

**ECOMOG AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA:  
A STUDY OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN ECONOMIC  
INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY**

**BY**

**OKEKE, GODWIN SOLOMON MMADUABUCHI  
B.Sc. (HONS.), M.SC. (LAGOS)**

**A THESIS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D.)  
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE  
UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS**

**MAY, 2009**

**SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES  
UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS**

**CERTIFICATION**

This is to certify that the Thesis:

**"ECOMOG AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA: A STUDY  
OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND  
REGIONAL SECURITY"**

Submitted to the  
School of Postgraduate Studies  
University of Lagos


For the award of the degree of  
**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Ph. D)**  
is a record of original research carried out

By

**OKEKE, GODWIN SOLOMON MMADUABUCHI**  
in the Department of Political Science

OKEKE, G.S.M.

AUTHOR'S NAME



SIGNATURE

26/05/09

DATE

Prof. S.O. Akinboye

1<sup>ST</sup> SUPERVISOR'S NAME



SIGNATURE

26/05/09

DATE

2<sup>ND</sup> SUPERVISOR'S NAME

SIGNATURE

DATE

Prof. Soremekun

1<sup>ST</sup> INTERNAL EXAMINER



SIGNATURE

26/05/09

DATE

Shambhavi Gopal Krishna

2<sup>ND</sup> INTERNAL EXAMINER

Shambhavi Gopal Krishna


SIGNATURE

26.V.2009

DATE

PROF. R. AYO DUNMOSE

EXTERNAL EXAMINER



SIGNATURE

26-05-09

DATE

Dr. Ademola Adedokun

SPGS REPRESENTATIVE



SIGNATURE

26/5/09

DATE

## **DEDICATION**

**This research work is dedicated to the Glory of GOD Almighty, WHO  
started it all, and in remembrance of my late father**

**Mazi M. Nwafor OKEKE,  
who instilled in me the value of education**

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This is my third degree in the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, having obtained my B.Sc. (Hons.) and M.Sc. in the 1990/91 and 1992/93 academic sessions respectively. I therefore make bold to say that I am a well-rounded and thorough-bred Akokite. This would not have been possible without the academic mentorship of my lecturers, most of who today are my very senior colleagues in this department. They include, Professors: Remi Anifowose (who is a father to us), Oyeleye Oyediran (rtd.), Alaba Ogunsanwo (rtd.), Tunde Babawale, Kayode Soremekun, and Drs. D.K. Ologbenla (Associate Prof.), Browne Onuoha, S.C. Ugoh, and other senior colleagues.

I have deliberately left out my knowledgeable supervisors Prof. S.O. Akinboye and late Ayo Akinbobola (Associate Professor), because they deserve a special mention in this enterprise. Dr. Akinbobola started this journey with us up to the time of defence of title and registration of supervisors at the School of Post-Graduate Studies, but could not finish it. However, his scholarly contributions remain invaluable. I wish him 'Peace Profound' in the bosom of the LORD. Prof. Akinboye has been wonderful. The speed and commitment with which he has, entirely revolutionized the M.Phil/Ph.D. programme in the department is 'open day', and the positive results speak for themselves. His tutorship right from my undergraduate days to his being my Ph. D. supervisor is worthy of emulation. He is a man with the milk of human kindness in his heart, and may the GOOD LORD continue to bless him.

I have friends who have left positive indelible marks in my life. They include Prof. Obijiofor Aginam of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, and his lovely wife, Dr. Chinyere, and children. Others are, Dr. Emmanuel Onah, Dr. B. Onuora Nweke, Chris Agoha- the Political Affairs Officer at the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UNMIL, whose assistance before and during my field work in Liberia and Sierra Leone is unquantifiable. Barristers: Mgbo Ohaenyem Okoye and J. Uzoma Ezeala, remain my old friends who when my new friends are not there for me, would always say, 'we know him'. I cannot forget my friends and colleagues 'Kayode Eesuola, Dr. Tola Odubajo, Lanre Awosika, Drs. (Mrs.) F. Chito Attoh, A. Nduka Eneanya, S. J. Chigbo Ekwealor, and others. I owe a lot of gratitude to my cousin Anabuike Osele and his wonderful family, Nnanna Odim and his family, F. Alonna Uwaezuoke and his family, and my very close friends in the Circle. Dr. Charles Ibeziakor, C. Kelechi Nwankwo and others too numerous to mention here are friends indeed. I give thanks also to the wonderful staff of the Department of Political Science. May God continue to strengthen all of you.

This acknowledgement will not be complete without saying a word about my family. My sincere thanks to my mother, Mrs. V. Chiagowuom Okeke, for her fervent prayers; my brothers and sisters, Ifeanyi and his family, Sunny and his family, Chris, Ndubuisi, Chinedu, Chidi, Uzoamaka, Nnedimma and Obiageli for their love and support. At the home front I thank my lovely wife, Ebere, for her care, love and tolerance, and our new baby boy, Osinachi---the little, lovely, bundle of joy.

**OKEKE, G.S.M.**  
*October, 2008*

# Table of Contents

	Page
Dedication	iii
Acknowledgement	iv
Table of Contents	v
Acronyms	viii
List of Appendices	238
Abstract	x
 <b>Chapter One:</b>	 <b>1</b>
1.0 Introduction	1
1.1 Background to the Study	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem	4
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study	6
1.4 Research Questions	6
1.5 Significance of the Study	7
1.6 Operational Definition of Terms	8
2.0 Scope of the Study	9
3.0 Research Methodology	10
References	15
	<b>17</b>
<b>Chapter Two:</b>	<b>17</b>
2.0 Literature Review	17
2.1:1 Review of Literature on ECOWAS, ECOMOG and Regional Security	17
2.1:2 Overview of Literature on Conflict and Conflict Resolution in West Africa	29
2.2 Theoretical Framework	42
2.2:1 Theories of Conflict Resolution	42
2.2:2 The Functionalist Thesis	46
2.2:3 The Democratic Peace Proposition	51
2.4 Justification for the Study: Establishing the Linkage between Economic Integration and Regional Security	57
References	75
	<b>85</b>
<b>Chapter Three:</b>	<b>85</b>
3.0 ECOWAS and Collective Security in West Africa	85
3.1 The Idea and Nature of Collective Security	85
3.2 History of ECOWAS and Economic Integration in West Africa	96
3.2:1 Integration Efforts in West Africa before ECOWAS	96
3.2:2 History of ECOWAS and Economic Integration in West Africa	101
3.3 Conflict Management in West Africa before ECOMOG	108
3.4 The Formation of ECOMOG	113
3.5 The ECOWAS-ECOMOG Interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone: The Legality Question	120
3.5:1 Liberia	121
3.5:2 Sierra Leone	127
3.6:1 ECOWAS Revised Treaty and Regional Security in West Africa	130
3.6:2 ECOWAS Revised Treaty, 1993	135

3.7 The Local and International Nexus of Conflict in West Africa	139
References	149
<b>Chapter Four:</b>	<b>153</b>
4.1 Background to the Liberian Crisis	153
4.2 Internationalization of the Liberian Crisis	166
4.3 ECOMOG Operations in Liberia	172
4.4 Peace Accords and Conflict Resolution in Liberia	178
4.5 The Role of Civil Society in the Resolution of the Liberian Crisis	184
References	189
<b>Chapter Five:</b>	<b>192</b>
5.1 Background to the Sierra Leonean Crisis	192
5.2 Internationalization of the Sierra Leonean Crisis	199
5.3 ECOMOG Operations in Sierra Leone	203
5.4 Peace Accords and Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone	206
5.5 The Role of Civil Society in the Resolution of the Sierra Leonean Conflict	214
References	218
<b>Chapter Six:</b>	<b>219</b>
6.0 ECOMOG and Conflict Resolution in West Africa: A Comparative Analysis	219
6.1 ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Resolution: An Assessment	219
6.2 Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone (The SLSC) and the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)	226
6.2:(i) Will the Special Court bring about Reconciliation and Justice in Sierra Leone?	230
6.2(ii) The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission	239
6.3(i) Conflict Resolution: The MERCOSUR Example	244
6.3(ii) April 22, 1996 Crisis in Paraguay: A Brief Overview	248
6.3(iii) An Analysis of the April Crisis	253
6.4 ECOWAS and the African Union: The Issue of Continental Security	258
6.5 ECOWAS and the UN Conflict Resolution Arrangement:	
The Quest for Harmony	267
References	270
<b>Chapter Seven:</b>	<b>274</b>
7.0 Conclusion	274
7.1 Synopsis	274
7.2 Contributions to Knowledge	279
7.3 Recommendations for Further Studies	280
7.4 Conclusion	283
Reference	286
<b>References</b>	<b>287</b>
<b>Appendixes</b>	<b>303</b>

## ACRONYMS

ACRI—African Crisis Response Initiative  
ACS—American Colonization Society  
ADB—African Development Bank  
AFL--- Armed Forces of Liberia  
AFRC—Armed Forces Revolutionary Council  
ANAD—Accord de Non-Aggression et d' Assistance en Matiere Defence  
APC----- All Peoples Congress  
AU----- African Union  
BCEAC—Bank of Central Africa and Cameroun  
BCEAO—Banque Centrale des etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest  
BMATT—British Military Advisory Training Team  
CFA—Communaute Financiere Africaine (African Financial Community)  
CJPC—Catholic Justice and Peace Commission  
CLHRE—Centre for Law and Human Rights Education  
CPA—Comprehensive Peace Agreement  
CSSDCA—Conference of Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation  
EAC—East African Community  
ECA—(UN) Economic Commission for Africa  
ECOMOG—Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group  
ECOWAS—Economic Community of West African States  
ECSC—European Coal and Steel Community  
EEC—European Economic Community  
EU—European Union  
FAO—Food and Agriculture Organization  
FTA—Free Trade Area  
GDP—Gross Domestic Product  
GSA—General Services Agency  
ICTY—International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia  
ICTR—International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda  
IFMC—Inter-Faith Mediation Committee  
IGAD—Inter-Governmental Authority on Development  
IGNU—Interim Government of National Unity  
INPFL—Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia  
IRCSL—Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone  
LCC—Liberian Council of CHurches  
LWI—Liberian Women Initiative  
MOJA—Movement for Justice in Africa  
MRU—Mano River Union  
MSC—Mediation and Security Council  
NCCP—National Coordinating Committe for Peace  
NDPL—National Democratic Party of Liberia  
NIFAG—Nigeria Forces Assistance Group



NMCL—National Muslim Council of Liberia  
 NPFL—National Patriotic Front of Liberia  
 NPRC—National Provisional Ruling Council  
 NOW—National Organization for Women  
 OAS—Organization of American States  
 OAU—Organization of African Unity  
 OMC—Observation and Monitoring Centre  
 OMZ—Observation and Monitoring Zone  
 ONUC—UN Operations in the Congo  
 PAL—Progressive Alliance of Liberia  
 PEN—Partido Encuentro Nacional  
 PPP—Peoples Progress Party  
 PRC—Peoples Redemption Council  
 RECAP—Reinforcement of African Capacity for Peace Keeping  
 REI—Regional Economic Integration  
 RSLMF—Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force  
 RUF—Revolutionary United Front  
 SADC—Southern African Development Community  
 SADCC—Southern African Development and Coordination Conference  
 SCSL—Special Court of Sierra Leone  
 SELF—Special Emergency Life Food Programme  
 SLAUM—Sierra Leone Association of University Women  
 SLPP—Sierra Leone Peoples Party  
 SLWMP—Sierra Leone Women's Movement for Peace  
 SMC—Standing Mediation Committee  
 SOFA—Status of Force Agreement  
 TWP—True Whig Party  
 UNAMSIL—United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone  
 UNAVEM—United Nations Angolan Verification Mission  
 UNHCR—United Nations High Commission for Refugees  
 UNO—United Nations Organization  
 UNOMSIL—United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone  
 UNOWA—United Nations Office for West Africa  
 UNTAG—United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia  
 WAND—Women's Association for National Development  
 YWCA—Young Women Christian Association

## ABSTRACT

This research work studied the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG's) experience, against the backdrop of regional security and conflict resolution in West Africa. It tried to establish a relationship between economic integration of ECOWAS and the resolution of regional conflict in West Africa. In other words, it attempted to establish an understanding of the prospects, possibilities and limitations of using an economic integration body, like ECOWAS as a mechanism for conflict resolution and how this exercise was able to affect economic development and the integration process in West Africa,

We adopted case study design, which allowed a comparative treatment of two or more cases in order to verify ideas and their relationships. In this regard, the study also compared ECOMOG operations in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the alternative resolution mechanism provided by MERCOSUR—the Southern Cone Common Market, which shares similar objectives, principles and purposes with ECOWAS.

We argued that ECOMOG served as a useful tool and mechanism for the resolution of conflict within the West African sub-region, considering the circumstances under which it was established, and the obvious constraints to its operations. The original lack of commitment to the ECOWAS security concerns gave rise to pseudo security arrangements among member states. There were also anti-integrationist moves that were made against other Community members, and these, among other reasons, partly discouraged genuine cohesion towards building strong and durable structures for the

sustenance of institutions and processes within the sub-region, which could have saved the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This is exemplified by MERCOSUR, which we adopted as a viable alternative model for conflict resolution, supported by the democratic peace proposition.

# **CHAPTER ONE**

## **ECOMOG AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA: A STUDY OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY**

### **1. INTRODUCTION:**

#### **1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY**

This research work seeks to study the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG's) experience, against the backdrop of regional security and conflict resolution in West Africa. It is an attempt to uncover the relationship between economic integration as symbolized by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the resolution of regional conflict in West Africa. It also looks at how the conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms have been utilized to empower members to play their roles effectively so as to ensure the realization of ECOWAS objectives. In essence, it tries to establish an understanding of the prospects, possibilities and limitations of using an economic integration body as mechanism for conflict resolution and how the whole exercise has affected economic development and the integration process in West Africa.

The motivation and enthusiasm for this research is woven around the issues raised by the ECOWAS venture into regional security, which started with the Liberian civil war and

was accentuated by the Sierra Leonean disaster. ECOWAS did not have a security mechanism in the mode of ECOMOG, before the Liberian civil war. With the outbreak of that war, it became apparent that something had to be done, especially in the light of the carnage that accompanied the conflict.

The original and broad objective of ECOWAS is:

the promotion of cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity ... and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standards of living of its people, increasing and maintaining economic stability, fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress and development of the African continent. (ECOWAS Treaty: Article 2(1)).

Today, this co-operation on purely economic matters has been expanded to include security issues and the establishment of a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution.

This expansion is as a result of the several conflicts that have broken out on the African continent, and especially in West-Africa since the 1980s. These include the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars, Cote d'Ivoire internecine crisis and the Guinea Bissau conflict. Up till date, some of these conflicts have recurred while others are still festering.

The ECOWAS experience in conflict prevention, management, and resolution through the mechanism of ECOMOG, was inspired by the 1978 Non-aggression Pact, the 1981 Mutual Assistance on Defence and the UN Charter. By 1981, because of the rising wave of conflict in the sub-region, ECOWAS had realized in the signing of the "Protocol

Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense" at Freetown on May 29, 1981; AISP3/5/81, the, "growing importance of security issues and the disruptive impact of (these) wars and conflicts on meaningful economic development", (Nigeria Treaties in Force, 1970 - 1990:898 - 908). In Article 2, the Protocol states that "any armed threat or aggression directed against any member state shall constitute a threat of aggression against the entire community". Extending the idea of collective security, Article 3 further stresses that "member states resolved to give mutual aid and assistance to each other for defence against any armed threat or aggression".

The justification for the ECOWAS initiative could be based on the developments in the 1990s, which transformed Africa into a zone of fundamental instability, mainly because of the withdrawal of the super powers after the demise of ideological warfare. With the internal contradictions of the rulership in Africa, and the focus of attention of the UNO in Europe to the 'benign' neglect of Africa, novel developments emerged. As Evans (1993: 4) has noted, while super power competition did generate a number of wars and insurrections of its own, "... it more often contributed to regional stability, as each super power ensured the survival of its respective allies but at the same time prevented them from embarking on military adventures that prejudiced the security of their sponsors".

These developments also led to the adoption of the Political Principle of 1991, and subsequently the Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 to accommodate and legalize the security concerns in the sub-region. The 1998 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, finally institutionalized ECOMOG as a framework for conflict resolution in West Africa.

It is in the light of the observed anomalies, such as the lack of defence and security mechanism that confronted ECOWAS with regard to the several conflicts in the sub-region that the interest arose for this research. The research thus seeks to explore the linkage between economic integration and regional security in West Africa. It also looks into the efforts of ECOWAS at conflict resolution in West Africa and how these efforts can be improved upon, and the alternatives to the ECOWAS mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, especially in the context of regional as well as global security arrangements.

## 1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The heterogeneous character of the Liberian state and the dominance of the minority Americo-Liberians in the country's politics and the perpetual marginalization of the indigenous Liberians for a long period, among other contradictions like the longstanding animosity, distrust and hatred among the indigenous ethnic groups, created bad blood in the polity. The eventual emergence of Samuel Kanyon Doe in the April, 1980 coup was expected to redress the long overdue grievances and bitter acrimonies that pervaded the political space in Liberia. This was not to be as Samuel Doe became brutal and intolerant of opposition. In the process of trying to perpetuate himself in power through rigged elections and silencing of co-travelers in the 'revolution', he over-reached himself and eventually created the crisis and war that befell Liberia. This subsequently led to a calamity of unimaginable proportions, including wanton killings, rape, destruction of property and brazen acts of lawlessness and abuse of fundamental human rights. When this became internationalized, ECOWAS, as its area of primary concern became involved

through the leading role of Nigeria. This situation was virtually replicated in the Sierra Leonean case later.

Before the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, there was no formal security arrangement in the West African sub-region, charged with the responsibility of preventing, managing and resolving conflict. The history of economic integration shows that security concerns in the mode of ECOMOG was never a consideration. In other words, institutionalized conflict resolution mechanism for integration bodies with economic purposes as their main objective was non-existent. Even the European Economic Community, EEC, now European Union, EU, which ECOWAS is modeled after, does not have a conflict resolution mechanism as it operates in West Africa. The ECOWAS experiment was therefore a departure from established standards in the history of economic integration.

This gap in the security concerns in West Africa and the circumstances of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the international arena, and especially the various crises that engulfed the West African sub-region were brought into sharp focus by the Liberian civil war. The state of lawlessness and the virtual collapse of the Liberian state made it more apparent that something urgent was imperative. This was the circumstance under which ECOMOG was born. The far-reaching nature of the ECOMOG intervention and the numerous conflicts that subsequently engulfed the sub-region also brought into clearer focus the importance of security in the midst of economic development.



This work seeks to analyze the ECOMOG as a regional security mechanism and conflict resolution in West Africa. It examines how regional security has affected the integration process in West Africa. It also evaluates the effectiveness of ECOMOG as a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution and the extent it has justified its establishment. It interrogates the persistence of violent conflict in the sub-region. Finally, it looks at what the possible alternatives to conflict resolution could be in the light of the circumstances in the sub-region.

### **1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The aims and objectives of this research work include the following:

- i) To examine how regional security has affected the integration process in West Africa;
- ii) To evaluate the effectiveness of ECOMOG as a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- iii) To investigate the possible alternatives to conflict resolution in the context of West Africa.

### **1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

This research work gave answers to the following questions.

- (i) How has regional security affected the integration process in West Africa?;
- (ii) How effective has ECOMOG been as a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution in West Africa?;

- (iii) What are the possible alternatives to the present regional security and conflict resolution arrangements in West Africa?

## 1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The central significance of this research work is that it uncovers the relationship between the ECOWAS economic integration programme(s) and the resolution of regional conflicts. In as much as there were methods for resolving conflicts before the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, the institutional structures designed for this purpose have been overtaken by the developments in the sub-region, and therefore have become ineffectual for resolving violent conflict in the sub-region.

Again, the research draws attention to the inherent contradictions in the state formation in Africa, and particularly West Africa, without recourse to the peculiarities of the African peoples. More so, in the case of Liberia, we saw how the USA abandoned Liberia when her assistance was mostly needed. Also Britain could not play any assertive role in resolving the problems in Sierra Leone. However, both the US and Britain emerged to take the glory through the United Nations (UN) intervention, after ECOMOG had cleared the Augean Stables. This essentially dilutes and downplays the crucial role that ECOMOG and ECOWAS played in bringing about the peace that obtains in both Liberia and Sierra Leone today, and could be likened to a travesty of historical reality.

The attention of the entire ECOWAS member states is drawn to the dangers of the carnage and destruction that was the lot of Liberia and Sierra Leone. As a result, they

would avoid the pitfalls of the past and unite in building durable institutions that would strengthen integration in the sub-region and bring about enduring peace and economic development.

The study also generates new insights from comparing experiences on conflict resolution. It examines the nature, commonalities and nuances of the conflicts that engulfed both Liberia and Sierra Leone, and thereby opens new vistas into the ECOMOG peace keeping operations in both countries. This comparison extends to seeking alternatives to the ECOWAS mechanism to conflict resolution. In this regard, the overview of the Southern Cone Common Market, MERCOSUR, which shares similar principles and objectives with ECOWAS, is aimed at drawing useful insights on comparative studies in conflict resolution.

## **1.6 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS**

- West Africa: This is defined as that part of Africa which lies to the north of the Gulf of Guinea and which also comprises all the 15 members of the Economic Community of West African states, ECOWAS, including Mauritania.
- Conflict: This refers to the clashes, competitions or the mutual interferences of opposing or incompatible forces and interests. It also includes those violent collisions, struggles, contests, or battles between these interests or forces who meet in opposition or hostility.

- **Conflict Resolution:** This means finding solution to a problem or making progress from a condition of discord to concord. This involves the process of bringing harmony to bear among the various warring factions and conflicting interests that lead to crisis with a view to promoting the integration process.
- **Integration:** This is the establishment of close co-operation, or some degree of unification of distinct entities, as countries or groups of countries, (which is often for economic purposes), especially in a specific area. This also involves a process of cohesion among these previously independent groups and individuals with regard to values, institutions, and communication leading to more social contact, cooperation and consensus.
- **Regional Security:** This means freedom from fear, danger, anxiety, uncertainty, aggression, care or doubt, with reference to a particular region, as in ECOWAS, and its counterparts elsewhere with similar functions, principles and purposes.

## 2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This research work focuses on ECOWAS and regional security with emphasis on conflict resolution in West Africa. The study concentrates on the period from the early 1990s when the circumstances that transformed ECOWAS from purely an economic integration body into security conscious institution gained much relevance. This period witnessed the revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993 to accommodate the security and conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanism of ECOWAS. Thus, the operations of

ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone constitute the most important part of this work as test cases. In this regard, this exercise covers the whole of West Africa with a population of over two hundred and fifty million people as an area of primary concern, but with some global dimensions.

The limitations of this research work include the problem of scope to be covered which is fairly large in terms of the whole of ECOWAS sub-regional territory, and the political, socio-cultural and economic complexities of the sub-region. However, serious efforts have been made through the research method and approaches to overcome these limitations.

### **3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **Research Design:**

This study adopts case-study design. It is an approach that is concerned with the collection of data for describing and interpreting existing conditions, prevailing practices, beliefs, attitudes, on-going processes and trends of a phenomenon (Anikpo, 1986). Case study design allows a comparative treatment of two or more cases in order to verify ideas and their relationships (Hammersley, 1985). Also, Huberman and Miles (1994) talk about cross-case analysis to verify pattern of ideas and their relationships. Alan *et al* (1998:325) and Gillham (2004:13) state that case study design is main method, and within it different sub-methods, such as, comparative method, record analysis, documents etc, can be used. It is a framework for research rather than a specific method. Within the framework any combination of methods can be used, including documentary records, observation,

comparative method, survey method, etc. Case study design is therefore justified for this study because it makes for comparison between past experiences in conflict resolution, like the African High Command that was muted by Nkrumah and the present quest by the AU, for a collective continental security as well as the sub-regional security mechanism, Accord de Non-Aggression et d' Assistance en Matiere Defence (ANAD), of the Franco-phone West Africa. Again, there is also the need to compare the ECOMOG operations in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the alternative conflict resolution mechanism provided by MERCUSOR, with regard to the democratic principle.

This research work is also a historical and theoretical exploration of regional security in its global context and its relationship with conflict resolution in West Africa. The data analysis is based on qualitative and descriptive analytical scheme to arrive at results and conclusions. The aspect of historical research requires critical investigation of events and developments, and evaluating past experiences as well as weighing carefully the evidence of the validity of sources of information on the past, following with the interpretation of the weighed evidence (Kerlinger; 1986:701). It also allows chronological arrangements and thematic ordering of events as reflected in the outline of chapters. The theoretical involvement extrapolates from relevant theoretical enquiries (conflict resolution, functionalist thesis and the democratic peace proposition) and their necessary application to West Africa. Qualitative data occur in various forms, including field notes, interviews, transcripts, documents, pictures and other graphic representations (Atkinson and Coffey; 1996:4).

### **Sample Population and Size:**

The population of study covers the entire West African States with a population of more than two hundred and fifty million people (Anadi, 2005).

### **Sampling Technique**

Purposive or judgemental sampling technique was adopted using a case study protocol (see appendix i). The case study protocol comprises the interview guide, personalities interviewed, and documentary research. A case study 'protocol' is justified and an essential technique in qualitative research of this nature, in order to replicate it in other settings in future. (Yin,1982)

### **Pilot Study:**

A pilot study was conducted prior to the commencement of the data collection. Interview guide questions were constructed and pre-tested with renowned experts and thesis supervisors who are known for their competences in this area, and it also enjoyed the required construct validity. The purpose of the pilot study was to validate the instrument for data collection and fine-tune its contents in order to make them focus on the research problem.

### **Methods of Data Collection:**

Data were collected through primary and secondary sources. The primary sources were done through in-depth face-to-face interview with the ECOWAS Documentation Officer,

at the ECOWAS Headquarters, Abuja, and those who participated in the ECOMOG operations in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, as stated in the case study 'protocol', in Appendix 1. Data were also collected from key informants at the National War College, Abuja; the Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, also in Abuja; the Political Affairs Officer at the United Nations Mission in Liberia, UNMIL, who also doubles as an adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Liberia, and who was the key informant covering both Liberia and Sierra Leone. 'Key informant' entails obtaining information from a community resident, who is in a position to know the community as a whole, or the particular portion one is interested in. That community resident can be a professional person who works with group one wants more information about or a member of the target audience (McKillip, J., 1987; Butler and Howell, 1980; Caffarella, R. S., 1982; Anderson, C. et al, 1990). The researcher also visited the study areas, Liberia and Sierra Leone, where extensive field works were carried out.

Data collected from secondary sources include archival materials, documents, pictures, journals, monographs, newspapers, magazines, government records, reports from international non-governmental organizations, extracts from world conferences, workshops, seminars and the internet.

#### **Validity and Reliability:**

Data collected were cross-checked with Executives holding portfolio in ECOWAS Secretariat and the key informants as stated above. Also, during field works in the study



areas on the spot assessment assisted in the validity and reliability of data. The use of historical approach also immensely assisted the validity and reliability of data. It allows for flexibility in terms of harmonizing historical records with oral evidence. This also makes the study valid and reliable in predicting the future of ECOWAS/ECOMOG as a mechanism of integration as well as conflict prevention, management and resolution. As for external validity the evaluation of these past events would pave way for making a valid generalization of the future of ECOWAS and ECOMOG.

### **Data Analysis and Interpretation**

Data analysis technique was through critical evaluation of past activities and similar experiences as compared to the use of ECOMOG by ECOWAS to bring about regional collective security and conflict prevention, management and resolution. Besides, field notes and tapes were content-analysed and relevant concepts extracted in order to establish the relationship between past events and present ECOWAS/ECOMOG initiative in order to predict the future of the regional body.

## REFERENCES

- Alan, T., Chataway, J., and Whyts, M. (1998) *Finding out Fast*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Anadi, S. K .M., (2005) "Regional Integration in Africa: The Case of ECOWAS". Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Faculty of Arts, University of Zurich.
- Anderson, C. L. *et al* (1990) Evaluation Review, (April), 182-191.
- Anikpo, M. (1986) *Foundations of Social Science Research: A Methodological Guide for Students*. Enugu: ABIC Publishers.
- Atkinson, P. and Coffey, O. (1996) *Making Sense of Qualitative Data: Complementary Research Strategies*. London: Sage Publications.
- Butler and Howell (1980) *Coping with Growth: Community Needs Assessment Techniques*. Corvallis OR: Western Rural Development Centre.
- Caffarella, R. S. (1982) Identifying Client Needs, *Journal of Extension*, (July/August), 5-11
- ECOWAS Treaty, 1975
- Evans, G. (1993) *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*. Australia: Allen and Unwin Pty Ltd.
- Gilham, B., (2004) *Case Study Research Methods*. New York: Real World Research.

Hammersley, M. C. (1985) "From Ethnography to Theory: A Program and Paradigm for Case Study Research", in the *Sociology of Education*, Sociology, 19 (2)

Kerlinger, F. N. (1986) *Foundations of Behavioural Research*. Japan: CBS Publishing Ltd.

McKillip, J. (1987) *Needs Analysis: Tools for the Human Services and Education*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Miles, M. and Huberman, A., (1994) *Quantitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. Thousand Oak. London: Sage Publications Inc.

1999 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Abuja: ECOWAS Secretariat

Yin, R. K. (1982) *Case Study Research: Designs and Methods*. London: Sage

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW**

##### **2.1.1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON, ECOWAS, ECOMOG AND REGIONAL SECURITY**

Scholars have made immense and significant contributions with regard to regional economic integration as a viable alternative platform for the promotion of peace. One of the pioneering efforts at providing a causal model of regional economic integration was developed under the stimulus of events in Western Europe in the 1940s. Of note are the intellectual efforts of David Mitrany and the functionalists, as well as Ernst B. Haas and the neo-functionalists whose thought had impact and influence on the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC, in 1952 and subsequently European Economic Community, EEC, now European Union, E.U. Indeed, what exists today as the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, drew from the ideas of the European Economic Community, EEC. It is relevant to recall that after the initial disagreement on the structure of the Organization of African Unity, OAU, during its formation, the founding fathers eventually settled for a gradual functional cooperation. This settlement agrees with the tenets of the functionalist thesis, which gave impetus to the formation of EEC, and which also precipitated the ECOWAS project.

It would be ineffectual in this regard to lose sight of the fact that ECOWAS was founded as a functional regional organization. The major objective of functional organizations is to promote economic, social or political collaboration with little or no regard for security factors. Bennet (1995) in his review of the list of functional organizations reveals that the majority of these organizations are formed for the attainment of economic goals of the members. This collaboration of the members is intended to achieve mutual economic advantages that cannot be attained through individual or unilateral policies. Mitrany (1943) intends that the habits of collaboration developed in functional areas would finally spill over into the political sphere and logically lead to the breakdown of political barriers among states. The role of regional economic organizations, without achieving broader political community may be to contribute modestly to the maintenance or restoration of peace and the integration of policy. This is why Nye Jr. (1971:112) states that:

Before a conflict has reached a stage of open hostilities, micro-regional economic organizations may indeed act to raise the price of conflict and to foster communications and help restructure values in a way that may have a restraining effect on political leaders ... After major fighting has broken out, the role of the regional economic organization will be primarily to symbolize the possibility of upgrading a common interest.

One wonders if, this understanding was the case about the ECOWAS. The available facts do not seem to address the question adequately. We could see that subsequent developments have shifted attention from the main objectives to a preoccupation with security matters and conflict management. The central question then is, what is the relevance of ECOWAS (an economic integration body) in the management of conflict? In essence not many scholars have taken the pains to examine the problems of economic

integration and regional security, as well as the institution of conflict resolution in West Africa at the same time, which this research work sets out to do. Available literature so far either treat economic integration *per se* or in the West African case, articles on conflict resolution, particularly the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts and civil wars.

The major work aside from the pioneer efforts of the functionalists and neo-functionalists on the *raison detre* for the establishment of ECOWAS could be premised on the work of Balassa (1962:2), who represents the neo-classical theorists and who argues that economic integration is a gradual process that evolves through five successive but fundamental stages as follows:

- i. The formation of a free trade area (abolition of trade barriers among member countries);
- ii. A custom's union (the establishment of a common tariff policy toward non-member countries);
- iii. A common market (free movement of the factors of production as well as of commodities within the area);
- iv. A complete economic union (harmonization of national economic policies among the member countries); and
- v. Total economic integration (unification of economic and social policies and setting up of a supra-national authority).

Hazlewood (1967) takes a broad overview of the African experience at integration which constitutes a volume of economic and political studies. In its main focus, the book laments that there is a weak economic and political integration between African states, despite the various extolling speeches, conferences, resolutions, and the quest for African unity. The scholars seem to agree that the unity that existed before independence was illusory, as it was externally imposed for the administrative convenience of the colonial powers. Hazlewood (1967:3) contends that, "...it was a unity of Europe in Africa, reflecting the hegemony of the metropolitan country over its various colonies".

Plessz (1968) undertakes to study the Problems and Prospects of Economic Integration in West Africa, at the time when the initial attempt was made and when West Africa (was) experiencing serious growth pains, caused in large part by political instability, which contributed to inadequate economic performance. Generally, the author from this perspective analyzes the integration problem in both the English and French-speaking regions of West Africa. Plessz (1968:78-79) identifies the frustrations faced by studying integration in West Africa, and is embittered that, "A long succession of attempts to eliminate, at least partly, the formidable handicap to economic development constituted by the fragmentation of the region, ended, at least for the time being, in a succession of disillusionments, and very few tangible achievements".

His findings hinge on two main pillars; (1) the overemphasis of ECOWAS members on meetings, conferences, resolutions and legal texts, as obtains in highly industrialized countries, which are not sufficient grounds to achieve the desired aims; and (2) the lack of viable structures for carrying out ambitious schemes for economic integration. These

include physical and human resources, administrative structures, and expertise and the tradition of international cooperation. These are lacking in West Africa, coupled with the internal fragile political order, which does not create a stable environment for governments to embark on long-term ventures. The resultant effect of this is the very slow pace of economic integration in ECOWAS, which is of little benefit to the countries of the region.

Onwuka (1982) studies the process of development integration in West Africa and the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, as a vehicle for regional development. He tries as much as possible to relate integration to the development requirements of the region, and ECOWAS is portrayed as the instrument for attaining these objectives.

Akinyemi, Falegan and Aluko (1984) put together the efforts of scholars in an effort to review the state of ECOWAS after a decade of existence as an economic integration body. Generally and in parts the book chronicles the concept, problems and prospects of economic integration in the West African sub-region, the monetary and financial implications of ECOWAS; industrial development and harmonization in West Africa, among others. This is relevant for understanding the ECOWAS objectives and sectoral issues surrounding the body especially at the early stages of its development. It also provides a background knowledge of the ECOWAS project which helps in understanding the grounding for our argument of the initial principles and purposes of ECOWAS and the later adventure to security concerns.



Asante (1986), closely examines ECOWAS in relation to policy issues and problems involved in economic integration among developing countries with specific comparison and references to other regional economic groupings in other parts of the world. In this preliminary study of ECOWAS he makes an attempt at critical observations which he thinks are of importance to policy makers and experts in West Africa. This is in the light of seeing regional economic integration as a potential weapon for accelerated development and industrialization in the sub-region. Asante's book is relevant to our study, but it has not set out to establish the linkage between economic integration and regional security, and did not anticipate those crises that propelled ECOWAS to establish ECOMOG.

Onwuka and Sesay (1985) take a comprehensive examination of the various sub-regional and continental integration schemes in Africa. Mainly two things motivated the present effort: (1) to close the gap that exists since Arthur Hazzlewood and his intellectual collaborators presented a groundbreaking scholarly enterprise by investigating integration and disintegration in Africa. The need for the study is further justified by the establishment of such organizations as Southern Africa Development and Coordination Conference, SADCC (later renamed Southern African Development Community, SADC), ECOWAS and the Mano River Union, MRU. More so, there is the issue of the collapse of the East African Community, and the new challenges that have faced the old economic organizations in Central and Southern Africa, and the African Development Bank, ADB; and (2) the recognition of the increased conflicts and contradictions in the perception about the future of regionalism and development in Africa. The authors as well did not anticipate the crises that engulfed ECOWAS, but is relevant for our purpose

to the extent that they exposed the conditions that existed and the need to be on the guard on the future of regionalism.

Akinyeye (1993) argues for a meaningful security arrangement for ECOWAS in order to attain the goals of integration. He opines that the conditions for a collective security arrangement exist in West Africa, and the benefits of such an arrangement to the integrating units will outweigh the cost of the arrangement. This "will require the formation of a body of troops for conflict resolution and peace keeping, as well as the joint production of arms by members of ECOWAS" (p.65). The article is helpful in analysing the possibility of the utility of the favourable security assets in West Africa and the need to convert them to the advantage of ECOWAS.

Lavergne (1997) puts together the efforts of scholars from a wide range of disciplines. These scholars came together to share their reflections on issues of regional integration and co-operation in West Africa 'by critically reviewing the experience of the past and exploring alternatives for the future'. It is rather viewed that West African countries today are weakly integrated nationally, regionally and internationally for obvious reasons, mainly ethnic and socio-political. In the African context, the Africans continue to search for new forms of community capable of overcoming major developmental problems and challenges of today's fast changing world. The book project did not particularly set to study conflict resolution or the linkage between economic integration and regional security, and therefore leaves a gap in knowledge, which this research work intends fill.

Akindele and Ate, (2001) contains chapters by seasoned scholars on issues that border on conflict resolution and the management of African security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. More specifically, this joint project explores major historical issues in African security before colonial rule; the dynamics of African security in the post-Cold War era; the range of constructive mechanisms as well as institutions deemed essential, especially in the context of demilitarizing the African security environment with regard to new regional commitment towards democratic and economic transformation. They also inquire about who should assume the direct responsibility for the management of the African Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century – the International Community, the major extra-African powers, or the African people? There is emphasis on the invigoration and broadening of the conceptual design of ECOMOG as a progressive indigenous institution for managing African security in this century. So many things are not taken into consideration in making this suggestion, such as, a proper assessment of ECOMOG operations in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, and its effectiveness or otherwise in the circumstances, the possibility of alternative conflict resolution processes in the sub-region that could be replicated within the African continent, with its attendant compounding complexities among others.

Imobighe (2003) makes a comparative assessment of the OAU (now AU) and OAS in regional conflict management. He discovers that while the OAS countries had an early start to regional integration, other regions, including the EU, have overtaken them in terms of concretizing their efforts towards full integration. Imobighe, believes that the solution lies in mustering the political will to implement the relevant provisions and carry out institutional reforms in order to make the AU a better conflict manager than its predecessor, the OAU. The focus of the author is a comparison of two continental bodies,

OAU (AU) and OAS, which are more political than ECOWAS, which is more economic. Our thesis also derives its impetus from the above.

Bah (2004), looks at the ECOMOG experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone as a bold attempt by a regional functional body which has taken a controversial step into security matters. This is rather a challenge to the sanctity of sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. The most significant outcomes from the ECOMOG intervention is the emergence of a regional security regimes built on three pillars: the conflict prevention, resolution, peacekeeping and security mechanism; the early warning system; and the moratorium on small arms and light weapons. In the light of the above, the thesis investigates "the extent to which the ECOMOG initiative presents opportunities for the promotion of human security through the establishment of a regional security regime" (p.7). This has not fully answered the question of how far this can go to accelerate the integration process in the sub-region or the issue of alternative security arrangement for ECOWAS.

Akinbobola (2000) raises the very important issue of non-military approach to conflict resolution in West Africa, with focus on Liberia. The various peace accords and the preference of 'diplomacy over militarism' is emphasized with the implications for Nigeria's leadership role as a regional influential in West Africa. This is important to the extent that the peace achieved in Liberia and, perhaps, Sierra Leone was not made possible only by the military campaign of ECOMOG.

Sawyer (1992) "Demonstrates how autocracy emerged from a tradition of patrimonial authority, with the prerogatives of governance persistently concentrated in the hands of successive presidents"(foreword). This pattern of authority control, though not despotic was easily appropriated by a military dictator. This is as a result of series of social and political choices of which the distant outcome was not foreseen, and central to this was the colonialist's adoption of a written constitution that prescribed a unitary government with centralized authority. Sawyer recommends African pattern of governance, which is expected to ameliorate the predatory and repressive effects of a centralized state.

The debate among Liberian political practitioners and publicists had been, "...more often on what to do and whom to include than on the structure of authority relationships, the primacy of the settler state, or types of values and orientations to be propagated". He therefore believes that there are scanty investigations on how the Liberian society was constituted, and the solution is that in order to move beyond Monrovia-centred analyses and passionate justifications and denunciations, "...the question of understanding the constitution of the Liberian social order remains as much of a challenge to Liberians and Liberianists as it is a problem of interest to those concerned with the nature and constitution of order in human societies generally". The book is a major contribution to the key problems that confront the Liberian society, and an attempt at relating the general course of events in Liberia to deeper cultural, economic, and social processes.

Sawyer's (2005) thesis is "...that institutional arrangement of governance in Liberia have been inherently flawed and have been a structural source of breakdown and significant contributor to violent conflicts; and that to reconstitute order, there is a need for a new

constitutional paradigm and a new constitutional design that depart significantly from those that failed”(p.xii). This is a follow-up from the 1992 book, but obviously influenced by his experiences in government and the impacts of Doe’s and Taylors regimes on his life and political activism. The available evidence shows that not much has changed in spite of tremendous advances in education, distribution and social integration. Sawyer’s efforts in participating at the highest levels of activities of regional and international governing bodies; and his experiences at how the state struggles to stand supreme and frequently unrestrained in affairs of humanity; how leaders in the guise of claiming to be an embodiment of the state, have projected their ambitions and personal agendas , go a long way in shaping the perceptions expressed in this important book.

Sawyer’s books (1992; 2005) are relevant for our study, especially as they relate to Liberia. They bring practical experience and academic authority on the problems of Liberian national politics, but they have not addressed the logic of economic integration and regional security which forms a major focus in this study.

Levitt (2005) focuses on the historical causes of the deadly conflict in Liberia, and presents an alternative framework for comprehending and examining the aged conflict dynamics between settler and indigenous Liberians, and within Liberian society itself. Levitt (2005) also tries to produce a comprehensive study of deadly conflict in Liberia. In doing this, he chronicles, reconstructs and examines the root, operational and catalytic causes of eighteen internal deadly conflicts in Liberia starting from its founding in 1822 to 2003 when the Taylor regime was dismantled. Levitt’s thesis is that among other issues, “...the diametrically opposed principles on which Liberia and native-village states

were, and the authoritarian political apparatus introduced into Liberia by the American Colonization Society (ACS) in 1822- and ultimately inherited by the settlers in 1847- permanently shaped the sociopolitical order responsible for the institutionalization of ethnopolitical conflict between settler and native Liberians between 1822 and 1980, and "all" Liberians between 1980 and 2003"(pp.xiii-xiv).

This book gives a good account of the major causes of the Liberian conflicts, which is also important in understanding the explanations of conflict in this research work, especially as it concerns Liberia. However, it has not dealt with the second limb of our thesis which is the linkage between economic integration and regional security, even though the Liberian conflicts, crises and war have far-reaching and wider implications for the instability in West Africa.

Adebajo (2002) attempts to navigate round the complex diplomacy woven around the Liberian civil war from 1989 to 1996, as well as the post war years under Taylor's presidency. Foremost attention is paid to the central role played by ECOWAS and the Nigerian leadership- "the aspiring subregional hegemon". The assistance provided by other international actors and organizations, including the US, UN, and OAU (now AU) is also given attention, but he argues persuasively that Nigeria's leadership role in the subregion more than any other consideration motivated the enthusiasm for the Nigerian involvement in the enterprise. A book written at a critical moment in the Liberian crises, it gives a good scholarly account of the disaster and carnage.

