagisation athough other factors (such as a low price for cashew nuts) were also involved. The total costs of the villagisation, including the value of property destroyed, the direct costs of the "operation", and the value of crops that were not planted or harvested were evidently very great indeed.[73]

In the foregoing analysis, we have examined the concept of rural development as a policy issue in Tanzania. The next chapter V is an analysis of the Tanzanian government's policy on parastatals and how this affects external resource procurement.
Do parastatals have any bearing on the aim of building self-reliant Tanzania? How does the attitude of bureaucrats affect work in parastatals. These and other related question will be examined.

Chapters IV and V discuss the two policy areas of rural development and socialist industralisation through parastatals as case studies of "lines of action" taken in Tanzania towards constructing a socialist society.

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We must go back to that traditional position which coincides with our present scientific thinking." (Zimbabwe News, Vol, 10, No. 6, November - December 1978, p.3

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CHAPTER VI

SOCIALIST INDUSTRIALISATION IN TANZANIA

I

STATE ENTERPRISES IN TANZANIA

A new type of monopoly resulting from state capitalism (that is the involvement role), was developed in Tanzania in the post-colonial era.

The Tanzanian economy is now domintated by an elaborate system of State enterprises - the parastatal system. In a government publication entitled Accounts of the Parastatals (1966 - 1974), parastatals are ofically defined in Tanzania as "commercial enterprises owned by the government or with majority government participation, and are run on commercial principles. Their accounts are not directly integrated into the government budget".[1]

The number of parastals in Tanzania began to increase rapidly after the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which committed Tanzania to socialism. By 1967, there were Declaration which committed Tanzania to socialism. By 1967, there were only 43 parastatals but by 1970, the number had risen to 85, and by 1974, it had risen to 139, and had continued to rise.[2]

There are parastatals in every sector of the economy. In agriculture, there are the Bukoba Tea Company, Basuto Plantations Limited, Tanzania Sisal Corporation Arusha Plantations Limited, and the Dindvia Tea Estate.

In mining, there are the Nyanza Salt Mines, Tanzania Gemstones and the Tanzania Petroleum Authority.

The numerous parastatals of the manufacturing sector include the National Milling Corporation, Friendship Taxtiles, National Cigarette Comapny, Tanganyika Portland Cement, Mtibwa, Sugar, Ubango Farm Instruments, Tanzania Fertilisers, Tanzania Shoe Company, Tanneries and Tobora Msitu Products.

The parastatals in the transport sector include; Zambia - Tanzania Road Services, Tanzania - China Shipping Line and Tachosili.

The commercial sector boasts of a large number of paraststals which include the Tanganyika Cotton Authority and Serengeti Safari Lodges.

The parastatals in Finance are the National Bank of Commerce; the Bank of Tanzania, Tanzania Investment Bank, National Investment Corporation, National Development Corporation, National Insurance Corporation, Tanazania Housing Bank and Tanzania Hotels Investments.

The service sector is well-served with parastatals which include Tanzania Wild-life Safaris, Tanzania Tours, the National Board of Accountants and Auditors, Tanzania National Park and the Tanzanian Legal Corporation.

It would appear that State capitalism arises primarily out of the desire of the national petit - bourgoisie which inherited political power. The national bourgeoisie which came into office in the wake of the independence movement soon found that they were in office only, but not in power because they had very little control of the economy.

But they also understood that political power had opportunity for economic power. They knew that the opportunity inherent in their political power were the best, and pherpas the only way they had for creating an economic base for their political power. They did not hesitate to use these avenues open to them - parastals emerged.

DEVELOPITNG PARASTATALS THROUGH EXTERNAL RESOURCE PROCUREMENT

As a result of the nationlisation programme of the Arusha Declaration, the parastatal systems replaced foreign firms as the primary instrument for the acquisition of external goods and services at the non-governmental level. This corresponds to the increased role of the public sector in capital formation and, in general, economic growth.[3]

With due regard to the imperatives of self-reliance, the parastatal institutions must still utilise certain external resources. They lack easy access to the international market, and are not independent centers of technological innovations. In addition, their state of data collection, capacity for data analysis, and the expertise and experience of their managerial personnel are grossly inadequate for the efficient and successful performance of their tasks.[4]

In response to those deficiencies, the public enterprieses have in general entered into partnership of one kind or another with foregin private firms, utilised the serives of foreign fact-finding missions, and employed the services of highly skilled individuals in managerial and advisory capacities. Of these, the most significant for external resource procurement is the use of foreign firms. Their operations are potentially of great advantage to their local counterparts, but equally potentially disadvantageous. Their role in the nation's avowed socialist reorgnisarion of society has therefore been a source of controversy.[5]

Through such firm, the public enterprise is able to enjoy the benefits of an intergrated team of managerial and technical personnel. In addition, they remedy the inadequate manpower situation, and provide patents, trademarks, brands and production processes, which are expected to facilitate the export of local products. Other expectations of benefits from them include technology transfer, especially through the tranining of local personnel, increased capital and greater profits.

