HEGEMONS AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA, 1960 – 2007

BY

ADEOGUN, ADEBAYO
7900097

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the memory of my parents, Chief (Hon.) Titus Oluwole Adeogun and Chief (Mrs.) Wojuola Adeogun.

ABSTRACT

The West and Southern regions of Africa are two parts that have attempted to integrate member countries within their respective regions. Regional integration in these regions of Africa have been facilitated by two hegemons who, like other hegemons, have been driven in their foreign policy pursuits by the determinants of foreign policy. Nigeria and South Africa had been two regional hegemons in the two regions respectively who have motivated integration in various ways. The work examines how the two countries have played hegemonic roles in the integration of their respective regions against the background of their national interest, domestic situation and the configuration of the international system. It discusses the different ways in which the two countries manifested hegemonic roles, the effects of such roles on integration in their regions, as well as the constraints both countries faced in their leadership roles. The work is based on some theories such as an African initiated framework of economic self-reliance and self-sustenance. Based on its findings the work contends that hegemons are crucial to integration processes, as no genuine regional integration can take place without hegemons. Hegemons provide critical all round leadership. The work further demonstrates that for regional hegemons to deepen integration in their respective regions, they must promote broad economic and political linkages. They must be willing to play the role of ‘benevolent hegemons’ by creating mutually beneficial relationships with their neighbours while ensuring that the relationship promotes long-term regional and national interests. The work further shows that the hegemonic roles of Nigeria and South Africa, though demonstrated in different ways, have contributed to the economic cooperation, growth and relative peace in their respective subregions. In addition, Nigeria and South Africa regard their member states as equal partners in the integration processes and there is no evidence to suggest that they have tried to dominate or put their weight to bear on other members of their subregions.

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LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ADB	African Development Bank
AEC	African Economic Community
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
APP	Africa Programme for Peace
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BLS	States Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Teams
CAF	Central African Federation
CBI	Cross Border Initiative
CEPT	Common Effective Preferential Tariff
CMC	Council of the Common Market
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONSAS	Constellation of Southern African States
CU	Customs Union
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Communities
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EIB	European Investment Bank

EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FLS	Frontline States
FTAs	Free Trade Areas
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISDSC	Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
ISS	Institute for Security Studies, South Africa
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
MDC	Maputo Development Corridor
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPs	Members of Parliament
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NTTB	Non-Tariff Trade Barriers
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OPDS	Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
PAC	Pan-African Congress (South Africa)
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
REC	Regional Economic Community
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RPTC	Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre

SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNITA	Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USA	United States of America
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

This work is a comparative study of the hegemonic roles of Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC towards economic integration, peace and security in their sub-regions. Hegemons play crucial leadership roles in deepening integration by promoting broad economic and political linkages in their regions. As hegemons in European integration, France and Germany made possible the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which transformed the European Community into European Union (EU) and made possible the establishment of a common currency in Europe. Similarly, as hegemon in American integration, the United States of America made possible the signing of the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in 1944.

In the same vein, Nigeria and South Africa have played hegemonic roles in efforts at integrating the West and Southern African sub-regions respectively. Nigeria as hegemon in West Africa made possible the signing of the West African Economic Community (ECOWAS) Treaty, which aims at deepening economic integration in the sub-region. South Africa on the other hand, though did not play a pioneering role in the formation of SADC, later joined the organisation after its formation and has equally been playing hegemonic role in deepening economic integration in the sub-region. The work therefore seeks to compare the contributions of Nigeria and South Africa towards sub-regional economic integration and maintenance of peace and security through their hegemonic roles in sub-regional communities (ECOWAS and SADC) respectively.

Since the 1960s, independent African states have signed a number of economic cooperation agreements at bilateral, multilateral and sub-regional levels, aimed at promoting economic cooperation and development among themselves and within their sub-regions. For instance, Nigeria began her sub-regional hegemonic role in 1972, when she and Togo initiated moves towards the establishment of an economic community, which embraced both Anglophone and Francophone West African states. This effort became a reality on 28 May 1975, when the Heads of State of fifteen West African countries in Lagos signed the Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS is unique because it bridges the Anglophone and Francophone divide, which had bedevilled previous cooperative movements in the sub-region.

In 1980, Southern African states yielded to the clarion call of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and the Lagos Plan of Action articulated in the same year by the Organisation of African Unity, by establishing an economic community in the sub-region. Nine Frontline States namely: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, established the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). SADCC aimed at reducing economic dependence on and vulnerability to the Republic of South Africa, which was, then under apartheid regime and pursuing policies antagonistic to its neighbours. This was to be achieved through building economic and particularly security infrastructure in the region. In this way, a basis for the development of the various states of southern Africa would be laid.

SADCC was therefore, established as the ‘economic pillar’ of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles in the region. Expectedly, the apartheid South African government launched total destabilisation strategy on SADCC member states with serious impact on their economies. These attacks also led to political destabilisation and civil wars in member states.

In 1992, SADCC metamorphosed into South African Development Community (SADC), an economic community aiming at deepening economic integration in the sub-region. With the collapse of the apartheid system and the establishment of majority rule in the country in 1994, The Republic of South Africa became a member of SADC, and a new relationship of cooperation and development began in the sub-region.

Despite her late entry into SADC, South Africa has moved like Nigeria into the forefront in integrative activities of the community. Nigeria and South Africa, two sub-regional powers in ECOWAS and SADC respectively, have been playing hegemonic roles in sub-regional integration. Both countries have brought their political weight, geographical size and wealth to bear on the two communities, without necessarily effecting political domination. That the two countries have been playing hegemonic roles in sub-regional integrative efforts should be seen as exercises in foreign policy pursuit. Foreign policy is determined by a number of factors such as national interests, internal political situation, economy, military strength, geography, orientation and ideology of the governing elite, and the configuration of the international system.[1]

Nigeria and South Africa have been playing constructive hegemonic roles in their respective sub-regions in which they are able not only to articulate the rules and the norms for their respective sub-regions, but also to convince other states to follow such rules, respect and adhere to the established norms. The hegemonic roles of Nigeria and South Africa in ECOWAS and SADC should be seen in terms of strong leadership and influence that both countries exercise in the affairs and activities of their sub-regions. As part of their hegemonic roles, both countries contribute over one third of the annual budgets of the two communities respectively. They are the 'industrial heart' and major trading partners, as they dominate intra-regional trade. Both countries have used their military forces in maintaining regional peace and security. They have also used their power and influence in promoting regional trade liberalisation and economic development and integration.

The founding fathers of ECOWAS and SADC did not envisage the type of intra-state conflicts, wars that later engulfed, threw the sub-regions into economic chaos, and created political instability in many member states. This situation did not only disrupt economic integration processes, but also led to developmental challenges in the sub-regions. Nigeria and South Africa have therefore, redirected their resources to address the issue of peace and security in the sub-regions, since no genuine economic integration could take place amidst conflicts, wars and political instability. Integration, no doubt, can reduce some of the intractable problems that lead to conflicts in the sub-regions, as a level of peace, stability is required before integration initiatives, and processes can take place.

As hegemons, Nigeria and South Africa have contributed to the relative peace through their efforts at conflict prevention, resolution and management, as well as restoration of democratic governments in many countries in the sub-regions. Both countries possess the human and material resources to intervene in sub-regional conflicts and wars. This they have done not unilaterally, but in collaboration with other member states. Both countries have therefore used intra-regional diplomacy to pursue peace and stability through ECOWAS and SADC, a practice internationally accepted as the United States of America pursued her Iraq agenda through the United Nations.

The hegemonic roles of the two countries have elicited negative perception within and outside the regions. Within the regions, some member states believed they were using the communities as vehicles for the expansion of their influence and interests in the sub-regions. While other member states felt, they were using their enormous size and wealth to dominate the communities. Outside the region, France criticised Nigeria's leadership role in West Africa as she felt this would eclipse her role in the subregion.

In ECOWAS, some Francophone states such as Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal remain antagonistic to Nigeria's actions. Their antagonism was based on their perceived economic and political domination of such a community by Nigeria. Francophone leaders such as Houphoeut-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire and Leopold Senghor of Senegal were apprehensive of Nigeria's political activities both within the sub-region and at the regional levels. They perceived moves by Nigerian leaders towards a sub-regional and continental economic union as ploy to dominate states in the sub-region and Africa in general.

In SADC, South Africa's hegemonic role created differences between Mandela and Mugabe and Mbeki and Mugabe over the status of the Front Line States (FLS) and its relationship with SADC. These differences created tensions in both organisations and in particular, affected SADC intervention in conflict areas in the region. The leaders also had personality clashes, as Mugabe believed that, as the leader of the Front Line States, Zimbabwe deserved some respect from South Africa since the Frontline States fought for South Africa's independence. These antagonisms and allegations have led to denial and counter denial by the two countries. They have expressed that their intentions are noble, and their actions are altruistic. Nigeria and South Africa's roles in ECOWAS and SADC can aptly be described as 'without dominance'.

Nigeria for instance, has expressed her position as that of providing creative and quality leadership aimed at maintaining the integrity of the union, guiding its goals, enabling it to adapt to new challenges, needs and circumstances. South African leaders while stressing that regional economic integration is a priority, dismissed fears that South Africa would dominate trade in the region and assured fellow member states that integration would be based on equal partnership.

The issue of dominance has taught the two countries, to be "moderate" in their dealings within their sub-regions and with other member states. It has also taught them to participate in multinational and collective efforts without any tendencies of unilateral hegemonism, as these could create basic problems.

Statement of the Problem

Since 1960s, African continent has witnessed a number of sub-regional economic integration efforts, which received a boost in the 1980s through the ECA, the OAU Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. ECOWAS and SADC were established not only as vehicles for economic integration, but also as economic communities, that would propel their sub-regions from underdevelopment into economic self-reliance and self-sustenance.

Nigeria and South Africa through ECOWAS and SADC have played hegemonic roles in economic integration and maintenance of peace and security in the West and Southern African sub-regions. Despite the hegemonic roles of Nigeria and South Africa in ECOWAS and SADC, full economic integration is still elusive and the sub-regions are yet to be economically self-reliant and self-sustaining. The myriads of challenges facing sub-regional economic integration includes unhealthy rivalry, fear of domination, and colonial hangover among others.

Hegemons play crucial roles in deepening regional integration. For instance, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty that transformed the European Community into the European Union (EU) and allowed the creation of a common monetary union in Europe was made possible by tough bargaining by two powerful states, Germany and France. The two states viewed the agreement as means of securing vital national interests.[2] Similarly, in 1994, American national and corporate interests laid behind the United States government's enthusiasm for signing the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA).[3]

Why has integration in Europe and America where Germany, France and the United States have played hegemonic roles been more successful and yielded more positive results than the attempts at achieving the same goals in West and Southern Africa where Nigeria and South Africa have been playing same roles?

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), endorsed sub-regional economic integration as the key element of development strategy and the most practical formula for promoting cooperation and economic development among African countries.[4] Using the European and America models, do Nigeria and South Africa the most powerful and richest states in West and Southern Africa have sufficient influence to drive integration agenda in their respective subregions?

The work seeks to compare the hegemonic roles of Nigeria and South Africa in the integrative processes in West and Southern Africa. An examination of the challenges confronting the two hegemons in driving the regional economic integration agenda would be attempted. This would be situated within the context not only of the leadership roles of the two hegemons, but also of the common and peculiar challenges of the sub-regions.

Significance of the Study

It is a truism that many works exist on integration, ECOWAS and SADC, but very few works have attempted a comparison of ECOWAS and SADC's integration efforts, while studies on the comparative roles of Nigeria and South Africa (two leading state actors) in the integration processes of the two regions hardly exist. All over the world, hegemons play important roles in deepening regional integration. As hegemons, Nigeria and South Africa have also played important and leading roles in the economic integration processes of their sub-regions.

This work therefore is significant as:

- it provides comparative information on the hegemonic roles of Nigeria and South Africa in ECOWAS and SADC, towards sub-regional economic integration, peace and security;
- it sheds more light on the activities of ECOWAS and SADC towards sub-regional economic self-reliance and self-sustenance;
- it further provides critical lessons for integrative efforts in other African sub-regions and elsewhere.

Scope of the Study

This study covers the period between 1960 and 2007. 1960, is the starting year, as it marks the year many African states achieved their independence and started working effectively with the ECA towards the promotion of sub-regional economic integration in Africa. The work terminates in 2007 to coincide with the end of regimes and leadership roles of two prominent African leaders, Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. Both leaders led their countries to contribute immensely towards the economic integration and development of their sub-regions. They equally established firm and cordial relations between the two countries, enthroned democratic rule in a number of African states and contributed to the maintenance of peace and stability without which integration and development could not be achieved in the continent. The coincidence in end of tenure of both leaders and regime change led to policy shift as their successors did not maintain the same level of commitment to this relationship.

The work examines regional integration processes in West Africa and Southern Africa with focus on the activities of Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC. It is a comparative analysis of the leading roles of Nigeria and South Africa as hegemons in deepening economic integration in their respective sub-regions.

Aims and Objectives

The aims and objectives of this study are as follows:

- To assess the leadership roles played by Nigeria and South Africa in ECOWAS and SADC.
- To compare the hegemonic roles of Nigeria and South Africa working through ECOWAS and SADC towards sub-regional economic integration, peace and security.
- To examine the question whether the two countries have in any way tried to dominate the sub-regions through their hegemonic activities.
- To examine whether the activities of Nigeria and South Africa can deepen integration in their respective sub-regions.

Research Questions

The following questions are relevant to the study:

- What leadership roles have Nigeria and South Africa played in ECOWAS and SADC?

- What have been the contributions of Nigeria and South Africa as hegemons towards sub-regional economic integration, peace, stability and security?
- Have Nigeria and South Africa attempted political domination of their respective sub-regions?
- Can Nigeria and South Africa deepen integration in their respective sub-regions?

Operational Definition of Terms

Some concepts are recurrent in this study and therefore need clarification.

Conflict is defined as a disharmony within an interaction process between or among parties pursuing contradictory goals in which one or more parties try to impose their own goals while the others try to resist the imposition.

Economic Integration is a process whereby two or more countries in a particular geographical area voluntarily join to pursue common policies and objectives in matters of general economic development or in a particular economic field of common interest to the mutual advantage of all participating states. It involves the existence of agreements that are formal and binding on all members, and the creation of a specialist administration able to guarantee the continuity of the community and to ensure the prompt execution of its decisions. Such decisions will involve the removal of existing barriers to trade and the formulation of policies intended to secure the development of the region as a whole and its constituent states.

Peacebuilding is effort to rebuild war-torn societies and institutions after hostilities have ended, as well as measures intended to prevent future conflicts.

Region is a part or segment of the world that consist of more than two states in physical proximity, which consciously share patterns of interaction at various levels. The territorial totality of this entity is considered a recognisable entity by all the units or members that form the region and by the external environment.

Regional Integration is a process through which a group of nation states voluntarily in various degrees has access to each other's markets and establishes mechanism and techniques that minimise conflicts and maximise internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits of their interaction. Having general access to each other's markets will include both formal and informal intra-regional trade, including revenue from the sharing of national resources (for example, energy, water); the free movement of capital and labour among member states; the harmonisation of their fiscal policies and monetary policies; and the harmonisation of finance and investment policies.

Regionalism is a set of ideas and theories based on the belief and attempts by neighbouring nation states, to foster economic or political cooperation among them in order to lessen their dependence on others outside the region.

Security Regime are sets of principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures that constitute institutionalised cooperation and permit states to exercise restraint in the belief that other states will reciprocate.

Concept of Hegemony

Since hegemony is an important theme in this, work a comprehensive analysis of the word would be attempted. The concepts of hegemon and hegemony have been used to examine and analyse dynamics, strategies, attitudes or properties that focus on and transcend the traditional three images of world politics namely; the individual, the state and the international system. A central element to the concept is that it may imply a great capacity for coercion, or a great degree of influence or control of the structures of the international system and the international behaviour of its units. It excludes situations of establishment of direct relations and official control of foreign governments or territories. The concept of hegemony therefore, is different from the concept of colonisation (which implies direct, official control). It differs from any form of relationship that implies direct management or cover forms of domination such as annexing, occupation or acquisition of foreign territories or populations.

Hegemonies in History

The word "hegemony" originated in ancient Greece and derived from the word *hegeisthai* meaning, "to lead." In ancient Greek history, an early example of hegemony occurred in the 6^{th}- 4^{th} centuries BC when Sparta became the hegemon of the Peloponnesian League. Later, in 337 BC, Phillip II of Macedon became the personal Hegemon of the League of Corinth, a position he passed on to his son Alexander the Great.

In Ancient Eastern Asia, Chinese hegemony was present during the Eastern Zhou dynasty (c. 770-480 BC), when the Zhou kings appointed five hegemons known as "Ba." This was due to the increasing chaos that resulted from the weak authority of the Zhou. The hegemons - initially from the powerful state of Jin - were men with sufficient strength to impose Zhou rule. In return, they got prestige and legitimacy they would not otherwise enjoy. The office of hegemon had vanished by the time the last Zhou king was deposed in 256 BC.

The term hegemon was used to describe Japan's three unifiers in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth century. Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu each had different titles and held many different posts during their lifetimes. They exercised hegemony over much of Japan and in Hideyoshi's case much of Korea at one point. For easy reference, they were collectively referred to as the three hegemons or the three unifiers.

Hegemony also appears as a cultural phenomenon as cultural institutions also maintained it. The cultural institutions of the hegemon established and maintained the annexation of subordinate peoples. In Italy, the Medici maintained their hegemony in Tuscany by controlling the production of woolens through the control of Florence's major guild, the *Arte della Lana.*

The dominance of the British Empire during the 19th Century can be considered the first emergence of a global hegemon whose influence reached all over the globe. The hegemony, or dominance, of Britain during this period stemmed not only from its large military power on the seas, but also from its financial and ideological power. Many British possessions were located around the rim of the Indian Ocean, as well as numerous islands in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. Britain also controlled large portions of Africa, as well as the entire Indian subcontinent.

In recent times, analysts have used the term hegemony in a more abstract sense to describe the "proletarian dictatorships" of the 20th century, resulting in regional domination by local powers or domination of the world by a global power. China's position of dominance in East Asia for most of its history offers an example of a regional hegemony. The USSR (1922–1991) and the United States (1823–present) each sought regional hegemony in their sphere of influence, then global hegemony.[5] Afterwards, in 1945, the USA and the USSR fought the Cold War (1945–1991) for control of the global European empires, which were politically destroyed by the global warfare of the Second World War.

In the mid-20th century, the hegemonic conflict was ideological, between the Communist Warsaw Pact (1955–1991) and the Capitalist North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 1949-present. During this period, each hegemon competed directly in the arms race and indirectly by proxy wars against any country whose internal, national politics might destabilise the respective hegemony.[6]

Since the end of the Cold War, Hubert Védrine, the French Socialist politician described the USA as a hegemonic hyper power, because of its unilateral military actions worldwide, especially against Iraq; while the US political scientists John Mearsheimer and Joseph Nye believes that the USA is not a true hegemon because it has neither the financial nor the military resources to impose a proper, formal, global hegemony.[7] Beyer argues that global governance is a product of US leadership and describes it as hegemonic governance.[8] Also, China, India, and the European Union are considered by some to be emerging superpowers capable of competing with the U.S in their own regions, and, in the case of the EU, worldwide.

Conceptualisation

Hegemony

In the 19th Century, the concept of hegemony has often been interpreted in different ways by different analysts. Hegemony has been used to indicate 'political predominance, usually of one state over another.'[9] Robert Cox emphasized that, economic and military superiority of a given state within a region is an insufficient source of coercive power to ensure acceptance of hegemony. Rather, to be effective, hegemony requires consent amongst the weaker states built around the acceptance and internalization of a universalizing ideology.[10]

Cox distinguished structural dominance from limited sense of dominance that is understood solely in terms of material power.[11] He argues that the international community plays an important role in fostering recognition of a hegemon amidst any reluctance to do so by the neighboring states of the hegemon. Graham Evans and Jeffery Newham argue that hegemony entails primacy or leadership.[12]

Keohane defines hegemony as a situation in which "one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing inter-states relations, and willing to do so." [13] Gilpin posits that hegemonic powers must have control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods.[14]

Immanuel Wallenstein considers a state hegemonic when it has achieved superiority over production, commerce and finance.[15] He argues that hegemony entails dominance so great that the nation state is capable of competing effectively in the domestic markets of its competitors. He identifies three instances of hegemony in the world economy system namely: the Dutch Republic (1625-1672), Great Britain (1815-1873) and the United States (1945-1965).[16]

Christopher Chase-Dunn argues that four factors have been basic in the characteristics of world system hegemony. The first one is geographic location. A second characteristic is that hegemony develops technologies that enable more efficiency in production. Hegemons' have diversified and highly capital-intensive agriculture and industries. Finally, the state has played an active role in the development of the hegemonic states.[17]

Keohane[18] and Gilpin[19] argue that in the international system states can attain hegemonies in their regions. A hegemon can be regional like Nigeria in West Africa, South Africa in Southern Africa, or continental like Brazil in South America. Some regional hegemons like Japan and China are trying to create security communities in Asia. Germany and the United Kingdom (U.K.), under the leadership of the U.S, are also engaged in shaping the security of Europe. David Myers defines regional hegemon as states, which possess power sufficient to dominate subordinate state systems (subsystems).[20]

Types of Hegemons:

There are three types of hegemons namely:

Benevolent Hegemon: The hegemon is interested in promoting generalized benefits than its self-interest and relies on rewards rather than coercion to ensure compliance by other states. It is more concern with the absolute gains of the states. A benevolent hegemon in most cases is willing to provide public goods in order to create and maintain open, stable economic order.

Mixed Motives and Strategies Hegemons: These hegemons have interests in the general as well as personal benefits and relies on coercive methods when necessary to achieve its objectives. It is concern with both absolute and relative gains.

Exploitative Hegemons: These hegemons are interested in their own self-interest and uses coercion to enforce compliance. They are more concern with relative gains.

Definition of Hegemon

Hegemon is when a state holds a preponderance of power in the international system or a regional subsystem; so that it can single handedly dominate the rules and arrangements by which international and regional political and economic relations are conducted. Hegemons actively construct rule-making bodies and institutions that formalize their dominant position; at the same time, they provide stability and the promise of prosperity as a trade-off for adherence to their dominance by lesser states. Hegemonic status rests on the ability to wield power in non-coercive ways with the consent of other states and the ability to pay military and economic costs are critical factors in exercising hegemony.

International cooperation is more stable if a powerful state –hegemon – is able to use its power in order to set rules for the international system and to reinforce the implementation of these rules. In this way, the hegemon does not only act in its interest, but also in the interest of other states, which profit from a stale international system.

Regional Hegemon

Regional hegemons are states, which possess sufficient power to dominate subordinate state systems (subsystems). At the regional level, a regional paymaster is necessary for the supply of the good 'regional integration.' Regionalism would develop 'more fully in those areas of the world in which there is a local hegemon able to create and maintain regional economic institutions' and will not progress 'in those areas where hegemonic leadership is less visible.'

Nigeria and South Africa's hegemony is evident when one looks at their military and economic indicators relative to Western and Southern African regions. Both countries have used their military forces in maintaining regional peace and security. Their hegemonic roles no doubt have suffered criticisms from member states.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework used in this study is based on the Hegemonic Stability Theory This theory states that a powerful leader is necessary for the creation and maintenance of an open and liberal world economy. This leader uses its power and influence to promote trade liberalisation and stable international monetary system primarily in order to advance its own political and economic interests. The leader cannot forcefully coerce reluctant states to obey the rules of a liberal international economic order, but seek their cooperation. These states therefore, cooperate with the hegemon because it in their own economic and security interests to do so.

In the light of the overwhelming economic and military power that Nigeria and South Africa have in their respective regions, the Hegemonic Stability Theory offers insights into the pattern of interaction between the hegemons and their fellow subregional members. This theory assumes that the presence of a single strongly dominant hegemon in international relations leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in a sub international system. [21] Conversely, the absence of an effective hegemon is associated with disorder and undesirable outcomes for individual states.

Different strands of this theory can be distinguished according to whether they conceive hegemonic leadership as more "benevolent" or "coercive" and by how they relate hegemony to interest and capability.[22] Effective hegemonic leadership requires an interest in providing public goods such as peace and security as well as the capability to do so. Public goods are those common interests which individual unorganised action is either not able to advance at all, or is not able to advance adequately.[23] Organisations such as ECOWAS and SADC can therefore perform a function with a view to achieving a common good when there are common or group interests.

Gilpin observes that the presence of a hegemonic power is central to the preservation of stability and peace in the international system.[24] By providing a stable regional order, the hegemon furthers its own interests, and provides for those of the region at the same time. It is arguable therefore, that hegemonic power curbs the anarchic state of the international system, because it has the effect of creating a quasi-government, which is able to provide security and stability. In this way, the international relations of the region no longer resemble the state of anarchy envisaged from the Hobbesian perspective. Security and stability are public goods that are non-excludable and therefore should suffer from the traditional collective action problem, but because of its clout with its neighbours, the hegemon can easily persuade them to contribute towards their attainment.[25]

Theories of Hegemony

A brief examination of the theories of hegemony would be attempted before justifying the use of the hegemonic stability theory as the basic theoretical framework for this study. Theories of hegemony attempt to explain how dominant groups or individuals can maintain their power -the capacity of dominant classes to persuade subordinate ones to accept, adopt and internalize their values and norms.

Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) developed one of the best-known accounts of hegemony. His theory defined the State by a mixture of coercion and hegemony, between which he drew distinctions. According to Gramsci, hegemony consists of socio-political power that flows from enabling the "spontaneous consent" of the populace through intellectual and moral leadership or authority as employed by the subalterns of the State. The power of the hegemony is thus primarily through coercion and consent rather than armed force.

The followings are therefore the theories of hegemony:

The Conventional Theory:

Define hegemony as a condition of disequilibrium of power in the international system in which, one state becomes so powerful that it can exercise leadership or dominance over the international system.[26] This state call hegemon, has the capacity to exercise fundamental control over the structures of the international system, as well as the (international) behaviour of its constitutive units.[27] The factors on which the superiority of the hegemon may lie include geography, natural resources, industrial, financial and in general economic capacity, military capacity and preparedness, population (including both quantitative and qualitative aspects such as education), morale and unity, quality of diplomacy and government, technological innovations and so on.[28]

Ikenberry and Kupchan sum up some of these factors by arguing that ‘the constitutive elements of hegemonic power include military capabilities: control over raw materials markets and capitals: and competitive advantages in highly valued good’[29] This conventional approach to hegemony has been challenged from two sides in international relations.

The Realist Theory: The realist theory is based on two dominant approaches: Robert Keohane’s ‘Theory of Hegemonic Stability’[30] and A.F.K. Organiski’s “Power Transition Theory. Hegemonic stability theory states that, the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single nation-state is the dominant world power, or hegemon.[31] The fall of an existing hegemon or the state of no hegemon diminishes the stability of the international system. When a hegemon exercises leadership, through diplomacy, coercion, or persuasion, it is actually deploying its “preponderance of power.” This is called hegemony, which refers to a state’s ability to “single-handedly, dominate the rules and arrangements of the international political and economic relations.” [32]

Charles P.Kindleberger often regarded as the father of hegemonic stability theory [33] argued in his book titled *The World in Depression: 1929-1939*, that the economic chaos between World War 1 and World War II that led to the Great Depression can be blamed in part on the lack of a world leader with a dominant economy. He opined that the liberal international economy required a political leader that could and would use its influence to create the international economic system and subsequently to perform a number of necessary economic functions to keep the system working efficiently.

The theory is more than economic thought: the central ideas behind Hegemonic Stability Theory is that the stability of the global system, in terms of politics, international law, and so on, relies on the hegemon to develop and enforce the rules of the system.[34] For instance, although the American hegemon played a crucial role in establishing and managing the world economy following World War II, it did so with the strong co-operation of its Cold War allies.

The Systemic Theory: The systemic theory is based on two dominant approaches: George Modelski's 'Long Cycle Theory' and Immanueal Wallerstein's 'World Systems Theory.'[35] Thomas J. McCormick, the leader of the Systemic theory defines hegemony "as a single power's possession of 'simultaneous superior economic efficiency in production, trade and finance." Furthermore, hegemony's superior position is considered the logical consequence of superior geography, technological innovation, ideology, superior resources and many other factors. [36]

The Long Cycle Theory: George Modelski the architect of this theory describes the connection between war cycles, economic supremacy and political aspects of world leadership.[37] Long cycles, or long waves, is an interesting perspectives on global politics. It permits "the careful exploration of the ways in which world wars have recurred, and how lead states such as Britain and the United States have succeeded each other in an orderly manner." Long cycles of global politics are patterns of past world politics.[38]

Modelski's long cycle theory, however, states that war and other destabilising events are natural products of the long cycle and larger global system cycle. They are part of the living processes of the global polity and social order. Wars are "systemic decisions" that "punctuate the movement of the system at regular intervals." After all, long cycles have provided, for the last five centuries, a means for the successive selection and operation of numerous world leaders.[39]

Under the terms of long cycle theory, five hegemonic rules have taken place, each strongly correlating to economic Kondratieff Waves (or K-Waves). The first hegemon would have been Portugal during the 16th century, then the Netherlands during the 17th century. Next, Great Britain served twice, first during the 18th century, then during the 19th century. The United States has been serving as hegemon since the end of World War II.

The Neorealist Theory

John J. Mearsheimer propounded this theory, and attempted incorporating this theory into 'offensive realism.' In his book titled, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* he outlines how anarchic system that neorealist subscribe to creates power hungry states who will each attempt to instill themselves as regional and global hegemons.[40] His theory is not widely embraced by fellow realists who argue that the hegemon supports the system so long as it is their interest. The system is created, shaped and maintained by coercion. The hegemon would begin to undermine the institution when it is not in their interests. With the decline of a hegemon, the system descends into instability.

In the neo-realist version of hegemonic stability, there is an element of exploitation in the system. The hegemon structures the system for its own benefit, although it may result in significant benefit for others. The hegemon uses its power to enforce other states compliance with the prevailing cooperation. Hegemonic decline brings with it a declining ability to enforce compliance by others, and a declining hegemonic interest in a system operating more to the benefit of others. Hence, after hegemon, world economic closure is likely, as in the interwar period.

The Neoliberal Theory: The neoliberals challenged the realist theory on hegemonic stability theory through their literature on regimes and international institutions developed since the late 1980s. A milestone in this regard was the special work edited by Krasner in 1983.[41] The work criticised hegemonic stability theory and concluded that international regimes have an independent causal affect in world politics (that is although they may be a product of hegemonic power, they are not reducible to it).

Robert Keohane further argued that an international system could continue to function through its international institutions even after the decline or collapse of the hegemon that had created it.[42] Thus, according to the neoliberal approach, although a hegemon is a necessary condition for the construction of a hegemony (a specific international order), hegemony itself can outlive the hegemon. In this manner, neoliberalism attempted to shift the focus of analysis from the subject of hegemony (that is the hegemon) to the conditions and mechanisms of its operation.[43]

Neoliberals argue that the hegemon provides public goods through institutions and work in the best interests of everybody. It is motivated by ‘enlightened self-interest:’ the hegemon takes on the cost because it is good for all actors, thereby creating stability in the system, which is also in the interests of all actors. With the decline of the hegemon, institutions do not automatically die; rather, they take on a life of their own (see regime theory).

Without international government, only a hegemonic state can provide collective goods. The hegemon will provide such goods because its size ensures that associated costs of provisions are less than the economic benefits that accrue to it.

The Gramscian Theory: Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony challenged the conventional theory of hegemony. According to Gramsci there are two types of political control: domination that is based on coercion, and hegemony that is based on consent.[44] Hegemony, for Gramsci signifies the process through which the leading group or ruling class of a society transforms its own interests and values into ‘common sense’ for all the members of this society.

Neo-Gramscian scholars such as Gill and Robert Cox propounded a new argument. According to them, to conceptualise how hegemony operates in the international system, it must move from a state-centric reading of the world system, where social forces are seen through national lens, to a reading of this system as a ‘totality.’[45] In Robert Cox’s terms, ‘hegemony in the international level is…not merely an order among states… World hegemony is describable as a social…an economic…and a political structure… World hegemony…is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms, which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries – rules that support the dominant mode of production.'[46]

The Gramscian approach locates the subject of hegemony not in a powerful state but in transnational social forces that dominate in the mode of production. Without diminishing the importance of material power and dominance over material resources, it understands hegemony not in terms of coercion, but in terms of consent, shared beliefs and commonsense.

Cox argues that 'Gramsci took over from Machiavelli the image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast, a necessary combination of consent and coercion. To the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases'. Thus, hegemony equals the establishment within the sphere of the international of universally accepted values – a commonsense. This Gramscian approach to hegemony came to complement Lenin's analysis on imperialism and Marxist approaches that focused on coercion rather than consent.[47]

The Radical Theory: Radical scholars such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe[48] and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri[49] were inspired by post-structuralism. Their works were inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, [50] but they differed on the way they define hegemony and understand its mode of operation. Laclau, following Gramsci, define hegemony as the moment that a specific particularity or project acquires a universal signification. Hegemony is a discursive order that consists of a set of practices that has acquired an independent dynamic, which is not reducible to the social forces that gave birth to it in the first place. Yet, the reproduction of hegemony depends to a great extend on the social forces from which it originates, and most importantly to the capacity of these forces to neutralise or resist, counter-hegemonic projects and forces.

Justification for Hegemonic Stability Theory

The hegemonic status of Nigeria and South Africa in West and Southern Africa, has been challenged internally and externally especially by Francophone states such as Cote d'Ivoire, and Senegal for Nigeria and Zimbabwe, for South Africa. Externally, France had not been too well disposed to the leadership role of Nigeria in West Africa, which she believes would challenge her dominance of the Francophone states. The Francophone states are jealous of Nigeria's leadership potentials and feared her political domination of the subregion. On the other hand, Zimbabwe, which had previously enjoyed a status of a regional hegemon before South Africa was reintegrated into SADC, was jealous of her hegemonic roles in the subregion.

Simply stated, this study argues that the hegemon plays a crucial role in maintaining stability and order in the world system. In other words, the hegemon is the most benign power in the global system. Because the hegemon is the power that benefits most from the existing world system, the hegemon has the greatest stake in keeping that system functioning. The military power of the hegemon keeps the peace, discouraging challengers to the global order. The economy of the hegemon is the engine that drives international economic growth and development.

In order to preserve its network of alliances, the hegemon is the political broker who moderates disputes between other powers, thus keeping them from escalating into serious conflict. The hegemon seeks to bind other states into the global order and thus play a leading role in developing global institutions that manage international security and economic relations. The hegemon is often the source and usually a propagator of ideas about world order and security. In the words of former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, the hegemon is “the indispensable nation... (the one) that walks tall and looks forward.” [51]

Nigeria and South Africa have played benign hegemonic roles in West and Southern Africa. Both countries dominate the economies of the subregions and they are the ‘heart’ of subregional economic activities. Their armed forces have been keeping the peace of the subregions thorough peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. Both countries have also participated in peace talks leading to peaceful settlement of disputes. Nigeria’s participation in the formation and deployment of troops for the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) has brought peace to a number of countries in the subregion. Similarly, South Africa’s deployment of troops to Lesotho brought peace to the country.

As hegemons, Nigeria and South Africa have contributed to the relative peace through their efforts at conflict prevention, resolution and management, as well as restoration of democratic governments in many countries in the subregions. They have done these in collaboration with other member states, using intra-regional diplomacy to pursue peace and stability in the subregions.

Methodology

The work adopts comparative method, which allows for contextualization of existing knowledge and integration of newly acquired knowledge Arend Lijphart defines comparative method as ‘a broad-gauge, general method, not a narrow, specialized technique’[52] The comparative method allows the researcher to observe and compare carefully selected cases based on some stimulus being present or absent. It makes possible testing and development of hypothesis thereby, making new ideas possibilities. It also shows how the hypothesis might be usefully refined or reformulated. Systematic comparison allows some aspect of political systems of two countries often provide empirical basis for building and refining general theories.[53] It also advances a heightened, comprehensive awareness of the diversity of the political world and can enable predictions about politics.[54]

Nigeria and South Africa have been contributing to the economic development and integration of their respective regions. By comparing the contributions of the two countries, new ideas about the two countries are acquired giving a better understanding of the two countries. Similarly, it is instinctive to compare the contributions of these two hegemons with other hegemons in other regions of the world. In this way, old and new knowledge would be acquired and integrated.

The study adopts the most different comparative research design. The most different research design has been summarised by Francis Castles as one that involves ‘a comparison on the basis of dissimilarity in as many respects as possible in the hope that after all the different circumstances have been discounted as explanations, there will remain one alone in which all the instances agree.[55]

Adopting this research design for this study, it is evident that Nigeria and South Africa differs in all respects as regard their contributions towards subregional economic development and integration in their respective subregions. Despite these variances, both countries remain hegemons in their respective subregions. Just as the United States of America provides the hegemonic role in the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA), Brazil provides same for MERCOSUR, so also Nigeria and South Africa provides hegemonic roles in West and Southern African subregions

Literature Review

Relevant literature for this study may be grouped into four broad categories. In the first category are works on hegemony, while the second category consists of works on regional economic integration in Africa. The third category consists of works on ECOWAS and SADC and the forth category consists of works on Nigeria and South Africa.

Hegemony

Antonio Gramsci (1891- 1937), is an Italian Marxist who introduced the concept of hegemony in international relation in general.[56] His recognition of the concept in his work titled, *The Prison Notebooks,* was a watershed between nineteenth-and twentieth century Marxism was fundamentally appropriate.[57] Gramsci analysed relations between states from a Machiavellian perspectives, in that there is a relationship of consent and coercion that occurs amongst states.[58]

The concept of hegemony according to Gramsci, is of utter importance to the ruling of the dominant class. In fact, the ruling of the bourgeois societies is dictated by the hegemonic relationships that are created and maintained. Through hegemonic ruling, the bourgeoisie class is able to maintain its reign of power by indoctrinating their beliefs, values, and perspectives onto the working class. The inability of the masses of workers according to Gramsci to see past this is what creates a false consciousness. Such ability to indoctrinate the masses of different classes with a common belief creates a common sense whereby the dominant ideologies of the ruling class are inherited by those being ruled. This process legitimizes the ruling of the bourgeoisie class and creates a subordinate relationship between the haves and have-nots.

The bourgeoisie exercise their hegemony of subordinating and subjugating the masses through two distinct methods: persuasion and dialogue or through coercive force. The first approach focuses on promoting the set of ideas that are prevalent to the dominant class in the society and ensuring that the subordinated groups come to agreement with such ideologies. The second approach deals with coercive physical force whereby those who are unwillingly to comply with the common sense and the values of those in power are dealt with. Gramsci explains that every ruling state exercises such methods through institutions such as the police and military forces.

Gramsci also focuses on these two forms of political control as the primary makeup of a society. Adding to Marx's base and superstructure theory, Gramsci divides the institutions of the state into political society and civil society. He classified government, police, and the armed forces as political society because they use various coercive methods in implementing the hegemony of the dominant class. The civil society comprised of institutions such as the church, schools, and families. He characterizes the civil society as a means of non-coercive persuasions. The roles of both the political and civil societies are to ensure the maintenance of the dominant ideologies and values that exist within the society.

Gramsci note that the capitalist class relies on the civil society to preserve bourgeois cultural values, which are important in maintaining the hegemony of the ruling class. The civil society therefore acts as an important instrument in maintaining the capitalist system and class hegemony. They are use to make compromises with the churches, political parties and the likes in order to gain their consent in a non-coercive manner. Thus, civil society and the state are mutually reinforcing of each other; civil society functions as a safeguard against any social upheaval, while the state uses coercive power and enforces discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ actively or passively.[59]

Gramsci also discusses the concept of intellectuals as being important instrument to the hegemony of the ruling class. According to him, all men are intellectuals, but not all men have the avenues to explore and pursue them.[60] He distinguishes two types of intellectuals: the traditional and organic. The traditional intellectuals are professors and clergy who assist the dominant group in maintaining their rule. The organic intellectuals are needed among the working class to counter the common sense views.

To conclude, the creation of hegemony involves the participation of several institutions that help legitimize the ruling of the class in power. The concept of hegemony is created through the social orders in which apparatuses and institutions are used to produce hegemony. Gramsci's theory of hegemony is related to concepts such as civil society as they both are tools relied upon by the dominant class in order to maintain its ruling authority. In addition, intellectuals are used not only to maintain but also produced hegemony. As such, the ruling class uses these various methods to preserve the existing inequalities and the consequential hegemony that they benefit from.

Charles Kindleberger's book titled: *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (1973), [61] expresses the original idea that a liberal international economy requires strong political leadership by the dominant economic power. According to the author, the existence of a liberal international economy required a political leader that could and would use its influence to create the international economic system and subsequently to perform a number of necessary economic functions to keep the system working efficiently. He identified and discussed at length the tasks that the leader of the world economy must carry out. These include; the creation and maintenance of a liberal trade regime, the establishment of the international monetary system, and playing the role of 'lender of last resort' to prevent financial crises.

A corollary of Kindleberger's hypothesis is that the relative economic decline of the leader leads to a weakening of the regimes governing a liberal world economy. The decline of the leader and its willingness to enforce the rules of a liberal world economy results in increasing trade protectionism and violations of the regimes governing trade, monetary, and other forms of international commerce. In the 1990s, an extremely important manifestation of the relative economic decline of American economic power has been the growing tendency for the world economy to fragment into regional blocs, centred on the major economic powers. The dynamics of the rise and then of the steady erosion of a liberal world economy can be demonstrated by an examination of the British and American eras of international leadership.

America political scientists have appropriated (though with proper acknowledgment) Kindleberger's basic ideas on the importance of a political leader for international economic affairs. Their several modifications have placed his basic insight in a realist or state-centric intellectual framework of political analysis and thereby fashioned a realist version of the theory of hegemonic stability. Firstly, the political scientists have substituted the word 'leader' with 'hegemon' to reflect the fact that the leader had to exercise power to achieve its objective; more specifically, a hegemon is the leader of an alliance such as the one organised by Sparta to defeat the Persians in the fifth century B.C.

Political scientists further argued that the hegemon creates a liberal international economy to promote its own interests as against Kindleberger argument that the leader creates a liberal international economy for cosmopolitan economic reasons. Finally, political economists contrasted Kindleberger's assumption that the interests of the leader were primarily economic; according to them, these interests were not only economic but also political.

Despite these differences between Kindleberger's liberal version of the theory and the political scientist version, both versions state that the provision of international collective (public) goods such as free trade and monetary stability requires a dominant power with an interest in a liberal world economy and a willingness to expend economic and political resources to achieve and maintain this goal.

John Mearsheimer's book titled *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* discusses the theory of "offensive realism" by highlighting its assumptions, evolution from early realist theory, and providing some prediction for the future. Majority of the predictions of the book are considered pessimistic as Mearshimer sees a world where great power conflict will never end.[62] Discussing anarchy and the struggle for power, the author posits that states are always looking for opportunities to gain power over their rivals. He argues that states pursue power because of anarchic system in which they operate. In international politics, there is no hierarchy, no "night watchman" to turn to when one state attacks another. For this reason, states are forced to rely only on themselves for security. Thus, they seek to expand their influence to increase their security.

Mearsheimer argues that a state's power in international politics is derived from its military force. He gave two assertions: first, that land force is the dominant power in the modern era; second, the large bodies of water limit the power projection capabilities of land armies. He argues that the presence of oceans in the world prevent any state from reaching world hegemony. He posits that the large bodies of water limit the power projections abilities of militaries and thus naturally divide powers in the globe.

Using Britain as an example, he posits that the English Channel acted as an offshore balancer in the continent. He argues that Britain never had the ambition to dominate continental Europe but rather aimed at maintaining the balance of power and ensuring that no state becomes so powerful as to achieve regional hegemony on the continent. Throughout the 19th century, Britain possessed an industrial capacity that could have easily dominated much of Europe, but did not. She calculated that her aims of achieving security could be easily achieved if the European powers could be played off against each other. By so doing, they would be occupied on the continent and unable to challenge Britain across the Channel or Britain's economic interests in Asia and Africa.

Regional Economic Integration in Africa

In the second category, Peter Robinson's work titled *Economic Integration in Africa,* [63] can be described as one of the early studies on regional integration in Africa. It examines the economies of integration, with special reference to less developed countries and some salient features of the African economic setting within which actual and projected schemes must operate.

It undertook a survey of the experience of existing arrangements for economic integration between independent African states, in East and Equatorial Africa and enumerated reasons why African states deserve integration, which was primarily for economic reasons. Integration according to him was seen as a means of helping to overcome the disadvantages of small size and making possible a greater rate of economic growth and development; providing wider markets, in order to attract more foreign capital and increase employment. Despite the advantages of integration, the gap between aspiration and achievement is large, as benefits are not automatically reaped by member states.[64]

Peter Robson recognises the role of the ECA in initiating discussions and attempts at establishing sub-regional economic communities in many parts of Africa where such were not in existence and concluded that the character and pace of economic development in Africa may be considerably influenced for the better by the consolidation and development of economic integration. African countries would benefit from long-term economic integration than short-term interest, which often leads to independent action. The future of economic cooperation in Africa will depend on which of these considerations becomes dominant.

The book edited by Arthur Hazlewood titled, *African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies of Economic and Political Union*, is a collection of articles on political and economic integration by reputable scholars.[65] The work attempts a quest for African unity within political and economic union. It discusses problems of integration among African states and argued that effective economic union can be achieved within the framework of a political association. The work further examines economic unions and political integration in some English and French speaking African states, analysing the influence of Pan-African ideas and organisation on integration in African.

Like Peter Robson, Hazlewood also discusses salient topics and economic integration in both Equatorial and East Africa without discussing those of West and southern Africa. Both works provide useful information on historical background on economic and political integration in Africa before 1968. The current study will fill this gap as both works terminate before the formation of both ECOWAS and SADC and will further examine Nigeria and South Africa's role in sub-regional economic communities.

The edited work by Adebayo Adedeji and Timothy M Shaw titled *Economic Crisis in Africa*,[66] gives a radical view on African political economy, by tracing the root problems of Africa's economic crisis to capitalism, colonialism, corporation and compradors, and the interrelationship between policy and production exchange and exploitation. The work examines the Lagos Plan of Action as a holistic plan that covers all aspects of African economic development and integration and concludes that for Africa to fully develop and integrate her economies would not only depend on the policies and strategies, but also on the degree to which the Lagos Plan of Action's myriad elements are adopted. The work agrees with the current work that the Lagos Plan of Action is a blue print for Africa's economic development and integration but fails to discuss the roles of hegemons and sub-regional economic communities in economic development and integration of the continent, a gap this work will fill.

Victor Adetula's work *AEC and the New World Order; the Future of Economic Regionalism in Africa*, examines the character of individual and regional economies in Africa. Adopting the dependency theory, the work discusses the nature of African political economies and how they have influenced the structure and pattern of regional integration.[67]

Using the AEC as case study, the author investigates the interconnection between the integration initiatives within the African region. He came up with the assumption that it is not possible to understand the process of African regionalism without an adequate conception of its historical circumstances as well as the dynamics of social forces within Africa as a region and the individual African economies. Although the author agrees with other authors on the nature of the challenges facing African integration efforts, he fails to locate them in historical context.

However, the central theme of the work is on the AEC Treaty and regionalism in Africa, there are areas of convergence between the work and the present study such as, the activities of sub-regional economic communities towards ensuring the gradual establishment of the Community and the relations between the Community and regional economic communities. On the contrary, the work fails to address any major contradictions, which severely militate against efforts at successful integration of African economies, which the present study intends to cover.

Yomi Akinyeye's chapter titled 'Regional Integration in Africa: Past Experience, Present Realities and Future Challenges'[68] takes a look at past efforts of African states at integration and the problems which impeded these efforts since 1960 to date. The author while discussing all functional integration institutions in Africa including ECOWAS, and SADC argued that despite the spirited efforts at integration, none of the sub-regional and continental communities geared towards integration has moved anywhere near the attainment of its objectives. He identified three reasons for the failure of past integration efforts in Africa including, the inability of African economies to achieve structural transformation and diversification;[69] inability of countries to fund projects essential for regional cooperation; non-complementarity of African economies; lack of industralisation and the destabilizing effects of the reduction or total cancellation of tariffs on African economies.

The essay admits that the prospect of regional integration in the continent would require a lot of adjustments and orientation by statesmen and the generality of Africans. African states also need to move towards economic complementarity; de-emphasise African external dependence on former colonial masters and industrialised west, harmonise international organisations with overlapping aims and objectives and encourage people's participation in the integration process. The author suggested a review of joint ventures or regional schemes among regional grouping as a way out of financial handicap by African states. He concluded that the implementation of these suggestions by political leaders and the generality of Africans would ensure Africa's integration.

Another work by Yomi Akinyeye, titled "State Actors and Regional Integration in Western Europe and West Africa: The French and Nigerian Cases"[70] is a comparative analysis of the roles of France and Nigeria in the integration of Western Europe and West Africa. The author examines the reasons regional integration in Europe, where France has played a pioneering and leading role has, recorded great success, while that of West Africa where Nigeria has been playing a similar role at achieving the same goal remains a dream in perpetuity.

He agreed that both countries initiatives at regional integration in Western Europe and West Africa are exercises in foreign policy. He went further to examine how these factors among which are national interests of a state, domestic situation, leadership orientation, ideology and the configuration of the international system affected the fortunes of both countries in leading regional integration in their respective regions. He opined that both countries had and still has underlying national interests, which have driven and continue to drive their participation in the regional integration processes of both regions. While analysing the lessons Nigeria and West Africa can learn about the integration process, it conceded that no two situations are identical.

Both works provide useful background information for this study. While the first identifies the shortcomings of sub-regional economic communities in Africa, the latter is comparative examination of hegemonic roles in regional economic communities is quite informative. The shortcomings of both works, which the current work intends to fill, are; the first work makes a general discussion on Africa's economic communities without been specific, the current work is specific on ECOWAS and SADC. The second work on the other hand, compares France and Nigeria's hegemonic roles in Europe and Africa, the current work limits its focus on Nigeria and South Africa, two African giants.

ECOWAS and SADC

Works examined here relate to the role of ECOWAS and SADC in sub-regional economic integration, peace, stability and security. ECOWAS does appear to be represented more in the literature than SADC. This may not be unconnected to its early establishment (1975) and the challenges facing sub-regional integration schemes during this period. Some scholars have argued that ECOWAS was not a baby of the ECA like SADC, which was directly initiated and executed through the ECA initiated programme, the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos. ECA's efforts would be appreciated as the first Commission to initiate plans towards the formation of sub-regional economic community in West Africa as far back as 1960s. Although ECA's efforts did not directly culminate in the formation of ECOWAS (as witnessed by the 1975 Treaty), it however, laid the foundation for this to materialise. Similarly, the Commission participated in drafting the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty.

The scholarly work of Peter Robson titled *Integration, Development and Equity, Economic Integration in West Africa.*[71] discusses economic integration schemes in West Africa such as the Mano River Union, Senegambia Economic and Monetary Union and ECOWAS among others from purely an economist point of view without reference to the political involvement. The chapter on ECOWAS forms an interesting reading. It gives a background to the formation of ECOWAS and could best be described as a summary and not a detailed work on ECOWAS and economic integration in West Africa, as it paid more attention to issues such as equity, compensation and balance development. The work is highly informative and extremely valuable to this work despite the fact that it lacks information on recent developments on the activities of ECOWAS towards sub-regional economic integration, a gap this work intends to fill.

Uka Ezenwe's book *ECOWAS and the Economic Integration of West Africa,* [72] give a detail account of pre-colonial disintegration to the colonial integration. These were centred on "a common currency, a range of common services and a customs union which served as a mechanism through which resources were distributed from the wealthier coastal states to their less well-endowed peripheral inland neighbours. The author discusses how intra-regional trade can be greatly developed by exploiting existing resources and restructuring existing infrastructure. On the question, whether economic integration should be seen as a mere tariff issue or not, the author believes that the problem confronting West Africa is that of economic development in its entirety.

The work examines the performance of nearly all the existing integrating schemes in West Africa, and concluded that "free-trade" does not guarantee the equitable distribution of the benefits it generate, hence the need for sub-regional integration scheme. Although, the work gives a comprehensive report on the prospects and perspectives of ECOWAS, it fails to see ECOWAS as a sub-regional scheme with the aim of creating a sub-regional Economic Common Market, a gap this work will fill.

The following scholars focus on ECOWAS, but from different perspectives. Ralph Onwuka's work, titled *Development and Integration in West Africa: The Case of the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS),* [73] discusses the process of integration as a vehicle for achieving economic development in West Africa. S.K.B. Asante's work, titled *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),* [74] on the other hand, focuses attention on important policy issues and problems involved in economic integration among developing countries with special reference to ECOWAS.

Both works trace the genesis of ECOWAS, focusing attention on the four previous attempts to create a regional community in West Africa between 1962 and 1968 and the various factors militating against these efforts. According to them, the first, second and third attempts were made by the ECA, while the fourth attempt was the Nigeria and Togo initiative, which eventually led to the signing of the ECOWAS Treaty in Lagos in May 1975.

Raph Onwuka"s work is a comprehensive study on the West African sub-region.[75] The chapter on "Genesis of ECOWAS; A Diplomatic History", is of immense contribution to the present work as it provides the much needed background to the present study on ECOWAS. Although the work discusses other topics on ECOWAS such as problems posed by the parallel existence of CEAO as sub-regional groupings in West Africa and ECOWAS comprehensive trade liberation scheme, it failed to discuss further, the recent efforts by ECOWAS towards sub-regional economic integration. There is no doubt, that since the evolution of ECOWAS, the sub-regional organisation has been making efforts at realising its objectives of sub-regional economic development and integration, the author did not highlight this.

Asante's work on the other hand discusses the activities of ECOWAS towards the creation of sub-regional Common Market. The main limitation of the study centre on the period as a decade is too short to assess the contributions of ECOWAS to sub-regional economic integration and development. The present study covers a period of three decades bringing into focus the recent activities of ECOWAS. The work is also limited by comprehensive and important primary sources such as the Executive Secretary's Annual Reports, ECOWAS Journals, and other recent ECOWAS Publications, as mentioned by the author. He further called for a full-scale study of ECOWAS using the available primary sources for deeper and comprehensive assessment of this first serious attempt at economic cooperation and integration in the West African sub-region cutting across divisions of language, history, and existing affiliations and institutions, for the first time in the history of sub-region[76]. The present study will fill this vacuum and provide recent information on the activities of ECOWAS as a sub-regional economic community.

Ojo Olatunde's article, titled, "Nigeria and The Formation of ECOWAS,"[77] and General Yakubu Gowon's unpublished PhD thesis, titled "The Economic Community of West African States; A Study in Political and Economic Integration," [78] both give a detailed analysis of the formation of ECOWAS. Both works trace Nigeria's role as the leader in the process of forming ECOWAS, which Nigeria has championed since the pan African period of the early 1960s, but achieved in 1975. Both authors provided reasons Nigeria wanted ECOWAS and enumerated Nigeria's commitment and leadership role in the sub-region.

According to Ojo, Nigeria's role as leader in the process of forming ECOWAS, was pragmatic and flexible. This dated back to the early 1960s during the heyday of efforts to institutionalise the concept of Pan-Africanism, but it was not until after the Civil War in 1970 that Africa became the pivot of Nigeria's foreign policy and government embarked on rigorous all-West Africa economic integration.

The author argues that despite internal and external opposition, several factors accounted for Nigeria's commitment and leading role. This included the need to have a West African institutional instrument for bargaining with the rest of the world, most especially, the industrialised countries and the desire to wrest control of the West African economy from the colonial masters and curtail their political and economic domination of African states even after their independence. Other factors include the country's desire to become the industrial heart of West Africa, and all the political power that this might bring, not only within Africa, but also in the world at large. Nigeria also wanted to undermine and erode French's economic and political influence in the sub-region. Lastly, Nigeria wanted to utilise her petroleum revenue while it lasts, and provide alternatives to oil dependency.