Adebajo and Rashid (2004) is a product of a seminar at Abuja, Nigeria which also reflects on some contributions of Dakar, Senegal, task force meeting in August 2002. The generality of the papers which form this volume come from different perspectives to providing, "... a context for understanding West Africa's security dilemmas by highlighting the links between the failures of economic integration and development, the challenges of democratization, governance and military insecurity, and cycles of violent conflict in West Africa"(p.ix). As a product of International Peace Academy's workshop, it basically aims at, "...exploring ways to strengthen the capacity of ECOWAS's security mechanism"(p.ix). The book is valuable for our research work as it helps in enriching the knowledge, especially on West Africa's security dilemma, but it has not specifically established the linkage between economic integration and regional security. This is not the purpose of the book, but it is central to our research.

#### 2.1:2 OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE ON CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA

Dahrendorf (1958:173-175) defines conflict as,

contests, competitions, dispute and tension as well as manifest clashes between social forces. All relations between sets of individuals that involve an incompatible difference of objective, that is in its most general form, a desire on the part of both contestants to obtain what is available only to one, or only in part – are in this sense, relations of social conflict.

In his contribution, Singer (1949; 145-146;) states that the derivation of the word conflict from the Latin word "confligere" (to strike together, to clash), suggests that it first designated an actual encounter with arms. It denotes a fight, a struggle, especially one



that is prolonged and intense. From the human facts of war therefore, Singer states that "It has at an early date been transferred to natural physical processes but there is a tendency to shift the centre of gravity of the term to psychic states harbouring opposed ideas, feelings, strivings; and finally to collisions of tendencies and claims that are, or appear to be incompatible"(p.146).

According to Anifowose (1982), the general discourse on the theory of violent conflict states that the explanations of political violence especially in contemporary times hinge on the relative deprivation, rising expectations and frustration-aggression, the systemic and group conflict theories.

The systemic hypothesis makes a socio-cultural explanation for the proper understanding of the problem of political behaviour. It lays emphasis on the variable which often contributes to the maintenance of a political order or disorder, such as the breakdown of consensual norms, instance of political alienation, the cohesiveness of a ruling group and its legitimacy and the attendant effects of the factors of industrialisation, modernisation and urbanisation, which impact on the social structure and process.

The group conflict theory views violent conflict as the outcome of intense competition between the relevant ethnic, racial and religious groups within the society. It focuses on the cleavages within a society and emphasizes the importance of the distribution of power to the understanding of violent protest. In essence, where lines of social distance are mutually reinforcing, violence is likely to occur. This could be likened to most cries of

marginalisation in Nigeria and the fears of some countries in the West African sub-region of the Nigerian domination.

Gurr (1970) gives further explanation to the reasons for violent conflict. He states that violent conflict could be explained from the point of view of the theory of relative deprivation and frustration-aggression. This theory was pioneered by Dollard in 1939, but was later developed and modified by his followers. Theoretical focus of the argument is that aggression is always the resultant effect of frustration. When an individual or a group feel(s) marginalised and alienated from a system where he or they rightly belong(s), and it becomes difficult or impossible to attain certain expected desires, the tendency is to vent or direct resultant anger towards those things perceivably responsible for his or their marginalisation, and this is usually in the form of violent protest.

Coser (1954, 1956) makes an effort to differentiate between realistic and non-realistic conflicts. Conflicts that stem from frustration of specific demands and from estimates of gains of the participants, and which are directed at the presumed frustrating object, he calls realistic; conflict in so far as they are means toward a specific end. Conversely, non-realistic conflicts are not occasioned by the rival ends of the antagonist, but by the need for tension release of at least one of them. This kind of conflict stems from frustrations caused by agents, other than those against whom conflict is waged.

Boulding (1962) identifies three peculiarities that are attributable and relevant to this stance. First, he argues that in international life there is an alternation between two forms of conflict, *covert* and *overt*. While 'covert' conflict reigns supreme during peacetime,

'overt' conflict obtains during war. Secondly, the international covert conflict is regulated by what he calls the "threat system", i.e. the threat of punishment, the threat of conquest and the threat of annihilation. The third in international conflict is that in which the super powers are directly and competitively involved and which threatens humanity with extinction.

Mack and Snyder (1957) define conflict as a special kind of social interaction process or 'interaction' relationship between parties who have mutually exclusive or incompatible values. They further characterise conflict as follows:

- a. There are at least two parties (analytically distinct units or entities), having some minimum degree of "contact" with and "visibility" to each other;
- b. There is a mutually exclusive and/or mutually incompatible values and opposed another party or parties, and control values, based on "resource scarcity" or "opposition scarcity";
- c(i). There are behaviours designed to destroy, injure or thwart or otherwise;
- c(ii). a relationship in which the parties can gain (relatively) only at each others expense;
- d. There are mutually opposed actions;

There are attempts to acquire power (i.e. to gain control of scarce resources and positions) or to exercise power (i.e. to affect behaviour in certain directions) or the actual acquisition or exercise of power.

Every conflict produces patterns of behaviour on the side of the parties to the conflict. Such behaviour could broadly be cooperative or competitive. Cooperative conflict behaviour will eventually elicit favourable responses from other parties in a conflict. On the other hand, competitive conflict behaviour has the capability of perpetuating itself with the attendant destructive behaviour. Scholars believe that there are practical benefits of cooperative conflict behaviour. This was also a major departure from the ancient set of tools that were based on the assumption that cooperation, while morally desirable, was in many cases politically naïve. Also, the conceptual insight that cooperation elicits cooperative behaviour by both sides in a conflict was mathematically demonstrated in game theory where conflict resolution practitioners examined a variety of models to understand how parties negotiate in conflicts.

The central argument is that cooperation shows itself to be the most desirable means of behaving in conflict situations insofar as all sides in a conflict realise the need to optimize their interests by cooperating. His effort also galvanized a new effort in research on why parties in conflict behaved competitively despite the advantages provided by cooperation. Fisher and Ury (1981), argue that there are essentially three forms of conflict behaviour; the first two, 'soft' and 'hard positional bargaining', which result in parties to a conflict either surrendering or defending their positions. This shows that there is no value system that could be invoked as a means of resolving conflict. Hence, cooperation itself becomes the ultimate value system and is stressed as the critical factor for conflict resolution.

In his contribution, Burton (1993) argues for the need to distinguish between the basic needs and interests of the parties in conflict. Essentially, the basis represents the

underlying motivations of humans, such as the needs for food, shelter, safety, identity, and love, which could be satisfied because of the subjective nature of these needs. To Burton (1994:12), "Disputes' involve negotiable interests, while 'conflicts' are concerned with issues that are not negotiable, issues that relate to ontological human needs that cannot be compromised". Invariably, this scholarly insight that conflict resolution is based on human needs, would lead to variable sum or win-win outcomes since no one's basic needs can be compromised in a conflict. Contrariwise, an interest based on conflict resolution leads to fixed-sum outcomes (win-lose) where parties in conflict are bound to compromise some of their interests because they have to cooperate to resolve the conflict.

Most of the conflicts in Africa are related to or woven around the circumstances the African countries found themselves especially after independence. The political circumstances in most African countries, generated conflicts among the contending interest groups in the struggle for power. Zartman (1989:12 – 17) tries to identify the root and major causes of general conflict in Africa. These include,

1. Decolonization power struggles, which came with the struggle for the attainment of political independence. Many countries were involved in this aspect including Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Western Sahara;
2. Conflicts arising from the challenge of consolidation of new independence. For instance, the experiences of Shaba, Ogaden, Chad and Angola;

3. The aftermath or 'leftover liberation movements'. This includes the activities of such liberation movements like UNITA in Angola, FROLINAT in Chad, and the Western Somali Liberation Front;
4. The arbitrariness employed by the colonial masters in the demarcation of boundaries. This led to 'ill-defined territory', for instance the conflict between Libya and Chad, and Togo – Ghana is a clear manifestation of this as a major cause and explanation of conflict.
5. There is also the case of structural rivalries between the African countries. This mainly explains the cause of conflict between Algeria and Morocco, Ethiopia and its neighbours, and the conflict caused as a result of the position and ubiquitous presence of Nigeria in West Africa; and
6. There is also a category of conflict caused by what Zartman calls 'runaway means', for instance, the conflict as a result of the Soviet aid to Somalia after 1963, and the Soviet aid to Ethiopia in 1977.

A recurring theme in the literature on the causes of conflict in Africa has been ethnicity and religion. But Ibrahim and Sambani (2000) have argued that it is high levels of poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources that are the major causes of conflict in Africa. They contend that it is poverty and the underlining competition for resources that typically lies at the heart of conflict in Africa.

Examples could be cited in the cases of Liberia and the control of diamond; Angola and the control of oil and diamond; and Sierra Leone and the control of diamond.

Adedeji (1999) posits that the most significant of all causes of conflict is the role of prevailing development paradigms in causing conflict or at least in fueling them. This is the case in relation to the fact that two decades of implementing externally initiated and funded development strategies, such as the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) has immiserated the lot of Africans and pushed them on edge, which in turn has engendered conflicts and exacerbated them. As a consequence therefore, Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis (2000), believe that there is little doubt that there is a direct correlation between civil strife and poverty. They contend that the lower a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the higher is the likelihood of civil wars. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) observe that poverty or lack of alternative economic opportunities is one of the major policy-related risk factors that can lead to conflict or restart conflict. Other factors are the extent of dependence of a country on natural resource rents and ethnic dominance. There is also lack of good governance, underpinned by lack of respect for the rule of law, social exclusion and intolerance. Other classifications vary with regard to the actors involved in a conflict, while there is yet others concerned with the conflict in which the state is a major party to the conflict. This is regarded as political conflict (with state involvement), and it is noted that with four decades of independence, Africa has had roughly eighty violent changes of governments, in addition to other well known conflicts and civil wars. There are also classifications in terms of duration of the conflict, the presence or absence of government repression before war and reference to ethnic or religious dimensions.

Foremost radical African scholars have volunteered more vigorous explanation to the conflict situation in Africa. They contend that in the main, the manner of colonization of the African continent is both coercive and violent. In essence, this remains the greatest compelling reason for the conflicts in various parts of Africa. The concomitant effect of this is the privatization of the state by a few interests which hence act as a subterfuge and define conflict in terms of relations between social groups. Against this background, one of Africa's foremost scholars of the political economy school, Ake (1995) argues that it is by exploring the role of the state in conflict that we can clearly understand the nature and incidence, longevity and destructiveness of violent conflict in Africa. This is so because, it goes beyond the reductionist ethnic explanations, often given by liberal scholars to raise such other issues as political legitimacy, democratic governance, human rights, armament and the arms trade.

Nnoli (2003:26), in corroborating Ake's stand argues that in concrete terms, the state violence in Africa has a historical character, with power as the defining element of statehood which took its roots from colonialism. This led to discarding of all the non-coercive elements such as, "morality, norms, values, customs and traditions, contracted obligations and historically derived checks-and-balances that diluted such power over the years in pre-colonial Africa and elsewhere in the world".

As a result of the above, the legacy of the colonial state structure was authoritarian, anti-democratic, domineering and repressive. This is reinforced by the stance of the international community during the early post-colonial period, which encouraged strong state which was logically authoritarian and coercively unilateral. In fact, the conflict



situation in Africa is a trajectory of the pattern of colonial conquests. As Nnoli, (2003:27) avers,

Expeditionary forces crushed dissent groups physically and violently. In the pursuit of this mission the rule of law, justice, equality, fair-play and transparent governance assumed secondary importance. Instead, the state manipulated ethnicity, religion, race, patriarchy and locality (region) to divide the African population and promote its influence. The virtual monopoly of the African country's resources by the colonial state relative to other social organizations in the country compounded this undemocratic character of state structure.

The above assertion is also in consonance with Johan Galtung's (1975: 153) "structural theory of violence", where he argues that there are two types of violence; direct (physical) and structural. While physical or direct violence takes place when it is inflicted on the human person, structural violence is embedded in the state's political structures. The inequitable structures generate conflicts that are often violent. This explanation could be applied in both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean situations, because of the inequitable state structures that dispensed the political largesse to the chagrin of the marginalized groups.

As Nnoli (2003:27-29) has also argued, these general tendencies of the conflict situation in Africa derive their sources from:

1. The intervention of the African state in the economy in a bid to end foreign economic domination. The result is the state's growth in power, wealth and influence;

2. The conceptualization of the African state in war like terms, which led the African leaders to strengthen the state as the central command structure for fighting poverty, ignorance and disease;
3. The dominance of the Keynesian principles which assigned a key role to the state in economic matters;
4. The influence of ideology which promoted strong proxy states and empowered them to 'neutralize ideological dissidents' within their borders;
5. The prevalence of the modernization theories that dispelled the disruptive influences, tradition and parochialism;
6. The emphasis on state and regime security over any other forms of security; and
7. The romance with socialist ideology which encouraged the state to play a leading role in the commanding heights of the economy.

Nnoli (2003) concludes that from this all-mighty and all-powerful state, the managers of state power in Africa believe that, they could get whatever they wanted, do whatever they wished and get away with it. This condition drives their aggression, promotes their arrogance and intransigence in the conflicts that they provoke in which they are directly or indirectly involved (practically all conflicts). It renders such conflicts intractable whenever the state finds it difficult to prevail over its adversaries.

Recent developments have shown that despite the over concentration of power in the state, there has been failure on the part of the state in Africa to fulfill its supposed part of the bargain. Riley (nd.) sees these failures of the African state as being characterized by three basic similarities thus:

1. The state's impotence and inability to rule, with the resultant lack of power and vulnerability to challenge;
2. The steady decline of the economy of African states with the attendant stagnant or negative economic growth rates, increased external economic intervention, growing parallel trade and increased incentives to use irregular activities or war to make an income, and
3. The slow or rapid descent into internal war.

Vogt and Aminu (1996) put together the research efforts of African scholars and experts on the issue of peace-making which has specifically become a major contribution to the understanding of the crisis and operations in both Chad and Liberia. There is a general agreement that conflict prevention and management are the basic preconditions for continental security of which the multiplier effect is growth and development. Particularly important for our purpose are "introduction and background of the papers", "Regional Peace Keeping: Theories and Models"; "Legal Questions Relating to Peace-Keeping in Africa", and "The case studies." In their discussions, some raise issues, which are relevant to our research, especially from the Liberian experience. Specifically,

we could appreciate the contributions of James, "The Role of ECOWAS in Peace-Keeping in Liberia" (321 – 339) Vogt, "The Involvement of The ECOWAS in Liberia's Peace-Keeping," (342 – 361); Iweze and Williams, "Analysis of the Operational Aspects of Peace Support Operations in Liberia", (399 – 421); among others.

It is obvious from the literature on the West African experience at conflict resolution that none has tried to make a comparative study in this area. However, most of these contributions seem to be largely descriptive and already have an end in view. Some of them have out-rightly justified the ECOWAS experiment with ECOMOG, without examining the critical issues involved, while others have made simplistic recommendations without going far enough. Yet the others remain undecided as to whether or not the ECOWAS experiment in regional security and conflict resolution is sustainable. In their efforts, the theoretical frameworks most often adopted do not in the main reflect the founding philosophy and theoretical considerations of the founding fathers of the ECOWAS project. The historical issues that gave rise to these considerations and their continued relevance are not reflected either. Majority seem to be in a hurry to achieve objectives that are not clearly defined. All these are the gaps which the present research work attempts to fill, including establishing the linkage between economic integration and regional security. There are other texts which are not reviewed in the literature, but which would be useful in the main thesis.

## **2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

We base our study upon three theoretical approaches. These are:

- (i) The theories of conflict resolution,
- (ii) The functionalist thesis, and
- (iii) Democratic peace proposition.

The justification for utilizing the above three theoretical approaches lies in their interconnectedness and direct relevance to our research work. While the theories of conflict resolution and the functionalist thesis are used to give answers to the first two research questions, the democratic peace proposition is used to explain the third research question. It is also adopted as the major theoretical approach.

### **2.2:1 Theories of Conflict Resolution**

When conflict flares, efforts are made to contain it. These efforts are referred to as conflict resolution. Scholars of conflict have tended to query the term "conflict resolution", since there is doubt as to whether conflict can truly be resolved or whether it is a realisable goal. It is argued that the word resolution suggests that conflict is a bad social phenomenon, which should be removed because of its assumed destructive outcomes. In taking a neutral position, Galtung (1994:89) points out that "in a conflict, there is somewhere a contradiction. And in a contradiction, there is, somewhere, dynamism". Also, there is the tendency to think of conflict and integration in dichotomous terms, forgetful of the fact that both are complementary parts of the social process. Indeed, Coser (1954, 1956), Dahrendorf (1958) and others have argued

persuasively that the dialectics of conflict and co-operation is embedded in the milieu of all societies and that conflicts perform certain functions for the maintenance, change and integration of the society.

Bush and Folger (1996) explain that these efforts have evolved into two approaches to conflict, namely; the problem solving approach and the transformative approach. While the problem solving approach focuses on mediation's (conflict resolution's) capacity for finding solutions and generating mutually acceptable settlements, the transformative approach to mediation/conflict resolution emphasizes mediation's (conflict resolution's) capacity for empowering parties to define issues and decide settlement terms for themselves, and also assist parties in conflict to understand one another's perspectives. Conflict transformation in essence is concerned with changing the attitudes and perceptions of the parties in conflict with one another.

Intriligator (1982) in his research on conflict theory adopted eight analytic approaches to conflict resolution. These include differential equation, decision theory/ control theory, game theory, bargaining theory, uncertainty, stability theory, action-reaction models and organisation theory. For the purpose of explanation, the stability theory treats the stability or instability of a system. This theory determines whether a system returns to equilibrium when there has been small perturbation from this equilibrium. He (1982:308), contends that, "The system is stable (unstable) if small perturbations do (do not) lead to restorative forces which bring it back to the original equilibrium". Again, the action-reaction models basically treats the interaction among agents, in particular how one agent reacts to actions initiated by another agent. And the bargaining theory is based on the interaction between

two agents who can obtain payoff only by reaching agreement concerning how the payoff will be divided and who, in terms of failure to reach agreement, will receive well-defined "threat" payoffs. The problem here is one of reaching some agreement when an agreement lies in the interest of both but their interests differ with regard to the terms of the agreement. All the eight approaches may provide succinct and useful classification of alternative analytic approaches, which have been used to study conflict resolution, but they are clearly neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive.

Mitchell (1993), states that conflict resolution is aimed essentially at intervening to change or facilitate the course of a conflict. Other problem solving techniques include "problem solving workshops", "interactive problem solving", "third party consultation", or "collaborative analytical problem-solving". In general terms, however, conflict resolution provides the opportunity to interact with the parties concerned, with the hope of at least reducing the scope, intensity and effects of conflicts. In this regard, Otite (1999: 8) opines that:

Conflict resolution performs a healing function in societies. It provides for the examinations (sic) of alternative pay-offs in a situation of positioned disagreements, and restores normalcy in societies by facilitating discussions and placing parties in conflict, in situations in which they can choose alternative positive decisions to resolve differences.

Other scholars have also made contributions to the theory of conflict resolution. Sandole (1993) characterizes conflict resolution processes as a dynamic phenomenon consisting of five stages. These include, initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement and termination. Wilmot and Hocker (1998) also identify several modes of conflict

resolution process as follows; facilitation, mediation, counselling and therapy, organisational development, conciliation, quasi-political procedures, informal tribunals, arbitration of several types of criminal and civil justice systems.

In his analysis of the evolution of conflict resolution, Salla (2000) recommends conflict transformation because it works at a much deeper level of the human psyche than the previous models of conflict resolution. Another reason is that it not only focuses on the sources of conflict but also on the antagonistic perceptions and feelings fuelled by frustrated needs of the conflicting parties.

With the usefulness of the transformative-based model of conflict, Salla (2000) equally contends that it may transform relationships, but it does not go far enough in addressing the underlying sources of conflict behaviour. He rather advocates for 'conflict transmutation', which according to him is "a model of conflict resolution that can be used to address the deep emotions and thoughts that arise during a conflict and perpetuate undesirable conflict behaviour". This is because conflict transmutation uses principles and techniques found in alchemy as a set of contemplative practices that transform deeply encrusted feelings and thoughts that fuel destructive conflict behaviour. In essence, alchemy works at the ultimate substratum of conflict and therefore needs to be given serious attention in terms of its transformative effect on negative feelings and associated thoughts stored at the cellular level. This is also because, although all memories carry with them an emotional charge, it is the negative emotions associated with frustrated human needs that are the source of destructive conflict behaviour.



In this sense, therefore, conflict energizes and motivates social change, and since its resolution may not always be possible, or at times even necessary, some scholars prefer to use the concept "conflict management" or "conflict transformation". While conflict transformation is a summary term for a complex web of independent factors including the parties concerned, social relationship, the changing positions and roles of intervenors, and the moderation of planned and unintended consequences; conflict management may be perceived as a wider concept involving conflict resolution and transformation when necessitated, and it is more of a long term arrangement involving institutionalised provisions and regulative procedures for dealing with conflicts whenever they occur.

When the cause(s) or source(s) of conflict are known, there is every likelihood that we will make a genuine effort to eradicate or minimise conflict in the sub-region, which will enthrone political stability and usher in a conducive atmosphere for economic development. Inexorably therefore, economic integration among the West African States will be enhanced; more investments would be attracted and the volume of 'transactionalism' would increase when proper and effective conflict management structures are put in place.

### **2.2:2 The Functionalist Thesis**

The Functionalist thesis is located within the general area of integration theory. Webster (1961) defines integration as "a unification and mutual adjustment of diverse groups or elements into a relatively co-ordinated and harmonious society or culture with a consistent body of normative standards".

Scholars contend that integration could be seen as a process whereby two or more countries in a particular area voluntarily join forces to pursue common policies and objectives in matters of general economic development or in specified economic fields of common interests to the mutual advantage of all the participating states. Scholars like David Mitrany and Ernst B. Haas deserve mention, for their observations and findings on the establishment of European Economic Community, EEC, now European Union, EU, an organization which according to Frankel (1973:48) is "...a living laboratory for the integration theory".

Mitrany (1943) examines the nature of the international system and why it had failed to prevent two world wars. Following from the failure of the international system to solve the problem of wars, Mitrany (1966:28) maintains that "the problem of our time is not how to keep the nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together". The author believes that the way forward could come from the functional co-operation which would facilitate transactional action across the boundaries of nation states which could act as a building block to mutual respect and understanding and inexorably lead to international peace and diffuse international tension and conflicts. In this regard, Claude Jr., (1971:379) states categorically that, "the development of international economic and social co-operation is a major pre-requisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and elimination of war".

There are two major approaches to integration theory, namely;

1. The transactionalist approach, which emphasizes the role of transactions between people as both an indicator of their attitudes towards each other and as the begetters of interdependence within the community. Karl W. Deutsch is one of the major proponents of this approach. Deutsch (as cited in Frankel 1973:53), in 1954 inaugurated a prolific school concerned with international transactions and argues that "international community can be ascertained and measured through the volume, content and scope of international transactions between its hypothesised members"; and
2. The neo-functionalist approach, which stresses the way in which supranational institutions possessing binding decision-making power emerge from a convergence of self-interest on the part of various significant groups in society. The major proponents of this approach are Ernst B. Haas (1958; 1964; 1971) and Joseph Nye Jr. (1971), among, others.

In essence, while the transactionalists see integration as a condition, the neo-functionalists see it as a process, since both economic and political issues are regarded as an eternal continuum. It is therefore within the transactionalist intellectual doctrine that the functionalist thesis finds relevance and focus.

Functionalist writings argue that the dominant changes in the World of the 20<sup>th</sup> century include economic development, the role of national governments in economic matters and the consequent need for technical or functional collaboration across national

frontiers, and the challenges to democratic political institutions as a result of the growing complexity of tasks facing them. From the above, Mitrany (as cited in Claude Jr. 1971:380) believes that a peaceful world society is "more likely to grow through doing things together in workshop and marketplace than by signing pacts in chancelleries". His thesis is that:

Sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, only through a function. By entrusting an authority with a certain task, carrying with it command over the requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred from the old authority to the new; and the accumulation of such partial transfers in time brings about a translation of the true seat of authority.

(Functionalism is a method) which would ... overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually integrated.

This gradualist approach is what Mitrany calls 'Federalism by installments' (as cited in Claude Jr. 1971:381). The supranational organisation envisaged by Mitrany is better placed to make the necessary rewards, as the organisation strives across frontiers amongst groups which are expected to exploit the new found co-operation, increasing interdependencies and enhancing the supremacy of the organisation rather than the primordial attachments to the nation states.

Claude Jr., (1971: 381) argues that among other things, "functionalism undertakes to grapple with the effects of both the excessive primitiveness of underdeveloped regions and the excessive intricacy of economic and social relationships in the intensely industrialised parts of the world. Thus it hopes to extirpate the roots of war" This will be

made possible with the expected gains of integration which can be exploited for the benefit of peace and economic development.

In this sense, Akinbobola (2007;17-18), observes that functionalism is a process,

whereby the benefits and gains of co-operation in one sector would be so encouraging that they would 'ramify' to other sectors, thereby contributing to the integrative impulse...when the benefits and advantages of interdependence begin to accrue, confidence, mutual trust could be built among the participating states which could put a stop to the use of violence as a means of resolving differences.

The functionalist thesis however has some shortcomings. According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1986:457) functionalism has been seriously criticised on the grounds that:

1. It is difficult, if not impossible to separate the economic and social tasks from the political;
2. Governments have shown themselves unwilling to hand over to international authority tasks, which encroach on the political;
3. Certain economic and social tasks do not 'ramify' or 'spill-over' into the political sector; and
4. The road to political integration lies in political "acts or will", rather than functional integration in economic and social sectors.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the relevance of the functionalist thesis in the explanation of integrative efforts in West Africa becomes quite understandable. It would be recalled that the various regional economic bodies in Africa took their roots from the stand of the majority of the founding fathers of the OAU. They opted for a gradual

functional co-operation among the various sub-regions which will eventually apex in a common market as against the radical group led by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who had argued for immediate surrendering of sovereignty by the emergent African states for a greater United States of Africa. Perhaps this is why, Akinbobola (2007) believes that the signing of the treaty establishing the ECOWAS on May 28, 1975 by the Heads of State and plenipotentiaries of the then fifteen member states in Lagos, Nigeria was a practical fulfilment of the goals and aspirations of a majority of West African leaders many of whom had hoped for such a gradual development shortly after independence in the early 1960s.

It could therefore be seen that the functionalist thesis complements the theories of conflict resolution in our research. This is because, while the functionalist thesis encourages transactionalism as a means to peace, the understanding of the cause(s) and source(s) of conflict and its amelioration makes for a conducive atmosphere for transactionalism to thrive. As this harmony exists, the much-cherished peace would be actualised.

### **2.2:3 The Democratic Peace Proposition**

The democratic peace proposition examines the role democracy could play as a solution to international conflict and world peace. The central argument according to Ray (1995: cover page), is that (there is the tendency that) “democratic states do not initiate war against one another and therefore offer an avenue to universal peace”. Although, this position was advanced by some western diplomats during the collapse of the Soviet

Union in the late eighties and debated among international relations experts within this period, the idea antedates the middle 1980s and the end of the cold war by about 200 years. The philosophical roots are traceable to the classic work of Kant (1795). The position of Kant (as cited in Ray, 1995:2), is that citizens in a democracy, or in any state for that matter, are likely to be opposed to decisions for war because, "they are doing the fighting themselves". The citizens will also be opposed to war because they must pay the costs of war from their own resources; again, most citizens in most countries base their attitudes about any given war on precise calculations of economic profit or loss for themselves.

In furtherance of the philosophical roots of the democratic peace proposition, the liberals and the realists in the academic field of international relations have made some useful contributions. For instance, Woodrow Wilson as the founder of idealism dominated the new utopian perspective in the study of international relations. The utopian arguments emphasize the liberal faith in reason, public opinion, individual liberty, democracy, international law and international organization. Wilson (as cited in Ray, 1995:9), believes that "a steadfast concert for peace ... can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations". This idea, however, got a devastating blow from events surrounding the onset of World War II and the predominant interpretation of those events after the war.

Having discredited the Wilsonian idea that democracy is a key to peace, the antidemocratic bent of realism was solidified by the founder of modern realism, Morgenthau (1948: 187) who explains that "when in the course of the nineteenth century

democratic selection and responsibility of government officials replaced government by aristocracy, the structure of international society, and with it of international morality, underwent a fundamental change". This did not stop the quest for democratic peace.

The explosive nature of the democratic peace proposition provoked considerable debate, especially among international relations scholars. This has given rise to eight 'empirical regularities' that constitute the democratic peace. Seven of these are associated with war process and democracy based on empirical observations.

They include the following:

1. Democracies are not at all immune from fighting wars with non democracies;
2. Democracies tend to win a disproportionate share of the wars they fight;
3. When disputes do emerge, democratic dyads choose more peaceful processes of dispute settlement than do other pairings of states;
4. Democracies are more likely to initiate wars against autocracies than are autocracies against democracies;
5. In wars they initiate, democracies pay fewer costs in terms of human life and fight shorter wars than non democratic states;
6. Transitional democracies appear more likely to fight than stable regimes; and
7. Larger democracies seem more constrained to avoid war than do smaller democracies.



Generally, the theoretical underpinnings of the democratic peace proposition focus on the differences between the structural and the cultural explanations, as emphasized almost simultaneously by Mesquita and Lalman (1992) on the one hand and Morgan and Schwebach (1992), on the other. The supporters of the cultural argument maintain that democratic countries are like-minded about economic and political policies, and that democratic political culture makes wars between democratic states unlikely, while the structuralists posit that political constraints on leaders in democracies make it more difficult for them to opt for force as a foreign policy option.

The democratic peace proposition is generally, vulnerable to attack on many points, including the rarity of statistical data on both international wars and democracies which could assist in more authentic factual analysis; the encumbrances in the definition of democracy, and the vulnerability of democratic regimes. What we have in Africa is a semblance of democracy. It is in this manner that Ake (1992,1994) tries to distinguish between 'democracy', which according to him is "...popular power, rule by the demos", and 'liberal democracy', which means, "...essentially consent of the governed, multiparty pluralism, electoral competition and guarantee of rights including equality before the law. (And) ...the consent of the governed is now taken rather than given". This type of democracy derides group identities and social formations, which are essential factors for the proper understanding and application of democracy in Africa.

However, the democratic peace proposition is still relevant both in West Africa and indeed Africa. This is because, when the member states become democratic and imbibe democratic values, perhaps, taking into consideration Ake's group identities and social

formations, which is presently denigrated, there will be more likelihood that they will resort to dialogue, as part of democratic culture in the resolution of conflict, than resorting to violence or war. This particularly is important to Ake (1992:7), because, "...as long as we deny their legitimacy as vehicles of political expression, we are annihilating the prospects of democracy and freedom, and impoverishing our people spiritually". When these conditions are complied with, they will in the final analysis engender an atmosphere of peace and stability and therefore attract the much needed economic development and integration.

The democratic peace proposition may also be useful in dealing with the West African situation since its central argument is that democratic states do not initiate war against one another and therefore offer an avenue to universal peace. What this implies in essence, is that if the countries of West Africa, including Liberia and Sierra Leone, are democratic, there is the possibility that the crises and war that engulfed them may not have occurred. This is so because they would have imbibed the democratic culture which would encourage dialogue in the resolution of conflict. Again the government would be more responsive and responsible to the opinion of the ruled and the internal mechanism(s) of democracy would have resolved the conflict(s) without violence. At a broader level, globalisation which has become the buzz-word in the international arena encourages the dominance of democracy within and among states for active participation in the international arena.

We could therefore see the full and major import of the democratic peace as our dominant tool of analysis in the West African situation with regard to conflict prevention,

management and resolution. This framework will thus enable us see as in the case of the Southern-Cone Common Market, (MERCOSUR), an organisation specifically set up for economic integration (as is also ECOWAS) used its structures and processes to stop an assault on democracy as demonstrated in the Paraguay crisis of April 22, 1996. MERCOSUR also shows how decisions at the national level are influenced by forces stemming from the regional level.

Used together, the above three theories form our analytical framework. The theories of conflict resolution examine the various ways of resolving conflict. Therefore when the nature, causes and sources of conflict are known among members and also the ways of resolving them, they can at least be contained before they degenerate to unmanageable proportions. The functionalist thesis encourages peace through transactionalism, because through increased transactionalism more understanding is created among the participating partners. This would make peace more realizable in an event of a conflict between them. And the democratic peace proposition encourages the emulation of democratic culture which in essence encourages peace through the democratic process. We can then appreciate why these three theoretical frameworks of analysis are relevant for our purpose in studying the linkage between economic integration and regional security, and conflict resolution in West Africa.

## 2.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY: ESTABLISHING THE LINKAGE BETWEEN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY

The justification for this research work lies in several issues that motivated the enterprise. We have identified the circumstances and enthusiasm that led to the establishment of ECOWAS. We have also noted that at the time of the establishment of ECOWAS, security concerns as they obtain today were not a priority. These concerns were not so because of the condition of the African states, and indeed West African states.

The fact is that it is not that the conditions for integration were not there in Africa/West Africa, at the time of independence; this has been aptly justified by Robson (1983: 1) as he states that,

In Africa itself, a particularly fertile ground for cooperation and integration is provided by the existence of large numbers of new states whose smallness and poverty represent severe constraints on their autonomous development...most small poor states have limited development alternatives. Their balanced development requires larger markets, and for most of them this points to some form of regional integration.

This is true and captures the condition of most African countries as at the time of independence. Indeed, as he aptly observes, it is only Nigeria that had a Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) which was greater than that of Hong Kong. Even so, out of the forty-five states in sub-Saharan Africa, twenty-four had fewer than 5 million inhabitants. In other words, the conditions for economic integration were very ripe.

It could also be seen that in as much as Nkrumah's idea of United States of Africa could not work, when eventually the African leaders settled for gradual functional cooperation, it would be seen that they were not totally sincere about it. Even, with the establishment of ECOWAS, some ECOWAS member states were still involved in one form of agreement(s) with each other for selfish purposes. This could be seen from Senegal and the Gambia agreement for the formation of a confederation of their two countries; there was Nigeria/Benin mutual defence pact which was designed to provide the basis for mutual assistance on defence matters. Furthermore, there was a quadripartite agreement which was signed between Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Togo and Ghana dealing with cooperation on security, customs, extradition and the cooperation of their police forces in 1984. It could therefore be seen that as a result of the selfish motives of the ECOWAS member states,

The desire for greater cooperation on matters relating to defence and security stems from the recognition by states of the vulnerability of their government to internal disruptions which can be encouraged and manipulated by forces external to their territorial boundaries (Nwachukwu *et al*, 1991: 120)

This lack of commitment to the ECOWAS security concerns gave rise to pseudo security arrangements among ECOWAS member states, hence the Non-Aggression Pact was abandoned and the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence was not implemented. Even so, Nkrumah, because of his obsession with the African Unity, did not also show genuine concern for the ECOWAS project following Ghana's withdrawal from the West Africa Airlines and the West African Marketing Board. Again, there is also division in the security mechanism with Accord de Non-Aggression et d' Assistance en Matiere Defence (ANAD) for the Francophone West Africans, and this has tended to make for the lack of total commitment to the ECOWAS security arrangement.

Furthermore, some core ECOWAS members have had reasons to make anti-integrationist moves to other community members. This was seen during the civilian government of President Shehu Shagari (1979 – 1983) "Ghana must go", and the military dictatorship of General Buhari. This was also demonstrated when large numbers of the community citizens were described as "illegal aliens" (1983 – 1985) and expelled from Nigeria; and Nigeria's closure of land borders with neighbouring ECOWAS member states (April 1984 – February 1986); and the ban on food exports to other West African countries (Abutudu, 1990: 102 – 103, as cited in Asobie, 2008: 19). The direct impact of this is that commitment to the ECOWAS integration became weaker.

This apathy towards genuine regional integration also betrays the absence of any genuine effort by ECOWAS members to promote democracy or build enduring democratic institutions which would have brought political stability. Available records show that there is no West African state that has not at least experienced an attempted coup (see table below).

**Table Showing Military Coups Country by Country in West Africa**

Country	Date	Coup Leader
Dahomey (Rep. of Benin)	a) 23 Oct. 1963	Col. Christophe Soglo
	b) 29 Nov. 1965	Col. Christophe Soglo
	c) 22 Dec. 1965	Col. Christophe Soglo
	d) 17 Dec. 1967	Maj. Maurice Kouandete
	e) 10 Dec. 1969	Maj. Maurice Kouandete
	f) 26 Oct. 1972	Maj. Maurice Kouandete
The Gambia	1981 1994	Failed coup attempt Yahya Jammeh
Ghana	a) 24 Feb. 1966	Lt. Gen. Joseph Ankrah
	b) 13 Jan. 1972	Lt. Col. Ignatius Acheampong
	c) 5 July 1978	Gen. Fred Akuffo
	d) 4 June 1979	Flight Lt. Jerry John Rawlings
	e) 31 Dec. 1981	Flight Lt. Jerry John Rawlings
Guinea	a) 3 April, 1984	Col. Lansana Conte
Liberia	a) 12 April 1980	Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe

Mali	a) 19 Nov. 1968 b) 25 March 1991	Lt. Moussa Traore  Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Toure
Niger	a) 15 April 1974 b) 1996	Lt. Col. Seyni Kountche Ibrahim Mainassara
Nigeria	a) 15 Jan. 1966  b) 29 July 1966 c) 29 July 1975 d) 31 Dec. 1983 e) 27 Aug. 1985	Group of Army Majors, led by  Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu  Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon  Brig. Murtala Mohammed  Maj. Gen. Mohammed Buhari  Gen. Ibrahim Babangida
Sierra Leone	a) 21 March 1967 b) 23 March 1967 c) 18 April 1968 d) 29 April 1992 e) 1996	Brigadier David Lansana  Lt. Col. Andrew Juxon-Smith  Sergeant-Major Rogers  Captain Valentine Strasser  Marda Bio
Togo	a) 13 Jan. 1963	Lt. Col. Etienne Eyadema
Upper Volta (Burkina-Faso)	a) 3 Jan. 1966 b) 8 Feb. 1974 c) 24 Nov. 1980 d) 7 Nov. 1982	Col. Dangoule Lamizana  Col. Dangoule Lamizana  Col. Daye Zerbo  Group Of NCOs and Junior Officers.



	e) 4 Aug. 1983 f) 15 Oct. 1987	Captain Thomas Sankara Captain Blaise Compaore
Cape Verde	2005	Army Mutiny that temporarily kept the government out of power
Cote D'Ivoire	1999 2000 2001 2002	Robert Guei Army Mutiny Attempted coup Guei died Failed attempt to overthrow Gbagbo
Geniea Bissau	1980 Nov. 1999 2003	Joao Vieira Gen. Ansumane Mane Gen. Ansumane Mane toppled, & coup plotters appointed Henrique Rosa as interim Pres. & Antonio Rosa as Interim Prime Minister
Senegal	1962	Botched coup leading to the arrest of P. Minister Dia.

*Source: Researcher's Compilation*

While this cannot be ruled out about the Mercosur member states (which we have chosen as our model of successful economic integration and regional security) it is evident that the level of commitment to the Mercosur project by members was unprecedented. This is in contradistinction with the ECOWAS experience. In the ECOWAS experience, there seems to be a disconnect either deliberate or inadvertent in promoting economic integration as well as regional security. This assertion does not lose sight of the fact that ECOWAS leaders were fully aware of the philosophical grounds for integration, as they were also aware that the European and Latin American examples they were emulating have taken certain benchmarks as given.

Scholars have also raised other questions about why regional integrative schemes fail in most Third World countries. There is an allusion to the theoretical approach to regional integration projects by participating countries. As Asobie (2008) observes, most of them adopt the functionalist approach which demands a certain measure of transfer of sovereignty, and also an approach which is a state-centred-top-down approach, and which unlike the communications theoretical approach disregards the social perceptions, values and affectivity of the participating members. In essence, he argues that the failure of the ECOWAS functionalist theoretical approach is that it has not mainstreamed the development of a sense of community through the evolution of common values, of a sense of security community, and expansion of social and economic transaction flows that

are at the heart of the communication strategy. In his estimation therefore (pp. 13-14):

...the problem with the conventional approach to regional integration in West Africa appears to be the tendency to commence the integrative process from the economic sector. The ECOWAS Treaty and the Treaty of the African Economic Community...focus on the economic dimension of integration as a starting point. In a region and sub-region, where the social sector was disorganized by colonialism and neo-colonialism, concentrating on the economic sector as the basis for regional integration is like building a castle without foundation.

While the fears raised by Asobie appear germane, another look at colonialism and neo-colonialism as being among the factors that caused disequilibrium in our social and political circumstances is not entirely true. This is because colonialism and neo-colonialism also left a disarticulated economy. So any specific emphasis on the economic sector as the basis of failure would be skewed and asymmetrical. Even so, the level of interactions among community citizens today tend to swing more on the positive side of the pendulum. This is why we shift attention more to the 'political will' needed as the driving force rather than the shortcomings of theoretical approaches. This political will is expected to harmonize both economic integration forces and regional security, because it would be strange to have economic prosperity in the midst of regional insecurity.

Scholars also believe that there is the existence of positive linkages between regional economic integration and peace and security. This is the philosophical consideration behind contemporary discourses advocating for more cooperation and integration at the international level in order to avoid bilateral, regional and even domestic conflicts. This has been amply demonstrated by the European experiment, and this was also elevated to the level of theory by the seminal work of Mitrany on cooperation in functional areas, as we stated earlier on. This is also collaborated by the then ECOWAS Executive Secretary Abbas Bundu, when he emphasizes that,


You cannot talk meaningfully about economic cooperation and integration by itself without also relating to the underpinning of political stability within the sub-region. The two are inseparable.... It is clear to me that regional solidarity and commitment to integration will be considerably enhanced where political stability becomes a common identity and is also perceived as a shared responsibility (cited in Nwolise, 1997: 50)

There is also a scholarly debate between the Mercantilists and Liberal Economists based on the pros and cons of economic openness. The Mercantilists argue that international economic interaction almost necessarily leads to conflict because of the inadvertent disputes over access to resources, distribution of the gains-from-trade, and or over trade imbalances. This is so, because in an anarchic world economic interaction is a zero-sum-game where states always pursue national interests at the expense of other states.

On the other hand, the Liberal Economists (Smith and his followers; cited in Lombaerde, nd) believe that, "...free trade contributes to the diffusion of economic prosperity and tends to balance economic interaction which is a positive-sum-game contribution to peace and stability". From both schools therefore, the relations between economic openness and peace and security could theoretically be positive or negative. But from both approaches causality runs from international economic interaction to peace and not vice versa. However the foundations of the Liberal approach is built on a micro-economic logic that expected positive effects of the occupation of different types of international exchange flows. Regional Economic Integration, REI, leads to more trade and more intense capital flows and in turn to higher levels of interdependence and "trust", more secured access to strategic resources and lower threats to embargoes. This inexorably leads to welfare, peace and stability. (Schiff and Winters, 1998; 2003, cited in Lombaerde, nd) state that higher interdependence increases the cost of war and political pressure against it.

The linkage between economic integration and regional security can be represented diagrammatically as follows:

### Diagram on Economic Integration and Regional Security



Scholars ask if the absence of security or low level of security alone can lead to Regional Economic Integration (REI). On this, Lombaerde avers that virtuous circles are possible;  $REI \Rightarrow \text{trade} \Rightarrow \text{peace/SEC} \Rightarrow REI \dots$  As the diagram demonstrates, regional economic integration (REI) leads to trade and subsequently peace and/or security (SEC), which inexorably also leads to further regional economic integration, (REI). Taking this argument further, peace could get a significant and visible dividend, which fuels the integration process. However at the macro level (countries, communities and societies) the possibility of widening and deepening of regional economic integration has a higher tendency for more committed and greater levels of interdependence and lower levels of self sufficiency, which has a link with security.