Some of these resources accounting for the power of the foreign firm relative to public enterprises include precisely those which motivated the latter to go into partnership with them, such as access to markets, technology, skills and data.

They are, therefore, able to control the activities of the public enterprises even from minority shareholders' positions. Since Their interests are one-sidely economic, and it is difficult for them to sacrifice economic consideration for the sake of the social and political benefits which may accrue from their activities. This monolithic pursuit of economic interests may, therefore, come into conflict with social and political imperatives of the activities of the public enterprises. Under these circumstances, foreign firms may influence them to ignore their socio-political goals.

As regards investments, the public enterprises have overly emphasised profit, the over-riding basis for the investment programme of foreign private enterprises. For example, a high proportion of NDC investment goes into the export sector, and luxurious domestic consumption reminiscent of the pattern of investment of the private enterprises prior to nationalisation.[8]

Thus, although the level of output has increased in some cases, the overall impact of the investment activities of the public enterprise on economic growth has countinued to be minimal. Very little, if any progress has been made towards creating linkages, domestic demand and domestic production. Since most of their activities have been confined to terminal products, the domestic value added created by increased output has been very low.

The fertiliser plant operated by the NDC and the Kloechkmer-Humbolt-Deutz of West Germany "uses imported materials, imported technology and imported expatriates to lose money".[9] It is located in a way that facilitates importing its inputs rather than using local raw materials; and it is not intended to foster a local chemical industry.

For example, several things caused the Mwananchi Engineering and Construction Company (MECCO) in which the National Development Corporation (NDC) held 60% of the shares until December 1970, to enter into partnership with the Overseas Construction Company (OCC) of the Netherlands. Among them were: (a) the desire to increase the scale of the company in order to make it more competitive for complex building and engineering contracts, (b) to save foreign exchange expended when foreign contractors secure these contracts (c) to train skilled craftsmen and technicians at all levels of the industry, and (d) to utilise foreign capital for increasing profitable investments.[6]

Foreign firms participate in the activities of the public enterprises in various ways. They have acquired shares in some of them, many times with a minority status. The OCC purchased 40% of the equity shares of MECCO. In most NDC subsidiaries, the foreign firm owns between 10 and 40 percent of the equity. However, in the Tanganyika Development Finance Limited, for example, the NDC of Tanzania, the Commonwealth Development of Britiain, the Netherlands Finance Company for Developing Countries of Holland, and Zusammenarbeit of West Germany hold shares in equal proportion.[7]

At other times, they entered into management with the public enterprises in which they did not participate in the equity Between 1968 and 1971. Both the NDC and the State Trading Corporation (STC) used the services of the American Consultancy firm, Mckinsey and Company Incorporated, in this fashion. In 1970, many hotels belonging to the Tanzania Tourist Corporation were similarly managed by the Hallmark Hotels (Tanzania) Limited, a subsidiary of the Hallway Hotels Overseas Limited of London. The Kilimanjaro Hotel was run, until October 1972, by an Isreali firm, M-Lonot, under a management agreement.

Much of the benefits expected from this mode of external resource procurement has not materialised. On the contrary, the effects of the participation of foreign private firms in the public enterprises have been unsalutary. Firms are motivated by their corporate interest, and bring their power to bear on their pursuit of them.

This reinforces the gap between domestic use and domestic demands. In addition, increases in the demand for the products of the public enterpires have been marginal, and, therefore, incapable of generating increased scale of their operations. Thus, the pattern of the economy remains distorted.

At the same time, the record of these partnerships in the transfer of technology to Tanzania has not been good. Since their pattern of investment is not related to any program to link up with domestic demands, it frustrates the growth of indigenous technology. first, the foreign firm as a subsidiary of a parent company located in the advanced capitalist nation makes no major technological innovation and decisions. It merely exports the products of technological innovations and decisions to the local public enterprise.

Its ability to promote technology transfer is, therefore, limited. Second, the foreign private firm has an interest in preventing independent centres of technological innovation. They seek to export their technological products irrespective of the local resource endowments. In any case, they are bound to import familiar, cheaper, and profitable technology.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Mwanza Textile Mill, in which a French Company, Amenital, owns 20%, is capital intensive, relative to the Friendship Textile Mill in Dar-es-Salaam built by the Chinese, which is labour-intensive.