Despite opposition to integration moves within and without, Nigerian leaders in the 1970s employed extensive efforts in national coalition, intensive and difficult regional negotiations and coalition formation and above all extensive "shuttle diplomacy" before ECOWAS could be inaugurated.

Looking into the future of ECOWAS the author opined that Nigeria is expected to play a leading role, to bear the major cost and deliberately forgo some of the benefits for the organisation to survive. He concluded that the country has demonstrated (within the limits of its resources) its willingness to forego immediate economic gains and play an active leadership role in order to achieve her goals. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that Nigeria has deviated from this course.

General Yakubu Gowon on the other hand, though presented in three volumes of over eight hundred pages, only volume one is relevant to the present study. Writing from a personal perspective, Gowon gives a detailed analysis of the formation of ECOWAS (which involved him personally), playing glorious tribute to the ECA. In his words, ECOWAS emerged as:

> a product of a decade and more of patient debate and continuing discussion, in which each state and every leader in the region was at one time or another, more or less closely involved. In addition to this large body of collective wisdom of the West African governments, also had the services of their own specialists and advisers, and the assistance and encouragement of bodies like the Economic Commission for Africa, one of many United Nations Agencies active in the continent.[79]

Like Onwuka, and Asante, the work traces ECA's efforts at establishing a West African Economic Community from 1962 to 1968. The author no doubt brought his personal experience and involvement into play as he gives what can be regarded as first hand information on the formation of ECOWAS between 1970 and 1975.[80] Although the work deals with many other areas of ECOWAS activities in West Africa, it lacked current information on ECOWAS efforts towards the sub-regional economic integration. Similarly, the work failed in giving a conclusive interpretation to ECOWAS efforts as a vehicle of economic integration in the sub-region.

Margaret Vogt and Ademola Adeleke both write on ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG. While Vogt's article, "Nigeria's Participation in the ECOWAS Monitoring Group- ECOMOG,"[81] discusses the Liberian Civil War and Nigeria's participation in ECOMOG, Ademola Adeleke's article, "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia,"[82] gives an account of the Liberian crisis and the roles played by Nigeria and ECOMOG. While Vogt traces the root causes of the Liberian Civil War and enumerates Nigeria's interest in the Civil War, Adeleke on the other hand enumerates the role played by Nigeria, the local hegemon and architect in the formation of ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

Vogt opined that Nigeria's interest in the Liberian civil war was derived from the recognition of the destabilizing impact that such a conflict will have on the stability of the sub-region, more so when many states in the sub-region have similar problems as Liberia. Although, it may be pointed out that other salient issues such as gross violation of human rights and violent suppression of democratic principle characterised Samuel Doe's regime, Nigeria's national interests were fundamental in her role in the terrible Liberian crisis.

The author carefully analysed the various criticisms and principles that trailed Nigeria's decision to be a co-sponsor of the multinational force. She concluded that the problem with ECOMOG was not with the principle underlying its formation or the objective it was meant to achieve, but the context within which forces were deployed in view of the principles of neutrality of participating states and the failure to embrace an effective information management mechanism.

The article by Ademola Adeleke on the other hand traces the history of ECOWAS as a traditional economic organisation which had to deviate after fifteen years from this traditional role to that of peace making and peace enforcer. The former involved negotiations and arbitration, while the later involved the deployment in August 1990 of 3000 strong multinational force to supervise a cease-fire. He noted that although ECOWAS did not prepare for either of the roles it found itself. This therefore brought to the fore some of the long term division and competing interest that existed in the sub-region and the objectives of Nigeria, the local hegemon and the architect of ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (known as ECOMOG).

The formation of ECOMOG according to the author was based on Nigeria's advice, while at the same time; Nigeria contributed the largest troops, which was to set in motion the peace process. Unfortunately, this was thwarted by ethnicity, intra-regional politics and diplomacy, and ECOMOG had to take up a new role of peace enforcer. Eventually, peace was achieved through an all-party conference, the Abuja Conference facilitated by Abacha and Rawlings.

ECOMOG intervention in Liberian crisis left some questions and lessons. Commenting on the question of legality of the intervention, Ademola Adeleke takes a pragmatic position on the issue. According to him, the civil war created security and humanitarian problems for states in the sub-region, which they could not ignore. On the lessons of the Liberian crisis, Vogt opined that information management mechanism was more fundamental to Nigeria's domestic interest as most criticisms on Nigeria's participation in ECOMOG were hinged on this and giving a false impression, that Nigeria had a hidden agenda in Liberia. Adeleke while commenting on the lessons of the crisis noted that despite its ill preparedness, ECOWAS succeeded in de-escalating the crisis and putting in place a transition government in Monrovia.

Vogt concluded by recommending an orderly transition from authoritarian to a truly democratic regime as the best way to end violence and the conduct of elections to allow the Liberians appoint a government of their choice. While Adeleke on the other hand, concluded that the hegemonic role of Nigeria in orchestrating the formation of ECOMOG demonstrated the ability of the sub-regional hegemonic power to use her influence in international organisations to build multinational coalition in support of a particular objective and this could be emulated by other sub-regional hegemons like South Africa. The author assesses the potential for using the ECOWAS operation as a model for conflict resolution in Africa.

Osita C. Nweke's work titled *ECOWAS Three Decades of Enduring Legacies in the West African Sub-region,* [83] attempts an appraisal of ECOWAS within the first three decades of its establishment. The author noted that although the founding fathers created ECOWAS as an economic community to achieve sub-regional economic development and integration, the community has fallen short of these expectations due to a number of reasons. He enumerated the prevalence of political instability, lack of peace and security in most of its member states, which adversely affected the stability, progress, growth and economic development in the sub-region. This situation has equally altered the brief of ECOWAS, which instead of fighting massive poverty and stunted economic growth has diverted most of its resources and time to dousing and putting to end intra and inter-state conflicts and wars in the sub-region.

He catalogued all intra-communal conflicts that had occurred in West Africa within the first thirty years stressing that this had led to the death of millions and rendering many homeless and therefore, marked ECOWAS low in human development. While agreeing with the World Bank that majority of ECOWAS member countries are listed among the least developed and highly indebted, the author believes that despite these woes, ECOWAS has achieved a lot in the area of promoting integration among the fifteen member states through the enduring institutional framework set up in the Revised Treaty. In his assessment, all the Organs of the communities have performed creditably well in discharging their duties.

While discussing the new structure of ECOWAS through the Revised Treaty, the author examines newly created organs, pays particular attention to the burden of conflicts and conflict management, and highlights ECOWAS Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Preventing, Management, Peacekeeping, and Security. The role and challenges of ECOMOG as an enduring instrument for conflict management and other challenges of economic development of the sub-region and the roles of NEPAD all receive adequate attention.

Adebayo Adedeji's work, titled "Collective Self-reliance in Developing Africa, Scope, Perspective and Problems,"[84] traced in historical perspective early attempts by West African leaders at achieving economic self-reliance. This began in November 1963 and spanned over the years but culminated in the Treaty establishing the West African Economic Community (ECOWAS), which was signed by fifteen West African leaders in Lagos on 28 May 1975. Paying compliments to both the Nigerian leader General Yakubu Gowon and his Togolese counterpart Gnasingbe Eyadema, towards the realisation of this noble objective, he went further, to give the meaning and scope of collective self-reliance within the framework of the New International Economic Order and gave five propositions of the New International Economic Order.

According to Adedeji, economic cooperation among developing countries has been limited to cooperation among them at the national, sub-regional, regional or inter-regional levels and pointed out that out of the eight principal aims of the ECOWAS Treaty, none provided for bargaining between the ECOWAS countries and the rest of the World, particularly, the industrialized part of it. He therefore hoped that member states would have to cooperate among themselves and bargain together with other nations of the World.

He opined that economic cooperation among African countries must lead to self-reliance and be virtualized as a process by which skill development, technology, capital goods, and services, finance and so on are internally generated rather than imported. He concluded by identifying five potential dangers that could militate against sub-regional cooperation in Africa.

Lipede Abiola's work titled "South Africa and Integration in Southern Africa: The SADC Experience,"[85] discusses the South African factor in the integration of Southern Africa. Tracing the integration vision in South Africa to the 1920s, this was translated into a new strategic initiative based on the idea of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) in the 1970s. CONSAS was designed to encourage economic cooperation between South Africa and her neighbours and act as an anti-Marxist alliance group around Pretoria.

The refusal of African states to join apartheid South Africa in any form of economic cooperation led to their formation of the Mulungushi Club in 1979. Working with the Front Line States, this Club was transformed into the South Africa Development Coordination Conference SADCC in 1982. South Africa therefore, launched total destablisation strategy on SADCC states with serious impact on their economies and causing political destabilisation and civil was in member states.

In 1992, SADCC was transformed into South African Development Community (SADC) for effective integration and the dismantling of apartheid and racism in South Africa in 1994 saw South Africa joining SADC and a new era of cooperation began between South Africa and her former adversaries towards economic integration in Southern Africa.

Like in other regional organisations, the economic and military strength of South Africa made her a hegemon in SADC and this has led to the fear of unequal share of the benefits of integration among member states. The aggressive northwards corporate expansion of South African companies has rekindled the fears and suspicious of her smaller and poorer partners. The debt burden, unequal trading terms and continuing conflicts were all factors that ensured that South African membership did not have the snowballing effects on countries in the region that would create a climate of economic stability peace and security. South Africa has also contributed immensely to the resolution of some intractable problems and conflicts in the region.

E.N. Tjønneland's, work, "Making SADC Work? Revisiting Institutional Reforms,"[86] focus attention on institutional reforms in SADC. The study begins with an overview of SADC's achievements, failures and shortcomings from the 1980s into the 1990s, which necessitated the restructuring of the organisation to make up for all that were seen as lack of progress towards the agenda laid down by the organisation in 1992. Listed among the achievements were its ability to attract investment for development projects, particularly in infrastructure, and ability to foster a degree of regional identity. Among the failure was its inability to push forward a development agenda in sectors other than infrastructure. In its restructuring efforts, SADC adopted the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), in an effort to shore up the institution in what was seen as lack of progress towards the agenda laid down by the organisation in 1992.

Considering the new structure, strategy and set of development priorities, the author concludes that institutional weakness is the main concern in the realisation for development in the region. Focusing on SADC institution as the main variable in the process of development, the author identified three factors that contribute to its strength and weakness. These include the SADC Secretariat, which had no formal political power; commitment of member states to the SADC development agenda; and lastly, the legitimacy and relevance of the organisation to the member states, civil society and donors.

The article by Laurie Nathan titled "SADC's Uncommon Approach to Security, 1992-2003,"[87] describes and explains the difficulty confronting Southern African Development Community (SADC) in establishing a common security regime and its failure to play a useful peacemaking role. The author attributes the malaise to three major problems, which are: the absence of common values among member states: the reluctance of states to surrender sovereignty to a security regime that encompasses binding rules and decision-making; and the economic and administrative weakness of states. All these are national problems that cannot be solved at the regional level. The capacity and orientation of a regional organisation is derive from, and are constrained by, the capacity and orientation of its members.

According to the author, the main obstacle to cooperation in the sphere of peace and security in the sub-region has been a lack of convergence around values rather than interests. States agreed that a mechanism for peacemaking and security cooperation would serve their interests but disagreed profoundly on the orientation and methods of that mechanism. He went further to assert that at the heart of all SADC's difficulties lies a systematic tension between regional goals and national constrains. As a result, the challenge of common security in southern Africa is more of a national than a regional challenge.

He concluded that the SADC Organ is likely to become more effective only if a core group of democratic countries drives it energetically. They must also be willing to devote adequate resources to it, provide incentives for compliance with its norms, and put pressure on other states when required. The necessary composition and size of such group is a matter of debate but it would have to include at the very least South Africa and a democratic Zimbabwe working with common purpose.

Maxi Schoeman's work titled "From SADCC to SADC: The Politics of Economic Integration,"[88] provides an overview of the extent to which politics, rather than economic considerations, has determined the establishment and functions of SADCC (1980-1993) and thereafter of SADC (from 1993) highlighting the impact these politics-driven processes had on the development of the southern African region.

The author opined that SADCC was established by the Front Line States as the 'economic pillar' of the anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggle in the region. On the other hand, transforming SADCC into SADC represented and increased emphasis on responding to international trends through mobilisation of the region's own resources, potentials and capacity. The author concluded that to the extent that one can compare the underlying dynamics of the establishment of SADCC and later its transformation into SADC, the most salient aspect of the process are the impact of globalisation of liberal economic thought and practice on the region and the impact of the end of apartheid in South Africa.

Whereas SADCC was established by the FLS to promote economic independence from South Africa and to strengthen individual states in the region through development cooperation, SADC looks to increasing economic integration of the southern African region in order to promote development and as a response to the demands of economic liberalism. The process of regionalism remains a politically driven, top-down approach; however, this is often fraught with political tensions between the region's two biggest states, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

The unpublished thesis of Akinboye Solomon Oladele titled, "Regionalism in Southern Africa: A Critical Appraisal of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)," [89] takes a critical look at SADCC as a unique experiment in regional cooperation and integration. This was done against the background of orthodox integration models that have succeeded in providing solutions to the development problems in Africa and other Third World countries. The work examines SADCC's pragmatic approach to regional integration to ascertain its suitability to the socio-political and socio-economic realities of southern African.

The author opined that the orthodox integration model, which characterised most regional integration schemes in Africa, was uniquely unsuitable to the socio-economic realities of southern Africa. Similarly, that SADCC's programme of action toward the fulfilment of the organisation goals recorded appreciable progress. The resultant effect of this was some reduction of economic dependence on South Africa by most members although some members were still dependent on South Africa due to a number of factors.

That SADCC reliance on external aid in achieving its goals of collective and regional economic development was faulty. Finally, that the limited sanctions imposed on South Africa by the international community was already affecting the SADCC states because of the retaliatory counter sanctions imposed on them by the apartheid region. While examining the problems of the organisation, the author stressed that despite the formidable problems and obstacles facing the organisation, it has been able to ride through the storm and concluded that the pragmatic approach to integration adopted by SADCC was a potent weapon for its success and viability while it lasted. The approach also provided the key to its sustenance.

Nigeria and South Africa

The work edited by Adeleke Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji and Chris Landsberge, tilted *South Africa in Africa the Post-Apartheid Era;* [70] discusses the giant strides made by South Africa since 1994. The work comprises of thirteen chapters contributed by various scholars and practitioners are not only academically rigorous but also policy-relevant, covering different interesting topics, but only five chapters are relevant to the present study.

The introduction contributed by the three editors examine the foreign policy of South Africa, which has centred on her role as peacemaker in Africa, promoter of democratisation on the continent, champion of Africa's interest abroad and the promotion of regional integration and development. The authors opined that South Africa favours a cautious and step-by-step approach towards regional development based on the principles of equity and mutual benefit; a denunciation of domineering hegemony towards the region; and belief on partnership and fairness. South Africa equally put much efforts and energy into restructuring SADC in order to boost international investor's confidence and attracting foreign direct investment into Southern Africa.

According to the authors, many outsiders view South Africa as a hegemon or a sort of regional super power in the sub-region and more broadly, on the continent; the government has denounced such ideas. Although, South Africa has been playing a prominent role in Africa and World Affairs, her leaders have down played such domineering attitudes. Despite the fact that South Africa has not been a political, diplomatic and military "bully" in Africa, many perceived her as economic "bully" in the region. There is no denying the fact that South Africa enjoys good trade relations with the rest of the region and her economic expansion into the continent has been both private sector driven and government promoted.

The authors claim that South Africa is a middle power seeking to punch above its weight in global politics. They contend that South Africa lacks the economics, and military muscle and political legitimacy to impose its preferences on the southern African sub-region, let alone on the continent. The work is no doubt a comprehensive account of South Africa's Africa relations and hegemonic role in the sub-region. It provides a good background to the current work.

Maxi Schoeman's article "South Africa: Behemoth, Hegemon Partner or Just Another Kid on the Block"? [91] address the question of where-and how – South Africa fits into Africa. The author pays particular attention to South Africa's international and African roles. As the title suggests is South Africa's role in Africa that of a behemoth, a colossus hegemon, partner, or just another kid on the block? In Schoeman's analysis, South Africa is striving for a hegemonic role in Africa that includes strong elements of partnership, and sometimes behaves as just like another country. As regards being a behemoth, the author encourages the country 'to play the role of a partner, and for the government to play the role of a hegemon with a well-developed sense of its responsibilities being based on its own long-term interest on a strong and vibrant continent.' Whether the country will yield to this advice is yet to be seen.

Khaele Matlosa's work titled "South Africa and Regional Security in Southern Africa,"[92] assesses contemporary regional security trends in southern Africa. It highlighting the various efforts made by South African leaders (Mandela and Mbeki) since 1994 in resolving regional conflicts and the dominant role of South Africa in the region's evolving security landscape based on the country's politico-economic power *vis-a vis* its neighbours. The author examines South Africa's leadership role, noting that Pretoria has not exercised its regional dominance through unilateral hegemonic designs for fear of projecting itself as a sub-imperial power whose foreign policy outreach is driven more by self-interest than by regional and continental imperatives. Matlosa supports these points with two case studies of South Africa's policies in Lesotho and Zimbabwe.

On SADC's Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), the author noted that the gulf of opinion among SADC members regarding the structure, mandate and leadership of the OPDS, paralysed this important institution and generated mutual distrust and tension among SADC members, resulting in the OPDS general failure to respond to multiple conflict situations in the region. X-raying the prospects for South Africa's regional role between 2006 and 2016, the author concluded that South Africa would continue to dominate the region and play important role in how regional security evolves.

Judi Hudson's work titled "South Africa's Economic Expansion into Africa: Neo-Colonialism or Development"? [93] considers the speed at which South Africa has become the largest investor in the rest of Africa in a short decade, eclipsing even the recent increase interest from non-African investors. The author describes this rush which began on a relatively small scale as 'one of the biggest economic phenomena of the last decade.' Highlighting the reasons for South Africa's rapid corporate expansion, the author expresses that the expansion has led to new relations of dependency and exploitation of workers in the African operations of South African companies, and assesses how unequal exchange and terms of trade disproportionately favour South Africa. This has thrown up complexities and challenges associated with post-apartheid South Africa's role in the continent. Hudson's work grapples with six questions, which centres on the big brother role of South Africa, her economic expansion into the continent and her regional peace-making role.

Adeleke Adebajo argues in his chapter, "South Africa and Nigeria in Africa: An axis of virtue"?[94] that Nigeria remains the most strategic partner of South Africa, a partnership built around the close personal relationship between Presidents Thabo Mbeki and

Olusegun Obasanjo. Both leaders worked closely together in managing African conflicts through the AU, SADC, ECOWAS, and the UN, promoting norms of democracy and offering their personal services and good offices in resolving African conflicts. Assessing both countries efforts at promoting democracy and human rights in the continent, the author opined that South Africa faces more fierce opposition from other African countries than Nigeria.

The author noted that the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa reached its nadir during the tenure of General Sanni Abacha between 1994 and 1998. When in 1995, Mandela called on SADC summit to take collective action against Nigeria; Many African leaders accused South Africa as sowing seeds of discord in Africa and undermining African solidarity. The bitter experience of depicting South Africa as a western stooge over Nigeria was a bitter experience for South Africa and Thabo Mbeki was determined not to suffer the same fate over Zimbabwe; hence, he developed 'Quiet Diplomacy.' This coupled with other factors such as personal closeness to Obasanjo facilitated close relationship with Nigeria between 1999 and 2007.

The author devotes much attention to South Africa –Nigeria relations between 1999 and 2007, assessing the Bi-National Commission (BNC) and the growing bilateral trade ties, as well as the strained relationship between Abuja and Pretoria over a number of issues. The author concludes that despite the strained relationship, Pax Abuja-Pretoria still has the potential force to drive Africa's Renaissance. To accomplish this, both countries will have to reassure other African countries that their intentions are noble, consult with other countries and endure that their actions are not seen as attempts to dominate the continent in pursuit of their own parochial interests. This is the only way the two countries can become the beacon of democracy and engines of economic growth to which their leaders clearly aspire.

Devon Curtis work titled "South Africa: "Exporting peace" to the Great Lakes region"?[95] assesses the South African 'model' of peacemaking and its applicability to two cases in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in which Pretoria played a leading facilitating role and deployed about 3000 peacekeepers. The limits of 'exporting' South Africa's negotiated 'government of national unity' abroad are addressed. The author offers three broad arguments. First, South African policymakers have championed 'democracy promotion' in Africa as a key foreign policy goal and tend to view conflict resolution through the narrow prism of South Africa's 'negotiated revolution'. Secondly, the South African approach has often failed to take into account the key political economy factors that are specific to the Great Lakes region. Finally, despite the limits of 'exporting' South Africa's own model to Burundi and DRC, both countries have benefitted from some of the transitional strategies employed by South African peacekeepers.

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CHAPTER TWO

ESTABLISHMENT OF ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES IN AFRICA

The Economic Community for Africa (ECA) is a United Nations regional economic organisation that has been operating in Africa since 1958. Relations between the ECA and African states between 1958 and 1962 were passive because of the composition of ECA membership. There was a dramatic change of attitude by the ECA from 1963 onwards after the ECA had responded to the intense pressure put on her by African states to carry out structural reorganisation. After this had been done, the ECA headquarters achieved an appreciable and effective level of Africanisation. The Commission was also compelled to expel South Africa and Portugal from the organisation, reduced the powers of countries such as Britain, France and Spain, from full to associate membership and thereafter, appointed Africans as permanent officials.[1]

In addition, the experience between 1958 and 1962 and the body of research and documentations, which the ECA had accumulated over the years, meant that discussion between the Commission and African leaders could take place on a sophisticated and realistic level. Because of this, from 1963 onwards, ECA officials made real attempts to improve the political links with African states. Frantic efforts were also made to follow up more closely the implementation of the proposals that the ECA had suggested.

On its own part, African leaders in Addis Ababa formed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963. Article II of the OAU Charter called on Member States to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve better life for the peoples of Africa. Specifically, it called for the harmonisation of their general policies in such areas as transport and communication, health, sanitation and nutrition and in science and technology. In line with this, the OAU created the Economic and Social Commission, to oversee economic and social matters in the continent.

In December 1963, the OAU's Economic and Social Commission submitted its first report to the regional body on the economic development of the continent. The report recommended an Africa-wide free trade zone, a payment union, a continental communication system and closer coordination of national development plans.[2]These recommendations fell short of the aspirations of Africans who had envisaged the idea of regional cooperation. The call for closer coordination of national development plans was rejected.

The report suffered severe criticisms from Africans prompting the OAU to pay more attention to political issues. Economic issues including development, cooperation, integration and other forms of collective actions were left to the governments directly involved and to the various United Nations specialised agencies such as the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), United Nations Trade and Development (UNTAD), Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to mention but a few.

ECA and African Economic Integration

By 1963, African leaders had developed more interest in the activities of the ECA and the OAU too had accepted the ECA's division of the continent into four geographical zones comprising North, Central, East and West Africa for effective regional economic development and integration. During this period, the ECA was pre-occupied with vigorous and well-documented campaigns to persuade African leaders on the need for and benefits to be derived from sub-regional economic cooperation by acquiring and disseminating detailed information on current economic trends in Africa. The ECA therefore played a vital role in influencing African leaders to embrace sub-regional economic groupings.

The United Nations also sponsored conferences and seminars that expressed the desirability of economic cooperation among developing countries. In its 1964 Final Act and Report, the First United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recommended that:

> Regional economic grouping, integration or other forms of economic cooperation should be promoted among developing countries as a means of expanding their intra-regional and extra-regional trade and encouraging their economic growth and their industrial and agricultural diversification with due regard to the specific features of development of the various economic countries concerned as well as their economic and social systems.[3]

The Pearson Commission,[4] (a UN Commission), also expressed the same opinion which, apart from recommending tariff elimination or reduction among developing countries, also recommended that the IMF and UNCTAD should look into the feasibility of a clearing arrangement among those countries. Since the mid-sixties, both the ECA and the OAU have been promoting intra-regional trade and economic cooperation on regional and sub-regional bases.

The West African Economic Community (WAEC)

In 1967, under the auspices of the ECA, twelve West African States agreed to form a West African Economic Community (WAEC). This was the first attempt by some West African countries at forging economic cooperation within the sub-region. Their ultimate aim was to achieve "a common agricultural policy, non-discrimination in inter-state trade, coordination in education, training and research, common industrial projects and methods of common financing of them, and coordination of development programmes."

An Article of Association was therefore signed by the following countries: Dahomey (Benin Republic), Ghana, Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire), Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and later The Gambia. Guinea refused to attend the summit and sign the Article of Association in order to show the hostility that existed between Guinea and Ghana after the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah the former Ghanaian leader and a friend of Sekou Toure of Guinea.[5]

The ECA played a prominent and leading role in preparing the Article of Association and organising the conference where the Article of Association was adopted and signed. Delegates at the meeting freely expressed their intentions to move rapidly towards a more permanent and more visible form of collaboration. The meeting appointed an Interim Council of Ministers to prepare a Treaty for approval at the next conference and appointed Leopold Senghor as Chairman, while Accra was named as the Provisional Secretariat.

A close look at the Article of Association and those later adopted by ECOWAS would reveal many similarities in many respects. Article I states the aims of the Community, which included "the promotion of trade, agriculture, transport, communication and trade, inter-change of goods and services among the member states, and the promotion and coordination of equitable development of their economies." Article 2 gave a detailed list of ways whereby all these aims might best be achieved including "consultation on a regular basis," co-ordination and harmonisation of economic policies, progressive elimination of customs and other barriers to the expansion of trade and joint developments in areas such as communication and the use of energy resources.

Article 3, gave individual member states the right to belong to other regional or sub-regional groupings within and outside the community if such measures did not prejudice the aims of the community.[6] Article 3, was later adopted by ECOWAS. This was significant and necessary since it protected the rights of the French-speaking West African states that were already committed to many economic arrangements with France. It also preserved the continued existence of all functional organisations that were already in existence in the sub-region and other bilateral economic arrangements to which some English, and French-speaking countries belonged.

The first meeting of the Interim Council was held in Dakar, Senegal chaired by Leopold Senghor in November 1967. During the meeting, a significant step towards the realisation of a future West African Community was taken by the twelve states that signed the "Protocol of Association". This meeting no doubt marked a turning point in the evolution of the Community as evidenced by the presence of African Ministers who represented their governments.

ECA officials prepared many reports and recommendations including a preliminary draft of the proposed Treaty for possible adoption by Member states as the basis for the future Community. The ECA's proposed Community was modelled after the EEC but more specifically after the Coal and Steel Community and towards sub-regional integration and a future Common Market. The ECA was concerned about the adoption of a common policy on the sub-regional imports and exports.

In this regard, the ECA appealed to the *Union Douaniere Des Etats De l'Afrique Occidental (UDEAO)* to remove or reduce trade barriers so that imports from non-UDEAO sub-regional states would be subjected to the same conditions as exports from the European Common Market and France. This proposal did not go down well with UDEAO countries. They argued that it would involve carrying out major changes in the Treaty of Association, which they had signed, with the EEC at Yaoundé in 1961. They also refused to accept the ECA proposal on the removal of restrictions on capital transfers among African states, as well as proposals for a 'payment union' and a common account currency.

The conference concluded with a series of recommendations that favoured an integrated common market, rather than a more limited free trade area or customs union.[7]The conference called for the removal of barriers to interstate trade and directed that future development in all fields should be coordinated among member states. It identified agriculture, education and research cooperation as areas of future cooperation. Once the preliminary studies had been completed and the relevant proposals formulated, the proposed secretariat was mandated to draft a new Treaty to be presented for approval and adoption at the next conference of Heads of State in Monrovia in April 1968.

The Third Conference of West African Heads of State met in Monrovia between April 23 and 24 1968, chaired by President Senghor and attended by nine of the fourteen West African states. Opening the conference, President Tubman of Liberia enumerated all past efforts of the ECA towards sub-regional economic integration through seminars and conferences. He said they had yielded no positive results owing to what he called "powerful elements within and outside West Africa." He reminded his audience that the sub-region remained among the least developed in the world and called for a practical step towards cooperation and integration in West Africa.[8]

At the end of the conference, delegates adopted a protocol establishing a West African Regional Group and signed a Communiqué, which stated that the Article of Association signed in Accra on May 4 1967, formed an integral part of the protocol. Member states were assigned specific tasks on behalf of the conference. Senegal and Liberia were delegated to draft the Treaty for the Economic Group, while Nigeria and Guinea were to prepare a list of priority studies for economic, social and cultural cooperation within the area. President Tubman was given the task of contacting states that were absent namely: Cote d'Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Niger and Sierra Leone.[9]

The next conference of the regional group fixed for Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) in March 1969 could not be held owing to the political instability that had engulfed African states during this period. Despite this, the ECA Secretariat had provided the technical and secretariat support needed for these conferences. The ECA consultant had presented for discussion at the meeting three important documents, namely: (i) Preliminary Proposal on the Possibilities for the Liberalisation of Trade and Payments in West Africa: (ii) A Preliminary Draft Treaty for an Economic Community of West Africa and Explanatory Notes, and lastly, the Report of the West African sub regional

Conference on Economic Cooperation. The ECA's efforts thereafter could be seen as setting the stage for sub-regional integration in West Africa.

Temporary Setbacks to Economic Cooperation in West Africa: 1967 – 1970

The failure of the West African Regional Group was a serious setback to the aspiration and efforts at regional integration in the sub-region. Mention must be made that the socio-political and economic terrain in West Africa during the second half of the sixties was not conducive to cooperation and integration. During this period, a large number of West African states were experiencing domestic economic and political problems. Many states were too poor to initiate any meaningful proposal, coupled with internal political strife. Above all, the region became prey to domestic instability and external insecurity. Seven out of the fourteen independent states experienced at least one military intervention that saw the emergence of the military in governance for the first time.

Nigeria, the largest and most populous West African state, experienced a civil war between July 1967 and January 1970. The civil war deepened the gulf between Nigeria and some West African states, most especially, those that fully supported Biafra. External influence also played a prominent role in the crisis, as France put a lot of influence and pressure on her former West African countries to support Biafra. The non-recognition and subsequent non-support for Biafra from Nigeria's immediate Francophone neighbouring states was one of the decisive factors that ensured Nigeria's victory. Moves towards economic cooperation during this period were not only stagnated; diplomatic relations between Nigeria and some West African States such as Cote d'Ivoire were also severed.

Sierra Leone also experienced a prolonged constitutional crisis between 1967 and 1968 and this rocked the foundation of the country's nascent democracy. There was also a continuous and successful war against Portuguese rule in Guinea-Bissau, waged by African nationalists with support mainly from neighbouring Guinea. One major consequence of this was the unsuccessful invasion of Conakry, the capital of Guinea, in 1970 with incontrovertible evidence of Portuguese and French complicity.[10]

Incidents of hostile verbal exchanges were also very rampant among West African States contributing to the general insecurity during this period. These involved Guinea with her more conservative Francophone neighbours, as well as Guinea and the new military leaders in Ghana after the removal of Nkrumah. Equally, there was tension between Sierra Leone, and The Gambia (two English-speaking states).

Among the Francophone states, there was growing alarm at the direction taken by French diplomacy, coupled with the uncertainty about the probable consequence of the political and social change in France after the resignation of President Charles de Gaulle in 1969 and her rapid integration within the European Economic Community (EEC). The end of the civil war therefore marked a new beginning for Nigeria to move towards sub-regional integration. This was sequel to a number of post-war developments in Nigeria.

First, the end of the civil war witnessed further strength in Nigeria's economy and political stand in the sub-region. Economically, Nigeria was not indebted to any nation during and after the war and her economy was intact and very strong. Politically, Nigeria was more than ever convinced of the need for an active, forward-looking foreign policy with all countries of the world and for improved relations with her West African neighbours. With her neighbours, Nigeria believed that the establishment of a regional community would not only enhance the socio-political and economic interests of Member States but also safeguard their common interest and reduce their economic dependency.

Nigeria and Sub-regional Economic Grouping: 1960-1969

Since 1960, West African states have attempted forming a West African Common Market or Customs Union in an attempt to increase intra-West African trade and Nigeria has been playing a leading role in these attempts. Nigeria's commitment to West African economic integration dated back to the 1960's, although Nigeria could not be regarded as a serious participating partner during this period. In the early 1960's, Nigeria's reaction to integration on the continent was to stand as a stumbling block to Ghana's Nkrumah's proposal of a Continental Union Government or, at the very least, a political union of West African states. Nkrumah's proposals failed both at the regional and sub-regional levels mainly because Nigeria opposed it and got a number of African states to support her stand.[11]

Nigeria's position then was that economic integration must precede political union and that economic integration itself must begin at the sub-regional level and proceed in stages, beginning with functional cooperation and leading towards, perhaps, a common market. Many reasons might be adduced for Nigeria's stand. In the first place, the idea of true integration (and union that is more so political) was novel on the continent. Integration -whether political or economic - was perceived as being synonymous with loss of political or economic authority. African leaders during this period jealously guarded their political and economic independence. There was "no shared conception of how and why they needed one another."[12]

African leaders believed in being part of the decision-making process affecting their countries rather than delegating authority to a regional or sub-regional organisation that would act and take decisions on their behalf. They believed in leading their country's delegation to all-important sub-regional, regional and continental political and economic meetings and conferences rather than delegating authourity. This they believed would not only keep them abreast of developments on the continent, but would also make them active players in issues affecting their countries and the continent.

Similarly, within West Africa there existed rivalries between Francophone and Anglophone countries and within the Anglophone countries. The Francophone states saw themselves as a world apart from the Anglophone states and vice versa. Ghana under Nkrumah closed all her borders with her immediate Francophone neighbours such as Cote d'Ivoire (West), Togo (East) and Niger (North). Rivalry also existed between Nigeria and Ghana after the latter withdrew from the West African Currency Board and West African Airways on the "insulting" ground that having achieved political independence, Ghana could no longer associate with dependencies in these and other institutions. There was a bitter struggle for continental leadership among African leaders. All these exacerbated divergent ideologies on the proper form and scope of unity among them.[13]

In West Africa, there was solidarity among French-speaking West African states, as they believed in the doctrine of *la francophonie*, which closely bound them together against Anglophone West Africa. On the other hand, Anglophone West Africa did not enjoy the same type of solidarity and fraternity, which the Francophone had and still have in *la Francophonie*. For instance, all Francophone West African states, with the exception of Guinea Conakry, managed to retain a common currency zone even after their independence.

France also opposed Nigeria's leadership role in the sub-region. Right from the colonial days to her independence, France had seen the leadership potential of the country, which would no doubt run contrary to her interest in the region. While granting her West African colonies political independence, France retained her economic and military ties with them. Nigeria's efforts at integrating West Africa were seen as attempts to weaken if not eliminate these ties. France naturally resisted this move.

One reason Nigeria assumed the leadership role in the integration of West Africa was to protect her national interest. In the 1960s, Nigeria was non-industrialised and underdeveloped and the country wanted to develop; development was rightly or wrongly equated with industrialisation.[14] In the same vein, Nigeria's stand was not unconnected with her desire to become the 'industrial heart of Africa'. This was expressed in the First National Development Plan 1962-68 and was indeed seen as a strategy to enhance the country's productive capacity and make her "the industrial heart of an African Common Market". This could only be realisable through a West African sub-regional integration scheme which would be implemented within Nigeria's productive capacity.[15] Nigeria no doubt has both the human and material resources to actualise her industrial dream, and an integrated West Africa would enhance Nigeria's developmental and industrialisation aspirations.

Similarly, Nigeria believed in integration to safeguard her domestic market and her raw materials. An integrated West Africa would form a larger market for Nigeria's products, while an un-integrated West Africa could encourage smuggling of goods across the porous and ill-policed borders to destabilise Nigeria's market. An unintegrated West Africa would make Nigeria and her neighbours vulnerable to external influence, which could undermine Nigeria's socio-political and economic interests.[16]

The same is true about security. An integrated West Africa would enhance Nigeria's security, most especially as Nigeria is bounded in the Northeast, North-West, East and West by Francophone countries. These nations, though sovereign, are small and weak and pose no threat to Nigeria individually or collectively; however, they could do a lot of harm should they collude with foreign powers to undermine Nigeria's security interest. Interestingly, majority of Nigeria's neighbours, even after joining ECOWAS, have some form of military arrangements with France. An integrated West Africa would therefore guarantee the security of Nigeria; make Francophone West African states less dependent on external powers; curb French influences and give African states the opportunity to be in charge of their destiny.[17]

Nigerian leaders since the country’s independence in 1960 have seen the country’s destiny and obligation to lead the black race. This is the notion of manifest destiny enunciated by successive Nigerian leaders. Nigeria therefore has as a foreign policy objective, which has declared Africa to be the cornerstone of her foreign policy.

Integration at both regional and continental levels was seen as a way of exercising this leadership role. Apart from other benefits mentioned above, an integrated West Africa where Nigeria plays a leading role was seen as a way of neutralizing challenges to Nigeria's continental leadership role and neutralising French hegemony on the continent.[18]

Nigeria's leadership role in the sub-region during this period faced a lot of opposition both internally and externally. Among those that opposed Nigeria were Anglophone and Francophone states; Nigerian parliamentarians; ministers; federal ministries; diplomats; labour and union leaders; students and the general public. President Nkrumah of Ghana was a leading opponent of Nigeria in the sub-region. The possibility of Nigeria's economic and political domination of the sub-region was one of the reasons Nkrumah insisted on immediate continental political union. This scheme would sideline Nigeria and give Nkrumah and Ghana the necessary political leverage in the sub-region and the continent.

Francophone states were also wary of any integration, especially sub-regional integration that would involve their states and Anglophone states. Their opposition was based on economic and political domination of such a community by either Nigeria or Ghana. Francophone leaders such as Houphoeut-Boigny and Leopold Senghor were apprehensive of Nigeria and Ghana's political activities both within the sub-region and at the regional levels. They perceived calls and moves by leaders of these two countries towards a sub-regional and continental political union as a ploy to dominate states in the sub-region and Africa in general. In the early 1960s during the formative years of the OAU, Francophone countries teamed up with Nigeria to oppose Nkrumah's call for "Continental Unity" based on the Union Government for

Africa. The was repeated for Nigeria during her move towards the formation of ECOWAS

Nigerians also opposed the country's participation in economic integration schemes. The initial opposition came from members of parliament (MPs) and representatives of the small processing, repair and manufacturing sector. The anti-integrationists centred their arguments on the neo-classical theory that integration among developing nations could not yield welfare gains and would further deepened Nigeria dependence on European countries. They argued that integration would not lead to an increase in intra-regional trade (which was grossly insignificant) since the African economy was competitive rather than complimentary.

Other anti-integration issues raised included problems of inadequate transportation and other infrastructural facilities as well as language and currency barriers. Furthermore, it was argued that integration with Francophone states would further tie Nigeria to France since integration could not break the strong ties existing between France and the Francophone states. Nigeria was also cautioned against the Francophone Associateship in the EEC, which was described as neo-colonial and from which all-African states must pull out.

Pro-integrationist members of the parliament and other government functionaries, on the other hand, argued that integration would reduce Francophone states, reliance on France and at the same time increase Nigeria's (and the sub-regional) bargaining power against European countries and offer economic benefits to all participants. It was further argued that Nigeria's market though poor, was large and needed integration to sustain the large-scale and diversified export and import-substitution industries needed to stimulate economic growth and development.[19]

Largely, the debate demonstrated that West African integration was an attractive policy option but needed some time before it could be achieved. It was felt, however, that the implementation could only be achieved in a friendly political atmosphere where there was cordial interstate relations and trust among leaders. This could only be implemented after Nigeria had developed a substantial productive capacity to make it the centre of growth.[20]

Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1960-1966) was very enthusiastic about regional economic development and integration. Although Nigeria regarded her neighbours as too militarily and economically weak to pose any threat to her internal and external relations, she nevertheless cooperated with them. At the regional level, Nigeria took an active role in settling volatile West African problems, in cementing cordial relations (at least among the Monrovia powers), by giving aid and technical assistance, and in instituting bilateral schemes such as the Chad and Niger Basin Commissions.[21]

At the United Nations, Nigeria cooperated with other African and Asian states and pursued a non-aligned policy and strongly demanded the economic development of Africa and that Africa's hope lay in sub-regional economic integration and continental cooperation within Africa, - not outside it. Accordingly, a lot of energy was devoted to the propagation, acceptance and practical realisation of these ideas both within and outside the United Nations systems. On the domestic front, efforts were geared towards the implementation of the First National Development Plan aimed at increasing productive capacity and the adoption of various ordinances aimed at attracting foreign investments for economic development with economic independence.[22]

However, Nigeria's performance at creating a cordial regional atmosphere recorded limited success by 1966. Her full interactions with other West African states within the United Nations, the O.A.U and in West Africa had brought home the reality of the interdependence of all West African states irrespective of language, cultural, political and economic barriers. It was also obvious that the continued rivalry between Nigeria and Ghana and the bitter quarrels between Nkrumah and the Francophone countries contributed to the non-implementation of an all-embracing West African integration scheme.[23]

The over-reliance of Francophone states on "Mother France" and the EEC and the overbearing influence of "Father de Gaulle" remained strong influences in Francophone states. It was therefore not surprising that Francophone states did not respond to Nigeria's call on all African governments to “lend support to the feasibility study of an African Common Market,” which the ECA had proposed in 1963.[24]

It may be concluded that though between 1960 and 1969, Nigeria attempted a pragmatic and flexible West African integration policy; she was unable to bring it into being. The regional atmosphere, most especially the lack of trust among African leaders, remained a potent and militating factor. Nigeria's economy and the non-development of her productive capacity though necessary for assuring her a central economic role and giving her the capability to make payoffs, were also militating factors. The unfavourable political and economic factors and, above all, the civil war all delayed the actualisation of Nigeria's efforts at the integration of West Africa until after the Nigerian Civil War in 1970.

Post 1970 Convergent Forces towards Sub-regional Economic Integration

A number of forces naturally came to the fore and aided efforts at economic integration in West Africa after 1970. These forces could be tagged as ‘natural and human’. The first of such forces was leadership change in many West African states. The military coup d’états that swept across West Africa from 1966 led to the death and deposition of many civilian leaders and brought military leaders into political office for the first time. In Nigeria and Ghana the coup d’état led to the death of Sir Tafawa Balewa and the deposition of Kwame Nkrumah, who lived in exile in Guinea. This naturally removed the Ghana-Nigeria rivalry and ultimately led to closer cooperation between the two countries.

Equally, the removal of Nkrumah erased the 'anti–Nkrumahism’, which had been a common phenomenon among Francophone West African countries. Ghana’s borders with all her West African neighbours, which had remained closed since Nkrumah’s period, were re-opened and close personal relationship developed between Kofi Busia of Ghana and Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire. In 1970, Ghana signed a five-year Treaty of Friendship and Understanding with Cote d’Ivoire to cooperate on international, social and economic matters. This among others opened the floodgates of cooperation agreements between Ghana and other West African states.

The second common convergent force was the change in the foreign policies in West African states. With Military coups in many West African countries came new young and dynamic military leaders who were determined in most cases to change the foreign policy orientation of their countries. The new leaders reduced government machinery, ruled by decrees (which were not challengeable in the court of law) and had fewer or no opposition or pressure groups compared to their civilian counterparts. These factors aided their dynamism in governance. The ability of the new leaders to take quick and decisive action on domestic and international issues engendered people's confidence in them.

The period also witnessed the disappearance of President Charles de Gaulle from the political scene in France in 1969. The end of the reign of President de Gaulle, who was the symbol of French mystique and lubricant of Francophone neo-dependence, brought the Francophone states together for the first time. They developed closer political cohesion among themselves and their close relations with France began to decline. This period also brought to the fore antagonism, personality and policy clashes among the old civilian Francophone leaders such as presidents Senghor of Senegal and Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire who had the greatest awe for de Gaulle and France, and their young military colleagues.

There was also 'anti-Nigerianism' among Francophone states during this period. Cote d’Ivoire demonstrated this during the Nigerian Civil War, when the country recognised Biafra in May 1968 and put pressure though to no avail on President Charles de Gaulle to do the same in 1969. This further strengthened 'anti-Nigerianism' among francophone countries and many secretly supported Biafra during the civil war. After the war, many Francophone leaders most especially Houphouet-Boigny and Leopold Senghor continued the anti-Nigerianism campaign. They saw Nigeria as wanting to suck in other West African states, overwhelm and dominate them.[25]

The military ‘new comers'’ publicly began to call for reforms in the cooperation agreements governing relations with France. They began to see the agreements as being one-sided and as a web that bound them more tightly to France for France to bleed them even drier.[26] They equally criticised organisations such as the Organisation Commune Africain et Malgache (OCAM) and the Conseil de l’Entente through which France continued to maintain political and economic cohesion with and among Francophone states.

This new development made France to raise anti-Nigerian sentiments and tried to rekindle Francophone sentiment of solidarity and oneness with France. In February 1971 France's new president, George Pompidou, embarked on a series of African tours during which he urged the West African Francophone states to "harmonise their efforts so as to counterbalance the heavy weight of Nigeria,” both in the West African region and in the EEC to which Britain and the Commonwealth were about to be admitted. He campaigned against their joining the proposed ECOWAS, which according to him would turn them into Nigeria’s underdogs. Based on France’s advice, Francophone West African countries started forming rival regional groupings to forestall the success of ECOWAS. [27]

This suggestion spurred Leopold Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny into action. Firstly, they settled the differences that had long existed between their two countries. Senghor thereafter paid an unprecedented official visit to Abidjan in December 1971 to demonstrate their friendship. During the visit, the two leaders affirmed their commitment to the formation of *Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (CEAO), an economic community of seven Francophone states (excluding Guinea). CEAO was to replace UDEAO, which had come under severe criticism. In April

1973, the seven Francophone countries of Benin, Niger, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Burkina Faso and Mauritania (Togo was an observer) signed the Treaty establishing CEAO. CEAO was ostensibly to be a customs union and the final Treaty provided Free Trade in certain commodities, free movement of persons, a common external tariff established over a two-year period and a Community Fund for compensation.

Although both Niger and Benin Republic signed the Treaty, the two countries alongside Togo felt that CEAO would not be viable if Nigeria was excluded. Burkina Faso also felt that Anglophone countries should not be excluded from the sub-regional organisation. It is pertinent to note that these disagreements and the tension between the landlocked states and the coastal states delayed the signing of the final Treaty by over a year since the Bamako meeting of 3 June 1972. There was no denying the fact the CEAO was deliberately formed to counter-balance Nigeria's political and economic weight and to checkmate her attempts at organising a larger economic community within the sub-region. [28]

Within Nigeria, a new wave of anti-integration and pro-integration forces developed with a segment of both in the government bureaucracy. In the early 1970's the anti-integration forces in government bureaucracy comprised principal officials of the Ministries of Trade and Industry and External Affairs on the one hand and pro-integration forces, on the other were principal officials of the Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction and the Nigeria Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture.

The anti-integration forces relied on the old argument that Nigeria's large market did not need regional expansion for large-scale industrialisation or that Nigeria was unlikely to gain from integration because of meagre intra-regional trade and competitive export goods. They therefore stressed the dangers of Nigeria becoming the paymaster of other countries economic development at the expense of Nigerians. They opined that since the oil boom had increased the internally generated revenue, "for capital economic development in the country, Nigeria could if necessary absorb substantial official aid without running into debt-service problems." It was also perceived that since lack of highly skilled manpower was the constraint on Nigeria's development the country could partner with foreign concerns that were ready to train Nigerians as a precondition before entering the country's market.

The main concern of the Ministry of External Affairs was national security and conservation of foreign exchange. The Ministry officials feared that under integration, French men and women who had acquired the nationality of Francophone states might serve as spies for France, while commitment to free movement of labour and capital would permit "foreign" nationals moving out of Nigeria to drain the country's foreign exchange.[29]

The pro-integration forces pointed out the hollowness of Nigeria's diplomacy in the sub-region as demonstrated by some Francophone states during the civil war. A West African integration scheme would offer "a national outlet" for external aid to African nations (now increasingly possible on a large scale, thanks 'to cash from crude oil') and provide an institutional framework for Nigeria's leadership and the erosion of France's political and economic influence in the sub-region.[30]

Nigeria believed that her new earning from petroleum should be diversified. It could also be used in the technological transformation of the country's economic fortunes alongside that of the sub-region as a whole. Gowon put it succinctly thus:

> "that there was 'a new Nigeria' that recognised its "new role" in West Africa and realised that "the gigantic task of economic and political regeneration would be of little avail" unless it was attuned to the requirements of the economy of the rest of Africa, "particularly West Africa".[31]

Members of the Nigeria Chamber of Commerce became interested in sub-regional integration scheme for two major reasons. The first was the potential gains they would derive from the indigenisation policy, which would naturally make them beneficiaries and masters of new enterprises while disposing and vanquishing the expatriates. The indigenisation policy would afford them the opportunity of increased capital formation and increased production since expatriate competition would have been eliminated.

Secondly, Nigerian indigenous groups supported regional integration believing that if they could get involved in working out its details early, they might be able to ensure the inclusion of a clause, which would allow free trade in the common market only for those enterprises that were largely indigenously owned in the integration agreement. (This was the case of the rule of origin clause, which was annexed to the ECOWAS Treaty). The prospects of displacing foreigners domestically and at the sub-regional level became an emotional issue that aroused the interest of the Nigerian members of the Chamber of Commerce in a West African Common Market.

Members of the Nigeria Chamber thereafter threw their total support behind the Ministry of Commerce and Reconstruction and other pro-integrationists who carried the day in the bureaucratic politics of Lagos. As a first step, the Chamber, embarked on an active move to solicit the support of its counterparts throughout Francophone and Anglophone West Africa. This move took the form of forming a Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture in August 1972, a few months after a Nigeria–Togo agreement to form a nucleus of an all–West African Economic Community was announced.

The objectives of the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce are stipulated in the Constitution of the Federation in Article 3, (a-f). Article 3(e) specifically states: "*To promote the establishment of an Economic Community and a Common Market in the West African region and encourage the speedy re-establishment of supra-national commercial institutions.*"[32]

While Article3 (e) bears directly on the establishment of the Economic Community (and even goes further to envisage the formation of a Common Market), all the other aspects of the objectives of the Federation are integrated into one single dominant objective, namely the promotion of closer economic cooperation in the West African Sub-region.

It must be emphasised that indigenous West African members of the Federation like their Nigerian counterparts have also seen greater opportunities in terms of competition with foreign enterprises in a common market. The Federation's activities went a long way towards preparing other West African governments to committing themselves to ECOWAS. By 1973, the Federation had been duly launched in eleven (11) West African states with the remaining states signifying their intention to join.

Right from its inauguration, the Federation placed special priority on the establishment of a West African Economic Community and a Common Market in the sub-region as the most dependable means of promoting rapid economic development and ensuring a rising standard of living for the peoples of the sub-region. Appropriately, the Federation, its corporate members and officers served as advisers in the negotiations, which produced the ECOWAS Treaty.[33]

The Nigerian government was determined to implement to the letter the country's Second National Development Plan 1970-74, which addressed the issue of a West African Common Market. The government wished to forge ahead with the Common Market in accordance with the protocol of the West African Regional Group. The Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction came up with an argument, which thrust was simply that long-term economic and political gain, rather than the short-term cost and sacrifices, should be Nigerian's primary consideration. The Ministry not only got the support of the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce but also succeeded in "inducing it to function across national frontiers."[34]

Nigeria’s Diplomatic Initiatives towards Sub-regional Integration: 1970 – 1975

January 1970 saw the end of the Civil War in Nigeria and the beginning of an unprecedented era of peace, rehabilitation and reconciliation. Within the country, government embarked on the three ‘Rs’ of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation. Outside the country, government was convinced that regional cooperation provided the only secure basis for the country’s continued unity and for the independence and development of her African neighbours.

In 1970 during the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, Nigeria extended the spirit of reconciliation to all countries that hitherto recognised and supported the rebellion, and suffered diplomatic severance. The spirit of reconciliation was therefore extended to, Gabon, Tanzania and Zambia that cooperated with Biafra and whose attitude to Nigeria during the civil war had been hostile.

In 1972, Nigerian Head of State General Yakubu Gowon launched personal diplomatic offensive at drawing both Anglophone and Francophone states into a wider economic community. Several circumstances made the promotion of the community an attractive venture for Nigeria during this period. The first of these circumstances was the recognition given to Biafra by Cote d'Ivoire during the civil war. This made Nigeria to realise that benign rapprochement with neighbouring countries was basic to Nigeria's national security if they were not to serve as a platform for the promotion of political instability. [35]

The second circumstance was the formation of CEAO by Francophone West African states. This aimed at fostering economic cooperation among Francophone states, excluding Anglophone countries particularly Nigeria and Ghana. Nigeria, on the other hand, wanted an economic community that would be all embracing. Nigerian leaders realised that the establishment of CEAO was a deliberate attempt to draw away the Francophone West African states from Nigeria's proposed initiative.

The third circumstance was Nigeria's emergence as a regional power, thanks to the large revenue accruing to the country from the sale of crude oil since the late 1960's. The new oil wealth assisted Nigeria in prosecuting the civil war without resorting to borrowing and enabled Nigeria to assist a number of African countries financially. A number of African countries enjoyed the ‘naira diplomacy’. The fourth circumstance was the commitment of the country’s political leaders to making the country the ‘industrial heart of Africa’.

The establishment of an economic community in the region was perceived as part of the politico-economic restructuring needed to enhance cooperation and collective self-reliance, which was basic to redressing the problems of regional underdevelopment. Regional free trade, which is free trade among developing countries, was seen as a healthy stimulus to balance economic growth and development. An economic union was felt to be a precondition for the expansion of mutual trade in the sub-region. Since the present world condition appears to largely favour the major economic powers, it is only rational that the weak countries should work to abandon their inferior political status and secure a respectable place in the international community by organising themselves into regional associations of their own.[36]

Nigeria’s Final Move towards Economic Integration

In General Yakubu Gowon’s strategy and diplomatic offensive, Togo was crucial. Nigeria needed Togo's cooperation to show that despite her size and wealth, Nigeria could team up with a smaller country. In addition, Togo and Nigeria’s cooperation was an indication that both Anglophone and Francophone countries could always work together and, finally, it was believed that the cooperation might bring in more Francophone neighbouring countries such as Benin and Niger Republics.

In April 1972, the Heads of State of Nigeria and Togo decided to revive the idea of an economic community that would cut across linguistic and cultural barriers. While attending Togo's 12th independence anniversary celebrations in Lome, Gowon and Eyadema combined serious business along with the festivities by signing a Treaty providing for the setting up of what the Togolese President Eyadema called "an embryo" of a West African Economic Community" (WAEC) between their two countries. It would remain open for other West African States to join whenever they were ready.

Meanwhile a Joint Commission of Experts would meet in Lagos in June 1972 to work out the details and make recommendations. According to General Gowon, this initiative was neither a *fait accompli* nor an ultimatum. It was an invitation to other West African colleagues to join and assist them in the crucial deliberations that would determine the future shape of the Community. Paragraph (4) of the Communiqué clearly stated that:

> The two Heads of State emphasised the need to promote cooperation among African countries at all levels- bilateral, regional, and multilateral- as a positive means for achieving African Unity. To this end, they agreed to establish an Economic Community made up of their two countries as a nucleus of a West African Economic Community.[37]

That Nigeria teamed up with Togo to form an Economic Community was significant in many ways. Politically, the move by the two countries was to demonstrate that a small, relatively poor country could engage in an economically rewarding relationship with a far larger and richer country. It was also to dissuade poor and smaller countries from the fear of being dominated by bigger countries when they eventually became members. Furthermore, the Nigeria–Togo initiative demonstrated clearly that language, size population and past colonial experience needed not constitute an insurmountable barrier to trade and economic relationship among West African states.

