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THE FISCAL IMPERATIVE IN THE AMALGAMATION OF 1914

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Introduction

Many historians that have written about Nigeria have shown a great deal of interest in the factors, which accounted for the amalgamation of 1914 by which Nigeria was established as a single political entity. The various works, which have been published, have treated exhaustively the administrative and political factors.¹ This paper emphasizes the financial and economic factors responsible for the union of the Southern and Northern Protectorates. In other words, amalgamation will be seen as an arrangement required for administrative unification, which was only possible by means of financial unification. Although the fiscal imperative is emphasized in this paper, other imperatives were administrative uniformity and centralization, economic unity, political unity and stability.

The Colonial Office served as a mediator from 1900 to 1913 on this thorny question and generally advised the governors to exercise some caution pending amalgamation. As an arbiter, it received all individual protests from the governors of each territory and only in very few cases did it divulge the contents of such protests to the other party. Since these protests contributed in a large measure to the amalgamation of 1914, it seems necessary here to summarise the crucial financial and economic issues at stake.

Fiscal Background to Amalgamation of 1914

It is interesting to note that the colonial governors in both protectorates advanced various arguments in support of amalgamation and that regardless of their predisposition towards this policy objective, they did not agree on the policy enforced by the Colonial Office under which Southern Nigeria made annual contributions to the administration of Northern Nigeria. Naturally, the governors of Southern Nigeria deplored such contributions, while those of Northern Nigeria wanted them increased.

The Colonial Office served as a mediator from 1900 to 1913 on this thorny question and generally advised the governors to exercise some caution pending amalgamation. As

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an arbiter, it received all individual protests from the governors of each territory and only in very few cases did it divulge the contents of such protests to the other party. Since these protests contributed in a large measure to the amalgamation of 1914, it seems necessary here to summarise the crucial financial and economic issues at stake.

Southern Financial Buoyancy

The Lagos Colony and the Southern Protectorate were financially strong enough to budget for public works and other capital projects. Furthermore, they even recorded surplus funds, which were invested overseas by the Crown Agents. In actual fact, by 31st March, 1900, the excess of assets over liabilities of the Southern Protectorate was £164,108, as against an expenditure of £176,140.² Within the same period, the Lagos Colony spent a sum of £207,143 out of a total revenue of £211,467.³ The Northern Protectorate, which had just been established, had no dependable source of local revenue to finance a large scale administrative set-up and was compelled to depend on an Imperial grant to the tune of £70,000.⁴ Its internal trade was not well developed to yield enough revenue while religious sanctions precluded it from engaging in external trade in alcoholic spirits like its southern counterparts. The financial buoyancy of the Southern protectorate was as a result of the lucrative import trade, especially that of liquor. In fact, it was Lord Lugard himself who, in accordance with the Brussels Acts of 1892, banned the import trade in liquor into Northern Nigeria, otherwise, the territory under his control might have enjoyed financial prosperity like its southern counterparts.⁵

Between 1900-1901, the total value of Lagos trade was £1,522,869 while that of Southern Nigeria had also gone up to £2,308,038.⁶ While realising the serious implications of this policy on the administration of Northern Nigeria, Lord Lugard, nevertheless, remained unyielding but was content with dependence on annual Imperial grants and the arrangement of 1899 by which Northern Nigeria was to receive annual contributions from both the Lagos Colony and the Southern Protectorate. By that arrangement, such local contributions represented the amount of duty collected on the northbound imports on behalf of Northern Nigeria, less the amount of expenditure incurred for customs and postal work carried out in the Southern Protectorate.

In that very year, the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury envisioned the impossibility of determining the exact proportion of the customs revenue derived from duties on goods imported for consumption in Northern Nigeria and thereby ordered that "... the customs receipts should be allotted to the three divisions in such proportions as the Secretary of State might from time to time direct having regard to the requirements of each individual division".⁷ This was allocation based on needs and not derivation. Here, one can vividly see that this was a time honoured fiscal arrangement, which is still being employed today in Nigeria.

The New Fiscal Arrangement and Southern Protest

In implementing this fiscal arrangement, the decision of the Secretary of State

was influenced by the annual figures of trade, which kept improving in the Southern territories. Since there were no separate records for customs duties on the northbound imports, their annual values could not be fixed and as Southern trade improved, the Secretary of State at various times ordered an increase in the Southern contributions accordingly. This naturally caused protests from the governors in the South, and among other factors, worsened relations between them and their northern counterparts.