While the mill in Dar-es-Salaam employs 3,000 local people, that in Mwanza empolys only 1,000. Although both produce the same amount of cloth and yarn, the former cost Shs 50 million to build, and the latter cost Shs. 80 million. But local resource availability dictates the use of a higher ratio of labour to capital. In such cases as the cashew nut factory run by the Tanitp Company Limited, the imported technology is not easily adaptable to local conditions. The partner-firm, Oltremare, supplied the machinery.

FOREIGN FIRMS AND TANZANIAN PARASTATALS.

The interest of foreign firms in monopolising technological innovation is reflected in their poor record in training the local personnel of the public enterprises. Whereas by 1970, Tanzanians had fully replaced their Chinese counterparts in the Firendship Textile Mills, the Mwanza Textile Mill intiated a programme of training local staff only that year.[11]

Two and a half years after the Overseas Construction Company's partnership with the Mwananchi Engineering and Construction Company, neither the projected training program, nor the proposed technical institute had materialised.[12]

Similarly, nine years after Mlonot became the managing agent of the Kilimanjaro Hotel, there was not a single Tanzanian in a top management position. It had taken no steps to train local middle, and high-level management staff; its training programme had been confined to junior staff.[13]

Even the argument that he use of foreign brands, trade marks, and production processes of the foreign private firms provides export opportunity for Tanzanian manufacture is not borne out in practice. Since these forms of technology and know-how are produced and marketed by various branches of the parent firms which hold the patents, the market for the product is practically saturated.[14] Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that similar goods manufactured in Tanzania would find ready markets in other countries.

This doubt is reinforced by the protectionist attitude of various governments, especially those of the advanced nations, towards such manufactured goods as processed foods drinks, berevages and tobacco, which are either in the infant stages or consitute the weak sector of the manufacturing industry.

The fertiliser factory had a similar problem when the fertiliser prices fell sharply following the establishment of large plants near the oil field in the Persian Gulf.
At the same time, the slow rise in local demand did not justify the cost of the new plant. The government could neither ask the farmer to pay higher prices, nor subsidise fertiliers sales.
It was left to the East German government to bail out the plant through a program of refinancing.[15]

Finally, the dominance of public enterprises in the economy of Tanzania has not solved the problem of income drain forn the nation. Their partnership with foreign private firms has perpetuated this drain through various forms of remuneration for the foreign partners. This is done in the form of payment for patent and trade mark usage: travelling, board and lodging expenses; purchase of machinery fixed fees; commission fees; dividends.

The foregoing happened in spite of the intention of the Companies (Regulation of Dividends and Surpluses Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1972 to block this drain.[16] Part of the reason for this is that the falsification of surplus is possible even within the confines of the law, and arises essentially out of the nature of the relationship between the foreign and public enterprises. The strong economic motive of the former causes them to devise ways and means even within the law, to make export profits.

Illustrative of this behaviour is the relationship between the Overseas Construction Comapny (OCC) and the Mwananchi Engineering and Construction Company (MECCO). Under the partnership agreement, the OCC would receive 40 per cent of the profits (or Shs. 100,000 per year if the profits are more) and a management fee equal to 1 per cent of the turnover of the public company.[17]

Inspite of the consistent losses suffered by the enterprise, the OCC equally consistently made profits. Part of its profits came from its practice of artificially maximising the company's turnover by taking on large contracts even when it knew that these would lead to losses. In addition to this, and the payment of inflated salaries to its expatriate personnel, there was evidence of over-invoicing. It purchased goods in Holland that would have been purchased more cheaply elsewhere.[18]

Similarly, Mlonot, which managed the Kilimanjaro, exported money to Israel. Part of its management agreement with the Tanzanian Government included a management fee equal to 3 per cent of the turnover of the hotel. In order to maximise turnover and, therefore, its benefits, Mlonot devised a system of accounting every three months. This enabled it to ensure that although the hotel consistently made profits, for a disproportionate amount of this period of three months, it paid as few bills as possible in order that the hotel might register profit.

According to the agreement, it paid the Tanzania government two-thirds of this and retained one-third. During the succeeding three months, it paid off all the oustanding bills causing the hotel to suffer a loss, but increasing its turnover and therefore obtained its net receipt of 3 per cent from it.[19]

Thus, the participation of foreign private firms in the public enterprises produces effects on Tanzanian development similar to those of foreign private enterprises when they operated independently. This in no way suggests that the new role of foreign private firms is as demanding as before. As a result of their legally subordinate status, and practically temporary nature, they may seek excessive profit in the short-run; but they cannot perpetuate the pattern of investment and technology transfer in the same manner as independent foreign firms can.