It is therefore on the basis of these observations that we find a justification for this study which tries to establish a linkage between economic integration and regional security. This is also important because the whole essence of economic

integration is to encourage the reduction of conflict. The ECOWAS experiment remains an enigma. This is so, because, in as much as it has often been cited as among the successful integration schemes in Africa, it has also had its share of contradictions. It is significant to note that even with the institutionalization of ECOMOG as a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security, it has not stopped violent conflicts within the sub-region. The difficulty in bringing about regional security through a regional economic integration body like ECOWAS remains a question that burrs curious mind. As Asante (2004: 62) observes,

Economic integration has a potential role to play in alleviating regional conflicts in light of the symbiotic relationship between peace, security, and economic development. Regional integration is not just an economic issue; it is a multidimensional issue in which integration is seen as a process of community building or social contraction and is not limited to the expansion of regional trade.

From the above point of view therefore, it could be seen that the novelty called ECOMOG is only an attempt to remedy the inadequacies of ECOWAS with regard to the security of the sub-region in the past. That which had been left undone is ignoring the linkage between economic integration and regional security. Perhaps, this ignorance is not because of the technical expertise to do that, but because of the lack of political will. This is why Robson (1983: 3) observes that “- It is often suggested that in the sphere of regional integration it is not so much technical knowledge that has been lacking but the political will”. Therefore in vain do the labourers for economic integration work if they

do not take care of regional security. This regional security in a holistic sense also means human security in which the sub-regional citizens have access to portable water, affordable education and health facilities, general development in infrastructural facilities and observance of the rule of law. In other words, in simple terms, good governance could be made the sub-regional ideology in order to fast-track economic integration and regional security.

It is therefore in recognition of the obvious gap between economic integration and regional security, and the lack of strategic vision by the ECOWAS leaders that they have embarked on more positive measures to strengthen economic integration in the sub-region, by adopting several protocols and frameworks with strong emphasis on regional security. This is because they have realized that there is no way any meaningful economic development could take place in an atmosphere of palpable insecurity. In essence, since the sub-region was threatened by the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars, and which practically transformed ECOWAS into ECOMOG, several protocols and frameworks have been signed, and some effectuated including the following;

- Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security. This is sequel to Decision A/DEC/.11/10/98 adopted in Abuja on October 31, 1998, and signed on December 10, 1999 in Lome, Togo. This decision was influenced by ECOWAS Revised Treaty, signed in Cotonou on July 23, 1993, especially Article 58; the OAU Charter, UN Charter, especially chapters VI-VIII; Non-Aggression Pact, signed in Lagos on April 22, 1978; The Mutual Assistance on Defence, MAD,



signed in Free Town, Sierra Leone on May 29, 1981; Framework Agreement of the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Defence (ANAD), signed in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire on June 9, 1977; the enforcement of ANAN, signed in Dakar, Senegal on December 14, 1981; the Declaration of Political Principles adopted in Abuja on July 6, 1991, on Freedom of Peoples Rights and Democratization; Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and on Extradition, signed in Dakar, Senegal, on July 29, 1992 and Abuja on August 6, 1994 respectively; Cairo Declaration of June 29, 1993 on the establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa, and adopted by the 29<sup>th</sup> Session of the OAU Conference of Heads of State and Government; Proliferation of conflicts which constitutes a threat to the peace and security in the African continent and undermines efforts to improve the living standards of our people; the need to develop effective policies to alleviate the suffering of the civil population, especially women and children, restore life to normalcy after conflicts or natural disasters and efforts in humanitarian sphere; cross-border crimes, proliferation of small arms and illicit trafficking which contribute to the development of insecurity and instability, and jeopardize the economic and social development of the sub-region; the need for increased and well coordinated multilateral cooperation; making relevant Treaties and Protocols more adequate, effective and pragmatic; the need to consolidate achievements in conflict resolution through ECOMOG, and the desire and need to establish an operational structure for the implementation of the decisions;

- Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa. The considerations for the above Declaration include; proliferation of light weapons is a destabilizing factor for ECOWAS member states and a threat to peace and security; it is line with the UN Conference on Conflict Prevention, Disarmament and Development held in Bamako, Mali, in November, 1996; Authority directives in Lome, Togo, relating to the establishment of a sub-regional mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security; ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs and Security, held in Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire, on March 11-12, 1998; UN encouragement for the disarmament in West Africa as stipulated in the Resolutions of the 50<sup>th</sup>, 51<sup>st</sup>, and 52<sup>nd</sup>, Sessions of the General Assembly; the meetings of Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs and Security held in Banjul, The Gambia, on 23<sup>rd</sup>-24<sup>th</sup> July, 1998, and in Abuja, Nigeria on 26<sup>th</sup>-29<sup>th</sup> October, 1998, and endorsed in Abuja on October 31, 1998; This Declaration is renewable after every three years;
- Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, signed in Dakar, in December, 2001. This is Protocol A/SP1/12/ 01 on Democracy and Good Governance, Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security. This Protocol was also influenced by; OAU solemn Declaration on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, adopted in Abuja on 8-9 May, 2000, and the Decision AHG.DEC 142(XXV) on the framework for OAU's reaction to unconstitutional change of government, adopted in Algiers in July, 1999; the

Harare Declaration adopted by the Commonwealth on December 20, 1991, and the Bamako Declaration adopted by the member countries of the Francophonie on November 3, 2000; Cotonou Declaration adopted on December 6, 2000, at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> International Conference on new or restored democracies; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women; Increasing wave of international terrorism caused by religious intolerance, political marginalization and non-transparent elections; to effectuate Protocol of December 10, 1999, there is need for the incorporation of provisions concerning issues such as prevention of internal crisis, democracy and good governance, the rule of law and human rights, and; to enhance the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security; this is also reinforced by the ECOWAS vision 2020, built on five pillars; the role of women, agriculture, private sector, infrastructure (physical and soft), and governance;

- ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight against Corruption, adopted on December 21, 2001. This was meant to strengthen effective mechanism to prevent, suppress and eradicate corruption in each of the member states, through cooperation between the states. This Protocol, also obliges members to adopt necessary legislative measures to criminalize active and passive bribery in the public and private sectors, illicit enrichment, false accounting, as well as acts of aiding and abetting corrupt practices, and the laundering of the proceeds of corruption; to ensure the protection of victims; and to provide each other with judicial and law enforcement

cooperation. The Protocol further calls states to harmonize their national anti-corruption laws to adopt effective measures against corruption and to introduce proportionate and dissuasive sanctions;

- ECOWAS Emergency Response Team. This was formed in the wake of conflicts and natural disasters that hit the sub-region in the past years resulting in the loss of lives, destruction of properties and displacement of many citizens. The Team, from thirteen member states received training in Ghana, where they were engaged in simulation exercises on how to manage situations, draw contingency plans, and galvanize support and launch appeal in emergency situations. They were assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ( UNHCR), Japanese government and development partners;
- At the continental level the African Standby Force (ASF) has been proposed, since 2003 for full implementation by 2010, by the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS), to help African militaries to develop operational competence and capabilities. This gave birth to ECOWAS Brigade (ECOBRIg), which is expected to respond to emergency situations in fourteen days. The five sub-regions in Africa are expected to contribute five thousand troops each per brigade for this purpose, supported by civilian police and ready for deployment in Africa and abroad;
- These are very laudable efforts to bridge the gap that exists between economic integration and regional security, but we also note that these are hampered by

differences in economic policies among member states, which is also informed by national interest and overall commitment to the welfare of their citizens. These issues make it difficult to reconcile the ECOWAS objectives with the national interests of member states. The issue of unequal levels development of member states brings about the self interests of each member state, and there also arises the problem of loyalty to former colonial masters in search of solutions to their national economic problems. There is therefore urgent need to heal these prejudices for assured security and meaningful economic integration.

## REFERENCES

- Address by General Ibrahim Babangida at the 13<sup>th</sup> Summit of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, held in Banjul, the Gambia, May 28-30, 1990
- Adebajo A. (2002) *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers
- Adebajo, A. And Rashid, I.(eds. 2004) *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.
- Adedeji, A. A. (1974) *The Evolution of a West African Economic Community*, Lagos, Federal Government Press
- Adedeji, A. (1999) *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*. London: Zed Books
- Aderinwale, A.; Abdullahi, B.; and Dia, M., (1999) "Sub-regional Security Protocols and Demilitarization in Africa, Otta: ALF, UNDP and ARIAS, May.
- Adisa, J. (1993), "Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Undercurrents and the Burden of Community Spirit", in Owoeye, J. (ed., 1993) *Nigeria in International Institutions*. Ibadan: College Press Ltd.
- Africa Research Bulletin (1966) V.3

Africa South of the Sahara, 21<sup>st</sup> Edition, Europe Publications, 1992

African Concord, July 30, 1990

Akabogu, C. (1992) "ECOWAS Takes the Initiative", in Vogt, M. A. (ed., 1992) *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace-keeping*. Lagos: Gabumo Pub. Co. Ltd.

Ake, C. (1992) "The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa", *CREDU Occasional Publication Number 1*

Ake, C. (1994) "Democratization of Disempowerment in Africa", *CASS Occasional Monograph No. 1*

Ake, C. (1995) "The Causes of Conflict in Africa: A Research Proposal", Port Harcourt: CASS

Akinbobola, A. (2000) *Regionalism and Regional Influentials: The Post Cold War Role of Nigeria in African Affairs*. Lagos: Maritone Ventures Ltd.

Akinbobola, A. (2007) *Regional Integration in West Africa: Challenge for Emergent States*. Lagos: Political and Administrative Resource Centre, (PARC).

Akindele, RA. And Ate, B.E. (eds., 2001) *Beyond Conflict Resolution: Managing African Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. The African Security Project: NIIA Security Studies Series. Ibadan: Vantage Publishers.

Akinyemi, A.B.; Falegan, S.B.; and Aluko, I.A.; (Eds., 1984) *Readings and Documents on ECOWAS*. Nigeria: McMillan.

- Akinyeye, O.A.(1993) "Regional Security and Integration: The ECOWAS Case", *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 19. No. 2
- Anifowose, R. (1982) *Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba, Experience*. Enugu: Nok Pub. International.
- Asante, S.K.B., (1986) *The Political Economy of Regionalism In Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)* New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Asante, S.K.B. (2004) "The Travails of Integration", in Adebajo, A. and Rashid I. (eds.) (2004) *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Asobie, H.A. (2008) "Conceptual and Theoretical Issues in Regional Integration in West Africa: The Nigerian Perspective", A paper presented at the International Conference on Regional Integration, Lagos Airport Hotel, Ikeja, Lagos, February 26-29, 2008.
- Ate, B. E., (1992) "Before Perestroika: African and American Perceptions of Regional Security in Africa", *NJIA*, Vol.18, No.1.
- Bah, M. S. (2004) "ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Constructing a Security Regime in West Africa", Unpublished Ph. D., thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.
- Balassa, B. (1962) *The Theory of Economic Integration*. London: George Allen and Unwin.



- Bennett, A. L. (1995) *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
- Bigombe, B., Collier, P., and Sambanis, N., "Policies for Building Post-Conflict Peace", *Journal of African Economies*, 9, October, 2000.
- Boulding, K.E. (1962) *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory*. New York: Harper and Row
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., and Lalman, D. (1992) *War and Reason*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Burton, J. (1993), "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy", in, Sandole D. and Hugo van der Merwe (ed., 1993) *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice*. Manchester University Press.
- Burton J. (1994) *The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass
- Bush, R. and Folger, J. (1996) *Image, Identity, and Conflict Resolution*. US Institute of Peace
- Claude, I. L. Jr. (1971) *Swords into Plowshares: The Problem and Progress of International Organization*. 4<sup>th</sup> edition, New York: Random House.
- Collier, P and Hoeffler, A. "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars", Policy Research Working Paper, 2355, Washington DC: World Bank 2000.
- Coser, L.A. (1954) *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict*. New York: Free Press.

Coser, L.A. (1956) *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Crisis Group Africa Report, No.87, "Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States".  
Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 8 December, 2004.

Dahrendorf, R. (1958) "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2.

De Mesquita, B. B.; Morrow, J. D.; Siverson, R. M., and Smith, A. (1999) "An institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace", *American Political Science Review, APSR*, vol.93, No.4.

Deutsch, K.W. (1954) *Political Community at the International Level*

Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L. Jr., (1986, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) *Contending Theories of*

*International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, New York: Harper and Row.

Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1981), *Getting to Yes*. New York: Penguin Books

Frankel, J. (1973) *Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States*.

London: Oxford University Press..

Galtung, J. (1992) *The Way is the Goal: Gandhi Today*, Gujarath Vidyapith, Ahmedabad.

Galtung, J. (1994) *Peace by Peaceful Means*, Peace and Conflicts Development and Civilization, Sage Publications.

Galtung, J. (1975) "Structural Theory of Violence" in Mendlovitz, S.H. (ed.),

(1975) *On The Creation of a Just World Order; Preferred Worlds for the 1990s*. North-Holland Pub. Co., Amsterdam: The Netherlands Institute for World Order.

Gurr, T.R. (1970) *Why Men Rebel*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Haas, E.B. (1958) *The Uniting of Europe*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Haas, E.B. (1964) *Beyond the Nation-State*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Haas, E.B. (1971) "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing", in Lindberg, L. and Scheingold, S. (eds., 1971) *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*. Harvard University Press

Hazlewood, A. (ed. 1967) *African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in Economic and Political Union*. London New York Toronto: Oxford University Press

Imobighe, T.A. (2003) *The OAU (AU) and OAS in Regional Conflict Management: A Comparative Assessment*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.

Intriligator, M.D. (1982) "Research on Conflict Theory: Analytic Approaches and Areas of Application", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 26 No.2, June 1982 307-327.

Lavergne, R. (ed., 1997) *Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspective*. Eritrea: International World Press.

- Levitt, J.I. (2005) *The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia: From 'Paternalitarianism' to State Collapse*. North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press
- Lombaerde, P. (nd) "Regional Integration and Peace". United Nations University; Comparative Regional Integration Studies, (UNU-CRIS), Bruges.
- Mack, R.W. and Snyder, R.C., "The Analysis of Social Conflict: Toward an Overview and Synthesis". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1, No.2, June 1957.
- Maoz, Z., and Abdolali, N., (1989) "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1817-1976". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (March): 3-35.
- Mesquita, B. and Lalman, D. (1992) *War and Reason*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Mitchel, C.R. (1993) "Problem-Solving Exercises and Theories of Conflict Resolution", in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo Van der Merwe (eds.) *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- Mitrany, D. (1943) "The Road to Security", *Peace Aims Pamphlet*, No.29.
- Mitrany, D. (1966) *A Working Peace System*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Morgan, T. C.. and Swabach, V., (1992) "Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?" *International Interactions* 17 (No. 4): 305-320
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1948) *Politics Among Nations*. New York: Knopf.

Nnoli, O. (2003) "Security of Africa in the Emerging Global Environment: What Role for the Military", Abuja: NWC; Graduation Lecture Series, No. 8.

Nwachukwu, I. *et al* (1991) *Nigeria and the ECOWAS since 1985: Towards a Dynamic Regional Integration*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd. and Lagos NIIA.

Nwolise, O.B.C., "ECOMOG Peacekeeping Operations in Liberia: Effects on Political Stability in the West African Sub-region", in *Africa Peace Review*, Abuja: Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, 1997.

Nye, J. Jr. (1971) *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*. Boston: Little Brown

Onwuka, R.I. (1982) *Development and Integration in West Africa: The Case of ECOWAS*. Ife; University of Ife Press.

Onwuka, R.I. and Sesay, A., (eds.) (1985) *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*. London and Basingstoke: McMillan Publishers.

Otite, O. and Albert, I.O. (eds., 1999) *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation*. Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd.

Plessz, N.G. (1968) *Problems and Prospects of Economic Integration in West Africa*.

- Montreal: McGill University Press

Ray, J. L., (1995) *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of The*

*Democratic Peace Proposition*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Riley, S. P., (nd) "Conflicts in Contemporary Context: The Effects of the Internationalization of Conflict in West Africa", Stoke on Trent: Staffordshire University.

Robson, P. (1983) *Integration, Development and Equity: Economic Integration in West Africa*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Salla, M. E., "The Evolution of Conflict Transmutation", *Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, OJPCR*, Issue 3.3/ June, 2000. Available on the internet at, [www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/](http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/).

Sandole, D.J.D. (1993) "Paradigm, Theories and Metaphors in Conflict Resolution: Coherence or Confusion", in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo Van der Merwe (eds., 1993) *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Sawyer, A. (1992) *The Emergence of Autocracy in Liberia: Tragedy and Challenge*. San Francisco: ICS Press.

Sawyer, A. (2005) *Beyond Plunder: Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Singer, K. (1949) *The Idea of Social Conflict*. Melbourne: University Press.

Vogt, M.A. and Aminu, L. S. (eds., 1996) *Peace keeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies, Vols. 1 and 2*, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Pub.

Wilmot, W.W. and Hocker, J.L. (1998) *Interpersonal Conflict*. Boston, Massachusetts: McGraw Hill

Zartman, I .W. (1989) *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New York Oxford: Oxford University Press

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.0 ECOWAS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA

#### 3.1 The Idea and Nature of Collective Security

The whole idea of regional security is to create the appropriate environment within which conflict can be negotiated to make economic growth and development conducive, since parties to a conflict are not likely to be conciliatory for as long as their forces are in active combat. This idea of collective security predates the United Nations System, as could be seen from the efforts of the historical precedents of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries—international organizations. It is on record that, the Concert of Europe (1815-1914—the chronological boundaries of diplomacy by conferences), represented a great experience and an experiment in the concept of policing Europe, and it was an acceptance at that time of the Concert to maintain peace. This was hegemony of the powerful European nations, and they held periodic meetings where they discussed common issues, which if not properly handled could lead to war.

It would be recalled, however, that the peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 marked the end of the Thirty Years War. It is also related to the guarantee of peace, the Pact of Paris of 1856, the Settlement of Vienna of 1815, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle of 1818, the Berlin Treaty of 1885 which demarcated European spheres of influence in Africa. These were all aimed at bringing order and harmony to the relations between states in dealing with problems of mutual concern. These were *ad hoc* arrangements and they provided no



organized machinery to which individual states embroiled in a dispute could turn in times of need. There was therefore, the need for the formalization of a mechanism for strengthening the international structure of peace and security. Also, there arose the Hague System (1899 and 1907) which was summoned at the instance of the Tsar of Russia, who allegedly, was actuated more by the financial disadvantages in the armament competition and the cost of maintaining the state's standing army than by a genuine concern to promote peace. Hence, he called for the conference of the Heads of State in the mode of the Concert of Europe, and included the USA and Canada.

The idea of collective security developed from the Covenant of the League of Nations [Articles 10-11], which eventually reflected in the United Nations Charter [Chapters VI-VIII; Articles 33-54], as part of the legacies of the historical precedents of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.

For instance, the Hague Conferences adopted a Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which filled a yawning gap at that time in Europe. The Convention obliged the parties, in case of serious disagreement or conflict, before appealing to arms, to have recourse to the good offices of mediation, as far as circumstances could allow. In addition, the Convention attempted to streamline and ameliorate rules regulating the conduct of warfare and the duties of neutrals. Although these rules were inadequate, they undoubtedly had a serious and useful influence on international affairs, in that they formed codes of comparatively humane instructions, which became embodied in the orders to the armed forces of most nations.

As a carryover from these 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries-experiences, the League of Nations which assumed formal effectiveness on January 10, 1920 in Articles 10 and 11 of its covenant emphasized the idea of universality of interest and indivisibility of peace, which are under the concept of collective security, i.e. "one for all and all for one". Each state is therefore tied to each other in terms of interest and commitment to peace, and particularly, the League tried to contain the world powers as guarantors of international peace and security. For the purpose of elaboration, Article 10 of the Covenant states that:

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.

In its Article 11, the principle of common concern is emphasized thus:

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.

Further to the enforcement of the general principles of collective security, article 16 of the Covenant provides for sanctions, and states:

Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15 (which outlines procedures for peaceful settlement of disputes), it shall, *ipso facto*, be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relation, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state, and the

prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a Member of the League or not.

But as the policies and sentiments of the member states were subject to continual variations, among other contradictions, each of which affected, in some degree, their attitude towards the League, the League failed and was succeeded by the United Nations Organization, UNO. According to Ziegler, (1990:32-36; 126;222-242) ,the League of Nations failed mainly because of the following reasons;

1. The Great Powers gave lip service to the new idea of collective security, but they still secretly believed in the old idea of the balance of power system;
2. The smaller states were no longer faithful to the Covenant of the League. For instance, in the Italian/Abyssinian (Ethiopian) crisis, the countries who favoured applying sanctions against Italy were mostly countries close to Italy that feared its expansionist tendencies – Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. However, other countries in this area supported Italy ; - Austria because of the fear of Germany, Albania, a client state, was dependent on Italy;
3. The non-participation of the United States whose President, Woodrow Wilson, was one of the great architects of the League, but whose wishes and desires were turned down by the American Senate. This time America was practicing isolationism as a major foreign policy thrust. As a result the US made no contribution in the two decades that preceded World War II;

4. The Covenant of the League declared war illegal if it violated various clauses of the Covenant, but this provision still permitted war, as long as the various avenues available for peaceful settlement are exhausted. Again, in 1928 many states signed the Pact of Paris for the Renunciation of war, but the pledge implied by the title notwithstanding, states did not abandon their weapons, thereby making the Treaty merely "a moral preachment";
5. Hitler exploited the weakness of the League in rearming Germany, and in total disregard to the provisions of the Covenant. Note, that in March 1935, in Hitler's policy Phase 1, he announced Compulsory Universal Military Service in denunciation of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty;
6. The nonparticipation and absence of major powers in the League. Japan withdrew in 1933 and Germany later from the League, thereby further undermining its effectiveness; and
7. The major blows that led to its final collapse include the Manchurian crisis, the Bolivia/Paraguay conflict, and the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), which exposed the League's bankruptcy.

Following from this, the League was eventually succeeded by the UN, which in chapter VII of its Charter stipulates that collective security actions should be taken if peaceful means fail to restore or maintain international peace and security "with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression" The UN Charter (Chapter

VIII, Articles 52-54) also recognizes the sharing of responsibility so that regional organizational attempts at conflict management will be part of a first stage strategies which will apex in the involvement of the UN, so that the UN involvement will be effected to enhance regional efforts.

The idea developed by ECOWAS today as her formula for regional security was drawn from the experiences of the historical precedents of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries-international organizations. This, as stated above, was actually given formal expression by the League of Nations in its idea of collective security as a means of bringing about world peace. As a system for maintaining international peace and security, it was intended to be a replacement for the system commonly known as the balance of power – a mechanism bequeathed to the 20<sup>th</sup> century for the prevention of war and the control of the use of force in international relations. In fact, as Claude, Jr., 1971:247) observes, collective security involves,

...the establishment and operation of a complex scheme of national commitments and international machineries designed to prevent or suppress aggression by any state against any other state, by presenting to potential aggressors the credible threat and to potential victims of aggression the reliable promise of effective collective measures, ranging from diplomatic boycott through economic pressure to military sanctions, to enforce peace.

Ziegler (1990: 219-220) states that collective security in its technical meaning is,

A system of states that join together, usually by signing a treaty, and make an explicit commitment to do two things: (1) they renounce the use of force to settle disputes with each other, and (2) they promise to use force against any of their member who break rule 1....(It) shares with the balance of power the principle "meet force with opposing force" or "gang up on the aggressor".

The aggressor should be deterred by the prospect of an overwhelming coalition. If deterrence fails, then the aggressor will be defeated by military action undertaken by this coalition

In this sense, the purpose is to keep peace among its members, and not to protect them against outsiders. It rests on the assumption that all nations share a primary concern in maintaining peace. The peace that is envisaged under collective security is indivisible, and threats to peace anywhere should be the concern of all members of the international system. The advocates of this approach to world peace therefore see it as a preferred system, because it differs from and is superior to the system of competing alliances associated with the balance of power concept, more so as the balance of power seems ineffectual as a solution to world peace.

There are three basic propositions of collective security as stated by Claude, Jr., (1971:255), as follows;

1. whoever commits aggression is everybody's enemy;
2. whoever resists aggression is everybody's friend; and
3. Membership in a collective security system involves alliance with nobody in particular but with everybody in general.

This in essence entails a fundamental subjective requirement that all states willingly entrust their destinies to collective security. Therefore confidence is the quintessential condition of the success of the system hence, states must be prepared to rely upon its effectiveness and impartiality. The effectiveness of the system, according to Bennett (1995:144), relies heavily on two conditions:

1. All states must be committed to peace as a paramount goal which requires the subordination of other goals of foreign policy. In practice, it means that each state must commit itself to act in concert with other states as a party interested more in peace restoration than in other national interests or in relationships with the state accused of threatening international peace; and

2. There should be the ability of the members of a system not only to reach initial consensus for establishing the system, but also to find a consensus in each situation that a threat to peace or a breach of peace does or does not exist. This consensus must have to extend to the identification of the aggressor state or states against which collective action is required.

The understanding, however, is that the classical meaning of collective security has been perverted and distorted as to jeopardize its precision as a theory for the attainment of peace in international relations. For one thing, aggression is difficult to define, and the determination that a threat to peace or a breach of peace has occurred and demands international action is equally complex and difficult. Among other contradictions and logical difficulties, the idea of collective security has taken on multifarious meanings, that some scholars even confuse it with collective-defense, which involves alliances for mutual protection against outside attack. Again, under collective defense, the appropriate response to any outside attack is war against an enemy, and not the restoration of peace through appropriate measured responses as obtains under collective security. Plano and Riggs (1967:244) attempt to make this clarification when they establish that the distinguishing factor between a collective security arrangement and an alliance is its

"inward orientation". An alliance focuses on external threat while a collective security system is concerned with the potential threat to members of the system posed by other members of the system. In this light, an arrangement like the Rio Pact has been described as having both the elements of collective security and old fashioned alliance. This, according to Plano and Riggs, is possible because, "To the extent that the pact is directed toward defense against external aggression, it is an alliance; to the extent that it is concerned with international violence within the hemisphere, it becomes truly a collective security organization". This perversion of meaning disregards some of the essential conditions of collective security theory and fails to distinguish collective security from the alliance system. Perhaps this is why Claude Jr. (1971: 248), has lamented that:

We have to live with the vagueness and confusion that have grown up around the concept of collective security ... I use the term to refer to the particular type of system for the enforcement of peace that was contemplated but never fully established by the statesmen of the League era, ... it is frequently used with such looseness and impression that analysis of the concept and evaluation of its merits as a formula for world order are fraught with peculiar difficulty.

As we have noted, some of the provisions of the UN Charter are extrapolated from the League experiences. There are reasons to believe that scholars like Bennett (1995) and Ziegler (1990) have justified the viability of universal approach to collective security, while others see in regional approach a better formula for the attainment of world peace. Bennett (1995:230) in his analysis of the UN regional approach to peace, defines a regional organization as:



a segment of the world bound together by a common set of objectives based on geographical, social, cultural, economic, or political ties and possessing a formal structure provided for in formal intergovernmental arrangements.

It must be noted, however, that in the 20<sup>th</sup> century a cleavage developed between certain advocates of universalism and some advocates of regionalism. However, both sets of antagonists agree that the international system must eventually be modified from the primacy of the nation-state in the direction of a partial surrender of state sovereignty to larger political units. The two schools of thought also agree on the goal of world order and stability and on the inadequacy of the state-centred system for this purpose. However, few regional arrangements with the capacity for collective self-defense existed in 1945. The Organization of American States, formerly The Union of American Republics, and the League of Arab States (Arab League) were the only regional agencies that included collective self-defense as part of their objectives. It is important to note that by this time there was a breakdown in the East-West cooperation, i.e. after World War II, and the increasing tensions of the cold war became the hiccup that led to the deadlock within the Security Council on issues involving the maintenance of peace and security in which the major powers had vital interests. Alternatively, with the precedent set by the United States the great powers sought security through a series of regional pacts.

As a result of this development, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, otherwise known as the Rio Treaty, established a regional security system for the Western Hemisphere. The United States also sponsored alliances for military defense, as a reaction against the emerging communist containment policy of her government. Among these were, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formed in 1951, and

the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 (disbanded in 1976). The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was formed in 1955 in response to this military threat and following series of bilateral security treaties among East European States.

The issue of regional arrangements is provided for in Chapter VIII (Articles 52-54) of the UN Charter. The vital principles in those provisions with regard to our purpose include the following:

1. Regional agencies may exist for dealing with such issues of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action as long as their activities are consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
2. States are encouraged to settle local disputes through regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council;
3. The Security Council may, in turn, utilize such agencies for the settlement of local disputes with the exception of action against enemy states resulting from World War II, no enforcement action shall be taken by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council; and
4. The Security Council shall be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or contemplated by regional agencies for the maintenance of peace and security.

The point as Bennett (1995:233) emphasizes is that these principles establish that, should there arise any conflict between the jurisdiction of a regional organization and the UN, universalism should take precedence over regionalism. It has been argued that because of the difficulties in the interpretations and meanings given to such phrases as 'local disputes', 'enforcement action' and 'fully informed' and the incessant debate with regard to the right of the Security Council to assume priority over disputes while they are under consideration by regional organization, the superiority of the universalist claim over regionalist claim is put in question.

## **3.2 HISTORY OF ECOWAS AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA**

### **3.2:1 INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN WEST AFRICA BEFORE ECOWAS**

There is no consensus of opinion on the geographical definition of the area, we know today as West Africa. It has to be noted, however, that the core of the region is not in dispute, but geographers disagree "as to the exact definition of its outer limits..." (Boateng; 1978:103). Boateng defines West Africa as comprising all the 16 ECOWAS members, with the exclusion of the Spanish Sahara, which he considers as forming part of the sub-region including Mauritania that withdrew her ECOWAS membership on 27<sup>th</sup> December, 2000.

Prior to this time, there had been various forms of activities going on in the geographical area, which is known today as West Africa. In fact, before colonialism there were

various forms of activities, which include, religion, trade including slave trade.

According to Mabogunje,

The history of West Africa is the long story of human movements, incursions, displacements, intermixtures or successions of peoples, and of the impact of these on the beliefs, attitudes and social organization of the various peoples who today inhabit this great area (Mabogunje ; 1971: 1)

This denotes that there were various forms of interactions among the peoples of the West African sub-region before the advent of colonialism, which came as a creeping encroachment on the entire African soil. The efforts that led to the eventual formation of ECOWAS could be located in the early 1960s, with the decision of the majority of the African leaders on functional cooperation starting from the sub-regions.

History records that integration is not new in West Africa. What is perhaps new is the nature of integration that exists today in West Africa, just like we have in other integration bodies elsewhere. This is why some historians note that, pre-colonial history shows that political and economic integration through limited trade and free movement of factors of production existed in the various Kingdoms in the West African sub region. Quoting Stanislas Adotevi, Michel (2004:1) states that,

... The notion of precise geographic boundaries is profoundly alien to Africa's historical and cultural traditions, because the rigid geographic boundaries of the post-colonial state contrast sharply with the fluid areas of socio-political and cultural integration that existed in the pre-colonial era.

This corroborates the fact that the kingdoms and cultures of West Africa were relatively well integrated in pre-colonial times, and this essentially rejuvenated the quest for regional unity today, which some see in many respects as a search for one's roots.

Beyond this, Asiwaju (1984:32) has argued that there have been two distinct but inter-related levels at which efforts at regional integration have been directed in West Africa.

These are:

1. the strictly functional, and
2. The emphatically political or constitutional.

This is in consonance with reference to Le Vine (1964:199) who argues that the distinction is based on the same principles stated by Apter and Coleman, in a joint study where they distinguished between what they call 'interstate functional unifications', with the objective of getting the collaborations of several distinct sovereign states for common political, economic, social and cultural tasks, and the 'super-state political unifications' which are short-lived and which produced political associations like the Mali Federation (1959-1960) and the Guinea - Mali Union (1960 - 1963), and perhaps the more durable Cameroon unification which has been sustained since 1962. More so, and in strictly socio-economic terms, Asiwaju (1984:34) argues that, "the West African sub-region has, within human memory formed a complex whole. The phenomenon of long distance trade in all directions dates from antiquity, as can be easily perceived from the history of the trans-Saharan trade which also covered both the savannah and the forest belts".

Against this background, the levels of unifications and integrations that have taken place in West Africa are spread from the pre-colonial through colonial and post-colonial

periods before ECOWAS was formed in 1975. As it were, the background to the current integration efforts in Africa, and indeed West Africa could be traced to the colonization of the African states during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Indeed by the turn of the 15<sup>th</sup> century West Africans have felt the European presence. By the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the French had set up trading posts at the mouth of the River Senegal. Other developments later took off from here. As the facts reveal, throughout the 1860s France was busy setting up trade and military posts on the coasts of Benin, Guinea and Cote D'Ivoire. There was a formal establishment of French West Africa by the late 1890s, which comprised Cote d'Ivoire, French Guinea, Niger, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Senegal, Mali and Dahomey (Benin). By 1905 Mauritania had become a French Protectorate, and it joined French West Africa as a colony in 1920. As a collective French West Africa, these nations became what is known today as the CFA (Communaute Financiere Africaine – African Financial Community).

The experience in British West Africa does not show so much marked difference. Decentralization was the approach to administration and efforts at inter-state integration were not completely lacking. In fact, there were institutions and organs of integration, which included a common West African Court of Appeal, Common Currency and Market Boards and the West African Conference of Governors of British Territories. In essence therefore, these institutions though they operated with different levels of success, offered a veritable avenue and a common forum and services which largely assisted in bringing these territories together, which were otherwise administered as separate units. As a consequence of these developments in both the French and British West Africa, the series of inter-colonial state relationships which followed and were encouraged between both

sides, eventually constitute the major independent states in the West African sub-region and the dominant elements in ECOWAS. As Asiwaju (1984:23) aptly puts it,

....Such inter-state relationships included formal types as were enshrined in the diplomatic agreements and associations such as the Anglo-French entente of 1904 and the Anglo-French Consultative Commission later. There were informal but yet very important exchanges, usually in the form of official visits and rendezvous on a reciprocal basis between French and British administrators at the level of governors and the provincial or district officers on both sides of their common boundaries.

The French, introduced the CFA currency in 1939 for the West African countries it colonized. This was fully convertible into the French Francs at a fixed exchange rate. This was one of the ways of holding the French colonies closely together and readily amenable to the French authorities. However, following de-colonization, by 1958, France offered the former colonies an opportunity to join the French Community. This was not acceptable to Guinea, as it opted out, while other French West African colonies joined this community whose aim was mainly to provide cooperation on common issues such as foreign affairs, defense, and higher education. The agreement to join the French Community led to the establishment of two banks in 1962 – Banque Centrale des etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) and the Bank of Central Africa and Cameroon (BCEAC) which dealt with CFA. These banks were controlled by France through the French Exchequer by the Minister of Finance. This had a major impact in the integration of the Francophone West Africa and also shows the reasons for the level of influence France has over its colonies even after independence.

Aside from these developments, the impact of the two world wars, 1914 – 18 and 1939 – 45 brought some level of cooperation between the British and the French who had to close ranks to fight a common enemy, by establishing common channels of communication both at the levels of governors and local administrators. Among other factors, ECOWAS became a reality on May 28, 1975.

### **3.2:2 , HISTORY OF ECOWAS AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA**

Regional integration in West Africa has originally proceeded on two separate but interrelated levels:

1. the strictly functional and
2. the political or constitutional.

Vicot Le Vine made this distinction on the same grounds as David Apter and James Coleman (Apter and Coleman; 1964:199). The two scholars in a joint article made a demarcation between what they call “interstate functional unifications” which seeks to provide collaborations of several and distinct sovereign states for common economic, political, social and cultural tasks on the one hand and the “super-state political unifications”. The experience in West Africa has produced short-lived political associations in the mode of the Mali federation of 1959 – 1960, and the Ghana - Guinea – Mali Union of 1959 – 1963, and the more sustainable Cameroon unification which started in 1962.



However, the ECOWAS in its present form, established as a viable strategy for the promotion of economic development in the West Africa sub-region, can be located within four historical events. These include the following:

1. The Interim Organization for West African Economic Cooperation, otherwise called the Liberian Initiative;
2. The Bamako Conference on Coordination of industries which would have led to the establishment of a regional Iron and Steel Industry. This conference was sponsored by the ECA – FAO;
3. the Niamey Conference aimed at enlarging the CEAO, sponsored by the ECA; and
4. The final effort that led to the establishment of ECOWAS otherwise called the Nigeria – Togo initiative.

The pioneer effort aimed at the establishment of a West African Economic Community was credited to President William Tubman of Liberia who, in his inaugural speech of January 7, 1964 introduced the notion of a free trade area in West Africa and subsequently sought the backing of his country to promote the idea. Following this declaration, on August 24, 1964, the representatives of the Ivory Coast (Cote D'Ivoire) Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea met in Monrovia, Liberia for the consideration of setting up such a free trade zone. At the end of the meeting, the representatives were favourably disposed to the idea of a West African free trade zone, which would also be made open to other states.

The Ministers of the four participating states met again from February 15 – 17 1965 and agreed to create an Interim Organization for Economic Cooperation which was aimed at establishing a more permanent organization for West African Economic Cooperation. The agreement to this effect was later signed at Freetown, Sierra Leone in May 1965, and in its Article 1, states that:

The Interim Organization was charged with the responsibility of planning the establishment of a multilateral system of economic cooperation of a regional character with a view to removing trade barriers, and encouraging the harmonious development of the cooperating states in every field

The second effort, the Bamako Conference mainly at the instance of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa ECA, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO, took place on October 14, 1964 and had as its central theme the guiding principles for the future coordination of such industries as plant biology centres, cement, textiles, steel, and food industries in the region. The understanding is that this effort would assist the West African states to reduce the flow of imports, especially when it was discovered that from records, the cement imports from the United States, for instance, was USD36m, in 1960 (Onwuka ;1982:56).

Among other things, the conference recommended the establishment of super phosphate granulating factories in Ivory Coast and Togo; a complex – compound factory in Nigeria founded on the use of natural gas, and a calcium carbide factory in Ghana. It was also decided that chemical industries should be located in Mauritania, Mali and Guinea, on the recommendation of the FAO. An economic and technical survey was to be conducted by

the ECA, in respect of the Iron and Steel works and with a view to establishing whether or not other West African states would provide sites with comparative advantage for the proposed iron and steel industries. These efforts later led to many protracted and subsequent meetings at the committee level, the Interim Expert Committee, composed of members appointed by member states. These efforts flopped as disagreements later set in.

The Niamey Conference was sponsored by the ECA, which organized four meetings through Africa with a view to finding viable economic groupings in each of the four sub-regions of Africa. The meeting for West Africa was held in Niamey, Niger in October 1966, and was attended by fourteen West African states (Nigeria, Ghana, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Mali, Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire), Togo, Senegal, Guinea, Niger, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Dahomey (Benin Republic), Mauritania and Gambia), and opened by President Diori of Niger on October 10, 1966. The central issue for discussion and which was placed as the first item on the agenda was presented by the officials of the ECA, which suggested a protocol of a "project of association" with the intention of enlarging existing area of cooperation. Other areas where common policies could be initiated include transport development and development and utilization of energy. By October 14 when the meeting ended, they released a communiqué which "recommended the putting into effect of a multinational programme for the development of power supplies" (Africa Research Bulletin, V.3, 1966:592). Not much was achieved in this meeting, but it was particularly significant for bringing the French-speaking and English-speaking West African countries together for the first time for the common purpose of integrating economically. Other conferences were later held in Accra, Ghana between April 27 and

May, 4 1967, Monrovia, Liberia from April 23 – 24, 1968. There was the Interim Council of Ministers meeting held in Dakar, Senegal from November 21 – 24, 1967.

The final attempt, which eventually led to the establishment of ECOWAS, was the Nigeria – Togo initiative. This came as a result of the goodwill and the rapport between their leaders Sylvanus Olympio of Togo (who also schooled in Nigeria), and Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balawa of Nigeria. This relationship continued after both leaders were assassinated in a military coup, Togo in the first African coup in 1963 and Nigeria in 1966.

On November 6, 1964 there was an agreement signed between both countries which removed visa requirements placed on the movements of the citizens of the two states by their respective governments. There was a second agreement between both countries; a Trade agreement which sought to achieve a maximum development of trade between the two countries by non-discriminatory practices, signed on May 4, 1966. Also, by this agreement the two states meant to promote and develop trade in accordance with the laws and regulations in force in each of the states. More so, to facilitate commercial intercourse, they agreed to furnish each other with all necessary information concerning the needs and possibilities of supplying goods and commodities originating from their respective territories. This also includes the granting of freedom of transit of commercial goods originating in the territory of one of them to the territory of the other. These efforts were scuttled by the civil war in Nigeria, which lasted from 1967 – 1970. There was however a renewed vigour in this direction as from 1971, but this time with all West African states. In fact Nigeria's African diplomacy was graphically captured by Arikpo

(1974: 11-12) then Commissioner of External Affairs in a lecture at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, as follows:

Within the few years, Nigeria had concluded trade agreements with seven neighbouring countries in the West African sub-region, Air services agreements with five, and economic cooperation agreements with another five. We have also established telecommunication links with five OAU member countries in the sub-region, and joint customs posts with three others ... Cash grants of over four million naira (about six million dollars, then) have been made available to eight member countries of the OAU, in addition to over a million naira (1.5 million dollars, then) worth of grain and other foodstuffs donated to the Republic of Niger. Nigeria continues to make the facilities at her ports and airfields available to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization free of charge for the purpose of transporting relief material to the neighbouring countries (following a crippling drought that affected a number of countries in the sub-region).

However, before 1972, there were other series of meetings, designed as Adebayo Adedeji notes, to achieve, "the evolution of an economic community in West Africa – a community which will cut across linguistic, cultural and other barriers"(Adedeji; 1974:5). In the light of the above, the Heads of State of Togo and Nigeria, in 1972 decided to carry on with the task of economic integration of the sub-region. A proposal was put up between the officials of the two countries, which patterned the structure, and scope of a possible West African Community. A pragmatic approach was to be followed and other West African states were invited to participate in the discussion.

Another Ministerial meeting to discuss West African economic cooperation held between December 10 – 15, 1973 to discuss the Nigeria – Togo proposal. This time Guinea –

Bissau was included. There was a general agreement between them on the necessary institutions for a community and possible areas of cooperation. The main areas of agreement include, the institutions of the community; trade, customs, immigration, monetary and financial matters; industrial harmonization (to be done in three stages, - first - joint ventures; second - training, and third - harmonization); natural resources; infrastructural links, transport, communication and energy, and settlement of disputes.

After the meeting, Nigeria and Togo, the two pioneering states were mandated to prepare a draft treaty with the assistance of ECA. There was to be a meeting of experts from the 15 states in Accra, Ghana in early January 1974 when the draft treaty was to be discussed, and a second ministerial meeting in Niamey, Niger in the first week of March, 1974 which was to consider the draft treaty submitted to it by the Accra meeting of experts. This was to be followed by the final phase of the formation of the West African Community - with the signing and ratification of the treaty at the meeting of the Heads of state and government in Lagos. This was met with series of disappointments. Eventually, the draft treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, was adopted by delegates from seven English and French speaking countries in Liberia at the end of January 1975. It was later submitted and signed at the Heads of state conference in Lagos on May 28, 1975. In all eleven Heads of state and four plenipotentiaries representing fifteen West African countries signed the treaty.

### 3.3 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA BEFORE ECOMOG

The nature of conflict management in general terms implies the establishment of an enduring institutional mechanism for handling conflicts. As we discussed in the theories of conflict, as part of the process of conflict resolution, there could also be conflict transformation. These concepts arose as a result of the fact that there is disagreement among scholars over whether or not conflict can actually be resolved.