Togo, interestingly preferred working with Nigeria to working with the Francophone states. In April 1972, the country hosted the OCAM Summit and Eyadema proclaimed his government's intension to avoid alliances that might impair the establishment of useful, bilateral relations with non-OCAM countries such as Nigeria and Ghana. In an unprecedented gesture of solidarity with Nigeria, and to illustrate the strong belief in a West African regional grouping, Eyadema declined the offer of the presidency of OCAM, for which, admittedly at the time, there were few contenders.[38]

The Nigeria-Togo Joint Commission met as scheduled and agreed on broad areas of cooperation including trade, industry, monetary payments, transport, communication and movement of factors of production. It also agreed on the necessary machinery for implementation, which were to be put into draft proposals by appropriate officials while Gowon was mandated to call a summit of all West African Heads of State to discuss them. A Council of Ministers meeting was to precede the summit before November 1972.

The next preoccupation of Gowon was to get other West African states to embrace the proposed economic community after the initial recorded success. Gowon’s next point of call was Benin Republic. Earlier in September 1971, Nigeria and Benin had instituted a common customs office and harmonised their postal services. In December of the same year (after the signing of the CEAO Treaty), Nigeria signed a Trade Agreement with Benin. The Trade Agreement provided for a most-favoured-nation and payments agreement, listed forty-two Nigerian products (thirty-two of them industrial) and twenty-five Benin products to be traded, and transit tax on commercial goods were eliminated. There were, in addition, clauses on trade fairs and exhibitions and on the procedure for the resolution of commercial differences.[39]

Nigeria also agreed to construct the twenty-four kilometre highway joining the customs town of Idi-Iroko to Porto-Novo. The work was completed in 1972 at a cost of ₦1.8million. The same year, Nigeria offered Benin ₦2 million twenty-five year interest-free loan. Nigeria further committed herself to a joint venture between the two countries. In 1972, Nigeria took over thirty percent equity and invested ₦7.2 million in a joint cement project and participated to the tune of ₦20 million in a joint sugar project; both industries are located in Benin.[40] Experts from both countries were to work out details on other areas of cooperation between the two countries.

The October 1972 coup in Benin brought in an ever-committed ally. Within a week, Mathew Kerekou was speaking of a Benin Union consisting of Togo, Benin and Nigeria.[41] It was not surprising then that Benin failed to sign the final Treaty that formally established CEAO in Abidjan in April 1973.

To this volte-face and to ensure continuing commitment, Gowon began a flamboyant display of Nigeria's wealth. Nigeria donated a set of printing machines worth more than ₦42, 000 to the Benin government. In January 1975, during the last round of canvassing for WAEC in Benin, Gowon introduced the "naira diplomacy." He donated ₦20, 000 for cultural development and another ₦5, 000 to a Horticultural and Nutritional centre. He also promised to finance an irrigation scheme in Benin.[42]

In March 1972, Gowon visited Sekou Toure in Conakry and, among other things, decided to establish "military cooperation" in the fields of defence and security, thus giving rise to speculation that Nigeria had reached a defence agreement with Guinea. Gowon also gave the *Jeunes de la RévolutionDémocratique Africaine* (one of the main political parties in Guinea) the sum of ₦50, 000. Early in 1974 when Toure complained to Gowon in Conakry that one thousand, five hundred mercenaries were massed on the border to topple his government, Gowon dispatched Nigerian troops and materials to Conakry. Toure in turn, pledged cooperation with Nigeria in bilateral and multilateral schemes.[43]

Nigeria and Niger had maintained cordial relations, most especially in areas of joint cooperation. By 1971, both countries had set up a Joint Commission for cooperation. The report of this Joint Commission was to form the basis of future cooperation. On January 8, 1972, Nigeria and Niger signed a landmark cooperation agreement by which Nigeria was to supply Niger with 30,000 kilowatts of electricity from Nigeria’s Kanji Dam project at a cost of N9.6million. The 1974, coup that overthrew Diori brought in Lt. Col. Seyni Kountche who rejected Niger’s “anachronistic” defence pact with France and sought Nigeria’s oil and asphalt on preferential terms. He therefore committed Niger to WAEC seeking only that the community “take into account the varying degrees of development of member states.”[44]

In November 1974, Col. Seyni Kounche visited Lagos to seek for continued financial aid for his drought-stricken country and to clear any misunderstanding over his failure to host the ministerial conference. He received General Gowon’s warm reception. By the end of November 1974, Nigeria had given Niger over ₦750, 000 in anti-drought aid. At the end of the visit, Kounche said that his “country was ready to support and contribute its quota towards the success of the economic development of the West Africa region.”[45]

Gowon also visited Nigeria's northern and eastern neighbours to solicit their support. Gowon visited the Cameroons and Chad in 1971 and 1972 respectively. The leaders of both countries Ahidjo and Tombalbaye respectively, expressed their strong desire to intensify cooperation with Nigeria and strengthen existing good, neighbourly relations. Both countries further expressed their commitment to existing bilateral agreements and the multilateral Chad Basin and River Niger Commissions, but they were not ready to join any economic community with Nigeria. Tombalbaye spoke for both leaders when he told Gowon that rather than they joining WAEC or indeed any other West African economic grouping, he hoped that "your great country will come as a full member of an economic grouping of Central African nations."[46] Both countries never joined ECOWAS.

Mali's leader Traore did not hide his unwillingness to team up with WAEC despite Gowon's passionate plea to him for "a new spirit of dedication and adventure" to deal with the problem of domination of African economies by foreign interests. Gowon told Traore that conditions were favourable to promote cooperation in all fields, and he hoped to count on Traore and the people of Mali to work towards the realisation of WAEC. Traore, instead, reminded Gowon that it was in Bamako that the Heads of States of French-speaking West Africa met in May of 1970 to establish CEAO, a Community that remains open to all West African states…[47] Initially, Traore had tactically declined joining WAEC because of CEAO

Mauritania, though sympathetic towards WAEC, faced a serious dilemma because of CEAO. In February 1971, Gowon paid an official state visit to Nouakchott and he and Mouktar Ould Daddah agreed to start joint consultations immediately with a view to entering into trade and commercial agreements. They regretted the slow progress on the all-West African Economic Community and pledged to do all in their power to bring it about.For Daddah, CEAO was an institution that he could not refuse in light of the preferences Mauritania would enjoy. He also feared that if his country should back out it might break up the Senegal River Authority to which his country and Senegal, a force behind CEAO belonged. Besides, Daddah preferred the preferences that Mauritania would enjoy in CEAO. Given these circumstances, Mauritania became a member of CEAO but with some misgivings and reservations.[48]

By May 1973, Gowon's strategy and diplomatic offensive have been partially successful. There was no doubt that the Anglophone countries were ready to work with Nigeria. According to Ambassador Lafayette Diggs of Liberia: “Liberia was ready to work hand-in-hand most cooperatively with Nigeria…for the achievement of this most desirable and worthy goal" of economic community of all West African states.[49]

Regarding the Francophone states, Gowon had succeeded in getting the full cooperation of Guinea to WAEC and got Togo and Niger to reject CEAO in favour of an all-West African community. Both Niger and Mauritania remained in CEAO but with some reservations. They could be said to be sitting on the fence and indeed saw the former as a step towards the latter. Mali opposed Gowon's WAEC out rightly, mainly because of Senegal; so also were Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.

Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal, two relatively powerful and influential Francophone West African countries opposed Nigeria’s moves towards West African integration for slightly different but reconcilable reasons. They opposed Nigeria's move for genuine fear of Nigeria’s domination of the organisation. By 1973, it would seem as if Nigeria had seen herself as an axis of growth and believed in the possibility of a mutually rewarding all-West African economic community, provided there was "true friendship and mutual confidence.” [50]

It was true that Gowon had not demonstrated true friendship and mutual confidence, most especially towards Cote d'Ivoire since the end of the Nigerian Civil War. Cote d'Ivoire was the only country in West Africa that Gowon did not visit after the civil war, so there was no personal contact between the two leaders. On the other hand, Gowon might have been of the opinion that such a visit to Houphoeut-Boigny might not yield the desired results considering her role and influence within Francophone West African states and in CEAO. For Cote d'Ivoire and her leader Houphet-Boigny, the fear of an integrated West Africa weakening or eroding this influence was of great concern.

Burkina Faso toed the line of Cote d'Ivoire because she relied much on her for access to the sea, for over forty percent of her external trade and for many other benefits from the Cote d'Ivoire -sponsored *Conseil de l'Entente.* The inability of Burkina Faso to take an independent line of action and decision was therefore understandable.

Senegal's position was not too radically different from that of Cote d'Ivoire. Initially, both Nigeria and Senegal agreed to work together in "harmony and convergence of views" on social and economic policies. They agreed to work together towards the establishment of regional and sub-regional groupings, take joint decisions to examine the problems of enlarging the African association with the EEC and to reinforce solidarity against the latter and many more; but Senegal later changed its mind within a year. Gowon was surprised at the Senegalese action and implored the Senegalese leader when he visited Lagos in November 1972 to cooperate with Nigeria in working for the creation of West African Economic Community across linguistic barriers and free from colonial legacies.[51]

Leopold Sedar Senghor saw in the proposed ECOWAS nothing more than a vehicle for the expansion of Nigerian influence within the West African sub-region. He was sceptical about Nigeria's domination and therefore called for a wider West African Economic Community stretching from Nouakchott to Kinshasa. While addressing the press on 12 April 1973, Senghor announced that he would have talks about a wider grouping with Kenyatta, Nyerere and Kaunda. This confirmed his acceptance of the French position, which was suspicious of Nigeria's motives. According to Senghor; “if Nigeria actually wanted a real wider grouping rather than regional hegemony, why not an Atlantic Group from Nouakchott to Kinshasa or, better still, an all-Tropical Africa Community.” He concluded that if these alternatives were unrealistic, so was the WAEC preferred by Nigeria.[52]

Gowon had another opportunity to canvass for support for WAEC when in 1973 he decided to tie the question of WAEC to the pending EEC-ACP negotiations. The disagreement between Nigeria and some Francophone states, mainly Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, prompted Nigeria in 1973 to sponsor an ACP meeting in Lagos between 7 and 9 July. The meeting, which was a follow-up to the decision at Accra where it was decided that all OAU member states should negotiate as one body, had the Caribbean and Pacific states in attendance and was meant to isolate deliberately Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal. The strategy was successful as a Nigerian- Wenike Briggs- was subsequently chosen as the African spoke person in the negotiations. With that, the triumph of Nigeria's stand was virtually assured.

The outcome of the negotiations was as significant as the negotiations themselves. As Isebill Gruhn has pointed out, a number of decisions reached such as reserving ten percent of aid funds to regional development projects and treating ACP countries as a custom area with respect to rules of origin of products. All these are supportive of regional cooperation, development, or even integration. Furthermore, throughout the negotiations, Nigeria, a leading oil-producing nation gave leadership at crucial times, lent leverage to the ACP side and contributed political and technical skill as well as impetus for action. Nigeria's leadership role was significant in the array of compromises, and the optimism and self-confidence, which the negotiations produced. Mutual respect and trust thereafter developed; "the spirit of Lome" became the slogan. A political and economic structure was achieved, which allowed ECOWAS to be concluded.[53]

Shortly after the agreement on ECOWAS, the world price of oil more than tripled in the wake of the Arab-Israeli "October War" of 1973. The Arab embargo on oil to the United States catapulted Nigeria to the fore line of indispensable oil producers in West Africa. This development no doubt helped to change West African states' perception of Nigeria's power and ultimately had an impact on relations between the EEC and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, as well as on the final decision made by other West African countries to implement the ECOWAS agreements effectively.

As J. B Ojo concluded, it was the atmosphere created by the ACP-EEC negotiations and by the North-South confrontation, the emergent confidence and trust in Nigeria's leadership, the pressure from the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, the Joint Nigeria-Togo Ministerial Mission and Gowon's personal diplomacy, which resulted in the Lome Ministerial meeting of December 1973. [54]

A number of Nigerians also played prominent roles in the formation of ECOWAS, within the government bureaucracy and the private sector of the economy. Among them were Adedeji Adebayo, Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction and Chief Henry Fajemirokun, President Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Industry Mines and Agriculture. Adedeji skilfully exploited his vantage position as economic development minister and his closeness to General Gowon to advance the cause of ECOWAS. Adedeji was a key figure among Gowon's entourage of forty, (40) who travelled to Togo in April 1972 where the decision to establish ECOWAS was announced. Gowon later entrusted Adedeji with the ECOWAS project.

Adedeji used his personal relationship with Chief Henry Fajemirokun to elicit the support of the leadership of the only organised group that was interested in ECOWAS - the Nigeria Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture. Not only did he get the support of this Chamber, he also succeeded in inducing it to function across national frontiers and eventual formation of the Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture. The activities of the Federation went a long way towards preparing other West African governments to commit themselves to ECOWAS. Chief Henry Fajemirokun was a key figure in the negotiation leading to the creation of ECOWAS.[55] It could therefore be said that a large number of Nigerians played prominent roles in the formation of ECOWAS.

Nigeria did not relent in her efforts at sub-regional integration. The Joint Nigeria-Togo Ministerial Committee met as scheduled in November 1972 and Adedeji Adebayo was a leading and active member of the Committee. The Committee prepared a draft proposal based on the guidelines approved by both Gowon and Eyadema when they announced their nucleus of WAEC. The Joint Committee also had the benefit of the EEC and CEAO Treaties. The draft therefore included all the benefits contained in the CEAO Treaty and the benefits that the larger Anglophone market and resources would offer. It also emphasised that what CEAO might lose in subvention from the EEC could be offset by compensatory subvention by Nigeria and greater possibilities of larger foreign aid.

A Joint Nigeria-Togo Ministerial Delegation thereafter toured all West African states between July and August 1973 armed with the draft proposal. The delegation had audiences with the Heads of State and Government and submitted the text of the proposal for discussion at the ministerial level. At the same time, the Chairman of the newly formed Federation of West African Chambers of Commerce, Chief Henry Fajemirokun, also intensified the activities of the Chamber, and enthusiastically supported the proposal until his death in 1974 in Abidjan while leading a delegation of the Federation on a state visit to the Ivorian capital.

A Committee of expert officials of both countries thereafter prepared a detailed draft which was later submitted to a Ministerial Conference of the fifteen (15) countries of West Africa held in Lome, Togo from 10^{th} – 15^{th} December 1973. The Lome Ministerial Conference was “a positive success” as it was attended by Guinea-Bissau that had just declared her unilateral independence from Portugal in September 1973. The conference called on Nigeria and Togo to draw up detailed proposals for the future shape of the community. The conference also outlined a timetable for the evolution of the Economic Community of West Africa States.

Between the 27^{th} and $28^{th}$of May 1975, the Heads of State and Government of the 15 West African States finally assembled in Lagos to sign the Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States. This was an epochal event in the annals of the sub-regional history. It was a major breakthrough in efforts at economic cooperation in the sub-region. The event represented the culmination of years of efforts by West African states to increase the economic mass and therefore, the bargaining base of their economies. Through a pooling of economic 'sovereignty', their intent was to transform their economies to improve the living standards of their peoples and to extend the struggle for political decolonisation into the area of economic decolonisation. Briefly, therefore, the inauguration of ECOWAS must be seen as an attempt by West African states to enhance their economic opportunities and reduce their external dependency.

The ECOWAS Treaty came into effect on 23 June 1975, when seven states namely, Ghana, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Togo and Burkina Faso ratified the agreement. By early July, Guinea, Benin and Niger Republics had also ratified the agreement bringing the number to ten (10). In November 1976 at Lome, Five Protocols to be annexed to the ECOWAS Treaty were signed. It was decided that the headquarters of the Community be located in Lagos while that of the Fund be located in Lome. Furthermore, Cote d'Ivoire was to nominate the Executive Secretary and Liberia to nominate the Managing Director of the Fund.

ECOWAS: Location and Membership

ECOWAS member states occupy a land surface of 5.1 million Km^2, which accounts for 17% of the total area of the African continent. The largest countries are Niger Republic (24.8%) and Mali (24.3%), while the smallest country is Cape Verde (0.1%). The West Africa population, which is increasing at an average rate of 2.67% per annum, was estimated in 2006 at 261.13 million inhabitants. Nigeria is the most populous country in the region with an estimated population figure of 134.22 million (51.4%), followed by

Ghana with a population figure of 22.46 million (8.6%) while the least populous Member State is Cape Verde with a population figure of 0.52 million (0.2%).

At inception, ECOWAS comprised sixteen countries in the West African sub-region, but with the withdrawal of Mauritania in 2003, membership currently stands at fifteen countries. Member states are Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger Republic, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. ECOWAS is the most populous of the regional economic communities in Africa.

The West African regional economy experienced an increase in the GDP from $141.9billion in 2005 to $170.1billion in 2006 with the 2007 projections reaching $181.0billion. A growth rate of 6% was achieved in 2006 and the projections for 2007 indicate a growth rate of 4.4%, which falls below the expected minimum sustainable growth rate of 7% required for achieving the MDGs. One major reason for the slowdown in economic growth relates to volatility in oil prices, which has affected negatively on the economies of the region, majority are oil-importers.

A trend analysis shows that for the past five years (2002-2006), the regional economy has been enjoying growth. All the three sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary) contribute almost the same to the regional economy. For instance, in the 2006 fiscal year, while primary sector contributed 31%, the secondary and tertiary sectors contributed 34% and 35% respectively to the regional economy. Concerted efforts are made to achieve and surpass the 2003 figure of 7.3% growth rate.[56]

ECOWAS consists of two distinct sub-regional economic groups: the eight UEMOA countries, which form a monetary, and customs union, with the CFA Franc as a common currency; and the seven-UEMOE countries, each with its national currency. This second group accounts for about seventy-five percent of the regional GDP and seventy percent of the population. Five members of the second group, namely: The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone are preparing with a renewed vigour towards the formulation of a secondary monetary zone (the West African Monetary Zone-WAMZ) by December 2009, within the regional framework of the ECOWAS monetary cooperation programme. On the basis of the performance of the countries under the ECOWAS macro-economic convergence criteria, the two regional currency zones will be fused together to form a single West African Monetary Union.[57]

Table 1: Real GDP and Growth Rates of ECOWAS Member States (2002 – 2007)

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007*
Benin	**4.5**	**4.1**	**3.1**	**5.4**	**6.4**	**2.5**
Burkina Faso	**5.0**	**7.8**	**5.1**	**6.8**	**7.7**	**4.1**
Cape Verde	**4.4**	**4.9**	**4.0**	**2.4**	**4.0**	**3.6**
Cote d'Ivoire	**-2.0**	**-1.7**	**1.6**	**1.0**	**2.5**	**2.5**
The Gambia	**4.8**	**5.1**	**5.3**	**2.8**	**4.0**	**4.2**
Ghana	**6.5**	**5.6**	**5.9**	**5.7**	**1.2**	**6.3**
Guinea	**4.7**	**1.0**	**2.7**	**2.2**	**7.1***	**0.8***
Guinea Bissau	**-6.8**	**0.7**	**4.0**	**4.0**	**4.5**	**9.4**
Liberia	**7.5**	**-24.0**	**22.3**	**9.6**	**14.0**	**16.6**
Mali	**4.2**	**7.8**	**1.2**	**7.7**	**7.7**	**2.8**
Niger	**5.6**	**4.7**	**-2.0**	**7.7**	**3.1**	**2.7**
Nigeria	**2.2**	**11.0**	**6.0**	**6.4**	**7.1**	**4.9**
Senegal	**0.7**	**6.7**	**5.6**	**5.5**	**4.0**	**4.0**
Sierra Leone	**5.1**	**12.7**	**12.3**	**7.5**	**10.2**	**6.5**
Togo	**3.0**	**2.1**	**4.4**	**1.1**	**4.1**	**2.2**
ECOWAS	**2.3**	**7.3**	**5.0**	**5.5**	**6.0**	**4.4**

Source: ECOWAS Database
*2007 figures are estimates

FORMATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC)

Regional cooperation and integration in Southern Africa owes its origin to historical, economic, political, social and cultural factors that have created strong bonds of solidarity and unity among the peoples of Southern Africa. These factors have contributed to the formation of a distinct Southern African personality and identity that underpin political and economic cooperation. Since the 1960s, Southern Africa's regional alliance patterns have been primarily determined by South Africa's military and economic dominance of the region. This and the policy of apartheid adopted by the white minority government of South Africa led to conflict-ridden relations between South Africa and her less powerful African neighbours.

In the 1970s, collective and individual opposition by African states to an apartheid-dominated regional order gave rise to two competing regional blocs: the South Africa-led Pax Pretoriana, manifested in the ideal of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) and the Frontline States (FLS) formed by independent African States. CONSAS was designed to encourage economic cooperation between South Africa and her neighbours and was to act as an anti-Marxist alliance group around Pretoria.[58] It was also to be used as a bulwark against Pan African Unity through its economic integration guise.

The formal establishment of structures to promote regional cooperation and integration among Southern African states started as an initiative of the Frontline States, and the original members were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. This initiative was directed initially towards the political liberation of the region. Since 1975 when they were formally constituted, the Frontline States have met regularly to co-ordinate efforts, resources and strategy, with regard to the National Liberation Movements of Southern Africa that were fighting against colonialism, racism and white minority rule. Later, this initiative was extended to address military attacks and destabilisation of majority-ruled states by apartheid South Africa.

The intensification of the struggle on both fronts strengthened bonds of solidarity and the need for collective action. Most of the countries of Southern Africa ultimately achieved political independence, but against a background of mass poverty, economic backwardness and the threat of powerful and hostile white minority-ruled neighbours such as South Africa and Rhodesia. Thus, the African leaders saw the promotion of economic and social development through cooperation and integration as the next logical step after political independence.

The road to the formation of SADCC could be traced to the 1980s and the efforts of the ECA towards the initiation of regional groupings in Africa and its effects on regional integration efforts in Southern Africa had been noted. The concept of a regional economic cooperation in Southern Africa was first discussed at a meeting of the Frontline States Foreign Ministers in May 1979 in Gaborone. The meeting led to an international conference in Arusha, Tanzania two months later. The Arusha meeting brought together all independent Southern African countries, with the exception of the then Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa, and international donor agencies.

The July 1979 Arusha Conference, agreed on a strategy to launch the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The then nine majority-ruled states of Southern Africa, namely: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, later met at Summit level in April 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia and declared their commitment to pursue policies aimed at economic liberation on the basis of a sustainable integrated development of their economies. The Summit adopted the Lusaka Declaration entitled *Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation* as well as a Programme of Action covering areas of Transport and Communications, Food and Agriculture, Industry, Manpower Development and Energy.

At the Conference, Sir Seretse Khama, the late President of Botswana, noted, "What we are trying to achieve is the ability to exercise some degree of choice which ensures us against domination by one powerful partner."[59] Clearly, the SADCC member states sought to translate the political unity achieved by the FLS over the decolonisation of Zimbabwe into building a regional economic order, divorced from South Africa. In the same vein, Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere, also a founding member of SADCC, noted;

> The basic reason for SADCC's strength is the political commitment that underlines its existence. For the Frontline States out of their own felt created SADCC need; although now it has a somewhat wider membership, the Frontline States still provide its core, are still the guardians of its objectives, and are still its main energizers.[60]

The formation of SADCC as a regional economic community marked a radical departure from African policymakers' preoccupation with trade-based and market integration schemes, On 1 April 1980, when the founding members of SACC signed the Lusaka Declaration, they effectively created an economic bloc that reflected the intractable conflictual relations between South Africa and its independent neighbours. The nine founding members were later joined by Namibia at its independence in

1991. Right from the outset, SADCC member states granted observer status to the Liberation Movements of South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a decision that anticipated eventual membership of a majority-ruled South Africa into the group.

The Lusaka Declaration embraced four interrelated objectives:

- The reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not only on the Republic of South Africa;
- The forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional organisation;
- The mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies;
- Concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of (SADCC's) strategy for economic liberation.[61]

SADCC Member states therefore, believed that reduction of external dependence was an economic necessity and not a political slogan. They believed that the dependency and subordination of Southern African countries in spheres ranging from transport and communications to trade and finance has, in the past, prevented and still gravely hinder their economic development and efforts at meeting the basic needs of their peoples. The general problems of weak, small, fragmented economies organised for the benefit of larger, stronger economies are made infinitely more severe by the nature of the South African states.

The dependence on South Africa, which was further compounded by South Africa’s economic and military hostility against SADCC member states, was an economic fact, which they must contend with. SADCC was not organised to threaten South Africa or any other nation. Its main goal was to achieve economic self-reliance and coordinated action in pursuit of common interests and not that of economic aggrandisement or economic sabotage. However, South Africa continued to carry out acts that hampered the achievement of self-reliance and pursuit of common interest within the SADCC Member states. SADCC was therefore an important means to hasten, broaden and strengthen national economic development for the benefit of the citizens of each member state.

In pursuance of these objectives, the organisation focused on functional cooperation in key sectors through a Programme of Action known as the SADCC Programme of Action (SPA). This reflected the spirit of Pan Africanism and its preoccupation with the need for regional integration as the means towards African continental unity and the recovery of African dignity and status in global affairs. These principles were enshrined in the 1963 OAU Treaty, the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos of 1980.

Throughout the decade, SADCC not only became a vehicle for coordinated self-reliance among the ten majority-ruled states of Southern Africa, it was also a platform for collective diplomatic opposition to apartheid. SADCC also served as a vehicle for mobilising extra-regional support against South Africa's hegemonic position in the region. The geopolitical conditions of racial conflict and South Africa's military and economic dominance of the region, however, made SADCC distinct from other regional organisations. The primary motive behind the SADCC initiative was to force a realignment of economic relations among and between its members and change their pattern of asymmetrical economic relations with South Africa to which they were historically linked as junior partners.

SADCC's Regional Coordination Strategy

SADCC's regional coordination strategy has since its establishment focused on a sectoral division of labour. The 1981 Summit held in Blantyre, Malawi adopted a Programme of Action for SADCC and assigned nine sectoral responsibilities to each of the founding states. Transport and Communications was assigned to Mozambique; Food Security to Zimbabwe; Energy to Angola; Agricultural Research and Animal Disease Control, the Secretariat and Chairmanship of SADCC to Botswana; Soil Conservation and Land Utilisation to Lesotho; Fisheries, Wild Life and Forestry to Malawi; Manpower to Swaziland; Mining to Zambia and Industrial Development and Trade to Tanzania. Following Malawi's refusal to relinquish fisheries to Namibia in 1990, SADCC split it in two; Malawi retained Inland Fisheries and Namibia was given responsibility for Marine Fisheries.

The decentralised structure that was adopted for coordinating the SADCC Programme of Action (SPA) underscored the need to build collective self-reliance, mutual trust and confidence and it was on this basis that the Organisation evolved over the years. The number of areas of cooperation increased as the membership of the organisation increased. Since each state was allocated at least one sector to co-ordinate, there was a need to respond to new challenges such as HIV/AIDS. Cognisant of the varying degrees of economic dependence of each state with South Africa SADCC did not require its members to renounce their membership of other regional schemes or their bilateral ties with South Africa. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) retained their membership of the South Africa-dominated Southern African Customs Union (SACU), while Lesotho and Swaziland remained in the Rand Monetary Area (RMA). Zimbabwe retained its Preferential Trade Agreement with South Africa, while Malawi continued to have formal diplomatic relations with Pretoria.

Transport and communication was designated a priority sector, since wars of liberation had closed all the traditional routes of landlocked states and increased the importance of South African outlets to the sea. It was also given priority attention in order to lessen dependence on South Africa. Despite this fact and perhaps because of the success achieved in this sector, it also became one of the main targets of South Africa’s destabilisation policy during the 1980s.

Mozambique was given the responsibility of coordinating this sector and SADCC established the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) to coordinate the rehabilitation and development of intra-regional transport networks. SATCC's overall strategy regarding the surface transport networks rested upon the corridor approach and it primarily focused on the rehabilitation of the Beira, Maputo, Nacala, Dar es Salaam and Lobito railways and transport systems The corridor approach not only allowed for a prioritisation of projects but also for a division of labour on the basis of national interest.

During SADCC's first decade, SATCC became the centrepiece of SADCC's entire Programme of Action and the sector most favoured by SADCC's major Western donors. By 1989, SATCC's $4.8 billion project portfolio accounted for 64 percent of the total value of SADCC's entire Programme of Action estimated at just over $7 billion and represented approximately $2.4 million or 63 percent of the funding pledged by donors[62]

SADCC adopted a Programme of Action that identified economic activities and development projects to be pursued. The project-based approach with each member state taking responsibility for a particular sector focused attention on the coordination of members' development initiatives, rather than on formulating a regional economic development strategy. The aim was to boost the activities of the individual states in the area of infrastructure and productive sectors. Cooperation in the field of transport infrastructure was, however, the prime concern of the organisation, given the landlocked countries of the region's dependence on South Africa for transportation of goods; developments in this sector became one of the main targets of South Africa's destabilisation policy of the 1980s [63]

The sectoral responsibility approach resulted in a highly decentralised organisational structure with a small secretariat in Gaborone and in a highly uneven distribution of efficiency and effectiveness within the various sectors. Although such an approach has its benefits, it underscores the basic principle of equality amongst members regardless of size or relative power. The sectoral approach also fostered a sense of common identity and common responsibility with every member, having a role to play.

On the other hand, member states were expected to provide finance for their coordinating activities on behalf of SADCC. Unavoidably, because of the general poverty and limited financial resources of many SADCC states, certain sectors were neglected, particularly the crucially important human resources development under the responsibility of Swaziland. Due to the level of under-development and general lack of recourses and financial capacity of SADCC member states, the organisation was heavily dependent on donor funding, each sector procuring funds for projects in its own realm.

Such an approach, apart from obvious dangers of unevenness and differences in approach and commitment inherent in it, also opened up the possibility that donors might have undue influence on certain sectors as they were dealing, by implication, with SADCC on a bilateral basis. Donor dependency further meant that the preferences of donors, and not necessarily of the region, would dominate SADCC activities. A last problem related to the decentralised structure and approach of SADCC was that donors often refrained from actually providing the financial assistance that they had pledged because the relevant sectors did not have the capacity to utilise such aid - a problem that has plagued SADC.

During its existence, SADCC saw an immense growth in the number of projects under its Programme of Action as well as the proliferation of new sectors to provide for new needs. Over time, the organisation also modified its approach to cooperation. Towards the late 1980s, at the time of the continental deliberations that would result in the Abuja Treaty of 1991, SADCC initiated a move away from specific projects towards the coordination of sectoral plans and programmes, and from the development of infrastructure to measures intended for the promotion of investment and production.

Dependence of SADCC Member States on South Africa's Transport and Communication Systems

Despite the formation of SADCC, member states of SADCC continued to depend on the Republic of South Africa for their economic survival. To fully appreciate the degree of dependence of Southern African states on South Africa, their dependence on South African transport and communication systems would be examined.

One dominant feature of the Southern African region has been the heavy dependence of most SADCC countries on South African ports, rail systems, roads and communications networks in such a way that the South African regime took advantage of this phenomenon in its political and economic relations in the sub-region. The transport patterns in the SADCC region have been influenced by numerous factors including geographical, political, historical and economic factors. These factors are particularly unique to the sub-region and a few examples would serve as illustration:

- Out of the ten majority-ruled countries in the region, six are landlocked and thus have no direct access to the coast but have to rely significantly for overseas trade routes and ports facilities on their coastal neighbours most of which were affected by unstable political climates;

- Of the ten countries, six have a common border with South Africa and the latter had used her economic, technology and military might to sustain its regional dominance;

- The difficult economic and political situation in the sub-region has resulted in major deterioration of the existing transport facilities leading to a substantial decline in the volume of overseas trade that passed through SADCC ports and transport network.[64]

Furthermore, a critical evaluation of the Southern African transport system reveals several other things. Firstly, South Africa compares favourably in the region in terms of its extensive railway network. Of the 39,000 km. railway strength in southern Africa, 23000 km. (about 60 percent) is in South Africa and Namibia.[65] South Africa has only 27.9 percent of southern African surface area. It possesses 65 percent of the rail trackage in the region; 57.9 percent of road network; and 60 percent (in numbers) of international harbours.[66] The SADCC region, on the other hand, has only approximately 13000 km. of railway network.

Secondly, there exists a strong link between the South African rail and road networks and those of SADCC member states, a phenomenon that has both historical and colonial origins and a deliberate South African policy. It is perhaps this strong link, which significantly explains the considerable dependent relationship between many SADCC countries and South Africa.

A closer examination of the existing SADCC transport and communication system would reveal this reality. The Maputo port and the adjoining port of Motala have direct rail connections with South Africa, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Swaziland and, until the 1970's, this port was of great significance to South Africa and Rhodesia's export trade. Between 1970 and 1974, traffic through the Mozambique transport network averaged roughly 3 million tons per year, or about 64% of Rhodesia's total export trade, 73 percent was handled by the port of Maputo alone.

By 1980 when Zimbabwe achieved her independence, 90 percent of her trade was passing through South Africa.[67] Immediately after her independence, South Africa used the UDI-induced transport and trade links to stifle the new nation. It was reported for instance "during the second part of 1980 and the first six months of 1981, imports were delayed in South Africa for several weeks while exports were prevented from being shipped. The transport crisis provoked unilaterally by South Africa cost the country during the period Z$5 million every week. By the end of the year, goods worth more than Z$100 million were still awaiting export."[68]

Swaziland too, had strong rail links with Maputo up to 1980. Swaziland depended heavily on the Richards Bay port in South Africa which is linked to it.[69] The Beira port and rail line were equally important to southern African external trade. It is also important to Zimbabwe as one-third of the country's external trade passed through this port. During the 1970's, the Beira port also handled roughly fifty percent of Malawian external trade. The Nacala port and rail system, opened in 1970, supplemented Malawian traffic and, at a point, handled all Malawian imports and exports. However, by 1981 Nacala handled only 40 percent of Malawian trade. In all, Mozambican ports are nearer to all starting points in Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia.

The Lobito port and Benguela line played an important role during the early 1970's chiefly in handling of Zambian and Zairean external trade. However, the continued civil war in Angola necessitated the closure of the Benguela line for a long period.

The problem of locomotives also affected operations of the railway systems in many SADCC member states. In September 1984, for example, only six out of the fifty-eight(58) steam locomotives of the central region of Mozambique railways were operational. Constant attacks by South African-backed RENAMO rebels in that country have persistently undermined the operations and repairs of the railways systems. Shortages of rolling stock and skilled manpower further worsened the situation, for a variety of reasons.

The Beira to Malawi, Maputo to Zimbabwe, Lobito to Zambia and Nacala to Malawi routes were practically closed to international traffic at the beginning of 1989. Similarly, the southern African region's roads and road transport systems have displayed several problems. Due to different colonial systems, the SADCC countries have inherited different standards in road design and development. Most roads within SADCC countries were poorly maintained due to the varying levels of economic problems being faced by countries in the region. The SADCC region lacks a reliable regional trunk road network and more than half of the tarred roads have been used beyond their designed life span and are deteriorating due to insufficient maintenance.

The inadequate and insufficient telecommunication systems in the region have also affected operations. The region was therefore unable to effectively cope with the rising demand on them during the 1980's and 1990's. With regard to insufficiency, most areas in the region were not covered by the existing telecommunication services. Even more politically worrisome was the fact that the SADCC region is linked through extra-regional points, including South Africa. Lesotho and Swaziland, for instance, still depend to a large degree on the transition facilities of South Africa for non-satellite intra-regional traffic. In the area of the SADCC region's civil aviation, there was no effective coordination of airline flight schedules as well as navigational communication and meteorological facilities.[70]

In conclusion, despite the formation of SADCC by independent southern African states and their determination to reduce their dependence on the Republic of South Africa, they depended heavily on South Africa for their transport system, telecommunication and other infrastructural facilities. Their continued dependence on South Africa for these facilities made them vulnerable to South Africa's attacks and economic destabilisation.

Table 2 South Africa and SADCC States: Trade Dependence, 1984

Frontline SADCC States	Imports Originating in South Africa (% total imports))	Export marketed in South Africa (% of total exports)
Angola	-	-
Botswana	78	7
Lesotho	97	42
Malawi	40	7
Mozambique	12	-
Swaziland	90	37
Tanzania	14	6
Zambia	14	6
Zimbabwe	18	10

Source: Singh, D."South Africa and Frontline States: A Case in Dependence and Destabilisation," in *African Quarterly* 1 – 2, (1985): 56.

The table above underlines the heavy dependence of SADCC member states, particularly the BLS countries, on South Africa for their imports, though the routes of their exports were relatively diversified.

South Africa's Reactions to the Formation of SADCC: Period of Conflict and Destabilisation

The nine Southern African states that formed SADCC in 1980 decided jointly to pursue policies aimed at economic liberation and integrated development of their national economies. One of the main objectives of the association was to make the economies of these countries less dependent on South Africa a country that was then an unwanted neighbour because of its unacceptable internal political and social policies.

In order to understand the relationship between the independent southern African states and the Republic of South Africa (RSA) during the Apartheid period, one needs to understand the philosophies and ideologies, which governed the two groups. The relation was characterised by conflict, destabilisation and competition. The question can be asked: What was the anathema about South Africa that the independent African states disliked so much, and what was South Africa's own perception of these states during this period?

Briefly stated, the major conflict between the independent states of southern Africa and the Republic of South Africa dated back to the days of colonisation. In 1948, the National Party came to power and systematised racial segregation in the country. Since then, the National Party's foreign policy objective was to protect the country's unique socio-political order from external threat. The major aim of the regime then was to achieve international acceptance of white minority rule and not simply Apartheid (which was just one form of white minority rule), in the face of black South African's demand for black majority rule. Severe opposition to South Africa emanated from the following sources.

First were the Liberation Movements based in neighbouring states, particularly the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan- Africanist Congress (PAC). All of them received military training, material support and territorial sanctuaries from independent southern African countries and other African countries. The second opposition came from the international community, which did not recognise the minority government and therefore imposed economic pressure on the regime. This became prominent especially after the 1976 Soweto uprising. The international economic threat became a reality when South Africa's access to international capital and technology severely deteriorated. The third opposition was a perceived conventional threat from the Soviet and Cuban presence in southern Africa due to the expansion of communism beyond the borders of Europe. This therefore presented South Africa with an excuse to act ruthlessly against Communist-inclined southern African states.

Central to all of the above was South Africa's desire to maintain neighbouring state's economic dependence on her, so that she (through accords and diplomatic relations and the CONSAS concept) could monitor the activities of the Liberation Movements. The Republic wanted to use her neighbours to head off international sanctions and as an export market in the region for South African industry, so that it could enhance its self-sufficiency in the face of sanctions.

During the 1980s, Pretoria tried to promote a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), which was an avowedly anti-Marxist and committed to the principles of free enterprise and market mechanisms. The rationale behind this objective was the creation of a ‘co-prosperity sphere' designed to increase regional 'interdependence' and thereby lessen the threat of international sanctions, while at the same time safeguarding markets for South African manufactured products.[71]

In creating SADCC, the nine independent African nations rejected South Africa's idea of regional cooperation via a Constellation of South African States (CONSAS). CONSAS was part of South Africa's “total strategy” to create a network of economic, political and security relationships in cooperation with the South African government. CONSAS was designed to include white South Africa, the ten South African Bantustans and the independent nations of southern Africa. The establishment of SADCC in 1980 dealt a devastating blow to the CONSAS idea and South Africa subsequently resorted to different strategies, including economic incentives and destabilisation, to discourage her neighbours from organising against her. However, CONSAS never took off and the idea collapsed.

Regionalism in Southern Africa during the Apartheid period was therefore characterised by an exceptional degree of economic integration running alongside marked political division and integration. Consequently, the level of ‘interdependence’ or ‘dependence’ that existed within the region was caused by a number of factors including colonialism, capitalism, incompetent government, socialism, the one-party state, Cold War expansionism and South Africa’s policy of destablisation.[72]

SADCC member states, on the other hand, had a popular belief that they had common interests, which would ensure the success of their programmes and simultaneously vindicate the belief that SADCC as a sub-system -could prosper and develop without the membership of South Africa. Although SADCC was not created as a counter-force to South Africa per se, its programmes were influenced by its rejection of Apartheid and promotion of economic independence among member states.

In the same vein, the main impulse behind the establishment of SADCC was economic. Its main aim was to reduce the dependence of Southern African states on Apartheid South Africa and the encouragement of economic development through poverty alleviation and self-sustaining development among them. This was to be achieved through self-reliance and economic cooperation. The promotion of peace and security was also an integral part of the SADCC Treaty.[73]

SADCC at inception had four development objectives including the reduction of economic dependence, particularly but not only on the Republic of South Africa. The first objective was no doubt, the most important in the SADCC programme. Indeed, the objective was so popular among member states and SADCC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana that the success or failure of the organisation has been built upon the attainment of this objective.[74] Many SADCC leaders advanced motivation for embarking on this first objective. The first president of independent Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, stated at the inaugural meeting in 1980, “Our goal is to achieve economic liberation and to reduce our economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa.”[75]

Although the apparent rationale behind the formation of SADCC appears to have been economic, the major driving force was undoubtedly political. SADCC members wanted to avoid what they perceived as a trap in South Africa’s conceived regional set-up in the Constellation of States of Southern Africa which was proposed by the South African government, and their aversion to apartheid.[76] As Weisfelder noted: “To be sure SADCC is a reaction against South African racism and economic hegemony. But it is also necessary to reiterate the predominantly positive character of SADCC goals, namely the promotion of economic independence, establishment of mechanisms for equitable economic integration, mobilisation of regional resources, and solicitation of international support for these objectives.” [77]

In 1987, the Executive Secretary of SADCC, Simba Makoni, said that SADCC member states were “not working to reverse the current order from a purely emotional or irrational political perspective, but from logical and rational economic realities. It would be equally unacceptable tomorrow when the ANC is in power in South Africa for the nine states of Southern Africa, which constitute SADCC now, to be as dependent on South Africa as they are today. We have made it clear that the relevance and validity of the SADCC will not end the day that the people’s flag is raised in Pretoria.”[78]

It is evident from the above that SADCC emerged out of conflict and confrontation between two opposing subsystems in the same region. Secondly, SADCC member states resented the degree and nature of their dependence on South Africa. This resentment was clearly reflected in the preamble of the Lusaka Declaration at the end of the founding conference: “Southern Africa is dependent on the Republic of South Africa as a focus of transport and communications, an exporter of goods and services and an importer of goods and cheap labour. Future development would aim at the reduction of economic dependence not only on the Republic of South Africa, but also on any single external state or group of states."[79]

It must be pointed out that SADCC leaders were not averted to South Africa as they had always maintained that they would admit South Africa once it abandoned its domestic racial policies. SADCC accepted Namibia as a member when it became independent.[80] This means that SADCC’s cardinal objective stemmed from member state’s opposition to Apartheid rather than from any real or imagined problems of economic dependence per se.

Pretoria's acceptance was to be effected and executed within the context of non-domination, until the existing dependence becomes inter-dependence. The former President of Tanzania and founding member of SADCC, Julius Nyerere, stated, "Our purposes are not simply greater independence from South Africa. If South Africa's apartheid ended tomorrow, there could still be a need for the states of Southern Africa to cooperate, to coordinate their transport systems, to fight foot and mouth disease together, and to rationalise their industrial development.[81]

South Africa's Attacks and Destabilisation of SADCC States

Most SADCC member states suffered greatly from South African military aggression and destabilisation activities between 1980 and 1992. The destabilisation process by South Africa was conducted either directly through military interventions or by proxy, such as the support of rebel activities that were fighting majority-ruled southern African states and particularly in the coastal countries of Mozambique and Angola. The military targets in the region have mainly been railways, ports, fuel depots, pipelines and several other strategic installations. South Africa continued its economic and military destabilisation policy in the region.

In pursuance of its economic and military destabilisation, South Africa maintained a military force in a number of African states. In1980, for instance, Pretoria had 2000 troops and advisers in Angola fighting with UNITA and by 1985; the number had risen to 5000. Pretoria also provided bases and camps for training of UNITA cadres after the Clarke Amendment.[82] RENAMO; a military force created by South Africa was also given moral, financial and military support by the government. This helped in prolonging the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. Indeed, South Africa was pivotal to much strife that occurred in Southern Africa between 1975 and 1990. [83]

The colonial legacy in countries like Swaziland, Botswana and Mozambique made them to be dependent on Pretoria for an outlet to the sea for their import and export of agricultural and other products. Successive South African leaders had used their facilities as a weapon against those countries in the region that supported the ANC, PAC, FRELIMO and the MPLA. South Africa employed strategies to destabilise SADCC countries by controlling the region's railway network system.

The net result of this state of affairs was the destruction of economic and political stability of those SADCC countries. This could be seen in terms of lost production; higher transport costs; poor economic growth; excessive expenditure on defence in countries that are largely riddled with debt service problems, low export receipts, poor manufacturing output record, declining or constant GDP growth rates, and so on. The SADCC Secretariat estimated the cost of South African destabilisation "at about US$30 billion for the period 1980-86, more than half of the foreign aid they received during the time.[84] The human cost of South African destabilisation was perhaps most revealing in terms of loss of life and displacement of people. In Mozambique alone, SADCC estimated that over five million people, roughly a third of the population, were affected by the resultant human displacement and starvation.

However, SADCC was unable to reduce its economic dependence on South Africa and was forced to draw more frequently on South Africa's capital, skills and communication links. The bold attempt by SADCC to reduce the dependence on South African ports by its members was stalled by war and South African policies of destabilisation in the region. An attempt by these countries to re-route exports meant additional transportation cost and reduced profits for countries such as Zimbabwe and Zambia. Zambia had to re-route its exports through the Tanzanian rail line. Many that could not do this therefore became appendages or clientele states of Pretoria.

South Africa employed many strategies between 1980 and 1990 to disrupt the flow of goods through the region, thereby destabilising the economy of independent South African states. There were six outlets to the sea available to SADCC member states. The most important was the connection between the Zimbabwean capital, Harare, and the Mozambique Indian Ocean Port of Beira, called the Beira Corridor. It was operative because Zimbabwe stationed 10,000 troops in Mozambique to guard it.[85]

The second outlet was the Tarzara railway, which ran from Zambia to the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam. This was also operative in the early 1980s, but later deteriorated badly due to a combination of factors. The first factor was poor maintenance by the host country and the other was destabilisation by South Africa and South Africa-backed rebel movements of RENAMO and UNITA of Mozambique and Angola respectively. [86] The other four outlets were inoperative because of similar reasons, namely acts of sabotage by the South Africa-backed mercenaries. The most important of those outlets was the 1200-mile railway line running from the border of Zaire to Angola's port of Benguela. It was kept closed between 1979 and 1986.[87] The other three closed routes all ran through Mozambique's port of Nacala. The closure of these routes affected negatively on SADCC's intention of reducing trade and economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa.

Aside from direct military attacks on SADCC countries, the South African government also engaged in indirect military attacks and economic manipulations to disrupt the economic activities of these countries. When Botswana made anti-South African statements in the United Nations (UN) and Organisation of African Unity (OAU), South Africa reacted by stopping refrigerator wagons to Botswana abattoir. This action, disrupted beef export to Botswana as all her beef exports passed through South Africa.[88]

In December 1980, there were also fuel shortages in Botswana as a result of the disruption of oil deliveries.[89] In response to the threatening situation, Botswana built tanks to hold three months' supply of oil products, but South Africa refused to provide the fuel to fill them. This is indicative of the sensitivity of the economy of Botswana to the trade relationship with South Africa. Brian Egner, an economic consultant in Botswana remarked; "We don't like them but we don't see any sense in infuriating them."[90] This statement essentially reflects the dependence of these countries on the Republic despite their disquiet about the latter's domestic policies.

In 1980, South Africa put both economic and military pressure on Zimbabwe to prevent it from buying fuel elsewhere, and therefore attacked fuel installations in Angola and Lesotho. By the middle of 1987, the disruptive activities of South Africa-backed RENAMO had made the use of port of Maputo by Zimbabwe impossible. Between 1982 and 1985, RENAMO had launched twenty-six (26) attacks on the Beira Corridor and more thereafter.[91] Throughout 1986 and 1988, RENAMO escalated its offensive on the Beira line, which rendered it dysfunctional. By 1986, owing to the mounting destabilisation in Mozambique, Zimbabwe's export trade that passed through her port declined from one-half to 20% while the remaining were re-routed through South African ports. This meant that Zimbabwe had to incur a loss of about Z$250 million annually in higher direct transport cost, which resulted from a switch from the port of Beira in Mozambique to Durban in South Africa.[92]

In post-independent Zimbabwe, South Africa withdrew locomotives, which had been loaned to the previous government of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. This action disrupted the economic life of Zimbabwe, resulting in the loss of export earnings estimated at Z$7 million a week.[93]

In 1986, when Zimbabwe and Zambia called for comprehensive sanctions against the Republic at a Commonwealth Summit in London, South Africa responded by imposing a levy of 25% of the value of imported goods passing through its territory to Zambia and Zimbabwe, thereby slowing down traffic from the two countries. South Africa thus demonstrated her indispensability to the economy of Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The impact of South Africa's policy of destabilising its neighbours, however, attracted most attention and was particularly contentious. For example, Hanlon argued in 1991 that Mozambique was once a model of Third World development, and identified destabilisation as the primary and overriding factor behind its plight, [94] while Blumenfeld considered economic dependence to be primarily a product of mismanagement in many of the SADC states. [95] There is no doubt that destabilisation had a debilitating and destructive impact on the Southern African economy. SADCC estimated that Pretoria's campaign of aggression in defence of white-minority rule resulted in 1.5 million deaths during the period between I980 and I988.[96]

In addition to the social and cultural distortions created by this covert war, destabilisation was estimated to have cost the region $6,246 million.[97] The successes and failures of this strategy have been well documented and examined by many authors.[98] Perhaps the heaviest cost was in the lost opportunities in areas, which affected the lives of ordinary people, notably agriculture.[99] The impact and consequences of destabilisation, particularly on social and economic standards in Mozambique and Angola, are legacies that now confront attempts to promote regionalism in the region.

SADCC: Successes and Challenges

SADCC was essentially a loose cooperative framework rather than a formal supranational entity. There was no treaty establishing the organisation or governing the activities of its members.[100] No SADCC institution was authorised to make binding decisions on behalf of individual members or the sub-region. Rather, each member state was responsible for a particular aspect of SADCC programme. Meetings were held at both the Ministerial and Heads of State levels and on an ad hoc basis. The rational underlying this informal arrangement was that it did not encroach upon member states' sovereignty and thus endeavoured to facilitate cooperation among countries with different ideologies and development.[101]Given the diverse political ideologies of SADC members, political cooperation was limited. Moreover, the organisation was not very visible on day-to–day basis. There was no Secretariat to administer its programmes or coordinate its activities.[102].

Although SADCC did achieve some measure of success, it failed to reduce the sub-region's economic dependence on South Africa. The organisation served to build solidarity among its members, and it mobilised significant international donor support for its projects. Despite such positive developments, Pretoria continued to exert a powerful economic grip on the sub-region. A 1985, SADCC report noted, for example, that countries from the sub-region had actually become more reliant upon South Africa as a trading partner since the organisation's creation. The 1986 SADCC Summit recommended the imposition of economic sanctions against Pretoria, but it did not establish a timetable for doing so. [103]

Table 3: Intra-SADCC Trade, 1982-84 (estimates)

COUNTRY	IMPORTS FROM SADCC (US $m).	%	EXPORTS TO SADCC(US $m).	%
Angola	12	4.3	2	0.8
Botswana	51	18.5	47	19.2
Lesotho	0.3	0.1	0	0.0
Malawi	26	9.4	14	8.6
Mozambique	26	9.4	14	5.7
Swaziland	3	1.1	7	2.9
Tanzania	24	8.7	4	1.6
Zambia	48	17.4	35	14.3
Zimbabwe	86	31.2	115	46.9

Source: J. Haarlov, *Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa. Central Elements of the SADCC Venture*, Report no.14

As reflected in Table 3, only three SADCC nations succeeded in conducting between 17 and 32 percent import trade with members, while the best performance in terms of exports to SADCC members was between 14 and 46 percent. In both instances, the stronger economies in the region, namely those of Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, were the best performers.

FORMATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

Towards the end of the decade, SADCC had become keenly aware of its limitations, among these premising being its development strategy on foreign aid and adherence to a voluntaristic institutional framework. This framework permitted the pursuit of national interests without due regard to the need for the effective coordination of macro-economic policies to achieve long-term regional competitiveness in the productive sectors. SADCC's immediate task between 1998 and 1990 was to redefine its objectives in the light of Southern Africa's changing political situation. It also became apparent that SADCC needed to be strengthened and overhauled to stand the test of time.

The attainment of independence and sovereign nationhood by Namibia in 1990 formally ended the struggle against colonialism in the region. In other countries, concerted efforts to end internal conflicts and civil strife were bearing positive results. In South Africa, the process to end the inhuman system of Apartheid and bring about a constitutional dispensation acceptable to all the people of South Africa was underway. These developments took the region out of an era of conflict and confrontation to one of peace security and stability, which remain prerequisites for cooperation and development.

On the African continent, efforts continued, mainly under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to promote closer economic relations. In 1991, some OAU Heads of State and Government signed the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) in Abuja, Nigeria. Like the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty made Regional Economic Communities (RECs) the building blocks for the continental community. In light of this development, SADCC Heads of State and Government viewed their efforts at regional integration in Southern Africa as part of this continental effort. More recently, the African Union, the successor to the OAU, has reaffirmed its commitment to the African Economic Community. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has designated RECs as implementing agencies for its programme.

On the global scene, fundamental and far-reaching political and economic changes were taking place. The Cold War had ended and world affairs were managed based on consultation and consensus rather than confrontation and competition. Integration was fast becoming a global trend. Countries in different regions of the globe were organising themselves into closer economic and political entities. These movements towards stronger regional blocs were expected to transform the world, both economically and politically, as firms within these economic blocs would benefit from economies of scale provided by large markets to become competitive both internally and internationally. For firms in Southern Africa not to remain behind, it became imperative for a large regional market to be established so that they too could benefit from economies of scale.

Salient Points on the shift from SADCC to SADC in the Post-Cold War Era

Continuous poverty in southern African states together with the political and economic changes in the Republic of South Africa and the global political economy towards the late 1980s encouraged a realignment of the organisation's development outlook and priorities. Firstly, by the early nineties many of the economies of southern Africa were still in a dire state. The failure of development policies, particularly of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that many of the SADCC countries adopted, allowed the poor economic performance of the previous decade to continue and challenged the SADCC to re-evaluate the policies that it had adopted.

Secondly, by the early part of the nineties there was a palpable sense that political events in South Africa were leading to a transition to majority rule. This called into question the raison d'être of an organisation that had positioned itself as a bulwark against the Apartheid regime. Thirdly, structural pressure on the SADCC mounted as it witnessed the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the worldwide increase in the number of formal regional organisations. Since Eastern Europe was no longer under socialist rule, there was the tendency that Western donors would divert aid from Africa, leaving the SADCC countries which depended on this aid to fund the great majority of their development projects to face potential losses in revenue.

Furthermore, the proliferation of economic blocs in the Americas and East Asia, together with the formalisation of the European Union, threatened the region, in the eyes of its leaders, and further marginalised it in the world economy. Combined, these sets of factors contributed to the organisation's act of revamping itself into a 'Southern African Development Community' (SADC) in 1992, with a new remit that attempted to adapt to these changes.

Having been reliant upon donor funding for the larger part of its development initiatives, the SADCC became concerned over signs of 'aid fatigue' among its international donors by 1989. These were exacerbated by the changes now occurring in Eastern Europe by 1990. Despite verbal pledges to continue assistance, but not to increase it to the region by officials in Brussels, Washington, New York, Ottawa and Stockholm, the SADCC states expected the 'opening up' of Eastern Europe to exert pressure on the aid budgets of Western countries and thereby have a negative impact on the flows of contribution to the SADCC region and developing countries at large.[105]

Furthermore, the socialist countries in the region in particular no longer foresaw the procurement of 'solidarity assistance' from these Eastern European states, which began to be seen as competitors for aid and investment. In light of this, 'most member states' had begun to discuss or implement economic and political reforms to adapt to these changes in the global environment. However, the SADCC states expressed a greater degree of concern over the competition it would face with the countries of Eastern Europe in the global market. As noted by the Report of the Executive Secretary at the Council of Ministers meeting, held in Lusaka, Zambia in January 1990:

> [M]ore importantly, the competition for investment and trade markets is going to intensify; and in this context, Eastern Europe enjoys the advantages of proximity, large markets with significant effective buying power, technical expertise and technological advancement. These advantages will be reinforced by feelings of kinship between Western Europeans and North Americans on the one hand, and Eastern Europeans on the other.[106]

This statement hints at a concern over marginalisation of southern Africa in the global political economy. This unease was furthered by another set of changes in the world, the move towards economic integration among the industrialised countries.