When private foreign ownership dominated the national economy, very little planning of economic activities could be undertaken, and irrational forces, by and large, determined the nature and limits of their activities. Today, with public owernship as the dominant form of economic organisation the possibility for national planning has increased.

Such planning is possible to be in the long run incompatible with the effects of foreign private capital. More specific guidelines should be provided for a pattern of investment and technology transfer more conducive to the convergence of domestic resource and consumption. In future, the foreign partners of the public enterprises will find it difficult to distort the pattern of economic development. Similarly, with lighter controls over their export of funds, their role in income drainage will be minimised.

IV

THE ROLE OF PARASTATALS IN THE BUILDING OF SELF RELIANT TANZANIA

The various problems, mostly from the internal environment, which still remain to be solved before Tanzania can be seen as a country on the path to socialism may be stated as follows: it concerns those which increase dependence on external conditions. Here, of course, the basic problem lies in the country's continued dependence on primary commodity exports for obtaining the capital and foreign exchange it needs for economic developemt projects. This has meant that external circumstances of demands for these exports must dictate the pace of economic growth. And since they remained unfavourable, there is a need for an alternative means of development funds. The only options available are rapid industrialisation through regional economic groupings which can sucessfully increase the effective size of the market for the nations industrial goods and industrialisation guided by the policy of self-reliance.

Problem of sovereingnty, political stability and intellectual bankruptcy among the leaders of the Third World hinder the path through regional economic groupings: while the path through further dependence is intitated by history and reason. The only solution is through increassed industrial production within the context of self-reliance.

The activities of the National Development Corporation (NDC) and the State Trading Company (STC) are crucial for further breaking dependence and increasing the production and distribution of industrial goods and services. The State has significantly intervened in the nation's economy to implement self-reliance as the major investible resource for industrial growth. This must come from the surpluses of these two parent parastatal bodies, as well as from the activities of other public enterprises. Therefore, their shortcomings tend to increase dependence and impede industrial production.

Investible surpluses have not been forthcoming from them. The main problems seem to arise from the will, energy and intellectual understanding necessary to ensure that the country's existing resources yield the maximum benefits. Even when allowances have been made for their teething problems, it is clear they need to keep administrative costs within bounds, and use national capital to produce results in forms of wage employment, social services for the population, basic and essential goods and services, cheap prices, extortable surplus and investable surpluses. "In my view, neither of these major patastatal organisations is operating in a manner so as to produce these results".[20]

They suffer from built-in faults of organisation, management practices, and competence of personnel, particularly with respect to the choice and cost of machines, the financial structure of the enterprise, the nature of the management agreement, the quality of personnel, and the agreement of production costs and marketing prospects.[21]

The parastatals have not shown frugality in their techniques for reaching investment decision, and in their normal and re-current adminstrative activities. This is particularly relevant at this junction in the history of the country's economic development because, having built up a momentum for investment in the existing and new services, further expansion must await the consolidation of ongoing enterprises. This meanss meeting their annual and daily recurrent needs. It is equally true of the non-parastatal sector.

The momentum of expansion generated after nationalisation has put a severe strain on the country's foreign exchange position For example, in early 1971, it was reported that the "reserves are now so low that they reduce the nation's ability to manage the economy freely, and easily".[22]

The country's foreign exchange holdings fell by Shs. 43,200,000 in 1970 compared with an increase of Shs. 164,300,000 in 1969. Similarly the holdings of Tanzania fell by Shs. 142,300,000 compared with an increase of Shs. 18,400,00 in 1969.[23] The country's capacity to expand existing services, or start new ones, is at present very low. Further progress in this direction must come from spending less and earning more.

V

PARASTATALS AND BUREAUCRATS

Many public servants do not seem to be concious of the intergrated nature of the economy and, therefore, fail to see the inter-relationship between public expenditure on the one hand and national production on the other. So far, the consequences of their myopic accounting principles have been diluted by the efforts of export in increasing the production of export crops. The latter's roles is however, being increasingly adversely affected by some of the activities of the parastatals which concern both producers and as consumers.

If the resultant low morale is not checked, their ability to hold the fort in the battle for foreign exchange is bound to be undermined. It is necessary, therefore to examine carefully, the structure of the growing sector in order to identify the positive and negative factors which affect their activites as prelude to taking corrective measures, drastic or otherwise. Of particular relevance here is the need for financial guidelines designed to arrest the rising recurent expenditure and cost of capital projects which put a lot of pressure on the foreign exchange position. Emphasis must be placed on good account keeping and management leadership as well as cost consciousness in all sectors of the economy. The existing enterprises must generate investable surplus if the economy is to grow in a manner commensurate with the demand of self-reliance.