In West Africa, before the establishment of ECOMOG, which has become an institutionalized mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution and security, there was no institutional framework that performed such function as we have it today. There were ad hoc arrangements most especially under the auspices of the OAU and the UN in a wider African context. In essence, what happened was a situation where the OAU played a major role, albeit, with a lot of handicaps in conflict situations in Africa. The issue here is that the manner conflicts in West Africa were handled before ECOMOG was established could be understood from the wider role played by the OAU, as the ECOWAS was virtually inactive.

Meanwhile in West Africa, before ECOMOG was established, the ECOWAS Treaty made provision for a Tribunal of the Community. The founding fathers at this period were quite aware of the differences that might arise in the interpretation of the provisions of the agreements for cooperation which may derail the implementation of the community programmes. This therefore necessitated the idea of a multinational body that would act as the impartial umpire among the community members in matters that

may result in a conflict of interest. In essence, from its inception, the Tribunal of the Community is expected to oversee the correct and unbiased interpretation and application of the ECOWAS Treaty provisions and the protocols, and also to settle any dispute that may arise. As Asante observes, the ECOWAS Tribunal is important in two respects;

1. assisting in clarifying matters whenever disagreement arises, essentially out of technical problems in interpreting the Treaty; and
2. the performance of its role in offering advisory opinion on technical and legal matters, which may minimize the dangers of a tendency toward politicization of nonpolitical issues by states in disagreement under the treaty.

As Asante (1986:68) also observes, "The strength of the tribunal is limited in the sense that it has neither the "powers of the sword" nor of the purse but instead those of impartiality and technical competence". The expected role of the tribunal is therefore hamstrung ab initio. The Tribunal also faces another jeopardy in the sense that the Franco-phone West African countries established their own mechanism for conflict resolution. This organ was established as a result of the conflict that erupted between Burkina Faso and Mali – two Franco-phone West African countries. This organ therefore serves the exclusive interest of the French West African countries. This is especially because of the fact that these Franco-phone West Africans are weary and uncomfortable with the overbearing and ubiquitous presence of Nigeria – an Anglophone state, on the West African political landscape. This also means that they discarded the Tribunal of the



Community, which would have served the purpose of settling the dispute(s) between them in favour of the contrivance adapted to suit their purpose(s).

We should recall that in 1978, there was a Non-Aggression Protocol, as well as the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense providing for collective military response against attack from non-ECOWAS countries, mediation and peacekeeping missions in the event of armed conflict between member states, and defense against external states that initiate or support insurgencies within member states. These protocols were not operationalised, until the Liberian civil war necessitated this. There are further considerations to be clarified for proper understanding of the West African situation before ECOMOG was established.

We elaborate from the point of the circumstances that existed at the international level at the time. It would be recalled that the world was under bipolar politics where there was ideological warfare between the East, as represented by the Soviet Union, and the West, represented by the USA. Against this background, the African conflict and security environment was determined and defined by a combination of factors including the legacies of colonialism, and heritage of African states, the persistence of settler colonialism, the ideological rivalry between the East and West, the nature of the African state, the nature of their economies as well as their demography (Nwokedi, 1996: 24 – 25).

Beyond this point, in as much as the OAU was central to the handling of conflicts in Africa, the issue of non-interference in the affairs of member states acted as a limiting

factor to the organization's effort. In chapter III of the OAU charter, it was stipulated that member states should not interfere in the internal affairs of member states. This non-interference clause was exploited in many instances, for example, while it was used during the Nigerian civil war to deny the legitimacy of the rebel cause by preventing a large number of African countries from recognizing Biafra; on the other hand apartheid South Africa's violation of Angola's territory was used as a plausible argument by the MPLA government in that country to justify the invitation of Cuba to intervene and to station troops in Angola. Ironically many African countries supported this, in total disregard of the non-interference clause.

The OAU succeeded on many instances in handling conflicts. The OAU charter provides for a commission on Mediation, Reconciliation and Arbitration. The Commission is a legal entity and adopts a juridical approach in dispute settlements. It relies on member states to submit their cases voluntarily to the body for adjudication. Since this was not fully utilized, the OAU evolved a more traditional African system of intervention by respected elders and fellow Heads of States. As Vogt (1996:49) observes:

The use of ad hoc committees of two or three heads of states expanded the scope of the regional organization to impact positively on many interstate disputes and to prevent them from escalating.

This method was effectively used in the settlement of the Algeria and Morocco territorial dispute in 1971, and Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, Nigeria and the Cameroons over Bakassi Peninsula, (before the intervention by the verdict of the International Court of Justice), Ghana and Togo over the Volta region and Burkina Faso

and Mali. This mechanism of ad hoc committee of heads of states facilitated the OAU effort in its prevention of the escalation of several conflicts, even when they could not be fully resolved. In this regard also, Nigeria played active role in some cases to assist in the resolution of conflict, both in West Africa and Africa. For instance, in 1986, before the out-break of the Liberian civil war, ECOWAS members, including Nigeria found bilateral and less formal means to pursue their regional security objectives, sometimes under the auspices of ECOWAS. This was demonstrated in the dispute between Liberia and Sierra Leone after Liberia closed its border in 1986 in the wake of a coup attempt allegedly launched from Sierra Leone, where Nigeria and Guinea were mandated to mediate between Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Again, Nigeria played a major role during her intercession in the Chadian crisis in 1979. Nigeria mediated between the rival Chadian factions and Libya at two conferences in Kano, Nigeria, and also sent 850-member peacekeeping force to N'Djamena to monitor the cease-fire. However, within three months, Nigeria was asked to leave after a dispute about compliance with Chadian government orders. As a follow-up in November 1981, six African states---Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire, Benin, Togo and Guinea , pledged to form a joint 6,000-member force under a Nigerian commander for the second Chadian operation. Though financial constraints prevented half of them from meeting their obligations, it was only Senegal, Zaire and Nigeria that provided troops for this second operation. Nigeria had to bear most of the burden, including the provision of three of five army units, and the airlift and logistical units. In the final analysis, the mission failed, even though Nigeria spent a whopping USD100 million. (Nigeria, African and Regional Issues: Back to Nigeria National Security; available on the internet at:

[http://www.photius.com/countries/nigeria/national security/nigeria national security afri...](http://www.photius.com/countries/nigeria/national_security/nigeria_national_security_afri...))

The UN also played a part in dispute settlements in Africa within the context of our discussion, though the first UN intervention was not in West Africa. The UN adopted the use of neutral interposition forces to bring the feuding parties to settle in a round table. It has to be recalled that the first peacekeeping experience of the UN in Africa was the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), at the request and invitation of President Kasavubu following the crisis in that country. The UN has also participated in settling disputes in Africa before the end of the cold war, like the 1988 POLISARIO/Morocco effort to allow the people of Western Sahara to decide the territory's future; the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) concluded in 1990 following the Namibian independence, UN Angolan Verification Mission, UNAVEM (I, II & III); (Fung; 1996: 72).

### **3.4 THE FORMATION OF ECOMOG**

ECOMOG has its origin in the circumstances that surrounded the Liberian crisis. With regard to the origin of the Liberian crisis and its subsequent internationalization, it is obvious that the nature of the crisis would call for external intervention in whatever form. By May 1990, the little skirmishes that started as a storm in an 'African calabash' had degenerated into a war of unspeakable tragedy. In fact, thousands of people have died as a result of the fighting, mostly civilians, while hundreds of thousands of others have been displaced as a result of the war. At this time, as Akabogu (1992: 73), observes:

...the various warring factions had fought themselves into a bloody stalemate, and none of them appeared capable of achieving a decisive victory. Thousands of civilians, Liberian nationals, citizens of other ECOWAS nations, diplomats and foreign citizens, were increasingly exposed to the triple hazards of war, starvation and disease

It is against the background of these excruciating and traumatic experiences that the ECOMOG was formed after four major summits as follows:

- ❖ The 13<sup>th</sup> session of the Authority of Heads of state and Government of ECOWAS convened in Banjul, The Gambia from May 28-30, 1990;
- ❖ Standing Mediation Committee Meeting in Free Town Sierra Leone, from July 5-20, 1990;
- ❖ The National Conference in Banjul, The Gambia on August 30, 1990; and
- ❖ The First Session of the Standing Mediation Committee, held at the Kairaba Conference Centre in Banjul, The Gambia from August 6-7, 1990.

During the 13th session of the Authority of Heads of state and Government of ECOWAS, under the chairmanship of the Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore, the then Nigerian President, Ibrahim Babangida proposed the setting up of a Community Standing Mediation Committee in his speech. Babangida admonished the members and urged for greater restraint in handling conflict in the region. Babangida (1990) therefore made a proposal, thus:

In view of the occasional clashes resulting from political misunderstanding among some of our member states, I

propose that this summit should set up a Standing Mediation Committee of four members including the country that holds the chairmanship of the Authority. Such a Committee should intervene in timely fashion, whenever disputes arise. The membership of the Committee could be reviewed every three years.

On the strength of this speech, the import and purport of this community standing Mediation Committee was started by the Authority on the conviction that regional security and stability, as well as peace and concord are imperatives for effective sub-regional co-operation and integration. It also emphasized the disruptions inherent in recurrent situations of conflict and dispute among member states, and which have a telling effect on the ultimate ECOWAS goal of a harmonious and united West African society. Following from this, the standing Committee, as proposed, and including the current Chairman of the Authority, was given strict operating guidelines, and charged purely with a mediatory role, and not to intervene militarily in the conflict.

The second stage came with the respective Foreign Ministers embarking on extensive discussions and consultations which culminated in a Ministerial-level meeting of the Standing Mediation Committee in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from July 5-20, 1990. These efforts could not yield much results, as the leaders and the warring factions refused to put an end to hostilities. Rather, they consented to do so only if the arrangement was to facilitate for any of them eventual emergence as the Liberian president.

The stalemate created as a result of the intransigence of the warring factions led to the next stage in the formation of ECOMOG. This was the First Session of the Community Standing Mediation Committee held in Banjul, the Gambia from August 6-7, 1990, under

the chairmanship of Sir Dauda Jawara. Other Heads of State and Government in attendance included those of Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, while Mali and Togo were represented by Ministers. Also in attendance was the O.A.U. Secretary General. During their discussions, there was again a special emphasis on "the wanton destruction of human life and property and the displacement of persons ... the massive damage in various forms being caused by the armed conflict... (and) the plight of foreign nations, particularly citizens of the Community" (First Session of ECOWAS standing Mediation Committee, 1990).

Subsequently, the Committee called on all the parties to the conflict to observe an immediate cease-fire and surrender all arms and ammunition to the custody of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group, (ECOMOG), which was simultaneously set up by the Committee. The initial military contingents of the Monitoring Group were drawn from the member states of the Mediation committee, and Guinea and Sierra Leone were also asked to assist the committee "in supervising the implementation and in ensuring the strict compliance by the parties with the provisions of the cease-fire. In furtherance to the restoration of peace and stability in Liberia, the committee approved certain measures as follows:

- ❖ Convening of a conference of all political parties and other interest groups for the purpose of establishing a broad-based Interim Government,

- ❖ The Interim Government would be empowered to take all necessary action for the preparation and organization of free and fair elections leading to the establishment in Liberia of a democratically elected government.
- ❖ To erase doubt and suspicion from the activities of the Interim Government, the Committee added two important provisions, (i) none of the leaders of the warring parties could lead the Interim Government; (ii) the head of that government would not be eligible to run for the general or presidential elections to be held subsequently.

The elections were scheduled to hold within 12 months. This move was applauded by both the AFL of Samuel Doe and the INPFL of Yormie Johnson, and they signified their intention to fully cooperate with it. However, the NPFL of Charles Taylor discountenanced the decisions of the committee, and vehemently refused to observe the terms and conditions of the proposed cease-fire. With the intransigence of Taylor, the stalemate persisted, and therefore the AFL and the INPFL could not be expected to surrender their arms and ammunition unless the NPFL was ready and prepared to do the same.

As a result of the above developments, a National Conference was convened in Banjul, The Gambian capital, on August 30, 1990. This was intended to give another opportunity to the warring factions to reach a compromise. All the principal political parties, churches and other major interest groups attended the conference, but Charles Taylor NPFL, stayed away. The conference however



elected Dr. Amos Sawyer, the leader of the Liberian Peoples Party, (LPP) as the President of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), and Bishop Ronald Diggs, who came second in the voting, was subsequently appointed the interim Vice-President (Africa South of the Sahara, 1993).

Following his election, and in his new capacity as the Interim President, Dr. Sawyer made a proposal for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The proposal contained the following terms;

- ❖ An interim legislative assembly would be set up in which Charles Taylor's NPFL, would be offered 6 seats and Yomi Johnson's INPFL would have 4 seats.

This was again rejected by Taylor as he continued to assert his claim to the presidency. There was an attempt by the US Government for mediated negotiation which led to the formal declaration of a cease-fire, and the terms was promptly violated by the NPFL. Other peaceful and equitable resolution of the conflict was embarked upon by both the ECOWAS standing Mediation Committee and the Interim Government of Dr. Amos Sawyer, but Taylor and his NPFL would not have anything to do with them. It therefore required a more direct and more forceful involvement to physically dislodge the warring factions and to create a situation that would be conducive for more meaningful negotiations. As Akabogu (1992: 82) observes, "It was no longer a question of whether ECOWAS should become involved; it was now a matter of how". It would be recalled that at the Kairaba Conference centre in Banjul, The Gambia, which was held from August 6-7, 1990, and where the decision to form ECOMOG was taken, five Heads of

State and Government attended (including The Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Nigeria), and senior representatives from Mali, and Togo. At this meeting, the Standing Mediation Committee after carefully analyzing the situational factors on the Liberian crisis decided to assume their responsibility of ensuring that peace and stability is maintained within the sub-region and in the African continent as a whole. They believed that the tragic situation in Liberia poses a threat to international peace and security. Nigeria in particular was miffed by the nature of external intervention in Liberia and the threat posed by the Libyan incursions into the sub-region. As Adeleke (1995:577) observes,

The fact that nearly all the francophone members of Ecowas have bilateral defence and security arrangements with France helps to explain why Lagos/Abuja saw the insidious hand of Paris behind the support being offered to the NPFL by Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso as unacceptable, as was Libyan encroachment into West Africa. Neither France nor Colonel Muammar Qaddafi could be allowed to use the NPFL as a vehicle to further their interests in Nigeria's geo-political orbit

Nigeria therefore had strong reasons to support any measure that would help to forestall these unwanted moves. ECOMOG was therefore established by the committee, "for the purposes of keeping the peace, restoring law and order, and ensuring that the ceasefire is respected". More so, the communiqué emphasized that "the sole purpose of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force is to create the necessary conditions for normal life to resume to the benefit of all Liberians" (Final Communiqué, first Session of ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, 1990).

The ECOMOG was initially made up of 3,500 men, composed mainly of naval personnel. At inception, they merely facilitated the evacuation of citizens, mainly women and children of member states and other Liberians who were trapped in the war zone, and for whom medical care and food aid could not be provided. ECOMOG faced many difficulties and initial setbacks. They also found out that there was no peace to keep, and the IGNU could not be installed. This led to the broadening of the ECOMOG mandate, and on September 12, 1990, it was announced that the force had been instructed to enforce a cease-fire, to clear the capital city of all threats of attack and establish and maintain effective buffer. The force was also increased from 3,500 to 6,000 men. Also more offensive weapons were added to its arsenal and aerial bombardment was employed to eliminate the immediate threat posed by Taylor and the NPFL. In his assessment of the ECOMOG involvement in Liberia, Akabogu (1992: 84) notes that "the ECOMOG involvement in the Liberian conflict was graduated, restrained and informed and dictated by the circumstances on the ground", and at each point, the urge and zeal for further commitment was irresistible.

### **3.5 THE ECOWAS-ECOMOG INTERVENTIONS IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE: THE LEGALITY QUESTION**

Serious legal questions were raised about the ECOMOG intervention, especially in Liberia. This is because there are charter provisions in the various international organizations with respect to peaceful resolution of conflicts, and the role(s) of regional organization(s) (in the case of the UN) in that regard. Even ECOWAS has the protocols

on Non-aggression and the Mutual Assistance on Defense, though the latter had never been truly operationalized within the context and meaning of its coming into being.

For the purpose of this research work, therefore, the legality of the ECOWAS-ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone needs to be examined. We may not need to go into the methodological rigours of legal technicalities, but the vital issues on matters of law, especially in matters of humanitarian intervention will be treated as they relate to both countries.

### **3.5:1 LIBERIA**

The legitimacy of the ECOWAS-ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was seriously contested, especially in scholarly circles on the following grounds:

- ❖ ECOWAS was a regional economic organization which was designed to foster economic integration (and a custom union is envisaged), therefore it lacked the powers to arrogate to itself the responsibility of mutual security;
- ❖ The deployment of ECOMOG is a violation of Article 3, section 2 of the OAU Charter and the corresponding articles of the UN, which expressly and unambiguously forbid interference in the domestic affairs of member states, and a further violation of the 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression, especially Article 2, which demands that, "Each member state shall refrain from committing,

encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of other member states;

- ❖ There was no right of humanitarian intervention under the existing international law, if the intervention is undertaken by a state or group of states outside the auspices of the United Nations; and
- ❖ The action of ECOWAS in Liberia exceeded a purely humanitarian mission, and hence required the consent of all the warring factions or a prior authorization by the UN Security Council. ECOWAS therefore needed to obtain the necessary consensus before the intervention.

In the first instance, the contestation on the legality of the ECOWAS (as a regional economic organization) intervening in the manner it did in Liberia, it was questioned if ECOWAS qualifies at all as a regional organization. But Stone (1959; 247-249; cited in Ofodile; 1994: 410) suggests that to qualify as a regional organization under Article 52, a regional actor must possess three characteristics as follows:

1. It must be formed by a standing agreement between a group of member states of the United Nations that establishes a more limited community than the United Nations itself;
2. It must deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security; and
3. It must have a direct relation to the region.

It has to be noted that the ECOWAS Treaty before then did not empower it to involve itself in matters of peace and security. Even the Protocols on Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance on Defense did not expressly authorize intervention if the conflict originated within a state or if it was supported not by an outside force, but by a member state. Even so, if we assume that ECOWAS is a regional organization within the meaning of Article 52 of the UN Charter, it is questionable and in fact doubtful and unintended for ECOWAS to put itself in a position to determine when there is a threat to international peace and security. The UN Charter clearly states that this is the exclusive preserve of the Security Council of the UN.

On the second issue, the guiding principle of the United Nations could be instructive. The Chapter VIII, Article 52 is clear on 'Regional Arrangements' to conflict resolution. It states inter alia:

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from Security Council.

Before the Liberian crisis however, ECOWAS had anticipated crisis in the sub-region. They envisaged the growing importance of security issues and the dangers they pose, especially on any meaningful progress on the economy of the region. This is why in 1981, ECOWAS leaders adopted a Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense, which was signed in May, 1981, in Freetown, Sierra Leone, by 13 of the (then) 16 member states, and which states that they were "convinced that economic progress cannot be achieved unless the conditions for the necessary security are ensured by all members of the Community" (Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, cited in: Nigeria's Treaties in Force, 1970-90).

On the strength of the above, they agreed that the Allied Armed Forces of the Community was to be created to be used, for instance, in cases of armed conflict between two or more member states if peaceful settlement fails or in internal security threat from outside the sub-region, and when such conflicts threaten the security of the entire community. It is therefore argued that the philosophical considerations behind this protocol clearly provided the legal basis and impetus for the Community concern and collective involvement in the conflict in Liberia.

Further issues still arise in respect of this intervention. Scholars argue that the urgent need to save lives should supercede any other considerations. At least intervention should be allowed on humanitarian grounds. And if Liberians could not save themselves, they should be saved from themselves. In fact, it would be disastrous and abominable for humanity, and especially the ECOWAS sub-region, to just stay and watch while Liberia went into unspeakable human conflagration. But these are moral questions. International lawyers, jurists and scholars maintain that there are certain conditions that must be fulfilled before intervention can be justified under international law. These include the following:

- ❖ The human rights record of the intervening nation or nations must be good;
- ❖ All peaceful means for resolving the conflict must be exhausted;
- ❖ The human rights violations must involve large scale atrocities;
- ❖ There must be no immediate hope of relief in the absence of intervention;
- ❖ Humanitarian intentions must be the overriding purpose for the intervention;
- ❖ The intervention must be justifiable through cost-benefit analysis;
- ❖ The intervention must be of limited duration and proportionality; and
- ❖ Group actions are preferred to unilateral action (Hassan: 1981; cited in, Ofodile, 1994: 396).

A critical examination of these criteria shows that most (if not all) the countries involved in the ECOMOG enterprise could not fulfill the basic conditions. For instance, at the



time of intervention in both Liberian and Sierra Leone, Nigeria which led the intervention, was heavily under the yoke of military dictatorship and her human rights records was despicable and deplorable, and several examples could be cited in this respect, including the trial of the 1990 coup suspects, letter bomb assassination of Dele Giwa, the editor of Newswatch magazine, the cancellation and annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, among so many other cases of human rights abuses. In a general assessment on the intervention in Liberia, Ofodile (1994: 409), opines that;

None of the reasons given by ECOWAS as justification for its intervention in Liberia, particularly in light of the established criteria for humanitarian intervention, is strong enough to legitimize its actions. Whether taken together or analyzed separately, these reasons cannot withstand the scrutiny of international law. Consequently, it seems clear that ECOWAS acted contrary to established international norms in involving itself in the Liberian civil war.

It is noted that the requirements for humanitarian intervention is cumulative, therefore, the non-fulfillment of condition nullifies the whole action. More so, ECOWAS appears to have acted beyond the legal powers granted by the Charter to regional organizations. The issue of consent of the UN has been equally debated. In this instance the 'approval' was given retrospectively in a statement by the president of the council taken note of ECOWAS' action and commending its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. Even so, the words of the Security Council was carefully chosen, and it does appear that they took a neutral stand by not explicitly approving or condemning the action taken by ECOWAS. In essence, the approval would have set a dangerous precedent, and equally, to condemn it would have led to a further breakdown of law and order. Therefore, the

decision has been described as "... a political solution to a messy situation", (Ofodile, 1994: 415).

### **3.5:2 SIERRA LEONE**

The Sierra Leonean and Liberian crises are intimately linked. Therefore we could argue without fear of contradiction that the responses of the international community to the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone was influenced also by the actions of ECOWAS in Liberia. There was a trend in the pattern of humanitarian interventions in various parts of the world within this period. We could recall the cases of inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB), the US and Allied Forces operation in Iraq, and UN action in Liberia, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti and the C.A.R. An examination of these cases creates the impression that, "... regardless of the legal basis for intervention, humanitarian intervention by groups of states, regional actors, or the United Nations in internal conflicts appears lawful", (Levitt; 1998: 363).

The case of Sierra Leone however also raises some legal questions on two fronts:

1. the Nigerian intervention and
2. the ECOWAS intervention.

On the basis of the Sierra Leonean crisis, the legality question has been supported on the following grounds, in respect of the Nigerian intervention:

1. President Kabbah requested that Nigeria intervene to restore democracy;

2. The SOFA between Nigeria and Sierra Leone permits intervention in the event of an internal threat to the state; and,
3. Nigeria was obligated and permitted to intervene under the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993.

Since international law recognizes that an incumbent government has the right to request military assistance from a third state in order to stop or ward-off an illegal prior intervention by another state, the Sierra Leonean situation in terms of fulfilling the rigours of legal requirements was mitigated by the experiences before it, especially Liberia and C.A.R. The ECOWAS Revised Treaty of July 24, 1993 seems to give legal impetus to the Nigerian intervention, because the Article 58 of the Treaty requires member states to "undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region", and pledge to "cooperate with the Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of *intra-state* conflict...". The fact has to be also mentioned that the Nigerian intervention was given legitimacy and credence because the UN did not reprimand or censor Nigeria for the action of intervention.

On the other hand, the ECOWAS intervention has been supported on the following grounds:

1. President Kabbah requested that ECOWAS intervene;

2. ECOWAS appears to have been entitled to invoke a right to humanitarian intervention;
3. ECOWAS was permitted to intervene under the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993;
4. ECOWAS may have acquired the requisite legal status to enable it to act as a *de jure* government; and
5. The Security Council retroactively authorized the intervention, (Levitt, 1998: 369).

On the above grounds therefore, the international community seems to have demonstrated its willingness to support forcible intervention in the internal affairs of states to safeguard democracy. The experiences of Haiti and CAR also testify to this. In these cases, there has to be also established cases of:

- ❖ human rights abuses to the magnitude that the *jus cogens* norms of international law have been violated;
- ❖ state collapse and slide into anarchy; and
- ❖ safe-guarding democracy in circumstances when a democratic government has been violently and unconstitutionally dislodged or supplanted against the will of its civilian population, (Levitt, 1998: 373).

### 3.6:1 ECOWAS REVISED TREATY AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA

The ECOWAS treaty came into effect on June 23, 1975, when the required minimum of seven states signed the treaty. The first seven countries that signed the treaty include, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo and Burkina Faso. By early July three other countries, Gambia, Benin and Niger also ratified bringing the total to ten. The remaining signed on a later date. The ECOWAS treaty contains 64 articles arranged into 14 chapters and has its central objectives as the promotion of,

Cooperation and development in virtually all fields of economic activity, particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters, for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its people, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and contributing to the progress and development of the African continent (ECOWAS Treaty, Article 1).

There seem to be seven principal objectives from the all-embracing set of objectives of ECOWAS, as follows:

- i. elimination of custom duties;
- ii. abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade;
- iii. establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy;

- iv. the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital;
- v. the harmonization of agricultural and industrial policies;
- vi. the establishment of a fund for cooperation; and
- vii. The harmonization of monetary policies.

There are however specific goals and provisions made for the realization of these declared objectives, in the areas of trade, monetary cooperation and cooperation in the field of industrialization. It is also anticipated that the establishment of the customs union would take a transitional period of 15 years after the Treaty has come into force.

In essence, chapter 1 of the Treaty spells out the aims and objectives of ECOWAS, while the chapter 2, including Articles 5 – 12 contains the provisions for the establishment, composition and functions of the four institutions of the community as follows:

- i. the Authority of Heads of States and Government which shall meet at least once a year shall be responsible for the general direction and control of the performance of the Community's executive function, and chairmanship will rotate;
- ii. the Council of Ministers which shall meet twice a year and shall consist of two representatives from each state and chairmanship will also rotate;

- iii. the Executive secretariat with an executive secretary, two deputy secretaries, a financial controller and other officers of the secretariat, and which shall be responsible only to the Community itself; and
- iv. The Tribunal of the Community, which shall have the responsibility of settlement of disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty where direct agreement fails.

There is also provision for the following four commissions of the community;

- i. The Trade, Customs, immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission.  
This commission shall be responsible for making recommendations on the harmonization of economic and fiscal policies, the giving of attention to the maintenance of balance of payment equilibrium and the examination of developments in the economies of member states. It also has the duty of making recommendations to the Council of Ministers on the establishment of bilateral systems for the settlements of accounts in the short term and multilateral system for the settlement of such accounts in the long term;
- ii. the Industry, Agriculture, and National Resources commission, which shall be responsible for the harmonization of development and free trade in the related fields;

- iii. the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission with developmental and harmonization functions pertaining to the fields to which the name applies; and
- iv. The Social and Cultural Affairs Commission responsible for improving the increasing inter state and the community's unified social and cultural activities.

Chapter 3 of the Treaty covers customs and trade matters, and the various issues relating to trade. In Article 12 for instance, the liberalization of trade is treated, while articles 13 – 16 cover customs duties, common customs tariff, Community tariff agreement and direction of trade. Articles 17 – 26 treat such issues as, revenue duties and internal taxation, quantitative restriction on community goods, dumping and other trade matters.

The treaty also takes care of the movement of people, capital and services. The member states undertake to abolish obstacles to free movement and also cover the harmonization of agricultural policies and promotion of joint projects in agricultural, marketing, research and agro-industrial enterprises. It envisages schemes for joint development of transport, communications, energy and other infrastructures, and equally speaks of the harmonization of the economic and industrial policies and the elimination of the disparities in the level of development of Member states. Again, the need for proper functioning of the community for the harmonization of monetary policies of the member states is mentioned. The Treaty also establishes the fund for cooperation, compensation and development.



Articles 36 – 39 treat monetary and financial relationships. While Article 36, the establishment of the Committee of West African Central Banks consisting of governors of these Banks, of which it is their function to work out the operational procedure of the clearing system and other monetary issues. Article 39 seeks the establishment of the movement of capital and capital issues committee, which shall harmonize the development of the community's capital market. Articles 40 – 48 cover areas in the cooperation on exploitation, distribution and development of energy and mineral resources, as well as the establishment of the fund for cooperation, compensation and development, specifically covered in Articles 50 – 52, and state *inter alia*, that the 'fund' shall take member state's contributions, income from community enterprises, receipts from bilateral, multilateral and other foreign sources and subsidies and contributions of all kinds from all sources and use these to finance projects in member states, provide compensations to member states and help develop the less-developed member states.

In Articles 53 – 55 the budget of the community is treated, while Articles 57 – 64 cover general matters in the areas of the citing of the Headquarters of the Community, the official languages of the community (which shall be English and French), status, privileges and immunities of Member States, appointment of the executive secretary, coming into effect of the Treaty and membership withdrawal. The Treaty recognizes all citizens of Member states as Community Citizens and all obstacles and impediments to their freedom of movement and residence within the Community are abolished.

The Treaty establishes standards for achieving industrial harmonization. Under this principle, Member states are bound to furnish each other with their major feasibility and

similar reports on projects established within their territories. They are also to exchange information about technical partners, as well as other foreign groups and report on their experience of industrial projects. As much as possible, they are required to undertake joint industrial studies and projects and finance research into the transfer of technology and the development of new products based on raw materials found inside the territories of Member states. They also owe it as a duty to ensure a uniform 'industrial climate' in order to avoid unhealthy rivalry and wasted resources. It also establishes the need for the exchange of experts and training facilities and 'division of labour' for projects.

Among other things, the Treaty also makes comprehensive provision about the 'rules of origin' of goods that are to be subject to common tariff treatment by Member states. For instance, the goods to be so subjected must have been entirely produced by consensus or enterprises whose headquarters are located within the Community and at least 51 percent of whose equity is held locally and at least half of whose directors represent member states. However, Member states can continue to impose restrictions in the interests of security, control of weapons, the protection of health, the transfer of gold, silver or precious stones, or the protection of 'national treasures'. Again, 'dumping' is prohibited and all Member States will afford each other 'most-favoured-nation' treatment.

### **3.6:2 ECOWAS REVISED TREATY, 1993**

The developments that led to the Revised ECOWAS Treaty could be traced to global developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The end of the cold war and the emergence of globalization opened a whole lot of new developments, which not only

caused series of crisis in the development programmes of the ECOWAS, but also revealed the inadequacies in the old Treaty. The conflicts in the sub-region also necessitated an immediate need for reviewing the Old Treaty to accommodate resolutions of ECOWAS taken to check these developments. Against the background of these developments, the then ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Dr. Abass Bundu (1989 – 1993) championed the need to review the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty. Following from this, he made a proposal to this effect in 1990 at Banjul (the Gambia) Summit of the ECOWAS Authority. He stated that there is a great need to rectify the institutional and administrative flaws of the Community which have continued to impair the forward movement of the Community in the desired direction. The proposal was adopted in the Decision of the Authority (A/Dec/10/5/90), and in its Article 1, the Decision directed “the Executive secretary to set up a Committee of Eminent Persons in the sub-region drawn from within the outside governmental circles, to undertake a review of the ECOWAS treaty”. (ECOWAS Official Journal, Vol. 1, June 7, 1990:25).

The committee of Eminent Persons was presided over by General Yakubu Gowon (rtd.). The final Report was presented on June 9, 1992, from which a draft of the new ECOWAS Treaty was constructed. This was considered and adopted by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS at its 1992 and 1993 summits.

It is relevant to note that the Committee operated on certain agreed *modus operandi* which include the following; (ECOWAS document 1992 p.2)

- a) that existing provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty found to be of advantage for achieving the aims and objectives of Community would be retained;
- b) the provisions that are inadequate or inappropriate for promoting regional operation and integration be reviewed;
- c) Adequate provision should be included to cover areas of cooperation and integration not included in the 1975 Treaty, taking into account contemporary developments, which have a significant impact on the vital interest of ECOWAS and its member states.

From the above guideline emerged three distinct areas of attention in the new ECOWAS Treaty, which include:

- i. wholesale retention of some aspects of the old Treaty;
- ii. modified version of certain aspects of the old Treaty; and
- iii. Brand new provisions which are included as a result of contemporary developments, especially as they relate to the globalization process.

For the purpose of our discussion, the brand new provisions include the following: Articles 1, 2, 13, 16, 20, 26, 34, 50-57, 60, 63-65, 68 and 77. It would be recalled that the old Treaty had 64 Articles while the new has 93.

Among the new provisions, Article 1 defines the key words and functional phrase or expression that occurs in the Treaty, thereby necessitating a sort of glossary of terms. Article 2(i) defines the nature of the community as "to make economic community in the region for the purpose of integration and the realization of the objectives of the African Economic Community (AEC). This particular provision supports Article 6(a) of the AEC Treaty of 1991, which emphasizes that "the Community shall be established gradually in six stages". The first stage consists of "strengthening" the existing economic communities, of which ECOWAS is one.

However, the brand-new provision, which relates more directly to our purpose, includes Articles 4 and 56. Article 4 basically defines the fundamental principles of the Community. They include, equality of status of member states; mutual interdependence, solidarity and collective self-Defence, non-aggression in their relations, maintenance of regional peace; stability and security, good neighbourliness, peaceful settlement of disputes, observance of fundamental human rights; and the observance of good system of governance in each member state envisaged by the Declaration of Political Principles adopted in Abuja on July 6, 1991.

The relevance of this article for our purpose focuses so much on issues bordering on security and peaceful settlement of disputes. This is also reinforced by the adoption of Political (democratic) principle which presupposes that military regimes in the sub-region negate the spirit of ECOWAS membership. By logical extension, this particular inclusion borrows the EU example, where domestic democratic governance is one of the basic requirements for the EU membership. This explains why Spain, Portugal and

Greece, once ruled by military junta had to jettison the garb of military dictatorship before they could be admitted into the EU. Again, the Organization of American States, OAS, has as part of its core concerns the promotion of Peace and democracy. (see the introduction and chapter 6 for more details).

Article 56 is also directly relevant for our purpose to the extent that it envisages community cooperation in political matters. More importantly, it reinforces the protocol on non-aggression, and mutual assistance on defense, human rights and democratization. It is therefore pertinent to observe that the inspiration for the ECOMOG enterprise and the legal explication for the exercise were drawn mainly from the protocol on Mutual Assistance on defense, which before this time was almost forgotten.

On a general note, the revised Treaty has largely and comprehensively taken care of the challenges in the globalization process, but how far and how long the existing structures in ECOWAS would carry and sustain them remains doubtful. We shall have reasons to find some of these out in the course of investigations in this research work.

### **3.7 THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL NEXUS OF CONFLICT IN WEST AFRICA**

The local and international nexus of conflict in West Africa implies the linkage between the internal and external dynamics of conflicts in the West African sub-region. There is no society that is conflict free, but what changes according to the dynamic perspective is;

The nature and intensity of conflict as a function of internal societal factors (such as ethnicity, class and religion) and of changes in the (sub-regional, regional and international) environment, with various degrees and levels of influence on the internal situation. In other words, the nature and intensity of African conflicts is a result of a complex, dialectical relationship between internal societal factors and the structure of the external environment (Martin; nd.: 1).

More so, it is worthy to note that for obvious reasons in the African region, and indeed the West African sub-region, the security is inextricably linked with the domestic security of a number of other states. This is as a result of shared geographical boundaries, trans-border ethnic and cultural affinity, punctuated by similar economic and environmental conditions. From the above observation we could recall the references to the internal contradictions in the African politics and the impact of the international environment as a result of the end to ideological warfare (cold war) which transformed Africa and indeed West Africa into a region of fundamental instability. It could therefore be seen that the answers to the linkage(s) between the local (internal) and international (external) nexus of conflict in West Africa is not far fetched.

The case in point in discussing the internal dynamics of conflict in West Africa is Sierra Leone (one of our case studies; full exposition of the Sierra Leonean experience will be made in chapter five). In Sierra Leone, the 1955 Ordinance on the import and export of arms and ammunition make it illegal for "any person who imports into Sierra Leone any small arm or small arms and ammunition except under an import licence ... shall be guilty of an offence" (part 3, section 8). Section 19 of the same Ordinance also states that, "any person who possesses any small arm ... unless he is a holder of a current licence ... shall be guilty of an offence". These conditions obtained in Sierra Leone in the

1960s and 70s when gun control laws provided a model for decentralized arms management and licensing. This system disappeared with the emergence of one-party state which did away with decentralized local government and gun-control (Bayraytay; 2000:88). The 1978 One-Party constitution was also silent on the availability, possession and use of arms. As Bayraytay (2000:88) also observes this development,

led to a proliferation of handguns, and the overt use of arms by some foreign business tycoons, especially the Lebanese. The regular military and paramilitary forces found themselves faced with parallel privately-owned forces. During this period a lot of arms trafficking took place, sometimes with the connivance of well-placed officers within the state's security apparatus.

This situation was exacerbated by the outbreak of the civil war which proliferated the use of small arms and light weapons. The point here is not that weapons create conflicts. There is however empirical evidence to show that,

when they are available, ... conflicts tend to become more violent and get more protracted because they tend to make warring factions believe the only way to settle their conflicts is through those weapons (Aderinwale et al, 1999:24).

As a consequence of this, when conflicts occur, they resort to violence as a result of the ready availability of these weapons which leads to loss of human (and often innocent) lives, with the attendant and extensive political and socio-economic repercussions: political instability, hordes of refugees and displaced persons, destruction of infrastructure, the phenomenon of child-soldiers, border terrorism and armed robbery in the urban centres (Yande Diop; 1999: 12 – 13). More so, the UN has stated that the easy



availability of over seven million military-style small arms and light weapons in West Africa led to the facilitation of the abduction and exploitation of over 25,000 children as child soldiers in armed conflicts, civil strife and rebellions which, have claimed over two million lives in the sub-region in the last decade alone (Boh; 2000: 39).

Research also shows (Aderinwale; 1999:3) that in the last ten years (as at 1999) most internal (intra-state) conflicts have been fought with small arms. This has made political and ethnic conflicts very violent even at the early stages. It is also reported that between 80-96 percent of all casualties of recent wars have been produced by small arms, and ironically, the victims, mainly civilians, are not directly involved in the conflicts. It is to be noted that the starting point of most conflicts are often remote and not initially paid adequate attention. In West Africa, this has been so and this could be mainly when security concerns in the sub-region was not initially given attention. Again, the moratorium on small arms and light weapons which was adopted in 1988, only shows the level of ignorance on the havoc they could wreck on the security and stability of the sub-region, more so, when the implementation is still problematic. This aspect is more dangerous because facts are very sketchy on the size of the trade, and there are no statistics, they are small and therefore easy to carry and move around. This has raised the questions about arms used, the type or make, who acquires them and for what purpose and the channels of supply.

Sierra Leone poses a pathetic case because these issues were ignored until they got out of hand. This was given added impetus by the long years of unipartism in the country, as the non-challant attitude of the government led to illegal acquisition, accumulation and

stock piling of arms which helped in engendering a political culture of violence. Arms were used in intimidating political opponents and thuggery was introduced into the body politic. As it were,

Rich and influential politicians whose mandate was at stake... proliferated the political scene with arms, recruited unemployed youths as thugs, and encouraged them to unleash violence during election time (the Constitution of Sierra Leone; cited in Bayraytay, 2000: 88).

As no country exists alone, when these conflicts degenerate to unmanageable proportions they become internationalized. This is because there are always external interests who would want to protect or preserve their interests, while new ones expecting opportunities to enter the system would seize any available opening and exploit it.

Within the MANO River Union, MRU, "the epicentre of conflict in West Africa" (IPA ECOWAS; 2002:7) movement of small arms and light weapons was not entirely new. As Cole (2000: 72) reports,

Before the war, the policy regarding the possession of arms and ammunition in Liberia was quite different from the restrictive policy existing in Sierra Leone, at a time when hunting was the villagers' only violent activity.

This explains why in later years there developed a complex network of gunrunning and other illegal activities within the MANO River Union. Subsequently, these developed a spillover effect within the sub-region. From available facts, in West Africa, as elsewhere in the world; the flow of these illegal weapons are very difficult and sometimes impossible to monitor as a result of lengthy, porous and poorly policed borders, coupled

with corruption of the officials, inadequate training for security forces, inefficient border controls, lack of financial resources and modern technology. Also, it has been discovered that more than 80 countries manufacture these weapons for an estimated USD 4 – 5 billion, annually, with over 40 per cent of the total supply channeled through illegal means. (Yande Diop, 1999: 39)

There is another context in which conflict can be viewed, because of its high propensity in contributing to violent conflict in the sub-region. There has been a serious reference to the problem of 'shadow military economies', for instance the illicit trade in weapons, smuggling precious stones, payments by trans-national economies, and the role of non-state military bodies, including (ethnic) militias, warlords and paramilitaries. In the case of Sierra Leone, this shadow economy went a long way in the sustenance of the RUF of Sierra Leone. The monies made from illicit diamond sales and other precious metals were diverted to warfare. Sierra Leonean diamonds and other precious metals found their way to western markets, ditto for Liberia, especially when these rebels were in control of the areas that are rich in these materials. This encouraged the rebels to flex their war chests, and went a long way in 'privatizing violence', even across borders.

This perspective dislocates the state-centred approach to security and brings to the fore, the impact of private interests and dissident groups on the social part of human security and military spending. These groups are often encouraged to use their illicit trade to upset the stability of the state and by implication the entire region. The linkages are therefore established between the local and international in the sources and origins of

conflict, as the proceeds from these enterprises are not used for the people's welfare, but for warfare, and personal aggrandizement of submerged interests.

One of the research findings (Aderinwale *et al*; 1999) is that there is enormous quantity of small arms and light weapons circulating round the world; between 500 million and one billion. The important thing to note is that when conflict is abated in one part of the world, the weapons of war are usually bought and transferred to conflict prone areas, through illicit means. Those who are engaged in this business, especially the fighters or combatants who have just come out of war, do it for pecuniary gains. This was discovered to be the situation in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, especially as they were caught up with the wave of democratization. The same could be said of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Some of the arms used in the Liberian war were transferred to Sierra Leone when Charles Taylor came to power in 1997, including some of the NPFL fighters, who moved into Sierra Leone to assist the RUF rebels. Today, the remnants of the NPFL are fighting in Cote d'Ivoire with the arms and ammunition used in the Liberian war. On the other hand, Sierra Leone and Guinea have been accused at one time or the other of contribution to the escalation of conflict in Liberia through the same means. Most often during disarmament, these weapons are expected to be surrendered and destroyed. The UN and other agencies have often opted for buying up the arms from the combatants.

These combatants often go to the highest bidder, and sometimes they do not surrender everything. In essence, in the process of disarmament the game is seen from the point of view of opportunity to make money by the disarming countries or combatants of the

warring factions. The process institutes unending circle of violence as the discarded arms find their ways to other parts of the world where they are needed. West Africa, particularly as a hot bed of violence is quite prone to this game which has continued to wreck havoc on the security situation in the sub region. This culture of violence is problematic and this is why it has been observed that,

When a civil war has gone on for too long, violence becomes normal and stability is redefined from the perspective of violent acts. Young boys grow into men believing that the only way to get ahead in life, whether politically, socially or economically is through the amount of firepower they could control, therefore, they will strive for nothing else apart from weapons. This dysfunctional socialization that defines success from the perspective of violence, therefore poses a more dangerous and long term damage to developing societies than the bloodshed and anguish (sic) caused when weapons are actually fired (Aderinwale *et al*, 1999: 26).

This has a logical implication on the West African experience. This is because if the orgy of violent conflicts that has engulfed the sub-region for a long time now is not halted, the long time negative effects on the security in the sub-region would be catastrophic.