In a theme document commissioned by the SADCC for its Annual Conference in 1992, it was observed that economic integration was “fast becoming a global trend”.[107] The study noted the creation of the European Common Market, which anticipated the ascendancy of the Nordic and Eastern European states; the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada and Mexico; the moves amongst Asian-Pacific countries, including Japan, to create a ‘co-prosperity zone’; the launching of the Mercosur in South America between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay; and, finally, an agreement to end all regional tariffs between Bolivia, Columbia, Peru and Venezuela.[108]

These blocs are centred on three major hubs of economic activity among the industrialised countries in Europe, North America and East Asia, viewed as powerful transformational entities that would harbour increasingly competitive firms and alter the alignment of economic and political power in the world. Thus, the case for regionalism was no longer about de-linking from South Africa or the world economy, but participating in the latter out of concern over losing out: “Southern Africa must, therefore, strengthen itself economically and politically if it is to become a serious player in international relations.” This called for ‘deeper cooperation and integration’ and “common economic, political and social values and systems” in SADCC’s immediate future.[109]

The beginning of the 1990s, also witnessed dramatic political events within southern Africa. During this period, there were movements towards majority rule in Namibia and South Africa. These represented the last set of important factors influencing the SADCC’s change in development strategy. Upon the independence of Namibia in March 1990, it quickly acceded to the SADCC one month later, becoming the organisation's tenth member state in April 1990. The significance of Namibian independence and membership in the organisation was that it lent to the growing sense in the region that Apartheid would soon give way to majority rule in South Africa.

In1990, President. W. de Klerk's took initial steps towards dismantling the Apartheid regime by freeing Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, lifting the ban on the opposition African National Congress (ANC) and its rival Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) from operating within South Africa and repealing the various Acts of legislation that worked to segregate the majority of the population.[110]

Despite these moves, however, the SADCC remained cautiously optimistic about relations with South Africa prior to a majority led government. In 1992, the Joint Planning Committee, comprising representatives of the SADCC member states and representatives of the PAC and the ANC, concluded that the member states should refrain from engaging in any long-term bilateral commitments with de Klerk's government in order to ensure continued pressure on the regime.[111]

However, as the end of Apartheid rule became imminent, the question of what the SADCC would stand for and how it would engage with South Africa as a member of the organisation came to the forefront of discussions within the organisation.

On17 August 1992, the Heads of State and Government of SADCC member states meeting in Windhoek, Namibia, signed a Treaty transforming the "SADCC" from a Coordination Conference into South African Development Community (SADC, the

Community) and redefined the basis of cooperation among member states from a loose association into a legally binding arrangement.

The purpose of transforming SADCC into SADC was to promote deeper economic cooperation and integration; to help address many of the factors that made it difficult to sustain economic growth and socio-economic development, such as continued dependence on the exports of a few primary commodities. It had become an urgent necessity for SADC governments to urgently transform and restructure their economies. The small size of their individual markets, the inadequate socio-economic infrastructure and the high per capita cost of providing this infrastructure as well as their low-income base made it difficult for them individually to attract or maintain the necessary investments for their sustained development.[112]

It is important to note that SADC differs from SADCC in three major respects;

a. It includes the regional power, South Africa;

b. Its primary goal goes beyond economic co-ordination to encompass regional integration; and

c. Its mandate extends to the political and security spheres.

The decision to replace SADCC with SADC and broaden the organisation's mandate and goals was based on four considerations. First, there was a deep concern about the growing marginalisation of sub-Saharan Africa. In light of the emerging global trend towards regional integration, it was hoped that a process of this kind would strengthen SADC member states in international trade and political affairs. Secondly, a host of socio-economic problems that transcended borders and could not be addressed adequately at the national level struck southern Africa.

Third, the ending of the Cold War led to widespread acceptance of multi-party political systems and an attenuation of ideological tension among states. Many of the protracted historical conflicts had consequently been resolved or were in the process of being settled. Namibia had attained independence; Cuba and South African troops had withdrawn from Angola; a cease-fire had been reached in Mozambique; and democratic elections were held for the first time in several countries. Most importantly, the demise of apartheid had removed the main source of regional strife and created the possibility of an inclusive regional body. Fourth, notwithstanding these positive developments, the resumption of the civil war in Angola in 1992 and the fragility of other transitions to democracy reinforced the need for a regional security forum.[113]

Accordingly, SADC opted for a development integration approach, which recognises the political and economic diversities of regional integrating countries including their diverse production structures, trade patterns, resource endowments, development priorities, institutional affiliations and resource allocation mechanisms. It addresses many of the production, infrastructure and efficiency barriers arising from the underdevelopment of the region.

This approach also has the advantage of complementing trade liberalisation with sustainable corrective measure, designed to cushion the least developed member countries against shocks arising from the removal of trade barriers. It further allows member states to define the scope and sectors of cooperation and to identify appropriate strategies and mechanisms to overcome impediments to integration and to address regional imbalances among member states.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) focuses on the harmonisation of trade and monetary policies and, by definition, forces the states to adhere to prescribed treaty provisions, as is the case of the market integration models of the European Community (EC) or Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Underlining SADC's desire to have South Africa within its fold, the Summit "expressed the hope that a democratic South Africa will join the SADCC family of nations soon in order to enable all peoples of the region to join hands together in building a new economic order in Southern Africa, based on balance, equity and mutual benefit.” [114]

The decision to become a market-based economic community is as much a response to the shortcomings of the 1980s as it is a tactical move to pre-empt SADCC's demise in a post-Apartheid Southern Africa. In the 1990s, membership of the organisation increased to fifteen (15) as new members joined; Namibia in 1990, South Africa in 1994, Mauritius in 1995, Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997, Seychelles in 1997 (but withdrew in July 2004) and Madagascar in 2005.

Since its inception, SADC has inculcated a sense of regional belonging as well as a tradition of consultation among the peoples and governments of Southern Africa, which, among other things, has improved regional security. It has also formulated the SADC Programme of Action (SPA), which covers cooperation in several economic and social sectors, and implemented several infrastructure and other projects.

Furthermore, SADC has developed protocols in a number of areas of co-operation, which provide the legal framework for co-operation among member states.

While SADC has recorded some remarkable achievements, difficulties and constraints have also been encountered. These include lack of institutional reforms for effective transformation from SADCC into SADC; lack of synergy between the objectives of the Treaty on the one hand and the existing SADC, SPA and institutional framework on the other; and finally lack of appropriate mechanisms capable of translating the high degree of political commitment into concrete programmes of community building and integration.

Location of SADC

SADC consists of fourteen countries and covers an area of about 9,859,000 km sq. It has a population of 230 million people, the majority of whom are rural. SADC's combined GDP is US$E230 billion. Based in Gaborone (capital of Botswana), SADC's main vision is that of "[A] common future within a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa."[115]

Economic Characteristics of the SADC Sub-region

Agriculture is the backbone of the SADC regional economy. In addition, the industry is the engine room of regional development and generates growth, jobs and wealth. Agriculture contributes 35 percent to gross domestic product of the SADC economy, 13 percent to total export earnings, 66 percent to the value of intra-regional trade and about 70 percent of the SADC population depends on agriculture for food, income and employment. SADC countries also have a vast and diversified mineral resource base, which includes precious, and base metals, industrial minerals and precious stones.

Three countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Africa and Tanzania account for almost two thirds of the total population (64.4 percent), while the other six smallest members (Seychelles, Swaziland, Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia and Lesotho) comprise only 4 percent of the total population. South Africa is the dominant economy and it accounts for about 70 – 80 percent of the SADC GDP and approximately 22 percent of its population. Without South Africa, SADC had a total GDP of around US$ 30 billion in 1993; South Africa's overall GDP stood at US$ 120 billion, representing 80 percent of the total. In 2000, the total SADC GDP was around US$182 billion and during 2000 and 2001 SADC imports accounted for 13 percent of total market share, while exports accounted for 4 percent.[116]

Seven of the SADC countries, Angola, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia are classified as highly indebted and least-developed economies. Indebted, poor and faced with food shortages, SADC has adopted the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Agriculture and Food security that sets priority areas and considers the establishment of a regional agriculture development facility, as well as a regional food reserve facility capable of providing disaster relief.

Almost all of the SADC countries depend on South Africa's railways, port (airports and seaports), highways and other transit facilities. South Africa exports far more to the SADC region than it imports. The levels of imports and exports differ from country to country. For example, Tanzania imports far more than it exports to SADC countries. Similarly, while South African imports from Mozambique have declined by more than 33percent per year, soybean imports from Malawi grew by 88percent.

In general, trade among SADC member countries has been rising recently, with Zambia importing various agricultural products from SADC member countries.[117] With the end of apartheid and the subsequent democratic transition, South Africa has made a great transformation from being the greatest conflict area to being the greatest peace-maker in Africa and its joining of SADC was expected to boost the organization's capacity.

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CHAPTER THREE

CONTRIBUTIONS OF NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA TOWARDS SUB-REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATIONAND DEVELOPMENT

Since the formation of the two sub-regional economic communities known as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, Nigeria and South Africa have assumed leadership roles in the two economic communities and in their respective sub-regions.

Nigeria was a co-founder of ECOWAS, while South Africa on the other hand was not so fortunate, as she was not among the founding nations of SADC. Despite this shortcoming and since becoming a member of SADC, South Africa, like Nigeria, has been cooperating with other member states towards the economic development and integration of the sub-region.

The leadership roles of the two countries have been challenged internally and externally. Citizens of the two countries and member states of both organisations have criticised the rationale for such leadership roles by the two countries. Nigeria and South Africa have been accused of domination and asserting their political and economic might within the sub-regions. This has led to denial and counter-denial by both countries. Despite the hegemonic roles of the two countries, there is no evidence to suggest that they have tried in any way to dominate or put their might to bear on other members in their respective sub-regions.

Nigeria's Leadership role in ECOWAS

ECOWAS member states continued to express their opposition to Nigeria's leadership role in the sub-regional organisation immediately the Treaty was signed in May 1975. This opposition proceeded unabated and like the pre-1975 opposition, it equally came from within and outside the country. Within the country, opposition came from government officials and the citizens, while France and other Francophone West African states such as Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire continued to oppose what they believed to be the domineering role of Nigeria in ECOWAS.

In Nigeria, government functionaries and the citizens criticised Nigeria's membership of ECOWAS because of what they perceived might be the socio-political and economic effects of the organisation on the citizenry and the country at large. Government functionaries saw integration initiatives as serving the interest of their states while the ordinary people doubted the success of such policy. The ordinary Nigerians saw ECOWAS differently from their leaders. They saw the regional organisation as a liability rather than an asset. Right from its inception, majority of Nigerians opposed the idea of integration, as they believed it would bring more socio-economic problems than the anticipated gains. They believed it would further deepen the dependence of developing countries on the developed ones.[1]

However, a number of government officials working in different government ministries in the civil service also vehemently opposed integration. These bureaucrats pointed out the dangers of Nigeria becoming the "Father Christmas and the Paymaster" of an integrated West Africa at the expense of its development and the welfare of its people. They argued that an integrated West Africa would mean sharing

Nigeria's wealth with regional partners to the advantage and benefit of foreign enterprises in those countries. An integrated West Africa, this group argued, would not bring any commercial or industrial advantage to Nigeria but be a drain on her economy.[2]

The jealousy expressed by many West African leaders during the formative years of ECOWAS also continued. Some West African countries, notably Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal feared the potential politico-economic weight of Nigeria within ECOWAS. They believed this would enable the country to dominate the community. Some observers of the West African scene would even see ECOWAS as "greater Nigeria". According to Asante, "Nigeria's physical size, demographic weight, and enormous wealth make it…albeit involuntarily... something of a bull in a regional China Shop."[3]

Nigeria's GNP in 1980 was not less than 75 per cent of the sub-regional's total; and it had the largest and most diversified industrial sector, endowed with a wide range of natural and mineral resources, including petroleum, iron-ore, tin, coal, and limestone. On 28 January 1982, the country commissioned her iron and steel sector and entered the "steel age", thereby taking the first major strike in creating a sound technological industrial base. ECOWAS was therefore an organisation of unequal partners.[4]

The fear of Nigeria dominating the grouping was made apparent during the November 1976 Summit meeting of Heads of State and Government in Lome. At the meeting, Nigeria, insisted that voting in the sub-regional grouping should be based on financial contribution to the organisation. In other words, countries making the highest financial contributions would have more voting rights than those contributing less. This situation would have given Nigeria more votes for a bigger say on how the community's budget should be operated and managed. The other states opposed this proposal and argued that voting was a question of sovereignty.

This issue was forcefully driven home by the late President Tolbert of Liberia, who warned that the funding of the community must not be used to undermine the sovereignty of member states-rich or poor, large or small, young or old.” He declared; "We are sovereign states and equal partners. This is the only way to journey together into a prosperous future.”[5] The enthusiastic cheers that greeted this statement were a clear indication that national sovereignty would play a significant role in the working of the community. It was also a clear warning to all states but in particular to Nigeria to be a bit wary, so that the jealousies, which had troubled similar communities elsewhere, would not impede the working of the group.

Another indication of the danger of such jealousies and fear were again quite evident during the prolonged debate over the choice of Lagos, the former Nigerian capital, as the headquarters of the community. President Senghor of Senegal opposed the choice of Lagos and suggested that the headquarters be located in the capital of a smaller country. His view was based on Nigeria's already commanding position vis-à-vis other members of the community, and its ability should it so desire to dominate the grouping. The Senegalese leader had for long persisted in the view that membership of ECOWAS be expanded to include "all states on the Western side of Africa facing the Atlantic such as Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Zaire and Congo Brazzaville" apparently to dilute Nigeria's status in ECOWAS.[6]

Nigeria had on many occasions and at many fora, international and local, denied the claim of dominating the community. Rather, Nigeria has expressed her position as that of providing creative leadership aimed at maintaining the integrity of the union, guiding its goals, enabling it to adapt to new and challenging needs and circumstances, such that the others would become almost unconsciously endeared to it. Nigeria's role in ECOWAS could be aptly described as one 'without dominance'.

Nigeria and ECOWAS: 1975 – 1983

Although it may appear that Nigeria has not been playing a dominant role in ECOWAS, she is no doubt the leading actor in the activities of the sub-regional organisation. The leadership role that Nigeria played during the formation of ECOWAS continued even after Gowon was ousted from office on 29 July 1975. Gowon’s administration succeeded in sensitising the nation to the importance and relevance of sub-regional integration and the continued leadership role, which the country must play if the arrangement must survive. Successive governments in the country, military or civilian, have recognised this fact and acted accordingly. All Nigerian regimes have seen ECOWAS as a vehicle for enhancing the country’s future economic development: they have also seen it as forming part of the country’s concentric circle theory of foreign policy.

Murtala Mohammed/ Olusegun Obasanjo and ECOWAS: 1975 – 79

General Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded in securing the headquarters of ECOWAS and was the prime mover in getting the organisation off the ground. He was instrumental to strengthening ECOWAS and allowing it to achieve full integration. In November 1976, the first five protocols of ECOWAS were signed after eighteen months of blockade by Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal and other Francophone African states who had earlier advocated an enlarged ECOWAS. He was also a party to the actualisation of the $80 million Nigeria Trust Fund in the African Development Bank.[7] He was elected ECOWAS chairman between1978 and 1979.

President Shehu Shagari and ECOWAS: 1979 – 1983

At the sub-regional level, Nigeria continued to play the role of financier for ECOWAS, although the country's economy had been battered due mainly to government's financial recklessness and corruption. In January 1983, the government expelled illegal aliens from the country. These people either had overstayed in the country or did not even come in through the official route.

The expulsion of these illegal aliens, though welcome by the generality of the population, did not go down well with the governments of West Africans states and articulate members of the foreign policy elite who argued that the economic woes of the country could not be blamed on the illegal aliens alone. Government functionaries and politicians in collaboration with foreign concerns had siphoned billions of Naira out of the country and it was therefore wrong to blame fellow citizens from ECOWAS states for the state of the economy. In spite of the criticism, the government stood its ground.

The exodus of almost two million illegal aliens did not go down well with Nigeria's neighbours who argued that they were not given any prior notice.[8]Since general elections in the country were around the corner, most political parties refrained from officially engaging the Shagari administration on the issue. The generality of Nigerians believed that aliens were taking over their jobs and it was therefore not a wise vote-catching strategy to take on the president on an apparently popular issue.

General Muhammadu Buhari and ECOWAS: 1984 – 85

General Buhari's administration, which most actually began on 1 January 1984, faced many domestic, financial and external problems. The administration inherited a depleted treasury with a heavy external debit profile and limited income that could not offset exports. Internally, the social condition of the people was nothing to write home about. Social disorder-characterised by strikes and widespread violence, arson, religious bigotry and hooliganism-were the order of the day. Externally, the government faced a legitimacy problem.

The international community was dissatisfied with the new government, which had overthrown democratically elected government of President Shehu Shagari. What further compounded the problem was that, before the coup the civilian government has just been three months in office after another general elections in the country. The international community therefore took its time before according the government the necessary recognition and acceptance.

Despite all these problems, Buhari's government began the meaningful process of enhancing the West African sub-region in Nigeria's foreign policy concentric circle. The government's policies and activities formed the background on which successive administrations built. The Buhari administration was the first to place great premium on national interest and capabilities in its foreign policy calculations. Despite the fact that the government remained faithful to all the foreign policy principles of previous Nigerian governments, including in particular Africa remaining the "centrepiece of Nigeria's foreign policy,"[9] the government formulated a new definition of the direction of Nigeria's foreign policy. According to Ibrahim Gambari, the country's foreign Affairs Minister:

> While Africa remains the centrepiece of our foreign policy, we cannot but operate within a series of concentric circles, which now effectively guides our behaviour on the African and world scene. The innermost of the circles of national interest involves Nigeria's security, territorial integrity and political independence and that of the neighbours of Nigeria …. The second circle involves our relations with the **ECOWAS sub-region where we intend to take more active interests** in the development of social, economic and political nature. Nigeria is not a global power, therefore our commitments, preoccupations and expenditure of our resources must be made to reflect our capabilities and interests. **It is for this reason that our primary focus is on the West Africa sub-region** since any event occurring in this area has an impact directly on Nigeria's interest….The third circle of national interests involves supporting self-determination and dealing with larger African issues.[10]

By this declaration, government's primary focus was on the West African sub-region and issues related to the country's immediate neighbours. Nigeria's relations with her sister African states were therefore to be defined by hard-headed realism which placed Nigeria's national interests first and ability to deliver second and not the general concept of "Africa as the centre-piece of Nigeria's foreign policy".

Buhari's government ran into serious trouble with her West African neighbours while steering the country's new foreign policy direction. Ibrahim Gambari emphasised that government was ready to promote good neighbourly relations, which did "not compromise on any issue of vital national interest." The country was ready to continue giving as much assistance "as is compatible with our resources" but it shall "no longer play the role of big for nothing brother' of any state."[11]

Government continued its emphasis and awareness on the 'limited resources' of the country and 'present economic situation' and this was to be translated into an aggressive foreign policy. Nigeria's foreign relations with her neighbours were based principally on her national interest in terms of what the country stood to benefit and not the other way round.

In the context of Buhari's West African policy, the first issue that probably demonstrated the primacy of Nigeria's national interest was the closure of all the country's land borders. This was done, according to Gambari, “to put the economic interest of our people first and for security reasons." There is no gainsaying the fact that the economies of most of the neighbouring states depended on Nigeria, so the border closure would affect them.

On its part government on was more interested in curtailing economic sabotage through trans-border activities by nationals of neighbouring states and by Nigerians. West African nationals were involved in illegal trafficking of Nigeria's currency to cart away goods, which Nigeria used its foreign exchange to procure. Similarly, there was smuggling of food items, causing artificial scarcity and inflation in Nigeria. There was also gunrunning, drug trafficking, smuggling of petroleum products and car theft on a large scale. Government considered all these before the border closure, though it caused many groans all over West Africa.[12]

The borders were actually closed on 23 April 1984, as part of the currency exchange exercise which was carried out between 25 April and 6 May. The intention was to prevent the holders of large amounts of Nigerian money in the neighbouring countries from bringing them back to the country for exchange to the new currency.

This was meant to punish them as they would suffer losses and hopefully discourage them from future currency trafficking.

The closure revealed many unofficial trading activities going on across the border. In many neighbouring countries, the non-availability of Nigerian goods led to widespread shortages and at the same time, the absence of Nigerian buyers of goods that were subsequently smuggled into the country created problems for many traders in neighbouring states. Another revelation was the availability of a large surplus of petroleum products in Nigeria after the borders were closed.[13]

The border closure was initially received by the neighbouring states with understanding, as they believed it was for a short period but later they realised that it would take a much longer time before the borders would be reopened. This therefore led them to send high-level representations to the Nigerian government. Leaders such as Hissene Habre of Chad, Dawda Jawara of Gambia, Samuel Doe of Liberia, Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Abdou Diouf of Senegal and high-level representatives from Niger and Cameroun all visited Nigeria. The foreign ministers of Nigeria, Ghana, Togo and Benin also met in Lome to discuss the border security issues.[14]

Initially, the reaction of Nigeria's Head of State, General Buhari, was to promise his numerous visitors that the borders would remain closed until a satisfactory system of regulating the border trade was worked out. It was obvious that Buhari's government was not in a hurry to reopen the borders, more so when government was no longer ready to tolerate all illegal trading activities at the borders.[15] The borders remained close throughout Buhari’s tenure, except for openings at request for some vital products such as oil, food items or relief materials to be allowed through the borders as it was done for countries such as Chad, Niger and Benin. It was clear that the Buhari administration could not be bothered by the reaction in neighbouring countries.

Rather than pacifying the neighbours, Buhari's government took another action which the neighbours perceived to be antagonistic but which government said was in the ‘nation's interest.' On 15 April 1985, government published an order that all illegal immigrants should either regularise their stay or leave the country before 10 May 1985. The Internal Affairs Ministry emphasised that the order complied with the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of citizens among member countries and added, "no self-respecting government would sit down and fold its arms as non-citizens of the country would break its laws with impunity.” [16]

Government was determined to implement the expulsion order despite the adverse publicity it was bound to generate. The exercise was indicative of the importance government attached to its conception of national interest, which the exercise was meant to serve. Government's reasons for carrying out the order were economic and security related. Economically, the illegal aliens were said to have taken over the jobs meant for Nigerians, thereby creating mass unemployment among Nigerians.

On security, they were accused of 'subversive activities.' Briefing the press on the activities of the aliens and the nation’s security, the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Major-General Tunde Idiagbon, complained of the "subversive role of foreign evangelists" who he said, had violated Nigeria's immigration laws and have "tried consistently to introduce fundamentalist and revolutionary doctrines" considered "alien and untenable to our way of life." [17] A few days later, religious riots broke out in Gombe state.

The Internal Affairs Ministry claimed that there were over seven hundred thousand (700,000) estimated illegal immigrants in the country, who came mostly from West African countries and could be divided into two categories. The first category were immigrants displaced by natural disasters such as the drought in the Sahel, mostly from Niger, Chad, and Cameroon and were concentrated mostly in the northern part of the country; while the second category were those who came to seek employment in the country consisting mainly of Ghanaians and Beninois and concentrated in the south.

Among those affected were some twelve thousand (12,000) immigrants classified as 'professional,' who had been issued 'temporary' work permits of between one and two years, renewable after expiration. Those in this group actually applied for regularisation of their stay, but the Internal Affairs Ministry made it clear that such temporary work permits were 'definitely' no longer to be granted. This was another testimony of government's belief in the primacy of Nigeria's national interest. Henceforth, those employers intending to retain the services of any immigrant had to apply under the expatriate quota regulations.[18]

Nigeria’s neighbours were restrained in their reactions. Ghana, with the largest number of immigrants, restricted its comments and drew Nigeria's attention to the clause in the regional security arrangement signed in December 1984 between Nigeria, Ghana, Togo and Benin, which required a member country to protect other members' citizens in its territory. Niger Republic’s interior ministry, with about

100,000 affected immigrants, expressed concern about the impact of such a large number of people returning back to the country in view of the economic problems the country was going through.

The Chadian government made no comment despite the fact that most of her affected citizens were refugees from war and drought in the country. All affected neighbouring states restrained their responses despite the fact that many of them also had problems of illegal immigrants in their countries among who were thousands of Nigerians. The ECOWAS Secretariat also refrained from making a comment. Despite the expulsion order, several West African heads of state attended two sub-regional organisation meetings in Lagos on 27 April 1984; these were meetings of the Chad and Niger Basin Commissions.[19]

The absence of recrimination was no consolation for those who had cause to put question marks on Nigeria's commitment to sub-regional unity. It was now very clear that the Buhari administration could not be bothered about its image in the sub-region and it had developed a lukewarm attitude towards ECOWAS. In 1984, Guinea was to host the ECOWAS summit of Heads of State, but shortly before then President Sekou Toure died and it became necessary to find a new venue as no nation was willing to host the meeting. The Buhari government initially showed interest in hosting the meeting, but later changed its mind giving the country's financial problems as its reason.

Keen observers believed that a government that had closed her land borders could not hold a summit to discuss the promotion of sub-regional integration. Togo later agreed to host the summit.[20] When the meeting convened in November 1984, Nigeria joined other states that called for the postponement of the effective commencement dates of previously-agreed protocols particularly those relating to the free movement of persons, services and goods. Furthermore, in 1985, Nigeria declined the invitation to host the summit and Togo was again forced to host the ECOWAS summit that year.

Nigeria's attitude and conduct during the 1985 summit was not better than that of the previous year. Nigeria also opposed the implementation of the second phase of the protocol on free movement and pressed for a one-year postponement. Nigeria's attitude gave other members a lot of concern and at the end of the meeting, Nigeria was elected Chairman of ECOWAS.[21] The aim was to involve Nigeria directly in the affairs of the organisation and make her develop a positive disposition towards the organisation. Buhari reluctantly accepted the Chairmanship of the sub-regional organisation.

The government of General Buhari believed in building strong regional institutions as a pre- requisite for establishing a meaningful regional integration arrangement. Nigeria continued to pay regularly her annual budgetary contribution of 32.5% to ensure effective operations of the Community’s activities. Equally, Nigeria on many occasions gave financial assistance to the ECOWAS Secretariat in Lagos during the latter’s financial crisis. For instance, in June 1985 the federal government settled a sun of N80, 000 being out-standing in respect of house rents for the Community’s technocrats in Lagos.[22]

There is no denying the fact that this unfriendly attitude of the Buhari administration greatly damaged Nigeria's international image among its West African neighbours.

They also provided the background for the policies of the Babangida's administration. It would be very wrong to put the blame of non-cooperation with ECOWAS on the shoulders of Buhari's government alone; in fact, government attitude was part of the public's negative perception of ECOWAS as nothing but a drain on Nigeria. This disenchantment with the community's objective was very strong both among officials and the citizenry by the time Babangida's administration took over. The prevailing attitude then was that, given the country's present economic difficulties, it could not afford to make any more sacrifices.

Perhaps one indisputable fact was that the Buhari administration was so occupied with the idea of 'Nigeria first' policies and forgot about re-organising the cross-border trade. This was considered a pre-condition for the re-opening the borders, and allowing free movement of people.[23] Largely, all the country's land borders remained closed and on 27 August 1985 the government of General Buhari was toppled in a military coup and General Ibrahim Babangida became the new head of state.

The Effects of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in Nigeria

The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons no doubt had both positive and negative effects on Nigerians and the country at large. First were the negative effects it had on employment in the country, which provoked criticisms and disgust among some labour organisations. In 1981, for instance, the Gongola State Branch of the National Union of Construction and Civil Engineering Workers vehemently condemned ECOWAS for having made it possible for contractors in the state to indulge in employing "cheap labour" from ECOWAS and non- ECOWAS neighbouring countries, while "Nigerians roam the streets without jobs". The Union declared that such indiscriminate recruitment was a calculated attempt to undermine the union.[24]

The private entrepreneurs in Nigeria who were bent on maximising profits found these unskilled labourers as ‘god sent’. The unskilled ECOWAS citizens therefore "outmanoeuvred and undercut" Nigerian unskilled workers. They were everywhere doing all sorts of menial jobs and settling for any amount just to keep body and soul together. They therefore posed a great deal of threat and rivalry to Nigerians. Similarly, ECOWAS expatriate professionals took over the work of indigenous Nigerians as they settled for any amount, far less than what their Nigerian counterparts would take. They were not only ready to accept inferior conditions of service, but were also readily available to replace their Nigerian counterparts.[25] This undermined the Nigerian Indigenisation Decrees of 1972 and 1977 which had reserved certain employments for Nigerians. Aside from this, it also undermined the Nigeria Labour Laws.

The second criticism against ECOWAS was based on social and health grounds. It was argued that ECOWAS immigrants perpetuated illegal activities including smuggling of goods across the national borders and committing crimes such as prostitution and robbery. It was also alleged that the uncontrolled influx of ECOWAS citizens brought along all types of diseases to Nigeria.

Nigerians equally felt that an integrated West Africa would lead to the influx of nationals from other West African countries to their own disadvantage. In 1982, the Kaduna State House of Assembly moved a motion urging the Nigerian government to reconsider its commitment to ECOWAS because of the influx of ECOWAS nationals to the country.[26] The Assembly linked the religious riots in the northern parts of the country to the influx of these ECOWAS nationals. The only effort made by the Shagari administration to checkmate the influx was to order all foreign nationals to normalise their papers. This action led to the expulsion of all illegal nationals from the country in 1983, while West African governments criticised the Shagari administration for undermining the ECOWAS protocol of free movement and stay.

In 1984, the Buhari administration took over from Shagari, complaining openly against the ECOWAS Protocol of free movement of people and goods. This was because criminals and saboteurs had taken advantage of the protocol's provisions to promote smuggling and trafficking in small arms, narcotic and drugs.[27] A year later, in 1985, the Buhari administration closed all Nigerian borders. This was because ECOWAS was seen as a liability rather than an asset and Nigeria could no longer expend her resources to subsidise the living standards of the sub-region.

Government thereafter ordered all illegal aliens to leave the country within a stipulated time, leading to the mass expulsion of West African nationals. West African nationals were seen as illegal aliens who had snatched jobs from Nigerian citizens. Nigerians regarded the ECOWAS free movement of peoples and goods as an instrument that had brought into the country a large number of ECOWAS citizens, with all the attendant increase in crime rate without a corresponding increase in advantages for Nigeria.[28]

Despite Nigerian's widespread outcry about ECOWAS citizens taking over their jobs and engaging in criminal and other nefarious activities, ECOWAS citizens also contributed their quota (though it may be minimal) to the Nigerian economy. During the oil boom period when many Nigerians shunned menial jobs, ECOWAS citizens came in to fill the gap. Aside from unskilled manpower, ECOWAS citizens also provided skilled manpower in the country.

Many Ghanaian teachers took up teaching jobs in the nooks and crannies of the country, thereby contributing to the educational development of Nigeria when Nigerian teachers were in short fall, most especially in Western states where the ruling governments had introduced the free education policy at all levels. This had led to a great increase in the number of students in all educational institutions. In addition, in the heyday of the Abacha regime, when Nigeria was treated as a pariah state, the country was able to minimise the effects of international ostracisation by refocusing her diplomacy on the West African region.

ECOWAS citizens were also employed in professional fields such as in money and financial institutions, oil and gas and real estate and property development. These cadres of officials were professionals who were employed on merit and as expatriates, many of whom were not affected by the expulsion order. Similarly, to date, many Nigerian institutions such as financial houses operate in many West African countries such as Ghana, Togo, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Liberia.[29] As at the time the Liberian crisis began, Nigerians formed the majority of non-indigene communities doing business in the country

President Ibrahim Babangida and ECOWAS: 1985-1993

When President Ibrahim Babangida assumed office on 27 August 1985, he promised to review the policies of General Mohammad Buhari, which he described as being characterised by 'inconsistency and incoherence and being guided by a policy of 'retaliatory reactions' and 'vengeful considerations'. The President promised an early improvement in Nigeria's relations with its neighbours. In particular, the president said, "ECOWAS must be reborn with a view to achieving the objectives of regional integration."[30] Addressing the Patron's dinner of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, on 29th November1985, Babangida said:

> Regional Integration arrangements such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) represent useful means for the promotion of accelerated economic development among countries…..We shall continue relentlessly in our efforts to see that ECOWAS survive and prosper and we shall make all necessary sacrifices within the limits of our economic resources.[31]

The immediate problems confronting Nigeria-ECOWAS relations when Babangida assumed the country's leadership position were the continued closure of the borders; the problems of immigrants; and the general apathy towards the organisation itself. All these and other problems such as readiness to assist in the economic development of the neighbouring states needed urgent attention if the new government was to be taken seriously at her word. Unfortunately, government encountered a number of problems and implementation had to be delayed.

Government could not immediately reopen the borders as it had earlier announced. The issue of whether to reopen or not to reopen became an open conflict between Foreign Affairs Minister Bolaji Akinyemi, who was in favour of immediate reopening, and Internal Affairs Minister John Shagaya, who was not particularly in favour of this, at least until some conditions on the borders could have been worked out.[32]

The borders were reopened on 28 February 1986; six months after Babangida took over, with many conditions attached to the reopening. According to the Minister of Internal Affairs, the action was "a gesture to promote good neighbourliness" and one meant to foster economic and social activities with countries in the sub-region. The statement went a step further by saying that steps had been taken, including repatriation of illegal immigrants and the creation of more border posts, towards solving the border problems permanently.

Border security agencies were also to be strengthened and armed. The borders with Chad were to remain closed, because of the continued civil war in that country which was producing more refugees than Nigeria could cope with. The minister further warned that West Africans should not see the restoration of borders crossing as opening the floodgates to smuggling, illegal entry and other criminal activities.[33] Though government recognised the need to normalise relations with her neighbours, there was also a noticeable caution about rapidly promoting ECOWAS objectives.

On 18 June 1986, barely two weeks to the opening of the 1986 ECOWAS Summit of Heads of States and Government scheduled to take place in Nigeria, the Minister of Internal Affairs, announced that the Nigerian government had ratified the Protocol on Free Movement of People. Government would also allow citizens of member states to live and work in Nigeria without visas and work permit. Immigrants in only six professional categories would be allowed: doctors and health personnel, architects, engineers, surveyors, bilingual secretaries and teachers. Excluded from the list were lawyers, accountants, journalists and unskilled workers. People in these categories formed the bulk of immigrants seeking entry into the country. The certificates of professionals in the approved categories would be verified by government agencies and such immigrants would be required to find work within six months of arrival, failing which they would be expelled.[34]The long list confirmed the inevitability of the phase two of the protocol and the view that government was not too enthusiastic about it.

President Babangida was elected Chairman at the 1986 Summit held in Abuja, even though he had just completed General Buhari's tenure who was the Chairman at the time of the August 1985 coup d'état. The Abuja summit marked a turning point in Nigeria's relations with the sub-regional body, as the country was henceforth to become more actively involved in the sub-region's affairs. Shortly before the summit, government provided more accommodation for ECOWAS staff in Lagos, renovated the ECOWAS Secretariat in Lagos and provided land for the new Secretariat headquarters in Abuja and provided five million naira towards offsetting the cost of the project. At the Summit, the President pointed to these facts and the ratification of the Protocol of Free Movement as evidence of good intentions on the part of his government.[35]

During the 1986 Abuja Summit, the Nigerian leader was more actively involved in ECOWAS programmes. President Babangida blamed the slow progress on trade liberalisation and other matters on cumbersome legislative procedures in each state as well as insensitivity of relevant government organs to the requirements of the Community. As a way of further committing Nigeria more to the Sub-regional body, the Heads of States present at the summit unanimously elected Nigeria as Chairman for another year.[36] This meant the 1987 Summit would also be held in Nigeria.

Nigeria and Sub-Regional Peace and Security

Nigeria became involved in a number of 'fire-fighting' activities in a number of troubled spots in the sub-region. The first was the Mali-Burkina Faso crisis and Nigeria brokered a peace agreement that was acceptable to both sides. France later used Cote d'Ivoire to frustrate it.[37] Nigeria also mediated in the Liberia-Sierra-Leone crisis, which had mutually closed borders against each other.[38] Nigeria was also involved in the Chadian crisis in March 1986 following a sudden re-kindling of the perennial shooting and war in the country. Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, initiated moves that would have put out the fire and prevented necessity for large-scale involvement. However, the Chadian initiative took an unexpected turn when the Chadian government issued statements alleging that Nigeria was serving as a recruitment centre for Chadian rebels.[39] The statement, though it came as a rude shock to the government, was an evidence of a new interest on the part of the Federal Government in the sub-region.

President Babangida was also personally involved in improving Nigeria's bilateral relations with many of Nigeria's West African neighbours. His involvement took the form of official visits to many of these states during which several agreements on cooperation covering economic, political, cultural and educational, scientific and technical as well as diplomatic spheres were signed. Also included were agreements on participation by West African states in Nigeria's Technical Aid Corps Scheme.

Many joint ventures were initiated between Nigeria and many West African states in fulfilment of the provisions of the agreements. The initiatives covered areas such as students and scientific research workers. President Babangida visited among others Sierra Leone, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, and Senegal-three Francophone states. Apart from Togo, Nigeria had never really enjoined close relations with the rest. These trips and the return trips by their leaders to Lagos helped to create a new atmosphere in which warm relations developed between them and Nigeria.

Closer bilateral relations between individual states could be considered a prerequisite for the development of a more positive disposition towards the sub-regional body, ECOWAS. According to the *West African Magazine,* the 1986 Abuja Summit "provided considerable evidence" that Nigeria was "willing to do right to ECOWAS after a period in which its commitment seemed to be slipping." [40]

Aside from developing positive bilateral relations with individual states, the Babangida government also developed a more positive disposition towards ECOWAS. In 1987, Nigeria's Abuja once again hosted the ECOWAS Summit with President Babangida as Chairman. During the two Summits (1986 and 1987), Nigeria's participation and commitment were remarkable. Having committed his government to more active participation in the sub-region's affairs at the 1986 summit, the President devoted his attention at the 1987 Summit to emphasising the importance of speeding up trade liberalisation as well as the development of cooperation programmes in the areas of transport and communications, and promoting the free movement of persons, goods and services. The trade liberalisation scheme finally took off in January 1990, although its implementation continued to be hampered by cash shortages.

During the 1987 Summit, moves towards a positive monetary union were made. The leaders adopted a programme based on the proposals made by the Governors of ECOWAS Central Banks, which was expected to culminate in a common currency in 1992. In the meantime, the five years in between were expected to be a transition period which would enable members to strengthen the West African Clearing House.[41]

As regards financial commitment to the community, Nigeria took a leadership position not only by keeping up its payment of one-third of the budget; Nigeria has been constantly upbraiding laggard states, persuading and sponsoring resolutions such as "Spirit of Abuja" in 1987 which threatened defaulting members with reprisals.

The president was also involved in resolving and mediating inter-state conflicts such as those between Ghana and Togo, between Senegal and Mauritania, between Burkina-Faso and Mali and the Liberian crisis. Other areas in which Nigeria helped out included championing a common position on decolonisation, apartheid and debit crisis, giving aid to cash-strapped ECOWAS countries such as Republic of Benin and Liberia in 1989 as well as suing for peace among quarrelling countries in ECOWAS.[42]

Another index of Nigeria's contribution is the attendance of every Summit by the president and active participation in taking initiatives and in general discussions. For example, during the 11th Summit of ECOWAS held in Lome from June 24-25, under the chairmanship of President Babangida Nigeria sponsored a strong resolution on the dumping of toxic waste on the West African Coast. Again, at the 12th Summit in Ouagadougou, Burkina-Faso between June 29 and 30, 1989, only 10 out of 16 Heads of State were present and Nigeria took an active position. The same was true for the 1991 and 1992 Summits in Abuja and Dakar respectively.

President Babangida was apparently interested in making ECOWAS serve Nigeria's foreign policy interest in the sub-region. During his tenure as ECOWAS Chairman, Nigeria no doubt dominated the sub-regional body. Even after handing over the chairmanship, Babangida continued to exert considerable influence on the organisation, and his desire to use ECOWAS as a foreign policy instrument was reflected in his proposal at the June 1990 Banjul Summit for the setting up of a Standing Committee on Mediation. After intensive lobbying, the proposal sailed through and a Committee comprising Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Guinea and Mali was set up. This important decision was to provide the background for probably the most controversial use Nigeria has made of ECOWAS, that is, the initiative in August 1990 to send a peacekeeping force to enforce a cease-fire in Liberia.

Government also made conscious efforts to promote integration in entrepreneurial activities across the community, in keeping, for example, with commercialisation, privatisation and the government's economic diplomacy. Although the scheme initially faced a number of problems, there is no denying the fact that it portends good for genuine people-oriented integration.

The decline in overseas travel by businesspersons because of high costs had served as an indirect boost to budding indigenous entrepreneurs. Nigerian businesspersons had moved to ECOWAS states to expand their businesses. For instance, an indigenous company, Joe Geld International Company Ltd. based in Nigeria in partnership with a European firm based in Holland, was one of the growing numbers of Nigerian-based companies expanding into the West African sub-region. The company had extended her business tentacles to Cotonou and Conakry.[43] Another company, Texaco (Nigeria) Ltd., also made some progress in partnership with Texaco Overseas subsidiaries in Cote d'Ivoire [44] with regard to getting its products, for instance, grease-across to other West African states.

In 1989, President Babangida addressed a meeting of the Federation of West African Manufacturers (FEWAMA) in Lagos. He stated that; "businessmen should show how they can institutionalise their coming together as a basis for increasing their inter-state experience and knowledge of available local resources to produce what the sub-region needs".[45]

It must be mentioned that many Nigerian businesses such as banking, airlines, insurance, food and beverages and telecommunications have expanded their businesses along the West African corridor.

Nigeria and the ECOMOG Initiative

In this section, Nigeria's involvement in ECOMOG would be attempted. The ECOMOG initiative would probably be considered the capstone of Nigeria's West African policy under Babangida. It was a venture undertaken and spearheaded by Nigeria ostensibly to stop the carnage that accompanied the civil war in Liberia. The roots of the Liberian civil war, which broke out in December 1989 can be traced back to the harsh and oppressive rule of Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, who in 1980 overthrew the government of and killed President William Tolbert. It was a popular view that President Tolbert had headed a government in which small but powerful

Americo-Liberian elite controlled the dominant political and economic positions.[46] Doe's regime was dominated mainly by his own Krahn ethnic group. This was also characterised by brutal suppression of opponents, and dissenting views and the use of naked force to quell opposition.

In 1985, Doe organised a farcical election, which he claimed he had won on a landslide, and subsequently became the president. Doe thereafter unleashed another round of terror on his opponents, executing opponents on framed-up charges and also killing coup plotters and, tragically, unarmed civilians whom he suspected of maintaining an opposition posture.

The international community was horrified by reports of the AFL's attack on the United Nations mission as well as the slaughter of unarmed civilians, with the most gruesome and notorious being the alleged killing of over 600 fleeing refugees-mostly women and children-in a local Lutheran Church in Monrovia. These atrocities created a huge refugee problem and threatened the political stability of the sub-region. Matters however, came to a head in Liberia on December 29, 1989, when Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, attempted a coup.[47]

When Charles Taylor's coup attempt failed, he fled the country and later assembled civilians, mostly under age children who were poorly trained, and began guerrilla attacks overrunning major Liberian cities and marching their way into Monrovia, Liberia's capital and seat of power. The rebellion began in Nimba County on the border between Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire, with soldiers trained in Libya and Burkina Faso and deployed to Cote d'Ivoire from where they launched their attacks. They soon fought their way into Monrovia, the Liberian capital, and were just a few kilometres away from the Presidential Palace, which housed Samuel Doe and his family.

Gradually, Monrovia came under direct military forays with the consequent threat posed to the diplomatic community in the city and the lives of many West African nationals. Both the rebel and government forces unleashed assaults on the civilian population and this resulted in the deaths of a large number of people. Embassies of foreign missions and that of Nigeria were attacked and ransacked, with many valuable items stolen. The rebel group took the nationals of several West African countries; specifically Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Guinea as hostages for their country's alleged support for Samuel Doe. Several Nigerians were therefore taken hostage and threats issued that they would be killed. Charles Taylor saw Nigeria as an obstacle to his political ambition in the country.

There was great concern for the welfare of thousands of refugees and foreign nationals who were caught in the cross fire of the rebellion. The deployment of humanitarian and medical assistance was made impossible by the complete state of anarchy into which Liberia was thrown, Doe had lost control and was confined to the Presidential Palace, which was now under siege, by the rebel forces.

The brutal and direct attacks on Nigerians, most especially by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), was based on a report (which was denied by the Nigerian government) that the government was supporting the government of Samuel Doe with arms and ammunition. Charles Taylor claimed that he found documents in the Nigerian embassy, which confirmed Nigeria's complicity with Doe.[48]

In Nigeria, public outcry condemned government's lackadaisical attitude and slowness in evacuating its nationals since things had fallen apart in that strife-torn country. As Margaret Vogt pointed out, what at first may have passed on Nigeria's side, later worked against her with the ensuing massacre of Nigerians, the sacking of the Nigerian embassy amiss a general deterioration in the crisis and the slide to anarchy.[49] In June 1990, Nigeria began to take more interest in the Liberian crisis. The president took remedial relief measure with respect to Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone and outlined a doctrine of Nigeria's responsibility with respect to preventing further escalation of the crisis.

Commenting on the suffering the crisis had inflicted on the population, President Ibrahim Babangida lamented that the "human catastrophe" in Liberia, had become an "international embarrassment" to Africa.[50] The OAU Secretary-General, Salim Ahmed Salim, pointed out that Liberia was in a complete state of anarchy and therefore a threat to regional peace and security.[51]

As war continued to rage on, the warlords remained irreconcilable. All attempts by the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (formed by Liberian religious leaders) to end the conflict proved abortive. President Doe had lost all political and administrative powers and he was strapped up in the Executive Mansion, in Monrovia. Describing the situation in Liberia, *West Africa Magazine* simply asked the question 'who is in charge in Liberia'? A number of African leaders, including President Yoweri

Museveni of Uganda, then the Chairman of the OAU, called for external intervention in the Liberian crisis.[52]

It was within this context that the 13th Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government was held in Banjul the Gambia, on the 6th July 1990. By this time, the acrimony and killings in Liberia had generated enough attention for the leaders to discuss and possibly take action. By this time, it had been reported that Charles Taylor was receiving armed and logistic support from Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. During this meeting, Nigeria proposed and it was accepted by member states that ECOWAS should set up a Standing Committee to mediate in the Liberian crisis and similar troubled spots in the future within the sub-region.[53]

The Mediation Committee thereafter met and outlined an immediate agenda consisting of the followings:

(a) Stopping the warring factions;

(b) Call for a ceasefire;

(c) Seek to persuade Samuel Doe, who had already lost control of over 70% of the country and who was holed up in the presidential mansion, to step down; and

(d) Convene an all-party conference of Liberians to appoint an interim government, which would then conduct elections for a truly national government to be formed.

It was proposed that an ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) be established immediately with troops contributed by Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea.

Togo was also to contribute troops but declined participation at the last minute. This was the immediate antecedent of the ECOMOG, which was at first a monitoring group.

The first task of ECOMOG was to facilitate the evacuation of citizens, mainly women and children of member states and Liberians who were trapped in the war zone and could not receive food and medical aid. Secondly, the peacekeeping force was to establish some form of order through effective policing action, to allow for the establishment of an interim government.[54]

As a strategic analyst has pointed out, the strategic role of ECOMOG was at first confined to the policing and peacekeeping in order to restore order in Monrovia so that an effective interim administration could be put together as well as rescuing nationals of other countries trapped by the escalating fighting. It should be stressed that right from the outset, ECOMOG was not conceived as an intervention force; if it were, the number, composition and the strategy adopted when the force was first deployed would have been substantially different.

It may be stressed, that the troops were first deployed to Sierra Leone and were there for about two weeks before they were later deployed to Monrovia. In fact, the initial Nigerian contingent was largely naval officers with the instructions to facilitate the evacuation of Nigerians and other African nationals. This was to convince the various warring factions of the good intentions of member states. If ECOMOG were conceived as an intervention force, the strike elements would have been substantial while the advantage would have been taken of the impact of surprise and quick action.[55] ECOMOG would have assumed an attacking strategy right from the start.

As it was, one of the warring factions declared war on ECOMOG even before it was deployed. Charles Taylor kidnapped more of the citizens of states contributing to ECOMOG, adding them to the already large number of hostages taken of citizens of countries in the West African sub-region. The NPLF opened fire on the ECOMOG as soon as the force landed in Liberia. Charles Taylor continued his war on ECOMOG and, by extension, on ECOWAS accusing the organisation of seeking to deprive him of the fruits of his victory and of intervention in the internal affairs of Liberia. He argued that ECOMOG was established as a cover for Samuel Doe to re-establish his authority which was as of that time irreparably damaged.[56]

ECOMOG received the blessing of the United States, which supported the programme for peace outlined by the group but did little beyond offering formal and token sympathy. At the emergence of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) under Prince Yormie Johnson, the ding-dong on the battlefield led to the strengthening of ECOMOG under the auspices of Nigeria and its metamorphosis into what experts described as a “striking force”

This however was not before the tragic assassination of Samuel Doe in September 1990 by forces controlled by Yormie Johnson. Ironically, and unfortunately, it was within the premises of the ECOMOG Secretariat that Samuel Doe was arrested and later killed by Yormie Johnson.[57] This incident temporarily marred the credibility of the force, but given its peacekeeping mandate ECOMOG could not have done otherwise. With Charles Taylor’s continued attack on ECOMOG forces, supported occasionally by Yormie Johnson, it became apparent that the terms of reference of ECOMOG must change before it could accomplish its mission in Liberia, most especially establishing an Interim Government.

After this event and the attack of Charles Taylor on a Guinean ship carrying senior officers of the Ghana army who had come to evaluate the situation, ECOMOG was instructed to enforce a ceasefire. It was also to clear the capital city of all threats of attack, establish, and maintain an effective buffer.[58] Major-General Joshua Dogonyaro of Nigeria replaced Lt Gen. Amold Quianou of Ghana as Commander of ECOMOG. To stop Charles Taylor from regular artillery attacks on ECOMOG positions, ECOMOG mandate was changed from a Monitoring Group to a 'strike' force that would enforce law and order. The structure and the strategic concept of ECOMOG also changed. The force was substantially expanded from three to six thousand while strategic use of the aerial bombardment was introduced in order to eliminate the military stronghold of the rebel forces and to force them to the conference table.

Clearly, Nigeria's initiative in ECOMOG was strong and this drew criticisms from domestic analysts and some West African countries. These criticisms span the legality, propriety, timing and operative cost of the intervention as well as issues relating to whether Nigeria's commitment to the late Doe had prevented it from seeing some of the larger implication of the crisis. These queries in turn prompted a battery of official statements defending Nigeria's role on geopolitical and security grounds as well as under Article 52 of the UN Charter. The United Nations Security Council formally upheld this latter reference to the UN Charter's provision on Regional Security in November 1992 in its Resolution 788. [59]

The 1992 ECOWAS Summit in Dakar was quite concerned with Charles Taylor's refusal to honour the Yamoussoukro Accord of 30 October 1991, the peace plan and other less known efforts (all involving Nigeria) to hammer out a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict. It must be pointed out that Nigeria used diplomatic influence at various multilateral fora to explain its role in Liberia, to elicit a joint West African position (in spite of early differences) and to get the combatants to peaceful negotiation and resolution.

Justification for Nigeria's Role in ECOMOG

In order to understand Nigeria's role, reference must be made to the fact that Nigeria was careful not to be seen as 'meddler or aggressor' in Liberian internal affairs. Nigeria therefore used the prestige of her status in Africa to try to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict. It could be argued that successive beefing up of ECOMOG was usually in reaction or retaliation to provocations by Charles Taylor's NPFL. As President Babangida once argued: "In fact, in a sub-region of sixteen countries where one out of three West Africans is a Nigerian, it is imperative that any regime in this country should relentlessly strive towards the prevention or avoidance of any crisis which threatens to jeopardize or compromise the stability, prosperity, and security of the sub-region." [60]

President Campaore, among other critics, questioned the legality of Nigeria's intervention in Liberia. Although his motives are no doubt suspect, considering the role he played in the conflict, the question of justification cannot be ignored as Liberia remains a sovereign state. Justifying Nigeria's intervention in Liberia, Adeleke posited that focusing on legalism would ignore the security and humanitarian problems, which the civil war created. The humanitarian issues were easily visible and received wide coverage in the media. The degeneration of the conflict into ethnic slaughter, a sort of miniature 'ethnic cleansing', similar to the situation in Somalia, the brutal attacks on foreigners, on women and children: none of these could be ignored. If the international community responded with the usual platitudes, West African states, if only because their citizens were being slaughtered indiscriminately in Liberia, could not remain indifferent. Neither could they ignore the political, economic, nor security problems created by the huge number of refugees. No one could deny their apprehension over the ripple effect of the war.[61]

President Babangida described this graphically when he addressed the ECOWAS Summit in Abuja in November I992: “Today it is Liberia tomorrow it could be any one of the countries represented here. Indeed, the cancer we are fighting against is already showing itself in Sierra Leone and in other parts of the sub-region.”[62] The 'cancer' was NPFL-type attempts to overthrow or destabilise African governments. The NPFL extended the conflict into neighbouring Sierra Leone by sponsoring the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel movement led by Foday Sankoh to destabilise that country. According to President Jawara, Libyan trained mercenaries 'from The Gambia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and possibly Nigeria ... [were] fighting on the side of Taylor'. ECOWAS leaders, Jawara admitted, could well imagine the implications for sub-regional stability if the NPFL fought its way to power.[63]Hence, for humanitarian and in particular, security reasons the Community responded positively to the Nigerian initiative.

Nigeria spearheaded the formation of a sub-regional peacekeeping force through ECOWAS, an economic community. Nigeria, the sub-regional hegemon, holds the key to understanding the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. As far back as I979, at the OAU summit in Monrovia, General Olusegun Obasanjo had appealed to African leaders to support regional peacekeeping operations “as a countervailing force to foreign intervention”. According to him, this was the only way to prevent vulnerable African states from falling “into the laps of extra-African powers for defence and security.”[64]

French economic and military presence in West Africa has been a major threat to Nigeria as both states compete for influence in the sub-region. In 1970, France sponsored the formation of Communauté Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) among Francophone West African states, in order to prevent Nigeria from realising her own strategic and geo-political goals. Nigeria viewed CEAO as a neo-colonial organisation aimed at intensifying the dependence of francophone West Africa on France. In response, Nigeria promoted ECOWAS, which was expected to bridge the colonial division of the sub-region in order to enhance the potential for meaningful development.

The fact that nearly all the Francophone members of ECOWAS have bilateral defence and security arrangements with France help to explain why Lagos/Abuja saw the insidious hand of Paris behind the support being offered to the NPFL by Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso as unacceptable. Also unacceptable was Libya’s encroachment into the West African region.[65] Neither France nor Libya could be allowed to use the NPFL as a vehicle to further their interests in Nigeria's geo-political orbit. The intervention in Liberia, Vice-President Augustus Aikhomu asserted, was initiated because the war had developed a potential for massive ... interference and destabilisation of the sub-region'.[66]

Moreover, Nigeria was the only country in West Africa that possessed the human and material resources to intervene in the war. However, Nigeria could not do it alone and unilateral action would be unacceptable to internal and international opinion. This would further reinforce the fear of Nigeria's desire to use its hegemonic position to impose its will on its smaller neighbours. The military regime in Nigeria therefore used intra-regional diplomacy to pursue its Liberian strategy through the framework of ECOWAS. This was internationally acceptable just as the United States pursued her Iraq agenda through the United Nations.