Within 1899-1900, Southern Protectorate administration contributed £10,750⁸ without demur. But in 1900-1901, the Colonial Office fixed its financial obligation at £34,000 because of the arguments put forward by the Northern Protectorate that the total customs collected on its behalf at the Southern ports had increased to that sum. Sir Ralph Moor, who had strongly urged in 1897 that the revenues of the three divisions should be equally distributed⁹, wanted the amount to be reduced to £15,000 for two main reasons; firstly, that Southern Nigeria had not charged Northern Nigeria the full expenses incurred on customs and postal work in collecting the customs dues and, secondly, that Southern Nigeria for the next two years would require all its revenue to provide communication infrastructures that would enhance the collection of customs dues.¹⁰ Let us note here that, Ralph Moor, who had earlier on supported revenue allocation by needs, was later being inconsistent in arguing for allocation by derivation. It was not, however, surprising that he failed in his venture.

Lagos Colony was also unwilling to pay an annual sum of £10,000 but found consolation under a pretext that was supported by the Colonial Office. In this case, the Secretary of State agreed that it should not pay the £10,000 annual contribution until 1904/1905 because it was paying annuity to the Imperial Government on Railway loan of £792,500.¹¹ Northern Nigeria agreed because it hoped to gain from the railway construction.

The Increasing Cost of the Northern Administration

By 1903, however, the cost of administration and military service in Northern Nigeria had increased as more areas were conquered and subjected to British control with the corollary of increased personnel. In particular, the cost of maintaining the West African Frontier Force at full strength was £250,000 out of the total revenue of £318,424 in 1902. In that year, the Imperial grant-in-aid was £280,000 as against £4,424,000 that was local revenue made up of tolls, fines and fees.¹²

While preparing the 1903/1904 budget, therefore, Lord Lugard anticipated increased expenditure on further establishment of administrative infrastructures and thereby implored the Colonial Office, not only to persuade the Imperial Treasury to increase its annual grant, but also to put pressure on Southern Nigeria to pay increased contributions. The deplorable financial situation in Northern Nigeria made Lugard suggest to the Colonial Office that the amalgamation of the two protectorates should be effected by 1904. In doing this, he quoted the observations of Ralph Moor, and Sir William MacGregor, who had at different times supported the proposed amalgamation which would unify the revenue of Nigeria under one administration.¹³ Though his scheme

of amalgamation excluded Lagos in preference for the union of Northern and Southern Nigeria, he believed, nevertheless, that the Imperial grants would be spared while the surplus revenue of Southern Nigeria would be expended on economic development of Northern Nigeria. From his own point of view, if some money were spent on the development of Northern Nigeria, it would result in a large increase of revenue to north and south alike. It is interesting to note here that Lugard re-echoed Moor's ideas¹⁴ which had been stated earlier on.

The Colonial Office, while appreciating the deplorable financial position of the North, made Southern Nigeria contribute £50,000 in 1903-1904 financial year and at the same time successfully persuaded the Imperial Treasury to grant £405,000. Meanwhile, the question of amalgamation could not be settled instantly, as the conflicting opinions of the local administrators militated against any master plan for the exercise. It was, however, believed in the Colonial Office that the personalities of the administrators of the three sections must be a prominent factor in the final settlement of amalgamation.¹⁵

The Colonial Office, therefore, decided to implement a report by Lord Selborne's Committee in 1898 that the amalgamation of Lagos and Southern Nigeria should come first. If this was done, there remained the problem of availability of efficient personnel to manage the new administration of the proposed amalgamation. This problem caused considerable anxiety. The Colonial Office preferred Sir Ralph Moor to Walter Egerton as the new governor of the amalgamated territories – Lagos and Southern Nigeria, but had to appoint Egerton because of Moor's retirement due to ill-health.¹⁶ It decided against amalgamating Northern Protectorate and Southern Nigeria in 1904 under Lugard because Lugard's over-centralising methods would hamper a smooth administration. Furthermore, it was difficult to get a more competent administrator to rule amalgamated Nigeria and even if found, Lugard would not serve under him.¹⁷

Consequently, the projected amalgamation of the two protectorates was rescinded, but the Imperial Treasury was to continue to give financial assistance to the north, an assistance that was to diminish as contributions from Southern Nigeria gradually increased. Lord Lugard was constantly warned against exceeding the approved estimates of expenditure, but the realities of the situation and the local requirements in the north necessitated excess expenditure. In 1905, for example, the Treasury expressed great concern about Lugard's expenditure because he recorded deficits in two consecutive years (1903-1904/1904-1905). Northern Nigeria was thereby stigmatised as "the most expensive of all British Protectorates".¹⁸ The gross authorised expenditure of £480,439 was exceeded by £18,547 in 1903-1904 while in the following financial year, an expenditure of £250,545 showed an excess amount of £12,723.¹⁹ These constant warnings and criticisms from the Treasury impelled Lugard to introduce direct taxation in the North though with the approval of the Colonial Office in 1905. The annual turnover of taxation and Lugard's use of the Native Treasuries was a justification that Northern Nigeria had great economic potential.