It is therefore commendable that ECOWAS has embarked on the tripartite method to reduce the conflict level in the sub-region. These include the moratorium on small arms and light weapons, the early warning system, and the institutionalized mechanism for conflict resolution in West Africa.

If we examine the politics of the establishment of the ECOMOG, (to be treated in detail in chapter 5) we could see the roles these states played and why they did so. What this entails is that the interests of these core states affect to certain degrees the peace and stability of the sub-region. As would also be observed, some of these states tend to frustrate peace efforts in situations which do not fully consider their interests. This could be observed from the initial stand of Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso on the establishment and use of ECOMOG as an interposition force in Liberia. More so, the role played by Nigeria in this instance has remained controversial and debatable. Some observers have argued that without ECOMOG, Charles Taylor and his NPFL would easily have over-run the Presidential Mansion and taken over power, and perhaps not much lives would have been lost and much carnage would have been averted. Otherwise, the role played by Nigeria, because of the perceived interests (whether personal or national) of the leadership of the country at that time, only prolonged the evil day. However, this line of argument may no longer be sustainable, in as much as, Charles Taylor, when he was handed over power could not utilize it well to solve the problems of Liberia. This is so because the essence of his struggle was to correct the misrule of Samuel Doe, which unfortunately was not to be, until he was eased out of power, and went on exile in Nigeria and now is facing charges for war crimes. What Charles Taylor rather did was to bring much more suffering and confusion on the people of Liberia and its politics. This is also borne out of his intransigence and utter disregard to the commendable role of ECOMOG, and the recommendations of the ECOWAS and the international community on the reformation of the Liberian army and other issues.

We could therefore see that these developments prove our second proposition valid; which stipulates that the attitude of the core states in West Africa to stability and security of the sub-region is dictated by the economic and other benefits they could gain from a given situation. Other instances could be cited in this regard, but at the moment this is constrained by the scope of our analysis. We would however make effort to explore other dimensions of this in the following chapters.

## REFERENCES

- Adedeji, A.A. (1974) *The Evolution of a West African Economic Community*. Lagos: Federal Government Press
- Adeleke, A., "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Ecowas Operations in Liberia". *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), 569-593
- Aderinwale, A., Abdullahi, B., and Dia, M., (1999) "Sub-regional Security Protocols and Demilitarization in Africa". Otta: ALF, UNDP and ARIAS, May
- Africa Research Bulletin, vol.3 1966
- Akabogu, C. "ECOWAS Takes the Initiative", in Vogt M.A. (ed. 1992) *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace-Keeping*. Lagos: Gabumo Pub. Co. Ltd.
- Apter, D. A., and Coleman, J., "Pan-Africanism or Nationalism in Africa", in AMSAC, Pan Africanism Reconsidered, as cited in Le Vine, V. T., "The Politics of Partition in Africa: the Cameroons and the Myth of Unification", *JIA*, Vol. *Xviii* 2, 1964
- Arikpo, O., "Nigeria and the OAU", lecture delivered at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, July 31, 1974
- Asiwaju, A.I. "Socioeconomic Integration of the West African sub-region in Historical Context: Focus on the European Colonial Period", in Akinyemi, A. B. et al (ed. 1984) *Readings and Documents on ECOWAS*. Lagos: NIIA
- Bayraytay, A. (2000) "Arms Control Policy under Threat: Dealing with the Plague of Corruption", in Ayissi, A., and Poulton, R. (ed.) *Bound to Cooperate:*



*Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone.* Geneva, Switzerland:  
UNIDIR

- Bennet, A. L. (1995) *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
- Boateng, E.A. (1978) *A Political Geography of Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Boh, H., (2000) "ECOWAS Adopts Curriculum to Control the flow of Small Arms". Abuja: The West Africa Bulletin, December, No. 8
- Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. New York: United Nations; Department of Public Information.
- Claude, I. L. Jr. (1971, 4<sup>th</sup> ed.) *Swords into Plowshares: The Problem and Progress of International Organization*. New York: Random House
- Cole, N.J.O., "Arms Smuggling: A Challenging Issue for the Customs Service in Post-War Sierra Leone", in Ayissi, A., and Poulton, R., (ed. 2000) *Bound to cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR
- Covenant of the League of Nations, in Claude, I.L. Jr. (1971) *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organisation*. Appendix 1., pp.453-462
- ECOWAS Document 1992
- ECOWAS Official Journal*, Vol. 1, June 7, 1990
- Final Communique, First Session of ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, 1990
- IPA/ECOWAS 2002

- Fung, I.R. "Control and Collection of Light Weapons in the Sahel-Sahara Sub-region: A Mission Report". *Disarmament*, Vol. 19, 1996
- Le Vine, V.T., "The Politics of Partition in Africa: The Cameroon and the Myth of Unification". *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. xviii, 2, 1964
- Levitt, J. (1998) "Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone". *Temple International and Comparative Law Journal*, Vol. 12.
- Mabogunje, A. "The Land and Peoples of West Africa", in Ajayi, J.F.A. and Crowder, M. (eds. 1971) *History of West Africa*. Vol. 1. London: Longman
- Martin, G. (nd) "Conflict Resolution in Africa", paper presented at the Conference for Reversal of Culture of Violence and Control of Smarview of the way in which African Conflicts should be analyzed, School of Government, University of the west Cape
- Michel, R.R. (2004) "The Integration of West Africa". *UW-L Journal of Undergraduate Research, VII*
- "Nigeria, African and Regional Issues: Back to Nigeria National Security" available on the internet  
 @<http://www.photius.com/countries/Nigeria/nationalsecurity/nigerianationalsecurityafri...>
- Nwokedi, E. "African Security: Issues and Problems in the 1990s and to the Next Millennium", in Vogt, M.A. and Aminu, L.S. (1996, Vol. 1) *Peace Keeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.
- Ofodile, A.C. (1994) "The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia". *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, Vol. 32 No. 2

- Onwuka, R.I. (1982) *Development and Integration in West Africa: The Case of ECOWAS*. Ife: University of Ife Press
- Plano, J.C. and Riggs, R.E. (1967) *Forging World Order: The Politics of International Organization*. New York: Macmillan
- Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, cited in Nigeria's Treaties in Force, 1970-1990.
- Vogt, M.A. and Aminu, L. S. (eds.) (1996) *Peace keeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies, Vols. 1 and 2*, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Pub.
- Yande-Diop, A., (1999) "Towards the Enforcement of the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in west Africa". Abuja: The west Africa Bulletin, October, No. 7.
- Ziegler, D. W. (1990, 5<sup>th</sup> ed.) *War, Peace and International Politics*. Glenview Illinois: Scott Foresman and Co.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4.0 ECOWAS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN LIBERIA

#### 4.1 Background to the Liberian Crisis

Liberia remains an important country in the history of Africa for the following reasons:

- It is the oldest republic in the continent, dating as far back as 1847;
- It was the oldest *de facto* one party political system in Africa up to 1980, as the ruling True Whig Party (TWP) had been in power continuously since 1877;
- Like most countries in Africa, it did not experience European style colonization.

The unfortunate crisis that befell this West African country remains a traumatizing experience in the lives of many. Several accounts have been given on the background to this crisis. Sesay (1980: 15-30; 1984: 75-93; Akpan, 1973: 217 – 336) have argued that the origin of the Liberian crisis started as “black-on-black” domination or imperialism, having been colonized by a handful of free American slaves in 1822, under the auspices of the American Colonization Society. From 1822, up to the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, these settlers (the Americo-Liberians), waged several wars against the indigenous people of Liberia in an attempt to subjugate them to their rule and authority.

Ironically, these Americo-Liberians only represent 5 per cent of the total population of Liberia estimated at 1.8 million in 1980, but they controlled the political and economic

power in the country almost to the exclusion of the majority of the citizens. Before the April 12, 1980 coup, of the 19 presidents none was an indigenous Liberian, and 11 out of the 19 presidents were actually born in the United States of America. Hence little or no attention was paid to the sensibilities of the indigenous Liberians with respect to their laws, customs and religious beliefs. Separate laws existed before 1948 for the indigenous people and the Americo-Liberians who inhabited Monrovia and other coastal areas of the country that is the Montserrado County. This state of affairs remained virtually the same until the advent of the Tubman administration in 1944 (Sesay, 1992: 30).

Other accounts on the Liberian crisis could be seen as remote or immediate. As it were, one of the remote causes was located in the Simeon Greenleaf constitution. Johnson (2003:103), one of the key elements in the crisis contends that:

Simeon Greenleaf's Constitution introduced separatism in government and caused suppression of opportunities against the natives. His commission's vision for Liberia was short and lacked wisdom. The result led to Liberia being greatly divided along ethnocentric lines. Those administrations that saw no evil in his constitution, perpetuated the abuse of human dignity and worth, and suppressed opportunities to the majority of Liberians.

We could therefore see that the nature of the Greenleaf Constitution and the failure of subsequent administrations to remedy and correct the defects contributed immensely to the crisis that later befell Liberia. The process of elite recruitment which was skewed in favour of the Americo-Liberians led to the marginalization of the indigenous folks. For instance during the Tubman and Tolbert administrations the Liberian elite came from the top 300 or so Americo-Liberian families, or less than 2 per cent of the total population of

1.8 million in 1980. This group formed the core of the country's national bourgeoisie. They dominated all top government and cabinet posts, occupied most of the strategic positions in commerce, industry, the church, fraternities (especially the Masonic temple), and provided most if not all the officer corps in the armed forces of Liberia before the coup in 1980 (Sesay, 1992: 30 - 31).

The government under Tubman did not help matters as the government was run like a family business. As under the Tolbert administration, the Minister of Finance in the early years of his administration, until his death in 1975 was the President's own younger brother, Steve Tolbert, while the President of Senate and Senator for Montserrado County, Frank Tolbert, was the President's Senior brother; and the President's two daughters were both made Deputy Ministers in the Ministry of Education, one in charge of instruction while the other was responsible for supervision, among others. Under Tubman, government was personalized to the extent that cheques worth \$25 and above had to be personally signed by him. More so, he used all the available state apparatuses to muzzle out every opposition out of existence and the country became a virtual police state. In fact, the relative peace enjoyed by Tubman was due to the fact that the majority of the citizens were grateful to the President for ameliorating some of the worst excesses of previous administrations. They were therefore prepared to tolerate some infringements on their rights and freedoms. Besides, the level of the people's political consciousness was also relatively low compared to what it was during the Tolbert years.

There are also other dimensions to the origin of the Liberian crisis as follows:

- The constitution of Liberia makes provision for citizens numbering 300 and above to form and establish a political party and compete for political power. But this was never to be in practice as the ruling True Whig Party (TWP) never conceded this right, until the advent of the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), led by Baccus Matthews in 1975. The party was therefore, able to remain in power for over a century, 1878 to 1980, thereby making the country the oldest de facto one party state in Africa. The party could not introduce reforms to accommodate the yearnings and aspirations of the indigenous Liberians. This is why Sesay (1992: 37) observes that, "The reluctance of the TWP to reform and accommodate "non-conformists" into its fold was to become much more glaring under the Tolbert administration and was to contribute in no small measure to the collapse of the First Republic in April, 1980".
- The inability and intransigence of the powers that be to ameliorate the glaring socio-economic inequalities in the country also contributed. Liberia is endowed with many valuable minerals including very rich iron ore deposits – the biggest in Africa and the third largest in the world (World Development Report: 1979: 126). The country is also endowed with diamonds, rich forest reserves and rubber, plus a very fertile soil for agriculture. During Tubman's regime, a lot of investments were attracted into the country especially in the iron ore, timber, and rubber plantations. It is on record that a year after his death (1972), private American investments totaled more than \$500m, easily the largest in Black Africa, then. This acted as a boost to the country's budget which rose progressively to reach \$71m at the time of Tubman's death in 1971. The country's GDP rose to an all

time high of \$420 and Liberia was listed as a middle-income country by the World Bank. There was however no even distribution of these gains. Rather 2 per cent of the Americo-Liberians controlled about 60 per cent of the nations wealth and consequently grew richer leaving the majority impoverished. This is why Clower et al (1966) and Sesay (1983:48-71), aptly capture the situation as "Growth without development". During his state visit to Liberia in 1976, the then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described Liberia as a "depressing, appalling slum".

- The operations of the Multi-National Corporations, MNCs did not help matters. They were given free hand to operate and they could not make any meaningful contribution to the economy of Liberia. For instance, Firestone which started operation in Liberia in 1925, and was an enclave within the national economy, contributed very little to the growth of infrastructure and industrialization, as it refused to process the rubber in the country or set up a factory for manufacturing tyres, but had only a tyre rethreading outlet in Monrovia (Sesay; 1992:38). The economy later nose-dived, and this affected the activities of the MNCs. Especially, the oil crisis affected the major MNCs in the country engaged in the extractive industry which accounted for 90 per cent of all the oil consumed in the country. At this time the consumption of oil was on the increase from 3.3m barrels in 1972 to 4.2m in 1973. Aid to Liberia dropped from \$80m in 1975 to \$44m in 1976. This was the situation where the average wage packet was only \$70 a month. Against this weak and precarious economic circumstances, Tolbert, ill-advisedly hosted the 16 annual summit of the Organization of African Unity



(OAU) in 1979, at a cost of over \$100m. This was financed mainly through loans, and this had an immediate and devastating impact on the economy.

One of the major and immediate factors that led to the Liberian crisis was the 'Rice Riots' of April 1979, and this marked a significant turning point in the history of Liberia. This is traceable to government proposal in late 1978 to increase the price of rice from \$22 to \$30 a bag. This would probably not have caused any problem if it was not discovered that the President of Liberia and one of his brothers were connected with the production, importation and sale of rice. This enraged the Liberian public. The advice given by Baccus Mathews and his party, Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) was not taken. They suggested that instead of passing the increase to the consumer, the price of rice could be hiked by \$3 through subsidies to be paid to farmers in the country. When this is calculated it would mean an additional profit of \$19,500 for Liberian farmers. The implication is that if this noble idea is carried forward, PAL would have subsidized the farmers, get the credit and still make the staple commodity available to the man in the street at the same old price. The pressure on Mathews to stop proposed mass demonstration did not work. At the last minute of the day of the planned action the leadership of PAL was about to defuse the tension, disperse the crowd that gathered at its headquarters and call-off the demonstration, the Government Security Forces acting on the orders of the President stormed the venue destroying lives and properties. About 200 people were feared dead. The Government rounded up all the key officials of PAL and Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), and any person suspected of having sympathy support for the two associations. They were later charged for "unlawfully, wickedly, maliciously and traitorously conspire, contrive and combine with divers other evilly

disposed persons to seize power and control by force and overthrow the legally constituted government of the Republic of Liberia" (New African: 1978:24).

Surprisingly, however, Tolbert ordered their release on the eve of the 16 OAU Summit in Monrovia in July 1979, and PAL was allowed to register as a political party, thereby breaking the one party jinx in December 1979. On March 7, 1980 Baccus Mathews called a failed general strike to force Tolbert out of office. This was to give Tolbert the needed ammunition to deal with Mathews and his new Peoples Progress Party (PPP). On March 8, 1980, the "Government (again) rounded-up the leadership and members as well as alleged members and sympathizers of the Progressive Peoples Party" (Saigbe Boley: 117). Within 48 hours, the president informed Liberians that there had been an attempt to overthrow the "Legally constituted government of the Republic of Liberia" by force by the PPP of Baccus Mathews, and those involved were described by the President "as this group of lawless and criminal minded citizens, joined by hooligans". For challenging the supremacy of the TWP and destabilizing the Republic at 'all cost', the time was therefore ripe for "extreme rigidity and in the extreme interest of the people no act of clemency will be exercised (West Africa, March 17, 1980). A huge reward was also placed on the heads of all those who had escaped arrest and were at large. Because of the fear that the government wanted to hastily try and execute the detained PPP leaders, which also filtered to the rank and file in the army, some of whom had been in contact with the detained men prior to the 'coup attempt', and in what seemed a well timed rescue operation, 17 non-commissioned and hardly literate officers in the Liberian army seized power on April 12, 1980, two days before the anniversary of the rice riots when, it was believed, Mathews and some of his senior officials would have been executed. In

the course of the coup, Tolbert was killed. Soon after, 13 very senior officers in his government and the True Whip Party, all Americo-Liberians were hastily and publicly executed in Monrovia (Sesay, 1992: 43).

This coup brought to an abrupt end 133 years of Americo-Liberian domination of the politics of the country and the majority indigenous people. Twenty-eight years Master Sergeant Samuel Knyon Doe, barely literate, became the first indigenous son of Liberia, to be the Head of State, since 1847. A litany of grievances which the majority of the Liberian people hold against the deposed late Tolbert and his Americo-Liberian Oligarchy were read out thus:

There had been an incomparable corruption in the form of conflict of interests, the selling of influence, the use of official positions for private gain, and other forms of corruption... there were illegal seizures and even convictions without trial ... the unemployment situation was so bad that there were more people looking for work than employed ... the cost of food is high and most of the people cannot afford \$40 to buy a bag of rice... the health situation is terrible that nearly one out of every five newly born babies dies before reaching the age of one (The Master Sergeant of the Revolution, 1989, and West Africa, April 21, 1980:68.

The crucial role played by the leaders of the PPP and MOJA in the political education of the coup makers and other events leading to the coup was rewarded as reflected in their appointment into critical positions in the first cabinet announced by Doe; Dr. Togba-Na Tipoteh – Minister for Economic Planning and Development, Baccus Mathews – Foreign Minister; H. Boima Fahnbulleh – Minister of Education; Amos Sawyer, - Special Adviser; George E. Bolay – Presidential Affairs Minister; and Charles Taylor (a close

friend of the Army Chief, Thomas Quinwonkpa), Director of the powerful General Services Agency (GSA) Sesay, (1992: 44).

With the appointments, many believed that the Americo-Liberian oligarchy and dictatorship had finally ended. But this marriage between Doe's People's Redemption Council (PRC) and the radical political groups was short lived. It came to an abrupt end, a year after the coup, when Doe's second in command, Thomas Weh-Syn was executed in 1981 after being charged with trying to topple the PRC government. This incidentally led to the gradual withdrawal of the radicals who provided the intellectual basis and support for the Doe regime. As Amadu Sesay observes (1992: 44),

The withdrawals of the core of the opposition movement from the PRC government provided the opportunity for Doe to consolidate his grip on the country. This was achieved in part through the appointment of men and women from his ethnic group, the Khrans, into very sensitive positions especially in government and in the army. Thus, with time, the regime assumed an embarrassing ethnic colour to the dislike of the other ethnic groups who formed the majority. This was followed by massive and blatant violations of human rights as Doe began to "see" many imaginary as well as "real" enemies in almost every nook and corner in the country".

In no distant future, the economy ran into serious problems. There was 20 per cent drop in economic activity from 1985 to 1989. The Liberian official currency the US dollar was devalued locally with the circulation of millions of what came to be known as 'Doe Dollars' which was non-convertible outside the country unlike the American counterpart. Doe received \$500 million from the US in aid which was higher than all regimes before him, but the gains filtered minimally to the rest of the economy and society due to

rampant corruption. Doe could not take the necessary policy measures because he lacked the intellectual depth, experience as well as the political discipline required. The 17-man appointed in 1987 by the American government to rescue the economy returned home in 1989 out of frustration. "Ironically, the 'corrective' regime itself became neck-deep in the same sins that it has accused its predecessor of committing against indigenous Liberians. It was therefore accused of:

The misuse of state resources...alongside an arrogant contempt for minimal standards of human rights, state terror, arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, torture, secret and public executions and the willful destruction of private property, wrongful dismissals, wanton raiding and raping, systematically organized to thoroughly intimidate the populace (West Africa, 9-15 July 1990)

These became a serious problem for Doe. Added to this was the fact that by 1983, he (Doe) had in one way or the other got rid of all the 16 other non-commissioned officers who formed the "gang of 17 that overthrew the government of Tolbert in 1980; and this led to increasing opposition to his corrupt, autocratic and ethnic centered regime. Among other things, on 20<sup>th</sup> August, President Doe ordered the arrest and detention of Dr. Amos Sawyer, for "masterminding a communist plot to install a socialist government in Liberia. After spontaneous protests from the students of the University of Liberia (which was violently suppressed by soldiers on the orders of Doe) Sawyer was released in October 1984. In 1985, two months to the Presidential elections, Sawyer's Liberian Peoples' Party (LPP) was banned under Decree 75, "which gave he authorities ample scope for banning people with un-Liberian political beliefs from forming political parties (West Africa, April 16 - 22, 1990:612). For what was described as his advocacy of ideologies

foreign to Liberia". Later, with all the attendant intimidation and harassment of opposition leaders and general electoral malpractice, Doe "won" the elections which he ran under his party – the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), and thereby became a 'Civilian' President with a 6 year 'mandate'. This 'victory' dashed the hopes of all those who had expected an end to the corrupt and tribally centred government of the former Master Sergeant turned Head of State.

Following from this, Thomas Quinwonkpa, one of the group of 17 that overthrew Tolbert who latter went into exile to escape the inevitable long knives of Doe, made a dramatic bid for power in Monrovia in the morning of November 12, 1985. For 8 hours he held on to the national radio station and made several broadcasts announcing the fall of Doe's government. Events later turned against him and his men. He got captured and butchered on the orders of Doe and his badly mutilated body was displayed for all those who cared to see. This also led to the mass killings of the Gios and the Manos, all from Nimba County which was believed to have been the base of Quiwonkpa. About 3,000 people, including women and children, were killed in reprisal raids carried out by the security forces of Doe (West Africa, April 22, 1990).

Charles who is a close associate of Quiwonkpa fled to the US, due to the failure of the coup. Doe sought for his extradition on charges of corruption and after much pressure from Monrovia, Taylor was arrested and put in prison pending his trial. Taylor escaped from detention after 3 months, first to Ghana; then to Sierra Leone and finally Cote D'Ivoire, one of Liberia's contiguous neighbours.

While in exile, he recruited young Liberians mainly from Nimba County who would be happy to see the downfall of Doe. This was not without the support of the then Ivorian President, late Houphouët-Boigny (though he denied it). He had strong reasons also for wanting to see the fall of Doe. Being a family friend of the Tolberts, he (Houphouët-Boigny) gave his daughter in marriage to the eldest son of the Liberian President, A.B. Tolbert. Late A.B. Tolbert was among those arrested by Doe and his men in the wake of the April 1980 coup. He was later confirmed dead by Doe although his body was never found.

On December 24, 1989, Taylor slipped across the Ivorian-Liberian border with a handful of his men and launched an attack against security posts in Nimba County close to the Ivorian border. Thereafter, events moved rather quickly as Doe's army, ill-equipped, ill-motivated and lacking in discipline, was thrown into complete disarray and in retreat. Within six months of the first attack, Taylor was in control of about 75 per cent of the country including the strategic port of Buchanan and the town of Gbarnga which later became the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) leader's headquarters. With the heavy defeat suffered by his troops and the US reluctant to come to his aid, Doe was compelled to retreat to the Executive Mansion, his official residence, where he was holed in with heavy fortifications, for several months until his unexpected capture and death in the hands of a break away faction of the NPFL, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by Prince Yormi Johnson (Sesay 1992: 47).

Following reports of genocide and gruesome atrocities (backed by coloured photographs), the US made the first, but half-hearted attempt to settle the conflict, as

Liberia's benefactor, and offered to facilitate Doe's safe conduct to any country that was prepared to grant him political asylum in order to bring the war to a speedy end. But as the saying goes, 'a senile dog's death, begins by making it deaf'. Doe refused to listen to the small still voice, and chose rather to fight the war from the Executive Mansion in Liberia, where he had been confined, and his only stronghold in the country. However, the civil war which ensued attracted the attention of Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) of which Liberia is a member. During the 13<sup>th</sup> Annual Summit of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, from May 28 – 30, 1990, in Banjul, The Gambia the issue was discussed. At the meeting, the Authority:

1. Expressed concern over the situation in Liberia;
2. Called on parties to agree to an immediate cease-fire, and to stop the unnecessary destruction of life and property, and;
3. Appealed to all parties to accept the holding of elections as a means of returning the country to peace and harmony.

As things stood, the ECOWAS Heads of State had earlier approved a suggestion by the then Nigerian President and OAU Chairman, General Ibrahim Babangida, to set up an ECOWAS Mediating Standing Committee, which held its first meeting in Freetown, Sierra Leone from 5 – 20 July, 1990, to find a peaceful solution to the civil war. Those who attended were representatives from Sierra Leone and Guinea, including the representatives of Doe, Charles Taylor, other political parties in Liberia and the Inter-Faith Committee. Cote D'Ivoire, a key factor in the conflict, did not attend. The



aftermath of this effort, clearly shows that the internationalization of the Liberian conflict was imminent.

#### 4.2 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE LIBERIAN CRISIS

The internationalization of the Liberian crisis could be traced to that point when Charles Taylor the rebel leader sought external support for his plans to overthrow President Doe's government. For instance, it was in Cote D'Ivoire that he initially started his campaign, and built his strong army mainly recruited from the Gio and Mano groups. Again, Libya trained some of the NPFL officers and men which has been stated as one of the reasons why he (Taylor) did not enjoy US support in the crisis. Libya being a traditional foe of the US (since Ghaddaffi) was seen as a major source of funds for the NPFL and its insurgency operations (*The Guardian*, August 5, 1990). Other countries like Burkina Faso initially gave Charles Taylor moral, material and financial support and was also a strategic training ground for NPFL men. It provided guards for Taylor's protection and his major source of arms supply. Before Compaore agreed to stop supplying arms to Taylor, the war was almost ended (*The Guardian*, February 7, 1991). It is on record that both Benin Republic and Togo, to some extent also gave support to the NPFL. Samuel Doe accused the Ivorian government of wanting him overthrown because it was against Monrovia's multi-party democracy while Ghaddaffi gave all the support to Taylor because it wants Taylor to kill the 5,000 or so Americans in Liberia (*Newswatch*, May 14, 1990).

Again, when the rebel forces split, and Prince Yormie Johnson formed his Independent National Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Liberia (INPFL), he also sought and got external support from the USA. Though this was denied by the USA, it was reported in the *Guardian Newspapers* (August 5, 1990: A3) by Taylor that, "Washington had backed the dissident rebel Prince Johnson against his own movement perhaps even to the extent of airlifting Prince Johnson's men into Monrovia to fight".

President Doe also sought external support, and visited some nations in the sub-region for support. Again, it was alleged that he got weapons from Taiwan and South Korea, and some support from Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Taylor alleged that, his troops began kidnapping and killing Nigerians because they saw Nigeria weapons in the hands of Doe's troops.

Another major factor that contributed to the internationalization of the crisis was the breakdown of discipline among the Armed Forces of Liberia and rebel troops which led to the combined effort of kidnapping, holding hostage, and killing of foreign nationals. These include 2 American Missionaries killed by rebel forces, and 2 Italians working for a logging firm in Nimba county. Also reported was those of 2 Nigerian journalists, Kris Imodibe of the *Guardian Newspapers* and Tayo Awotosin of the *Daily Champion Newspapers* who disappeared, with the rebel sources saying that they had been killed as spies. These killings increased at an alarming rate, especially involving foreign citizens from ECOWAS member states, with the sending of ECOMOG to Liberia in August, 1990. Within this period over, 3,000 foreign citizens most of who were Nigerians were held by the NPFL. As reported by the (*Daily Champion* August 30, 1990:1), "Resentful

of the mediatory role of ECOMOG forces in war torn Liberia, a desperate Mr. Charles Taylor yesterday held hostage citizens of the five ECOWAS nations which contributed men and equipment to ECOMOG".

Again, the movement of refugees from Liberia to the neighbouring countries contributed to the internationalization of the crisis. This movement was necessitated by attendant difficulties; breakdown of law and order, the total collapse of discipline among the soldiers, social and economic hardship, escalating insecurity of life and property, etc. It was that: "Each day, close to 1,000 Liberians now flee into neighbouring Sierra Leone as the war between government troops and rebels of National Patriotic Front of Liberia rages on....Nigeria hosted over 141,000 out of the over 600,000 Liberian refugees. (And official report from the United Nation High Commission for refugees (UNHCR), has it that) ... about 300,000 Liberian refugees were in Guinea; 120,000 in Cote D'Ivoire, and 80,000 in Sierra Leone causing the UNHCR to start planning relief measures for the refugees" (*Newswatch*, October 1, 1990)

Aside from these facts, there are other serious issues that called for external intervention. There were over 1,000,000 displaced persons scattered in different locations within Liberia. Again, in August 1990, Doe's forces murdered about 600 refugees in the St. Peter's Lutheran Church in Monrovia at night. Men, pregnant women, nursing mothers, and children were killed in cold blood. On August 12, 1990 government troops gunned down 21 civilian refugees in Congo Town, and most of these refugees were mainly from Gio and Mano ethnic groups who Doe saw as supporters of Taylor. *Newswatch* however, reported that the killing of patients and other victims dragged out of hospitals, homes and

refugee camps, prompted the Italian Ambassador to call for United States intervention in August 1990, while five other European Ambassadors issued a statement to the effect that Liberia was sliding into "anarchy and national suicide" (*Newswatch*, August 13, 1990). Again, because the people faced socio-economic hardships, especially hunger and starvation in Monrovia, and the prevention by rebel forces of members of the International Red Cross from offering assistance in Liberia, some Liberians also called for international assistance. Even Senator David Toweh from the Nimba County whose sons were killed by government forces, spoke on the floor of Senate on May 30, 1990 and suggested that the only way out of the crisis was mediation by International Organizations like the Organization of African Unity (OAU), UNO and ECOWAS, and incidentally called on the international community to help Liberia (*The Nigerian Economist*, July 9, 1990: 18).

Furthermore, there was an attack on the United Nations Mission in Monrovia directed by the government forces against hundreds of Gio and Mano ethnic groups who ran into the United Nations Mission for protection in June 1990. The world was shocked at this dastardly and brazen act as there was no respect for the immunity of the United Nations, and this led the UN representative in Liberia Michael Heyn to describe the attack as "incredible and a violation of International Law". The UN Secretary-General dispatched a protest to Doe's government and ordered the immediate evacuation of UN workers from the country (*Newswatch*, June 11, 1990).

There were also attacks on foreign Embassies in Monrovia by the belligerents which violated the diplomatic immunity of Embassy buildings in International law, and which many saw as a phenomenon that would touch on many nations. Note also that, Nigerian Embassy was invaded twice, the first on July 12, 1990. The reason given by the rebel forces was mainly the perceived friendly relations between the Doe government and the Nigerian authorities (*African Concord*, July 30, 1990: 20 - 21). Again, Togolese Embassy was attacked by Taylor's forces. These attacks on embassies were seen by many as a threat to international peace and security. This led various countries to evacuate their citizens, which is part of the internationalization process. By May 1990, Japan, Italy, Britain among others closed their embassies and asked their citizens to leave Liberia. The US sent in 6 warships in June 1990 to see to the safety of American citizens and installations in Liberia. Ghana evacuated her 70,000 citizens. Nigeria evacuated her embassy officials, and lecturers seconded to the Ibrahim Babangida Post-graduate School. Later, 2 Nigerian war-ships, NNS OFFIOM and NNS AMBE were sent to Liberia in July 1990 to evacuate some 5,000 Nigerians trapped there. Before now, Nigerians in Liberia have cried out for evacuation, following a letter of threat of elimination. These Nigerians included the Nigerian Ambassador and some Nigerian Lecturers in the University of Liberia. The letter read in part, "We congratulate your (Ambassador's) efforts and the efforts of your government in helping Doe to eliminate Gio and Mano people. But don't forget, Doe will not and never will be there forever. We will be liberated one day and on that day, we shall identify our foes.... And all of you would suffer, just the same way we have suffered under Doe with your kind

assistance.”(cited in *Newswatch*, July 30, 1990). The letter was dispatched from NPFL. All these departures of foreigners were seen as the failure of Doe to contain the crisis.

It could be correctly asserted that the internationalization of the Liberian crisis reached its peak with the landing of ECOMOG. However, the ECOMOG forces were asked to open up routes to enable the much needed food, drugs, clothing and other needs to be transported into Liberia to help the starving and sick people. Again, there has to be organized a national conference involving all political parties and interest groups in Liberia with the aim of establishing a broad-based interim government in which President Doe, Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor will not participate, etc. Also, Dr. Moniba claimed to have copies of correspondences about ECOMOG intervention, to the effect that the coming of ECOMOG “... was due to a letter written by the Doe administration to the Chairman of ECOWAS, asking them to send a peace keeping force.”(*West Africa*, 24 February – March 1992: 316 –7). The ECOMOG forces left Freetown, where they first grouped and landed in Monrovia the following day, and were welcomed by Doe and Johnson’s factions, while Taylor’s NPFL declared war on ECOMOG. As Nwolise (1992: 64) describes it, “The NPFL saw ECOMOG as an intruding aggressor-force which had been assembled to deny him (Taylor) fulfillment of his presidential ambition. Thus, NPFL never allowed any form of co-operation with the ECOMOG, and blocked all avenues to peace.” Finally, with the death of Doe on September 9, 1990, in the hands of Prince Johnson’s men, an interim government was formed in exile and later installed in Monrovia on November 22, 1990.

### 4.3 ECOMOG OPERATIONS IN LIBERIA

ECOMOG operations in Liberia started with a simple command structure. The highest ranking officer is the Force Commander, and below him are Deputy Force Commanders who are also the contingent commanders of their countries troops. The Force Commander operates a small planning staff headed by a chief of staff. The chief of staff deals and co-ordinates the activities of the various contingents in close co-operation with his deputies, and also takes care of common problems. Also under the directive of the Force Commander is the Central Planning staff, who are responsible for designating the various sectors of the mission area to the respective contingent commanders. In doing this, due consideration is taken with regard to their strength, instructions from their home governments, their affinity to the host country and the level of their equipment, arms and ammunition.

ECOMOG does not operate a centralized logistic administration system. This is because each country provides its own contingent with arms, ammunition, food, transport and communication equipment. However, Nigeria provided the entire force with petrol, oil and lubricants, while the U.S. through a private company called Pacific Architect Engineers (PAE) also assisted ECOMOG operations with transport helicopter services, communication facilities, vehicles and general repairs and maintenance, and these services are utilized by all the contingents. Under the prevailing circumstances, Khobe (2000: 5) observes,

In operations, the Force Commander's mission is given to the contingent commanders, who then task the various units of their contingents. Because of the high level of control by home governments, the contingent commanders enjoy considerable autonomy from the control of the force commander. There have been instances where contingent units were pulled out of their areas of deployment without approval or even the knowledge of the force commander, thus endangering the deployment of flanking contingents. Some contingents have also at times refused to come to the aid of other contingents without clearance from their home governments.

It is under this command structure that ECOMOG started operations in Liberia. But the title of force commander became moribund when General Quainoo of Ghana was changed following his dismal performance and ECOMOG complicity under his leadership, in the INPFL capture and murder of President Doe, at the ECOMOG headquarters. And as Adebajo (2002: 79) notes,

General Quainoo's title of force commander was changed to field commander for General Dogonyaro. It was thought at first that the Ghanaian would continue in Freetown as force commander in over all charge of coordinating the political side of the mission with ECOWAS's leaders while leaving the field commander in charge of the military operations on the ground. But Dogonyaro refused to accept anything less than total command of ECOMOG, and the position of force commander became moribund.

It was therefore under this initial command structure under General Quainoo that ECOMOG landed and started its operations in Liberia. As already pointed out, NPFL did not welcome ECOMOG, because Charles Taylor and the leaders always felt that ECOMOG with Nigeria's overwhelming presence and Babangida's closeness to Doe-has come to stop him from his ambition of shooting his way to power, especially as he was



already in control of over 70 per cent of the Liberian territory. But the break-away faction of NPFL, the INPFL welcomed ECOMOG with open arms, with AFL, who had their various reasons for doing so. According to Howe (1996-1997: 154),

The INPFL and the AFL cooperated with ECOMOG for two self-serving reasons: each was too weak to challenge ECOMOG, directly, but each could benefit from ECOMOG's protection and from any destruction ECOMOG inflicted upon Taylor. The INPFL'S initial aid to ECOMOG gave it special privileges, which included unhindered armed access to ECOMOG headquarters.

This view is equally corroborated by Khobe (2000: 3) when he asserts that,

...Perhaps the political atmosphere under which ECOMOG entered Liberia and began its march to history is best illustrated by the nature of the factions which supported its arrival. Prince Yormie Johnson and President Doe were sworn enemies of both Charles Taylor and each other. Each welcomed ECOMOG with a view to use it to advance his own political objectives. Doe wanted the force to restore his political authority, which would involve military action against Charles Taylor and Prince Yormie Johnson. Prince Yomie Johnson, on his part, wanted the force to relieve the military pressure on him from Taylor's forces, giving him the opportunity to reorganize and consolidate while waiting for an opportune moment to eliminate both President Doe and Charles Taylor.

In as much as these divisions exist, General Quainoo and ECOMOG forces were welcomed by thousands of the Liberian people who went to the free port full of joy, and singing "Thank God for ECOMOG", for coming to save our lives. The operation started on August 24, 1990. Part of the initial mandate was to "seal off the exploding military situation until the bases of a more durable settlement could be established" (cited in

Bassey, 1993: 161). They were therefore to secure ceasefire and set up an interim government, rehabilitate destroyed essential services such as hospitals, electricity, water and food supplies. Unfortunately, when ECOMOG landed with 3,500 strong troops, mainly from Nigeria, it soon discovered that there was no peace to keep.

Taylor and his NPFL were suspicious of the ulterior motive of the member states of the ECOWAS Mediation Committee. They therefore gave a five-point precondition for ceasefire, "under which ECOMOG can gain the support of the Liberian people" (Bassey, 1993: 163). These preconditions include:

- i. the immediate exit of Doe from Liberia;
- ii. inclusion of Taylor in "any interim government since the NPFL has effective control of virtually all of the country,
- iii. broadening the membership of the mediating committee of ECOWAS; and
- iv. the effective participation of the Organization of African Unity, OAU (now African Union, A.U) (Bassey, 1993: 163)

This was not to be, and meanwhile there were increasing casualties and human catastrophes. As Adisa (1993: 141) has observed:

...the stalemate in the persisting confrontation within Monrovia exacted a high toll of casualties and devastation and offended international sensibilities while providing excuse for external intervention on the basis of military humanitarianism...

While this condition persisted and in the process of trying to find solution to the logjam, Doe was captured at the ECOMOG headquarters and subsequently murdered by Yormie Johnson and the INPFL. This action drew a lot of criticisms and questioned the neutrality of ECOMOG in the whole Liberian affair. ECOMOG was also accused of complicity in the capture and subsequent killing of Doe. This development led to the removal of Quainoo as the ECOMOG force commander. He was replaced with General Dogonyaro, and the ECOMOG mandate was changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The peacekeepers were also ordered to establish a buffer zone in Monrovia against NPFL attacks. These objectives were met as Dogonyaro's approach yielded the following results;

- ❖ The NPFL was repelled from central Monrovia;
- ❖ A buffer zone was secured;
- ❖ Sprigs Payne Airport was captured from the NPFL to stem the flow of its arms imports; and
- ❖ The port of Buchanan was blockaded.

Subsequently Taylor accepted a cease-fire in November 1990, and ECOMOG established a secure headquarters, electricity and water were restored to the capital city and humanitarian assistance was resumed. General Dogonyaro was later replaced by General Kupolati.

The ceasefire by Taylor and the NPFL was only temporary. Meanwhile other splinter groups joined the struggle, including ULIMO (later to break up into ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K). Taylor's intransigence and delay tactics led to series of unfulfilled dialogues, conferences and agreements. There was also the Yamoussoukro I-IV, agreements. The major highlights of the Yamoussaukro agreement are:

the deployment of ECOMOG to all parts of Liberia; the encampment and disarming of factions under ECOMOG's supervision, with members of former U.S. President, Jimmy Carter's International Negotiations Network visiting the camps; the creation of a buffer zone, on the Liberia/Sierra Leone border; monitoring of all Liberian air and seaports by ECOMOG; an expansion of ECOMOG, with the addition of 1,500 Senegalese troops; resettlement of refugees; and the creation of an interim government, elections commission, and ad hoc supreme court to organize elections in six months. Disarmament was to occur between 15 November 1991 and 14 January 1992 (Adebajo, 2002: 89)

Taylor was allowed to continue administering areas under his control during the transition. Adebajo (p.89) also flaws the Yamoussoukro agreement on the grounds that, "...it was ambiguous in talking of "encapment" of the NPFL rather than full demobilization and in granting ECOMOG only a "supervisory" rather than monitoring role in disarmament, allowing Taylor to claim that the NPFL and not ECOMOG, would disarm his fighters. In addition, timetables were too short...; details on demobilization, reintegration of fighters into civilian life, and equipment sites were vague; there was not enough emphasis on full disarmament before elections, allowing Taylor to hold the "Savimbi card" in reserve; and ULIMO was not brought into the process, even though it controlled territory seized from the NPFL.

#### 4.4 PEACE ACCORDS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN LIBERIA

The Liberian Peace process went through an excruciating winding path. It would not therefore adequately serve our purpose to analyze the peace accord in details. What we have to do is to state the essential features of the accords and then try to analyze the final accord that subsists the fragile peace in Liberia today. This is also because several scholars Aboagye (1999), Adebajo (2002), Omagu (2001), Oni (2002) among several others have done serious works in this area. It would therefore be ineffectual to repeat or go all over it again. It would be seen from our analysis on the Liberian crisis before now that there were strong evidences to believe that Charles Taylor who is a key figure in the crisis had a mindset, which was to become the Liberian President at all costs. Therefore anything that would constitute a stumbling block must be removed. This contributed in having a tortuous and labyrinthine road to peace in Liberia. There were violations of the various peace accords, and in fact almost all of them were not honoured.

Perhaps, the right point to start to chronicle the Liberian Peace accords could be the Bamako Accord of November 1990, which became possible because of the kind of pressure that was put on the hitherto intransigent NPFL leader, Charles Taylor. This led to the extraordinary summit of the Authority in Bamako, Mali, where for the first time the ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia by all the warring factions were negotiated on November 28, 1990. The main part of the decisions and agreement include the following:

- An approval of all the Decisions of the Community Standing Mediation Committee during its first session at Banjul from 6-7 August, 1990;
- ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia and the entire West African sub-region was adopted;
- An agreement on the status of ECOMOG between the Community and the Interim Government of Liberia was concluded;
- There was a joint declaration on cessation of hostilities and peaceful settlement of conflict by the AFL, the NPFL and the INPFL;
- It provided for the holding of general and presidential elections within 12 months under ECOWAS and military observation, among others.

The effort that was made to implement and operationalize the Bamako accord in Banjul, The Gambia in December 1990 was scuttled by Charles Taylor as he argued that Banjul was not a Liberian territory, and moreover, the Gambian forces were in ECOMOG against him, among other excuses. This led to another trial, the Lome Accord of February 1991. The accord was sponsored by Nigeria, Senegal and the host country, Togo between 12-15 February 1991 during the 5<sup>th</sup> session of the SMC, in Lome, Togo. The Accord was signed again by all the three factions

having deliberations together for the first time. The peace plan made the following provisions;

- Disbanding of the factions at a number of assembly and disarmament sites; the AFL at the BTC and camp Schiefflin; INPFL at its traditional base in Caldwell and the NPFL at Firestone, Camp Naama, Salal, Ganta, Gbarnga, Zwedru and Todee-Monsterrado;
- An ECOMOG reception center to be sited at each disarmament site with the responsibility to register troops and surrendered weapons;
- Rehabilitation of disarmed combatants, among others.

The failure of this Accord led to the Yamoussoukro Accords I-IV from June - October 1991. The most prominent which is Yamoussoukro IV Accord was finalized on October 30, 1991, and provided for the following;

- Disarmament and encampment under ECOMOG supervision within a 60-day time frame before repatriation, rehabilitation and nation wide elections
- ECOMOG was to control all air, sea ports and border crossings

- A buffer zone to be established on the border with Sierra Leone.