The ECOWAS Protocols on Defence and Non-Aggression, neither of which envisaged conflicts like that in Liberia, could nonetheless be used to provide a legal justification for the peacekeeping operation. As President Babangida noted, Article 52 of the UN Charter recognises the right of regional organisations to take action at the regional level to maintain international peace and security.[67]

It can also be argued that General Babangida initiated ECOMOG in order to help Doe, his friend. There was little doubt that relations between the two countries were very strong. Nigeria paid US$20 million to establish the Ibrahim Babangida School of Political Science and Strategic Studies in Monrovia. Nigeria was the only country visited by Doe with a request for arms during the NPFL's rapid advance on Monrovia.[68] Babangida's friendship may indeed have influenced his actions, yet it can hardly be denied that establishing ECOMOG conformed to Nigeria's security and economic interests in the sub-region. As the core state in ECOWAS and the dominant economic and military power in West Africa, Nigeria could not remain impassive to a crisis such as the one in Liberia, within its strategic and geo-political orbit.

Nigeria's crisis management in Liberia could be seen as being built within her own security objective as well as commitment to West African integration and prosperity. The success of Nigeria's diplomatic efforts in putting its role in Liberia on the agenda of global dialogue and approval can be gauged from the tone of the Resolution 788(1992) adopted by the United Nations Security Council at its 3138th meeting on 19th November 1992.

The documents regretted the failure of the combatants to abide by the Yamoussoukro IV Accord of 30 October 1991, which "offers the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict by creating the necessary conditions for free and fair elections in Liberia." It went on to applaud the "continued commitment of ECOWAS to and efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict."[69] The statement can be regarded as an endorsement of Nigeria's activist role in crisis management under Babangida's auspices and under the various peace initiatives, which include the Committee of Five meeting in Cotonou on 20 October 1992, and the Final Communiqué of the First Meeting of the Monitoring Committee of Nine issued at Abuja on 7 November 1992.

Nigeria has been responsible for many of the advances made to establish a coordination of security for West African states and was responsible for the idea of a peacekeeping force in Liberia. The logic behind the mission of the Nigerian government and people as far as the security of the West African region was concerned was clearly expressed by the President and Commander-in Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces in his statement on "The Imperative Features of Nigerian Foreign Policy and the crisis in Liberia." There, he explained that the principles underpinning Nigerian foreign policy derived from the defence and protection of “our territorial threshold, that is, the integrity and sovereignty of our country from all acts of aggression.[70] However, this objective was dependent upon and crucially linked to the state of health and the level of security within three concentric territorial circles.

The first of the concentric circles is within the territorial boundary of Nigeria itself; the second constitutes the ring of countries that are directly contiguous to Nigerian territory. The state of “health” of these countries is directly linked to Nigeria’s national security and this explains why relations with the circle of states surrounding Nigeria are hinged on a policy of “good neighbourliness”. The third circle of states incorporates the countries in the entire West African sub-region. The security and territorial integrity of Nigeria is directly affected by any factor that distorts the stability of the region, because Nigeria’s economic development and prosperity is predicated on the development of a prosperous sub-region where the free exchange of peoples, goods and services can be promoted without much political hindrance.

Some may argue that with the concentric circle theory, Nigeria has designed a Monroe Doctrine for Africa. Nigeria’s interest in establishing effective and integrated security in the sub-region is shared by other states and it is designed to promote the general wellbeing of the region. It is not an attempt to create an exclusive sphere of influence in which Nigeria’s dominance will not be challenged or threatened. The ultimate objective is the unification and integration of the entire five regions of Africa. West Africa contains the largest number of states in Africa, with many of them smaller than regions in some of these other countries. The integration of the African region would be enhanced by the effective integration of West Africa.

Conclusion

Nigeria's crisis management initiatives span the African continent. Mediatory efforts have been launched around the continent and in various inter-state conflicts in West Africa. In the case of Liberia, it is pertinent to observe:

(a) Nigeria's readiness to use its influence in Africa to resolve African conflicts.

(b) A desire to take charge and limit or contain foreign intervention in Africa.

(c) The intractability of crises, which made it difficult to reach, answers quickly.

(d) The mobilisation of international goodwill to support Nigeria's mediatory and conflict management initiatives.

(e) Nigeria's contributions to the search for peace in Africa through the deployment of Nigeria's influence in crisis management and conflict-resolution efforts.

SOUTH AFRICA AND SADC: FROM CONFLICT AND DESTABILISATION TO COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

South Africa acceded to the Treaty of the South African Development Community on 29 August 1994, at the Heads of State Summit in Gaborone, Botswana. The country's Senate and National Assembly approved this accession on 13 and 14 September 1994 respectively. South Africa's focus as a member of SADC is on regional cooperation for the socio-economic development of the Southern African region. South Africa's membership of SADC provides an opportunity for the country to tackle, in a coordinated fashion with other member states, issues such as sustainable regional economic growth, HIV/AIDS, the problem of illegal immigration and refugees, smuggling of narcotics and arms as well as sub-regional peace and security.

Since South Africa joined SADC in 1994, the South African government has regarded the southern Africa region as the most important priority of its foreign relations. To illustrate this importance, the first foreign policy document adopted by the government was in fact a "Framework for Cooperation in Southern Africa," which was approved by the Cabinet in August 1996. The "Framework" spelt out South Africa's vision for the southern African region as that of highest possible degree of economic cooperation, mutual assistance where necessary and joint planning of regional development initiatives, leading to integration consistent with socio-economic, environmental and political realities. This was the main reason why post-apartheid independent South Africa joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in August 1994.

A Government White Paper in 1994 included the following statements that were relevant to the foreign policy of South Africa:

- It is impossible to rebuild the economy of South Africa in isolation from its neighbours. It would also be dangerous for South Africa to dominate its neighbours, as it would restrict their growth, reduce their potential as markets, which will worsen their unemployment and lead to increasing migration to South Africa. It is therefore important for South Africa to participate in regional development through multilateral fora such as the South African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).

- It is important for South Africa to cooperate with its neighbours to develop an effective growth and development strategy for South Africa, in order to overcome the negative results of World Bank and International Monetary Fund programmes, which had been forced on the region.

- The integration of foreign policy and trade policy as part of a broader strategy to strengthen South-South relations is important. Also important is the democratisation of international institutions, thereby ensuring better prospects for developing.

It is imperative to mention that right from 1994 South Africa's foreign policy has clearly indicated the inter-relationship between foreign and economic policies. It also underlines the interdependency that exists between South Africa and its neighbours, in terms of internal policy objectives. Lastly, it identifies the importance of cooperation with South Africa, as a leading economic role player, as well as cooperation between states in the southern hemisphere to satisfy their economic and foreign needs and objectives. [71]

Reactions of African Leaders to South Africa's admission into SADC

Since 1992 that SADC was inaugurated, African leaders have expressed their willingness to have South Africa in their fold. They looked forward to South Africa's membership of the organisation as this would not only put an end to South Africa's destabilisation policy but would also bring immense economic and social benefits to member states. Even before joining the Community, many member states had relied on South Africa for their economic survival, despite the country's obnoxious policy of apartheid and racism.

Dr. Kamuzu Hastings Banda, the President of Malawi, declared to his SADCC colleagues: "My first duty is to look after the interests of 4 million people. … Being a good African does not mean cutting your economic throat. I have to be realistic. Colonial geography and history are against us. We cannot boycott South Africa, Rhodesia or Mozambique (Portuguese); that would mean the breakdown of Malawi's economy."This was equally collaborated by his Botswana counterpart and former SADCC chairman, President Quett Masire, when he said: "It is difficult for us to be seen championing the cause of sanctions against South Africa when in fact it is going to hurt us before it hurts South Africa."[72]

African leaders no doubt welcomed the admission of South Africa not only because the white minority regime had ended the policy of apartheid and racial discrimination in the country, but also for the economic benefits. The situation becomes even clearer when one recognises that the goals of economic development and dependence reduction on South Africa were inevitably entwined, and that the former could not occur without the latter.

Among the countries of southern Africa there was widespread recognition of the benefits to be derived from regional collaboration. Governments throughout the region supported the idea of closer economic cooperation as a means of promoting economic development and reducing exploitative dependency relationships arising from limited and unspecialized internal markets, which lack economies of scale.[73] Regional collaboration, is therefore perceived to be an appropriate mechanism for the expansion of trade, income and bargaining power.[74]

The admission of South Africa into the organisation brought a new lease of life. It brought a period of accommodation, as against confrontation, an end to apartheid and the cooperation of a ssub-regional financial, military and industrial giant. A friendly South Africa brought immense benefits to SADC. For instance, it brought a large array of skilled expertise, its huge financial resources translated into Direct Foreign Investment. This improved the level of common tariffs distribution among member states, particularly among smaller and poorer partners to help counter the imbalances and inequalities among them.

South Africa, together with other states, made available their food reserves to ensure that SADC combated the drought that affected the region in the early 1990s thereby averting the threat of famine and immeasurable suffering, which would have been the aftermath of the drought. South Africa has taken a lead in the region in addressing the issue of economic collaboration and integration. These include the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) in the region; the development of basic infrastructure; the development of human resources and the creation of the necessary capacity to drive this complicated process forward; as well as the urgent need for peace, democracy and good governance to be established throughout the region.

When Nelson Mandela was the President of South Africa between 1994 and 1998, he brought a lot of goodwill to the organisation, most especially from the West. This goodwill continued during Thabo Mbeki’s reign as he equally provided the necessary ingredients to enhance the capacity of the organisation. President Mandela maintained a policy of cooperation and conciliation. He stated that his country's internal problems were of paramount importance and that South Africa did not seek to take the dominant role in SADC. President Mandela, while stressing that regional economic integration was a priority, dismissed fears that South Africa would dominate trade in the region and assured fellow member states that integration would be based on equal partnership.[75] However; the sheer size of the South African economy compared to surrounding states still gives cause for concern for other SADC members.

There is no denying the fact that Pretoria's admission has meant a revitalisation of the organisation as it has contributed immensely to SADC integration efforts. Her membership has brought absolute peace and progressive relations among the states. It was a very important turning point in the organisation. The first meeting attended by South Africa gave the organisation some teeth. It marked the beginning of cooperation in a number of areas and an evidence of a new political will within the region from all the member states to make their region of Africa succeed.

Another important point is that in post-apartheid southern Africa, the increased level of political stability has meant that the countries of the region can now explore options for regional economic integration and concentrate more on economic development. As SADC Executive Secretary, Kaire Mbuende noted:"Economic development cannot take place in an insecure environment, and this is the time to consolidate democracy and peace in Southern Africa."[76]

South Africa's Economic Dominance within SADC

In 2002, the combined population of SADC countries was approximately two hundred and ten million people and the total GDP was USD226.1 billion.[77] However, the levels of economic development in the region are highly uneven. While the population of South Africa is a little more than 20 percent of the combined population of SADC, the GDP of South Africa is almost 75 percent of the combined GDP of SADC.

Table 4 Share of each member of total SADC GDP 2001



Source: SADC 2003d, 72

Table 4 shows clearly, how South Africa is overwhelmingly dominant economically in the region. South Africa also dominates the intra-regional trade patterns. Before the membership of South Africa, SADCC was a heavily trade dependent area but with only a small share of intra-regional trade.

Given South Africa's absolute and relative economic strength, it is not surprising that she dominates intra-regional trade in the region. Because of the Republic's relatively sophisticated manufacturing sector, it is in a good position to export a wide variety of consumer and producer goods to a region that, with the exception of Zimbabwe, lacks a developed industrial economy. In the 1990's, imports from South Africa almost monopolised the markets of Lesotho and Swaziland (each 90 percent), Botswana (80 percent), and Namibia (75 percent). They were the single most important source for Malawi (40 percent), as well as Zambia and Zimbabwe (each 20 percent).[78] The equivalent figures for exports destined for South Africa were Lesotho at 55 percent, Swaziland, Malawi, Namibia and Zimbabwe at 47, 37, 29 percent and 19 percent respectively, and Botswana at 6percent.

As table 5 shows, the share of intra-regional trade in relation to all trade in SADC increased from 3.1 percent to 10.0 percent during the 1990s.

Table 5: Share of SADC in each Country's Export, in percentage

Share of SADC in Countries' Exports	1980	1985	1990	1995	1999
Angola	0,03	0,00	0,01	0,03	0,7
DR Congo	0,05	0,03	0,1	6,0	0,3
Malawi	12,4	15,4	1,6	17,2	16,9
Mauritius	1,4	0,1	1,2	1,4	1,4
Mozambique	1,1	0,3	0,3	32,1	17,4
South Africa	0,7	2,8	2,5	10,7	11,5
Seychelles	10,5	0,8	0,4	1,4	1,2
Tanzania	5,2	0,1	0,5	1,4	7,4
Zambia	0,9	3,1	0,8	3,8	7,8
Zimbabwe	1,3	25,0	30,7	31,7	28,0
Intra-SADC trade	**0,9**	**3,4**	**3,1**	**9,9**	**10,0**

Source: Chauvin and Gaulier 2003, p. 11.

However, as Table 6 shows, most of the growth is due to the increase in trade flows including South Africa, which have increased rapidly after the demise of apartheid, and accounted for nearly 80 percent of all intra-regional exports in 1999.

Table 6: Contribution of each Country to Intra-SADC Exports, in percentage

Share of SADC in Countries Exports	1980	1985	1990	1995	1999
Angola	0,2	0,0	0,03	0,03	0,9
DR Congo	0,4	0,1	0,1	2,7	0,1
Malawi	11,1	6,1	0,5	1,9	2,3
Mauritius	2,2	0,1	1,4	0,6	0,6
Mozambique	1,8	0,1	0,1	1,4	1,6
South Africa	64,2	50,5	56,0	76,5	77,8
Seychelles	0,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,1
Tanzania	9,6	0,1	0,2	0,3	1,3
Zambia	4,4	4,1	1,0	1,3	2,0
Zimbabwe	6,0	38,9	40,7	15,4	14,9

Source: Chauvin and Gaulier 2003, p. 12.

These tables show how the share of SADC had increased after the demise of apartheid and how it had gained a larger relative share in overall intra-SADC trade. At the same time, the relative share of other SADC members share had decreased in intra-SADC trade flows. This was because the volume of South African exports alone was much bigger than other SADC members together, as shown in table 7:

Table 7: Total Intra-SADC Exports

	Intra-SADC exports (Value in USD)	As a proportion of total intra-SADC exports	1999	Intra-SADC exports (Value in USD)	As a proportion of total intra-SADC exports
Angola	703	0%	**Angola**	1986	0%
DR Congo	101 306	3%	**DR Congo**	3505	0%
Malawi	74 012	2%	**Malawi**	85 004	2%
Mauritius	21 061	1%	**Mauritius**	23 478	1%
Mozambique	52 105	1%	**Mozambique**	0	0%
Seychelles	703	0%	**Seychelles**	1 869	0%
South Africa	2 922 100	76%	**South Africa**	2 825 344	78%
Tanzania	10 120	0%	**Tanzania**	48061	1%
Zambia	48 323	1%	**Zambia**	71 071	2%
Zimbabwe	589 865	15%	**Zimbabwe**	542 060	15%
Total	**3 820 573**		**Total**	**3632 412**	

Source: Gonzalez-Nunez 2003

South Africa's dominance is even more pronounced in the financial markets. South Africa is about the only country in the region with a functioning and independent specialised financial institution such as banks, long-and short-term insurers, private sector pension funds, mutual funds, participation mortgage bond schemes and mining and industrial finance houses. With a total market capitalisation of about $280 billion, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange dominates the capital market of the region and, with a daily turnover of about $7 billion; the foreign exchange market in

Johannesburg is providing an increasing service for international settlements for a number of other countries of the region. With a turnover of more than $700 billion in1996, the South African bond market and a growing market for derivatives, South Africa is in a favourable position to provide sophisticated financial services for the whole SADC region. [79]

This domineering position of the South African economy has certain advantages, but at the same time makes harmonious regional co-operation more complex. Some of the other partners in SADC hold an understandable fear that their economic independence will be jeopardised by a too aggressive policy of economic integration of the region. The role that South Africa plays within SADC must therefore be approached with tact and ingenuity.

South Africa's Contributions to SADC's Development and Integration

In 1993, Nelson Mandela declared that a democratic South Africa would forge closer economic relations with other southern African states in a way that would end its economic domination of the region.[80] Since 1994, South Africa has, largely through its thriving private sector, actively invested in various countries in the region. South African investors comprise a broad and diverse spectrum, including parastatals as well as small, medium, and large private enterprises.

Since joining SADC in 1994, South Africa has been involved in the activities of the community. South Africa has taken a leading role in the region to address such issues as closer collaboration and economic integration. These include the establishment of a free trade area in the region, the development of basic infrastructure, the development of human resources and the creation of the necessary capacity to drive this complicated process forward, as well as the urgent need for peace, democracy and good governance to be established throughout the region.

South Africa was formerly saddled with co-coordinating the Finance and Investment and Health sectors. Many South African departments have been actively involved in many activities of SADC, such as Transportation and Communications, Agriculture, Trade, Energy and Mining, and so on. In August1996, South Africa signed the SADC Protocol on Trade. This further confirmed her commitment to the establishment of a Free Trade Area in the region. Negotiations to determine member states, tariff structure have been concluded. The Trade Protocol was ratified by more than two-thirds of SADC member states and it was implemented on the 1st of September 2000. At present, more than half of SADC member states have already deposited their Instruments of Implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade.

In recent years, South Africa has emerged the largest foreign investor in Southern Africa. In 2000, South African direct investment in the thirteen SADC countries exceeded US$5.4 million. In 2001, South African investment in the region amounted to R14.8 billion and multistate deals to some R27 billion. In 2001 and 2002, among the biggest deals done in the region were investments of $1.1 billion by SASOL in the Pande and Temane gas fields in Mozambique. BHP Billiton, the Independent Development Corporation (IDC), and Mitsubishi invested $860 in the expansion of the Mozal aluminium smelter project in Mozambique. Mobile communications company Vodacom invested $142 in Tanzania and a further $139 million in the DRC. Sun International has spent $56 million on hotels in Zambia; Pretoria Portland Cement has spent $53 million on mergers and acquisitions in Zimbabwe; the power parastatal ESKOM invested $6 billion in the Inga hydro electrical project in the DRC to generate 40,000 megawatts of electricity and linking South Africa via Angola and Namibia, over a distance of 3,000 kilometres. South African Airways has spent $20 million on a stake in Air Tanzania. South Africa is one of the biggest trading partners of many African countries. In the retailing sector, Shoprite has stores in most of the SADC member states. However, trade balances remain skewed in its favour.[81]

In terms of net value, mining and industrial investments have dominated. South African investment in the sensitive agricultural sector in the region has been relatively small but has led to significant job creation. South African companies have been attracted to SADC countries because of the region's abundance of diamond, gold, coal, and platinum resources. Luckily, for these countries, their natural resources have continued to attract investment despite political and economic turmoil.

Over the period 1994-2003, Mozambique received 51percent of South African companies' investment into the SADC region. Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia followed as the recipient of 10 percent, 9 percent, and 9 percent respectively of the total foreign investment from South Africa. During this period, South Africa was the leading investor in Mozambique. Among South Africa's investment in Mozambique were investments in iron, aluminium, coal and telecommunications. South Africa's cellular operator Vodacom International clinched a 15-year license in Mozambique in 2002. Vodacom International holds 98percent shares in Vodacom Mozambique, with another partner, Emotel, holding 2 percent. Vodacom has warehoused 25percent of the shares for its Mozambique partners to pay back over four years. Vodacom expects its investment in Mozambique to increase to $200 million over 10 years and the market to grow to between 1.5 and 2.5 million users by 2012.[82]

Prior to the 1994 elections in South Africa, the ANC issued a statement meant to guide the country's future foreign policy in Africa. A passage on its projected relations with the region is worth quoting as it enables us to understand the reasoning behind South Africa's investments in southern Africa:

> The region sustained us during our struggle and, with our own; its people's blood was spilled to end apartheid. Our destiny is intertwined with the region's; our peoples belong to each other … We are convinced that the long-term interests of the South African economy will best be served by an approach to regional co-operation and integration which seeks to promote balanced growth and development.[83]

Since then, South Africa's Africa policy has coalesced around the notion of an African Renaissance. Devised by South African President Thabo Mbeki, it involves five areas of engagement with the African continent: the encouragement of cultural exchanges; the emancipation of African women from patriarchy; the mobilisation of the youth; the broadening, deepening, and sustaining of democracy; and the initiation of sustainable economic development. Through his advocacy of the renaissance concept, Mbeki has sought to place South Africa at the forefront of solving Africa's problems, According to Taylor and Williams, the renaissance appears to be about maximising South Africa's strategic options on the continent. One of its key elements is to deepen regional co-operation and integration to reduce the disadvantages created by small markets.[84]

The African Renaissance suggests a continental effort led by South Africa to advance the familiar 'end of history' thesis. South Africa's African Renaissance is anchored in a chain of economics, which, with time, might become the African equivalent of the Asian Tigers. The East Asian economic miracle…has offered hope to the people of Africa. the African Renaissance posits Africa as an expanding and prosperous market alongside Asia, Europe and North America. South African capital therefore, is destined to play a special role through the development of trade, strategic partnerships and the like … in exchange for acting as the agent of globalisation, the continent will offer South Africa a preferential option on its traditionally promised largesse of oil, minerals and mining.[85]

South Africa also has contributed immensely in the area of transport and communication. The Southern Africa Transport and Communication Commission made huge strides in a railway-restructuring programme, which eased the problems encountered by traders in the region. The programme involves the private sector in running of the railways through concessioning. Private sector participation in the rail industry has been visible in South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe.[86]

The success story of the Maputo Development Corridor has inspired a further range of development corridors and Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs), employing various strategies for advancing regional integration and multinational economic development. These include Biera, Limpopo, Nacala development corridors, and the Gariep and Libombo development initiatives.

South Africa has also played a leading role in the development of the Berlin Initiative, which strives to foster closer co-operation between the European Union and SADC. A Regional Cooperation Conference was held in Berlin from 16th to 19th June 1992 organised jointly by the Development and Africa Leadership Forum. Priority issues involved under this Initiative are the consolidation of democracy in the southern African region, combating illicit drug trafficking, clearance of landmines, regional integration, promotion of trade and investment and combating HIV/AIDS. South

Africa together with the other member states of SADC is also co-operating with the USA under SADC/US Forum Initiative." Western Friends" of southern Africa are also willing to fund important strategic projects raising doubts again about the usefulness and self- reliance component of integration in the region. .

South Africa played an important role in having gender issues placed on the SADC Agenda and is a signatory to the Declaration on Gender and Development and the Addendum on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Children. As a follow-up to the Declaration on Gender and Development, South Africa hosted a SADC Conference on Violence against Women and Children in March 1998, in Durban.

In 1999, the SADC Council focused on Special Programmes, which entailed setting up of working groups to deal with issues such as Mine Action, Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Disaster Management in the region. At the SADC Council Meeting in Windhoek in August 2000, a Secretariat Officer was appointed to monitor progress with the Working Groups dealing with these issues. Both the small arms and landmine issues were also discussed with the European Union under the Berlin Initiative. South Africa continues to play a significant role in these deliberations and, together with the other member states, ensure that the interests of the region are communicated to the wider international arena.

South Africa and other member states of SADC established the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in June 1996, as a forum in which political issues in the region could be discussed and resolved. Due to differences in interpretation of the functions and structures of the Organ, it did not become an operational and functional instrument of SADC. At the extraordinary SADC Summit held in Windhoek, Namibia from 9-10 March 2001, Heads of State and Government finally reached an agreement on the role, functions and structure of the Organ. A Draft Protocol drawn up was adopted at the SADC Summit in Blantyre, Malawi on 14 August 2002. The broad intent of the Organ's Protocol is to achieve solidarity, peace and security within the SADC region through close co-operation on matters of politics, defence and security. The emphasis is on the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration. In this context, the Organ's Protocol addresses both intra- and inter-state conflicts and stipulate principles for collective action in managing such conflicts.

As regard SADC meetings and conferences, South Africa is an active participant, as she has hosted many ministerial and official meetings. South Africa became the first SADC member state to host both the Summit in 1995 and the Annual Consultative Conference in one financial year. South Africa has also hosted special Summits on the situation in Nigeria in 1996 and the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo in August 1998. Furthermore, South Africa hosted the OAU Conference on Landmines, which served as a precursor to the Ottawa Convention. At the 1996, SADC Heads of State Summit in Maseru, South Africa was elected as Chair of SADC for a period of three years. During its chairmanship, five SADC Protocols reached the implementation stage and the organisation adopted some recommendations regarding the rationalisation of its structures and programme of action.

Another area where South Africa has made significant contribution to the development of SADC is in the resolution of some of the intractable problems and conflicts in the region. Inter-and intra-state conflicts and activities of rebel groups have long hindered the long-term economic development of the region. The civil wars in Angola, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo and civil strife in Zimbabwe have left the entire region devastated and traumatised and the economies of member states in distress. Millions of people were internally displaced and became refugees in other countries. Infrastructural facilities were destroyed, making reconstruction a priority in government policies in the region.[87]All these slowed down the process of integration in the region.

More importantly, the war pitted SADC member states against each other and the civil war therefore became a regional war. In September 1998, South Africa and Botswana sent troops that participated in Operation Boleas, which helped Mosakeng, the Lesotho leader, to regain control of the country after a mutiny by junior officers. Similarly, South Africa's immeasurable peace process in the DRC cannot be over emphasised, as South Africa provided funds and other forms of support to assist the Congolese. In 2001, South Africa participated in the forty-five days long Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Addis Ababa, in order to end the three years of civil war in the country. Her efforts in funding the Dialogue and facilitating other peace processes in Southern Africa went a long way in bringing peace to the DRC and institutionalisation of democracy in the country. South Africa, alongside Namibia and Botswana, were instrumental in monitoring the reintegration of the rebel forces into one national army with assistance from Britain and Netherlands.

On the other hand, South Africa's membership of SADC brought new challenges to the organisation. It brought jealousy, disharmony, and new a form of tension among members of the community and this affected the development of regional consensus and in turn the progress of regionalism in southern Africa. These tensions were between Maputo and Pretoria on one hand and between Pretoria and Harare on the other. The intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho in 1998 and by Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique in the DRC crisis-both peddled as intervention by SADC-exposed the shortcoming of the Organ of Politics Defence and Security and the rivalry between Pretoria under Mandela and Harare under Mugabe. Differences between Mandela and Mugabe over the status of the Front Line States (FLS) and its relationship with SADC created tensions in both organisations and affected SADC intervention in conflict areas in the region. Both leaders also had personality clash, as Mugabe believed that, as the leader of the Front Line States Harare should be accorded the deserved respect, since the Frontline States had fought for South African independence.

Other member states of the community remained suspicious of the impact that South Africa's activities would have on the community. With time, Pretoria came to terms with this reality, accepted the actions of co-members, and responded to their requests with humility working only within the framework of SADC or the African Union (AU).[88]

Furthermore, South Africa's commitment to the regional integration is being questioned by other member states, particularly non-SACU members who believe that Pretoria gives preference in trading and other matters to her partners in SACU.SACU members in SADC namely, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho, have their currencies tied to the South African Rand making the establishment of a common currency almost unattainable. This may also make free trade in the region almost unachievable.[89]

Another area of growing concern for SADC member states is South Africa's trading partners. Some SADC partners are increasingly concerned about the way in which South Africa's suppliers are gaining increasing market share in the region. Coupled with this fear is the South Africa-European Union Trade Pact, which members believe would enable EU companies to use South Africa as an export base from which they would make inroads into other southern African markets, thereby damaging local industries. SADC states also fear that EU exporters would gain access to the South African market on better terms than those available to neighbouring SADC firms.

The EU-SA Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was finalised in March 1999 and is likely to further hindered market integration, as exemplified by the dumping of EU beef, canned tomatoes, and flour in South Africa. With respect to beef, in September 1993 all qualitative controls on beef were lifted, resulting in an increase of over-subsidised beef in South Africa from 6,600 tons to 46,000 tons by 1995. At its peak, such was being sold for less than half the price charged by South African producers. This resulted in massive revenue losses by producers in South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Swaziland. In fact, the estimated loss to South Africa and Namibia producers was larger than the total EU aid package. Namibia lost approximately eleven (11) percent of its beef export market.[90]

Over-subsidised EU canned tomatoes have threatened the production of South African tomato canneries, and South Africa’s milling industry has asked the government to take action against heavily subsidized EU flour, which is threatening the South Africa flour market.[91] Numerous studies evaluating the impact of an EU-SA FTA have pointed to the serious consequences for the SADC region. The IMF, for example, noted that

> For Non-SACU SADC countries, there is likely to be a loss of export competitiveness in the EU markets because it would erode the value of the preferential access (relative to South African exports) that they currently receive in the EU agreement because of the Lome agreement. This loss relates not only to trade but also to the potential reduction in investment that had located in these countries to benefit from the benefits granted under the Lome agreement. In addition, it would erode the value of the preferential access (relative to European exports) that will be conferred on these countries in South African market by the SADC.[92]

In addition, SADC Executive Secretary Kaire Mbuede expressed his concern that “EU exports of grains, dairy and livestock products threatened to wipe out vast chunks of the region’s labour-intensive agriculture sector.”[93] Other critics have noticed that the SACU countries, an EU-SA FTA, would result in revenue losses that amount to six to eleven times the annual EU aid received-or between US$ 400 and US$ 800 million.[94]

South Africa and the European Union have denied these claims. Speaking at a 1997 Conference of the European Network for Information and Action on Southern Africa, Mr. João de Deus Pinheiro, European Commissioner for Development, dismissed speculation that the EU-South African trade pact would hurt Southern African businesses, emphasising that there were "good reasons to be optimistic." He pointed out that the EU had made it clear in its trade negotiations with South Africa that South Africa should give the same trade concessions to its neighbours as it would give to the EU. This very principle has also been laid down in the SADC Trade Protocol, and through this double-locked mechanism, the EU-South Africa trade talks serve as a crowbar for opening up South Africa to the region, he added. He further predicted that the entire region would benefit because growth in South Africa-EU trade would fuel growth in South Africa, and this in turn would make her buy more from her neighbours.[95]

Also speaking on the trade deal and its benefits to SADC as a whole, SADC Deputy Executive Secretary Prega Ramsamy explained that the asymmetry principle agreed between South Africa and its partners in the SADC Trade Protocol negotiations means that South Africa's "cuts in tariffs will be deeper for the SADC countries than for the EU." He also discounted fears that EU companies would be able to encroach on SADC markets by transiting goods through South Africa.

SADC rules of origin specify that if more than 35 percent of a product's inputs originate in SADC countries, the product get preferential access to the SADC market. Certain bilateral agreements between South Africa and other SADC countries specify a threshold lower than 35 per cent. "It may be that those companies with a very high component of foreign imports would not meet the 35 per cent value-added [threshold] and might have problems penetrating the market," he surmised.[96]

Describing SADC countries' concerns over the EU-South Africa trade deal as "legitimate," an April 1999 study by the South Africa Foundation nevertheless predicted that signature of the SADC Trade Protocol "will go a long way to providing equal access for products from SADC countries to the South African market." Moreover, the study said the EU-South Africa trade agreement might give an impetus to signing of the SADC Trade Protocol.[97] Mr. Hidipo Hamutenya, Namibia's Minister of Trade, shares this view. He said; "There was really no sense of urgency [to trade liberalisation in South Africa]. But now that South Africa is focused on the free trade agreement with the EU, they will have the opportunity to speed up the SADC Protocol." [98]

If South Africa responds to pressure induced by trade liberalisation by acquiring technology to improve competitiveness, then this technology acquisition also will likely penetrate the rest of the SADC market, adds Mr. Ramsamy. "I think it's important in the context of globalisation that we should use the region as a stepping stone to the global market, and this is where the South Africa-EU free trade pact comes in.” [99]

Rationale for South Africa’s Investments in Southern Africa

Establishing South Africa’s real motives for investing in southern Africa is a complex undertaking. However, there are three main explanations. One school of thought, led by Tevera and Chimovu, suggests that its investments provide it with an “indirect sense of moral restitution.” [100] This should be viewed against the billions of dollars lost by southern Africa because of the destabilisation campaign waged by the apartheid regime. Indeed, the tone of the ANC statement quoted earlier suggested that many ANC leaders, most of who were exiled in the region, felt a strong emotional and intellectual attachment to southern Africa and Africa in general.

The moral restitution narrative is strengthened by the South African government’s adoption in 2001 of the African Renaissance Fund and International Co-operation Fund Act, which provides funding for co-operation with other African countries. Among other things, the Fund is aimed at promoting democracy, good governance, and socioeconomic development and integration throughout Africa.

Other analysts are more cautious, and argue that the South African government is not selflessly aiming to uplift the regional economy. McKinley, for example, argues that by extending the mandate of state-owned enterprises such as the IDC and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) to fund projects elsewhere in the region, South Africa intends to maintain hegemonic control over the regional economy. He contends that South Africa's R1 billion 'economic rescue' package to Zimbabwe in 2000 was not an act of generosity but part of a wider plot to secure this country's strategic interests, and to position it as a sub-imperial power in the region. This perspective resonates with Colin Stoneman's observation that 'it is unrealistic to expect nations …to behave altruistically.'[101]

A third group of analysts contends that South Africa's foreign policy in southern Africa is primarily informed by its domestic realities. South African policy-makers agree that the country cannot be an island of prosperity in a sea of poverty. According to this thesis, it is in South Africa's interest to promote private sector investments and peace in southern Africa, since an economically prosperous southern Africa would reduce the illegal flow of people to South Africa.[102]

The need to do this has become acute because, despite being a regional powerhouse, South Africa has lost one million jobs since 1994, and 53 per cent of its citizens live in poverty. This partly explains South Africa's continued support for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), also comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. Lesotho and Swaziland are almost completely dependent on South Africa, and derive more than 50 per cent of their revenues from the SACU Development Fund.[103]

Goldstein reminds us that the investment behaviour of South African companies is typical of developing country multinationals. Following the liberalisation of the South

African economy, local companies have faced growing domestic competition from international competitors, and their profits have declined. Therefore, their investment drive in neighbouring states has been motivated by the belief that they will face less competition from local firms, and can use their superior resources to position themselves advantageously in the region even in relation to international subsidiaries. Many South African businesspersons regard southern Africa as a huge and largely untapped market which, though turbulent at times, provides good returns on investment.[104]

To be fair, South Africa's role as a leading power in southern Africa is also informed by and dovetails with external expectations. Its role in the region resonates with the American foreign policy strategy of identifying and supporting certain states as more important than others. These 'pivotal' states are regarded as particularly relevant for regional and international stability. Thus, South Africa, like Nigeria in West Africa, is seen as a country destined to lead southern Africa. Other Africans have also encouraged this notion. For instance, in his address to the South African parliament in 1997, the late Julius Nyerere called upon South Africans to "take up their responsibilities" in Africa.[105]

Perhaps we should conclude this section with Horvei's succinct characterisation of South Africa's dilemma in respect of Africa: "If it ignores the region, it is seen as callous; if it becomes actively involved, it is seen as returning to the domineering ways of the past." [106]

Assessment of South Africa's Investments in Southern African States

The impact of South African investment in SADC countries is enormous, particularly given the economic, social and cultural diversity of the sub-region. In general terms, it could be seen in positive and negative terms. The value of South African investment in SADC countries may be relatively small but the effect is significant. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNTAD):

> "In absolute terms, the amounts invested in southern Africa countries [by South Africa] may be small, but they account for a significant share of FDI for some southern African economies, (such as Mozambique). Small investments make a big difference in small economies." [107]

There is a Jekyll-and-Hyde quality to South Africa's economic expansion. Rather than push "the little guys" out of business, South African companies argue that they are breaking up local monopolies and bringing prices down. They are also creating jobs, particularly in tourism; boosting consumer choice; transferring skills and technology to local workers; ensuring the reindustrialisation of some economies through the acquisition and revitalisation of moribund state-owned enterprises, and increasing revenue generation for southern African governments.

South Africa's investment in southern Africa is also significant and important as it has helped in boosting investment confidence from other foreign investors who have tagged on to South African FDI.[108] This has equally led to the promotion of external investor confidence. Although it is difficult to have a direct causality, there is no denying the fact that there has been increased investment in southern Africa. This has been linked to South Africa's increased expansion in those countries. These efforts are part of the positive impact of South Africa's investment in southern Africa

Among the negative aspect of South African investment in southern Africa is that some people have rejected the idea that FDI is important for development in Africa. An UNTAD report in 2005, *Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct Investment*, questioned the "over-emphasis on FDI as a source of development finance in Africa" and rejected the idea of FDI as an "unalloyed good". Supporting the potentially negative impact of FDI, Ralph Haman of the AICC outlined the following factors: the disruption of local supply chains; disregard for labour and human rights standards; environmental damage; anti-competitive behaviour; and low levels of transparency and disclosure.[109]

Another negative impact of South Africa's investment in Africa is casualisation. Many South African workers are not enjoying statutory work protection. According to Miller, "workers in the region feel that, next to South African workers, others are treated as second-class citizens.'[110] This may stem in part from the strong regulatory framework in South Africa.

Research conducted by South Africa Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) found that "South Africa's investments have limited links with local businesses because of their capital intensive nature and knowledge specificity." Local procurement is less evident than one might have hoped, and importing South African products and services may distort local markets.[111]

There is also the widespread complaint from neighbouring countries that South African companies are 'dumping' their goods on local markets and are advantaged by incentive schemes to entice foreign investment, schemes which exclude local businesses, and thus contribute to distorting the market further.[112]

Reg Rumney of Business Map argues that when a region receives a surge of external investment there is a fear that an “enclave economy" is created, as was the case in Angola where investment for offshore oil platforms created a circle of wealth insulated from the rest of the poverty-stricken country”. He continues: “there is a real possibility that such surges of investment may exacerbate inequality within a country, with damaging political and social consequences.”[113]

More specifically, in 2002 a UN Report to the General Assembly named some twelve South African companies in a list of firms accused of looting mineral resources in the DRC during the civil war, which erupted in 1997, as part of the world body’s investigation into the role of illegal exploitation of mineral resources in the Congo’s conflicts. These firms included blue-chip names like Anglo American, Anglovaal mining, De Beers and Iscor among others.[114]

According to a recent study, South African companies in southern Africa are earning profits two to three times higher than those earned in their home operations.[115] Reported average returns of between 30 percent on equity in the banking sector and up to 60 percent in other sectors illustrate how profitable doing business in southern Africa can be.[116]

Former UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, has noted that; ‘The rates of return on investment in southern Africa are very high.”[117] With many SADC countries being former British colonies, South Africa shares many institutional, political, economic and cultural traditions with them. Consequently, South African companies find these business environments familiar, as there is no language or institutional barriers. More generally, South African companies are assumed to have greater familiarity with conditions in southern Africa than investors from elsewhere outside the sub-region do.[118]

Many logistical challenges confront many southern Africa countries that may act as constraints to South African investor's enthusiasm. These include; high business costs due to inadequate and patchy infrastructure; transportation and freight costs. Others include, unreliable electricity; currency fluctuations; stringent conditions to access credit; high business taxes; inefficient banking systems; the challenge of the HIV/AIDS pandemic; high crime rates; poor governance; corruption; and political risk or changes in ruling regime which can render "agreements unhonoured or alter the economic environment at a short notice.'[119]

In the real sense, anti-South African sentiment is increasingly evident in many countries. The perceived volume of South Africa's investment is causing resentment in many SADC countries. In Kenya, South African businesspeople, both black and white, were described as brash, arrogant, insensitive, selfish, the Americans of the continent. South Africa could be in danger of acquiring the image of the "ugly American" that Uncle Sam continues to have in Latin America and the Caribbean.[120]

South Africa and the Issue of Regional Hegemon

A striking feature of the relations between South Africa and other southern Africa states is that, despite the former's transition to democracy, the latter have retained some of the wariness and hostility, which they displayed towards the apartheid government. The reasons for these attitudes are varied. Some see South Africa's capital as a threat to their relatively small private sectors. According to this view, South Africa's investments are seen as tantamount to a 're-colonisation' of the sub-region.[121]

Reflecting on the cool relations between South Africa and its neighbours, Vale and Maseko have noted that the assumption that what is good for South Africa is good for southern Africa has often conjured up some uncomfortable historical encounters between southern African states and South Africa's powerful establishment. These encounters which, despite the miracle attached to South Africa's transformation, have scarred southern Africa's psyche.[122] Southern African states wariness about South Africa's commitment to regional equitable development is not entirely baseless.

At the SADC economic summit in Cape Town in May 1996, President Robert Mugabe publicly criticised South Africa for raising duties against imports of Zimbabwean clothing and textile products, despite South Africa's massive balance of trade surplus. The Zimbabwean leader asserted that 'South Africa cherishes the notion that because it is the most developed country in the sub-region it can use other SADC countries as receptacles for its goods, while protecting its industries'.[123]

Many SADC leaders have also argued that South Africa seems intent upon global rather than sub-regional integration. A case in point was the decision by the South African government to negotiate a separate FTA with the EU, which is widely perceived as inimical to SADC's regional agenda. According to Vale and Maseko, many South African government officials display a belief, also common among many South Africans, that their country has 'everything, while having nothing to gain from Africa'.[124]

The expansion of South African business into southern Africa has resulted in the closure of various local enterprises. Besides this, South African businesses operating outside South Africa often source goods in South Africa rather than locally, thus further contributing to trade imbalances in the region.

The late President Levi Mwanawasa of Zambia for example, criticised the South African retailer Shoprite Checkers for importing bananas from South Africa instead of buying them from Zambian farmers who, in his view, produce better bananas than their South African counterparts.[125] These examples suggest that the rhetoric of 'new regionalism' and development through co-operation needs to be treated with caution. Perceived national self-interest is still the driving force and determinant of state behaviour. In this sense, there appears to be very little to distinguish the 'new' from the 'old' regionalism.

It is widely acknowledged that the market-driven approach to Africa's rebirth has yet to achieve the intended goals of reducing unemployment and creating a thriving African middle class. These misgivings are strengthened by the fact that South African investments have resulted in the creation of very few and mainly short-term jobs.[126] Deepening poverty has driven many southern Africans to South Africa.

South Africa and Sub-regional Peace and Security: 1994-2007

Supporting peace and democracy across Africa is a key to South Africa's foreign policy goals. Chris Landsberg noted that the South African government seeks to advance development and economic growth across Africa, and feels this cannot occur without peace and security. South Africa's foreign policy therefore makes an explicit link between peace and security, development, governance and growth.[127]

South Africa's Department of Foreign Affair's 2005-2008 Strategic Plan describes the Department's mission as follows: "Our vision is of an African continent that is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-racial, non-sexist, and united and which contributes to a world that is just and equitable."[128] The White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Mission adopted by the South African Parliament in October 1999 also recognised that the country's response to conflicts must "include a focus on effective governance, robust democracies and ongoing economic and social development."[129]

South Africa has been playing an important role in regional security efforts in southern Africa through SADC**.** Two primary factors shape South African foreign policy. The first is identity. The outstanding feature of foreign policy in the post-apartheid era indeed has been South Africa's identification and engagement with the rest of Africa. This echoes Pretoria's own acknowledgement that, "although South Africa acknowledges its global responsibilities, the prioritisation in South African foreign policy makes Africa the prime focus of future engagements. South Africa has an obvious interest in preserving regional peace and stability in order to promote trade and development and to avoid the spill over effects of conflicts in the neighbourhood."[130]

The second factor is the evolving nature of conflict and security challenges, primarily but not exclusively on the African continent. State collapse, migratory diseases, trafficking of arms, drugs and people, ethnic violence, interstate warfare, crime and transnational terrorism combine in a conflict matrix far more complex than that of the Cold War. The irony is that Africa is at once more peaceful and democratic and also more fragile and unstable than at any previous point in recent history. Consequently, as the government's 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions notes, "a radically altered post-Cold-War security environment has seen the transformation (or mutation) of classical peacekeeping operations into complex, multidimensional conflict management activities."[131]

South Africa's self-identification as an African state and the vastly transformed nature of local and international conflicts underpin the country's foreign policy philosophy. Welile Nhlapo, former Deputy Director General of Foreign Affairs, explains: "We had to take cognisance of the changing international security environment, the eruption of almost intractably violent conflicts in so-called 'failed states,' and the lack of political will to participate in peacekeeping in Africa evinced by the main players of the Security Council. We also had to take note of the sad reality that peacekeeping operations without the consent of the belligerent parties hold little prospect for success in the long term and that peace enforcement by parties unrelated to the conflict seldom entice warring parties to the negotiating table."[132]

This leads us to a third important factor, which is specific to South Africa's approach to conflict resolution: the country's own experience in peaceful transformation from apartheid to democracy. As the White Paper states: "South Africa provides the international community with a unique example of how a country, having emerged from a deeply divided past, can negotiate a peaceful transition based on its own conflict-resolution techniques and its own vision of meaningful and enduring development. The South African approach to conflict resolution is thus strongly informed by its own recent history, national interest and experience in the peaceful resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts, which compels it to participate in peace missions to alleviate the plight of other peoples who are struggling to resolve similar conflicts."[133]

Since 1994, South Africa has faced the crucial challenge of how to relate to its neighbours in ways that do not suggest insensitive hegemonism but at the same time provide regional leadership. South Africa is no doubt a regional power not only in the Southern African region but also in Africa. This has led to a number of questions being raised on the role of South Africa in regional security.

On the role of South Africa in regional security, scholars have made fair projections. Robert Rotberg remarked, "South Africa, once the warmonger of the region, is now a potential peacemaker and peacekeeper. Its combined army, air force and navy of 100,000 (now 50,000) is far larger, better organised, and trained than that of Zimbabwe or those of the smaller, weaker nations in the region."[134] Adebayo Adedeji was quick to advise wisely that "it is…of paramount importance that South Africa defines its place in Africa positively and affirmatively…. South Africa should become a self-confident force, reinvigorating Africa's drive and resourcefulness and playing a leadership role in this important endeavour: putting Africa's house in order."[135]

During the apartheid era, South Africa was, to all intents and purposes, the region's major destabilisation force until the early 1990s. A regional hegemonic role since its historic election of 1994 has shifted the imperatives of Pax Pretoriana from malevolent to benign. This has occurred through Nelson Mandela's policy of nation building and reconciliation within the country and through diplomatic engagement in South Africa's 'near abroad' and later through Thabo Mbeki's much more forthright embrace of Pax Africana: promoting peace on the continent through regional actors. Thus, Mbeki's twin policy of Pax South Africana and Pax Africana has attempted largely successfully to coalesce South Africa's interest with the larger interest in the African continent.[136]

South Africa and Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa

South Africa's conflict resolution model rests on three pillars: preventive diplomacy, peace building and peacemaking. The country emphasises the importance of building and strengthening governance, the constituents of which the White Paper identifies as the rule of law, competent and independent judiciaries, effective police services and fair and efficient criminal justice systems, professional civil services, and the subordination of partisan interests to national interests and goals. South Africa stresses the need for "peace missions" over "peacekeeping," the former being more inclusive and embracing the principle, that conflict resolution is first a political rather than a military project.

As John Stremlau observes, the South Africa mediation strategy in the DRC -without question South Africa's most important achievement -did not "allow President Thabo Mbeki direct recourse to the threat or use of military force, an essential policy tool in traditional statecraft".[137] Rather, Mbeki built broad international cooperation to secure a political solution supported by a relatively modest military peacekeeping force.

Since 1994, South Africa has taken the lead in three significant conflict resolution attempts in Burundi, the DRC, and Lesotho. The record is mixed, but it is not without notable successes: in Burundi and the DRC, South Africa's tireless efforts have resulted in a restoration of political contestation in both countries and successful elections that have produced so far fragile but nonetheless functioning governments. In both instances, South Africa took the lead in bringing the combatants to the negotiating table.

South Africa and Peace Process in Burundi

In Burundi, the latest violence was sparked by the assassination of its first democratically-elected president, Malchior Ndadaye, in 1993.In 1996, there was a military coup d'état in Burundi staged by the Tutsi former head of state, Pierre Buyoya, who had overthrown a Hutu president, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya and also sacked the National Assembly. All efforts to find peace failed and it took two years before Buyoya's government agreed to multi-party negotiations chaired by Julius Nyerere, the Tanzanian leader. This marked the beginning of the Arusha Peace process.

With the Arusha negotiations finally taking off, South Africa played only a secondary role as the government was not directly involved. However, two South African officials played prominent roles. Nicholas 'Fink' Haysom, a South African lawyer', was the Chairman of the powerful second committee on democracy and 'good governance'. This committee was responsible for drafting a power-sharing agreement and the principles for a future Burundian constitution. Andrew Mansondo, a South

African General who had been one of those in charge of integrating the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) after 1994, was the vice-chairperson of the Third Committee on Peace and Security, which was tasked with negotiating a cease-fire and an agreement on security sector reform.

The Arusha negotiation continued over the next two years. It was marked with much difficulty, changing demands and positions, new alliances formation of Burundi's political parties, and efforts to manipulate the facilitation team. The armed conflict continued throughout this period, and the two main rebel groups involved in the conflict-the Palipehutu-FNL (*Parti pour la liberation du peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Liberation*) and the CNDD-FDD (*Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratic-Forces de Defense pour la Democratic*)- did not participate in the Arusha talks.[138]

In October 1999, South Africa became directly involved in the facilitation after the death of Julius Nyerere. Mandela wanted a quick end to the negotiations and he took a more heavy-handed approach towards Burundian participants than Tanzania's patient and methodical approach. Addressing the country's leaders for the first time, Mandela said "Why do you allow yourselves to be regarded as leaders without talent, leaders without a vision? The fact that, women, children and the aged are being slaughtered every day is an indictment against all of you."[139]

Mandela and his facilitation team brought a lot of pressure on the Burundian parties to come to agreement. During the February and March Arusha negotiation session, Mandela presented a draft agreement to the delegates. The document included a three-year transition power-sharing government prepared by Fink Haysom and his team. On

28 August 2000, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed in the presence of visiting U.S President Bill Clinton and other regional leaders. Although all Burundian parties signed the agreement, they individually and collectively refused to honour the terms of the peace agreement and the armed struggle continued.

Among other provisions the agreement, specified a transition period of thirty-six months. Transition political positions were divided between the Group of Seven (G7), which were predominantly Hutu parties and the Group of Ten (G10), which were predominantly Tutsi parties.[140] Burundi's politicians, however, could not agree on who should be the president during the transition period and this situation continued for another one year. Mandela later broke the deadlock by announcing that Pierre Buyoya would remain president for the first eighteen months of the transition, while a member of FRODEBU (*Front pour la Democratie au Burundi)* would be vice-president.

In the second eighteen months of the transition, a FRODEBU member would be president and UPRONA (*Union pour le Progres National)* would be vice-president. All Burundians in exile were encouraged to return home to participate in the transition programme. In October 2001, Burundi's National Assembly adopted a transitional constitution by acclamation, and the transition government was inaugurated on 1 November 2001.

Despite the peace agreement and formal interim constitutional structures, conflict continued in Burundi throughout 2001. Negotiations for cease-fire with the rebels therefore began and South Africa's then vice-president, Jacob Zuma, was the main facilitator. These negotiations were concluded with two smaller wings of Burundi's rebel forces in October 2002.On 30 April 2003, Buyoya stepped down as president and Domitien Ndayizeye of FRODEBU took his place.

In June 2003, the South African protection force was expanded to about 1500 peacekeepers and incorporated into the first-ever African Union peacekeeping mission: the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB). Ethiopia and Mozambique also deployed troops to the force. In November 2003, South African mediators succeeded in reaching an agreement between the government in Bujumbura and the largest active rebel fraction, the CNDD-FDD Nkrurunziza wing. Due to pressure from South Africa to make up for the financial and logistical shortcomings of the AU force, a UN peacekeeping mission, ONUB, was deployed in June 2004 to take over from the AU.

South African leaders continued to put pressure on Burundi's leaders to embrace peace and in August 2004, Burundian leaders signed further a power-sharing agreement, the Pretoria Agreement, which outlined post-transition structures and principles of governance. This accord was adopted as a draft constitution by the transitional government.

Despite the criticisms and outright rejection of the agreement by the Tutsi leaders, Zuma, backed by regional leaders, rejected these claims and insisted on the implementation of the agreement. Finally, on 28 February 2005, a Referendum was held and Burundians across the country voted overwhelmingly in favour of a new constitution. In June 2005, Communal (local) elections were held and legislative elections took place in July 2005. The former rebel party, the CNDD-FDD, was the clear winner in both elections winning 55percent of the communal seats and 58 per cent of the vote in the National Assembly elections. On 19 August 2005, the National

Assembly and Senate elected the new president of Burundi Pierre Nkurunzia, leader of the CNDD-FDD. He was sworn in as president on 26 August 2005, and this marked the end of the transitional periods that were intended to usher in peaceful democratic governance in Burundi after years of violent conflict in the country.[141]

South Africa and the Peace Process in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The peace process in the Congo was not the same as that of neighbouring Burundi due to a number of factors including involvement of a large number of external actors such as Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and Chad; the enormous economy at stake; the weakness of the Congolese state; and the vastness of the territory. All these factors combined to lead to very different dynamics in the Congo.

South Africa had always been interested in pursuing a negotiated settlement in the Congo. In 1996, when Laurent Kabila and his rebel movement (the *Alliance des forces democratique pour la liberation du Congo-Zaire*, AFDL) were fighting their way into Kinshasa, Nelson Mandela had unsuccessfully tried to broker a peace deal between then President Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila.

Again in1998, when rebel forces backed by Rwanda and Uganda started fighting against Laurent Kabila, South Africa tried to intervene diplomatically by calling for a broad-based government involving the representatives of all parties in the country. This move also failed as members of the South African Development Community did not agree on South Africa's emphasis on diplomatic negotiations; rather, the majority of them wanted military intervention as a way of settling the dispute.[142]

In July 1999, an agreement was signed in Lusaka by the governments of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola. A month later, the main Congolese armed rebel groups signed the accord. The Lusaka agreement was a cease-fire calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC, disarmament and reparation, and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. It also called for 'Inter-Congolese political negotiations which should lead to a new political dispensation in the country'. Equally, it provided a timetable for the Inter-Congolese negotiations, which specifically should include the Congolese government, the armed groups, the political parties, and civil society, all with equal status. The broad-based nature of the proposed participants was an innovative feature of the process.[143]

In December 1999, the Organisation of African Unity mandated Sir Ketumile Masire, the former president of Botswana to facilitate the process. For two years, the cease-fire out lined in the Lusaka agreement could not be implemented for the Inter-Congolese negotiations to begin as Laurent Kabila refused to work with Ketumile Masire, citing his inability to speak French and understanding of the issues at stake.

In January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards and his son Joseph Kabila, took over as President. He recognised Masire as facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and promised better cooperation with the UN Mssion in the Congo. In October 2001, the Inter-Congolese dialogue finally began in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia after a preparatory meeting had been held in Gaborone, Botswana in August. The peace process was slow between November 2001 and February 2002, and it was not until February 2002 that South Africa became fully involved in the Congolese peace negotiations.

South Africa became increasingly involved in the process in 2002 when the Inter-Congolese dialogue resumed in the country's Sun City resort from February to April 2002, attended by three hundred and thirty-six delegates including government officials, political parties, all rebel groups and civil society representatives. The Inter-Congolese dialogue suffered from internal and external problems. There was lack of consensus among the parties on several important power-sharing points, and some individuals were profiting through the continued conflict and insecurity in the DRC and thus had little interest in reaching an agreement. Ketumile Masire, too, did not have a firm grip as he had difficulty mediating between the belligerents and their foreign allies.[144]

South Africa, however, wanted the dialogue to succeed. Mbeki personally intervened and the dialogue went back on track. As the host country, South Africa had strongly committed itself to the Inter-Congolese dialogue, and failure would have hurt Pretoria's reputation as a successful peacemaker. South Africa also suffered from criticisms as many Congolese questioned the neutrality of the South African government, which was seen as supportive of Rwanda and the RCD-Goma faction. The rivalry between South Africa, Angola, and Zimbabwe for lucrative contracts in the DRC (most notably mining contracts) also reportedly contributed to difficulties and delays in the Inter-Congolese negotiations.[214]

The Inter-Congolese dialogue in the Sun City therefore achieved no comprehensive agreement. However, the Kabila administration and the MLC delegation concluded a bilateral deal between themselves, which several smaller parties also signed. In July 2002, South Africa brokered an agreement in Pretoria between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, whereby Rwanda would withdraw its forces from the Congo, in return for the disarmament of Rwandan Hutu rebels. In September 2002, DRC and Uganda signed a separate agreement brokered by the Angolan government. By the end of 2002, most of the Angolan, Zimbabwean, Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian troops had withdrawn from the DRC, in a process also facilitated by US pressure, particularly on Rwanda.