Lord Lugard established Native Administrations and effected the necessary

assessment and collection of general tax and *jangali* through the agency of the emirs, village and district heads. This establishment of Indirect Rule, based upon the traditional system of administration helped a great deal in increasing local revenue from £53,726 in 1903-1904 to £110,545 in 1905-1906.²⁰

Egerton's Arguments and Defeat

When in 1904, Walter Egerton succeeded Ralph Moor as the administrator of Lagos and Southern Nigeria; he took up the usual arguments against contributions to Northern Nigeria. In 1905-1906, Lagos was expected to contribute £15,000 as against £10,000 that it gave in 1904-1905; the Southern Protectorate was also to give £60,000 as against the payment of £50,000 in 1904-1905. Egerton objected to this arrangement and to a large extent his protests, though in different phraseology, re-echoed Moor's arguments.²¹ It was, however, clear that he would not like to be handicapped by lack of funds in implementing the proposed development projects in Lagos and the Southern Protectorate.

In explaining the economic policy of Southern Nigeria, Egerton intimated that "... money makes money ..." ²² "the more you develop British trade in a country, the better it is for that country ... the greater the trade the greater the revenue if it is well spent the better the lot of the people we govern". ²³ By saying this, Egerton implied that the wise management of increased revenue in the South justified the relative economic progress that had been so far achieved for the general welfare of the people. He objected to the gradual impoverishment of the Southern administrations by demands for contributions in excess of customs due collected on northbound imports. He scorned the selfish motives of the northern administrators and apart from this he wondered why trade spirits were not allowed in the north, under sufficient safeguards and tax to minimise drunkenness. If this was done, Egerton felt that both Britain and Southern Nigeria would be freed from heavy contributions to the cost of Northern Nigeria. But definitely this policy was against Islamic belief as held at that time in Northern Nigeria. The Colonial Office discounted Egerton's protests and made him comply with its instructions.

It will be seen that, although the colonial governors were protecting the Imperial interest, they were also mindful of promoting their individual meritorious services within their respective areas of jurisdiction. If a good administration was well maintained, each of them was given the credit for administrative capability by the Colonial Office. This lingering awareness, therefore, created room for the unexpected self-centredness, which was a permanent feature of protests and counter protests in their despatches to the Colonial Office.

The Northern Railway and the Southern Loan

By 1907, Northern Nigeria had waxed strong financially and had been able to record an asset balance of £79,996. In that year, the administration committed an expenditure of £498,848 out of total revenue of £533,087 made up of local revenue from

various sources as well as a contribution of £70,000 and £295,000 respectively from Southern Nigeria and Imperial Treasury.²⁴ By this time, Northern Nigeria proposed to construct a 3' 6" gauge railway from Baro to Kano. In doing this, the Crown Agents made available £1,230,000 as a loan out of the surplus funds of Southern Nigeria. This loan was to yield an annual interest of 3¼ per cent.²⁵ The question of railway construction was another economic factor that generated petty arguments and protests between the administrators of the two protectorates. This was because railway construction helped in promoting both external and internal trade on which the sustenance of the administrations depended. The separate railway systems under different administrations engaged in an unedifying cutthroat competition. This state of affairs appeared absolutely ridiculous.