In terms of its long-term impact on economic growth, the most significant problem of the parastatals arise from the cultural and psychological dependence of their personnel as a result of the colonial heritage. The interllectual tools with which they approach their economic problems are mere imitations and many times poor imitations, of those of the advanced capitalist states.

It is significant that, it general revolutionary political thought in the Third World has not been matched by a similar development in the reality of economics particulary as regards the capacity of the people to master their environment.

> Political revolutionas should, as a matter of course, offer the people liberation from, and mastery of, their material environment. If it cannot do this, it cannot introduce a higher mode of production. Then, without a material base, increased consciousness will soon be dissipated. Revolutionary change, to be self-sustaining, must not only affect relationships between people and their natural environment. It is the latter which permits the transition to a higher mode of production.[24]

Unless the economic orientations of the Tanzanian bueaucrats, leaders, managers and administrators change radically in the direction of a revolutionary approach to the society's economic transformation, it will remain difficult to achive a convergence of domestic production and domestic consumption.

The country will coutinue to produce what it does not consume, and consume what it does not produce, and will remain dependent on external conditions, and therefore unable to achive self-sustained growth in material production.

Inspite of the size of the Tanzanian market, the country can achieve substantial economic transformation if it confines its heavy industry to the manufacture of the major basic materials required as inputs into the domestic consumption of goods. This would allow for the convergence of domestic resourse use and domestic demand, increase the local value added in domestic production and prepare the ground for innovative attitudes and skills in the country.[25]

In the next chapter, which concludes the thesis we shall examine some of the reforms in the socialist policies in Tanzania (especially in the agricultural sector), in view of the fact that the initial policies did not meet the aspirations of the people. This lack of fulfilment informed the direction of the reforms. The concluding chapter shall also look beyond the socialist experiment in Tanzania, and attempt to make generalistions about the characteristics of the economies of similar countries within the African continent. The elements present in the socio-eceonomic relations of such countries are identified, and this would lead to an understanding of similar countries undergoing the socialist experiment.

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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

I

REFORMS IN THE SOCIALIST POLICIES IN TANZANIA SINCE 1982

Since the early 1970's Tanzania has experienced recurring economic crises as a result of a succession of external shocks, compounded by serious domestic policy failures.[1] Since the beginning of the 1980's crisis has become a chronic condition of the economy, "one which threatens the living standards and the basic needs fulfilment of much of the Tanzanian nation".[2]

A major contributing factor throughout the period has been the poor performance of legally marketed agricultural output, including both export crops and, to a lesser extent, staple food grains. A wide range of observers agree that these disappointing results derive to a considerable extent from the combination of weak incentives, to legally marketed peasant production, over-centralised and inefficient parastatal marketing arrangements, and a long-lasting neglect of research, extension, and infrastructure affecting major and minor crops.

Within the African context, the Tanzanian crisis has a number of obvious special features. The country is not one of the extreme cases of rural neglect. Rural social service provision has received high priority in practice as well as at the level of official rhetoric. The levels of basic needs satisfaction are well above average for countries in Tanzania's income group. There is a genuine commitment to the avoidancae of social, and particularly regional (and hence ethnic) inequalities, and policies which depress marketed agricultural production. These are often justified in these terms as well as in more conventional terms of industrial priority and protection for urban wage-earners.

Some observers place the government's specifically socialist commitments - especially the Ujamaa village programme of the early 1970's, high on the list of causes of the country's misfortunes.[4] However, this would seem to be a mistake. Because of its effects on local ecological balancaes, villagisation may have significantly reduced agricultural output in certain areas.

However, the effects of Ujamaa in the sense of voluntary or imposed cooperative farming, have been quite small, and are hard to distinguish from the impact of policies affecting agriculture as a whole.[5] In any case, the most dramatic features of Tanzania's agricultural crisis have less to do with declinig overall output, than with the disruption of the balance between export and food crop production, and of relation between the peasantry and the "official" national economy. In response to powerful disincentives, peasant producers have withdrawn massively from official marketing channels into un-official "parallel" markets or subsistence production.[6] In these respects, the Tanzanian carisis belogs squarely within the wider picture of tropical Africa.

A similar conclusion has been drawn by some of the country's major aid donors. As a stable country, apparently committed to a rural-led development path, Tanzania became, in the early 1970's a preferred recipient of poverty-oriented development aid from bilateral and multilateral sources. In the mid and late 1970's it was the site of Integrated Rural Development Projects, and other poverty-focused programmes funded by several European and North American agencies and the World Bank.