In December 2002, following months of consultations, shuttle diplomacy and negotiations facilitated by the UN Special Envoy, and the government of South Africa, the Congolese parties signed an all-inclusive peace agreement in Pretoria. In April 2003, further negotiations between the parties under UN/South Africa auspices led to the signing of an agreement on the text of a transitional constitution and memorandum on military and security issues at Sun City with facilitator Masire. The Pretoria agreement provided for a transitional government with president Joseph Kabila (PPRD) and four vice-presidents from different groups and factions:Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC), Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (PPRD), Azarias Ruberwa (RCD-G), and Z'Ahidi Ngoma (civilian opposition).Ministerial portfolios were divided proportionally among the armed groups, unarmed opposition, civil society, and Mai-Mai.[146]

On 30June 2003, the transitional government was sworn in and in May 2005, the transitional National Assembly adopted a new draft constitution with a text agreed on by representatives of the warring parties. In December2005, the Constitution was approved in a referendum in which over 80 percent of the votes cast were in favour. Subsequently, South Africa deployed over 1000 troops to the DRC under the 16,700-member UN peacekeeping mission, and was also involved in efforts to create a new

Congolese army. South Africa's military was also involved in efforts to screen and train the new Congolese army.[147]

On 30 June 2006, after many delays due to financial, technical and political problems, the first democratic elections were held in DRC, the first in forty years. Foreign observers including South African electoral observers monitored the elections. In the first round, none of the presidential candidates won an absolute majority. President Joseph Kabila, who won 44 per cent of the votes, and Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba, who won 20 per cent of the votes, faced each other again in the second round of elections three months later. On 29 October 2006, the second round of election was held in conjunction with provincial elections and Joseph Kabila won 58 per cent of the vote. Initially, Bemba challenged the results, but later conceded defeat, following which Kabila was sworn in as president about one month later.[148]

The two peace processes in Burundi and the DRC have culminated in democratic elections and the establishment of new governments under new constitutions. They could therefore appear to be successful South African 'exports'. Nonetheless, this view could both be flawed and premature, since elections do not necessarily mark the end of peace processes. The two countries are still extremely fragile and peace is by no means guaranteed.

In Burundi, the new government has increasingly resorted to autocratic tactics. A number of prominent opposition politicians were arrested and tensions have increased since elections in 2005. The cease-fire agreement with the remaining movement, the FNL had not been implemented by March 2007. In the DRC, state institutions are very weak; violence remains passive in the eastern part of the country and the security environment in other parts of the country is volatile.

Arguably, neither country would have progressed this far in their peace process were it not for South Africa's role. Without Mandela's facilitation efforts, which led to deployment of a South African protection force for politicians returning from exile and to South African troops forming the backbone for the African Union peacekeeping mission in Burundi, it is likely that the Burundian peace process would have collapsed. Similarly, without Mbeki's pressure to resolve outstanding issues during the Congo negotiations, it is likely that the Congolese peace process would have developed quite differently.

Yet, both peace processes evolved in environments that were tremendously different from South Africa's own negotiated transition and the troubled implementation of the two agreements reflects these differences. It is too early to assess whether or not the processes in Burundi and the DRC will lead to durable post-election peace, due to some apparent challenges. These challenges can be traced to the political economy of conflict, patterns of authority in the two countries, and the regional dimensions to these conflicts.

The peace processes in the two countries reflect a South African 'approach' to transitions. This approach assumes that inconclusive dialogue and broad-based national unity government can lead to peace since differences are negotiable. It also assumes that constitutional development can contribute to ending violence. Indeed, many aspects of the two peace processes have been encouraging. Since the signing of the Arusha Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi in 2002 and the

Pretoria Sun City Accords for the DRC in 2002-2003, there have been some hopeful changes in both countries. Nonetheless, despite the optimism surrounding the elections and the establishment of new governments in Burundi and the DRC, the experiences of both countries have exposed the limitations of a South African peace process ‘model’. Specifically, the context of conflict in Burundi and the Congo and the patterns of authority in the two countries are different from each other, as well as vastly different from the South African case. The promotion of a South African-style transition in two environments that are so dissimilar from South Africa’s has led to several unexpected outcomes, which are contributing to tensions and difficulties in the post-election period.

South Africa and the Peace Process in Lesotho: 1998

In 1998, a violent conflict broke out in Lesotho with its attendant regional implications. After the second general elections in the country in 1998, a number of opposition parties contested the outcome of the elections by organising protests which in many cases led to violent encounters with the security forces. What seemed to be a disagreement over the outcome of the elections progressively turned into a violent conflict, nearly escalating into a civil war. The belligerent forces in the dispute- the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD),government and the main opposition parties- could not resolve this conflict through dialogue and constructive mechanism resolution as neither side was prepared to shift from their positions regarding the election outcome.

Regional actors thereby became involved in the Lesotho conflict through both diplomatic and military means. South Africa, through its Minister of Safety and Security, Sydney Mifamadi, played a major diplomatic role in mediating a settlement of the violent conflict leading to the establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA). The IPA proposed a variety of constitutional and electoral reforms as part of conflict resolution efforts. Similarly, a prominent judge of the South Africa Constitutional Court, Justice Pious Langa, investigated the allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities surrounding the 1998 general elections by some opposition parties.

It is therefore evident that South Africa (and not SADC) played the most prominent role in the management of the Lesotho crisis of 1998, both militarily and diplomatically. Not only did South Africa get directly involved in the Lesotho conflict diplomatically, but also at the invitation of the LCD government, South Africa and Botswana sent military forces to Lesotho. There were sharp divisions on the character and nature of this military expedition. In whatever way it is perceived, it could be called a 'child of circumstance' that came in when all local efforts to resolve the crisis through constructive means had failed and South Africa and Botswana were able to rein in the belligerent forces both diplomatically and militarily. Ultimately, Lesotho's near civil war was nipped in the bud. Ironically, the role of South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho's 1998 conflict was not managed through the then embattled OPDS.

Troops Deployment

The deployment of troops has grown as an element of South Africa's foreign policy armoury. Nonetheless, it is seen as part of a broader conflict resolution approach, based on South Africa's conviction that sustainable peace cannot be brought about through military means alone. Under Mandela, troop's commitments to peace missions were not contemplated as the defence force was undergoing transformation from an apartheid force to one that integrated the various military formations of the liberation movement as well as the armies of the homelands.

The 1999 White paper on Peace Missions signalled a break with this approach as South Africa became more confident on the continent and felt that the region's underlying fears, caused by the apartheid regime's destabilisation campaigns, had been sufficiently laid to rest. South Africa currently has just fewer than four thousand(4,000) troops deployed in peace missions in Africa, under either an AU or UN mandate. South Africa is the largest troop contributor in SADC, the 4th largest in Africa and the 7th in the world.

However, its deployment capacity has probably reached its limit. Although South Africa embarked on an ambitious (and controversial) arms procurement package in the late 1990s, the defence budget as a proportion of GDP has declined from the levels it reached in the late 1980s, as have the number of troops. Defence expenditure is currently about 1.6% of GDP, while almost half of all African states spend more than 2% on defence. Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota has emphasised that South Africa should consider increasing its defence spending according to its regional responsibilities and the limits of other partners in the region.[149]

South Africa's Future Regional Peace Role

Since the 2004 election and the ten-year celebration of its constitution in 2006, South Africa's regional role has been enhanced. The 2004 election has not only ensured and solidified the legitimacy of the ruling ANC government at home; it has also enhanced its regional and international credibility. Increased domestic legitimacy and enhanced foreign credibility are bound to embolden South Africa in its foreign policy, especially in its immediate neighbourhood.

The future projection to make in relation to South Africa's regional role is that the country will remain the region's dominant power, with tremendous influence on peace and security in the region and beyond. South Africa's continued democratic dispensation will encourage its neighbours towards democratic consolidation, peace and stability. South Africa will likely play its regional role with high sensitivity first in response to its own interest, and to the fears and interests of its neighbours. Be it as it may, the reality is that South Africa has projected its regional leadership role through multilateral partnerships and avoided heavy-handed hegemonic designs because of its unpleasant historical experience.

Secondly, South Africa' foreign policy will continue to be geared towards managing conflicts on the continent through both bilateral and multilateral arrangements despite failures of its controversial military intervention in Lesotho in 1998. There is no denying the fact that there will always be variations in South Africa's efforts at managing regional conflicts, depending on the country concerned.

Thirdly, South Africa will continue to avoid unilateral interventionism that could give regional states the impression that it is acting like a bull in a China shop. South Africa should opt for collective leadership, acting largely through existing multinational institutions such as SADC, the AU and NEPAD.

Fourth, this multilateral approach will be pursued in line with Mbeki's African Renaissance vision. As Shelton puts it: "South Africa's active participation in peacekeeping also clearly forms part of Mbeki's efforts to advance the African Renaissance by contributing to greater peace and stability in Africa….President Mbeki has stressed that "without peace, stability and democracy" Africa has no chance of economic development and prosperity."[150]

In the areas of regional security and democratisation within SADC, South Africa's role over the past decade has been marked by a deliberate diplomacy of collective leadership and overt avoidance of unilateral hegemonism in part due to the post-apartheid regime's regional destabilisation. Mbeki's 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe, which has earned him both friends and enemies at home and abroad, should be understood within this context.

South Africa's regional policy over the next five years is spelt out in the ANC election manifesto as speeding up "economic integration in southern Africa and strengthening democracy, peace and stability as well as economic growth and development; and in particular, devoting time and resources to assist in social and economic reconstruction in Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo Angola and Swaziland."[151]

Fifth, South Africa interventionist policy in future must be sanctioned and authorised by SADC. South Africa's intervention in Lesotho was not authorised by SADC and in order to camouflage the hegemonic design of its military intervention in Lesotho, South Africa involved Botswana in the operation so that the mission could pass as a 'SADC intervention' in the same way that the DRC intervention was described as a SADC intervention by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

South Africa's interventionist policy in Lesotho have to be understood in the context of the latter's location in the belly of South Africa, which raises the stakes that South Africa is always bound to consider Lesotho's insecurity as directly affecting its own security. In order to avoid criticisms of using 'big brother' tactics and unilateralism, Tshwane's future involvement in Lesotho must likely take the route of multilateralism, especially through SADC and the AU.

Sixth, since South Africa has conducted her second elections, it now has to focus its attention on how democracy evolves in the SADC region and other parts of the continent. South Africa and its non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have closely monitored elections in 2004 in Malawi, Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique. Tshwane has led SADC election observer missions during the general elections in Botswana, Namibia and Mozambique. South Africa plays this role in line with its broader continental role within NEPAD, especially the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). South Africa underwent its own self-assessment as part of the APRM process in 2006.[152] South Africa's concern for regional democratisation is born out of the recognition that insecurity in any part of the SADC region could translate into insecurity for all other SADC member states.

Conclusion

The most significant limiting factor in South African conflict responses is perhaps its own ambivalence. While the country has provided a bold vision and vigorously supported the building of Africa’s new diplomatic and security architecture, there remains an element of hesitation, which has its roots in South Africa’s apartheid legacy. It is important to note that the former Frontline States are highly sensitive to any behaviour that reminds them of the apartheid regime’s aggressive policies of regional hegemony.

Hence, a pronounced articulation of Pretoria’s claim to regional leadership would imply a high risk of isolation. This may help to explain why South Africa has been more proactive and persistent in building multilateral structures at the AU level and taking a lead in mediating conflicts further north, while showing reluctance to provide the same energetic leadership within its own sub-region.

South Africa's dominant role in the Southern African security arrangement has been explored with a suggestion that this will continue in the near future. There will also be continuity rather than discontinuity in the role played by South Africa in how the regional security situation evolves. Security in Southern Africa will be driven more and more by a projection of South Africa's regional image, through multilateral bodies such as SADC, than by unilateral hegemonism. South Africa will not tolerate any bullying from its neighbours, and at the same time continue to link its national interest with imperatives for regional and continental integration through SADC, NEPAD and the AU. While Pretoria may adopt a unilateral hegemonic approach to small, dependent economies such as Lesotho and Swaziland, this approach will not be employed in cases of larger and less dependent economies such as the DRC, Angola and Zimbabwe. All these three countries could eventually compete with South Africa for regional economic and political dominance in southern Africa.

In terms of prospects for South Africa's continued regional role, five conclusions have been proffered. Firstly, South Africa will remain a dominant regional force with corresponding advantage on the region's evolving security architecture. Secondly, South Africa will promote democratisation of the region and manage violent conflicts with the aim of advancing the country's national, strategic and commercial interest as well as promoting regional security and stability. Thirdly, South Africa will exert its regional influence more and more through multilateral approaches thereby avoiding the unilateral hegemonism of the apartheid era. Lastly, South Africa’s strategy should be a passionate commitment to continental initiatives such as NEPAD and the APRM.

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CHAPTER FOUR

NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA: COOPERATION BETWEEN 'TWO AFRICAN GIANTS'

Since attaining her independence in 1994, the Republic of South Africa has taken her place among the comity of nations and has occupied leadership position in southern Africa and in Africa as a whole. South Africa has equally emerged not only as a military power, but also as an economic power in the sub-region and in Africa. South Africa, despite her newness in the African political arena, has ranked equal with Nigeria as a hegemon in the sub-region and in Africa.

One major issue that has generated much debate within and outside Africa is whether the two hegemons, Nigeria and South Africa, can perform their leadership roles in managing Africa's many conflicts through the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the South African Development Community (SADC). Whether they can drive economic integration and development through the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); and promote democratic governance on the troubled continent.

Former Nigerian military leader General Abdualsalaam Abubakar, between 1998 and 1999, called on Nigeria and South Africa to establish an 'axis of power to promote peace and stability on the continent'[1]. The post-Cold War era witnessed the reluctance of western countries to intervene militarily in African countries, most especially after the debacles in Somalia and Rwanda leading many observers to question whether Nigeria - which was then leading a peace mission in Liberia under the auspices of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) - and South Africa could fill this vacuum. South Africa, despite her economic wealth and military power, equally faces powerful military challenges and political rivals in the southern African sub-region like Nigeria does in West Africa. Both Nigeria and South Africa therefore share a lot in common within their respective sub-regions.

During the 1990's, Nigeria joined other states in carrying out swift and decisive military interventions in West Africa. South Africa also undertook such military actions in southern Africa. South Africa has military and economic capacity but lacks the legitimacy to play a hegemonic role. Nigeria has more legitimacy in her own sub-region, but lacks the military and economic capacity to act as an effective hegemon.

While Nigeria and South Africa are militarily and politically powerful, relative to other states in their sub-regions, they must still develop the capacity and legitimacy to influence their respective regions and they have often failed to persuade other states to follow their lead on vital political, security, and economic issues. Nigeria faces opposition from countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana, Liberia, and Burkina Faso, while South Africa also has to contend with countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia. These states have the capacity to increase significantly the cast of the aspiring hegemons when attempting to impose their will on their respective regions.

Nigeria and South Africa are expected to play constructive hegemonic roles in their respective sub-regions in which they are able not only to articulate the rules and the norms for their respective regions, but they are also able to persuade other states to follow such rules as well as respect and adhere to established norms. Hegemony is therefore about leadership, influence, and not just bullying dominance.[2]

Nigeria and South Africa: Hegemons in Africa

The hegemonic roles of the two countries have made some commentators to suggest that the future of the entire continent rests on the fate of Nigeria and South Africa. Olu Adeniji former Nigerian Foreign Affairs Minister said: “Nigeria and South Africa have always been considered as the two countries that should propel Africa, south of the Sahara, into the contemporary economic level.”[3] The head of South Africa's Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), Garth le Pere, and the head of Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Joy Ogwu have both described South Africa and Nigeria as 'global power perch'.[4]

Adebayo Adedeji, Nigerian head of South Africa's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) noted; “South Africa and Nigeria …constitute Sub-Saharan Africa's two economic colossuses”.[5] Outside the continent, American foreign policy guru Henry Kissinger opined that: “No state except Nigeria or South Africa is in a position to play a major role outside its immediate region…African security issues should be left largely to African nations, with Nigeria and South Africa playing the principal roles.”[6] This chapter will investigate the validity of these claims and examine in detail the close relationship between the two countries highlighting areas of cooperation and differences between 1960 and 2007.

Post-independence Nigerian leaders believed that the country was destined to play a leadership role on the subcontinent. As they tried to assume this role, a number of factors militated against them in the early post-independence years. In the 1960s, South Africa was under White minority rule and the country faced international condemnation, expulsion from international organisations and economic and political sanctions.

Nigeria faced a lot of opposition within and outside the country such as from France and Francophone states, which utilised their colonial ties to gang up against Nigeria's perceived domination. These countries were perhaps shielded by France, which provides political and economic assistance to her former colonies. France therefore frustrated Nigeria's attempts at seeking greater political influence in West Africa through economic means and encouraged Francophone states to form rival economic blocs.[7] Nigeria-led ECOWAS therefore experienced a lot of difficulties that impeded the easy accomplishment of its objectives most especially that of establishing a Common Market in the sub-region.

South Africa, on the other hand, during the apartheid era, subdued her neighbours both economically and militarily through a policy of destabilisation. Unlike Nigeria, South Africa during this period still, provided the economic backbone that benefitted her neighbours, through her flourishing arms and manufacturing industry. South Africa dominated the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), established with Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia - a feat not accomplished by Nigeria. Aside from South Africa’s domination of her neighbours, she also frustrated their efforts at industrialisation.

In April 1980s when the South African Development Coordination Conference was formed, South Africa unleashed a reign of terror through her destabilisation acts and military attacks, both directly and indirectly on independent African states in the region. Despite attempts by the SADCC member states to reduce their dependence on

South Africa, the majority of them still traded with South Africa and depended on her for their economic survival during the apartheid era.

At the continental level, between 1960 and 1990 Nigeria provided dynamic leadership to anti-apartheid and decolonisation struggles. Lagos was in the forefront of total eradication of apartheid and racism from Africa by giving liberation movements' financial and material support. In 1976, the South African Relief Fund (SARF) was formed to provide scholarships and relief materials to South African students and refugees.

The Nigerian government offered scholarships to South African students willing to further their education in the country. Through her contributions to the liberation struggles, Nigeria became a member of the Frontline States of Southern Africa, and served for a long time as Chairman of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid; and in 1977, Nigeria hosted the UN Anti-Apartheid Conference in Lagos. At the UN, Nigeria championed the isolation and sanctions against South Africa economically, politically and socially; and despite her economic downturn, Nigeria maintained her financial funding until South Africa's transition in the 1990s.[8]

During the apartheid period, relations between the two countries were far from cordial. It was an open hostility. There were no diplomatic or economic relations between them. During the Nigerian Civil War between 1967 and 1970, South Africa supported the secessionist Biafra with mercenaries, military equipment and funds with a view to breaking the oneness and power of the 'mighty Nigeria'. In retaliation, after the war Nigeria intensified her anti-apartheid efforts and gave more material and financial support to the liberation movements of southern Africa.

There were no official trading activities between Nigeria and South Africa as the Nigerian government warned all companies operating in the country to have no dealings with the apartheid regime. Government warned that sanctions would be imposed on erring companies. In line with this, in September 1979, the Obasanjo administration nationalised the assets of British Petroleum and the Barclays Bank in Nigeria for their alleged activities with the apartheid enclave.

When the South African government led by President F.W. De Klerk initiated moves towards dismantling apartheid and racism in the country with a view to returning the country to democratic rule, Nigerian leaders watched with keen interest. Little wonder that three months after his release from prison, Nelson Mandela paid a 'thank you' visit to Abuja to express his gratitude for the country's support during the liberation struggle. He also received a reported $10 million campaign contribution for the African National Congress (ANC) from General Ibrahim Babangida.[9]

In April 1992, President F.W. De Klerk led a South African business delegation to Nigeria. This was a clear recognition by South Africa's business community of the huge potential of Africa's largest market. Nevertheless, this visit did not go down well with the ANC, which later queried Nigeria; Abuja brushed the issue aside because the country needed no such authorisation. [10] This was the only minor spat that occurred between Nigeria and South Africa between1990 and 1994, but despite this, there were great expectations that a democratic South African government would usher in the birth of an alliance between Africa's two economic powerhouses.

Nigeria and South Africa: 1994 – 1998

It is an irony of history that a democratic government in South Africa met a ruthless military regime in Nigeria, a situation that can best be described as what operated in South Africa during the apartheid era. In 1994, President Nelson Mandela became the first black president of the democratic Republic of South Africa. Nigeria on the other hand, had just witnessed a political crisis, which began immediately the June 12, 1993 presidential elections were annulled by the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida.

The resultant prolonged political logjam in the country forced General Babangida to step aside on August 27, 1993. The Interim Government installed by General Babangida and headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan spent only three months in office as the most powerful man and deputy to the Head of State, General Sanni Abacha took over political reins in a palace coup in November 1993. General Sanni Abacha was ruthless, reclusive and a despotic ruler, who survived in office by clamping down brutally on the opposition and did all he could to remain in office.

Nigeria under Abacha became a pariah state while on the other hand Nelson Mandela was the bride of the world and a starkest contrast to General Abacha. Nelson Mandela was a hero, ‘a father of the nation.' He was a symbol of unity, an international icon respected worldwide. Mandela spent twenty-seven years as a political prisoner for his beliefs and embodied his people's aspirations for a democratic future. Mandela, an iconic figure and winner of the Nobel Peace prize in 1993, has been widely celebrated as a political saint and one of the greatest moral figures of the twentieth century.

As president, he came to symbolise his country's racial reconciliation and his charisma helped South Africa's young, democratic institutions to grow. He made his country accepted in the international community by changing the pariah status of his country. His four-year reign witnessed peace, reconciliation and political stability. He laid the solid foundation for democracy in the country. Mandela served as a sharp contrast to Abacha by bowing out as president as promised, after the end of his first term in 1999.[11] While South Africa was getting out of its pariah status, Nigeria under Abacha was assuming it.

By 1995, Nigeria under General Abacha's autocratic rule and South Africa under Nelson Mandela had traded places: it was Nigeria and not South Africa that was receiving international condemnation. It was Nigeria, and not South Africa, that was being considered for expulsion from the Commonwealth, a move championed by South Africa. It was Nigeria, under a repressive military regime, which was facing mounting criticisms over its human rights record. It was Nigeria, which was increasingly becoming isolated in international society. Nigeria was witnessing political instability and insecurity. It was Nigeria that was considered to be possibly heading towards civil war; and it was Nigeria that the international community was imposing sanctions on.

It was an irony of history that under Abacha, everything that happened to South Africa during the apartheid regime happened to Nigeria. It must be stressed, that as Nigeria championed moves to eradicate apartheid in South Africa, so also did South Africa under Nelson Mandela champion moves to punish Nigeria under Abacha. Mandela did not hide his disgust for Abacha, as he came down heavily against him, calling him all sorts of names, openly condemning, and criticising him.

Having abandoned its apartheid past, South Africa was widely acknowledged the most likely political and economic success story in Africa. Unlike in Nigeria and West Africa where military leaders took over political power in the states, post-apartheid South Africa provided a democratic model for the region, with its *avant garde* government of national unity between 1994 and 1998.[12]

Trading activities between the two nations began immediately apartheid was dismantled in South Africa. A look at the statistics of trade relations between the two countries would reveal that Nigerian exports initially had a slight edge on imports from South Africa. The statistics between 1994 and 2002 showed that it was only in 1994 that South Africa exported into Nigeria more than what Nigeria exported into South Africa. In 1994, Nigeria exported products worth $3.1 million, while South Africa exported into Nigeria goods worth $8.1 million. However, in 2000, Nigeria exported products totalling $128.1 million while only $70.7 million worth of goods came from South Africa into the Nigerian economy. Moreover, in 2001 and 2002 Nigeria exported products worth $165.8 million and $361.9 million respectively, while South Africa brought into Nigeria products worth $164.8 million and $272.8 million respectively.

In the overall economic sphere, South Africa could be said to be slightly ahead of Nigeria .In 2006, South Africa had a GDP of about US$193 billion, compared to Nigeria's US$53 billion. While South Africa has for years had a steel industry that feeds its arms and manufacturers, Nigeria's Ajaokuta Steel Complex, which had been planned since the 1970s and soaked up to US$4 billion, became a white elephant mired in corruption and inefficiency. While South Africa's digital cellular telecommunications network was among the world’s largest, Nigeria's telephone system and power supply during this period were notoriously erratic.[13]

The nadir of relations between post-independence South Africa and Nigeria was undoubtedly reached after the Abacha regime brutally hanged the environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his fellow Ogoni campaigners. This had happened during the Commonwealth Summit in Auckland, New Zealand in November 1995. Prior to this incident, Mandela, under pressure from Nigerian pro-democracy activists as well as western and a few African governments, had gone to Abuja to intercede with Abacha for the release of Moshood Abiola. During the visit, Mandela reportedly pleaded with Abacha that Africa's many conflicts were providing ammunition to Afro-pessimists who were arguing that blacks were incapable of ruling themselves. He appealed to Abacha's sense of his place in history. [14]

In the same year, President Nelson Mandela sent Archbishop Desmond Tutu and his Deputy Mbeki to Abuja to plead for the release of political prisoners, including Chief M.K.O. Abiola and Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, two close associates of many ANC stalwarts. During his visit, Tutu echoed Mandela's sentiments to his host:

> We in South Africa do not want to compete with Nigeria for the leadership of the continent, but we are jealous of the continent's reputation. The fact that the giant of Africa is in the state that it is in terms of its human rights record and the whole question of democracy, this has had an impact on all of us".[15]

When Mandela learnt about the killing of the 'Ogoni nine’, he felt betrayed because he felt he had received personal assurances from Abacha for clemency for them. In fact, Mandela had assured his fellow Commonwealth leaders that Abacha would not kill them.[16]

Mandela was so furious that he reacted impulsively, accusing Abacha of behaving like an 'insensitive, frightened dictator' who engaged in 'judicial murder', warning that Abacha was sitting on a volcano and he was going to explode it under him'.[17] Mandela called on Washington and London to impose oil sanctions on Abacha and advocated Nigeria's expulsion from the Commonwealth. When he returned home, he recalled his High Commissioner to Nigeria, George Nene, who had been somewhat unfairly criticised by South African civil society groups. He was criticised for not having made contact with Nigerian opposition leaders and gaining better access to a notoriously reclusive leadership. On the contrary, Nigerian leaders felt that Nene had become too close to the opposition and had lost all leverage with the Abacha government.[18]

In December 1995, Mandela called a SADC Summit to take collective action against Nigeria. In retaliation, Abacha refused to let Nigeria's footballers defend their African Nations crown in South Africa in 1996. Abacha's Ministers severely criticised Mandela and his moves against Nigeria in view of her anti-apartheid role. Nigeria's Minister of Information, Walter Ofonagoro, accused Mandela of being a 'black head of a white country' who could not be trusted. This statement was hurtful and insensitive and ordinary South Africans would not easily forgive Nigeria for this personal slur on the country's saintly icon.[19]

Mandela failed to rally enough states to take action against Nigeria and failed to ignite the volcano; he thereafter realised with dismay the intricacies of African diplomacy. Ironically, it was South Africa that was being accused by many African leaders of becoming a western stooge, sowing the seed of division in Africa and undermining African solidarity. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former UN Secretary-General reminded Mandela of Nigeria's peacekeeping sacrifices in Liberia and Sierra Leone.[20] ANC stalwarts also reminded Mandela of Nigeria's contributions during the anti-apartheid struggles and also of Nigeria's contributions towards the party's campaign funds and believed that South Africa should be grateful to Nigeria and not condemn her actions.

This was one of the pitfalls of Mandela's ethical foreign policy as regards Nigeria. As the ANC's Pallo Jordan reviews:

> When, on the eve of a Commonwealth Summit, Sanni Abacha ordered the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, then President Mandela moved swiftly to break off relations and called for tough measures against the Nigerian military junta. While Britain, France, Germany and others verbally applauded his actions, not one of these countries followed South Africa's example. British oil multinationals continued business as usual; the USA kept up rigorous dialogue with Abacha while the US corporations expanded business contacts; France sought to exploit the tension between London and Abuja to its own advantage. South Africa held the moral high ground, but in isolation.[21]

Thabo Mbeki, the Deputy President, later intervened and this changed South Africa's policy. Mbeki had worked in the ANC office in Lagos between 1976 and 1978, so he understood both countries and the main players. He devised a strategy with South Africa's High Commissioner, George Nene, to engage in dialogue rather than confronting the Nigerian government. He embarked on a diplomatic mission to Abuja and initiated contacts between the security agencies of both countries.[22]

South Africa pulled out of the Commonwealth Action Group on Nigeria that had been set up shortly after Auckland. South Africa refused to sanction Nigeria at the UN Commission on Human Rights; and cancelled a major conference of the pro-democracy group scheduled to take place in Johannesburg in early 1996.[23]The first

Nigerian ambassador to South Africa, Alhaji Shehu Malami, presented his credentials to Mandela in August 1996.

In May 1996, Mbeki addressed the country's parliamentarians and gave detailed justification for his actions. He said: "We should not humiliate ourselves by pretending that we have strength which we do not have.” He said Pretoria did not have the leverage to dictate to Nigeria and urged South Africa to encourage efforts to support Nigeria's transition to democratic rule. He warned South Africa not to overestimate its strength in a fit of arrogance, and noted the failure of the West, which had the power to impose oil sanctions on Nigeria to act. Instead, Mbeki observed that Mandela had been set up for failure and ridicule by western countries that preferred to protect oil profits, investments and Nigeria’s assets in their countries.[24]

However, the sudden death of Abacha in June 1998 dowsed the political tension between the two countries and restored a cordial relationship. Mbeki travelled to Abuja shortly after General Abdulsaalam Abubakar had resumed power, urging the Nigerian government to restore civil liberties and release political prisoners. In August and September 1998, Abubakar travelled to South Africa. As a way of showing the restoration of cooperation between both countries, Nigeria's new military leaders invited Mandela to attend the ECOWAS Summit in Abuja. General Abdulsaalam Abubakar later presided over a transition to democratic rule that ushered in President Olusegun Obasanjo on 29 May 1999, bowing out gracefully after less than a year in office.

Nigeria and South Africa: 1999 – 2007

In 1999, both Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki assumed the leadership of their countries. Although both men are very different personalities, they had a close personal relationship, dating back to between 1976 and 1979 when Obasanjo was Nigeria's military leader and Mbeki served as the ANC representative in Lagos. Obasanjo also met South Africa's future leaders during his visit to the apartheid enclaves as co-chairman of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group CEPG) in 1986.

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, then a member of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on South Africa, worked assiduously to, among other things, secure the release of jailed African National Congress (ANC) leader Nelson Mandela. Obasanjo also had the privilege of being the only black non-South African leader to have visited Nelson Mandela in Prison under EPG auspices. This personal relationship no doubt remained indelible. Little wonder Mandela also took it upon himself to plead for the release of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and others when Sanni Abacha arrested and detained them in connection with the 1996 phantom coup.

In the late 1970s, General Olusegun Obasanjo as Nigerian Head of State developed a close working relationship with southern African leaders. This was at a time when Nigeria was considered a member of the Frontline States and a generous supporter of liberation movements in the region.[25] During this period, both leaders worked together in exposing the evils of apartheid to the international community and in the setting up of the South African Relief Fund (SAFR) in 1977.

The democratic wave blowing across the globe had just blown across the two countries with Obasanjo taking over from the military as a democratic leader after many years of repressive military rule and Mbeki taking over from Nelson Mandela and consolidating democracy after many years of apartheid and white supremacist rule. Obasanjo's first foreign trip abroad on becoming the president was to attend Mbeki's inauguration in June 1999.

Both Obasanjo and Mbeki were respected internationally, despite the fact that they faced enormous internal economic and political problems. Both leaders faced severe criticisms at home for embarking on frequent foreign trips and not spending more time on alleviating pressing problems of poverty, unemployment and crime at home. Both leaders have worked closely at managing African conflicts through the AU, ECOWAS and SADC. They have attempted to promote norms of democratic government through the Africa Union who's founding Charter they were instrumental to shaping.

Obasanjo and Mbeki challenged the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) inflexible adherence to absolute sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Both leaders were instrumental to the formation of the African Union in 2001 and Mbeki became the first Chairman of the AU in 2001-2, while Obasanjo was elected AU Chairman in 2003-4. During the 1999 OAU Summit in Algiers, Algeria, Obasanjo and Mbeki were among the leaders who pushed for the ostracisation of regimes that engaged in unconstitutional changes of government. The organisation subsequently barred the military regimes of Cote d'Ivoire and the Comoros from attending its Summit in Lome, Togo in 2000 despite vigorous protests from the two affected leaders.

South African and Nigerian officials usually met before important AU and UN meeting to coordinate their policies. The strategic alliance between Tshwane and Abuja came through clearly during the AU Summit in Addis Ababa in June 2004 as both African powers-key actors on the AU Peace and Security Council -carefully coordinated their efforts on NEPAD and over the Congo conflict. At the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa in July 2004, Obasanjo and Mbeki strongly pushed for a grossly under-staffed AU Commission to be given the resources to perform its duties effectively. [29]

Obasanjo and Mbeki addressed the issue of conflicts and conflict resolution in Africa. Obasanjo hosted a Commonwealth meeting that discussed land reforms in Zimbabwe in September 2001, and led peacekeeping efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Mbeki, on the other hand, with the support of Mandela and his deputy president, Jacob Zuma, lent his country's weight and resources to peace efforts in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He was also particularly critical of the military regime of General Robert Guei of Cote d'Ivoire and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Sierra Leone. As the AU mediator to the country, he was active in the negotiations to restore constitutional rule to Cote d'Ivoire from November 2004.In August 2003, he had helped to convince Charles Taylor to leave for exile in Nigeria. He personally escorted Charles Taylor to Nigeria to begin his new life in exile.

Nigeria and South Africa have been involved in peacekeeping: Nigeria in Liberia (ECOWAS) and South Africa in Burundi (under the AU) despite their fragile economies. Both countries have also advocated that future peacekeeping venture should serve under the auspices of the UN, with African countries contributing troops. This not only represents an attempt to legitimise such military actions, but it is also a conscious effort to alleviate fears of aggressive regional hegemons pursuing their own parochial interest under the guise of keeping peace in Africa.

Obasanjo and Mbeki have lobbied the rich world on behalf of Africa at annual Group of Eight (G8) meetings, although these have not always yielded the expected positive results. Both leaders were also the driving force in the NEPAD process. The plan is based on direct bargaining between Africa and its largely western donors. In an exchange for support from external actors, African leaders have agreed to take responsibility for, and committed themselves to democratic governance. In October 2001, sixteen African leaders had met in Abuja for NEPAD's first implementation meeting. In October 2003, President Olusegun Obasanjo hosted a meeting between NEPAD and the Heads of African Regional Economic Communities (RECS) in Abuja in an effort to encourage them to align their integration programmes with NEPAD's goals. Both leaders have also pushed twenty-six African leaders to sign up its Peer Review Mechanism. This has prompted some South African and Nigerian intellectuals to call for a 'Pretoria-Abuja axis' to lead the continent.[27]

When the OAU was to be transformed into the AU, Obasanjo and Mbeki, ensured that the organisation adopted a gradualist approach to unity rather than the more federalist model proposed by the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. They also successfully pushed for Mali's outgoing president, Alpha Konare, to become the first chairperson of the AU Commission, in order to have a strong, visionary leader that could interact easily with other Heads of state.[28]

South Africa's efforts at promoting democracy and human rights have sometimes been met with fierce opposition from other African countries. After some difficulties in its peacemaking role in Burundi, South Africa has been more cautious when dealing with its African counterparts. SADC leaders like Robert Mugabe, Sam Nujoma and Eduardo dos Santos felt that they preceded Mbeki in the liberation struggle and complained that the ANC-led government had not repaid the sacrifices that their countries made for the liberation of South Africa.

South Africa contributed about 1500 troops to a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC (MONUC) and expended a lot of resources and time in leading peacemaking efforts. South Africa successfully brokered the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the Congo in 2002. Mbeki had made several unsuccessful attempts at breaking the political impasse in Zimbabwe. He has worked with other African leaders to achieve this feat but to no avail. The lessons Mbeki learnt from Mandela's difficult experience over Nigeria taught him to employ multilateral diplomacy in pursuing regional diplomatic goals.

Nigeria, another giant of Africa on the other hand, has been more militarily active than South Africa in its own sub-region, although not without similar suspicion and criticisms from its neighbours. Nigerian leaders between 1990 and1994 were fully committed to an activist security role in Liberia and Sierra Leone, despite strong public opposition from Nigerians and non- Nigerians.[29] Nigeria provided the human and financial resources that fuelled the ECOMOG locomotive. No doubt, Nigeria remains the indispensable local power in West Africa.

Obasanjo's administration withdrew the bulk of its troops under a UN force (UNAMSIL). Nigeria also led an intervention into Liberia in August 2003, but insisted as a condition for deployment that the UN take over the force three months later and sends troops from other countries. These are clear signs of the growing frustrations of regional peacekeeping and the desire to ease the financial burden of a fragile oil-dependent Nigerian economy. Obasanjo did however; conduct mediation efforts in a number of African countries such as Sudan's Darfur region, Togo, and Cote d'Ivoire.

Economic Cooperation between Nigeria and South Africa: 1994-1999

Between 1994 and 1999, South Africa had a poor political and economic relationship with Nigeria as a military junta that was politically hostile towards South Africa was then ruling Nigeria. In the rush for markets into the rest of Africa after the country's 1994 democratic elections, South African companies did not regard Nigeria as a favoured destination.

At the time of South Africa's liberation from apartheid rule, Nigeria was under a military dictator, Sanni Abacha, who had taken power by force in 1993. Despite strong liberation-era, ideological ties between Nigeria and South Africa, there were few economic links. The stories emanating from Abacha's Nigeria were not conducive to South African business expansion into the country. Aside from the logistical difficulties associated with entering a then unknown market a long way from home, there were stories of hangings, arbitrary arrest, state-sanctioned murder, growing poverty and a country that was increasingly isolating itself from the rest of the world.

There were equally stories of epileptic and erratic power supply, infrastructural decadence and general insecurity in the country. Only the most hardy business people joined the market at that time, and even then, they faced stiff competition in a market historically dominated by British and American companies. The country's suspension from the Commonwealth in 1995 over human rights abuses helped to keep South African business at arm's length.

During this period, investors mostly kept to markets in Southern Africa and for those few who wanted to venture into West Africa, Ghana was the preferred choice. Not only was it an Anglophone country, it was politically more stable than Nigeria, under a reformed military turned civilian ruler, Jerry Rawlings. Ghana's economy was more stable and the environment was more conducive. On the political scene, Ghana was experiencing political stability at home. It was therefore not surprising that Ghana became a haven for African businesspersons, including Nigerian businesspersons, during this period.

However, it was not long before South African companies recognised that despite the perceived difficulties in the country, Nigeria, with a population of over one hundred and fifty million people, was a market to be reckoned with. Slowly, business ties increased but it was not until 1999 that economic ties between the two countries took a firm root. The political terrain in Nigeria was more stable than what it used to be and the country was more economically conducive to investment. Coupled with these was the close personal relationship that existed between leaders of the two countries.

Nigeria and South Africa's Bilateral Cooperation Since 1999

The political and economic hostilities between the two countries, however, dramatically changed with the end of the military rule and the election of the Peoples

Democratic Party's presidential candidate, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, as the Nigerian president in May 1999. The relationship between Nigeria and South Africa was helped by the fact that Thabo Mbeki had formed a strong friendship with Obasanjo when he was in exile in Nigeria from 1976 to 1979.

In 1999, the South African and Nigerian governments signed bilateral agreements on trade and investment. These agreements, among other things, aimed at increasing the amount of trade and investments between the two countries.[30] The agreement on investments specifically protected South African companies' investments in Nigeria from any possible future nationalisation. Indeed, the agreement on investments was highly favourable for prospective South African investors in Nigeria. Added to this, the two governments also signed an agreement on eradicating double taxation. This meant that South African companies that paid tax in Nigeria would not have to pay tax again on profits that were, repatriated to South Africa.[31] Such measures were aimed at increasing the attractiveness of the Nigerian market for South African investors.

A number of the Agreements/Memoranda between the two countries had been negotiated and signed –with the majority of them ratified. These include:

- Agreement on the establishment of a Bi-National Commission of Cooperation;
- Agreement for the Avoidance of Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion-with respect to taxes on income and Capital Gains;
- Trade Agreement;
- Agreement on Defence Cooperation;

- Agreement on Police Cooperation;
- Agreement on Cooperation in Arts and Culture;
- Extradition Agreement;
- Agreement on Immigration Matters; and
- Memorandum of Understanding between the Foreign Ministries;

The South African Department of Trade and Industry undertook a number of trade missions to Nigeria over the years, and each country had received visitors from the other country comprising mainly top officials, and at times the presidents. Such visits were designed to discuss bilateral and economic issues between the two countries.

South Africa-Nigeria Bi-National Commission: Aims, Achievements and Challenges

In October 1999, both countries established the South Africa-Nigeria Bi-National Commission (BNC), thereby formalising the strong ties between them. The Bi-National Commission has been meeting regularly ever since and aims at increasing the amount of trade and investment between South Africa and Nigeria. At the meetings, trade and investment opportunities in Nigeria were identified and plans were put in place so that they could be realised. In this way, many deals that have proved very lucrative for South African companies and parastatals have been facilitated through the Bi-National Commission. The Bi-National Commission has five concrete objectives thus:

- First, to provide a framework for joint efforts to bring Africa into the mainstream of global political, social and economic developments;
- Second, to provide the basis for the governments and private sectors of both countries to consult with each other to promote bilateral trade and industry;
- Third, to improve bilateral relations in the fields of technology, education, health, and sports;
- Fourth, to use both country's human and natural resources to maximise socio-economic development through collaborative efforts; and
- Finally, to establish the mechanism to promote peace, stability, and socio-economic integration in Africa.[32]

The inauguration of the Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National Commission (BNC) has further confirmed the realisation that the two countries could become significant partners in the promotion of peace and security as well as political and economic renewal of the continent. Thus, a symbiotic relationship was struck when Nigeria with a teeming market, low technological base and poor infrastructure teamed up with rich South Africa with a high manufacturing base and advanced agro-allied development. Given this framework, the Commission was viewed as a vehicle for strengthening and deepening cooperation between the two countries in defence and security, science and technology and infrastructure as well as education and culture.

BNC meetings were held between 1999 and 2004 alternating between Nigeria and South Africa: in October 1999; April 2000; March 2001; March 2002; December 2003; and September 2004. The 2002 meeting initiated the idea of a Nigeria/South

Africa Free Trade Area, while the 2003 meeting called for a Business Investment Forum between both countries. By the time of the sixth meeting, the focus was around eight working groups: trade, industry and finance; mineral and energy; agriculture, water resources and environment; foreign affairs and cooperation; defence; immigration, justice and crime; social and technical; and public enterprises and infrastructure.

The sixth meeting was held in Durban, South Africa between 6 and 10 September 2004. Officials discussed how to increase trade, with Nigerians urging South Africans to accelerate discussions with their Southern African Customs Union partners (Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Namibia) in order to establish a free trade area with Nigeria. During this meeting, the Business Investment Forum was renamed 'South Africa-Nigerian Business Forum.' The meeting further urged for the establishment of a Special Implementation Committee within the BNC to ensure an effective monitoring mechanism, as well as to develop a concrete programme of action with clear time frame. Continuity officials were encouraged to participate in the activities of the forum, so also were legislators and chief executives of South African provinces and the Nigerian states were equally encouraged to participate in the future BNC sessions.

The establishment of the South African-Nigeria Bi-National Commission has no doubt recorded significant achievements in the socio-political and economic frontiers of not only the two partner countries but also Africa at large. The establishment of the Commission has propelled the growth in the volume of trade between the two countries. South Africa's exports to Nigeria between 1999 and 2005 rose from $520million to $2.9 billion, while exports from Nigeria to South Africa also increased from $1.2 billion over the same period. The huge imbalance in trade is one of the areas the Investment Forum should address.

Many of South Africa's biggest firms have moved into Africa's biggest market in large numbers. There are currently more than one hundred South African companies operating in various economic fields in Nigeria. Although the number of Nigerian companies operating in South Africa cannot be ascertained, they are believed to be much lower than South African businesses in Nigeria. Statistics available have shown that the number of Nigerian companies operating in South Africa is few. These include; Union Bank, First Bank, Philips Consulting, News Media, Financial Standard and This Day Newspaper.[33] Nigeria's export to South Africa is mainly oil, complimented by small quantities of natural rubber, cocoa butter, palm oil, and oil cake. While South Africa shows greater diversification, exporting telecommunications, broadcasting, energy, banking, hospitality, industrial chemicals, paper/news prints products, packing materials, plastics, flat sheets, and raw/processed food and other consumer goods to Nigeria.

The Role of Chambers of Commerce

In May 2001, a Nigeria-South Africa Chamber of Commerce was established with over one hundred and fifty business people in attendance. The Nigeria-South African Chamber of Commerce (NSACC) is a non-profit organisation created for the promotion, facilitation and assistance of Nigeria-South Africa related businesses. The Chamber of Commerce is a valuable source of information on the Nigeria-South Africa laws and regulations and provides all necessary network on Nigeria-South

Africa related business knowledge and practical advice. It disseminates information in this regard and supports agencies that are interested in any aspect of the supply chain.

In 2005, it contributed to the setting up of another Chamber of Commerce in South Africa- the South Africa-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce, which is a reciprocal Chamber of Commerce. The South African-Nigeria Chamber of Commerce (SANCC) facilitates South African contacts for the members of NSACC, and this is a fundamental breakthrough for the Chamber. The Nigeria-South African Chamber of Commerce also set up other Chambers of Commerce, like the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce and has a strong alliance with other Chambers of Commerce in South Africa such as Durban Chamber of Commerce and Cape Regional Chamber of Commerce.

If any member is interested in any information in Nigeria, such a member would contact the Nigerian counterpart who would provide the information, thereby making life a lot easier. Members of the Chamber of Commerce also play host to missions from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Western Cape Development Agency and many more from South Africa.

The South African-Nigerian Chamber of Commerce arose out of the Bi-National Commission. Some of the largest South African companies that have investments in Nigeria are members of the Chamber, such as MTN, Standard Bank, First Rand, Imperial, Johncom, Massmart, Nampak, and Sun International. The main goal of the South African-Nigerian Chamber of Commerce is to identify investment opportunities in Nigeria for South African corporations.[34] Added to this; the South African-Nigerian Chamber of Commerce also provides information on the policies of the Nigerian government and how to do business in Nigeria. It also conducts market research for South African companies wanting to invest in Nigeria.

The Chamber receives strong support from the South African government. On many occasions, the President, Deputy President and other government officials have addressed and offered support to members of the Chamber. Linked to this, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) launched the South African-Nigeria Business Investment Forum to assist South African companies wanting to invest in Nigeria.[35] All these efforts have yielded significant results as there are over one hundred South African companies operating in Nigeria. Efforts are also in top gear to get more Nigerian companies to start their business in South Africa.

The South African High Commission in Nigeria also provides massive assistance to South African companies investing, or wishing to invest, in Nigeria. In fact, it works closely with the South African-Nigerian Chamber of Commerce and the DTI to further South African business interests in Nigeria. It provides various services to prospective South African investors in Nigeria, including providing contacts and information on Nigeria's business climate.

All the above measures have been extremely valuable in furthering South Africa's business interests in Nigeria. Indeed, the South African state has used its diplomatic power and the relationship that it has with the Nigerian government to assist South African corporations and parastatals to become big players in the Nigerian economy. Along with this, South Africa, through NEPAD and the signing of the bilateral agreements on trade, has found a very lucrative market for its exports in Nigeria. Indeed, South Africa has started to import vast amounts of Nigeria's oil to assuage the thirsty of its relatively small, but highly consumerist, elite and middle classes.

On the other hand, the Nigerian government has not provided necessary incentives to encourage Nigerian businesspersons do business in South Africa as South African governments and government agencies have done for South African businesspersons in Nigeria. Although the Nigeria-South Africa Chamber of Commerce has provided the needed information on the business terrain in South Africa, government's financial and moral backing is lacking, thereby contributing to the paucity of Nigerian companies operating in South Africa. Government should be ready to bankroll large projects on behalf of Nigerian companies in South Africa. It will not be out of tune to mention that many Nigerian companies operating in South Africa are there on their own volition.

South African Companies Investments in Nigeria since 1999

It is a truism that South African corporations have become major players in Nigeria's economic terrain since 1999. Prior to 1999, there were very few South African companies operating in Nigeria. This situation dramatically changed with the assistance of the South African state and the signing of bilateral agreements and the establishment of a Bi-National Commission. Added to this, the South African state, through the state-controlled Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), bankrolled some of the largest projects that the South African private sector has embarked upon in Nigeria.[36] The result of these measures are that today there are over one hundred South African companies doing business in Nigeria. Within a period of eight years, South African companies have become major players in almost every sector of the Nigerian economy.

The biggest investment by South African companies in Nigeria has been in the telecommunications sector. In 2001, MTN was awarded a license by the Nigerian government to operate a cell phone network in the country. In return, MTN had to pay licensing fees of over US $ 285 million. Added to this, MTN spent a further US $1 billion on setting up its operations in Nigeria. Currently, MTN is the largest cellular network company in Nigeria and has over ten million subscribers. This has seen MTN making massive profits in the country.

In 2004 alone, MTN recorded an after-tax profit of over R2.4 billion in Nigeria.[37] The success story of MTN convinced many other South African firms that Nigeria was worth investing in. South Africa has only six big cities compared to Nigeria's over twenty seven.[38] Such profits have led other South African telecommunications companies to also set up shop in Nigeria in a bid to get a piece of the very huge pie. Telkom announced that it was buying Multilinks, which operated a wireless network in Nigeria, for US $ 200 million.[39]

Many South African financial institutions also invaded the Nigerian market such as Stanbic Bank, Rand Merchant Bank (involved in equity and funding deals) and Standard Bank, among others. South African companies have also become dominant in Nigeria's construction sector. Entech, a Stellenbosch-based engineering company, headed a consortium of South African companies that were awarded a tender worth R2.1 billion from the Lagos State government to redevelop the Bar Beach and Victoria Island area of Lagos. The idea is to turn the area into a complex akin to the

V&A Waterfront.[40]Another South African construction firm, Group Five, was awarded a R585 million deal to build a power station in Nigeria for the Ibom Power company.[41]

Many large South African companies have also invaded the tourism and leisure sector in Nigeria. Under NEPAD, the South African parastatal, the IDC has become one of the largest investors in Nigeria's tourist sector. To date it has invested over US $ 1.4 billion in tourism and telecommunications ventures in Nigeria.[42]Another major player in the tourism sector is the South African company Bidvest. Through its subsidiary, Tourvest, it has purchased one of the biggest tourism companies in Nigeria, Touchdown Travel, The biggest development in the Nigerian tourism sector; however, is the massive Tinapa Project in the Cross River State. This project falls under the auspices of NEPAD and has the full backing of the South African and Nigerian governments.

The project entails the construction of a massive entertainment complex, consisting of four shopping centres, five bulk warehouses, four hotels, and a casino and is set to cost over US $ 300 million.[43] The major stakeholders in this development are South African companies, such as the Standard Bank, Tsogo Sun, Broll, Johncom, and Southern Sun. Indeed, the centre pieces of this development will be a 300-room hotel owned by Southern Sun and a casino owned by Tsogo Sun. Another South African company, Broll, will be the leasing agents of the complex.

South African state has provided direct assistance to these companies so that they can carry out this project. Indeed, the state-owned IDC has provided finance and has underwritten these companies' investments in this project. Also in the tourism industry is the Protea Hotels, which plan to build fifteen more hotels in Nigeria between 2006 and 2008, at an estimated cost of R500 million.[44]

In the Nigerian retail sector, South African companies also loom large. Massmart, Metro-Cash, Carry and Pep Stores and Shoprite have opened a number of stores in Nigeria. Added to this, Johncom has established a number of stores selling books, CDs and DVDs in Nigeria. A number of South African companies have also entered into the fast food business, including Famous Brands, St Elmo's, and Nandos. In fact, South African companies control almost 50 percent of the international fast food franchising industry in Nigeria. She has out-competed companies from both the European Union and the United States. Considering that the fast food industry in Nigeria is worth over US $ 2.5 billion a year, this control over the fast food franchising business in Nigeria has meant that South African companies have made super profits.[45] The South African property management group, Broll, has also landed a deal to manage five hundred and ninety- four retail fuel stations across Nigeria. This deal, too, is worth millions of dollars.[46]

South African companies are also heavily involved in Nigeria's media and entertainment sector. DSTV is a major force in the television industry and accounts for ninety per cent of the viewers that watch satellite TV in Nigeria. This has seen DSTV growing into the sixth largest company listed on the Lagos Stock Exchange. Johncom has also eagerly entered into the Nigerian entertainment sector. It has established cinema complexes throughout Nigeria. One of these cinema complexes, in Lagos, cost US $40 million dollars to develop. Along with this, Johncom has purchased one of the largest daily newspapers in Nigeria, Business Day.

Prior to 1999, the Nigerian government awarded all oil concessions in the country to companies from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. As a result, companies from the Northern imperial powers dominated Nigeria's oil sector. After 1999, this situation began to change, in part because of the close relationship between the leaders of the two countries. Companies from the Northern imperial powers, although still dominant in the oil industry, no longer have a complete monopoly over the oil concessions in Nigeria as companies from South Africa, China, and India have also gotten a piece of the action.

One of the first actions of Obasanjo's government in 1999 was to award the South African state the right to market fifty thousand barrels of Nigerian oil a day. In 2003, Thabo Mbeki intervened to ensure that this was increased to one hundred and twenty thousand barrels of oil a day. However, the South African government has opted to pass on the rights to market this oil to a shadowy company, the South African Oil Company, which is registered in the Cayman Islands. The South African Oil Company in the Cayman Islands is seventy per cent owned by a Nigerian-American businessperson, Jakes Lawal. Who owns the other thirty per cent, however, is a mystery.Indeed, the Cayman Island law system protects the identity of the shareholders that own the other thirty per cent. Lawal, however, has close connections with leading ANC figures.

In fact, the *Mail* and *Guardian* reported that rumours have been circulating that the ANC directly benefited from this deal. Indeed, it is interesting that the Cayman Island's South African Oil Company also has a sister company registered in South Africa. It is perhaps no co-incidence that some of the shareholders in this sister company happen to be leading ANC figures.[48]

Other, more genuine South African companies have also enjoyed receiving oil concessions from the Nigerian government. Ophir Energy, owned by Tokyo Sexwale's Mvelephanda Resources, got the right to drill for oil in several blocs in Nigeria. This is bound to add to Ophir's current value of over R 14 billion.[49] Some South African companies have also entered into partnerships with well-established multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria. For example, SASOL has entered into a fifty-fifty partnership with Chevron to develop a gas-to-fuel plant at Chevron's Escravos oil terminal. This plant would cost US $1.3 billion and would come on line this year. It will initially produce thirty-three thousand barrels of fuel a day, but this will be increased to as much as one hundred and twenty thousand barrels a day over the next ten years.[50] A number of South African firms have also been involved in providing services to the oil multinationals in Nigeria. Most notably, Grinaker established an oilrig fabrication yard in Port Harcourt in 2000. It assembles and services the oil rigs that multinational oil companies use in the Niger Delta at that facility.[51]

Private South African companies are not the only big players in the Nigerian economy; the South African state, through its parastatals, is also chasing profits and business opportunities in Nigeria. The South African government-funded Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) invested in Nigerian oil, gas, infrastructure, tourism and telecommunications. In addition, South Africa's Spoornet has worked with the Nigerian Railway Corporation to revive Nigeria's trains.