From the outset, Egerton calculated that, since the revenue of Southern Nigeria was to be spent on the construction of Northern railway, annual contributions should be slashed down. To him, it was unthinkable that this project was to be financed out of Southern Nigeria's revenue because of northern tariffs which prohibited traders from Southern Nigeria from operating in the Northern Protectorate.²⁶ It was in the light of this that he advised the Colonial Office to raise a loan for the railway project in the open market and under the Public Works Loan Act of 1907. While rejecting Egerton's advice, the Colonial Office expected Southern Nigeria to deduct the annual interest from its yearly contribution of £70,000. However, this arrangement for interest payments was cancelled because of the fear that it would paralyse the finances of the North and due to the unpredictable behaviour of the South. It was not surprising, therefore, when the Imperial Treasury promised to include the interests in its annual grants to the North, which varied from £22,500 to £50,000.²⁷

By 1910, it was discovered that Northern Nigeria would need an additional loan of £200,000 from Southern Nigeria to complete the Baro-Kano railway. The Colonial Office asked Southern Nigerian Government to advance this sum on its credit. As would be expected, the Legislative Council at Lagos protested vehemently against this loan. The unofficial members were particularly vocal in opposing the motion for the loan on the grounds that Northern Nigeria was alleged to have assumed control over the section of Southern Railway in the north after Jebba by fixing its own rates on that section.²⁸ Sapara Williams cautioned the members that the loan should not be given unless the relations between North and South, with regards to the railway between Lagos and Zungeru and Baro and Kano, were settled by the Secretary of State to the advantage of Southern Nigeria. He concluded by saying "we are really strangers to the management (of the Southern Section in the North)... after it had passed Offa"²⁹

Sir Akitoye Ajasa and Hon. S. H. Urry supported Sapara Williams' views. Akitoye's stand was vividly vehement as reflected in his statement: "there is no disguising the fact: we do not like this loan. If we are in order (to oppose it) as unofficial members, we will vote against the motion by way of protest and Your Excellency could then comment on our action in bringing the matter to the notice of the Secretary of

State".³⁰ Two reasons accounted for the failure of these protests: firstly, the loan was to be issued on the command of the Secretary of State which nobody dared to oppose; secondly, this loan, including the previous one of £1,230,000 was already yielding 3¼ per cent interest, which was deemed reasonable by the financial commissioner in the prevailing state of the market. Be that as it may, a conference was held between the Management of Lagos and Baro-Kano Railways at Offa on 22nd and 25th March, 1911 to reconcile the railway rates and settle regulations for inter-change of traffic and rolling stock.³¹ All the points raised were agreed to except the through-rates between Baro-Kano lines. Further meetings, which were arranged subsequently, ended in a deadlock and the two railways continued to engage in cutthroat competition.

In 1911, Governor Bell unavoidably found himself embroiled in the vortex of debate on the existing economic rivalry and suspicion between Southern and Northern Nigeria and suggested a panacea for putting an end to it. Bell, in his despatch³² to the Colonial Office, observed that the Northern Administration would find it difficult to balance its annual budgets because the West African Frontier Force, the Marine Service on the Niger River, as well as Baro-Kano and Bauchi Railway lines, had become very expensive. Great emphasis was placed on the anticipation that the Northern Railway System would not be able to pay its way as the years passed by, hence Bell's advocacy of unification of two competing railway systems and an eventual amalgamation of the two protectorates. In calling for the unification of the Marine, Customs and Postal departments as well, Bell was recalling the difficult early years of Lugard's administration, which had impelled him to propose amalgamation in 1902.³³

Increasing Pressure for the Amalgamation Scheme

The Colonial Office was also under great pressure from several quarters in 1911 on account of the amalgamation of the two protectorates, for obvious reasons. In 1911, Morel published his book *Nigeria, Its People and Its Problems*³⁴, which devoted the last three chapters to the need for such a reorganisation. The popular readership, which the book enjoyed, reactivated the debates on this issue, thereby putting pressure on the Colonial Office.

As was said earlier on, the question of personnel for the headship of Lugard's proposed amalgamation imperilled his scheme in 1904. And from 1906 to 1912, unedifying rivalry, mutual hostility, selfish motives and sectional intrigues, marred the relationship between the administrators of Southern and Northern Nigeria. By 1911, however, the Colonial Office decided at last on choosing Lord Lugard as the only man who could implement the reorganisation of the two protectorates. Apart from his administrative competence, the Colonial Office also aimed at preserving Lugard's Indirect Rule System in Northern Nigeria, so that, given his firm commitment to his brain-child, his choice as the Governor-General was practically automatic.³⁵ The Colonial Office decided against making the serious mistake of entrusting the "task of amalgamation to anyone who was strongly imbued with Southern Nigeria ideas".³⁶