As elsewhere, however, such donors have tended recently, to shift their attention away from integrataed projects, towards a combination of rehabilitation and structural adjustment lending. One of the arguments has been that in crucial macro-economic and political/ administrative respects, the conditions for the success of rural projects in Tanzania were much less favourable, more like the Tropical African norms.[7]

Tanzania has, however, undertaken its own review of the structural adjustment problem, including the needs of the agricultural sector.[8] As a result of the deliberations in 1983, a major new policy statement was adopted on "The Agricultural Policy of Tanzania". In its published version, the statement was prefacaed by an appeal from President Nyerere to "stop this neglect of agriculture" and start "working on the direct and indirect needs of the agricultural producers".[9] It calls, inter alia, for a stablilisation of the existing range of ownership forms a -re-organisation of research and extension activities, and the restructuring of marketing on the basis of a new division of labour between cooperatives and parastatal crop authorities and marketing boards. The policy also commits the government to an improvement of the level and quality of agricultural producer prices, and the campaign to improve the efficiency and reduce the marketing margins of the parastatals.

Even on paper, the new policy guidelines stop short of the changes recommended by the World Bank in its unpublished report on Tanzania's agricultural sector in a number of, arguably crucial respects.[10]

Three problem areas of reform in which there is significant gap between what the government has proposed since 1983, and what many specialist advisers and foreign aid donors consider to be necessary are:

a) Capturing the benefits of the parallel market.[11]

b) Improving the efficiency of the parastatals.

c) Prioritisation of agriculture and associated industries in foreign exchange and other resource allocation.

Despite the dilemmas and tensions under these three headings, it is clear thata whata is already on the accepted agenda involves some very significant changes of gear for Tanzanian agricultural policy. In some important respects, at least, the country may be said to be in transition towarads a policy and institutional set-up more favourable to a sustainable pattern of agricultural development. The more the somewhat vague prescriptions of the policy guidelines are translated into the sorts of actions suggested by the government's own specialist advisers and like-minded intaernational opinion, the more clearly this will be the case.[12] In this sense, the most important fact to note, perhaps, is the general trend towards more pragmatic and more "technical" policy-making in Tanzania during the first half of the present decade, a trend which journalistic observers expect to continue under President Nwinyi.

Interest in the actual course and results of these reform will focus on two areas, which are likely to receive rather unequal attention. The economic and technical aspects, touching as they do, on the divergent viewpoints and institutionalised concerns of the various national and international agencies, can be expected to be monitored with some care.

Tanzania is already the subject of an intensive World Bank case study in agricultural development management, and this type of work is likely to continue.[13] It is likely, however, that the political and social aspects of the process of reform will be much less closely observed and analysed. Yet, it is around issues of this sort that some of the major uncertainties and open questions revolve.

The foregoing has shown that discontent as a result of inadequacies of the socialist policies led to some re-thinking in Tanzania and this has led to major reforms, especially, in the agricultural sector. In Section II we shall look at the problems of Afarican countries undergoing the socialist expedriment in the light of the reforms in Tanzania.

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II

PROBLEMS OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES UNDERGOING THE SOCIALIST EXPERIMENT

Socialism has been called an "intellectual proteus". There are many ways of defining it. There is "Guild Socialism", Socialism, as practiced in Western Europe, Utilitarian Socialism, Marxian definition of socialism, and so on.

Marxist socialism is particularly interesting because the intellectual history of this type of socialism is chracterised by controversies. There have therefore been many revisionist attempts at defining "Marxist Socialism". Lenin's imprint of the "Vanguard Party" and Rosa Luxemburg's ideas on the "Second International" and "Socialist democracy" readily come to mind.

The reality of the situation in Africa is that there are several African leaders who have come to power in the name of socialist revolution, or who have proclaimed socialism as the basis of their rule.

Some distinctions are helpful. There are those like Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Angola where there was a revolutionary struggle led by a Party with a sophisticated political organisation and an essentially Marxist-Leninist ideology. It is in these places that the claim of socialism is most convincing. Very concerete steps have been taken to effect the transition to socialism in both the spheres of distribution and kproduction. But as the leadership in these places readily admit, it is still very much socialism from the top, serious contradictions remain, and the the class struggle goes on.

In other places such as Tanzania, Ethiopia and Benin, where socialism has been formally embraced by a leadership which was not involved in a revolutionary colonial struggle, and did not before coming to power belong to a Socialist Party, evidencae of socialist

transformation is far less tangible. Socialist transformation has tended to be confined to the sphere of distribution, and has barely touched the sphere of production, which is what really counts.