It is imperative to mention that there has been no reciprocal attempt by the Nigerian private sector, government and government parastatals to make an aggressive incursion into the South African market as South African companies have done in

Nigeria. Entry of Nigerian companies into South Africa faced many challenges including non-issuance of visas and other travelling permits by the South African High Commission in Abuja, xenophobic attacks and insensitivity to the plight of the private sector.

Economic relations between the two countries have also blossomed, with trade growing from less than $12 million in 1994 to about $100 million in 1998 before peaking at $400 million in 2001. By 2003, Nigeria had already become South Africa's third largest trading partner and largest single continental importer in Africa after Zimbabwe and Mozambique.

The most remarkable element in the bilateral relations of the two countries is the burgeoning relationship between the private sectors of the two countries. Businessmen from Nigeria and South Africa now frequently visit each other’s countries, with many South African firms working in Nigeria. In 2003, Nigeria's exports to South Africa were 98.3 percent consisting mainly of oil, although Nigeria's Union Bank and First Bank also had representatives’ offices in South Africa. Many Nigerian professionals also work in various fields such as academia, medicine, accounting, human resources, and property development in South Africa.

Prior to 1999, trade between Nigeria and South Africa was minimal but by 1994, there was a trade explosion between the two countries. South Africa exported US $ 8.1 million worth of products to Nigeria, while it imported US $ 3.1 million worth of commodities from the country.[52] With the signing of the South Africa-Nigeria bilateral trade agreement this situation changed. Trade between the two countries grew enormously from R730million in 1998 to R4, 9 billion in 2003. By 2003, South

Africa was running a trade deficit with Nigeria of R215million. By 2005, South Africa exported goods to the value of R 3.4 billion to Nigeria and imported R4.2 billion worth of commodities from Nigeria.[53]

Although South Africa runs a trade deficit with Nigeria, the pattern of the trade replicates that found between a non-industrialised countries and industrialised one. South Africa exports a wide variety of goods to Nigeria. For instance, it exports machinery, electrical equipment, appliances, wood, paper, waste, prepared foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, plastics, rubber, chemicals, and base metals to Nigeria. However, oil makes up ninety-seven per cent of Nigeria's exports to South Africa.[54] This situation means that South Africa is exporting a wide range of goods to Nigeria, many of which are value-added manufactured goods with the potential to grow dramatically.

Conversely, Nigeria's export products to South Africa consist of a single raw material - oil. Its oil exports to South Africa are unlikely to increase dramatically over the next few years; and its export products are unlikely to diversify. This translates into an unequal situation between South Africa and Nigeria, in which South Africa is in fact the dominant partner in terms of trade relations. Indeed, if one excludes oil, which is imported to meet the petrol-guzzling demands of South Africa's elite class, Nigeria is in fact exporting hardly anything to South Africa and is certainly not exporting any value-added manufactured goods. What really highlights the unequal relationship that exists between Nigeria and South Africa, however, is the fact that South African companies and parastatals have come to dominate many sectors of the Nigerian economy.

South African Drive to Accumulate Capital in Nigeria

Since adopting NEPAD, the Nigerian state has been accelerating the privatisation process in the country. South African parastatals have been one of the major beneficiaries of this process. Indeed, through its parastatals, the South African state has become directly involved in accumulating capital in Nigeria. For example, as part of the move towards privatisation, the Nigerian government provided Umgeni Water with R 350 million contracts to manage Port Harcourt's water services for three years. The contract could possibly be extended to twenty years.[55] If it is extended, it would be a massive money-spinner for Umgeni Water and the South African state.

As part of the privatisation of the energy sector, the Nigerian government allowed the state- owned ESKOM to buy a fifty-one per cent stake in the Nigerian Electric Power Authority (NEPA). With this, ESKOM received contracts worth US $165 million from the Nigerian government. Eskom has also entered into partnership with Shell in Nigeria to upgrade and operate gas-powered power stations. The Nigerian government has granted Eskom and Shell a US $540 million contract to operate power stations in Port Harcourt.[56] It is very interesting that ESKOM, a company owned by the South African state, wished to enter into a partnership with Shell, considering Shell's appalling human rights and environmental record in Nigeria. Indeed, Shell has destroyed the environment of the Niger Delta and has been directly responsible for over three thousand oil spills in that area since 1976. Added to this, Shell, along with the Nigerian government, were implicated in the murder of over two thousand activists in the Niger Delta since the 1980s.[57] Clearly, the South African state and ESKOM are not interested in this; what they are interested in, however, is the profit.

South African parastatals have also ventured into the entertainment industry. For instance, Arivia.com was provided with a contract worth R140 million by the Nigerian government to assist with the running of the country's lottery. Another South African parastatal, PetroSA, won the right to drill in a number of oil blocs in Nigeria. Added to this, PetroSA owns Brass Exploration Unlimited in Nigeria. Through this company, PetroSA and the South African state have a forty per cent interest in the Abana oilfield off the Nigerian coast. Currently, the Abana oilfield is producing twenty-two thousand barrels of oil a day.[58]

Challenges to Economic Cooperation between Nigeria and South Africa

The most obvious challenge to the hegemonic ambitions of Nigeria and South Africa was that the relations between both countries relied too heavily on the personal relationship between Obasanjo and Mbeki. There have been calls to institutionalise the bilateral relations between Tshwane and Abuja, so that it would survive the exit of one or both leaders from the national scene. The creation of a Bi-National Commission and the growing commercial ties may eventually solve this problem, but so far this is yet to be seen. It is also uncertain whether Obasanjo and Mbeki's successors will maintain the same level of commitment to this relationship.

By 2006, it was obvious that both Obasanjo and Mbeki were beginning to lose political grip in their countries. In May 2006, Obasanjo lost a bid in Nigeria to amend the constitution to allow him run for a third term in office. In addition, Mbeki faced open opposition at home after ousting his deputy Jacob Zuma in June 2005. In Nigeria,many incidents brought about political tension. There were militia attacks of oil installations in the oil-producing Niger Delta, leading to interruption of oil supplies and kidnapping of oil workers in a bid to force government to address the neglected area's socio-economic grievances.[59] There were also numerous sporadic ethnic and religious clashes, which have resulted in thousands of deaths between 1999 and 2007. The April 2007 elections that led to President Umaru Yar' Adua being declared president suggested that the country is still a long way from consolidating democratic rule.

It was obvious that Mbeki favoured the Abuja-Tshwane alliance having been unable to assert effective leadership in Southern Africa because of the strong opposition from her neighbours and resistance from states such as Angola and Zimbabwe. These states that fought the apartheid regime in South Africa see themselves as potential regional leaders. Mbeki on his own part needed to bolster his continental ambition and therefore ventured outside his region and reached out to Nigeria, Africa's most populous state. Obasanjo and Mbeki thereafter worked closely together in diplomatic fora in pursuit of continental initiatives such as NEPAD and the AU. At a point in time, Obasanjo's closeness with Mbeki was criticised by his professional diplomats and policy advisers who believed Obasanjo had a soft spot for Mbeki and South African businesspersons.

There were cases of serious disagreement sometimes leading to political tension between Nigeria and South Africa. One of such was over Zimbabwe during the Commonwealth Summit in Abuja in 2003. Mbeki wanted Mugabe to attend the Summit, but Obasanjo refused as this could lead to a boycott and disruption of the Summit. Obasanjo’s handling of the Zimbabwe issue at the meeting did not only embarrass Mbeki, but also echoed the Nigerian president’s more robustly critical position towards Mugabe than his South African counterparts. Similarly, during the Summit, Nigeria and South Africa voted differently for the new Commonwealth Secretary-General as Nigeria did not favour the South African candidate.[60]

By 2005, differences that are more serious emerge between Nigeria and South Africa over three main issues: proposal for a reformed UN Security Council; Cote d'Ivoire; and the OAU Chair. On the UN Security Council, both countries had consistently expressed an interest in occupying one of the two permanent African seats on the expanded UN Security Council. This led to a cantankerous situation between officials of the two countries. Eyebrows were raised at an AU summit when one of Obasanjo's aides proclaimed that South Africa and Egypt were not qualified to represent Africa on a reformed UN Security Council because they were 'not black enough.'[61]

Tensions were also evident in Cote d'Ivoire after the rebel *Force Nouvelles* withdrew support from Mbeki's mediation efforts in 2005, accusing him of bias towards President Laurent Gbagbo: the rebels called on the AU to mediate and resolve the impasse. In September 2005, the UN Security Council tasked ECOWAS with overcoming the impasse thereby shifting the locus of peace making from Tshwane to Abuja.

Nigerian diplomats faulted Mbeki's role in Cote d'Ivoire as he failed to report on his efforts to Obasanjo, the AU Chairman who appointed him. They believed that he wanted to claim the glory from any peace-making success. Although in December 2005, both Obasanjo and Mbeki jointly visited Cote d'Ivoire, close observers noted the rift between them. Another area of discord between Obasanjo and Mbeki came into the open during the AU Summit in Khartoum in January 2006, when Mbeki (supported by other African leaders) strongly opposed the suggestion that Obasanjo continue as AU Chairman for a third consecutive term. Obasanjo was therefore not offered a third term, and the incident apparently led to his early departure from the Summit.[62]

The BNC meeting between Nigeria and South Africa failed to take place in 2005 and 2006, the first time since its inception in 1999, causing a lot of serious concern for observers. The official explanation in 2005, that South Africa's new Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka needed time to settle in her job, did not hold any water. On the Nigerian side, Obasanjo and his vice-president Atiku Abubakar also had problems over the presidential succession. Finally, the posting of a new Nigerian ambassador, Olugbenga Ashiru, instead of the trusted Olagunju in October 2005 gave room for lingering suspicions. There is the fear that all these could develop into political tension between the two countries. The xenophobic attacks on Nigerians by South Africans also caused much concern.

BNC meetings have also focused on the challenges facing the two countries and the continent. Among these are issues of immigration and crime. In the area of immigration and crime, the meeting encouraged closer collaboration between Nigeria's Ministry of Internal Affairs and South Africa's Department of Home Affairs. The South Africans asked for the issuance of Nigeria visas to be for more than six months, while Nigerians complained that the multiple-entry visas for Nigerians often forced them to return to Nigeria for verification with each entry. Nigerians also raised concerns about the reported beatings of Nigerian nationals at South Africa's Lindela Detention Centre, as well as the harassment of Nigerian citizens by members of the South African Police Service (SAPS). Both countries further pledged cooperation between the SAPS and the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) to curb drug trafficking.

For BNC to achieve its goals, it must foster greater involvement of South African and Nigerian civil society groups in its formal meetings. Two meetings of the Nigeria/South Africa Dialogue on Civil Society and Africa's Democratic Recovery were held in Lagos and Johannesburg in 1999. Such contacts, particularly strong during the dark days of the Abacha regime, should be increased so that civil society activists can complement the efforts of both governments and the private sectors.

There have been some strains in the relations between Tshwane and Abuja that the BNC has sought to address. Nigerian diplomats have often complained about negative press reports and xenophobic stereotypes of Nigerians as drug traffickers and criminals. They have noted that local South Africans as well as Mozambicans, Moroccans, Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese, Russians and Italians are also engaged in these nefarious activities, but the nationals of these countries in South Africa are not accused with the same broad brush, as are Nigerians. A Johannesburg radio station, 94.7 Highveld, was forced to apologise after it claimed that Nigeria President Olusegun Obasanjo was carrying cocaine in his bag when he came to attend Mbeki's inauguration in June 2004. Some Nigerian diplomats have attributed this caricature of their nationals by sections of South Africa's press to the generous contribution that their country made to the anti-apartheid struggle.[63]

The Nigerian Consulate in Johannesburg showing a clear concern about the image of Nigerians living in South Africa, took out advertisements in major South African newspapers to warn South Africans not to be involved in the scams of Nigerian fraudsters peddling get-rich-quick letters.[64]

On the economic front, despite all South African investments in Nigeria, Nigerians have not benefited much. This is partly because South African corporations operating in Nigeria are allowed to repatriate the profits that they make out of Nigeria. Added to this, the Nigerian economic sector has become completely foreign-owned, which has had negative implications for the country's sovereignty. Majority of South African corporations also source most of the raw materials they use for the products they sell in Nigeria through South Africa and not locally. This means they operate in an enclave and do not promote the creation of upstream or downstream industries in Nigeria.

South African companies operating in Nigeria have also created very few job opportunities. The jobs they have created have tended to be casual. At many South African-owned companies in Nigeria, workers have been denied the right to join trade unions or participate in trade unionism. For example, despite its massive profits, MTN has only created five hundred permanent jobs. Most of its employees are casual or temporary workers, and it has equally denied all of its workers the right to join a trade union.[65]

South African companies have also been involved in blatant profiteering and looting in Nigeria. Indeed, MTN charges the highest rates in the world for cellular phone calls in Nigeria.[66] Along with this; some South African companies have implemented heavy-handed tactics to recover revenue owed to them by Nigerian consumers. In fact, ESKOM/NEPA has hired ten South African companies to collect the debt that was and is owed by Nigerian consumers.[67]

Some South African companies have even been involved in, or were complacent about, human rights abuses in Nigeria. For example, in 2005 there was a community protest outside of the Escravos oil terminal where Chevron and SASOL where establishing their gas to fuel plant. Representatives of these companies at the Escravos oil terminal called in Nigerian security forces to break up the demonstration. On arrival, the Nigerian forces opened fire on the crowd, killing one person and injuring thirty people. Some of the protesters were severely beaten with rifle butts and other weapons. Added to this, access to the healthcare facilities at the Escravos terminal was denied to the injured protesters. The result was that it took several hours for the injured protesters to find their way to a hospital.[68]

Other challenges facing South African investors in Nigeria are the social vices rampant in the country. South African investors have complained about corruption advance and fee fraud (popularly called '419’ based on a section of the Nigerian criminal code) -swindles that have damaged Nigeria's reputation internationally.

They also noted other drawbacks to doing business in Nigeria, including: erratic power supply, water, sewerage as well as telecommunication and transport problems, owing to the country's dilapidated infrastructure. Other include too much government involvement in the economy and lack of predictable policies; a low level of technical skills; the need to pay bribes; delays in getting supplies out of Nigeria's ports (also requiring the payments of bribes); and a weak judiciary that sometimes leads to non-enforcement of contracts. [69] Despite MTN's overall profit for 2002, its expenditures have been far greater than anticipated as infrastructure costs are 2.5 times as much in Nigeria as in South Africa.

On the other hand, Nigerians also accuse South African firms of patronising behaviour and for operating apartheid-style enclaves for their staff. They also describe South Africans as 'neo-colonialist mercantilists bent on dominating the huge Nigerian market and repatriating profits without opening up the South African market to Nigerian goods. According to Aminu Mohammed "Like wildfire tearing through dry forest, South Africa is rapidly entrenching itself in every facet of the Nigerian economy…South African companies loom large and are still growing". [70]

However, some Nigerians have praised the skill and professionalism of South African firms, which they say, has improved competition and standards in Nigeria. There is no gainsaying the fact that Nigerians have benefited from the few job opportunities created by South African firms in the country.

Despite impressive growth in bilateral trade between Nigeria and South Africa, there have also been spectacular disappointments. South African Airline (SAA) had a deal with the Nigerian Airways in December 2000 to take over the latter's unused routes through New York and Lagos. The New York route was cancelled in March 2002 after losses of R54 million in six months. Although South African Airlines still flies to Nigeria, the deal with Nigeria Airways ended in 2003.

Similarly, Vodacom, South Africa's largest mobile telephone company, also left Nigeria in May 2004, two months after reportedly agreeing to a five-year contract with a South Africa-based partner, ECONET Wireless International over concerns about ‘level of corporate governance’ in Nigeria. This bore testimony to the ‘perception gap’ that exists between the two countries. Corruption allegations against two Vodacom executives contributed to its decision.[71] Complaints by South African businesses that the Nigerian government has failed to open its markets fully to South African products have been reciprocated by Nigerian businesses seeking market in South Africa. There is no denying the fact that South African companies have a better share of the Nigerian market than their Nigerian counterparts do.

Conclusion

The continental leadership role of Nigeria and South Africa has not been universally accepted. Some countries see the strategic alliance between the two countries as little more than a new breed of African imperialism, while others see it as mere cooperation between two countries that poses no threat to others. As a way of not accepting their hegemonic actions, African states show their resentment to what appears to be the two countries hegemonic roles.

In 2004, South Africa's bid for the Olympics Games failed partly due to lack of African support. Nigeria failed to gain African support for its successful UN Security Council bids in 1977 and 1993, after breaking the rotational rules of the African Group. In the recent debates about permanent seats for Nigeria and South Africa on the AU's 15-memer Peace and Security Council in 2003-2004, other states refused to accept any special permanent status or votes for both countries, and instead created five three-year renewable seats to compliment the ten biannual rotational seats.[72]

Nigeria and South Africa will have to reassure other African states that their intentions are noble. Both countries must consult with other countries and ensure that their actions are not seen as attempts to dominate the continent in pursuit of their own parochial interests. The two countries can become the beacons of democracy and engines of economic growth aspired by their leaders if the two countries can take necessary precautionary measures.

On the economic sphere, Nigeria has served the South African capital and the state's interest very well. It has facilitated the process whereby South Africa has become a major economic player in Nigeria since 1994. Indeed, South Africa has joined the older imperial powers in looting Nigeria's resources and dominating its economy. South African companies are having a field day in Nigeria’s economic terrain. The number of South African companies operating in Nigeria keeps on increasing daily, while there is no appreciable increase in the number of Nigerian companies operating in South Africa. Similarly, while petroleum dominates Nigeria’s export to South Africa, South Africa’s export to Nigeria covers all consumable products. There is a need to correct this trade imbalance in favour of Nigeria

Endnotes

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CHAPTER FIVE

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE HEGEMONIC ROLES OF NIGERIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Nigeria and South Africa have contributed immensely individually and collectively to peace and security in their respective sub-regions. Nigeria working through ECOWAS and South Africa through SADC have contributed meaningfully towards the relative peace and security that most countries in the sub-regions are currently enjoying. ECOWAS and SADC have set up machinery necessary for regional peace, security and socio-economic development of their respective sub-regions. The peace and security arrangements include mediation mechanism for conflict resolution, peacekeeping, capacity building, good governance, democratisation, small arms and early warning systems. Both communities have employed such machinery in order to maintain peace and security in their respective sub-regions.

ECOWAS and Sub-Regional Peace and Security

Conflicts constitute a great threat to peace and security in the sub-region and undermine efforts at improving the living standards of the peoples. The issue of regional peace and security therefore continue to be of great concern to all stakeholders in the sub-region. This is not only because of the loss of life and physical destruction; it also hinders socio-economic development. In the last couple of years, the region witnessed major crises in member states such as Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Togo and Sierra Leone. However, it is heartening to note that recently there has been some improvement in the security situation and peace is gradually returning to the region.

The regional political upheavals, aside from creating many difficult developmental challenges, also led to the challenges of refugees and internally displaced persons, demobilisation, disarmament and rehabilitation of ex-combatants, peacebuilding and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. ECOWAS and the international community therefore have the task of assisting the affected countries to address the national economic challenges.

On the issue of democratic governance, the region had witnessed the emergence of democratic government in nearly all member states. Starting with Nigeria in 1999, war-torn countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau have installed democratic governments. In some member states such as Togo, fair and transparent elections were held to avert political and constitutional crises. The efforts of Nigeria, the ECOWAS Secretariat, the African Union, the United Nations, the Commonwealth and other international organisations are commendable in the regional peace process. Finally, ECOMOG (a Nigerian military initiative) must also be commended for its role in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace monitoring in the region.

ECOWAS Treaty and Sub-Regional Peace and Security

Since inception, ECOWAS has been concerned with peace and regional security, which are necessary factors in the socio-economic development of member states. The 1975 ECOWAS Treaty was silent on a sub-regional security framework. By the late 1970’s, West African leaders had recognised that they needed to pool their resources together to address the various internal security problems in their respective countries. Such problems often overflowed into neighbouring countries. They realised early enough that the success of an insurgence or revolutionary movement in one country was bound to spread to others. Consequently, in April 1987, West African states signed a Non-Aggression Treaty in Lagos, Nigeria. However, this Non-Aggression Treaty only addressed the issue of open support that the various ruling classes might give to the opponents of incumbent rulers. It failed to address the issue of the various movements that threatened most of the regimes internally.

It was in recognition of the fact that the Non- Aggression Treaty did not provide mutual security against the very real threats of internal insurrection that member states, prodded by Nigeria and Ghana, negotiated and signed the Protocol on Mutual Defence Assistance in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 29 May 1989. The Protocol provided for a non-standing military force to be used to render mutual military aid and assistance to any member state that suffers external aggression. However, Article 4(b) stated the actual purpose of the Protocol. This provided for a collective response where a member state was a victim of internal armed conflict that was engineered and supported actively from outside, and which was likely to endanger the peace and security of other member states.

Under Article 18(2) of the Protocol, member states were not entitled to intervene militarily if the internal armed conflict posed no danger outside the borders of the afflicted state, and if it was not supported from outside. In order to secure the military assistance of the community, the head of state of the country desiring assistance was required to ask for it in writing through the Chairman of ECOWAS. Once received, such a letter would serve as a signal for military force of the Community to be placed on an emergency footing.

The nature and composition of the military force envisaged under the Protocol was defined in Chapter V, Articles 13 and 14. It was to be known as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). Each member state was required to earmark units from its national armed forces that in an emergence would be placed at the service of the Community. The AAFC was to be under the command of a force commander who would be appointed by the Chairman of the Community on the recommendation of the Defence Council of the Community, which consisted of both the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of member states. The force commander was to act in concert with the chief of defence staff of the particular member state that required military assistance from the Community.

According to the Protocol, the AAFC would be used as follows:

- Where two member states are in conflict, the Community will interpose the AAFC between them as a peacekeeping force.

- Where a member state is the victim of internal armed conflict supported from outside and its head of state has requested military assistance in writing from the Community, the AAFC would be sent to it as an intervention force.

Although the Protocol was invoked with respect to the Liberian crisis of 1989/90, the AAFC never materialized. Rather, a small group of ECOWAS member states led by Nigeria put together the intervention force known as ECOMOG.

History of ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

The pioneer fathers of ECOWAS created the sub-regional body mainly as an interstate economic development agency to pool resources of member states together for the common good of members. It was an economic integration arrangement with common market objectives such as trade liberalisation, harmonisation of economic policies, free movement of factors of production and sectoral development programmes. The issue of conflict management in terms of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which the organisation was compelled to champion within the sub-region, was never the thinking of these pioneering fathers. As a matter of conjecture, one could say that the Community at the time of formation did not envisage the nature of the threat and the conflicts, which later engulfed the sub-region.

Although the Protocols on Non-Aggression and on Mutual Assistance in Defence were signed in 1977 and 1987, respectively by member states, they only took into consideration the likelihood of external aggression against member states but failed to envisage the possibility of intra-state conflicts as witnessed in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. ECOWAS member states led by Nigeria quickly initiated an intervention strategy in spite of the structural, organisational and operational inadequacies and put together an ad hoc peacekeeping and later enforcement group named ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). This attempt and innovation by ECOWAS was a very bold step, which, with time, has changed and expanded the traditional peacekeeping role of peacekeepers that were faced with hostilities in the areas of their operations. The ECOMOG innovation has become a good example, which has been adopted in the management of other conflicts across the world of regional peacekeeping.

The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was set up in August 1990 as part of implementation of the decision of the ECOWAS Mini Summit held in Banjul, Gambia. The main objective of ECOMOG was to map out strategies for the resolution of the Liberian crisis. It has the following specific mandate: (1) Maintain law and order in Liberia (2) Protect life and property (3) Maintain essential services (4) Provide security to the interim administration (5) Observe elections and (6) Conduct normal police duties.

In order to achieve this specific mandate, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) raised an armed force drawn from member states. It is pertinent to mention that some African countries such as Tanzania and Gabon also contributed forces towards the execution of ECOMOG's mandate.

Role of Nigeria in ECOMOG Operations

Nigeria played a significant role in the formation of ECOMOG in 1990. In fact, ECOMOG could be called 'the brain child' of the Nigerian leader President Ibrahim Babangida. During the ECOWAS Head of State and Government summit in Banjul, The Gambia, Nigeria proposed, and it was accepted by member states, that ECOWAS should set up a Standing Committee to mediate in the Liberian crisis and similar troubled spots in the future within the sub-region.[1] This Committee later set up ECOMOG.

As Nigeria spearheaded the formation of ECOMOG, so also did she spearhead the deployment of ECOMOG troops. Though Nigeria received the encouragement of other countries in the region and from beyond, she took the lead in the deployment of troops and the commencing of actual military operations. It must also be mentioned that Nigeria spearheaded the financial commitments of ECOMOG. While the United States and other countries provided, through the UN, financial assistance and logistical support, Nigeria paid the largest part of the bill - up to seventy per cent of the total. In addition, the Nigerian contingent in ECOMOG constituted the largest of the force, usually making up some seventy per cent of the rank and file and over half of the officer corps.[2] Nigeria was also responsible for most of the military equipment of ECOMOG.

Aside from military support, politically and institutionally too it was clear that Nigeria was in command of the intervention force. Thus, Lagos used the abduction from ECOMOG headquarters and murder of Samuel Doe as an excuse to have General Arnold Quainoo, the Ghanaian Force Commander, replaced by one of its own citizens. To achieve this, Nigeria leaned on the Chairman of the SMC and ECOWAS Authority, the Gambian President Jawara, to appoint a Nigerian officer-Major-General Joshua Dogonyaro.[3]

Technically, it was the SMC, which had the power to appoint the commander, who fell under the president of the ECOWAS Authority, with the Executive Secretary, and the latter's Special Representative serving in an intermediary capacity. However, in practice the chairperson of the Authority was 'merely the titular head' of ECOMOG. Moreover, the fact that some of the subsequent chairmen of the Authority, such as Senegal and Benin, had few or no troops at all serving in ECOMOG nor even a personal representative in Liberia, did not enhance the potential influence of the Authority. The establishment in 1991-1992, of the Committees of Five and Nine merely reinforced this situation.

The institution's void could not be filled by the Executive Secretary either. His Special Representative, who was supposed to transmit the Authority's political directives to the ECOMOG commanding officer, was recalled in 1992 and the Executive Secretariat declined to send a replacement. According to the Director of its Department of Legal Affairs, Roger Laloupo, this was done because of financial constraints.[4] In any case, it meant that the Executive Secretariat was not always aware of what was going on in Liberia. This situation was somewhat ameliorated when President Rawlings was ECOWAS Chairman (1994-1995); he sent a personal representative to Monrovia who also liaised with the Secretariat.

The absence of an ECOWAS official meant that the Secretariat was no longer involved in the Liberian operation. ECOMOG became, in the words of Laloupo, "more or less a Nigerian affair" and a "purely military" one at that. There was little coordination with the political authorities of ECOWAS member states. While the Nigerian Field Commander reported to the Executive Secretary and the chairman of the ECOWAS Authority, he also reported to his home government. In practice, he took his orders from the Nigerian Ministry of Defence, more specifically its 'Committee on ECOMOG.'[5]

Nigeria was also responsible for equipping ECOMOG. Since Nigerian soldiers dominated ECOMOG, all military equipment used by her soldiers were supplied by Nigeria including arms and ammunitions, communication gadgets, uniforms, boots, military vehicles and many more. The Nigeria Air force was also involved on the battlefield as it provided air attack and air coverage for the troops when advancing. Aside from military supplies, Nigerian contractors were also involved in food supply to the soldiers. Nigerian contractors were involved in supplying all ECOMOG needs including office stationery, furniture, computers and many more. In other words, Nigeria provided troops, logistics and financial resources estimated to be about $4.5 billion on the Liberian crisis alone, which helped the ECOMOG to successfully carry out its role.

Nigeria's objective in Liberia was to restore peace through ECOMOG and not to win a war. Nigeria was not at war with anyone and had not declared war on Liberia. Although Charles Taylor declared war on the citizens of ECOMOG contributing states, it was not the de facto Liberian government that declared war on Nigeria. In fact, ECOMOG was in Liberia to peacefully settle an unfortunate fratricidal conflict and facilitate the transition process. Thus, neither Nigeria nor ECOMOG was interested in assuming power in the country.

Opposition to Nigeria's Role in ECOMOG

Smaller countries in the sub-region feared Nigeria's dominance in ECOMOG. Some countries feared that ECOMOG was a kind of imperial excuse used by Nigeria to interfere in the internal politics of smaller states. Although the evidence on the ground contradicted this fear, some non-regional countries exploited it to discourage these countries from active participation in ECOMOG.

Ironically, when their internal opposition overwhelmed some of these countries, they started pleading for intervention by ECOMOG under Nigeria's leadership or active participation. This scenario played itself out in Guinea-Bissau, where the regime of President Veira was lukewarm to ECOMOG until his own political enemies overwhelmed him. His desperate effort to secure Nigerian participation in the

ECOMOG force sent to his assistance failed. As it were, the entire operation failed and his opponents overthrew him.

The difference in colonial experience of member states is another political issue that affected ECOMOG operations. Francophone member states saw the security goals of the sub-region differently from Anglophone member states. Francophone states were not comfortable with ECOMOG actions. Consequently, they saw ECOMOG more as a military force put in place by Nigeria and designed to solve the security problems of Anglophone member states, using the collective economic resources of the entire Community.

This attitude, coupled with their close political, economic and security relationship with the former imperial metropolitan state France, made them to adopt a lukewarm attitude to all ECOMOG operations. Indeed, many of the insurgent leaders enjoyed close relations with the leaders of Francophone member states, who also had considerable economic investment in these states. The leaders of Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso supported Charles Taylor for personal and economic interests. Late Ivoirian president Felix Houphet-Boigny, who was an in-law and had been a close friend of late President William Tolbert, supported Charles Taylor.

Charles Taylor's rebel faction declared that ECOMOG was established as a cover for Samuel Doe to re-establish his authority, which as at that time, was irreparably damaged. He therefore declared war on ECOMOG, accusing the organisation of seeking to deprive him of the fruits of his victory and of intervening in the internal affairs of Liberia. He even refused to accept any government, transitional or not, of which he was not the head. Ironically, Samuel Doe at first also rejected the deployment of the Monitoring Group.

Many West African leaders also held this view. They believed that President Ibrahim Babangida set up ECOMOG to assist his friend, Samuel Doe, to remain in office. They therefore felt there was no need for their governments to send their troops to Liberia since ECOMOG was set up to achieve a personal agenda of the Nigerian leader.

Charles Taylor further argued that ECOMOG was attempting to deprive him of his hard-earned gains on the battlefield, especially the reward of the presidential seat. ECOMOG was perceived as an instrument of an orchestrated attempt to impose a government consisting of those who fled the country in the face of persecution by Samuel Doe, especially of academics and those who did not participate in the fighting.[6]

ECOMOG was also accused of being an intervention force and this was in violation of Article 3, Section 2 of the Charter of the OAU, which stipulates that members should not interfere in the internal affairs of other states.7 Critics, linked the Liberian crisis, which had international dimensions as an internal affair. ECOMOG was therefore accused of interfering in the internal affairs of Liberia.

The rivalry and deep suspicion between the ruling classes of West African states further complicated the political environment. Member states such as Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso refused to participate actively in and even opposed ECOMOG's operations, because Nigeria played a prominent role in the decision to send the troops and was taking credit for the initial start-up of the operations. Togo, which had earlier promised to send troops declined at the last minute just because no Francophone country sent troops initially.

Many African countries worked against Nigeria and ECOMOG. Libya was believed to be the main arms supplier to Charles Taylor's NPFL through Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire. The Francophone countries were also believed to be supporting Charles Taylor's NPFL because they perceived Nigeria as trying to impose its will on and wield influence on Liberia. These countries also benefitted immensely from looting the economy of Liberia, most especially her mineral and natural resources. This was made possible through collaboration with Charles Taylor.

The UN also supported an expanded ECOMOG, which was demanded by Charles Taylor as a condition for agreeing to disarm his forces. This led to the UN paying for the incursion of troops from Tanzania and Uganda in an expanded ECOMOG. This demand was made by Taylor as part of his distrust for Nigeria and ECOMOG activities in Liberia. The UN later realised the futility of her efforts as Charles Taylor never disarmed but rather continued his offensive on ECOMOG troops.

Appraisal of ECOMOG'S Contributions to the Sub-region

There is no denying the fact that ECOMOG made phenomenal contributions to the restoration of peace, stability and security in the West African sub-region. As the first standby military force in Africa, ECOMOG contributed immensely not only to the restoration of peace and security but also to the emergence and protection of the democratic institutions in many West African states. For the first time in African history, ECOMOG provided African solutions to African problems. All the soldiers and their commanders were Africans, using African perspectives to solve African problems

Similarly, the success story of ECOWOG peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau had given a huge psychological and political boost to African leaders. African Heads of State and Government now view ECOMOG as a sub-regional standby military force, which could be deployed at any time to any country where there is political trouble in any part of the sub-region. ECOMOG did not only end civil wars and political upheavals in some member states such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, it also provided the needed back-up for the conduct of elections and installation of new democratic governments in these countries and many others in the Sub-region.

Liberia

ECOMOG forces were deployed to Liberia in August 1990 after the outbreak of political disturbances between the incumbent President Samuel Doe and forces led by Charles Taylor. The mandate of ECOMOG in Liberia was the restoration of peace, security and law and order. In carrying out its mandate in Liberia, ECOMOG did not only enforce peace but also engaged in many humanitarian activities aimed at reducing the suffering of the people. In effect, ECOMOG helped considerably in creating a conducive and favourable atmosphere for the possible conduct of a free and fair election in Liberia on 19July 1997.

Similarly, ECOMOG, supported by the United Nations, provided the enabling environment for the transitional government installed by ECOWAS after the exit of President Charles Taylor in 2003. ECOWAS, with the support of the international community and the United Nations, conducted elections in Liberia in 2005. The ECOWAS Observation Mission and the Mediator's team observed voting in selected polling precincts in Liberia during the Presidential and Legislative elections of 11 October 2005 and the run-off of 8 November 2005. The team turned in the verdict of a free and fair election process. The Chairman of ECOWAS Mediator Team, General Abdulsalam Abubakar (former Nigerian Head of State) visited the country regularly to review the implementation of the agreement with all parties involved. These routine consultations and dialogue by the mediator helped considerably in resolving some thorny and sensitive issues.

After her investiture on 16 January 2006, the new President of Liberia, Her Excellency, Mrs. Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson, visited development partners and countries that contributed to the restoration of peace in Liberia. When she visited Nigeria, the Liberian President formally requested President Olusegun Obasanjo to extradite former President Charles Taylor who had been in political exile in Nigeria since his departure from power in August 2003. On Saturday, 25 March 2006, President Obasanjo acceded to the request for the extradition of Mr. Charles Taylor, to be tried by the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone. The case has subsequently been transferred to the International Criminal Court for Sierra Leone in The Hague.

ECOWAS continues to support Mrs. Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson's democratically elected government and its reconstruction programme. ECOWAS has also appealed to the UN Security Council to lift economic sanctions to enable the country to benefit from the exploitation of its resources. A further appeal has also been made to the international community to honour its pledge to assist the country.

Sierra Leone

ECOMOG forces intervened in Sierra Leone after the overthrow of the lawful government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah on 25 May 1997 in a coup d'état led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma of the Sierra Leonean army. In February 1998, ECOMOG forces restored constitutional legality and reinstated the government of the democratically elected president. In September 1999 all parties in the conflict, namely the lawful government, the RUF rebels and the members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) military junta signed in Lome an Agreement Protocol on the final settlement of the crisis. Following ECOWAS appeal to the international community for meaningful assistance for a final restoration of peace, a United Nations peacekeeping force tagged "UNAMSIL" was put in place to replace ECOMOG forces in the country.

ECOMOG, which began as a mere ad hoc military arrangement, has now turned into a 'defender' of democracy and constitutional order. President Kabbah, after he was restored back to government stated, "by its professionalism and outstanding performance in the sub-region, ECOMOG has demonstrated that it has the potential to become a regional peacekeeping and enforcement organisation on a par with similar forces anywhere in the world."[8] However, the transformation of this economic community into a *de facto* security organisation is in itself a product of interplay between economic development, regional security, democratisation and conflict management in Africa.

The May 2002 presidential elections in Sierra Leone ushered in the process of returning normalcy to the country. UNAMSIL operation in the country helped in improving the security situation and restoring public confidence in the security institutions. Significant progress has been recorded in the country in the area of reconstruction of state institutions, infrastructure and reconstructing of security agencies with a view to establishing a professional military force that respects democratic authority and human rights. Most of the achievements were made possible through the support and commitment of the international community, particularly the United Nations, ECOWAS and Great Britain. Acting on the conviction that the achievements made were on a sustainable basis, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) left the country in November 2005 but the United Nations still maintains an office in Freetown.

The Government of Sierra Leone set 28 July 2007 for the conduct of the next presidential and parliamentary elections. In line with this mandate, ECOWAS monitored the elections that enabled lasting peace to reign in the country. On 21 September 2006, ECOWAS used the occasion of a meeting of the International Contact Group on the Mano River Basin countries, held alongside the 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, to appeal to the international community to continue to provide assistance to the government of Sierra Leone for the implementation of its economic development programmes. ECOWAS continue to play its role and work closely with the partners within the ICG-MRB, and through agencies within the framework of the ECOWAS-EU, UN and AU Troika partnership, in order to support the on-going peacebuilding and reconstruction initiatives in the country.[9]

Rationale for ECOWAS Intervention in Conflict-Ridden Member States

Why did ECOWAS, an economic integration grouping, assume the role of conflict management and peacekeeping? The answer is simple and straightforward: ECOWAS assumed this role when the state apparatus and the fragmentation of political authority in both Liberia and Sierra Leone collapsed and rebel forces of the NPFL and RUF contested state hegemony. Before ECOMOG intervention in both crises, the state, as the authoritative political institution, had lost its legitimacy and could not provide the needed security for her citizenry, nor could it control its territory or perform public welfare functions.[10]

Amos Sawyer, former President of the Liberian Interim Government of National Unity, summed up the situation by stating that as of August 1991 the Liberian state and nation had collapsed and needed resuscitation because the state and people lacked the capacity to salvage themselves from self-destruction. Further, he went on to query;

> ...Where does a country whose government has collapsed and with warring factions that are unable to reach an agreement, and unable to establish any form of authority, where does this country go, what do the people do, what then becomes the most crucial issue is then survival? Is it the question of their preservation of their own humanity, or is it the question of holding on to some legal notion of sovereignty?[11]

Many controversies trailed ECOWAS interventions in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, it is important to state that these interventions were usually carried out mainly on humanitarian grounds when state authority had lost its capacity to regulate the affairs of people within its territorial jurisdiction. State collapse is often caused by decades of patrimonial redistribution of state resources among the ruling elite and its supporters, thereby excluding the majority of the population from the political and socio-economic processes.[12]

As William Reno noted;“the repressive and exploitative rule of William Tubman and William Tolbert, coupled with the civilianised military dictatorship of Samuel Doe provided the basis for state fragmentation.” [13]In Sierra Leone, the APC one-party patrimonial authoritarianism under Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh established the foundations for state recession.[14] The fragmentation of both Liberia and Sierra Leone because of civil war made ECOWAS the only legitimate authority to interfere in the two countries particularly, in its ability to use force for the preservation of law and order. Through ECOMOG, ECOWAS maintained the multilateral intervention to restore some semblance of law and order. ECOWAS therefore became a central factor in reconstituting these collapsed states.[15]

ECOMOG’s peacekeeping efforts in Liberia therefore helped to resolve the almost nine years of bloody civil war and returned the country to democratic governance. In Sierra Leone, the ECOMOG-led ‘Operation Sand Storm’ saw the restoration of constitutional rule in that country. ECOWAS conflict management performances have earned ECOMOG ‘the accolade of being Africa’s first successful flagship in peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding’.[17] Ernst Haas states that “most observers agree that ECOWAS’s first foray into collective security was a great improvement over the OAU (AU) failures in these endeavours.” [17]

ECOWAS and the New Security Framework

Concerned with continued conflicts especially within the sub-region, which hitherto had affected its economic development, and in the aftermath of intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS leaders began a series of meetings with the Secretariat and civil society organisations to design a permanent security framework for the sub-region. The new framework would be more proactive in responses and would apply the lessons of the two conflicts to future crises. Head of State and Government Summit in Abuja, Nigeria accepted and endorsed a Draft Protocol on 10 December 1999.

The Protocol is based on the principle of supra-nationality, is known as the *ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*. It seeks to institutionalise norms such as consultation and collective management of regional security concerns. This mechanism effectively replaces the earlier Protocols and the Revised Treaty of 1993. The new Mechanism improves markedly on the model under which the Liberia and Sierra Leone interventions took place with the following objectives:

- to prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-state conflicts;
- strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early-warning, peacekeeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines; and
- maintain and consolidate peace, security and stability within the Community.

To implement the laudable objectives of the mechanism, the following key organs were set up: (a) The Authority (b) The Mediation and Security Council (c) The Executive Secretariat to implement the decisions of these organs.

The Authority

The Authority, the highest decision-making organ, is composed of Heads of State and Government of member states, with powers to act on all matters concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping, security and humanitarian support, peace-building, control of cross-border crime, proliferating of small arm, as well as all other matters covered by the provisions of this mechanism.

The Mediation and Security Council (MSC)

Next to the Authority, is the Mediation and Security Council (MSC), which takes decisions on issues of peace and security in the sub-region on behalf of the Authority. It also implements all the provisions of the Protocol including: deciding on all matters relating to peace and security; deciding and implementing all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security; and authorising all forms of intervention.

The Mediation and Security Council (MSC) has in turn established a Committee for Mediation and Security (CMS) to harmonise decision-making about deployment.[18] This is an improvement over what, during ECOWAS's Liberia intervention, functioned as the Committee of Nine. The CMS is a rotational system comprising nine countries elected for a two-year period, with no permanent seats. The Council has been involved in the deployment of ECOMOG forces to trouble spots in the sub-region. The Mediation and Security Council operates at three (3) levels, namely: Heads of State and Government, Ministerial and Ambassadorial Levels.

Executive Secretary

The Executive Secretary is empowered to initiate actions for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security in the sub-region. Such actions may include fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict. Among the roles of the Executive Secretary are: to recommend the appointment of the Special Representative and the Force Commander for approval by the Mediation Security Council and to appoint members of the Council of Elders.

Supporting Organs of the Institutions of the Mechanism

To ensure the implementation of the objectives of the Mechanism as stipulated in Article 4, these Institutions should be assisted by others enumerated in Article 17 of the Protocol. They are: (a) The Defence and Security Commission (b) The Council of Elders (c) ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

The Defence and Security Commission

The Defence and Security Commission, an important organ in the conflict management process, comprises defence experts drawn from all the member states and is charged with providing expert advice on security matters and peacekeeping. It examines all technical and administrative issues concerning the appointment of the force Commander and determines the composition of the contingents in peacekeeping operations. Members of the Commission are:

- Chiefs of Defence Staff equivalent;
- Officers responsible for Internal Affairs and Security; and
- Experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
- Any other Heads of paramilitary services like customs, immigration, drug/narcotics forces, and border guards may be invited to join.[24]

The Commission has been involved in several capacity and confidence building measures and in the areas of conflict resolution and peacekeeping in the sub-region.

Council of Elders

Article 20 of the Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Peace-Keeping and Security provides for the establishment of a Council of Elders made up of eminent personalities, who on behalf of ECOWAS can use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators. On 19 January 2005, ECOWAS Authority approved the list of thirty-two members of the Council of Elders and they were sworn in on 15 March 2005 in Niamey, Niger Republic.

After their swearing in ceremony, the Executive Secretariat assigned some elders to conduct fact-finding and observation missions during the Legislative and Presidential elections held in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger and Togo. The individual and collective activities of members of the Council of Elders have contributed to the relative peace achieved in a number of ECOWAS member states. The Executive Secretary had utilised the services of past Heads of State and acclaimed professionals from divergent fields in West Africa as point men, to settle disputes or head missions on conflict resolution. In 2005, General Abdulsalam Abubakar (Rtd) was named the facilitator to Liberia, while President Thabo Mbeki was named facilitator to Cote d'Ivoire. This device has proved effective because the erstwhile statesmen are known and respected internationally.

New members of the ECOWAS Council of Elders were elected on 12 January 2006 for a period of one year and the swearing-in ceremony took place in Niamey on 29 March 2006. During the year, members of the Council of Elders led ECOWAS observation teams to elections in Togo, Liberia, Burkina Faso and Benin. In addition, two members of the Council also went on a fact-finding mission to Guinea and The Gambia. In the case of The Gambia, the mission was to assess the state of preparedness of the country for the September 22 presidential and parliamentary elections. The efforts and activities of the Council are undertaken with the objective of promoting peace, stability and security in ECOWAS member states through preventive diplomacy. [19]

ECOWAS Observation and Monitoring Systems

Most crises that have engulfed the West African sub-region have occurred because no attempt was made to prevent them at the rudimentary stages, prompting ECOWAS to establish a regional Observation and Monitoring System (OMS), or the Early Warning System, consists of;

a) the Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) located at the Executive Secretariat Abuja

b) four Zonal Bureaus in Banjul (The Gambia), Cotonou (Republic of Benin), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and Monrovia (Liberia). Member states were divided into four zones on the basis of proximity, ease of communication and efficiency to facilitate the reduction of any emergent crisis before it becomes full blown.

The establishment of the Observation and Monitoring Centre is crucial in several ways. The Centre is expected to be the focal point of the Early Warning System.[20] The function of the zonal centres is to observe and analyse the social, economic and political situation in their zones, and to report to the Executive Secretary on their perceptions of threat. The Executive Secretary is expected to use such reports to begin designing response strategies.

The process of full operationalization of the ECOWAS Observatory and Monitoring System (OMS), or the Early Warning System, took off in January 2005 and was completed in February 2006. The system will enable ECOWAS to obtain accurate information to improve policy design and facilitate rapid and appropriate responses in mitigating and preventing violent conflicts and the resultant humanitarian crises.

Composite Stand-by Units

Member states agreed to make available to ECOMOG units adequate resources from the army, air force, navy, gendarmerie, police and all other military, paramilitary or civil formation necessary for the accomplishment of the mission. All fifteen

ECOWAS members have made commitments to contribute substantial troops and materials to an ECOMOG Standby Unit.

Observation Missions

These consist of unarmed civilian and military personnel provided by member states and may be deployed alone or in conjunction with armed personnel. They shall, inter alia, supervise and monitor ceasefires, disarmament, demobilisation, elections, respect for human rights, humanitarian activities and investigate any complaints or claims brought to their notice.

The 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance

The 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance is ECOWAS's most comprehensive governance-related instrument. Signed on 21 December 2001, the Protocol is an expression of a new collective political resolve of ECOWAS member states to take the process of preventing and resolving violent conflicts forward and to achieve peace and security through the development of democracy and good governance.

The Protocol, subtitled 'A Supplementary to the Mechanism' specifically complements Chapter V of the Mechanism with detailed provisions for ensuring democracy, good governance and the Rule of Law. The primary aim of the Supplementary Protocol on Good Governance is tackling the root causes of conflicts in the sub-region engineered by marginalisation, non-transparent elections, bad governance, despotism and human rights abuses.[21]

Holding of Democratic Elections

This is an important component of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance and a very important barometer for democracy in the sub-region. Elections are also a potential source of conflict and threat to peace and security. Section 1 (Article1) of the Protocol covers the constitutional convergence principles which seek to introduce uniformity in the constitutions of ECOWAS member states, while sections II and III makes crucial provisions on Elections, Election Monitoring and ECOWAS Assistance. These provisions are very significant as the majority of West African leaders have not institutionalized an orderly transfer of political power and particularly because they see politics and political office as a life and death struggle. If elections are conducted peacefully and freely, it would surely promote peace and security in the sub-region.[22]

Monitoring Security and Democratic Elections in the Sub-region

It is appropriate to assess how far ECOWAS has implemented the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in the sub-region. The ECOWAS Secretariat has been involving civil society and activists in the conflict prevention and management and regional integration process. The Community has established Election Units and sponsored the West African Civil Society Forum (WASCOF) to work with member states in building credible institutions to conduct and evolve electoral procedures that produce transparent, free and fair results. Working through the Elders Council and WASCOF, election observers and monitors have been fielded in several member states, namely Sierra Leone and Mali in 2002, Nigeria in 2003, Ghana in 2004, Togo, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia in 2005 and Benin in 2006.

The Envisaged Role of the Community Parliament

One of ECOWAS's most crucial and innovative investments in peace and security is the Community Parliament. The 1993 Revised Treaty (Article 13) established the Community Parliament, [23] while the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Parliament came into force on 14March 2000. The Parliament was inaugurated eight months later in Bamako, Mali. The Parliament is a 120-member strong body whose members, it is hoped, will eventually be directly elected for a five-year term. [24]

In the interim, before direct elections take place, Nigerian members were elected from the National Assembly as against universal suffrage. This ad hoc transitional phase was not provided for in the Protocol, which is unclear about how parliamentarians should be chosen. Nigeria has 35 seats, while Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire have eight and seven respectively. Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Senegal have six members each while Benin, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo have five members each.

The Parliament has several uncertainties about its functions and how the Parliament delegates duties to its committees. Interestingly, for a sub-region known for violent conflict, security and conflict prevention was not one of the Parliament's defined competent areas.[25] The Parliament, after it convened, established a Committee on Defence, Security and Integration. However, without power to legislate, influence procurement, or influence policy-making and implementation, the Committee's influence over security issues lies solely in the merit of its actions and possibly its reports. Still, even these nominal functions should be supported by civil society think tanks that have the skills and experience to do security analysis.

The Speaker of Parliament, Ali Nouhoum Diallo, in his first public statement asserted that his priority would be to maintain peace and security in the sub-region. He said: "We are doing something fast about achieving peace and security," he said.[26] He further posited that in line with this priority, "[the Parliament Committee on Defence and Security] will have to go to Cote d'Ivoire to pacify the northern and southern population. Next is Liberia and Guinea. There is also no security in…Sierra Leone. These are the priorities."[27]

The Chairman of the Committee has also identified the conflicts in the sub-region as the main priority areas of his committee and has initiated moves to end some of the crises through dialogue. According to him, "peace is what we aim at achieving in ECOWAS Parliament. It is our watchword and deserves to have it because we can no longer sit and watch…when we should be talking about development of our human and natural resources."[28] The Committee will not just consult with officials, but "will also meet the people to discuss with them. The civil society organisation will be consulted regularly for expert input to the Committee's formulation of security policies, resource allocation, and general analysis is a welcome development."

The Chairman also reiterated the limitations of the Committee. He said: "We are not usurping the powers of ECOWAS Heads of States all we are doing is to act as an advisory body to them in the areas that concern the development of the sub-region."[29] The Parliament, he said, intended to 'work hand in hand with ECOWAS Head of States' at getting results for peace initiatives in the sub-region. He further noted; "we shall be meeting with the president of each country to discuss the modalities for peace moves so that it helps us to take decisions."[30]

For the time being, the Parliament's role is mainly advisory. Although it can in theory comment on all community-related issues, it has no legislative powers and it has limited its interest to human rights and fundamental freedom.[31] However, it provides a forum for dialogue, consultation and consensus. ECOWAS has identified improving the Parliament's oversight of the security sector and its organs as crucial for improving both governance and human rights in the sub-region.

Convention on the Control of Influx of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Other Related Materials

Within the past two decades, West African states have witnessed an upsurge in armed resistance groups that have successfully engaged sovereign governments within the sub-region in prolonged civil wars. The effects of these wars have been devastating on the socio-political and economic integration of the sub-region. The casualty figure of civilians including children, women and the aged killed in these wars is enormous, while the number of displaced people is on the increase daily.

Government has been forced to increase spending on defence budgetary allocation and infrastructural development leaving no room for economic development and integration. Countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote d'Ivoire are case examples, while recently in Nigeria cases of militant activities in the oil-producing Niger Delta region has led to armed attacks on oil installations – just as pipeline vandalisation and hostage-taking for ransom by the militant groups are very common. It is important to point out that sovereign governments are no longer the sole custodian of small firearms and other weapons, which have found their ways into the hands of rebel groups and individuals.

ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP)

ECOWAS has launched the new ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP), to replace the defunct Programme of Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED). ECOSAP aims at contributing to the reduction of armed violence through capacity building measures in the ECOWAS Secretariat and the member states. ECOSAP had made many achievements including capacity-building programmes, which would be progressively integrated into the ECOWAS Small Arms Unit in Abuja (established since September 2006). ECOSAP has also transformed the ECOWAS Moratorium into a convention on the control of small arms and light weapons in order to underscore the determination of West African leadership to make the fight against illegal circulation of arms and weapons in West Africa a permanent feature on the ECOWAS agenda.

ECOWAS Peace Support Operations (PSO) Logistics Depot

The ECOWAS Peace Support Operations (PSO) provides the foundation for all levels of PSO logistic support and services covering areas of supply, material, services, receipt, issue, storage, maintenance and general support including the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). On 9 December 2006, an Agreement in respect of the issue was signed and a Supplementary Amendment to the Agreement was subsequently signed on 29 August 2006. Consequently, the government of Sierra Leone has offered Hasting Airfield Complex as the site for the proposed Coastal Depot location. A Global Logistics Donors Conference for the ECOWAS PSO Logistics Depot was held in Freetown between 10 and 11 October 2006 to mobilise funds for the establishment of the Depot. The Executive Secretariat continued its consultation with the government of Mali on the formalisation of arrangements for the establishment of the proposed humanitarian depot.

ECOWAS Peace Fund

The launch and restructuring of the ECOWAS Peace Fund is a very important step in the collective quest for peace and security in West Africa, as the facility will contribute to the promotion of peace in ECOWAS member states and reinforce the institutional capacities of civil society in the countries affected by conflict. It will also enhance good governance and ensure better coordination and management of post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. The fund was restructured in 2006 to ensure a professional financing arrangement.

Under the ECOWAS Peace Fund arrangement and the ADB grant, the ECOWAS Secretariat in February 2006 fulfilled all conditions precedent to the first disbursement to the ECOWAS Peace and Development Programme (PADEP). As a consequence, the ADB proceeded in May 2006 to effect the first disbursement to the implementing partners and the operation of the Project Technical Implementation Unit. In order to ensure an effective coordination of the activities of the project at the national level, the Executive Secretariat organised a national launch of the project in Liberia in May 2006 and in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea in July 2006. The launching of the project in some other countries, namely Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Togo has also been implemented.

Conclusion

There is no denying the fact that ECOWAS has made giant strides and charted a new direction for regional conflict management in the international system. The establishment of ECOMOG as an intervention force was no doubt novel in the history of regional conflict management. The success of ECOMOG has made it a role model in the international arena. The presence of ECOMOG has contributed immensely to the relative peace achieved in the sub-region probably because the 'fear of ECOMOG is the beginning of wisdom' for all future coup planners in the sub-region. Currently, the existing instruments for the management of conflicts in the sub-region are being improved to stand the test of time.

Importantly, the West African sub-region is characterised by high levels of poverty and criminality. Member states and ECOWAS as a sub-regional body need to address issues of poverty, crime and bad governance, which are the major causes of conflict. To sustain and improve on its achievement, ECOWAS and national governments must begin to pay more attention to economic development to eradicate poverty in the sub-region.

SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AND SUB-REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Prior to the formation of the South African Development Community in 1992, the Frontline States (FLS) cooperated among themselves in the area of peace and security in the sub-region as a security against minority-ruled Republic of South Africa.

Formation of Inter-State Defence and Security Committee

In 1975, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia established the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), as a substructure of the Frontline States. At the time of its establishment, the ISDSC was essentially a ministerial committee comprising ministers responsible for Defence, Home Affairs/Police, State Security/Intelligence and Immigration Services. The ISDSC discussed issues relating to individual and collective security requirements and those related to the liberation struggle.