An important factor that influenced a change of attitude on the part of the Colonial Office was the relative economic development in the north and the construction of its railway system. Despite the competition between the northern railway and the southern, it was obvious that the former could not pay its way without assistance.³⁷ This crucial problem, along with other issues, precipitated amalgamation arrangements. As has been noted above, Morel, Hesketh Bell and Walter Egerton drew up unauthorised schemes of amalgamation. These schemes placed much emphasis on economic expediency as the basic factor that would, in the final analysis, compel an eventual amalgamation. In spite of deep thought and common sense, which featured prominently in drawing these schemes, they were rejected. Even though they supported a common objective of unified central administration, they were, nevertheless, rejected not for lack of personnel but "partly because they would have reduced the area of Fulani Control and partly because Lugard regarded them as extending the provincial system of Southern Nigeria which ... does not appear to have been a success".³⁸

The Benefits and Beneficiaries of the 1914 Amalgamation

In this frame of mind, Lugard jettisoned the projects in preference for his scheme based on the feasibility study, which he undertook and completed by May 1913.³⁹ This scheme, however, incorporated some of the useful ideas and proposals contained in the previous ones. Thus, the amalgamation of 1914 enabled Northern Nigeria to meet the heavy cost of its administration and finance the operation of its railway (now a central department) out of the surplus revenue of Southern Nigeria. Apart from this, the new political arrangement gradually minimised the financial burden on the Imperial Treasury and put an end to the periodical petty dispute on account of payment of contributions by the Southern administration. The new political order was to focus its attention on the general development and welfare of the country at large.

Although the amalgamation programme was officially implemented on 1st January 1914, certain preliminaries had been arranged in 1912. By December 1912, the departments that were amalgamated as common to both protectorates were Customs, Marine and Railway. In the same way, the separate public debts were unified and, consequently, the Crown Agents authorised the government of Northern Nigeria to discontinue the payment of interest on the Southern Nigerian loan for the Baro-Kano Railway. Similarly, Southern Nigeria stopped advancing annual contributions to Northern Nigeria after December 31st, 1912.⁴⁰

From January 1913, all Railways accounts began to be audited by the Southern Nigeria Audit Department. The Assistant Auditor and his staff, who were engaged in the Northern Nigeria Railway Audit, were transferred to the Southern Nigeria Audit for the same purpose. Amalgamated accounts of the Railways, Customs and Marine Departments began to show all disbursements and receipts on all heads, while all debts accruing to Northern Nigeria were charged to Southern Nigeria accounts, as the combined departments were now administered in the South.⁴¹ By the end of 1912, Northern Nigeria

had a debt responsibility of £1,630,000 as against the loan of £8,267,665,⁴² which Southern Nigeria was to liquidate. Total contributions from Southern Nigeria from 1899 to 1912 amounted to £820,720 while the Imperial grants-in-aid amounted to £4½ million from 1899 to 1913. This, of course, included £865,000, which was paid for the expropriation of the Royal Niger Company but excluded fifty per cent of the profit realised by the Royal Mint from the importation of silver coins to the North.⁴³ Notwithstanding this staggering amount already expended on the North, the British Treasury was to give it an annual grant of £100,000 from 1914 to 1918 after which all grants ceased.⁴⁴

Early in 1913, attention was focussed on further amalgamation of departments such as the Central Treasury, Judiciary, Post and Telegraph, Survey, Central Secretariat, West African Frontier Force and Public Debt. With this arrangement, Nigeria now had a common staff that could be transferred to any part of the country at the discretion of the Governor-General. Lagos remained the capital of Southern Province while Kaduna became the new capital of Northern Province in place of Zungeru. A Nigerian Council created by Lord Lugard, replaced the former Legislative Council, which had been in existence in Lagos. The new council met at Lagos once a year. The annual budget became known as the Nigerian budget and consisted of the estimates of Southern and Northern Provinces, as well as those of the Lagos Colony and the central departments. These estimates were separately prepared under each administration, but were later incorporated into a single budget and transmitted to the Colonial Office by the Governor-General for approval. Each Lieutenant Governor retained his own approved draft as his authority for expenditure. Nigeria as a whole now had a common financial year, which began on January 1st and terminated on the 31st December.⁴⁵

In order to promote the much-needed free flow of trade, the fiscal frontier and all customs stations on inland frontiers in Northern Nigeria were abolished. Similarly, the Northern law by which licences were imposed on traders from the South, was repealed⁴⁶ so that in the end, the Nigerian traders began to enjoy not only freedom of movement but also the mutual cooperation and peaceful co-existence which amalgamation sought to promote.