Perhaps the socialist experiment has gone as far as might be expected in these formations. It is unlikely that a petit-bourgeois leadership already well-established in power, will, so to speak, commit suicide as a class. Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to be dogmatic about the limits of socialist development in these places. The very impressive kchanges achieved in the sphere of distribution have created a momentum for more socialism, which the leadership has had to curb for example in Tanzaina. Nevertheless, it is entirely impossible for this momentum to counteract the reactionary tendencies of the leadership, and to propel the system towards more socialism. This may well be the case in Ethiopia.

The problem of constructing a socialist society is extraordinarily complex, and should not be confused with the problem of making a socialist revolution. Unfortunately, much of the writing on socialism in the third world, including Afarica, is very concerned with the question of the possibility of socialist revolution, but pays hardly any attention to the problem of constructing a socialist society. Associated with this misplacement of emphasis is a tendency to discuss the problem of realising socialism as a matter of commitment and taking the right action.

In the case of the African socio-ecomonic formations whose leaders have opted for socialism, scholarly assessment has focused on leaders' intentions, policies and actions, as lif intentions and actions tell the whole story. Not enough attention has been paid to objective forces. We appear to have forgotten Marx's admonition that"

> no social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence has matured within the framework of the old society.

One of the pertinent objective forces posing problems for the making of a socialist society is the state of the development of productive forces. The point here is not so much the problem it poses for socialist revolution as the problem it poses for the road to socialism. The state of the development of productive forces in Africa threatens to turn socialism into a caricature, even with the best of intentions. For instance, it tends to encourage political authoritarianism and reduce socialism to the management and redistribution of poverty.

However, there are some characteristics of a country undergoing the socialist experiment. We know that most traditional writings on socialism address themselves only to what is expected of a socialist society. There is a paucity of information on the nature and characteristics of a society that is moving towards socialism, presumably from a different socio-political formula.

Given the potential number and range of such societies, it is necessary for us to acknowledge that some very major difficulties exist. One of these is that these societies will be confronted during the effort to construct a socialist society with the problem that traditional Marxist economic theory does not deal with satisfactorily, or indeed specifically with the problems of developing the productive forces of such economies.

It can be argued that socialist economic theory does not deal adequately with the problems of designing an economic strategy for transforming underdeveloped economies.
These economies are not only technologically, politically, financially and militarily dependent, they are also small, often practically too small to be viable even if all things are equal.

But can one expect scholars to develop a general theory that will will explain the process of constructing socialist societies. I share the arguments of Sweezy and Bettelheim that:

> There can be no such thing as a general theory of the transition between social systems. This is not because relatively little attention has been paid to the subject, though this is undoubtedly true, but because each transition is a unique historial process, an which must be analysed and explained as such.

NOTE

(*) See C. Bettelheim and P.M. Sweezy, The Transition to Socialism, pp. 107 - 8.

III

THE MIXED NATURE OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIES

The socio-economic structure in a country that has taken the road to socialism is primarily heterogeneous, being composed of severel different socio-economic systems, and by nature changing.

By the socio-economic structure of society we mean:

a) The aggregate of the various types of social production composing the economy and their mutual inter-connections and

b) The classes and social groups corresponding to them.

The economy of a country undergoing the socialist experiment is characterised by the three main socio-economic sectors, namely the socialist, the petty commodity and the private capitalist. The socialist sector plays the leading role.

In addition to these principal sectors, the economy of the transition period may include other modes; for example patriachal and State capitalist, and so on.

The existence in the transitional economy, of petty commodity and private capitalist sectors in addition to the socialist sector is due to objective causes. The farms or businesses of petty commodity producers in town and country, for example, are prescribed peasants and artisans from the working class, which do immense damage to socialist construction. However, peasants cannot be switched over immediately to collective farming. Time is needed for the conditions necessary for the socialist transformation of peasant farming.

The "socialist sector" unites nationalised firms and businesses with cooperative undertakings formed through voluntary associations. Thus, the economic basis of the socialist sector is socialist ownership of the means of production in its two forms; State and Cooperative.

The "petty commodity" sector includes the farms and businesses of petty producers in town and country; peasants, artisans and handicraft workers, whose production is based on private property and personal labour.

The "private capitalist sector" consists of undertakings of the bourgeoisie in town and country. In urban areas, it consists of private industrial and commercial enterprises, and in the countryside of "Kulak" farms, that is farms on which hired labour is employed.