The agreement was popular for bridging the gap between the Anglophone which endorsed the IGNU and the Francophone that did not approve of it. This was the culminating point to the Geneva Ceasefire Agreement on 7 April 1992 at the request of Cote d'Ivoire. The Geneva meeting reaffirmed faith and commitment to the Yamoussoukro Agreement of 30 October 1991, and to work to strengthen efforts towards the implementation.

The failure of this agreement led to the Cotonou Accord of 25 July, 1993. In essence, both the Cotonou Accord and the Geneva Agreement raised no new issues except the arrangements for a Transitional Government, as well as securing another ceasefire from August 1, 1993, and the arrangements for disarmament, demobilization, general elections and general amnesty, among others. Again, the failure of the Cotonou Accord gave way to the Akosombo Accord of September, and the Accra Conference of November 1994.

The Akosombo Accord of 12 September 1994 was signed by the AFL, NPFL and ULIMO-K, and extended the life of the LNTG to October 1995, when elections were expected to be held, among others. Due to frustrations and political wrangling, the Accra Conference was called in November 1994 mainly to resolve the membership of the Council of state. Following some complications caused



mainly by the NPFL regrouping at Ganta, 60 Kilometres to the North-east of Monrovia, a second Accord was signed, and called the Accra Clarifications of 21 December, 1994, by all the warring factions including the NPFL, ULIMO-J, AFL, LPC, LDF and NPFL-CRC, and which scheduled a ceasefire on 28 December 1994. This was to be followed by another conference in January 1995, which did not succeed because of propaganda against the Government of Ghana, to the effect that it was supporting and collaborating with the factions. The Abuja peace process then came as a result of,

The failure of the series of talks in Accra in December 1994 and January and March 1995 (which left the peace plan in limbo owing to NPFL-ULIMO-K attempts to squeeze ULIMO-J out of the equation and by Nigeria which tended to delay the process until the ECOWAS chair rested in Abuja (Aboagye, 1999:123).

As a result, this Accord resolved the following issues:

- A comprehensive ceasefire on 26 August, 1995;
- Installation of the new 6-member council of state under Wilton Sankawulu of 1 September 1995;
- Troop withdrawal by 26 September 1995;
- Full ECOMOG deployment by 16 December 1995;
- Disarmament and demobilization by 30 January 1996;

- Repatriation and Resettlement; and
- Elections on 20 August, 1996.

Under this agreement ECOMOG was to monitor the borders, as well as to man the entry points by land, sea or air in order to ensure that no arms or ammunition flowed in. They were also to assemble and disarm factional combatants, and verify the movement of arms, assist in the return of refugees and IDPs, and to conduct confidence-building patrols for free and fair elections.

Despite all of these, a lot of things happened which prompted ECOWAS to warn at the Accra Conference of 7-8 May, 1996, which was also the 14<sup>th</sup> multinational attempt to resolve the Liberia crisis; it would reconsider ECOWAS involvement in Liberia were the leaders not to consider the implementation demands and arrangements for the removal of weapons and fighters from Monrovia and the return of captured ECOMOG weapons and looted UNOMIL equipment and materials, among other observations. This period also coincided with the arrival of Major Gen. S.V.L Malu (August 1996 – January 1998), fondly referred to as the *No Nonsense* General, who had the honour of bringing the peace process to a glorious end, (Aboagye, 1999).

#### 4.5 THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE LIBERIAN CRISIS

Scholars have a general understanding of what civil society or civic life is, though they sometimes differ with activists on what this actually mean. In simple terms, it would mean the life or lives that we live publicly which is independent of the state. Harbeson, Rothchild and Chazan (eds. 1994; cited in Toure, 2002:6) define civil society as constituting the realm and range of voluntary and autonomous associations which operate in the public domain between the family and the state, and though which in relation to the state, yet is independent of it. In the same light Varshney (2002:4) has this to say about civil society:

By "civil society" or "Civic life", I mean the part of our life that exists between the state on one hand and families on the other, that allows people to come together for a whole variety of public activities, and that is relatively independent of the state. Civil society is not a non-political but a non-state space of collective life. Moreover, in its non-state functions, it can cover both social and political activities.

This is important in the Liberian case because the whole idea of conflict resolution or peace building in Liberia did not start and end with the military campaign by ECOMOG. In fact they played very important and critical role(s) in peace building, reconciliation and democratization, in as much as they also operated under excruciating and repressive environment. As Toure (2002:1) also notes,

During the civil war, civil society groups collaborated on common issues such as disarmament and elections, threatening to withdraw cooperation from and reject any faction that came to power through bullets rather than ballots. Though sometimes marginalized by warlords during the peace process, civil society's ultimate endorsement of the transition from war to peace in Liberia was critical to ending the war in 1997.

These roles also cover not only during the war period, but also during the post civil war period, i.e. after 1997. It has to be noted that the activities of the civil society groups did not start or end with the Liberian civil war. In fact, the antecedents to organized civil society in Liberia is traceable to the lone crusade for Press freedom and other civil liberties by Albert Porte, who was a school teacher, social commentator and pamphleteer, during the long years of his career that spanned over six decades (1920-1986). But modern institutions of civil society in Liberia started in the 1970s during the presidency of William Tolbert. This was when organizations like Movement for Justice in Africa, (MOJA), Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) among others emerged.

For our purpose however, the pioneer effort to end the Liberian civil war could be found in the efforts and activities of the Inter-faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) which was an amalgamation of the Liberian Council of Churches (LCC), and the National Muslim Council of Liberia (NMCL). The first consultations between the disputing parties to the conflict were held in 1990, of which its proposals were adopted and articulated as ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia. Again, the IFMC

played a noticeable leading role in the peace processes. It was a leading critic of the flaws in the numerous peace accords. However, it made two landmark efforts in the following areas:

- i. The stay-home actions organized in March 1995, and February 1996 to protest against the Peace agreements that rewarded the warring factions with positions in government, and
- ii. The campaign it launched to encourage disarmament among Liberia's estimated 33,000 fighters, through the campaign for Disarmament Committee, which was a consortium of civil society groups.

Other civil society groups that later joined in the struggle for peace in Liberia include human rights organizations and women groups prominent among which are Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (JPC), Centre for Law and Human Rights Education (CLHRE) and the Liberian Women Initiative. It is noted that it was the JPC and CLHRE that documented and exposed the wide ranging human rights abuses and widespread atrocities committed by all the warring factions during the civil war. Their activities slowed down following the installation of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) under the protection of ECOMOG. Even so, they expanded their activities to include human rights education and the provision of legal services to those who suffered human rights abuses. These

activities also opened the window for the women's group to place women and children's issues on the front burner in the debate for peace and reconciliation in

✦ Liberia.

Other groups that played notable roles include the SUSUKUU, an offshoot of MOJA, and the Special Emergency Life Food Program (SELF) which provided humanitarian relief and gave assistance to the war-affected populations. SELF, for instance organized the affected communities into blocs for the purpose of distributing food and other relief items. (Toure, 2002).

The media also played a vibrant role as could be seen in the activities of newspapers like the Plain Talk, the Liberian Age, the Inquirer and the Foto Vision, who articulated concerns about the unfolding peace process and other scenarios like the anti-warring faction sentiments. Charles Taylor's private media network for the Greater Liberia known as the Liberia Communication Network also acted as the propaganda arm and mouth piece of the NPFL.

There is also the historic role played by the active students unionism who were front-liners advocating for democratic transformation in Liberia. They also demonstrated against autocratic rule and were consequently tortured and brutalized by the security forces for their efforts. As Toure (2002:2) observes, "The student community, largely represented by the University of Liberia has

spoken out on almost every issue of national concern-ranging from the ongoing war in Lofa County (condemned), to the international sanctions imposed on Liberia (supported)".

The efforts of the civil society in Liberia especially during these trying times were however limited. This is mainly because they were dependent on foreign aid, largely from the US and the Netherlands, which adversely threatened its existence and survival.

## REFERENCES

- Aboagye, F.B. (1999) *ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia*. Accra: Sedco Publishing Ltd.
- Adebajo, A. (2002) *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa*, Boulder, London: Lynne Rinner Publishers.
- Adisa, J. (1993), "Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Undercurrents and the Burden of Community Spirit", in Owwoye, J. (ed.) (1993) *Nigeria in International Institutions*, Ibadan: College Press Ltd.
- Akpan, M.B. (1973) "Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule Over the African Peoples of Liberia", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol.7, No.2.
- Bassey, C. (1993) "Nigeria in ECOMOG: Dilemma of Preventive Diplomacy?" in *International Institutions*, Ibadan: College Press Ltd.
- Clower, R.W. et al (1966) *Growth Without Development*, Evanston: North-Western University Press.
- Daily Champion, August 30, 1990
- Howe, H. "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping". *International Security*, Vol. 21, No.3 (Winter, 1996-1997).
- Johnson, Yomi (2003) *The Rise and Fall of President Samuel K. Doe: A Time to Heal and Rebuild Liberia*, Lagos: SOMA Associates.



Khobe M.M., "The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa", Monograph No.44 Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000, also available at

<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monograph/No44/ECOMOG.html>; assessed

July 20, 2006

Newswatch, May 14, 1990; June 11, 1990; July 30, 1990; August 13, 1990.

Nwolise, O.B. "The Internationalization of the Liberian Crisis And its Effects on West Africa", in Vogt, M.A. (ed.,1992) *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace-keeping*. Lagos: Gabumo Pub. Ltd.

Omagu, D.O. (2001) *Regional Peace and Security: A Historical Perspective of the Role of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone*. Calabar: Ushie Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.

Oni, S.K. (2002) *The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations: Liberia and Sierra Leone*. Ibadan: Sam Bookman Pub.

Saigbe Boley, G.E. (1993) *The Rise and Fall of the First Republic*. London: Macmillan

Sesay, Amadu (1980) "Social Inequalities, Ethics, Heterogeneity and Political Instability: The Case of Liberia", *Plural Societies* (The Hague), vol. 11, No.3, Autumn.

Sesay, Amadu (1992) "Historical Background to the Liberian Crisis", in Vogt, M.A.  
(ed.,1992)*The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at  
Regional Peace Keeping*, Lagos: Gabumo Pub. Co. Ltd.

The Guardian, February 7, 1990; August 5, 1990

The Master Sergeant of the Revolution, Monrovia: Ministry of Information and  
Culture, June, 1981

The Nigerian Economist, July 9, 1990

Toure, A. (2002) "The Role of Civil Society in Nation Reconciliation and Peace  
building in Liberia" International Peace Academy, April 2002.

Varshney, A. (2002) *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in  
India*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

West Africa, April 21, 1980; 9-15, July, 1990; 24 February- March, 1992

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.0 ECOWAS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SIERRA LEONE

#### 5.1 Background to the Sierra Leonean Crisis

The Sierra Leonean crisis has both remote and immediate causes. The remote causes could be traced to the nature of the state that the colonial masters bequeathed to the politicians on the eve of their departure at independence, and how they managed it. What is discovered is that the state at independence was structurally skewed in favor of one ethnic group, and when the leaders do not have the political maturity to handle the differences, conflicts erupt and further neglect leads to degeneration into crisis, and perhaps war. The Sierra Leonean experience can be properly captured within this context. The first major impact of these structural deficiencies was when in March 1991, an obscure rebel movement which goes by the name Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by an ex-corporal of the Sierra Leonean Army and an ex-Army photographer, launched series of attacks from the Sierra-Leonean-Liberian border, specifically on the Police Station at Bomaru in Kailahun District. In this attack, the RUF was able to overrun the station and capture the bulk of the weapons there. Their mission was to bring down the government of the All Peoples Congress (APC) headed by Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh, whose administration was accused of being corrupt, inefficient, tribalistic and lacking popular mandate. Unfortunately, the Government did not take this attack seriously. As Alie (2000: 15) notes,

Some APC politicians even argued, if less convincingly, that the skirmish was orchestrated by some unpatriotic opposition elements in the Southern and Eastern regions of Sierra Leone who were bent on derailing the democratic process that was unfolding after a long period of one-party rule. In short, rather than grapple with the issue headlong, the political leadership sought simplistic interpretations and advanced conspiracy theories to address what later turned out to be a very complex and thorny problem.

This attack has been linked to Charles Taylor (then leader of the rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), who had a few months earlier in a programme of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), threatened to punish Sierra Leoneans for allowing ECOMOG to use their territory as a base for peacekeeping operations against his movement. He told the world that, "Sierra Leoneans would taste the bitterness of war", because of their support for ECOMOG, and which was preventing him from shooting his way to power in Liberia. Because of the way and manner this issue was handled by the Government it later degenerated to unmanageable proportions.

Beyond this action, scholars have questioned the cause(s) of the crisis in Sierra Leone. In his narration of what went wrong and why, Alie (2000: 17-35) discussed several factors which have severally and collectively contributed to the debacle in Sierra Leone. These factors include over-centralization of state machinery, rural isolation, factionalism and ethnic politics, the politics of systemic exclusion, chiefdom level politics, wealth, corruption and abuse of power, the neglect and misuse of the youth, and the attendant lapses in state security. It is ironical that Sierra Leone had the pride of place of becoming the first country in post-colonial Africa where an opposition party ousted a ruling incumbent party from power through the ballot box. This feat was achieved during the

general elections of March, 1967, where the APC, defeated the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). The APC later derailed and abandoned its commitment to participatory democracy, prior to 1967. The result of this was the institutionalization of a highly centralized, inefficient, and corrupt bureaucratic system of government, which marginalized the people and deprived them of their rights and freedom. Several things followed from this, including suppression of dissenting voices, concentration of power in a few hands in the capital and lack of access to resources for non- APC members, confining socio-economic development to Freetown and a few other towns, thereby leading to utter isolation of the rural areas.

Other things also followed. It is noted that Sierra Leone has 17 ethnic groups who collectively occupy a geographical area of 27,925 square miles. The Temne who occupy the largest section of the Northern region, and the Mende who occupy and dominate south and eastern parts of the country, together account for 60 per cent of the country (Alie,2000: 21). However, the diversity of ethnicity could not have caused problems if not for the deliberate tactics of divide and rule by the colonialists. As it were,

During the colonial period most of the Government's economic activities had been concentrated in the South and East, where the main cash crops (coffee, cocoa) were grown to satisfy demand in Europe. The South and East also had rich deposits of strategic minerals, including diamonds. The Southerners also appear to have embraced western education much more vigorously than the Northerners, who were pro-Muslim. The early and sustained exposure of the southerners to Western influences gave them an edge over other provincial groups in the post-colonial politics and administration of the country (Alie,2000: 23)

This dichotomy was later to lead to the fissiparous tendencies in the political system. For instance, when the junior officers loyal to the APC government restored constitutional order through a counter-coup in April 1968, and with the return of Siaka Steven from exile in Guinea and his subsequent appointment as the Prime Minister, he (Siaka Steven) quickly replaced the Mende officers in the army with Northerners, among other moves that portrayed ethnic colorations. These developments also led to a situation where loyalty to the APC replaced loyalty to the country, and opposition supporters were denied access to a fair share of the country's resources including job opportunities.

Unfortunately also, with all the endowment of Sierra Leone with natural resources it wallows in abject poverty due to corruption and abuse of power. This is why the one time British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold observed during the Consultative Conference on the Peace Process in Sierra Leone in April 1999, that,

The tragedy of Sierra Leone is that her people are among the poorest in the world, while the country is among the richest. The reasons for this are entirely man-made. The countries in the world are poor because of natural disasters, few resources, unfertile territory, or building populations. Not so in Sierra Leone. God blessed this land with an abundance of resources. Just a relatively few people are responsible for the misery and hardship suffered by many (cited in, Alie, 2000:29)

This situation obtained because of corruption and abuse of power. The leaders did not do anything to stop this. Rather corruption, avarice and other vices were institutionalized and the apparatuses of the state were turned into instruments of corruption. President Siaka Stevens was noted to have supported corruption openly. And he was quoted as

having said that, "A cow grazes where it is tethered". Subsequently, transparency and accountability disappeared from the system. Reno (1995) aptly captures this when he writes about corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone.

Amidst all these problems the government did not have any plans for the development of the Youth. They were rather neglected and misused. Alie (2000:31) captures this graphically when he writes that:

No group suffered more from political and economic exclusion, than the under-twenties. The progressive deterioration of the economy over the years had its most adverse effect on the youth. A hard core of young men and women emerged who were without jobs or a reliable means of income. This marginalized youth felt dejected, cut off from the mainstream of society. Loosing faith in the system, some became radical and rebellious, including school leavers, university graduates, and certain unemployed ghetto dwellers who were in no short supply in Freetown and other urban centres. For these youths life was an uphill task. Youth radicalism and anger against "the system" was particularly marked in the late 1970s and 1980s when there was an urgent desire for change. Youths in Sierra Leone and elsewhere found comfort and inspiration in songs such as "System Dread", "Send another Moses", and other lyrics by singers such as Bob Marley and Peter Tosh.

By this very fact the government was actually sitting on a keg of gun-powder, waiting to explode, especially when the youth was also being acculturated in violence, with Colonel Gaddafi's Green Book – which a former American President described as watermelon – green on the outside, but red inside. It could therefore be seen why the conflagration that engulfed Sierra Leone had an in-built source. The general lapses in the security system also worsened the situation. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons ignited the

fire that burnt the entire system (see more on this on the local and international nexus of conflict in West Africa).

Sadly enough the concomitant effect of this disaster could not easily be mitigated. This is why President Tejan Kabbah notes that,

...to a culture of...non-cooperation with the (political) authorities...the intimidation of the general public by successive dictatorial régimes, the high level of illiteracy...high unemployment, poverty, lack of social programmes for the youth and the failure of the judicial system killed loyalty and any sense of belonging to the state. All these created a deep-seated cynical attitude towards government, politics, politicians and the public administration apparatus (cited in Alie, 2000: 34).

From the foregoing, we can then understand in proper details the circumstances that ignited the Sierra Leonean crisis. The hopelessness in Sierra Leone led to the formation of the RUF by some lecturers and students of Fourah Bay College in 1982. With the outbreak of the civil war in the neighbouring Liberia, the smouldering crisis in Sierra Leone was ignited. At this point, the intellectual founders of the RUF trained with the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). But for some other reasons, the NPFL leadership split the RUF leadership, and assisted Corporal Foday Sankoh to assume the leadership of RUF at the detriment of the intellectual founders of the organization. This very act therefore gave Foday Sankoh the impetus to commence armed rebellion against the constituted authority in Sierra Leone on March 23, 1991, as he vowed to be fighting "people's war" in order to "liberate" the masses from "the corruption and the oppression



of the APC government which indeed had corruptly ruled Sierra Leone for twenty years' (Muana, 1997; Abraham, 1997; cited in CDD, 1999: 15).

It has to be noted that before the RUF mayhem, and despite the introduction and adoption of a new constitution restoring plural system, the APC was eventually ousted from power in a military coup led by Captain Vallentine Strasser and junior army officers. The grievances against the APC government include poor pay and working conditions for the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF). The government of Strasser, known as the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was in power for nearly four years and was unwilling to negotiate with the RUF, and this also led to the intensification of the rebel campaign. In 1994, the government launched a 'total war' on the RUF as the conflict also spread to the Northern part of the country. Before long however, Strasser was overthrown in a palace coup by his colleagues. Meanwhile, civilians had started forming militia groups to provide protection from the fighting and support for the forthcoming democratic government. They organized democratic elections in March 1996, which was won by Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP).

Kabbah won the presidential elections with 59.9 per cent of the votes. As the new government settled down, confrontations between the civil defense groups (Kamajors) and the RUF forces persisted. Eventually, the RUF and the national army, former enemies joined forces and overthrew the fourteen-month-old democratic government. The coup was led by Major Johnny Paul Koromah, an army officer, under the umbrella of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) which is composed of members of RSLMF and a majority portion of the RUF. Things deteriorated from this point until the

eventual restoration of Kabbah to power through ECOMOG intervention, and later the United Nations.

## 5.2 The Internationalization of the Sierra Leonean Crisis

The core of the problem in Sierra Leone is not necessarily ethnic rivalry. The issue is that the power players mobilize ethnic solidarity as a weapon to achieve their selfish motives. Ethnicity is therefore a subterfuge for the main reason of the conflict, crisis or war. The main reason for crisis or the subsequent war is resource control, just like what obtains in most crisis-ridden countries. Sierra Leone is a small country with rich endowment in natural resources. And as we noted early on, Sierra Leone is rich, but poor because of the mismanagement of the resources. This disagreement over resource control took on international character where foreign interests got involved and this assisted in exacerbating the crisis in the country.

In a research; case study of Trade in "Sierra Leone" one of the interviewees formally stated. "The war is not tribal, and it is not religious. It is simply largely a war over control of diamonds. Little pieces of rock that people around the world like to wear on their fingers and hang from their ears. As you can see, because of these rocks I no longer have an ear or five of my fingers" (testimony by Muctar Jalloh before US House of Representatives, available on the internet at; <http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/diamond-sl.htm>; assessed on July 16, 2006).

The importance of this resource in funding the conflict has international dimensions. It has been argued that the changing dynamic among the world's guerilla/revolution

movements shows that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and associated regimes, these groups were stifled of funds since their source of funds supply Soviet Union and Cuba can no longer support communist movements around the globe. Alternative sources of funds have to be sought for. This is why in Colombia, the FARC and ELN, the two major guerilla movements fighting the government of Colombia had to resort to cocaine production. Before now, they could expect significant funding from the Soviet Union depending on their ideological commitment and disposition. Hence there was the escalation of cocaine production to fund their activities. They use money gotten from drug trade to support their war with the Colombian government. In the case of Africa, it is diamonds, which have supported the wars in Angola, Congo and Sierra Leone.

Sierra Leone is known for the production of gem quality diamonds. This is estimated at 300,000 (worth \$100 to \$300 per carat) carats by De Beers in 1998. The government of Sierra Leone through official sources exported an estimated 114,438 carats, while this figure fell to 9,320 carats in 1999. These diamonds come from Kenema, Kono and Bo districts located in the central and eastern parts of the country. It can then be deduced that the fall in production by the government of Sierra Leone is traceable to the RUF control of the diamond producing districts.

There is a long open border between Liberia and Sierra Leone and the diamonds mined by the RUF are exported through Liberia to the international market. Liberia is a poor country and also has a limited diamond production on its own, so many of the diamonds

sold by Liberia must come from outside sources, mainly Sierra Leone. As the case study on trade in Sierra Leone shows:

Charles Taylor, the (then) president of Liberia, helped create and is still believed to covertly support the RUF. Liberia, and Charles Taylor have long been involved with the RUF, and today are involved in facilitating the RUF's efforts to sell diamonds on the black market. Recently the European union cancelled US\$50 million dollars in development aid to Liberia. This was done to punish Liberia for its role in the sale of the RUF's diamonds. Diamonds mined by the RUF make their way from the war torn fields of Sierra Leone into Liberia, and hence onto the international market (available on the internet at; <http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/diamond-sl.htm>; assessed on July 16, 2006).

The main international market for the Sierra Leonean diamond is Antwerp, Belgium, which handles an estimated 80 per cent of the world's trade in rough diamond, through a private organization, Hoge Raad vor Diamant (HRD) or the Diamond High Council, and which represents the diamond dealers. The origin of a diamond is determined not by where it is mined, but by where it is imported from. Hence, 'a diamond mined in Sierra Leone, smuggled into Liberia, and shipped through Switzerland would have its point of origin determined by the Diamond High Council as Switzerland'. This lax control in Antwerp and other centres like Tel Aviv and Bombay have been frowned at by human rights groups for their contribution to the trade in blood diamonds. Again, the lack of interest in the origin of a diamond or information on it is the main contribution to the sell of diamonds in the international market by the RUF.

The diamond trade involves huge revenues, an estimated \$6.7 billion in rough diamonds in 1998; nobody wishes to

drive away this lucrative trade. All this benefits the RUF, allowing the group to buy the equipment and help it (sic) needs to continue its campaigns. US estimates of \$30 - \$50 million a year in diamond sales by the RUF, directly contributes to the chaos besetting Sierra Leone (available on the internet at; <http://www.american.edu/TED/ice/diamond-sl.htm>; assessed on July 16, 2006)

This source of conflict, crisis and war in Sierra Leone attracted other international actors, including Nigeria, Liberia, National Patriotic Front of Liberia, (NPFL), ECOMOG, Guinea, the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the United Kingdom, and the US. Following the overthrow of the Kabbah administration, members of the international community condemned this act by the AFRC. The members of the international community that condemned the act include, the UN, OAU (now AU, African Union), European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK), and ECOWAS. They subsequently severed diplomatic ties with Sierra Leone.

Nigeria became a major actor in the crisis following the overthrow of the Kabbah government, which was democratically elected, forcing him to flee to Guinea. Before fleeing, Kabbah officially requested that Nigeria and ECOWAS intervene and restore him to power. The appeal by the whole of the international community including the OAU, and pursuant to the obligations under the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) between Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the Federal Republic of Nigeria sent additional Nigeria Forces Assistant Group (NIFAG) troops to Sierra Leone to restore law and order. However, NIFAG was met with strong resistance from the Juntas and the RUF, and was forced to retreat. Nevertheless on August 30, 1997, during the 20<sup>th</sup> Summit of ECOWAS in Abuja, Nigeria, ECOWAS officially mandated ECOMOG to enforce sanctions against the junta

and restore law and order to Sierra Leone. Again in support of ECOWAS efforts, on October 8, 1997, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1132, which imposed an arms and petroleum embargo and travel restrictions against the military junta. On February 5, 1998, in response to an attack by the junta forces on its position at Lungi, ECOMOG launched a military attack on the junta, which eventually led to their removal from power in Freetown on February 12, 1998.

### **5.3 ECOMOG OPERATIONS IN SIERRA LEONE**

The ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone came as a result of the break down of dialogue and the recalcitrance of the coup makers to comply with the various peace agreements. As the next sub-section deals with the peace accords and conflict resolution in Sierra Leone it may not be necessary to belabour it here. However, it has to be noted that following the Sierra Leonean coup, the then Nigerian Head of state and ECOWAS Chairman, General Sanni Abacha and at the request of General Lansana Conte, the President of the Republic of Guinea, and also in consultation with other Heads of State in the sub-region and the foreign Affairs Ministers of ECOWAS met in Conakry, the Republic of Guinea on Thursday June 25, 1997, and expressed serious concern to review the Sierra Leonean situation and explore possible measures for speedy restoration of constitutional order in that country.

Three main issues that confronted ECOWAS at that point in time include;

- i. The early reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah;
- ii. The restoration of peace and security, and
- iii. The resolution of the issues of refugees and displaced persons.

There was however OAU backing on ways and means to achieve these objectives as a result of the reaffirmation of the ECOWAS Foreign Affairs Ministers of the position taken by the ECOWAS Heads of state at the 33<sup>rd</sup> summit meeting of OAU on the situation in Sierra Leone. They laid emphasis on measures to achieve constitutional order in Sierra Leone through the following methods:

- i. Dialogue
- ii. Imposition of sanctions and enforcement of an embargo, and
- iii. The use of force.

This received the blessing of the OAU, the Commonwealth of Nations and the UN, but due to the recalcitrance and intransigence of the junta, there was a convoluted peace process, which eventually led to the use of force to dislodge them from power, with the use of ECOMOG Forces. This military operation was code-named 'operation Sandstorm', which came in two phases. The phase I was code-named 'Tiger-Head' which flushed out the AFRC regime from Freetown and restored the democratically elected government of Tijan Kabbah to power, and the

phase II was code-named operation 'Tiger-Tail', which was launched to clear the rebel insurgents from the little spots that they were still occupying after restoring President Kabbah to power.

The first phase of the operation commenced on February 5, 1998, with Brigadier-General Maxwell M. Khobe commanding. The ECOMOG successfully took back free town on February 12, 1998. President Kabba, however, returned to Freetown on March 10, 1998, and resumed normal administration of the country. The phase II, (operation Tiger-Tail) was graduated, but the main action took place between March and April 1998, when the rebels were pushed to their stronghold in the Kono, Tonkolili, Kailahun Districts, and the thin line along the diamond rich areas in the middle belt of the country. The Kabala resistance was also later overcome, and, "with the Kabala recapture marked... the peak of success which ECOMOG has hitherto achieved over the rebels", (Okubor; 2000:113).

There were still pockets of resistance from the Revolutionary United Front, RUF, rebels in the hinter lands of the country when Nigeria announced to the world of her unwillingness to continue to fund ECOMOG following the emergence of democratic order with the general elections of 1999, where Chief Obasanjo emerged the President. ECOMOG was praised for its operations in Sierra Leone. As Omagu (2001:243) observes,



The ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone represented a watershed in the history of the West African sub-region response to military incursions into governance, a phenomenon which had virtually created stagnation, poverty, and misery resulting from corruption and mismanagement of the finances of most ECOWAS countries where the military had forcibly taken over from elected civilians... ECOMOG has advanced beyond the peace-keeping operation it was originally designed to monitor in Liberia.

After several diplomatic maneuvers, a controversial peace agreement was signed between President Kabbah and Corporal Sankoh in Lome, Togo, on July 7, 1999, and where Sankoh and the members of the RUF were granted total amnesty, and the promise of reintegrating the RUF into the Sierra Leone army, as well as the assurance of several cabinet seats in government.

Even so, with the obvious flaws in the Lome agreement, the UN obliged it with a peace-keeping mission, following the Lome signatories request to the UN Security Council to, "... amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the tasks provided for it in the Present Agreement; (and) to authorize the deployment of a peace-keeping force in Sierra Leone" (cited in Malan *et al*; 2002:19).

#### **5.4 PEACE ACCORDS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SIERRA LEONE**

The peace process in Sierra Leone was excruciating, convoluted and thorny. There were many agreements signed but which were not honoured especially by

the rebels. The first major effort is the ECOWAS mandate to implement the recommendations of the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers for the resolution of the Sierra Leonean crisis. This is contained in the final communiqué of the meeting of June 26, 1997 which held in Conakry, Guinea. On this occasion the ECOWAS Committee of Four on Sierra Leone joined the Representatives of the OAU and ECOWAS Secretariats extended an invitation to Major J.P Koroma of the Republic of Sierra Leone in which he was requested to attend a meeting in Abidjan on July 17, 1997. After the discussions, four major agreements were reached as follows;

- To resolve all issues related to the Sierra Leone crisis peacefully, in the best interest of the people of Sierra Leone, the sub-region, Africa and the international community as a whole.
- Ceasation of hostilities and the establishment of a cease-fire throughout Sierra Leone, while all efforts are deployed towards the peaceful resolution of the crisis;
- To work towards an early restoration of constitutional order, consistent with the objectives of ECOWAS; and

- To allow the Sierra Leone delegation time to return home and hold further consultations with the regime in Freetown in order to facilitate a consideration of the detailed modalities for the return of constitutional order to their country (cited in Omagu, 2001:225).

Despite the optimism that greeted this agreement, Koroma and his group violated it and rather went to the national radio and television to say that he would handover power in 2001, and that the four-year transition programme was aimed at first establishing sustainable peace which will usher in an enduring democracy.

A second meeting was held from 29-30 July, 1997, between the ECOWAS Committee of Four on Sierra Leone, the representatives of the OAU, the ECOWAS Secretariat and the representatives of Major Koroma. In presenting their proposal, the Koroma delegation willfully ignored the agreements reached during the first meeting especially on the question of the restoration of constitutional order in Sierra Leone. Meanwhile while negotiation was going on Koroma on July 31, 1997 announced his cabinet Ministers which in essence was meant to torpedo the peace process.

Meanwhile, there was another meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS, representatives of the UNO, OAU and ECOWAS from 27-28 August, 1997 at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, where the Ministers condemned the

breakdown of negotiations between the ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Four and the representatives of the Sierra Leone regime, due to their recalcitrance and lack of good faith. The Ministers therefore went on to recommend the enforcement of sanctions and the establishment of ECOMOG II to assist in immediate restoration to power of the legitimate government of Sierra Leone. To this end, ECOMOG II has the responsibilities to,

- enforce the sanctions to be decided by the Heads of state and Government against the regime;
- maintain and monitor the ceasefire in Sierra Leone, and other tasks that may be assigned to it by the Heads of state and Government in pursuit of ECOWAS objectives; and
- ECOMOG II to be under the command of the ECOMOG in Liberia; and
- The Committee has to be mandated to seek assistance from the UN Security Council in order to render mandatory and universal any sanctions adopted by ECOWAS.

However the then ECOWAS chairman, Nigeria's General Abacha embarked on diplomatic shuttle which took him to Cote D'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso to fully exploit the option of peaceful resolution of the face off. This was also reaffirmed during the twentieth summit of the Authority of Heads of state and

Government which held at Abuja from 28-29 August 1997. The communiqué released after the meeting expressed the concern of the Authority on intransigence of the Sierra Leone regime, and therefore asked member states to immediately place a general and total embargo on all supplies of petroleum products; arms and military equipment to Sierra Leone and abstain from transacting businesses with that country. Again member states were to freeze funds held by members of the regime, military officers and civilians directly or indirectly connected with the regime, as well as their families, among others. The ECOWAS initiative was supported by the UN in order to extend the sanctions to the international community, following Resolution 1132 of October 8, 1997. In reaction to this development, ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Five met at Abuja from 10-11 October, 1997, to assess the situation and evaluate the UN Security Council Resolution (S/RES/1132; 1997) and adopt strategies for the achievement of early restoration of constitutional order in Sierra Leone.

However, further discussions were held with an enlarged delegation of Koroma in Conakry from 22-23 October, 1997, and the junta was admonished to appreciate the fact that national reconciliation was a pre-condition for the return of peace in Sierra Leone. Even so, they were enjoined to let the cause of peace in Sierra Leone supercede all other considerations and also be mindful of the fact that finding a peaceful resolution lay in the hands of Sierra Leoneans themselves. They expressed their desire to resume discussions with the committee of five and

explain that the junta had no intention of staying in power up to 2001 as earlier announced. As a result the Committee of Five and the representatives of Koroma adopted the ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone with a six-month timetable with effect from October 23, 1997, with an agreement for restoring President Kabbah to power. The ECOWAS peace plan provides for:

- Cessation of hostilities,
- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of combatants;
- Humanitarian Assistance;
- Return of Refugees and Displaced persons;
- Restoration of constitutional Government and Broadening of the Power Base;
- Reintegration of combatants
- Donor Appeal for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation; and
- Immunities and Guarantees.

The junta also violated this agreement and scuttled the peace plan. A further review meeting of the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs which held at the Abuja ECOWAS Secretariat on 19 December, 1997 and New York from 5-6

February 1998 presented several reports which clearly showed the deterioration of the situation, including human rights abuses, gun-running and amassing of weapons of war, among others. Matters came to a head with the final implementation of the ECOMOG mandate given to it by ECOWAS leaders against the AFRC and the RUF alliance with operation "Sandstorm" which lasted from February 5-12, and which swept them out of power in Freetown. President Kabbah was reinstalled on March 10, 1998 in an occasion witnessed by Guinean, Malian and Nigerian Leaders, and the OAU Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim, and Ibrahim Fall who represented the UN Secretary General.

Finally, for a lasting peace in Sierra Leone, ECOWAS initiated several diplomatic manoeuvres which resulted in the signing of a peace accord at Lome, Togo, on July 7, 1998 under the auspices of the Togolese leader, President Gnassingbe Eyadema. The accord was signed by the government of Sierra Leone, represented by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the RUF. The peace accord covers five major areas including political, military, humanitarian, human rights and socio-economic issues. The issues that border on the political include,

- the immediate release of RUF leader Corporal Sankoh
- liberation of prisoners of war and non-combatants
- granting of amnesty to Sankoh and combatants,

- exiles and others for reasons related to the conflict;
- transformation of RUF into a political party,
- appointment of RUF members to parastatal posts and public offices;
- establishment of a commission each for the consolidation of peace and review of the 1991 constitution; and
- The establishment of an Independent National Electoral Commission to prepare for general elections, among others (cited in Omagu, 2001:238).

The meeting for the joint implementation of the peace plan came with the August 1999 meeting in Freetown, which was part of the ECOWAS effort to keep the peace accord going. In attendance were the Sierra Leonean Government and RUF, with Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, the US, ECOWAS, OAU, the Commonwealth and the UN as members. The meeting expressed satisfaction with the legislative measures taken by the Sierra Leone Government to implement the various provisions of the Agreement, its ratification and the renewal of legal implements of RUF participation in governance, among other issues.

This peace accord later broke down in May 2000 following a renewed fighting between forces loyal to the two sides after the deployment of some 11,000 UN peace keeping troops known as United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra



Leone, UNAMSIL, which was to help implement such key areas of the agreement as disarmament, demobilization and integration of combatants. Hope was however restored when again an agreement was signed between the Sierra Leone Government and the RUF rebels, in Abuja on November 10, 2000. Following from this the two sides agreed to an immediate resumption of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration which is one of the key elements of the Lome peace accord. Also as a demonstration of good faith, the RUF agreed to the immediate return of all weapons, ammunitions and other equipment seized from ECOMOG and UNAMSIL, among other issues.

In as much as the Lome peace accord remained controversial, it has assisted in bringing about the easing of tension and cessation of hostility in Sierra Leone, with the restoration of constitutional order and peace. Ever since, there has been another smooth transition of government in Sierra Leone following the 2008 general elections.

## **5.5 THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE SIERRA LEONEAN CONFLICT**

We have earlier defined civil society as constituting the realm and range of voluntary and autonomous associations which operate in the public domain between the family and the state, and though which in relation to the state, yet is

independent of it. These groups also played vital roles in bringing about peace in Sierra Leone. In other words there were many colourations of civil society groups and individuals who made serious impact at different stages. While some were active in mobilizing public opinion in favour of peace and democratization, others operated behind the scenes with the high level international political maneuvering that led to the Abidjan peace Accord.

At the early stage, the initial efforts and good intentions of the civil society groups remained largely on the fringes of the actual negotiations. However, return to democratic governance became the buzzword of many organizations, coupled with sustained international support for Sierra Leone civil society organizations. The major handicap of these groups was the fact that virtually all the negotiations took place outside Sierra Leone.

Among the many civil society groups, include, Women's Movement for Peace, the Council of Churches in Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone Labour Congress and the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union, who later came together to form the National Coordinating Committee for Peace, NCCP. Their main objective was "... to create a strong national peace constituency, which would force both the government and the RUF to the negotiating table and ensure that any peace agreement would be sustainable", (Accord 2000:43).

Series of negotiations for peace also took place and also included the efforts of the paramount chiefs, senior officials of the Supreme Islamic Council, the Council of Churches, the Labour Congress, the Teachers Union, the Petty Traders Association, officials of the Sierra Leone Women's Movement for Peace, SLWMP, and representatives of the displaced people, and the diaspora actors who are individual Sierra Leoneans outside the country who were involved on all sides of the conflict. Others who made visible efforts include Sierra Leone Association of University Women (SLAUM), who met regularly for networking, information sharing, and collective action on issues of common concern; the Young Women's Christian Association, YWCA, Women's Association for National Development (WAND), and the National Organization for Women (NOW).

Generally, women's peace campaign put issues concerning women and children on the front burner, but in a non-partisan and non-confrontational manner, and this approach made the discussions and public debates of contentious issues possible without the fear of offending the government or the rebels. They continued to affirm their position and commitment to peace and free and fair elections as an essential and fundamental part of the peace process. Among others, they also underlined the need to address women's issues such as illiteracy, health care, women entrepreneurship to reduce poverty, reform of laws detrimental to women on divorce, poverty, marriage and inheritance.

There is however a serious emphasis on the vital role played by the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL), which among other players stands out as the most highly visible and effective bridge builder between the warring factions and a population devastated and divided by many years of violence. As Turay (2000:53) observes,

Among Sierra Leone's civil society groups, the IRCSL showed great initiative and played a significant role in facilitating dialogue and building confidence among the different parties to the conflict, both prior to and after the Lome peace talks. The IRCSL earned the respect of civil society, the parties to the conflict and the international community.

To command this level of respect and attention, the IRCSL resorted to a variety of actions including consultative meetings with all the key players in the crisis, press releases, communiqués, experience sharing, prayers and the preaching of God's message of repentance, forgiveness and re-conciliation. It is also on record that the council took the bold step to initiate the first meeting between Sankoh and Kabbah after the invasion of Freetown. Again, their visit to see Charles Taylor in Monrovia which recognized him (Taylor) as a key player capable of prevailing on the rebels to lay down their arms also helped in the success of the Lome talks. This also assisted in bringing about the improved relationship between the two governments. Very important also is the Council's involvement in helping to build confidence between the rebels and civil society, though this received a great shock in May 2000, following the military confrontation.

## REFERENCES

. ACCORD, *Paying the Price*, Issue 9, March, 2000

Communiqué of Meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Four on Sierra Leone, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivories, July 17-18, 1997

"Early Civil Society Peace Initiatives", in Lord, D (Ed.) (2000) *Paying the Price: The Sierra Leone Peace Process*, Accord, Issue 9.

Malan, M, et al (2002) "Peace keeping in Sierra Leone", ISS Monograph Series, No. 68, Jan. 2002.

Okubor, C.O. (2000) "The Sierra Leone Crisis", *The Nigerian Army Journal*, Vol. 9, No.3, March 2000.

Omagu, D.O. (2001) *Regional Peace and Security: A Historical Perspective of the Role of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone*. Calabar: Ushie Printers and Publishing Co. Ltd.

Turay, T.M. (2000) "Civil Society and Peace building: The Role of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone", in Lord, D. (Ed) (2000) *Paying the Price: The Sierra Leone Peace Process*, Accord, Issue 9

UN Security Council Resolution (S/RES/1132, 1997)

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **6.0 ECOMOG AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN WEST AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

#### **6.1 ECOWAS MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN ASSESSMENT.**

The effort of creating a mechanism for conflict resolution by ECOWAS could be gleaned from the point of view of the establishment of the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security on December 10, 1999, at Lome, Togo, by the Heads of state and Government of Member States of ECOWAS. This move is in reaction to the increasing outdated assumption that inter-state warfare constitutes the dominant threat to peace and security, coupled with the "unnecessary duplication of conflict management mechanisms operating within the same sub-region" (Soremekun, 2006:191). The issue of duplicating as posed by ANAD (which is a conflict resolution mechanism for Franco-phone West Africa States) is meant to solve the problem of dualism.

The effort was set in motion in 1997 by the ECOWAS Heads of States and Government in Togo. This process was finalized and approved for implementation by December 1999. The protocol lays emphasis on prevention, management and

resolution of internal inter-state conflicts pursuant to paragraph 46 of the Framework of the Mechanism. It seeks also to implement the relevant provisions of Article 58 of the Revised Treaty as well as strengthening cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early-warning, peace-keeping operations, the control of cross border crime, international terrorism and the proliferations of small arms, anti-personnel mines, and the maintenance and consolidation of peace, security and stability in the sub-region. It also, as part of its objectives, seeks to establish institutions and also formulate policies that allow for the organization and coordination of humanitarian relief missions; promotion of close cooperation between member states in the areas of preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping. It also has the responsibility to:

- ❖ Constitute and deploy a civilian and military force to maintain or restore peace within the sub-region, whenever the need arises;
- ❖ Set an appropriate framework for the rational and equitable management of the national resources shared by neighbouring member states which may be cause(s) of frequent inter-state conflicts; and
- ❖ Formulate and implement policies on anti-corruption, money-laundering and illegal circulation of small arms and light weapons, among others.

In more specific terms, the Protocol emphasizes six possible conditions under which the Mechanism may be applied. These include;

1. In cases of aggression or conflict in any member state or threat thereof;
2. In case of conflict between two or several member state;
3. In case of internal conflict (a) that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster or, (b) that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region;
4. In event of serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law
5. In the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government, and;
6. Any other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council.

In order to achieve these set out goals, the Mechanism established the following structures;

- i. The Authority of Heads of State and Government
- ii. The Mediation and Security Commission



- iii. The Defence and Security Commission
- iv. The Executive Secretary
- v. ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
- vi. The Council of Elders, and
- vii. The Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of Political Affairs, Defence and Security.