The Fiscal Impact of 1914 Amalgamation

In response to the request of the Lagos treasurer in 1914,⁴⁷ the Crown Agents amalgamated the accounts of the two sections and, according to the new arrangement, they began to send to the treasurer at Lagos, all the abstracts of receipts and expenditure. From 1914 onwards, any balance due to Northern Nigeria was incorporated with the balance due to Southern Nigeria.⁴⁸ Practically speaking, this unification of accounts was in harmony with the general scheme of amalgamation and was expected to supersede the old practice of transferring sums of money from Northern Nigeria to Southern Nigeria, or vice versa, in the Crown Agents' Books.

By the end of 1913, Nigeria had a total public debt of £8,267,500 but after deducting

expenses on the printing of the various loan prospectus, advertisements and past redemptions, the actual amount of loans, available for public works, was £7,871,000. So far, the total amount spent from loan funds was £6,759,500. On railway construction alone, £5,755,823 was expended, while the rest was sunk into Lagos Harbour Works, Lagos Wharfage Scheme, Lagos Water Works and other development projects. By 1914, Nigeria had a total reserve of £2,276,000 to its credit for financing other new projects.⁴⁹

This healthy financial situation enabled Lord Lugard in 1914 to budget for a revenue of £3,381,587 (including £100,000 grant-in-aid) and an expenditure of £4,354,216 (including £1,000,000 for the Eastern Railway). Be that as it may, the incidence of the War dampened his enthusiasm and disappointed his expectations. Under war conditions, the Colonial Office revised the already approved estimates to leave a balance of £749,494⁵⁰ on 31st December 1914. Henceforth, Nigeria was to prepare herself for financing the war in the Cameroon out of her surplus funds.

NOTES

1. See J. J. White: 'Central Administration in Nigeria 1914-1960. The Problem of Polarity'. (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ibadan, 1967). A. O. Anjorin, 'The British Occupation and the Development of Northern Nigeria 1897-1914', (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London University 1965). Chapter 5 'Background to the 1914 Amalgamation'. T. N. Tamuno: *The Evolution of the Nigerian State*, (London, 1972). Alan Burns, *A History of Nigeria*, (London 1972). Chap. X-XVII. W. N. M. Geary, *Nigeria Under British Rule*. (London 1927).
2. CP.520/3, Desp. 260, 25th September 1900. Major L. Gallway to Chamberlain, Secretary of State (hereinafter referred to as S. of S.) on Annual Report 1899-1900 Public Record Office (hereinafter referred to as P.R.O.) London.
3. CO.147/174, Enclosure 1 attached to Conf. 8th March 1905, Egerton to S. of S. P.R.O. London.
4. CO.446/7, 2nd February 1899, Lugard to S. of S. P.R.O. London.
5. J. J. White, 'Central Administration in Nigeria, 1914-1960. The Problem of Polarity', (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ibadan, 1967), pp.24-25.
6. CO.147/174, Enclosure 1 attached to Conf. 8th March 1905, Egerton to S. of S. P.R.O. London.
7. CO.879/72, Desp. 677, 22nd May 1902. Chamberlain to Ralph Moor, P.R.O. London.
8. CO.520/3, Desp. 307, 7th December 1900. Ralph Moor to S. of S. P.R.O. London.
9. CO.446/24, Enclosure No. 1 attached to Desp. No. 438 of 28th August 1902. Lugard to S. of S., which referred to Desp. Of 26th June 1897, Moor to S. of S. P.R.O. London.
10. CO.520/2, Desp. 417, 9th December 1901, Moor to S. of S. P.R.O. London.
11. CO.446/26, Desp. 657, 24th December 1902. Lugard to S. of S. P.R.O. London.
12. CO.446/26, Desp. 657, 24th December 1902. Lugard to S. of S. P.R.O. London.
13. CO.446/24, Desp. 438, 28th August 1902. Lugard to S. of S. P.R.O. London. Ralph Moor was quoted as saying inter alia "I am convinced that irreparable harm is being done by the

present system, there should be but one policy in opening up and developing Nigeria, not three as at present ... I feel very strong on this and feel that every day of the existing system means loss”.

14. According to Moor's argument, the development in Southern Nigeria would increase customs dues for Northern Nigeria.
15. CO.446/24, Desp. No. 438, 28th August 1902. Comments by Antrobus, P.R.O. London.
16. CO.446/24, Comments by Butler on Desp. No. 438, 28th
17. *Ibid.*
18. CO.446/48, 6th February 1905, Treasury to S. of S. P.R.O. London.
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