The "partriarchal mode" embraces mainly subsistence farming with little or no connections with the market. This sector exists in countries where, before the revolution, pre-capitalist forms of economy existed alongside capitalist ones (for example socialist African countries).

The heterogeneity of the economy also determines the specific features of the relations of production. In any established mode of production, production relations of a certain type predominate, but in the society of the transition from capitalism to socialism, there is an inherent aggregate of production relations of various types that are closely linked, and interact, though in a contradictory way.

The existence of different socio-economic systems in the economy of the transition period is a natural phenomenon. "Nowhere in the world is there pure capitalism developing into pure socialism", Lenin wrote.

IV

THE TANZANIAN ECONOMY AND SOCIALISM: SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

The major modes of production can be identified in a country like Tanzania, which is undergoing the socialist experiment. They are the socialist sector, the petty commodity sector, the private capitalist sector, the patriachal mode and the State capitalist sector.

a) The Socialist Sector

The State enterprises arise from the socialisation of the means of production previously owned by the exploiting classes (capitalists and landlords). In addition, cooperative undertakings are formed through the voluntary associations of many petty commodity producers.

The evidence shows that state enterprises have not been transformed into cooperative undertakings. In fact, it appears State enterprises dominate cooperative efforts, hence making a merger an uphill task.

b) The Petty Commodity Sector

This embraces the businesses of petty producers in town and country; peasants, artisans and handicraft workers whose production is based on private property and personal labour.

In Tanzania, as a result of the village settlements, the petty commodity sector has been highly developed.

c) The Private Capitalist Sector

This consists of undertakings of the bourgeoisie in town and country. The Kulaks in the countryside, and private industrialists in the cities.

To a large extent, private capitalists remain in Tanzania. This is understandable in the light of the "petty bourgeois" socialism practiced in the country.

However, the private capitalists, the "Kulaks" in the countryside have been curbed in their activities due to collectivisation of farms. The implication of this is that the private capitalist sector is highly developed, when defined in terms of the industrial capitalist in the cities. But when private capitalism is seen in the light of land ownership in the countryside, State Ownership of all land has incapacitated this category of private capitalists.

d) The Patriachal Mode

This embraces mainly subsistence farming with little or no connections with the market economy. The patriachal mode of production is highly developed in Tanzania.

This is not surprising in view of the fact that before Tanzania embraced the "socialist option", pre-capitalist forms of economy existed alongside capitalist ones. The monocultural base of the agricultural sector of the economy remains, however.

e) The State Capitalist Sector

This consists primarily of concessions and enterprises leased out by the State and mixed State and private undertakings. In view of the government's nationalisation policy, State capitalism has been highly developed. There is, however, a minimal level of mixed private and State undertakings.

V

CONCLUSION

We shall now recapiltulate the findings. The "socialist sector" in Tanzania remains undeveloped. This has serious implications for a country which claims to be socialist. In the process of undergoing a socialist experiment, the socialist sector should be dominant. The fact that the socialist sector is not developed in Tanzania means we cannot begin to talk about "socialism" in any serious way as far as this country is concerned.

The petty commodity sector is highly developed because of the "villagisation policy". This is welcome in a country which claims to be on the socialist path.

The private capitalist secdtor entails two categories of capitalists; the industrial capitalists and the Kulaks. Industrial capitalism remains highly developed in Tanzania, while Kuklaks are less prominent. The persistence of the industrial capitalist on such a large scale in the political economy of the country does not augur well for a socialist transformation.

The patriachal mode of production is highly developed in Tanzania because the country had pre-industrial mode of production alongside individual production before the adoption of socialism as ideology. This is a useful development in a socialist transformation. State capitalism has been highly developed in Tanzania. This is also good for the socialist experiment.

On the whole, the Tanzanian economy remains peripheral in relation to the metropolis. The fact that the socialist sector which should be the dominant sector in the transformation to socialism is not highly developed in Tanzania leaves much to be desired.

Despite the lip-service paid to socialism, the economy still follows a capitalist line. The distorted economy as a result of colonisation, remains monoculturally based inspite of Ujamaa Vijijini.

Besides, the central Party, CCM, has to all intents and purposes, lost the flavour of the initial vanguard Party as envisaged by Lenin. The Party was used to stifle the legitimate demands of workers during the Mwongozo and post-Nwongozo proletarian struggles. The industrial capitalist's position of exploiter was thus endorsed.

The implication of this is that the socialist experiment in Tanzania needs to be further consolidated. The underdevelopment of the socialist sector of the economy vis-a-vis the other sectors suggests that Tanzania still has some way to go towards the ultimate aim of building a socialist society.

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