Among these, the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) unquestionably the mechanism's nerve-centre of gravity; has jurisdiction to take decisions on issues of peace and security in the sub-region on behalf of the Authority of Heads of State and Government. This jurisdiction covers three major levels, as follows

- ❖ Heads of State and Government of the nine members;
- ❖ Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs and Security of the MSC Member States, and
- ❖ Committee of Ambassadors of the nine member states who have dual accreditation to the host State and to ECOWAS.

Soremekun (2006:192-193) has reacted to the structure of the mechanism and emphasized that:

- ❖ The Council of Elders is a classic innovation in institutional engineering for conflict resolution and also reflects and illustrates African respect and veneration for the views and roles of elders in the settlement of disputes.
- ❖ ECOMOG, which grew up in the 1990s as ECOWAS' *ad hoc* response to the situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone and subsequently commanded respect and admiration for its activities, seemed to have been sanctimoniously legitimized and accepted as a stand-by arrangement for conflict management and peace-keeping operations in the sub-region.
- ❖ Constitutional and institutional investment on an early warning system can be seen in the creation not only of a regional Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) at the ECOWAS Secretariat, but also of four Observation and Monitoring Zones (OMZs) in different parts of the sub-region. Banjul (The Gambia), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Monrovia (Liberia), and Cotonou (Benin Republic),

- ❖ Although the Mechanism's new legal regime suggests that ANAD may choose to disappear through transformation into a specialized agency of ECOWAS, there is yet no evidence that it has actually disappeared and,
- ❖ Efforts were made to define three situations justifying ECOWAS' involvement and intervention in intra-state conflicts, which ordinarily in general international law, fall within the domestic jurisdiction of individual states.

These observations are central to the commitment to make ECOMOG and other structures effective as an instrumentality for conflict prevention, management, resolution and security. This is why all the Mechanism's institutional organs for conflict resolution have been put in place and are operational as they are now involved in the search for reconciliation and stability in Liberia. Also, the Council of Elders has been constituted, and the structure responsible for the early warning system which operates under the authority of the Executive Secretary (now President of the Commission), but through the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence and Security is now operational at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja, as well as in the fields in the sub-region, (Soremekun, 2006:193-194).

Again, all these efforts are made to put the necessary structures in place in order to take care of the shortcomings attendant upon ECOMOG operations, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone. As we could see, ECOMOG encountered several challenges during their operations in both countries. There are also several limitations and mistakes which were made during this period which the Mechanism is meant to correct. This does not preclude the fact that the ECOWAS sub-region still has lots of hamstrings and hiccups which always hamper enterprises of this nature. For instance, it is belittling that all the efforts by ECOMOG could not bring about a final solution to the Liberian/Sierra Leonean wars. This is why it became necessary for the UN interventions in both countries, which seem to take the shine off the achievements of ECOMOG and ECOWAS. As a result of this, Soremekun (2006:200) and Omagu (2001:119) agree that for the fact that ECOMOG is still an ad hoc arrangement there is urgent need to institutionalize the peace-keeping and enforcement force.

Even so, a lot of work still needs to be done since there is also the need to rationalize all the structures, mechanisms, institutions or organs which still have similar principles and purposes with that of the Mechanism within the sub-region. It is also instructive that member states stop playing double-standards in terms of the support they offer to warring factions in the sub-region and also the lack of financial resources, inadequate training of peacekeepers, and the slow progress in establishing an effective early warning system which still constitute obstacles to

the operationalization of the ECOWAS Mechanism which negates ECOWAS objectives and principles. These would go a long way in enhancing the effectiveness of ECOMOG and the ECOWAS in her effort to bring about a peaceful, strong, and stable sub-region.

## **6.2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SIERRA LEONE (THE SLSC) AND THE LIBERIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC)**

The Sierra Leonean civil war (1991-2002) was characterized by horrendous unspeakable human right violations. According to the Human Right Watch (2000)

Sierra Leone's nine-year conflict was characterized by unspeakable brutality. International war crimes of the worst type were routinely and systematically committed against Sierra Leoneans of all ages. The suffering inflicted upon the civilian population has been profound. While all sides committed human right violations, rebel forces were responsible for the overwhelming majority.

Under the circumstances in Sierra Leone, the crimes and human rights abuses include abduction and forced labour, sexual violence and rapes, use of child soldiers, amputations and other forms of physical violence and torture and general violations of the laws of war with impunity.

Against the background of the foregoing, an agreement was reached between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone in 2002, for the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Because of the prevailing situation of impunity of which the Security Council was deeply concerned, the UN and the associated personnel in its Resolution 1315 (2000), requested the "United Nations Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the government of Sierra Leone to create independent special court", to prosecute people who have the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international law while the Sierra Leonean civil war lasted.

As a follow up to this request, in June 2000, President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah asked for assistance and guidance from the UN Secretary-General for this purpose. Part of the reasons that compelled this action was the unacceptability of the amnesty, in violation of the international prohibition of amnesties for crimes under international law, which was granted to the perpetrators of these heinous crimes, by the Lome Peace Agreement in 1999. In this regard, on January 16, 2002, the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone adopted an *Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone*, "to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. On March 7, 2002, Sierra Leone enacted Special Court Agreement, 2002, Ratification Act 2002 to implement the statute. The court has a

three-year mandate and its source of funding comes from voluntary contributions from states.

The special court falls under the new category of internationalized courts established to handle crimes under international law. Examples elsewhere are the special panels for East Timor (now Timor-Leste), the special Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia. These are different from each other, but have similarities in that they have some elements of both national and international mix.

There are also the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the ICTY and ICTR. However, the special court for Sierra Leone differs from others in that (i) while the ICTY and ICTR sit outside the area of conflict (ICTY in the Hague, and ICTR in Arusha Tanzania), the special court for Sierra Leone is based within Sierra Leone; (ii) It has mixed composition with some judges and other staff appointed by the UN and the remaining staff by the host government (iii) The Sierra Leonean law as well as international law is applied.

For these reasons, the court is referred to as 'mixed' 'hybrid' tribunal, unlike the ICTY and ICTR which are international bodies and organs of the UN. The special tribunal does not have power to arrest, and so relies on the willingness of states to cooperate for its arrest warrants and other orders to be enforced.

The Sierra Leonean civil war lasted for about ten years, but the mantle of the special tribunal covers from 1996 to 2002. Within this period apart from recorded atrocities, an estimated 75,000 lives were lost, and the Revolutionary United Front, RUF, was heavily implicated and indicted, with strong backing from Liberia, and aided by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, AFRC, of Sierra Leone. From available records (Amnesty International; "Special Court for Sierra Leone", available on the internet; <http://web.amesty.org/pages/ictsierrealeone-eng>; Accessed; assessed on September, 28, 2005:5).

As of February 2004, the prosecutor of the special court had indicted thirteen people from all sides in the conflicts; nine of those indicted had been arrested and transferred to the custody of the special court and are awaiting trial, two had died and two had not been arrested and surrendered to the special court.

An important issue that calls for discussion at this juncture is in respect of Charles Taylor, former Liberian President. Charles Taylor's indictment and international warrant of arrest was announced on June, 4, 2003, while he was in Ghana to attend peace talks with rebel groups. This warrant of arrest was subsequently transmitted to the government of Ghana, which flouted its obligations under international law to execute the warrant. Taylor left Ghana peacefully and was offered asylum in Nigeria after he was eased out of power in Liberia. This raises serious questions about the commitment of the government of ECOWAS to come in a concerted effort to actualize transitional justice within the sub-region. However, Taylor is



now facing charges at the Hague. He had to be moved because of the security implications of his trial in Sierra Leone.

**6.2(i) WILL THE SPECIAL COURT BRING ABOUT  
RECONCILIATION AND JUSTICE IN SIERRA LEONE?**

The mandate of the special court for Sierra Leone does not include reconciliation, but merely, "to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November, 1996". In essence, the 'evildoers' are expected to face the wrath of the law-to face justice and pay for their sins.

If we counterpose the Sierra Leonean case with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, TRC, we begin to see various spectrums of transitional justice. This also raises a lot of issues which may not necessarily be relevant for our purpose. However, for purposes of analysis, the South African TRC is different from the Sierra Leonean Special Court in so many ways. We want to emphasize that while in the case of South Africa, the TRC was an internal South African matter, initiated by the government of South Africa to advance the process of governance in that country, in Sierra Leone, the special court had the backing of the UN, with its funding from voluntary contribution by states, and is meant to specifically prosecute and punish offenders. More so, the model of

reconciliation in South Africa was conceptually problematic, hence the special focus that underlines the exercise was emphasis on multi-layered healing of human relationships in post-apartheid South Africa, relationships of individuals with themselves, relationships between victims, relationships between survivors and perpetrators, relationships within families, and between neighbours.

A follow-up to this lays emphasis on concept associated with individual reconciliation, including, healing, dignity, forgiveness, apology, restitution, and the rebuilding of relationships. Sierra Leone actually faced a dilemma of granting general amnesty to the perpetrators of human rights violations in the face of obvious international pressure, especially from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The government was weary about not torpedoing the peace process mid-way because the rebels had not fully disarmed. Therefore any attempt to force them to disarm and face criminal charges may backfire. They treaded softly with the Lome Peace Accord. In fact the parliament of Sierra Leone on February 22, 2000, enacted "the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 2000". The commission is to consist of seven members, four of whom shall be citizens of Sierra Leone, and the other three are to be appointed by the president from among persons recommended by the UN Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Sierra Leone and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The objectives of the commission include:

- ❖ To create an impartial record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lome peace agreement;
- ❖ To address impunity, to respond to the needs of victims;
- ❖ To promote healing and reconciliation; and
- ❖ To prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.

The functions of the Commission are as follows:

- ❖ To investigate and report on the cases, nature, and extent of the violations and abuses referred to above to the fullest degree possible, including their antecedents, the context in which violation and abuses occurred, the question of whether those violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorization by any government, group or individual, and the role of both internal and external factors in the conflict;

❖ To work to help restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation by providing an opportunity for victims to give an account of the violations and abuses suffered and for perpetrators to relate their experiences, and by creating a climate which fosters constructive interchange between victims and perpetrators, giving special attention to the subject of sexual abuse and to the experiences of children within the armed conflict; and

❖ To do all such things as may contribute to the fulfillment of the object of the commission (Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, p. 5).

Evidence shows that from the standpoint of the international community giving account of what happened during conflict, seeking justice for the wronged, and promoting peaceful reconciliation among the combatants and their larger societies constitute the most significant first steps of what is to be done for countries emerging from violent conflict. In the Sierra Leonean case, it has been argued that truth commissions and war crimes tribunals can provide an essential service by presenting concrete evidence about terrible crimes. It is also important to note that transitional justice systems and mechanisms are devised to assist victims regain a sense of dignity and self-worth-the feeling, essential to citizenship in a democratic polity (Barsalou; 2005:11).

Generally speaking, truth telling, justice seeking, and reconciliation are inherently political processes, which are normally heavily influenced by conflicting interests and access to resources. It is also contended that the process of seeking justice through legal procedures can be more important in building respect for the rule of law. Barsalou (2005; 1-2) has made some striking observations as follows;

- ❖ Countries emerging from long-term violent conflict are troubled societies that are prone to destructive social and political patterns. Therefore, under the circumstances, basic psychological adjustments in individual and group identity, aided by reconstruction processes, are essential to reconciliation;
- ❖ The tasks of promoting justice, psychological relief, and reconciliation are hugely challenging and costly and actually takes time to actualize;
- ❖ The beneficiaries of any particular transitional justice intervention are often ambiguous and questionable. The way and manner the process impacts on individuals and the broader social groups with respect to psychological rehabilitation and reconciliation is different and
- ❖ Societies emerging from conflict are often multicultural. Therefore, when designing transitional justice mechanisms there is need to take into

consideration the cultural traditions and strengths and to consult the population that the interventions are meant to help, among others.

The lessons for West Africa in the Sierra Leonean case leaves a sour taste among the people. The very fact that Charles Taylor could not be handed over for prosecution at the initial stage to the Sierra Leonean Special Courts shows that the sub-region was not serious about transitional justice. The truth is that the world will not take the sub-region serious if they do not straighten the issues about justice, and when next an occasion calls for world attention and assistance, they may well look the other way.

However, the issue of transitional justice in West Africa is still precarious and hanging on the balance. In most of the West Africa states fragile peace exists as a result of various injustices the people talk about and expect to be addressed. Some are making efforts to do this, others are still prevaricating and vacillating. A critical look shows that in Nigeria, many years after the Oputa panel firmed up activities and submitted report, with the follow up of the National Political Reforms Conference virtually nothing has happened. At least the reports have not been made public, and the various ethnic groups keep on clamoring for the injustices to be addressed. In Cote d'Ivoire, the injustice of indegineity and citizenship by the South against the North is still festering and the situation remains volatile. The South African President, Thabo Mbeki keeps brokering

peace between the parties. The situation confirms our findings that West Africans and ECOWAS are not serious about transitional justice.

We can go on and on. In Togo, it only took the intervention of Nigeria for the reversal of the decision to foist Faure Gnassingbe, the son of the late maximum ruler Gnassingbe Eyadema, on the people. This was short-lived however, as he was quickly brought back through a flawed election. The people keep clamouring for the reversal of the election results and for the several injustices to be addressed. Liberia is still a smouldering fire. Ghana is relatively stable, and in fact many Nigerians and other West Africans have relocated to Ghana to do business, which shows a significant growth in democratic practice in Ghana, after the stability brought about by J.J. Rawlings purge and the establishment of democratic practice and successful regime transition to the present democratic dispensation.

A lot can also be said about other countries. The mechanism of transitional justice are intended to help victims regain a sense of dignity and self worth. These are feelings that are essential to citizenship in a democratic polity. Unfortunately in the West African situation, the process of transitional justice is found to be inherently political and the stake holders have failed to prevent political considerations from dominating. According to the report of the South African TRC (vol. 5:352);

A commitment to reconciliation and healing, means that the psychological plight of individuals who were involved in the perpetration of gross human rights violations and their families should be acknowledged. Like victims, perpetrators need to be given space to examine their emotional reactions and to reintegrate what has probably been disassociated from their emotional life...perpetrators share with their victims the potential for and experiences of past traumatic disorder.

For the society to move forward, we need to be serious and committed to the issue of justice. This justice should not be delayed or else it becomes justice denied. In West Africa, the situation is still very complex, partly because the core states who are looked up to take the lead still perpetrate injustices on its people. For instance, Nigeria has several cases of injustices on its people and harboured an indicted war criminal. How then can other countries have the liver to embark on issues bordering on justice? We however expect that the situation will improve. We therefore make the following recommendations;

- ECOWAS should be more involved in the issue of transitional justice in the sub-region. It is not enough to leave, for instance as in Liberia and Sierra Leone, after a semblance of peace has returned without taking active part in post-conflict reconstruction and transitional justice. The ECOWAS can also invoke the political principle of 1991 in this regard;



- ❖ We also think that AU and the UN should be more involved. They should not wait until war breaks out. The UN Charter has provisions for pacific settlement of disputes, and through regional arrangements, and the Constitutive Act of the African Union envisages a common defence policy for the whole continent. For this to work the AU must have to support the sub-regions as building blocks for the continental enterprise by taking the issue of transitional justice in the sub-regions very seriously.
- ❖ The democratic structures in the sub-regions must be strengthened and avenues for people to ventilate their grievances created, so that the core issues that bring about conflicts and injustices will be addressed in order not to revert back to anarchy and disorder. Genuine efforts should be made to bring about sustainable development in the sub-region and poverty reduction should be given utmost priority. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the UN should be taken into consideration in order to meet the challenges of globalization.

Finally, we believe that transitional justice in West Africa is still problematic. And the literature in our social sciences in this regard are still scanty and offers little guidance on the best methods to evaluate the impact of transitional justice mechanisms in the sub-region. The efforts of the non-governmental organizations are commendable, but they can still do more, and the civil societies also have to be

alive to this responsibility. It is our fervent hope that these efforts, coupled with effective leadership, political will and good governance will change the face of justice generally, for good in West Africa.

#### **6.2(ii) THE LIBERIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION**

The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission covers two major areas. The first relates to the restoration of the rule of law in the transition period. This involves the promotion of law and order, prevention of crime and prosecution of offenders through the due process of the law. This is meant to arrest the culture of violence and lawlessness which pervaded the political space in Liberia, and restore the path to democratic governance. What this entails is the revamping of human resources and the infrastructural facilities which include re-equipping and funding of the judiciary, law enforcement agencies and other allied services and departments.

The second part of the TRC involves human rights abuses and impunity. This envisages that in order to serve the ends of the rule of law and justice, those who were involved in human rights abuses should be brought to book. Also, in order to ensure transitional justice, institutional mechanisms should be put in place to bring persons suspected of gross abuse of human rights to trial. This is necessary in order to stop and forestall the cycle of impunity that Liberia had become. If this is not done it may create the impression that warlords can do anything and get away

with it all. This is part of the reasons why the Liberia Comprehensive Peace Agreement, CPA (2003) and the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003) try to emphasize the symbiotic relationship between the rule of law and the security of the state.

In this regard, what the CPA has succeeded to do is to call for a forum for truth telling and national healing through the TRC, getting those who had committed crimes against the people punished. This is against the norms of the laws of armed conflict. The CPA (2003) rather provided the platform for the reestablishment of the rule of law by the LNTG, where all the members of the warring factions were accommodated with other international partners. Again, the nature of the Liberian war and mostly the child soldiers who needed special efforts for their urgent and effective rehabilitation informed the second provision. Serious questions have been asked about these provisions. This is why Aboagye and Rupiya (2005:256) contend that,

- The regional peace instruments providing for a TRC alone are flawed and amount to a miscarriage of justice which does not augur well for sustainable peace-building in Liberia and indeed West Africa;

- In as much as a criminal court is desirable under the situation, the timing is also important in order not to compromise the effectiveness of the TRC; and
- It is also important to strengthen the mechanisms of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), in order to effectuate the Liberian equivalent and which may include the use of the SCSL to deliver justice for Liberia.

These are relevant assertions which need to be addressed if the Liberia TRC is to move forward. The observed flaws notwithstanding, President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf on Monday, February 20, 2006, inaugurated the Liberian TRC at a well-attended ceremony in Monrovia's Executive Mansion, in which the nine members of the Commission took their oath of office. On this occasion she outlined the role of the commission to include.

- The documentation of all abuses, validating and establishing the narratives of both victims and victimizers, while paying special attention to women, children, the elderly and other vulnerable members of society;

- To provide at the end of their mandate, clear and workable recommendations on how Liberia can collectively retribute for the past, and move on in unity to face the future. (available on the internet at:

<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ABES-6M8LZQ?OpenDocument>).

It has to be noted that the culminating point to the TRC was the mandate of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement of August 2003 which was formally established by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of Liberia published in 2005. Since then ECOWAS has been overseeing the process which resulted in the selection of the TRC Commissioners. The TRC's composition reflects of the multi-ethnic and multi-dimensional nature of the state and also has a broad regional balance. As a support to the nine TRC members, there are three international technical advisers- two appointed by ECOWAS and by the UN High Commission for Human Rights.

It is noteworthy that President Johnson-Sirleaf stated that, "This commission is our hope-to define the past on our behalf in terms that are seen and believed to be fair and balanced, and bring forth a unifying narrative on which our nation's rebuilding and renewal processes can be more securely anchored" (available at; <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ABES->

6M8LZQ?OpenDocument). How this can be achieved remains a myth. This is because most of the expected perpetrators of these evils and war crimes are today 'honourable men' in the Liberian National Assembly, and the charges on former Liberian President Taylor is not directly connected to the crimes in Liberia but Sierra Leone. Up to the time of the winding up of fieldwork in Liberia by this researcher (November, 2007), the work of the TRC has not started. Its work is said to start by January 2008, and up till now nothing has happened. Apart from the observed contradictions and hiccups, the necessary institutions need to be fortified and given the necessary assistance to operate. Perhaps this is why Aboagye and Rupiya (2005:257) maintain that,

...unless the capacity of these institutions is enhanced and maintained through the provision of such mundane things as office facilities, office furnishings, equipment and adequate monthly and other remunerations that are paid on time, technical advice, advocacy, and retraining and education may not be sufficient to sustain effective rule of law, given the brain drain of the professional elite.

This also includes curbing the corrupt practices of legal and other public officials. Indeed, the Liberian TRC is a peculiar case, and with the present scenarios, how the Commission would function and what the outcome would be remains a matter for conjecture.

### 6.3(i) CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL EXAMPLE

Mercosur is the acronym for Mercado Comun del Sur (Spanish) or Macado Comun del Sul (Portuguese). It equally means the Southern Cone Common Market. The choice of Mercosur is to demonstrate that there is an alternative to conflict resolution mechanism as it operates in ECOWAS. The emphasis here is the role that democracy could play in solving both internal and international conflicts. Mercosur does not have a formal dispute-settlement process, because, "political negotiation is the means of handling all disagreements and conflicts" (Cohn, 2005: 294).

Mercosur is an economic integration body which shares similar principles and purposes with ECOWAS. The final document that formally established Mercosur is the Treaty of Asuncion signed on March, 26 1991 by the Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The Treaty set a timetable for the achievement of the objectives of Mercosur in three stages:

1. The formation of a Free Trade Area, FTA, from 1991 to 1994;
2. A Custom Union in 1995, and
3. A common market, as the final stage.


In a short period of existence, Mercosur is one of the economically most successful sub-regional integration schemes in the Western World in 1990s. It has

remained largely an intergovernmental endeavour, though it is building a future sub-regional institutional structure. This is why there are no autonomously-financed supranational bodies. However, the Treaty of Asunion created four principal sub-regional organs, as follows:

- ❖ Common Market Council: This organ consists of four foreign ministers and the respective ministers of the economy. It is the decision-making organ of Mercosur whose decisions are binding on the member states.
- ❖ Common Market Group: This is the Executive organ of the Mercosur. Its work is facilitated by 10 technical working sub-groups that analyze specific issues
- ❖ Administrative Secretariat: This organ is the sole Mercosur body with a permanent seat and an own budget. It is responsible for all administrative assistance to the other common organization, stores and disseminates Mercosur documentation and organizes the meetings of the Common Market Group
- ❖ Joint Parliamentary Commission: This forms the representative body of the member state parliaments. The main tasks are to legislation. This is as a result of the need to give integration process a clear political and participatory dimension.

The main organs are diagrammatically represented below:





**Source:** Andres Malamud, (nd) "Presidentialism and Mercosur: A Hidden Cause for A Successful Experience", Department of Social and Political Sciences, European University Institute, Florence.

The enthusiasm behind the integration and cooperation initiatives which actually culminated in the early 1990s is as result of the following factors:

- ❖ The democratization of Latin America;
- ❖ The international trend towards the formation of regional economic and trade blocks; and
- ❖ A redefinition of Latin America's relations with the United States. As Stermer (nd:2) notes,

The failure of import substitution and of "economic nationalism" encouraged the adaptation of a new economic strategy based on competitive integration into the international economy. Simultaneously, democratization has permitted a rapprochement between the government of the region. Democratization has created a new link between democracy and integration and regional parliaments have therefore become a fundamental element of integration.

The emphasis on democracy as requirement for membership has assisted in whittling down finding solution to intractable conflicts. This also explains the reason why all conflicts are settled through democratic processes. This has therefore assisted in making Mercosur one of the fastest growing economic integration bodies in the Western World. It has helped in strengthening the economy, security and stability of the sub-region.

In fact, democracy is a sine qua non for membership and any dealings with the organization, and this is also the main reason why prior to the establishment of Mercosur in 1991, democratic regimes were first inaugurated in the region in the 1980s. Following from this, Schmitter (1991); Hurrel (1995); Fournier (1999), have noted that democracy consequently and inevitably becomes one of the main goals as well as an indispensable conviction of support for the agreements reached. The test case for democracy in the Southern cone actually came with the April 22, 1996 crisis in Paraguay.

### **6.3(ii) APRIL 22, 1996 CRISIS IN PARAGUAY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW**

April 22, 1996 remains a landmark in the history of Paraguay with regard to the country's destiny with democracy. The crisis started as a result of President Carlos Wasmosy's decision to remove the Army Commander, General Lino Oviedo from his post. As a result of the coup that ended the regime of Alfredo Stroessner in 1989, General Oviedo had continuously increased his power and positioned himself into a symbol of influence in the armed forces in Paraguayan politics. The decision by the President to remove Oviedo from power was as a result of fierce power struggle between the two. The General refused to accept and obey the President's order and this stalemated into the April 22, 1996 crisis. As a consequence, from 22-25<sup>th</sup> April 1996, there was a serious threat to the democratic transition in Paraguay. However, the period of stalemate and suspense was followed by peaceful resolution. In this situation the forces of globalization,

regional integration and democratization converged with increasing intensity for a short period of 4 days. In other words the increasing influence that economic cooperation exerts over national political decisions was brought to the fore.

In the Presidential election primary of the Colorado Party in 1993, the leader of the Party, Luis Maria Argana was declared the official party candidate for the Presidential general elections. He was eventually fraudulently replaced through the influence of General Oviedo by Carlos Wasmosy. For this purpose, Wasmosy had to be paying a political price to Oviedo, the Godfather. As Machiavelli (1981) writes, "If the Prince govern thanks to the people, he can govern with tranquility, but if he governs thanks to another powerful man, he will always be paying back". In this light Wasmosy had always protected Oviedo's position and therefore became dependent on his approval. The extent of this approval came to the fore when Oviedo, using obstructive tactics, sought to block an agreement between Paraguay and Brazil to construct a bridge across river Parana. Oviedo's action threatened both Wasmosy's ability to govern Paraguay and the country's relations with her powerful neighbour. Following from this, on the morning of April 22, 1996, President Wasmosy informed Oviedo of the decision to relieve the General of his duties. There were basically two options open to Oviedo at this point in time:

- i. He could accept the order and resign
- ii. He could initiate a coup against the President.

General Oviedo however, refused to accept and obey the order. From the above scenario, the key actors include:

- i. President Carlos Wasmosy
- ii. The recalcitrant and disloyal General Lino Oviedo, and
- iii. The other actors – both internal, regional and global, and they are as follows:
  - ❖ Internal actors – the civil society and domestic public institutions, for instance the armed forces, the public and the parliament;
  - ❖ Regional actors – Mercosur as an institution in concert with Brazil and other members, and associated countries, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia; and
  - ❖ Global actors – those not participating in the Mercosur integration process – the US, EU, and OAS

It is noted that on the afternoon of April 22, 1996, Oviedo's insubordination filtered to the press, but the Embassies of the US, Argentina and Brazil were

informed of the real situation. Other Ambassadors later got the information through Lorenzo Baldissieri of the Holy See. By 4.00pm an urgent Cabinet meeting was called at Mburuvicha Roga, the Presidential Residence. One hour later, the speaker of the Senate, Rafael Casabianca, telephoned the President and offered to mediate in the name of the Congress. Later, the Speaker received Senators Loyal to Oviedo who proposed that Wasmosy resign, and Casabianca assumed the Presidency. Casabianca refused on the ground that the offer was unconstitutional.

However, about 6.30pm, an official public information on the crisis came through the US embassy, followed by Brazil representing Mercosur and then Argentina. Also, major opposition parties announced their support for the President's decision. Finally, the President's voice came on air confirming the situation. Then students and other citizens took to the streets in demonstration of support for democracy. These also included, Centre Left Alliance, Partido Encuentro Nacional (PEN), Unionists, Journalist, NGO members and independent intellectuals. Prominent among them was Carlos Filizzola, the elected leader of PEN, and mayor of Asuncion.

Meanwhile, Casabianca and Oviedo held a private meeting where Oviedo proposed that Casabianca assume the Presidency if the President and his vice resign. This was rejected when Casabianca returned to the Presidential residence.

Threats were made against Mburuvicha Roga, and the following morning President Wasmosy went to bed at the US Embassy-technically on exile.

On 23<sup>rd</sup> April, democratic institutions also received support from the Air force, Navy, the national Police and the representatives of the judiciary. The international community supported institutional structures rather than the government, the army rank and file lost faith in General Oviedo. Later on Tuesday 23<sup>rd</sup> April, Oviedo had volunteered to resign, but the emissaries (the friends of Oviedo and friends of Wasmosy) held talks and suggested that Oviedo be appointed Minister of Defence – a sort of soft landing to allow him resign the post of Commander in Chief without losing face.

At a lunch attended by a number of ambassadors, only the Secretary General of the OAS Cesar Gaviria actively supported Oviedo as Minister of Defence. The people were disappointed with the development, though some ambassadors considered it as a domestic issue, the people felt that Oviedo was being settled not punished. Later on, while the El dia del Jinete ceremonies was going on, Oviedo received a telephone call from a Brazilian General Zenildo Lucena, who was once his instructor, to the effect that the Brazilian President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, has made it clear that if there was a coup severe economic and political sanctions would be imposed on Paraguay. The OAS Secretary General also later held a press conference in support of democracy in Paraguay. This was followed

by an OAS extra-ordinary session held in Washington reiterating its support for democratic government, while the same position was taken by the UN Security Council.

As it later turned out, General Oviedo handed over command of the armed forces to Oscar Rodrigo Diaz Delmas in a theatrical ceremony, where he repeatedly hugged President Wasmosy. This was necessary for him, Oviedo to assume the post of defence Minister, but unfortunately for him, the people remained resolved in their opposition to the promotion of Oviedo, which they felt would be an unjust solution to the crisis. This was also not going to favour the President in his attempt to curb the influence of the armed forces in Paraguayan politics. Strong opposition also came from both houses of Parliament, with a resolution against the naming of Oviedo as Minister of defence. However, on the afternoon of 24<sup>th</sup> April, after further reflections in the Presidential mansion at Santa Teresa, Wasmosy arrived at the capital on the 25<sup>th</sup> where the swearing in ceremony of Oviedo was billed to take place, only to announce that he had decided to listen to the people of Paraguay. Subsequently, General Oviedo was retired, having also lost his power base.

### **6.3(iii) AN ANALYSIS OF THE APRIL CRISIS**

Certain observations could be made from the point of view of the participants and actors in the April Crisis in Paraguay. For instance, a look at the civil society



shows that they are weak, fragile and lacked continuity. They also lacked the ability to put pressure on the political institutions, there is no strong opposition party, there is political apathy on the side of the people who perceived the democratic institutions, together with the armed forces as one single apparatus, instead of tools for political participation, (Stromberg; 1998);

On the other hand, the US interest in general in Latin America is to fight drug trafficking, open up markets with a view towards hemispheric integration; and to establish representative democracy. With regard to Paraguay however, the US is also interested after isolating the Stroessner regime, and naming high commanders in the struggle against drug trafficking, in the following:

- ❖ The maintenance of the transition process, and
- ❖ The fight against corruption. The US also faces competition from the EU, Japan and China for influence. In the case of Mercosur, it has not been seen as a redistribution project but it is based on competition and very 'economistic' in nature and also the prerequisite for joining is democratic government. The 1994 Ouro Preto Protocol affirms that all decisions in Mercosur must be taken by consensus. In the April crisis, however, the greatest achievement of Mercosur, was acting as a political bloc, and since democracy is the precondition for membership,

it would have been hard to imagine how the process would have come out between countries with different political regimes.

The Central role of Mercosur in the April crisis is for standing for the irreversibility of the democratic process. This also establishes that there is a relationship between Paraguay's participation in Mercosur, and the fact that the attempted coup during the April crisis did not succeed. Again, Mercosur also played a more political role than economic since Mercosur at that point in time had not as such benefited economically from Paraguay, and if there had not been this institutional pressure the attempted coup would have succeeded. It also allays the fears of some members within the sub-region, like Chile and Bolivia, who had expressed misgivings, and also because of their recent history, that democracy has failed to deliver economic development. Therefore the success of the attempted coup would mean that these countries could revert to authoritarianism, and the possibility of military coups in the region would not be ruled out. They were therefore indirectly defending their own institutional stability, with the accompanying process of further integration in the sub-region, since in the globalization project market stability depends also on the stability of political life.

It is also important to note that the interest of global actors lie in the defence of general values, safeguarding human rights and democracy. It is therefore difficult to separate the influence of global actors from regional actors, because the close

coordination between Mercosur and the global actors suggests that it was the totality of their concerted action and joint forces that halted the crisis. It is also acknowledged that it is the regional integration process, through the instrumentality of Mercosur, that generated the kind of political interdependence which made the intervention by these countries more urgent and based on the broader motives and objectives of Mercosur. In his general observations, Stromberg (1998) states,

...the representatives of Mercosur and the US... took much firmer stand than did internal actors...Thanks to the international communities solid support during the crisis, however the people of Paraguay did not feel abandoned...But above all, the April crisis caused many officers to understand the interdependence between Paraguayan politics and the international context of globalization and sub-regional integration in Mercosur.

We could see therefore from the above analysis, the justification for recommending the Mercosur example as a viable alternative to the ECOWAS experiment. This is also because Mercosur and ECOWAS share so many similarities both in objectives, principles and purposes, most basic of which is economic integration which has been elaborated in our discussions.

However, some of the fears expressed among ECOWAS members also exist in Mercosur. For instance the problems encountered by Regional Trade Agreements in Latin America since the early 1960s because of the members' inward-looking

development strategies, national security concerns; unpredictable macroeconomic policies; the relationship between Brazil and Argentina marked by a 150-year history of suspicion and economic and military rivalry. Mercosur members are Less Developed Countries, LDCs whose economies are highly vulnerable to international developments; the ubiquitous presence of Brazil accounting for about 70 percent of Mercosur's GDP, among others (Cohn, 2005). These could be likened to the skepticism expressed in the ECOWAS situation of the Anglo-phone-Fronco-phone divide; weak economies of member states; Nigeria's overbearing presence and intimidating human and natural resources, among others. In the face of all these challenges Mercosur has succeeded, why ECOWAS by way of comparison has not done so well. There are rooms for improvement though, which is why the Mercosur example is very important in this research for our purpose, and with serious emphasis on the democratic peace proposition. This theoretical stand point found its usefulness and practicability as an analytical framework for our claim in the April 22, 1996 Paraguayan crisis where Mercosur stood up to be counted.

One glaring fact about the Mercosur example is its rapid growth within its short period of establishment, 1991. In contrast, ECOWAS since its establishment, 1978, still finds it difficult to implement some of the shining examples as demonstrated by Mercosur. There is therefore the need for ECOWAS to wake up and face these challenges. This is because a peaceful society which is conducive

for economic integration as Mitrany believes is "... more likely to grow through doing things together in workshop and market place than by signing pacts in chancelleries" (cited in Claude Jr. 1971: 380).

The history of ECOWAS demonstrates the fact that they have not always acted together, and this becomes more glaring even when coups occurred. When Nigeria was championing the course of democracy in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it was heavily under the yoke of military dictatorship. Even so, the level of disagreement that attended the ECOWAS experiment does not show that they acted in concert as demonstrated in the Mercosur example. One important lesson however, is that the role Brazil plays in Mercosur, is also the role Nigeria is expected to play or perhaps plays in ECOWAS. Other cases could also be cited, but we do not want to lose focus of our purpose which remains that ECOWAS has alternative for conflict prevention, management and resolution, which a body that is set up with the same objectives, principles and purposes, Mercosur has demonstrated in the Southern cone, with the April 22, 1996 crisis in Paraguay.

#### **6.4 ECOWAS AND THE AFRICAN UNION: THE ISSUE OF CONTINENTAL SECURITY**

ECOWAS and African Union have reached a certain level of symmetry on the issue of conflict resolution. It has to be noted that just as ECOWAS did not

originally envisage security issues in its present form, the AU had no such concern especially with the failure of the then proposed African High Command. The original African energy and aspirations was channeled towards a greater political unity based on freedom, equality, justice and progress. These efforts at best culminated in the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity, OAU. The OAU transformed into AU in May 2002, and with the transformation came also the issue of continental security.

It has to be observed that ECOWAS and AU do not have the same or similar objectives. For one thing, ECOWAS is more economic while AU is more political. Even so, the circumstances that led to the establishment of ECOWAS is traceable to the gradual functional co-operation adopted by the OAU founding fathers. In other words, ECOWAS is a practical fulfillment of the goals and aspirations of the majority of West African leaders stemming from the OAU agreement on gradual and functional approach to continental unity.

Several issues have been raised with regard to which organization is more properly placed to handle security issues and the resolution of conflict. Some who argue in support of sub-regional arrangement, as in ECOWAS, state proximity as the propelling force which create the sense of balance between the countries involved in conflict, and which allows them to politically define the nature of the conflict. In fact, political and geographical proximity allows the countries involved in the

sub regional conflict to realize the effects and repercussions of a given conflict, and when the need arises, to seek extra-regional support to bring the dispute to an end.

There is also the belief that regional or sub-regional organizations bring credibility to conflict resolution. This is because they are seen as fair and knowledgeable, and can therefore co-author and spearhead peace efforts, and their initiatives can therefore receive the blessing and backing of extra-regional organizations both within and outside Africa, due to the trust reposed in them. There has been serious rebuttal of these claims. As Howe (1998-1997: 145-176) observes, these claims about acceptance, knowledge, commitment, and military suitability which is hoped to quickly resolve regional conflicts are largely spurious. His observations are on the contrary as,

The difficulties of ECOMOG's attempts at peace enforcement suggest strongly that states should not enter an ongoing conflict without a clearly adequate force. ECOMOG's experience demonstrates an obvious but important lesson: it is infinitely easier to enter than to leave a conflict. The hastily assembled ECOMOG lacked acceptance, knowledge, and military capability to act as effective peace-keepers or as enforcers. Its six-year commitment has continued largely through the use of undisciplined surrogates (p. 174).

Even so, doubts have been expressed about countries that are strong economically or militarily which allow their governments to influence the initiatives that the

regional organization promotes. In consequence, the leader of the influential state takes the initiative and secures the support of other member states of the sub-region in order to launch a peace effort in the name of the regional organization concerned. The acceptance of this initiative is double-edged, because, while some member states will agree to it, others may perceive it as pushing others around. However, no matter which way the pendulum swings, it would be difficult to speak of ECOWAS, without Nigeria in those terms, or SADC without South Africa, and Inter-government Authority on Development, IGAD, without Ethiopia.

There have been different levels of performance by these regional bodies in terms of roles played in conflict resolution. ECOWAS and IGAD can be identified as the most active in dealing with conflict in West Africa, Sudan and Somalia respectively. The AU has also been very assertive and now projects stronger image in its support and approval for the activities of regional organizations. The relatively recent effort by the AU could be traced to the Conference of Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation, CSSDCA of which the initiative was launched in Kampala under the auspices of the African Leadership Forum, the OAU and the ECA. The CSSDCA effort was motivated by the urgent need for a redefinition of security and sovereignty. In this regard, Soremekun (2006:196) believes that there is one striking correlation that can be noticed between ECOWAS and AU. This relates to the fact that "...ECOWAS and the AU, have since revised their respective notions of security to embrace, a much more elastic



concept of non-interference in the internal affairs of states”, which hitherto was not the case. Soremekun further states that a more striking feature of the stated aims of CSSDCA and the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security is that both appear to be mirror-images of each other. This is because,

...apart from the obvious similarities of the tasks like, peacekeeping and conflict prevention, there is also the striking similarity of a Council of Elders whose mandate is to mediate in conflicts. In view of the fact that the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism was brought on stream much earlier, it is possible to contend that, CSSDCA has partly drawn its inspiration from the 1999 ECOWAS Mechanism (Soremekun, 2006:196).

We have to note however that this similarity does not make us forget that *ab initio* there had been a proposal for an African High Command of which the failure of this proposal to gain the acceptance of African leaders led to the AU to fall back on the necessity of allowing the sub-regional bodies to be in charge of their respective security arrangements. It could as well be argued that since the original agreement and understanding had been for a gradual functional engagement, perhaps the time has come for a harmony in security matters, especially with the realization that security is central to regional integration. Hence, in the Principles of the African Union, Article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act envisages the, “establishment of a common defence policy for the African Continent”. This is

why the role of ECOWAS and other sub-regional bodies have become relevant in this respect.

The challenge here is therefore how to harmonize the roles played by the sub-regional bodies and the expectations and principles of the AU, vis-à-vis the UN. Scholars have given some explanations and offered solutions to this. Some of these are based mainly on the limitations of, for instance, the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. These limitations were technical and logistic, and these were the main reasons why the UN intervention became necessary, coupled with the huge financial commitment by mainly Nigeria. But as Ate (2001: 120) has argued "what is at stake is not merely a matter of technical capability, but the institutional survival of the concept and its mechanism in the longer term". To him the solution to this problem lies in imbining democratic political culture, the role of the media as an essential instrument to promote security, the need to intensify regional integration and economic coordination simultaneously with the process of managing conflict and security, sub-regional leadership (i.e. Nigeria to be intact and not falling into anarchy, and quality external support for ECOWAS).

Even so, the nature of external support as the Clinton administration's African Crisis Response Initiative, ACRI, now AFRICOM the French Reinforcement of African Capacity for Peace-keeping RECAMP, and the British scheme which

operates under the African Peace-keeping Training Support Programme, of which the main executing agency is the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT), could not go far enough, because of the exclusion of important stake holders like Nigeria, in the project. More over, these three schemes introduced security structures which are separate from and in competition with the regional security arrangements envisaged and being put in place by the OAU (AU), SADC and ECOWAS.

Beyond this, the Bush administration in the US, has transformed ACRI into AFRICOM, "to coordinate all US military and Security interest throughout the continent", as against what Clinton had in mind with ACRI in 1996. Perhaps, the September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda hit has changed all this as the Pentagon believes that AFRICOM will allow the US to have a more integrated and effective approach to Africa with regard to three priority areas of oil, terrorism and instability. President Bush also believes that, "This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa...enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa" (cited by Ampah, 2008, available on the internet, at <http://theghanaijournal.com/2008/02/19/aimiing-bushayus-africacommandagainst-nkr...>; accessed, February 22, 2008).

AFRICOM is to be created by September 30, 2008, but there have been discordant tones on the issue of hosting AFRICOM, from South Africa to Nigeria. These are for obvious reasons, but the Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has accepted to host AFRICOM, because it is a,

Recognition of the growing importance of Africa to US national security interests, as well as recognition that long-term African security lies in empowering African partners to develop a healthy security environment through embracing good governance, building security capacity, and developing good civil-military relations (Ampah 2008).

The President's contention is that both America and Africa would benefit from it. Ampah (2008) supports her stand on the ground that, "countries which hosted US military bases after World War II were virtually free from instability. Any military adventurist would think more than twice before giving any serious thought to the blow that dozen or so AK47s could render". In essence this would also make it impossible for another Charles Taylor or Samuel Doe to pick up arms for a coup in Liberia. There is also a caveat here, since hosting AFRICOM could be a potential invitation and a tourist attraction for Al Qaeda and the like. This contention could also be mellowed down by the fact that, futuristically, there is a quiet but palpable anti-terrorism crusade taking place in North America, and the next occupant of the White House may take a softer stance on it.

In an important sense, the idea of AFRICOM has wider implications for ECOWAS and AU. This in one sense would impinge directly on the affairs of a continent that is showing signs of urgency in its own integration process. The issue then is how America could be accommodated without compromising the future common defence and security agenda of the AU. This is why there is urgent need for a common AU position on this. This is why Ate (2001: 124) believes that,

All peace-keeping assistance designed for Africa by the West and others ought to be considered within the operational guidelines adopted by these regional institutions and in consultation with them...and because the schemes were developed independently of one another, they are flawed by the absence of central coordination vis-à-vis Africa's own interest and perspective on conflict and security management.

This observation is important, since we in this research work have also argued for alternatives to ECOMOG as a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution in West Africa. We support this line of thought to the extent that it supports patterns that are in tandem with Africa's security projections and arrangements. However, the model we have adopted for this research, the Mercosur example, still remains relevant and germane. This is because, the moment democratic forces are very well developed within the sub-region and in Africa, and with increasing integration into the globalization process, the use of a mechanism in the mode of ECOMOG and its equivalent in other sub-regions in Africa may no longer be necessary. This is because of the expected role that

democracy is supposed to play. It should be recalled that since Mitrany's enunciation of the functional approach to peace and the role of democracy, no war in the magnitude of World War II, has occurred in the West. Therefore, while ECOMOG remains relevant at this moment, greater emphasis should be focused on building democratic institutions, human security, and structures for integration, so that conflict resolution would only be a matter of routine through the democratic process. Therefore, the 1991 ECOWAS Political Principle must be operationalised for any meaningful sub-regional stability and viable economic integration to take place.

#### **6.5 ECOWAS AND THE UN CONFLICT RESOLUTION ARRANGEMENT: THE QUEST FOR HARMONY**

The UN has as one of its primary purposes the maintenance of international peace and security, and to take "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace" Under the Article 24 of the UN charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. And for the actualization of this objective, Article 29 empowers it to establish such subsidiary organs as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions. Also, the UN charter provides for Regional Arrangements in the resolution of conflicts, as long as it is in consonance with the principles and purposes of the UN. It is partly on this that the idea of ECOMOG

was anchored (see, the legality question on the formation of ECOMOG in chapter three).

Today, ECOMOG has been institutionalized as a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security in West Africa. This has been accepted, and as Ate (2001:118) has argued, "By international consensus, ECOMOG in West Africa acquired firm normative and legal status under international humanitarian law". We do believe that this is as a result of cooperation and tacit support from the UN and the rest of the international community. The issue here however, is not that of cooperation and support from the UN, but on the interpretation(s) given to the issue of Regional Arrangements. Are the regional arrangements supposed to be ad hoc or permanent? After all, the UN peace-keeping efforts are carried out on ad hoc basis. But ECOMOG which falls under the regional arrangements to resolve crisis has acquired a permanent status. One could therefore ask whether or not recognition or cooperation from the UN with ECOWAS on this issue means the same thing as legality or legitimacy? If so, which appropriate legal instrument is responsible for this from the UN, which has the sole authority for the maintenance of international peace and security.

What we observe is rather cooperation from UN, but the proper legal entanglements have not been properly strengthened out. This has largely remained

silent, but since ECOMOG was launched in Liberia in August 1990, there has been cooperation between ECOWAS and the UN. In fact this approach to regional peace-keeping operation also engaged the attention of the UN which culminated in the UN and AU concept for regional standby force for the continent. This cooperation and work relation between the ECOWAS and UN led to the establishment of the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) in September 2002.



## REFERENCES

- Aboagye, F.B. and Rupiya, M.R. (2005) "Enhancing Post-conflict Democratic Governance through Effective Security Reform in Liberia", in Aboagye, F.B. and Bah, M.S. (2005) *A Tortuous Road to Peace: The Dynamics of Regional, UN and International Humanitarian Interventions in Liberia*. Pretoria: Institute for Security studies, ISS.
- Ampah, S. 2008) "Aiming Bush's Africa Command and against Nkrumah's African High Command", available on the internet at: <http://theghanaijournal.com/2008/02/19/aiming-bushaays-africa-command-against-nkr>
- Ate, B.E (2001) "The ECOMOG Concept: Enhancing Regional Capacity for Conflict and Security Management in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century" in Akindele, RA. And Ate, B.E. (eds., 2001) *Beyond Conflict Resolution: Managing African Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*; The African Security Project: NIIA Security Studies Series. Ibadan: Vantage Publishers.
- Barsalou, J., (2005), "Trauma and Transitional Justice in Divided Societies", Special Report 135, US Institute of Peace April 2005.

Claude, I.L. Jr. (1971) *Swords into Plowshares: The Problem and Progress of International Organization*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition, New York: Random House.

Cohn, T.H (2005) (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition) *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice*.  
New York: PEARSONLongman.

Constitutive Act of the African Union; available on the internet at:  
<http://www.oau-oua.org/LOME2000/Africa%20Union%20Constitutive%20Act%20ENG.htm>

ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security, December, 1999.

Fournier, D. (1999), "The Alfonsin Administration and the Promotion of Democratic Values in the Southern Cone and the Andes", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 31, pp. 39-74.

Howe, H., (1996-97) "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping", *International Security*, Vol. 21, No.3 (Winter, 1996-1997) 145-176.

Human Rights Watch, 'Letter to Mr. Madibo Sidibe Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Mali and Chairperson of the Joint Implementation Committee of the Abidjan Peace Agreement', Africa Division Jan. 23, 2005.

Hurell, A. (1995), "Regionalism in the Americas", in Fawcett, L. and Hurell, A. (eds.) *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Liberia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission inaugurated; SRSG Doss announces \$500,000 donation from UNDP, available at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ABES-6M8LZQ?OpenDocument>

Machiavelli, N. (1981), *The Prince*, London: Penguin Books

Omagu, D.O. (2001) *Regional Peace and Security: A Historical Perspective of the Role of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone*. Calabar: Ushie Printers and Pub. Co. Ltd.

Schmitter, P.C. (1991), "Change in Regime Type and Progress in International Relations", in Adler, E. and Crawford, B. (eds.) *Progress in Postwar International Relations*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Act, 2000.

Soremekun 'K (2006) "Contemporary African responses to existing Security Scenarios: Challenges and Opportunities of Engagement for West African states, in Mwagiru, M. and Oculi, O. (eds.; 2006) *Rethinking Global Security: An African Perspective?* Nairobi: Heinrich Boll Foundation.

South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 5.

Stromberg, T. (1998) "Did Regional Integration Save Democracy in Paraguay? Analysis of Changing levels of Governance, available on the internet at: [www.ciaonet.org/isa/pah01/](http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/pah01/), accessed February 16, 2008.

The Dynamics of Regional, UN and International Humanitarian Interventions in Liberia. Pretoria: Institute for Security studies, ISS. (2005) A Tortuous Road Peace:

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### 7.0 CONCLUSION

#### 7.1 SYNOPSIS:

What we have tried to do in this research work is to examine how regional security has affected the integration process in west Africa, and to evaluate the effectiveness of ECOMOG as a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as investigate possible alternatives to conflict resolution in the context of west Africa. In the second limb of our research, we attempt to study the linkage between economic integration and regional security in the context of the ECOWAS experiment.

The main objective of ECOWAS was to achieve economic integration and shared development so as to form a unified economic zone in West Africa. Later on the Scope was increased to include security matters because of the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone which sent serious warning signal on the lacunae which existed in the effort to nurture economic integration without regional security. Although, ECOWAS became concerned early with peace and regional security which are necessary factors in the socio-economic development of member states, it did not pay much attention to it. Thus, with the adoption of the Non-aggression Protocol in 1978, and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense, none of them was operationalized until the necessity that was Liberian crisis and war. This was followed by the Political Principles in July 1991. At this time it dawned on the entire sub-region that a successful regional economic integration can only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace and stability.

Indeed, ECOMOG served as a useful tool and mechanism for the resolution of conflict within the West African sub-region, considering the circumstances of its coming into being. There were obvious constraints to its operations in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, but it restored peace and ushered in democratically elected governments in both countries with the support of the international community and the UN, under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In the context of ECOMOG operations in both countries, it tried as much as possible to be a neutral force, despite the sub-regional politics attendant upon its establishment and how it was manipulated by certain interests within the sub-region. This very fact was bemoaned by some of the war lords in the Liberian civil war during my interview with them in my field work. However, ECOMOG in the effort to bring peace in both countries tried as much as possible to go where other multi-lateral forces found too dangerous to go.

In general, there were some measure of indifference and resentment about military enterprise in Liberia and Sierra Leone among Francophone and Lusophone countries that largely saw the crises in both countries as Anglophone affairs, coupled with Nigeria's ubiquitous presence in the sub-region and in the whole effort to bring peace in the countries concerned. No precise figure was officially made available as to what Nigeria or ECOWAS spent in the enterprise, even though most Nigerians felt that the economic difficulties were acute and the country and the government should not be spending so much money on foreign adventures no matter how well intentioned.

Regional security has largely affected the integration process in West Africa through the attitudes of the core states in West Africa. These attitudes are determined mainly by economic motives. There is also the divide which has constituted hiccups in the achievement of meaningful economic integration of the West African sub-region. The Franco-phone and Anglo-phone divide and the sometimes unhealthy rivalry between them is a major factor in the much needed cohesion of the sub-region. This is also amply demonstrated during the formation of ECOMOG, and the ECOMOG operations in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. There is also the issue of familial ties between the Tolbert of Liberia, Houphouët Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire and Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso which also played a role in the initial disagreement and logjam during the formation of ECOMOG, its role and the resolution of conflict in Liberia. However, it may be too early to make any meaningful assessment on how regional security has affected the integration process in West Africa, based on the Liberian and Sierra Leonean experiences. This is because the two case studies are still struggling to consolidate on their nascent democracy, though Sierra Leone seems to be more stable than Liberia. The Liberian case is made more difficult because of the fact that most of the warlords who committed heinous crimes against humanity are today walking free on the streets of Liberia, and some are occupying important positions in government, including the Liberian parliament. This was made possible by the Liberian Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Even so, the differences in natural and human resource endowments, with the attendant institutional and administrative systems, among the ECOWAS member states remain a stumbling block to the economic integration of the sub-region. This is because, these remarkable differences significantly and constantly shape their commitment, relations

and ability to participate meaningfully in the sub-regional economic integration programmes.

ECOMOG has served a very useful purpose in the resolution of conflict in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. The operations of ECOMOG in both countries have been acclaimed as being fundamental to the restoration of normalcy in both countries. This can be justified with the relative peace and security we experience in both countries today. But there are still inadequacies to be addressed. How this could be done is still a matter of controversy between the practitioners and even among scholars. However, ECOMOG has been institutionalised as a mechanism for conflict resolution in West Africa. This alone has not addressed the effectiveness or otherwise of ECOMOG. The effectiveness is affected by many factors, including, the politics of the sub-region, the funding of ECOWAS, external influences where global politics play out, especially the western influence. We could find out that despite the tremendous effort expended by ECOWAS and ECOMOG, it seemed to pale into insignificance with the intervention of the United Nations in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. It therefore creates the impression that the UN takes the glory of victory after the ECOMOG has performed the vital functions. This is why some have argued that since ECOWAS has not carried the job to its logical conclusion, it cannot therefore claim to be in total control of the situation on the ground in the sub-region as far as security is concerned. This therefore puts the effectiveness of the mechanism in this regard into question.

With regard to alternative(s) to the resolution of conflict in West Africa, the first of such alternatives is the strengthening of democratic institutions among member states. This



includes the empowerment of the atomized and helpless, respect for the fundamental rights of the citizens, and good governance. In the case of Liberia for instance, there is the more serious problem of the erosion of family values. This erosion of family values coupled with severe economic disempowerment made it easy for the war lords to recruit and use the helpless youth to further their selfish interests. For instance, this fact partly explains why Charles Taylor, an Americo-Liberian found it easy to recruit the indigenous Liberians to further his selfish agenda in that country. This is also largely true about Sierra Leone. The resort to genuine democratic norms by the ECOWAS member states would support the democratic peace proposition and the enviable record set by MERCUSOR in solving its regional conflict in the Southern Cone.

There is also the need to solve the problem of ethnicity which in a way has helped in escalating conflicts, especially in Liberia during the last days of Taylor in office. The Mandingoes who are one of the major ethnic groups in Liberia is a trans-border ethnic group. They are found in Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone, and the Gios are also the Jakubas of Cote d'Ivoire. These ethnic groups face the problem of indigene/settler dichotomy in these countries where they are in the minority, coupled with the deep-seated animosity among them. The adoption of genuine regional integration whereby states harbouring trans-border ethnic groups will agree to harmonize their policies and citizenship requirements as a principle of good governance will go a long way in providing a lasting solution to these crises. These states will recognise their citizenship rights as long as they fulfil their duties and obligations to the states where they live. The state should reciprocate by according them their constitutional rights and privileges.

When these problems are taken care of at the state level among the ECOWAS member states, there is also the need to streamline the activities of ECOMOG, either in terms of its being incorporated as part of the proposed collective defence mechanism for the African Union or a more definitive role given to it by UN which recognizes regional arrangements in the resolution of conflicts. This would solve the problem of inviting or the intervention of the UN mid-way into the operations of ECOMOG. There is also the need to substantially minimize the use of ECOMOG as a political tool to which it is sometimes subjected to by some West African leaders.

## **7.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE**

From the findings above, this research has made the following contributions to knowledge:

1. This research work has amply demonstrated that there is a very strong linkage between economic integration and regional security. We have been able to prove that, there is no way any genuine and legitimate business and economic development can take place in an unstable and volatile environment. The realisation of this lacunae in West Africa led to the various Protocols and Mechanisms now put in place by the ECOWAS leadership, in order to forestall future crises in the sub-region, and in the process hasten regional integration and development;
2. That because of the prevalent cases of poverty and hunger among the populace there is need to strengthen the economy and family ties of the contending groups

which make them vulnerable as tools of violence in conflict situations. In essence, nation-building and security should be pursued simultaneously with regional integration, in order to also close the existing gap between regional security and economic integration in West Africa.

3. That contrary to argument by some scholars that ethnicity and religion (in themselves) constitute the main causes of conflict in West Africa, this research has shown that poverty, hunger and unemployment constitute part of the major factors that provoke violent conflicts in the sub-region. This factor is however thrown into sharper relief by the undemocratic nature of most West African states, which also fosters mal-governance in the sub-region. This is why the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance has become necessary;
4. That the remarkable disparity in both natural and human resource endowments and the different institutional and administrative systems, which constantly shape the politics of the sub-region, significantly affect meaningful economic integration among ECOWAS member states. The solution lies in curing the apparent prejudices that exist among member states.

### **7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES**

This research work recommends that further studies should be carried out in the following areas which are tangential to our work:

- Why violent conflict has persisted in West Africa despite the various mechanisms put in place by ECOWAS. This is important because since the institutionalization of ECOMOG as a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, several other conflicts have occurred in West Africa. The Liberian case is still volatile; this is why there is still heavy and ubiquitous UNMIL presence in Liberia. This researcher also found out during his field work that the Liberian peace is still very fragile. This was also confirmed by one of the war lords interviewed, Prince Yormie Johnson, who is now a Senior Senator in the Liberian Parliament. He expressed serious misgivings when the question of guaranteed peace was posed to him. He was seriously dissatisfied with the way things were going on. His complaint ranged from corruption in the executive arm, to diversion of arms (by the executive) donated by Nigerian government for equipping the Police force among others.
- To explore the possibility of having one common defence force in West Africa, because of the Francophone/Anglophone divide (ECOMOG/ANAD). This may perhaps find solution on the best way to bring about harmony in their operations and also have one body to fight a common problem in the same sub-region;

- There is need to study the ECOWAS Parliament with a view to examine the possibility(ies) of making laws that should be binding on member states, especially laws that will abhor coups and resolutions and policies that would make for good governance. This is necessary because, since it was established by Articles 6 and 13 of the 1993 Revised Treaty, of which the Protocol was signed in Abuja on August 6, 1994, the existing selection process has serious deficiency in stamping its authority on decisions that affect its peoples, thereby hampering the quality of democracy in the sub-region
- The future of ECOMOG in the light of the position of the African Union, AU, on common defence policy for the African continent and the United Nations on regional security. The essence of this is to forestall a situation where ECOMOG will stop midway only for the UN to come and take credit for the major work done by ECOMOG;
- Why other economic integration bodies with the same principles and purposes as ECOWAS have succeeded without a conflict resolution mechanism in the mode of ECOMOG, other economic integration bodies do not have the type of conflict resolution mechanism like ECOWAS. But they are successful and have largely achieved the purposes and objectives for which they were set up. The EU in this pioneering endeavour does not

have this type of conflict resolution mechanism. Even though it may be excused for relying on NATO for this purpose, but NATO does not necessarily or primarily serve the regional interest(s) of the EU. We can also make reference to others like MERCOSUR, SADC, EAC, among others.

#### **7.4 CONCLUSION**

ECOWAS has continued to strive towards the realization of its aims and objectives, especially the integration of the countries of the sub-region through the harmonization of national economic, social and political policies. It has continued to encourage the promotion of democracy in the sub-region on the basis of political pluralism and respect for fundamental human rights as embodied in the universally recognized international instruments on human rights and in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. To this end, it can be argued that ECOWAS has survived within the framework of its original objectives and principles in spite of the vicissitudes it continues to face.

The establishment of ECOMOG reflects the determination by the Community to deal with conflict and security issues in the sub-region. In furtherance of this, members agreed to establish an observation and monitoring system and a number of organs that would assist in containing and diffusing imminent conflicts. This is why ECOWAS created four observation centres in Banjul (The Gambia), Cotonou (Benin), Monrovia (Liberia), and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). This development underscores a commitment in conflict

management and security in the sub-region, in addition to ECOMOG's traditional operational concepts of intervention, peace enforcement and peacekeeping.

It has been stated that conflict resolution is generic and quite broad, and the causes and application of conflict resolution principles differ from region to region. The ECOWAS experience is therefore dependent upon the peculiar circumstances it found herself, and was also concerned with employing mechanisms that would appeal to the political realities of the Community. However, even if ECOMOG may not be indispensable as a mechanism for the resolution of conflict in West Africa, we may as well see that direct and complete external intervention could further exacerbate the problems. In other words, conflicts in West Africa could be resolved without ECOMOG, but it also has associated implications. This is why we investigated how other economic integration bodies have become successful without a resolution mechanism in the mode of ECOMOG, and MERCOSUR is our reference point. Nigeria could play the positive role that Brazil is playing in MERCOSUR with the active collaboration of other core states in West Africa.

Perhaps this is partly the reason why Nigeria was instrumental to the establishment of ECOMOG. Nigeria contributed huge financial resources and personnel to ensure the sustenance of ECOMOG throughout the period it was on the ground. If ECOMOG was to exist without Nigeria's role, its achievements would probably have been limited and its existence shortlived. And perhaps without ECOMOG, Taylor may have found it very easy to overrun Liberia and take over power from Doe. But the effect of this may also have been catastrophic, because as Nwolise (1997:52) opines,

..., when one considers the greater catastrophe that would have befallen the sub-region if Taylor had had his initial success, it would become clear that even if the Liberian crisis ended in July 1990 (before ECOMOG's formation) the after effects would have continued to be felt in the sub-region for a long time due to the domino effect

This is why it is necessary for the ECOWAS member states to imbibe democratic culture which its counterparts elsewhere have made a *sine qua non* for membership application. The basic issue is that democracy has inbuilt mechanism for conflict resolution, and the conflict that engulfed the sub-region would not have been possible, (at least not up to the magnitude of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean disaster) if the two countries and the rest of the member states are democracies.

The history of regional security clearly shows that it started as an effort to checkmate the western powers. Further to this is the recommendation for regional integration to deepen stability of which the works of the functionalists was very crucial. It has also been acknowledged that since the functionalists gave intellectual backing and depth to integration, no war in the magnitude of the world wars 1 and 11 has occurred. Therefore, it is very important to acknowledge the importance of regional security in the midst of economic integration. This positive linkage should be explored by ECOWAS, and since this was not given adequate attention *ab initio*, it could be imperative to pursue regional security and economic integration of West Africa simultaneously. When this is done and with the maturity and consolidation of democracy in the sub-region, a time may come when ECOMOG may no longer be necessary as a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution in West Africa.



## REFERENCE

Nwolise, O.B.C. "ECOMOG and Peacekeeping in Liberia: Effects on Political Stability in the West African Sub-region", in *Africa Peace Review*, Abuja: Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, 1997.

## REFERENCES

- Aboagye, F.B. (1999) *ECOMOG: A Sub-Regional Experience in Conflict Resolution Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia*. Accra: Sedco Publishing Ltd.
- ACCORD, *Paying the Price: the Sierra Leone Peace Process*. Issue 9, March, 2000
- Address by General Ibrahim Babangida at the 13<sup>th</sup> Summit of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, held in Banjul, the Gambia, May 28-30, 1990
- Adebajo A. (2002) *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rinner Publishers
- Adedeji, A. A. (1974) *The Evolution of a West African Economic Community*, Lagos, Federal Government Press
- Adedeji, A. (1999) *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*. London: Zed Books
- Adeleke, A., "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Ecowas Operations in Liberia". *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1995), 569-593
- Aderinwale, A.; Abdullahi, B.; and Dia, M., (1999) "Sub-regional Security Protocols and Demilitarization in Africa, Otta: ALF, UNDP and ARIAS, May.

- Adisa, J. (1993), "Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Undercurrents and the Burden of Community Spirit", in Owoeye, J. (ed., 1993) *Nigeria in International Institutions*. Ibadan: College Press Ltd.
- Africa Research Bulletin (1966) V.3
- Africa South of the Sahara, 21<sup>st</sup> Edition, Europe Publications, 1992
- African Concord, July 30, 1990
- Akabogu, C. (1992) "ECOWAS Takes the Initiative", in Vogt, M. A. (Ed.) (1992) *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace-keeping*. Lagos: Gabumo Pub. Co. Ltd.
- Ake, C. (1992) "The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa", *CREDU Occasional Publication Number. 1*
- Ake, C. (1994) "Democratization of Disempowerment in Africa", *CASS Occasional Monograph No. 1*.
- Ake, C. (1995) "The Causes of Conflict in Africa: A Research Proposal", Port Harcourt: CASS
- Akinbobola, A. (2000) "Nigeria's Leadership Role in the Resolution of the Liberian Crisis: An Evaluation of Bilateral Relations and Regional Response" and "Abuja Accord and the Resolution of the Liberian Crisis: Implications for Nigeria's Leadership Role in the West African Sub-region", in, Akinbobola, A., (2000) *Regionalism and Regional Influentials: The Post Cold-War Role of Nigeria in African Affairs*. Lagos: Concept Publications Ltd.

- Akinbobola, A. (2007) *Regional Integration in West Africa: Challenge for Emergent States*. Lagos: Political and Administrative Resource Centre, (PARC).
- Akindele, RA. And Ate, B.E. (eds., 2001) *Beyond Conflict Resolution: Managing African Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. The African Security Project: NIIL Security Studies Series. Ibadan: Vantage Publishers.
- Akinyemi, A.B.; Falegan, S.B.; and Aluko, I.A.; (Eds., 1984) *Readings and Documents on ECOWAS*. Nigeria; McMillan.
- Akinyeye, O.A.(1993) "Regional Security and Integration: The ECOWAS Case", *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 19. No. 2.
- Akpan, M.B. (1973) "Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule over the African Peoples of Liberia", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol.7, No.2.
- Alan, T., Chataway, J., and Whytes, M. (1998) *Finding out Fast*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
- Alie, J.A.D. (2000) "Background to the Conflict (1961 – 1991); What Went Wrong and Why?", in Ayissi, A., and Poulton, R. (eds.) (2000), *Bound to Cooperate: Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, United Nations: United Nations Disarmament Research, UNIDIR.
- Anadi, S. K. M., (2005) "Regional Integration in Africa: The Case of ECOWAS". Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Arts, University of Zurich.
- Anderson, C.L., et al (1990) Evaluation Review, (April) 14, 182-191
- Anifowose, R. (1982) *Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba, Experience*. Enugu: Nok Pub. International.

- Anikpo, M. (1986) *Foundations of Social Science Research: A Methodological Guide for Students*. Enugu: ABIC Publishers
- Apter, D. A., and Coleman, J., (1964) "Pan-Africanism or Nationalism in Africa", in AMSAC, Pan Africanism Reconsidered, cited in Le Vine, V. T., "The Politics of Partition in Africa: the Cameroons and the Myth of Unification", *JIA*, Vol. Xviii 2.
- Arikpo, O., "Nigeria and the OAU", lecture delivered at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, July 31, 1974
- Asante, S.K.B., (1986) *The Political Economy of Regionalism In Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Asante, S.K.B. (2004) "The Travails of Integration", in Adebajo, A. and Rashid, I. (eds. 2004) *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Asiwaju, A.I. "Socioeconomic Integration of the West African sub-region in Historical Context: Focus on the European Colonial Period", in Akinyemi, A. B. et al (ed. 1984) *Readings and Documents on ECOWAS*. Lagos: NIIA
- Asobie, H.A. (2008) "Conceptual and Theoretical Issues in Regional Integration in West Africa: The Nigerian Perspective. A Paper presented at the International Conference on Regional Integration, Lagos Airport Hotel, Ikeja, Lagos, February 26-29, 2008.
- Ate, B. E., (1992) "Before Perestroika: African and American Perceptions of Regional Security in Africa", *NIIA*, Vol.18, No.1.

- Atkinson, P. and Coffey, O. (1996) *Making Sense of Qualitative Data: Complementary Research Strategies*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bah, M. S. (2004) "ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Constructing a Security Regime in West Africa", Unpublished Ph. D., thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.
- Balassa, B. (1962) *The Theory of Economic Integration*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Barsalou, J. "Trauma and Transitional Justice in Divided Societies", Special Report 135, US Institute of Peace April 2005.
- Bayraytay, A. (2000) "Arms Control Policy Under Threat: Dealing with the Plague of Corruption", in Ayissi, A., and Poulton, R., (ed.) *Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, Geneva, Switzerland UNIDIR.
- Boateng, E.A. (1978) *A Political Geography of Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bassey, C. (1993) "Nigeria in ECOMOG: Dilemma of Preventive Diplomacy?" in *International Institutions*. Ibadan: College Press Ltd.
- Bennett, A. L. (1995) *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
- Bigombe, B., Collier, P., and Sambanis, N., "Policies for Building Post-Conflict Peace", *Journal of African Economies*, 9, October, 2000.
- Boh, H., (2000) "ECOWAS Adopts Curriculum to Control the Flow of Small Arms", Abuja: The West Africa Bulletin, December, No.8.

- Boulding, K.E. (1962) *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory*. New York: Harper and Row
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., and Lalman, D.,(1992) *War and Reason*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Burton, J. (1993), "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy", in, Sandole D. and Hugo van der Merwe (ed., 1993) *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice*. Manchester University Press.
- Burton J. (1994) *The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass
- Bush, R. and Folger, J. (1996) *Image, Identity, and Conflict Resolution*. US Institute of Peace
- Butler and Howell (1980) *Coping with Growth: Community Needs Assessment Techniques*. Corvallis, OR: Western Rural Development Centre.
- Caffarella, R.S. (1982) "Identifying Client Needs", *Journal of Extension*, (July/August), 5-11
- Charter of the United Nations, and Statute of the International Court of Justice, United Nations, New York.
- Claude, I. L. Jr. (1971) *Swords into Plowshares: The Problem and Progress of International Organization*. 4<sup>th</sup> edition, New York: Random House.
- Clower, R.W. et al (1966) *Growth Without Development*. Evanston: North-Western University Press.
- Cole, N.J.O., "Arms Smuggling: A Challenging Issue for the Customs Service in

- Post-War Sierra Leone", in Ayissi, A., and Poulton, R. (eds., 2000), *Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR.
- Collier, P and Hoeffler, A. "Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars", Policy Research Working Paper, 2355, Washington DC: World Bank 2000.
- Coser, L.A. (1954) *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict*. New York: Free Press.
- Coser, L.A. (1956) *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.
- Crisis Group Africa Report, No.87, "Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States", Dakar/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 8 December, 2004.
- Dahrendorf, R. (1958) "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2.
- Daily Champion, July 13,, 1990; August 30, 1990
- Decision of the Authority (A/ Dec/10/5/90)
- De Mesquita, B. B.; Morrow, J. D.; Siverson, R. M., and Smith, A.(1999) "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace", *American Political Science Review, APSR*, vol.93, No.4.
- Deutsch, K.W. (1954) *Political Community at the International Level*
- Deutsche, M. (1991), "Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution", in, Vayrynen, R., (ed., 1991) *New Directions in Conflict Theory*. London: Sage Publications
- Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.L. Jr., (1986, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*. New York: Harper and Row.



- "Early Civil Society Peace Initiatives", in Lord, D (Ed.) (2000) *Paying the Price: The Sierra Leone Peace Process*, Accord, Issue 9.
- ECOWAS Official Journal Vol. 1., June 7, 1990
- ECOWAS Document, 1992
- ECOWAS Revised Treaty, Abuja: ECOWAS Executive Secretariat
- Engaging Sierra Leone*, CDD Strategy Planning Series No.4; Round-Table on Reconciliation and State-Building, Lome, Togo, June 21 – 22 1999: A Report by the Centre for Democracy and Development, London;
- Evans, G. (1993) *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*. Australia: Allen and Unwin Pty Ltd.
- Final Communiqué , First Session of ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, held in Banjul, The Gambia, August 6-7, 1990
- Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1981) *Getting to Yes*. New York: Penguin Books
- Frankel, J. (1973) *Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Fung, I.R. "Control and Collection of Light Weapons in the Sahel-Sahara Sub-region: A Mission Report". *Disarmament*, Vol. 19, 1996
- Galtung, J. (1975) "Structural Theory of Violence", in Mendlovitz, S.H., (ed., 1975) *On the Creation of a Just World Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990s*. Amsterdam: North- Holland Pub. Co.; The Netherlands Institute for World Order.
- Galtung, J. (1992) *The Way is the Goal: Gandhi Today*. Gujarath Vidyapith, Ahmedabad.

- Galtung, J. (1994) *Peace by Peaceful Means*. Peace and Conflicts Development and Civilization, Sage Publications.
- Gillham, B., (2004) *Case Study Research Methods*. New York: Real World Research.
- Gurr, T.R. (1970) *Why Men Rebel*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Haas, E B. (1958) *The Uniting of Europe*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Haas, E.B. (1964) *Beyond the Nation-State*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Haas, E.B. "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing", in Lindberg, L. and Scheingold, S. (eds., 1971) *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*. Harvard University Press
- Hammersley, M. C. (1985) "From Ethnography to Theory: A Programme and Paradigm for Case Study Research", in *The Sociology of Education, Sociology*, 19 (2)
- Hazlewood, A. (ed. 1967) *African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in Economic and Political Union*. London New York Toronto: Oxford University Press
- Howe, H. "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping". *International Security*, Vol. 21, No.3 (Winter, 1996-1997).
- Imobighe, T.A. (2003) *The OAU (AU) and OAS in Regional Conflict Management: A Comparative Assessment*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.
- Intriligator, M.D. (1982) "Research on Conflict Theory: Analytic Approaches and Areas of Application", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 26 No.2, June 1982 307-327.

- Johnson, Yomi (2003) *The Rise and Fall of President Samuel K. Doe: A Time to Heal and Rebuild Liberia*. Lagos: SOMA Associates.
- Kerlinger, F.N. (1986) *Foundations of Behavioural Research*. Japan: CBS Publishing Ltd
- Khobe M.M., "The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa", Monograph No.44 Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000, also available at <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monograph/No44/ECOMOG.html>; assessed July 20, 2006
- Lavergne, R. (ed., 1997) *Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspective*. Eritrea: International World Press.
- Levine, V. T. A., (1964) "The Politics of Partition in West Africa: The Cameroons and the Myth of Unification", *JIA*, Vol. Xviii 2
- Levitt, J. (1998) "Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone". *Temple International and Comparative Law Journal*, Vol. 12
- Lombaerde, P. (nd) "Regional Integration and Peace", United Nations University; Comparative Regional Integration Studies, (UNU-CRIS), Bruges.
- Mabogunje, A., (1971) "The Land and Peoples of West Africa", in Ajayi, J.F.A. and Crowder, M. (eds., 1971) *History of West Africa*. London: Longman.
- Mack, R.W. and Snyder, R.C., "The Analysis of Social Conflict: Toward an Overview and Synthesis". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1, No.2, June 1957.

- Malan, M, et al (2002) "Peace keeping in Sierra Leone", ISS Monograph Series,  
No. 68, Jan. 2002.
- Martin, G. (nd.) "Conflict Resolution in Africa", paper presented at the conference  
for Reversal of a Culture of Violence and Control of Smarview of the way  
in which African conflicts should be Analyzed, School of Government,  
University of the western Cape.
- Maoz, Z., and Abdolali, N., (1989) "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1817-  
1976". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (March): 3-35
- McKillip, J., (1987) *Needs Analysis: Tools for the Human Services and Education*.  
Newbury Park, CA: Sage
- Mesquita, B. and Lalman, D. (1992) *War and Reason*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale  
University Press.
- Michel, R. R.(2004) "The Integration of West Africa", *UW-L Journal of Undergraduate  
Research, VII*.
- Miles, M. and Huberman, A. (1994) *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded  
Sourcebook*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. Thousand Oak, London: Sage Publications Inc.
- Mitchel, C.R. (1993) "Problem-Solving Exercises and Theories of Conflict Resolution",  
in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo Van der Merwe (eds.) *Conflict  
Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*. Manchester  
and New York: Manchester University Press.
- Mitrany, D. (1943) "The Road to Security", *Peace Aims Pamphlet, No.29*.

- Mitrany, D. (1966) *A Working Peace System*, cited in; Claude, I.L. Jr., (1971) *Swords into Plowshares: The problem and Progress of International Organization*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., New York: Random House.
- Morgan, T. C.. and Swebach, V., (1992) "Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?" *International Interactions* 17 (No. 4): 305-320
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1948) *Politics Among Nations*. New York: Knopf.
- New African, (London), June 1978.
- Newswatch, May 14, 1990; June 11, 1990; July 30, 1990; August, 13, 1990; October 1, 1990
- Nnoli, O. (2003) "Security of Africa in the Emerging Global Environment: What Role for the Military", Abuja: NWC; Graduation Lecture Series, No. 8.
- Nwachukwu, I. *et al* (1991) *Nigeria and ECOWAS since 1985: Towards a Dynamic Regional Integration*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd. and Lagos: NIIA
- Nwokedi, E. "African Security: Issues and Problems in the 1990s and to the Next Millennium", in Vogt, M.A. and Aminu, L.S. (1996, Vol. 1) *Peace Keeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.
- Nwolise, O.B., (1992) "The Internationalization of the Liberian Crisis And its Effects on West Africa", in Vogt, M.A. (ed., 1992) *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace-keeping*. Lagos: Gabumo Pub. Ltd.

- Nwolise, O.B. C. "ECOMOG Peacekeeping Operations in Liberia: Effects on Political Stability in the West African Sub-region", in *Africa Peace Review*, Abuja: Centre for Peace Research and Conflict Resolution, 1997.
- Nye, J. Jr. (1971) *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*. Boston: Little Brown
- Ofodile, A.C. (1994) "The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia". *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, Vol. 32 No. 2
- Okubor, C.O. (2000) "The Sierra Leone Crisis", *The Nigerian Army Journal*, Vol. 9, No.3, March 2000.
- Omagu, D.O. (2001) *Regional Peace and Security: A Historical Perspective of the Role of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone*. Calabar: Ushie Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd.
- Oni, S.K. (2002) *The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations: Liberia and Sierra Leone*. Ibadan: Sam Bookman Pub.
- Onwuka, R.I. (1982) *Development and Integration in West Africa: The Case of ECOWAS*. Ife; University of Ife Press.
- Onwuka, R.I. and Sesay, A., (eds., 1985) *The Future of Regionalism in Africa*. McMillan Publishers.
- Otite, O. and Albert, I.O. (eds., 1999) *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation*. Ibadan, Spectrum Books Ltd.
- Plessz, N.G. (1968) *Problems and Prospects of Economic Integration in West Africa*. Montreal: McGill University Press

- Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, done at Freetown, May 29, 1981; in  
Nigeria Treaties in Force, 1970-90
- Ray, J. L., (1995) *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of The  
Democratic Peace Proposition*, Columbia: University of South Carolina  
Press.
- Reno, William, (1995) *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*. Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press
- Riley, S. P., (nd) "Conflicts in Contemporary Context: The Effects of the  
Internationalization of Conflict in West Africa", Stoke on Trent:  
Staffordshire University.
- Robson, P. (1983) *Integration, Development and Equity: Economic Integration in West  
Africa*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Salla, M. E., "The Evolution of Conflict Transmutation", *Online Journal of Peace and  
Conflict Resolution, OJPCR*, Issue 3.3/ June, 2000. Available at,  
[www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/](http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/).
- Sandole, D.J.D. (1993) "Paradigm, Theories and Metaphors in Conflict Resolution:  
Coherence or Confusion", in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo Van der  
Merwe (eds., 1993) *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration  
and Application*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University  
Press.
- Sesay, Amadu (1980) "Social Inequalities, Ethics, Heterogeneity and Political Instability:  
The Case of Liberia", *Plural Societies* (The Hague), vol. 11, No.3,  
Autumn.

- Sesay, A. (1983) "The Liberian Revolution: Forward Match, Stop, About-Face Turn",  
*Conflict Quarterly*: Fredericton, Canada, Summer.
- Sesay, Amadu (1984) "Conflict and Collaboration: Liberia and her West African  
 Neighbours", *Journal of Political Science* (Zaria) vol.3, No.2, December.
- Sesay, Amadu (1992) "Historical Background to the Liberian Crisis", in Vogt, M.A. (ed.,  
 1992) *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional  
 Peace Keeping*. Lagos: Gabumo Pub. Co. Ltd.
- Shaw, T. (1964) "The Prehistory of West Africa", in Ajayi, J.F.A. and Crowder, M.  
 (eds.,1971) *History of West Africa*. London: Longman
- Singer, K. (1949) *The Idea of Social Conflict*. Melbourne: University Press.
- The Guardian Newspapers, August 5, 1990; February 7, 1991
- The Master Sergeant of the Revolution, Monrovia: Ministry of Information and Culture,  
 June, 1981
- The Nigerian Economist, July 9, 1990
- Toure, A. (2002) "The Role of Civil Society in Nation Reconciliation and Peace  
 building in Liberia" International Peace Academy, April 2002.
- UN Security Council Resolution (S/RES/1132, 1997)
- Vogt, M.A. and Aminu, L. S. (eds., 1996) *Peace keeping as a Security Strategy in  
 Africa:Chad and Liberia as Case Studies. Vols. 1 and 2*, Enugu: Fourth  
 Dimension Pub.
- Webster's (1961) *3rd International Dictionary Unabridged*. London: G.Bell and Sons  
 Ltd.
- West Africa, March 17, 1980, April 21, 1980



West Africa Magazine, February 24-March, 1992

Wilmot, W. W. and Hocker, J. L. (1998) *Interpersonal Conflict*. Boston, Massachusetts:  
McGraw Hill.

World Development Report (1979) Washington, D.C., World Bank.

Yande – Diop, A., (1999) "Towards the Enforcement of the Moratorium on the  
Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West  
Africa", Abuja: The West Africa Bulletin, October, No. 7

Yin, R. K. (1984) *Case Study Research: Designs and Methods*. London: Sage

Zartman, I .W. (1989) *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New  
York Oxford: Oxford University Press

Ziegler, D.W. (1990 5<sup>th</sup> ed.) *War, Peace and International Politics*. Glenview, Illinois:  
Scott, Foresman and Co.

## APPENDIX 1

### CASE STUDY PROTOCOL

- Personalities Interviewed:
- ECOMOG Field commander: Major Gen. (rtd.) Tunji Olurin, the researcher posed several questions to him during the public presentation of Adekeye Adebajo's book, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa*, in 2002 at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Victoria Island, Lagos.
- UNMIL Force Commander: Lt. Gen. Isaac Chukwukadibia Obiakor, interviewed in his office at UNMIL headquarters in Monrovia, during my field work in Liberia, in November, 2007.
- INPFL Leader (Prince Yormie Johnson): now a Senior Senator in the Liberian Senate, interviewed in his home at the outskirts of Monrovia during my field work in Liberia in November, 2007.
- ECOMOG P. R. O. in Sierra Leone: Col. Chris Olukolade (now Force P.R.O.), interviewed in his office at Bonny Camp, Lagos, in July, 2001.
- ECOMOG Soldiers: Col. Jonah Isa Bawa, and others interviewed at a venue in Ikoyi, Lagos in 2005
- ECOWAS Chief of Division, Documentation: Mr. H.A. Warkani, interviewed in his office at the ECOWAS headquarters, Abuja, during one of my field work trips in Abuja in 2005
- Experts in Institutes of Conflict Resolution (as mentioned in the research methodology)
- Academics, who are experts in Conflict Studies (especially in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts); Prof. Osita Eze, Dr. Yoroms, 2005 (both of Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja; note that Prof. Eze is now the Director General of NIIA, Lagos; Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, during his book presentation at NIIA, 2002, Lagos; Dr. Fred Agwu, scholar and research fellow, NIIA, Lagos;

Martin Scott (Assistant Professor) and Director for International Partnership and Coordinator of Adjunct Faculty of the University of Liberia, November, 2007, etc

- Former Director West Africa, International Crisis Group, A research Think Tank in Conflict Studies; and Adviser to the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General in Liberia, and recently appointed Director for West Africa, International Centre for Transitional Justice, Cape Town, South Africa, Dr. Comfort Ero, interviewed in her office at UNMIL, headquarters during my field work in Liberia, in November, 2007.
- Officials of UNMIL AND UNAMSI (including the Head, Political, Policy and Planning Section, Dr. Femi Badejo; UNMIL Deputy Chief, Political, Policy and Planning Section, Mr. Ademola Araoye, and UNMIL Political Affairs Officer, Chris Agoha, all interviewed in their offices at UNMIL headquarters, Monrovia in November, 2007.
- Liberian Embassy Officials and the Sierra Leonean High Commission Officials during my field work in Lagos, 2005.
- Liberian Refugees in Nigeria coordinated by Samuel G. Dweh in 2004
- Nigerian Survivors of the Liberian/Sierra Leonean Wars: Augustine Nwafor, Anyaogu Okonkwo. These survivors narrated their experiences to me in Ebutte Meta, Lagos in 2006.

## APPENDIX 2

### INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Note that this interview schedule intends to direct the important issues that need clarification(s), aside from the accounts we have in textbooks, journals, newspapers, magazines and interviews granted by certain personalities on the issue of ECOMOG, regional security and conflict resolution in West Africa. The questions asked largely reflect those raised in the research questions.

Questions:

1(a) Can the objectives of ECOWAS be adequately fulfilled through this approach to peace and regional stability and integration?

1(b) Considering the original principles and objectives of ECOWAS, could it be said that in the present circumstances, these objectives and principles are being met?

2. Do you consider ECOMOG necessary, especially as an institutional mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution in West Africa?

3. From the performance of ECOMOG so far, could it be viewed as a success story considering its operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone? What are your reasons?


4. Why are some West African countries not favourably disposed to having ECOMOG?

5. Are there no alternative(s) to ECOMOG with regard to the issue of regional security?

6. Has ECOWAS tried to study the method(s) of conflict resolution in other regions?


7. What suggestions do you have for the improvement of the ECOWAS/ECOMOG as an instrument of economic integration and a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution?

# APPENDIX III



WEST AFRICA - PRESENT STATUS OF ECOWAS

# APPENDIX IV



WEST AFRICA - SHOWING THE STUDY AREA

9°W

8°N

Sierra  
Leone

8°N

Kissi

Lorma  
Mandingo

Guinea

Gbandi

Wende

Lorma

Lorma

Lofa

Kpelle

Gbarpolu

Mandingo

Mandingo

Mandingo

Mandingo

Grand Cape

Mount Gola

Vai

Gola

Kpelle

Bong Kpelle

Kpelle

Mandingo

Gola

Bomi

Vai

Gola

Kpelle

Mandingo

Grand Bassa

Bassa

Bassa

Gola

Gola

Krahn

Sargo

Krahn

Grand Jide

Krahn

Margibi

Bassa

River-Cess

Kru

Sargo

Grebo

Sino

Grebo

Grebo

River Gee

Grebo

Grebo

Grand Kru

Kru

Gr

Maryland

9°W

Map of Liberia showing potential  
inter-ethnic hostility boundaries  
Ethnic Hostility boundary line  
Hostility region  
Land Disputes between tribes

Ivory  
Coast