The ISDSC was established as a forum for sharing and coordinating defence and security strategies. It was created as an informal body with no charter or constitution; it had neither a headquarters nor secretariat, yet it was more formally structured than the FLS Summit. Meetings were held on an ad hoc basis, but at least once per year, at both ministerial and official levels.[32] Angola, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe joined the organisation during the FLS era. In 1992, SADC was formed and the FLS was disbanded. The ISDSC was retained and its membership was expanded to include all SADC member states with the admission of Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa and Swaziland. Mauritius became the twelfth member in October 1996, while the DRC and the Seychelles joined in November 1997.

In 1999, the SADC Department of Foreign Affairs summarised the key functions of the three ISDSC subcommittees as follows:

- ***Defence***: to review and share experiences on the prevailing military security situation in member states; to explore areas of further multilateral military co-operation and practical means for the realisation thereof; to exchange views and propose mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.

- ***Public security***: to coordinate public security activities in the sub-region; to exchange experience and information between member states on public security issues such as motor vehicle theft, drug trafficking, counterfeit currency, illegal immigrants, forged travel documents and firearm smuggling; and to explore areas and means of enhancing cooperation among police agencies in the sub region.

- ***State security*****:** to review the security situation in the sub-region and to analyse issues affecting respective member states.

SADC Treaty and Development of Security Framework

In 1992 SADC was created as an economic community… but with the primary aim of maintaining peace and security in the sub-region. The Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of southern African states, which accompanied the SADC Treaty "Towards the Southern African Development Community," addressed the issue of a more formal security structure thus:

> Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for

> regional cooperation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security.[33]

The SADC Treaty anticipates the creation of a security framework. Article 4 identifies "solidarity, peace and security," as one of the principles that should guide the actions of SADC members. Article 5 provides that one of the objectives of SADC is to "promote and defend peace and security." Article 21 obligates member states to cooperate in the area of "politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security." Yet beyond these broad provisions, the Treaty does not flesh out the details of a peace and security mechanism. Indeed, Article 22 instructs that members will conclude the necessary protocols in such areas of cooperation.[34]

Proposal for an Association of Southern African States (ASAS)

Between 1992 and 1994, the SADC Secretariat attempted to drive the formation of a regional security policy and imbued it with a democratic and anti-militarist character. In July 1994, the Secretariat convened the Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security in Windhoek, attended by ministers, officials, parliamentarians and members of non-governmental groups. The workshop endorsed the non-militarist agenda and recommended the establishment of an independent Human Rights Commission and a SADC Sector on Conflict Resolution and Political Cooperation.[35]

On 30 July 1994, the old Frontline States (FLS) coalition proposed the formation of a new security entity, 'the Association of Southern African States' (ASAS), to serve as the regional security body.[36] SADC Heads of State and Government ultimately rejected the ASAS proposal with a Communiqué which stated that:

> The Summit considered and granted the request of the Foreign Ministers of SADC, that the allocation of the sector to any Member State be deferred and that they be given more time for consultations among themselves and with Ministers responsible for Defence and Security and SADC Matters, on the structures, terms of reference, and operational procedures for the sector.[37]

During its 1995 annual meeting, the Summit was unable to make progress on regional security arrangements. The immediate deadlock arose from Zimbabwe's insistence that the security forum should follow the tradition of the FLS and be chaired on a permanent basis by the longest-serving head of state in the region, namely President Mugabe; other countries preferred the option of a rotating chair. Mugabe was reportedly piqued that his seniority and leading role in regional politics were being undercut by the emerging dominance of post-apartheid South Africa and the international status of President Mandela.[38]

SADC and the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS)

SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 18 January 1995, proposed ‘The Organ for Politics, Defence and Security’ (OPDS), in place of ASAS. SADC Summit later accepted this proposal.[39] President Ketumile Masire of Botswana, as Chair of SADC, in May 1996, wrote to SADC Heads of State declaring that the Organ had officially been established. He also indicated that Mugabe would serve as its interim chair until the next SADC Summit.[40] SADC Summit issued a Communiqué, which defined sixteen objectives to be pursued through the new body. It also provided that the Organ would function at the Summit level, operating independently of other SADC structures, as well as at the Ministerial and Technical levels. Its Chair would rotate among a troika on an annual basis. The ISDSC would become an institution of the Organ, and the Organ could establish other structures as well.[41]

During the launch, Mugabe was confirmed as the Chairman of the OPDS. In his address, he argued that the establishment of the OPDS represented a firm commitment and resolve by regional leaders that Southern Africa would 'never again recede to the situation of conflict and confrontation. SADC leaders [sought] to and protect a new Southern Africa focused on 'peace and development', democracy and protection of human rights.[42]

However, a fissure within SADC regarding the relative autonomy of the Organ soon became apparent. South Africa, on the one hand, maintained that the body should be a SADC sub-structure and should report directly to the SADC Summit. Zimbabwe, on the other hand, asserted that the Organ should function under a separate chair, as essentially a parallel structure to SADC. The Summit's decisions gave rise to much confusion and tension in subsequent years.

The decision that the Organ would operate independently of other SADC structures subsequently gave rise to the anomalous prospect of two separate fora of heads of state being responsible for addressing conflict in the region. South Africa argued that in terms of the SADC Treaty, this responsibility fell within the Organ’s mandate, and form a core function of SADC Summit.[43]A Zimbabwean official provided a counter argument. He argued that this would amount to an attempt to imprison the SADC Organ in the SADC Treaty.[44] During his tenure as the SADC Chairman in 1997, Mandela became so exasperated with Mugabe's rival authority as the Chairman of the Organ that he threatened to resign if the Organ were not made accountable to the Summit.[45]

By the late 1990s, it was clear that SADC was also polarised into two incompatible camps that viewed the organ from different perspectives. One camp - comprising Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania - perceived the Organ as a common security regime whose primary basis for cooperation and peace-making would be political rather than military.[46] The other camp - comprising Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe - preferred a mutual defence pact and prioritised military cooperation and responses to conflict. Mugabe stated that he foresaw the Organ developing into a 'kind of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for the region.[47]

The divergent visions spawned heated debates on a range of issues, such as the structure of the Organ and the role of its officials. The major conflicting perceptions between the two leaders were on the functions of the OPDS. While Pretoria contended that the Organ had been suspended, Harare maintained that the OPDS was alive and kicking since it continued to execute its mandate through SADC's Inter-State Security and Defence Committee (ISDSC).

Conflicting strategies over SADC's involvement in the DRC conflict further aggravated the internal crisis within the OPDS. While South Africa and some SADC member states (including Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique) preferred preventive diplomacy and negotiated settlement of the conflict, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia opted for a military intervention in the DRC in 1998 in support of Laurent Kabila's government. As the division within SADC widened, Angola, Zimbabwe and the DRC signed a mutual defence pact in April 1999 that excluded other SADC states, despite the organisation's earlier commitment to a regional defence pact.

The 1999 Maputo SADC Summit finally broke the impasse over the OPDS by adopting a new SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP). The SADC Mutual Defence Pact among other things, aimed at promoting security cooperation in joint military training and peacekeeping exercises.[48] 1999 was significant in the history of SADC. It did not only bring on board the SADC Mutual Defence Pact that ended the stalemate around the OPDS, but also marked the assumption of office of Thabo Mbeki as president of South Africa after Mandela stepped down. It is worth noting that Mandela and Mbeki had different perceptions about SADC.

In 2001, SADC's Council of Ministers held an extraordinary meeting in Swaziland and signed a communiqué, which resolved the problems of failed SADC organs. The meeting resolved that:

- the OPDS must become an integral part of the SADC Summit and answerable to the chair of SADC;
- the leadership of the OPDS should rotate annually on troika basis;
- the 1992 SADC Treaty must be amended to accommodate the restructuring of the OPDS; and
- Robert Mugabe would retain the chair of the OPDS until the 2001 summit which would elect another chair.[49]

In 2001, the SADC Head of States Summit in Blantyre, Malawi officially adopted the restructuring of the OPDS, thereby removing the major obstacle confronting collective security in the region. Similarly, SADC member states signed the Revised Version of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. The Protocol states that the OPDS is mainly responsible for managing both intra-state and inter-state conflicts. The objectives of the Protocol include promoting peace and security in the region; protecting people and safeguarding the development of the region against instability arising from a breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict, inter-state conflict aggression; and promoting regional coordination and cooperation on matters relating to security and defence and the establishment of appropriate mechanisms;

The Protocol also resolved the leadership of the OPDS as follows:

- the Summit shall elect a chairperson and deputy chairperson of the OPDS on the basis of rotation among the members of the summit, except that the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the summit shall not simultaneously be the chairperson of the OPDS;

- the terms of office of the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the OPDS shall be one year respectively; and the chairperson of the OPDS shall consult with the SADC Troika and report to the Summit; and

- the Troika composed of new chair (Mozambique), the outgoing chair (Zimbabwe) and the incoming chair (Tanzania) was appointed.

The Protocol also provides an elaborate structure of the Organ under the Chair and the Troika as follows: a Ministerial Committee; the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy

Committee (ISPDC); the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordination Committee (SARPCCO).

In 2003, SADC Summit adopted the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDC), which further strengthens security among member states. The SADC MDC provides for both non-aggression and mutual defence against an attack on a member state (including an internal threat). This falls short of automatic mutual defence, as it provides that 'each state party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate.'[50]

Having ratified the revised version of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security, SADC member states developed a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO), which was approved in August 2004. The SIPO provides general guidelines that spell out specific activities for the realisation of the Organ's objectives including the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Mutual Defence Pact. The SIPO recognises that member states have demonstrated the political will to cooperate in political, defence and security matters.

This has created an enabling environment for peace, security, and stability in the region. Unfortunately, the region continues to face potential and actual military threats stemming from unfinished demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration in some member states and activities of former military personnel, terrorism and land mines. SADC therefore believes it is very essential to avert political conflict, external aggression and promote peaceful relations among its members and citizens.[51]

SIPO therefore commits member states to cooperate in the political sector by promoting political pluralism and the development of democratic institutions and practices, including the observance of human rights. The agenda also includes the creation of common electoral standards and the code of conduct for good governance including the creation of conditions for political parties to accept election results and creation of regional commissions for human rights.[52]

Through SIPO, SADC member states have also outlined activities that would strengthen their defence, protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order. In addition, these activities would also help to develop collective security capacity as well as peacekeeping capacities and standby arrangements to enhance regional capacity to deal with humanitarian disasters and assistance.

It must be stated that although the OPDSC seeks to respond to both operational and institutional challenges to the enhancement of security in the region, the major challenge is on the capacity to implement what the member states have decided and to monitor the state of implementation. This will be determined, apart from the political will, by the quality of human resources in each member state and the training and experience of implementing agencies. While some of these challenges can be fully resolved in a relatively short period, others such as the availability of financial resources and their prioritisation and technological requirements are more serious and may take a longer time.

Capacity building in Southern Africa: South Africa and SADC

Working through SADC South Africa has been involved in a number of capacity-building efforts including peacekeeping, military training and monitoring of elections in the sub-region. Although a number of capacity building efforts have been initiated before South Africa joined the organisation, the efforts have not only resulted in peace, stability and security but has also contributed to the increase in the socio-political and economic development of member states. Despite the fact that these capacity-building faces a number of challenges, it has no doubt contributed to the relative peace and security currently enjoyed by SADC members.

ISDSC Initiatives

SADC members have undertaken some important capacity-building initiatives, primarily through the ISDSC. After the dissolution of the FLS, the ISDSC continued to exist in anticipation of its (yet undefined) role as an institution of the SADC Organs, [53] with its three sub-committees taking on new responsibilities mainly in the area of capacity building. Recognising the importance of a secure and reliable communication network, ISDSC established a satellite communication system linking the various SADC governments. This “high-level hotline” was installed and became operational in early 1999. Each member state was given two terminals, which they will place as they deem fit with one likely dedicated to the office of each nation’s Defence Minister. The idea is that the terminals should be supervised twenty-four hours per day.[54]

Under the ISDSC's supervision, the SADC sub-region has committed itself to creating a standby brigade with each country-earmarking units as well as headquarters staff. This arrangement was supposed to be operational by the end of 1998, but due to the impasse concerning the Organ, little progress was made. According to Major-Geneneral Daan Hamman, former de facto Secretary of the ISDSC, the SADC Organ must initiate and determine the procedure to be followed in the case of a conflict alert in order to deploy peacekeepers, and establish the civilian structures to manage the peacekeeping operation.

The ISDSC has equally been involved in important training and other preparatory initiatives. For instance, the Defence Sub-Committee resolved a number of technical problems associated with disaster relief support operations. It also approved a training syllabus for peace support training, based on the United Nations training syllabus and requested that the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC), through its Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), coordinate and harmonise peacekeeping education training in the SADC sub-region.[55]

Establishment of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC)

With funding from Denmark, the ISDSC established a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre RPTC) in Zimbabwe, responsible for UN Command and Staff Training in SADC. Following the contested elections in Zimbabwe, however, donors withdrew support for the Centre. Based on the OAU Chief of Staffs' recommendation, SADC decided in favour of the creation of a 'sustainable brigade-size peacekeeping force' over a five-year period, following the example (although not the practice) established in West Africa. The first phase would consist of the establishment of a skeleton staff for a permanent multinational mobile brigade headquarters, while in subsequent years the rest of the brigade take form. In this regard, SADC is therefore more cautious than West Africa in seeking to promote regional security, reflecting a divided region, limited experience in building security on regional as opposed to a national basis and lack of a ‘lead nation.’

SADC -UNDP Initiated Capacity-Building Projects

In collaboration with the UNDP SADC also initiated a number of capacity-building projects to strengthen the Community. The UNDP’s *Programme to Strengthen Africa’s Regional Capacities for Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Recovery* aimed at developing and implementing regional strategies and building capacity in the security sector. Other UNDP initiated activities included: a training seminar on *Project Formulation and Management, and Resources Mobilisation* in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2003, with participants from ECOWAS and SADC Secretariats, the troika of the organ, the African Union, the Mano River Union and civil society organisations from West Africa and the Great Lakes region. A training manual was developed and published to facilitate future training and dissemination.

In 2004, with the support of the Danish Embassy in South Africa, SADC organised a conference on defence and security cooperation in Maputo, Zimbabwe, titled *Enhancing Peace and Security for Development in Southern Africa*. The conference brought together one hundred senior participants, comprising heads of defence;

security, foreign affairs, chiefs of defence staff, and principal secretaries of defence. On 13 November 2003, SADC and UNDP signed a Memorandum of Agreement, with UNDP providing technical assistance for SADC in the form of one professional staff officer, one support staff member and a full complement of office equipment, computers and furniture. However, SADC could only make use of these materials from February 2005.

Officers from the SADC Secretariat and the troika participated in an ECOWAS working group session on the operationalization of the ECOWAS early warning system. The UNDP/ECOWAS project document on the operationalization of the ECOWAS early warning system was shared with the SADC Secretariat and the Organ Troika. The UNDP also organised a training workshop in Maputo, Mozambique from 28 to 30 September 2004 towards the empowerment of SADC troika officials and secretariat personnel with enhanced skills and competencies in conflict analysis, mediation and negotiation.

Peacekeeping-Related Instruction

The Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC), established in November 1995, has endeavoured to market itself as the sub-region's peacekeeping training centre. With advisory and financial assistance from both Denmark and the United Kingdom, the ZSC has improved its training facilities and expanded its courses in peacekeeping. The RPTC has conducted other training programmes in addition to the annual course. With Danish support, the RPTC is currently developing a "clearing house" that will, among other things, monitor peacekeeping training activities, identify new regional training requirements, and keep a record of trained peacekeeping practitioners and instructors in the sub-region and beyond. The clearinghouse will also establish direct links between the various SADC countries at the defence force level.[56]

Rather than relying exclusively on the RPTC, other SADC members have begun to offer peacekeeping related training to other countries in the sub-region. Malawi with British support hosted a four-week regional command and staff course in October 1998and an eight-month regional training course for junior officers in January 1999. Similarly, Namibia and Britain jointly hosted a regional senior officer's course in late 1999.South Africa has suggested that individual SADC countries should provide peacekeeping training in a particular 'specialty,' under the rationale that no single country can possibly have a centre of excellence that covers all the components of peacekeeping.[57]

Regional Peacekeeping Training Exercises

Operation Blue Hungwe

The sub-region has also initiated regional peacekeeping training exercises, the first of which was held in April 1997. Some 1,500 troops from ten SADC countries participated in exercise Blue Hungwe, hosted by Zimbabwe with British assistance.[58] Blue Hungwe aimed "to enhance regional African liaison, cooperation, military skills and interoperability by means of a multinational joint field training exercise in the tactics and techniques of international peacekeeping. The exercise included three phases of substantive training including a weapons handling, tactical and medical assistance, roadblocks, and convoys.

Blue Hungwe proved to be a useful initiative and was instrumental in highlighting areas where progress would be made. Brig. Adrian Naughten, Commander of the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) in southern Africa, acknowledged that certain contingents lacked adequate knowledge of who does what in a multinational integrated headquarters. However, he stressed that given the lack of expertise and the varied military standards among the participating States, Exercise Blue Hungwe was a resounding success and "a major achievement in both military and political terms."[59] Some observers praised the exercise's straightforward format as well as its comprehensiveness. Others emphasised the need for the Sub-region to conduct standardized pre-deployment training and to develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and enhance the compatibility of communication equipment and procedures for effective command and control.[60]

Operation Blue Crane

South Africa hosted the brigade-level Operation Blue Crane under the auspices of the ISDSC in April 1999. Operation Blue Crane, which cost US$ 3.3 million, brought together 4,965 troops from thirteen SADC countries. It was designed to simulate a UN-led multinational operation deployed in a classic inter-positional role between two warring factions on a fictional island in the Indian Ocean. The exercise had both land and naval components covering military as well as humanitarian and media relations skills. It included a significant role for civilians.[61]

Blue Crane can be termed a success for a number of reasons. Although South Africa received significant financial and logistical contributions from donor countries, it essentially organised the exercise on its own. Blue Crane was also the first brigade-level undertaking held in Southern Africa. The exercise proved timely in view of the tensions in the Sub-region, giving participants the much-needed opportunity to train together. Beyond that, it developed Standard Operational Procedures that SADC can use in future peacekeeping missions. It was also the first exercise that involved both civilians and the military in joint training.[62]

Despite a number of criticisms that trailed Blue Crane, a number of lessons learned have been identified. Some viewed the exercise's emphasis on the civilian component of peacekeeping as too ambitious or unrealistic. Military participants and observers in particular complained about the heightened participation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The organisers of the civilian activities have concluded that there should be more opportunities for joint civil-military training.[63] The structure of some of the battalions was also criticised as impractical and unworkable in an actual operation.[64]

Operation Tulipe

In May 1999, eight SADC member states participated in a sub-regional peacekeeping training exercise in Madagascar. Madagascar, which has expressed an interest in becoming a SADC member, organised Exercise Tulipe with French assistance. Some 1,700 troops from France and ten African countries, namely Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, The Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe participated.[65] This exercise provided another important opportunity for the sub-region's armed force to train together.

SADC's Response to Violent Conflicts in Member States

A number of violent conflicts erupted in SADC member states between 1995 and 2003. They included:

- the long-running civil war in Angola that ended in 2002 when the leader of the rebel movement UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, was killed.
- a rebellion and full-blown war with state belligerents in the DRC that began in 1998;
- election disputes, a mutiny and an external military intervention in Lesotho in 1998;
- a failed secessionist bid in Namibia in 1998/l999; election disputes in Malawi in 1999;
- a constitutional crisis in Zambia in 2001;
- election disputes on the Zanzibar island of Tanzania in 2001;
- continuous state repression and violence in Zimbabwe from 2000,
- Angola threat to invade Zambia in order to halt supplies to UNITA in1998, and
- in 2000 Zambia accused Angola of conducting military attacks on its territory.

SADC Military Intervention in Conflict-Riddled States

SADC as a sub-regional organisation has not been as successful as ECOWAS in sub-regional peacekeeping operations. Whereas the strength of ECOWAS has been the dominant role of Nigeria in ECOMOG, South Africa has been unable to play a similar role in SADC because of a number of factors, most especially the rivalry between Pretoria and Harare, which led to the development of two hostile camps in the sub-region. SADC carried out two peacekeeping operations: one in Lesotho in 1998, which was very successful, and the other in DRC in 2003, which was partially successful. Both operations were faulted by the two opposing camps.

SADC and the 1994 Lesotho Crisis

In 1994, a violent conflict erupted in Lesotho involving faction fighting within the country's armed forces and the new Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) government, which had come to power in 1993 through a general election. Tension also arose between newly democratically elected Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle and the Kingdom’s monarch, King Letsie. SADC's members, through the initiatives of the London-based Commonwealth Secretariat and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) embarked on preventive diplomacy to manage the crisis after internal efforts at conflict resolution had failed to bear fruits.

In January 1994, a task force on the Lesotho crisis, which comprised Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, was set up by SADC with the mandate of finding a lasting solution to the conflict. Despite the concerted diplomatic efforts of the task force, the conflict escalated. On 17 August 1994, the King, while reacting to government’s action, suspended the constitution and dissolved the BCP government and appointed a six-person Council of Ministers to form a transitional government in a move that was deemed to be a ‘Royal Coup.’[66]

On 23 August, SADC Task Force intervened in the crisis by condemning the ‘Royal Coup,’ and on 25 August the warring factions were assembled in Pretoria and given a week to resolve their differences. Letsie and Mokhehle thereafter agreed in principle to restore constitutional order and ultimately reinstated BCP government in power through a Memorandum of Agreement signed on 2 September 1994.

The memorandum committed the parties to promote peace, reconciliation and the stability of the country. Much more important, the memorandum stated that Pretoria, Gaborone and Harare would remain the guarantors of Lesotho's democracy and stability, with the power to intervene on behalf of SADC in case of any instability that threatened the country's democracy. Following the 1998 SADC Summit in Mauritius, Mozambique was added to the list of SADC countries mandated to guarantee Lesotho's fragile democracy.

This was the first time SADC had taken such a bold and decisive action in a regional political crisis. This arrangement also signified that Lesotho's sovereignty had been eroded in the eyes not only of its people but also, more significantly in the eyes of other SADC states. This situation of course confirms the old international relation dictum that the big and powerful nations do what they want, while the small and weak nations accept what they must. It also shows the leadership role of South Africa in peaceful resolution of sub-regional crisis. South Africa did not only provide the platform for peace to be achieved in Lesotho, Pretoria was also made one of the guarantors of Lesotho's democracy and stability, with the power to interfere on behalf of SADC in case of any instability that threatened the country's democracy. However, an attempt by South Africa to implement this mandate in the 1998-1999 Lesotho crises met with severe criticisms from other SADC member states, most especially the Zimbabwe-led camp.

SADC and the Second Lesotho Crisis: 1998-1999

In September 1998, the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Pakalitha Mosisili, fearing further breakdown of law and order in his country, requested SADC member states to intervene militarily in support of his government to stabilise a domestic crisis. This was done against the backdrop of mounting dissent over the results of a national election held in May 1998, which were rejected by opposition parties claiming the elections had been rigged in favour of the ruling Liberal Congress for Democracy (LCD).

In August 1998, SADC set up the Langa Commission to investigate the allegations of fraud in an effort to stem the growing political crisis. The Commission ultimately found that there had been irregularities in the voting and counting process but refused to nullify the elections. Political tension continued to mount in the country and there were fears of an imminent coup. On 11 September 1998, the situation further deteriorated when a group of junior officers of the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) placed the prime minister under house arrest and imprisoned the army commander and other senior members of the Lesotho Defence Force.

On 22 September South Africa and Botswana in consultation with Mozambique and Zimbabwe deployed troops into Lesotho. The intervention known as 'Operation Boleas' was essentially a South African undertaking with Botswana's contribution made up of only a motorised infantry company (130 personnel) and a battalion command element. South Africa, by contrast, initially sent roughly 500 troops to Lesotho and provided air and medical support. The CTF was placed under the command of Col. Robbie Hartslief of the SANDF.[67] Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which together with Botswana and South Africa were "guarantors" to the previously mentioned 1994 agreement, supported the intervention.[68]

The deployment met with unanticipated resistance from sections of the Lesotho army. Eight South African soldiers and an estimated Basotho soldiers were killed in battles over several days. Anarchy and public demonstrations against the intervention ensued, leading to the virtual sacking of the capital city, Maseru. Riddled with strategic and tactical errors, the operation was widely viewed as a political and military disaster.[69]

In response to public criticisms, Pretoria insisted that the head of a legitimate government facing an incipient coup had requested the deployment and that the operation had only been authorised after efforts to end the mutiny through negotiations had failed. South Africa based the legality of the intervention on the following factors:

- the operation took place under SADC auspices;
- it came as a result of a SADC decision not to permit coups and other unconstitutional changes of government in southern Africa; and

- it was based on a 1994 agreement that South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana would be guarantors of stability in Lesotho.[70]

A former South African defence official noted several flaws in the argument of defence put forward by South Africa. According to him, “the SADC decision not to allow coups in the region was a proposal from the ISDSC to the SADC Summit and the Summit had neither endorsed the ISDSC's proposal nor sanctioned military action in Lesotho.”[71] This statement unequivocally condemned the military intervention of South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho.

There is no denying the fact that the decision to respond militarily was made without explicit SADC authorisation, although the SANDF claimed that the intervention took place under “SADC auspices” in accordance with “SADC agreements.”[72] At a 21 September 1998 meeting, the South African Minister of Safety and Security and representatives from Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe reportedly confirmed that SADC had authorised a possible military intervention in the event of a coup in Lesotho.[73] In fact, there was no record that the organisation took such a decision.

A week before the intervention, SADC Heads of State met in Grand Baie and merely expressed concern at the civil disturbances and loss of life following the recent elections in Lesotho and welcomed the mediation initiative led by the South African Government. According to Malan, “it is hard to imagine how this was translated into a SADC mandate for a peace operation that resembled a military invasion and occupation of the Kingdom of Lesotho.”[74] Moreover, doubt has been cast on the legality of Lesotho’s request for assistance in the first place. Although Mosisili, as Head of Government, appealed for states to intervene, King Letsie III, Lesotho’s nominal Head of State, had not been consulted as required by the Constitution and had opposed such an action.[75]

By October 1998, Operation Boleas had restored a semblance of calm and a negotiated settlement was reached between Prime Minister Mosisili and the aggrieved opposition parties. In October 1998, they agreed to establish a Transitional Committee responsible for organising new elections within eighteen months. Troops from the CTF began to withdraw in significant numbers and Operation Boleas was concluded on 15 May 1999.[76]

The botched intervention raised doubts internationally about South Africa's diplomatic and military competence. The military response imposed by South Africa and Botswana was arguably not justified by the circumstances, as diplomatic initiatives, and possibly imposition of economic sanctions, might have succeeded in resolving the crisis. According to Richard Cornwell, "Lesotho was a prime candidate for negotiated settlement. Besides, in these situations, you do not just march in. You mass troops at the border, make threatening noises or drop a few paratroopers and flyers."[77] The intervention was also inconsistent with South Africa's policy of non-military intervention in the DRC. Beyond that, it challenged expectations that South Africa will play a constructive role in the sub-region. Moreover, it raised the concern that if South Africa could not handle a relatively small problem like Lesotho… how could it serve as the sub-region's policeman?

SADC and Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998 to 2007

In 1996, a rebellion in Zaire led to the fall of President Mobutu and the assumption of the presidency by Laurent Desire Kabila the following year. The country was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo and became a member of SADC. On 2 August 1998, the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie* (RCD, Congolese Rally for Democracy) launched a rebellion against Kabila in the northeastern part of the country with the support of Rwanda and Uganda, which had helped to bring him to power. Kabila's *Forces armées congolaises* (FAC) proved ineffective and the RCD quickly made inroads into the country.[78]Within two weeks, the RCD had seized the Inga hydroelectric dam that supplied electricity to the capital and advanced to the outskirts of Kinshasa. Kabila appealed to SADC for assistance as his forces could no longer curtail the advancement of the rebels.

Kabila secured the diplomatic and military support he desperately needed from SADC countries spearheaded by Zimbabwe. In his capacity as the Chair of the Organ, Mugabe immediately convened a meeting in Victoria Falls of heads of state from Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. He excluded South Africa, which then held the Chair of SADC, because of the tension with Pretoria over the Organ.[79]

Mugabe announced at the meeting that a four-nation committee of representatives from Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe would be created and charged with helping to secure a ceasefire. Upon receiving the recommendations of the four-nation committee, Mugabe referred it to an ISDSC meeting in Harare on 18 August. Speaking shortly while appearing on state television, Mugabe declared that SADC had decided unanimously to meet Kabila's appeal. The following day Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia announced that they would deploy troops in the DRC on behalf of SADC.[80]

The intervening states justified the deployment as an act of collective defence against the alleged invasion of the DRC by Rwanda and Uganda. They also claimed that the deployment had been authorised by the Organ and the ISDSC. The justifications that the three troops-contributing countries offered for their actions were unfounded. They initially explained that their intervention had been based on an Organ's decision.

The Organ, however, was not operational at that time and was not involved in the peace negotiations as only a handful of SADC states were present at the meeting convened by Mugabe. Still, Mugabe as the Chair of the Organ believed he could take the decision on the Organ's behalf. The intervening countries alternatively claimed that an ISDSC decision authorised their intervention. Yet the ISDSC did not have a mandate to take decisions on behalf of SADC Summit. Moreover, only four ministers were present at the August 1998, ISDSC meeting from which they claimed they had derived their authority.[81]

Mandela's spokesman, Parks Mankahlana, put it bluntly: "There is no way that the people who met at Victoria Falls and Harare could have met under the auspices of the SADC."[82] Tensions between Mandela and Mugabe on SADC's position grew and the prospects for SADC to play an effective role in resolving the conflict diminished. Both men exchanged thinly veiled insults. For example, Mugabe told Mandela: "No SADC country is compelled to help [a brother country] beset by conflict. But those who don't want to help should keep quiet about those who want to do so." [83]

Supported by Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, South Africa pursued a diplomatic solution to the DRC crisis. Mandela convened an emergency meeting of the SADC Summit in Pretoria but Mugabe declined to attend, proclaiming that 'it is not possible for us to resolve [the crisis] as SADC because we are divided'.[84] The Pretoria Summit insisted that military action was unacceptable and called for an immediate ceasefire and process of negotiations.[85]

At the Non-Aligned Movement's Summit hosted by South Africa in Durban on 2 September, Mandela unexpectedly toned down his strong rhetoric against Mugabe when he declared that SADC supported the military intervention by the three states in the DRC. Mandela said, "It is quite reasonable when a legitimate leader says 'I have been invaded' and asks for support and it is quite reasonable for countries to respond to that."[86] But Mandela's acquiescence to Mugabe's actions did not signify his approval. Mandela simply was no longer interested in engaging Mugabe verbally in the public. The apparent turnabout was intended to ease the tension with Mugabe and restore a semblance of unity to SADC.[87]

Indeed, the South African president continued to champion a negotiated settlement. According to Horst Brammer, the Deputy Director of SADC Political Affairs in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Mandela's announcement was purely an attempt to reflect some form of unity in SADC. South Africa did not diverge from its position that a standstill ceasefire and elections were necessary for a true resolution to the conflict.[88]

Mandela's efforts to resolve the conflict through diplomacy were undermined by the split within SADC and by the active involvement of several actors outside of SADC supporting Kabila and the rebels. For instance, a coalition of largely Francophone Central African States backed Kabila.[125] The Gabonese President El Hadj Omar Bongo also supported Kabila and hosted a meeting of regional countries united in their support for Kabila.[89]

Attempts by SADC member states to establish an uneasy compromise between Mugabe and Mandela were apparent in the carefully worded communiqué issued at the SADC Summit in Mauritius. The text welcomed the initiatives of SADC and its member states to restore peace and security to the DRC and diplomatically mentioned both the Victoria Falls and Pretoria meetings. SADC Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and commended the governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for providing troops in a timely manner.[90]

Zambia's President, Frederick Chiluba, was given the unenviable task of developing a programme of action to promote a peace process. He was mandated to broker a ceasefire while former President Masire of Botswana was charged with facilitating an internal dialogue process in the DRC. In July 1999, the state belligerents signed the Lusaka peace accord, which shifted the locus of international support from SADC to the UN and the DAD. Although President Mbeki played a key peacemaking role thereafter, facilitating the formation of a transitional government of national unity in the DRC in 2003, the violence continued to simmer and flare throughout 2004 and 2005.

Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections

One of the most important developments around democratisation in the region has been the adoption of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, which in accordance with the AU principles was adopted in Durban in July in 2002 and commits member states to seven principles for democratic governance through credible and legitimate elections.[91]

In 2003, SADC member states adopted the Strategic Indicative Plan for the OPS (SIPO), which essentially defines how SADC's security and political mandate would be operationalised with a view to achieving regional peace and institutionalising democratic governance. SIPO views the promotion and development of democratic institutions and practices by SADC members and the observance of universal human rights as key objectives of the OPDS. SIPO offers defined policies objective.[92]

Ensuring the implementation of SIPO and adherence to the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections in the region has been a Herculean task for South Africa. The first test cases were during the 2004 elections in Botswana, Namibia and Mozambique and the 2005 elections in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mauritius.[93]

SADC Community Parliamentary Forum

The South African Parliamentary Forum was established in1997 as an autonomous institution of SADC. It is a regional inter-parliamentary body composed of thirteen (13) parliaments representing over 3500 parliamentarians in the SADC region. The Forum seeks to bring regional experiences to bear at the national level, to promote best practices in the role of parliaments in regional cooperation and integration as outlined in the SADC Treaty and the Forum Constitution. Its main aim is to provide a platform for parliaments and parliamentarians to promote and improve regional integration in the SADC region through parliamentary involvement.

The objectives of the Forum address a wide range of issues, including but not limited to: promotion of human rights, gender equality, good governance, democracy and transparency; promotion of peace, security and stability; and hastening the pace of economic cooperation, development and integration based on equality and mutual benefits.

The Forum has taken a keen interest in election observation in its member states. In this regard, the Forum has observed elections in Namibia, Mozambique Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Tanzania. Based on these observations, the Forum has developed and adopted Electoral Norms and Standards for the SADC region, which serves as benchmarks against which to assess the management and conduct of elections in the region. Based on the adopted Norms and Standards, the Forum also decided to abandon its earlier focus on the observation of polling and counting activities and extend its mission to other phases of the electoral process, namely the pre-election and post-election phases.

The Forum also developed the *SADC Parliamentary Forum Strategic Plan (2006-2010).* This strategic plan analysed a revision of the Forum's vision and mission statements and identified strategic objectives that the Forum would have achieved by 2010.

ECOWAS and SADC Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: A Comparative Analysis

The conflict resolution mechanisms of both ECOWAS and SADC as regional security complexes would be examined within the larger OAU/AU politics of "African solutions for African problems". An attempt at how relations with the regional hegemons have shaped this security complex would be made.

Regional Security Complex and Conflict Resolution

The concept of regional security complex is explored here as a tool for understanding regional conflict resolution. A regional security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns are so closely intertwined that their national securities cannot meaningfully be understood in isolation from one another. In brief, a security complex may exist where there is a high level of mutually felt insecurity among two or more regional states.

The Southern African Regional Security Complex

The fourteen member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) constitute the southern African security complex. The evolution of this complex has been shaped by several historical, political and economic factors.[94] The close interdependence binding the southern African countries together and the fact that most of them are ruled by "weak" and "divided" states is what qualifies them as members of the same regional security complex. Conflict in any member state is very likely to spill over into the neighbouring countries. Many commentators recognised this fact as the driving force towards the regional approach to conflict resolution.

Conflicts in the security complex are usually intra- rather than inter-state and they have largely been due to struggle for power by various groups within the state rather than conflicts between and among states.

The West African Regional Security Complex

The fifteen member states that form the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) constitute the West African security complex. The evolution of this complex has been shaped by the decision of the fifteen states to form an economic union as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on May 28, 1975 in Lagos. A multiplicity of reasons was responsible for its formation including economic motivation that perceived ECOWAS integration as a national and regional development strategy. Politically, ECOWAS regionalism was assumed to serve as an instrument for foreign policy and a collective bargaining bloc and as a motivation for south-south co-operation as well as for collective solidarity in the historic tradition of functional cooperation in the sub-region. This regionalism was also prompted by factors relating to the maintenance of regional peace and security.[95]

The motivations for the formation of ECOWAS, according to Olatunde Ojo, were economic development and regional security.[96] Nigeria was instrumental in the formation of ECOWAS and provided politico-economic leadership in the efforts to develop a collective regional peace and security system in West Africa. Francis D.J. argues that despite its primary objective of regional economic development, challenges of regional security threats have been a constant concern for ECOWAS member countries.[97]

These West African states, like their Southern African counterparts, were bound together by these threats to the international security environment and the fact that most of them were also ruled by "weak" and "divided" states qualified them as members of the same regional security complex. Conflict in any one-member state is very likely to spill over into the neighbouring countries. As noted above, conflict in the West African security complex has equally been intra-rather than inter-state and they have largely been the result of various struggles for power by various groups within the state rather than conflicts between and among states. This has been true for the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

ECOWAS and SADC's Intervention in Regional Conflicts

Most conflicts that occurred within the two Communities were intra-rather than inter-state, largely caused by power tussle among the various groups within the member states. One major concern of the Communities' members was that conflict in any one-member state might spill over into the neighbouring countries and this was why they quickly rose up to the challenges. Both Communities employed various means to settle such conflicts, including meditation, good offices, military intervention and peacekeeping forces.

ECOWAS intervention in regional conflicts had been *ad hoc* in nature. ECOWAS responded to the crises in Liberia in 1989 by establishing a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). This then established the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which undertook peacekeeping in Liberia in 1990 and again in 1999 and 2003, in Sierra Leone 1997-2000, in Guinea-Bissau in 1999 and in Côte d'Ivoire in

2003. Through these actions, ECOWAS has gradually developed institutional capacity for crisis management. ECOMOG now stands like a standby force for the sub-region.

However, in Liberia and in Sierra Leone in particular, ECOMOG performance was controversial. It did not enjoy unanimous support within ECOWAS and according to some observers, it rather exacerbated the crises.[98] The domination of Nigeria, particularly when under military rule, did not facilitate acceptance of the legitimacy of ECOMOG troops. Still, a diplomatic norm has emerged emphasising the centrality of ECOWAS in conflict management in the region.

In 1999, ECOWAS adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, as a way of strengthening its mandate and institutional capacity to manage conflicts.[99] The Mechanism thus becomes the Organisation's constitution on collective security in the West African sub-region. The Mechanism in a clear departure from the OAU/AU traditional principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states empowers ECOWAS to intervene in the internal conflicts of member states. This must be because of massive violation of human rights and breakdown of the rule of law.[100] ECOWAS has also put in place an observation and monitoring system and has institutionalised coordination with NGOs through the Civil Society Forum (WACSOF) since 2003.

However, the Southern Africa region lacked meaningful attempts at cooperation. Difficulties have been faced both as far as the content of the cooperation and its form are concerned. On the one hand, there has been confusion on whether member states should enter a defence pact, that is a military alliance, or develop a comprehensive security policy. On the other hand, there are deep political divisions that hamper the formulation of a common policy, and the ability to interfere in the internal affairs of any of the member states.

Nevertheless, SADC had taken action in at least three cases. In the 1994 crisis in Lesotho, a SADC task force comprising South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe brought peace to the country. The three countries, together with Mozambique in 1998, were later mandated to guarantee Lesotho's fragile democracy. SADC achieved peace in Lesotho without military intervention. The situation was different in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which witnessed intra-state political crisis but with external backings of the warring factions.

SADC intervention in the DRC did not enhance the stability of the country; rather it contributed to the fragmentation of the country and external exploitation of its resources. It was not an economic success for Zimbabwe, although government officials there anticipated that revenues from the mineral riches of the DRC could cover the costs of the intervention. On the contrary, Zimbabwe's economic downturn and domestic political problems were only exacerbated.[101]

In the same year 1998, SADC military intervention in Lesotho, though restored peace in that country, was viewed by many observers as a military and political disaster.[102] After the military interventions in Lesotho by South Africa and Botswana and in the DR Congo by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, it was eventually agreed that those SADC states that felt able to intervene to assist a member state at the request of its government should do so. Sandra MacLean argues that the SADC as a regional organisation has been most affected by the conflict in the DRC and yet it has been largely silent on the issue. This she thinks largely explains the modest success in its conflict resolution efforts. South Africa has led most of the peace efforts in the sub-region.[103]

The gulf of opinion between and among SADC members regarding the structure, mandate and leadership of the OPDS undoubtedly paralysed this important institution and generated mutual distrust and tension among SADC members. As a result, the OPDS generally failed to respond to multiple conflict situations in the region including the protracted and costly war in Angola and sporadic political unrest in Swaziland. In most cases of violent eruption in the region, SADC has refrained from any engagement, treating violence as a purely domestic affair. Zimbabwe is a case in point. SADC has not only remained silent, but has expressed solidarity with the Zimbabwean government and condemned its international critics.

It is important to mention that although SADC did not possess a military intervention force like ECOMOG, or authorised military intervention in troubled states, SADC in 1998 and 1999 was able to make a collective effort to sanction military interventions aimed at resolving intra-state conflicts in Lesotho and the DRC respectively. By 2000, the Lesotho conflict had been sufficiently resolved and the parties reconciled, while a tenuous political settlement of the DRC conflict was achieved in 2002 both through military intervention by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia and peace a process largely brokered by South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki and Angola’s Eduardo dos Santos. Clearly, the health of the OPDS as a regulatory mechanism for peace and security in the region remains extremely poor owing primarily to complications at birth.

Power Relations in the Sub-regions

There is no denying the fact that the relations of the two Communities with the two regional hegemons, Nigeria and South Africa, have shaped the security complexes in the sub-regions. In the Liberian and Sierra Leonean cases, the ability of Nigeria to mobilise other ECOWAS members into an intervention force to intervene in Liberia and its single-handed military intervention in Sierra Leone mapped out the contours of a regional security complex in the West African sub-region. Besides, it is quite clear that to a certain degree the conflict in Sierra Leone was aggravated by the war in Liberia.

South Africa, on the other hand, had not been as successful in her efforts as Nigeria. South Africa has not been able to mobilise other members of SADC into an intervention force to intervene in any conflict in the sub-region. On the contrary, South Africa, backed by Botswana intervened in Lesotho without SADC authorisation and did not participate in the DRC intervention forces. The problems confronting conflict resolution in the southern African subcontinent have more to do with power tussle among the states, most especially between Pretoria and Harare, leading to non-implementation of the resolutions passed by the Organs on Politics, Defence and Security.

The power relations of the two regional security complexes are asymmetrical in nature and this serves as an obstacle to the realisation of conflict resolution in the two Communities. For instance, in both cases we could identify regional powers or hegemons: Nigeria for ECOWAS and South Africa for SADC. However, notwithstanding the preponderance of the powers of the two hegemons, power relations within the complex did not make it easy to reach decisions. In the case of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone using ECOMOG, some francophone members of ECOWAS were not very keen and that complicated the effectiveness of the mission amid charges of Nigerian bias towards some of the warring factions in Liberia. This culminated in the need for UN peacekeepers and some neutral troops from Tanzania and Uganda. In the case of Sierra Leone, Nigeria single-handedly led the ECOMOG intervention force before other forces could join.

In SADC, South Africa with some support from Botswana made the difference in the intervention in Lesotho even though this could not be replicated in the DR Congo. South African intervention in Lesotho was criticised by other SADC member states as having no SADC authorisation; so also was the military intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique in the DRC without any SADC authorisation. The power politics within SADC centred around two camps: the South Africa-led camp (comprising South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania and Lesotho), and the Zimbabwe-led camp (comprising Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique). It was also that of personality clashes between former President Nelson Mandela and President Robert Mugabe and between President Thabo Mbeki and President Robert Mugabe.

The Pretoria/ Harare clashes were premised on who leads the sub-regional affairs. For Mugabe, his efforts and those of other African states contributed immensely to the liberation and independence of South Africa. As the longest serving president, he expected to be accorded leading role in sub-regional affairs and not South African leaders. The state actors in the Zimbabwe-led camp always criticised Pretoria, most especially in her conflict resolution efforts.

South Africa is fully involved in SADC but has not driven the integration process as many observers expected in the light of its compromised strength in the region. In the mid-1990s, officials from SADC complained that Pretoria devoted less attention to its relations in southern Africa than elsewhere.[104] Since then, perceptions of neglect have persisted.[105] According to Mwesiga Baregu, SADC members 'wonder whether South Africa is a SADC team player or is driven purely by self-interest.'[106]

Pretoria no doubt has a coherent vision of common security; it does not have a comprehensive strategy. Its defence and foreign affairs staff often arrive at regional meetings without a ministerial directive.[107] Mbeki championed institution building at the continental level through the African Union, yet he devoted little attention to this process at the sub-regional level.[108]

The apparent neglect is due to a number of factors. Following the advent of democracy in 1994, government was preoccupied with the formidable challenges of national reconciliation, transforming state department and addressing the socio-economic legacy of apartheid. These challenges detracted South Africa from the region and posed practical obstacles to regional engagement. For instance, the inability of the armed forces to participate in multinational peace operations was (and remains) constrained by the political and organisational complications arising from the merger of government and guerrilla armies.

More generally, South Africa is strong only by African standards. Viewed objectively, it is a developing country with a relatively weak state, a small economy and limited capacity to contribute to external development.[109] It falls in the lower middle-income bracket and is confronted by substantial poverty, unemployment and inequality challenges. Given this combination of objective weakness and regional strength, Pretoria might believe that it has more gain from economic and development co-operation with industrialised countries in the North than from similar cooperation with its neighbours.

In addition, government has been extremely wary of adopting a political posture because of regional fears of domination that are heightened by Pretoria's policy of destablisation in the 1980s. The legacy of apartheid and liberation politics have created a balance of power based more on history than on formal power, preventing Pretoria from playing the role of local hegemon and enabling Zimbabwe to pose a rival source of influence.[110]

Southern Africa is inhibited too by the absence of democracy in many SADC states. Taking a strong stand against human rights abuses and authoritarianism courts the danger of breaching the principle of African solidarity, isolating the country and diminishing its leverage. For instance, in 1995, other African leaders soundly rebuffed President Mandela when he called for sanctions to be imposed on the dictatorial regime in Nigeria. Foreign affairs officials were chastened by this experience, which subsequently informed Mbeki's strategy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe. In 2001 a senior member of the African National Congress (ANC) justified this strategy on the grounds that government would not repeat Mandela's 'terrible mistake' when he acted as a ‘bully’ against Nigerian dictatorship and ‘everyone stood aside and we were isolated’.[111]

Unlike South Africa, Nigeria has demonstrated her hegemonic role in West Africa in several spheres of the Community’s activities but most visibly in security matters, particularly in conflict management, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. The series of conflicts in the sub-region exposed the potential of Nigeria as a regional hegemon with a lot of will and resources when critically needed. Nigeria could have looked the other way during the Liberian crisis. That would have had disastrous repercussions on ECOWAS. Instead, she mobilised her resources and applied her political influence in a manner that saved the situation and ECOWAS. She provided troops, logistics and financial resources, now estimated to be about $4.5 billion on the Liberian crisis alone, which helped ECOMOG carry out its role.[112]

Nigeria and South Africa in Third-Party Intervention and Good Offices

Nigeria and South Africa have led third-party interventions in their respective sub-regional communities. In SADC, South Africa led an effective intervention in the Lesotho crisis even though this was criticised. The intervention in the DR Congo was ineffective and in the long run it was left to those SADC members who felt able to do so and it had to resort to the good offices role of former Botswana president Sir Ketumile Masire, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki who hosted the all-party talks of the Congolese warring factions.

In the case of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, various West African leaders hosted peace talks ending in various peace accords. In the case of Liberia, it finally took President Obasanjo of Nigeria to offer President Charles Taylor exile in Nigeria, which was to pave the way for the final peace accord for Liberia, which ended the conflict. Both hegemons have employed third-party intervention and Good Offices in ending conflicts and in peacebuilding in their respective sub-regions.

Conclusion

Both ECOWAS and SADC were formed primarily as economic communities, but they now see themselves forced by changing international relations, particularly at the end of the Cold War, to assume functions they were not originally set up to deal with. They have had to deal with conflicts, which had been suppressed by the Cold War. The record of conflict resolution of the two security complexes has been mixed. The SADC intervention in Lesotho was botched and its peace-making efforts in the DR Congo failed, yet these were the only authentic SADC attempts to forestall conflicts in the region.

In this regard, ECOWAS diplomatic and military missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were arguably better. In the case of Liberia, it may be argued that ECOWAS prolonged the Liberia civil war causing more harm than good to displaced persons. However, the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone saved thousands of lives by providing a buffer between the combatants and hundreds of displaced persons.

The conflict resolution mechanism of ECOWAS has not been very effective. In correcting the situation, the organisation has put in place a Mechanism to deal with conflicts even though this is yet to be ratified by the required nine members. On is own part, SADC has set up its organ on Politics, Defence and Security but it has suffered from lack of agreement on the mandate and functions of the Organisation

In the four case studies in the two regional security complexes there is a lack of formal institutional structures in the regional organisations to deal with conflicts even though, ECOWAS has now set a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

The lack of a mechanism for conflict resolution in the ECOWAS and SADC security complexes is one factor that would explain the ineffectual regional interventions. SADC’s organ of Politics, Defence and Security was established in 1996 but it has virtually not functioned since its creation. The intervention of ECOMOG in both Liberia and Sierra Leone was a mixed fortune and did not lead directly to the end of the two crises. ECOWAS combined the use of the intervention force with years of mediation for which several peace accords were signed in both the Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts culminating, in the eventual peace in the two countries. Thus, no formal conflict resolution mechanism existed in the two complexes prior to the eruption of the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, DR Congo and Lesotho. This led to ad hoc arrangements to form ECOMOG to intervene in the conflicts in West Africa and for SADC, South Africa-led military intervention in Lesotho although this had no formal SADC authorisation.

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CHAPTER SIX

CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF INTEGRATION IN WEST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

ECOWAS and SADC face challenges similar to other regional economic groupings in the world. These challenges, though surmountable, have certainly slowed down the pace of integration in both communities. Both organisations have therefore been grappling with these challenges with a view to overcoming them.

Challenges facing the West African Economic Community (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS experiences problems common to regional groupings the world over. Several reasons have been adduced for the generally slow pace of implementation of the ECOWAS integration agenda and its developmental impact. Professor Adebayo Adedeji, for instance, attributed this to the economic crisis that has engulfed the continent since 1980.[1] According to him; a major problem confronting ECOWAS in its developmental efforts is the lack of "a group or a popular dynamic supporting integration. He also opined that pressure groups for the mobilisation of public opinion in the direction of the Community are almost totally non-existent."[2]

Other leaders such as General Abdusalami Abubakar, former Nigerian military head of state attributed the slow pace of integration to the many conflicts, which have ravaged the sub-region.[3] It should also be pointed out that these failures reflect the inadequate commitment of the governments of the various member states to the ideals for which ECOWAS was set up. Leaders of member states lack the political commitments and will, as they are reluctant to respect the spirit of supra-nationality on which the organisation is expected to function. In addition, their attitude to the payment of dues and the quality of representation and attendance at meetings leaves much to be desired.

Other challenges, which have hampered the realisation of the dream of promoting sub-regional integration and intra-regional trade in West Africa, abound in low-level intra-regional trade, reliance on tariffs as a major source of revenue, low level of industrial and agricultural productivity and poor state of infrastructure. The withdrawal of Mauritania from the Community in late December 2000 and other dramatic changes that took place in the sub-region together with external processes all hampered the growth of ECOWAS.

For over thirty years of ECOWAS existence, the sub-region has continued to witness violence and conflicts leading in many cases to intra-state civil wars. This remains a major threat to peace, security and economic cooperation in the sub-region. ECOWAS has spent a substantial part of its existence on resolution of crises in a number of states such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea Bissau and, quite recently, Cote d'Ivoire. These conflicts and wars have brought untold hardship to the people of these countries, leading to displacement of people and refugee problems. In view of the lingering problems in these states, the sub-regional community has diverted a substantial part of her resources meant for economic development to solving political crises and war. Similarly, the states entangled in wars could not contribute meaningfully to sub-regional trade and economic integration.

It is incorrect to argue that in the absence of any visible improvement in trade, ECOWAS significantly moved into the political sphere by establishing the joint peacekeeping force (ECOMOG) in 1990. The real issue is that though the conflicts retarded the economic progress of ECOWAS, it also significantly contributed to greater political consciousness and interaction in the sub-region. This new character of politics and security related issues in the sub-region contributed to generating a new dynamism in the West African integration process.[4]

Linked to the preponderance of violence, conflicts and absence of peace is the persistent high level of poverty in the region, which is exacerbated by a high population growth rate, slow economic growth and the challenges of huge debt burden. Many countries in West Africa fall within the United Nations, list of Least Developed Countries (LDC). There is also the problem of small and domestic markets in the sub-region with only Nigeria and Ghana having sizeable markets for meaningful trade.

Another major problem confronting ECOWAS is that the production structures of ECOWAS member states are not complementary but rather competitive with each other. In other words, member states of ECOWAS produce the same products and sell them in the same market. This in turn reduces intra-regional trade. The strategy of reducing customs duties to increase intra-regional trade in West Africa has also shown that though reducing customs duties is necessary it is not sufficient for promoting intra-regional trade in West Africa.

There is no doubt that ECOWAS is confronted with many challenges and has not been able to increase intra-West African trade. For instance, in 2001 intra-ECOWAS export and import trade was only 9.25 per cent and 31.44 per cent of total West Africa export and import trade. In contrast, ECOWAS export and import with the European

Union was 31.44 per cent and 45.5 per cent of the total West African export and import trade for the same period.[5] This unimpressively low rate of intra-ECOWAS trade cannot provide the required wider market, which is needed for modern industrial growth.

A major challenge confronting ECOWAS and deeper sub-regional economic development and integration has been how to harmonise the financial systems in the sub-region considering the different competing monetary systems operating in the sub-region. ECOWAS lacks a common payment system. This was an obstacle to the achievement of a sub-regional market and the successful liberalisation of trade. The currencies of member states are tied to different major hard currencies, such as the French franc, the Portuguese escudo, the English pound sterling and the American dollar.[6]

The currencies of member states are still not convertible, despite the fact that a programme of monetary cooperation has been launched with the ultimate goal of achieving a single currency. Little success has been recorded in attaining the stipulated convergence. Serious efforts have been made to establish a West African Monetary System but many hurdles remain to be crossed. Until the currency barrier is dismantled, the prospect for increased intra-ECOWAS trade and sub-regional development cannot be realised. For a single currency to be achieved in the sub-region, it would require a much clearer degree of social and political cohesion and integration since member states are at different levels of development.[7]

Most member states of the Community have abolished visa and entry permits as well as introduced the ECOWAS Travel Certificate, the ECOWAS Brown Card and ECOWAS Liability Insurance Card, with the aim of facilitating the free movement of persons from one ECOWAS member state to another. While the visa and entry permit requirements may have been abolished in all ECOWAS member states, it was observed that "nearly all member states still maintain numerous checkpoints, and ECOWAS citizens are subject to administrative harassment and extortion" at every checkpoint along the long stretch of road linking all ECOWAS states.[8]

Similarly, though the ECOWAS Travel Certificate has entered into circulation in some member states such as Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the President of the ECOWAS Commission claims "high printing costs are prohibiting factors for some members." The Community therefore had to seek for financial assistance from a number of donors for such members."[9]

Member states have been reluctant to introduce the harmonised immigration and emigration forms at their border posts thereby hindering free movement of people across the borders. It must be mentioned that the following twelve countries have currently applied the ECOWAS Brown Card and the ECOWAS Liability Insurance Scheme, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-Leone and Togo. The problem is that two major vehicle insurance systems are coexisting in the sub-region: the ECOWAS Brown Card and the CIMA Code, thus hindering the free movement of vehicles across member states.

The non-implementation of most of ECOWAS migration rules is often the rule rather than the exception. In spite of the lofty provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty and Protocols, the continuous initiation and application of discriminatory economic policies against non-citizens (including Community citizens) by the various ECOWAS states has at best ridiculed the claims on the liberalisation of movement of persons in the ECOWAS sub-region.

The greatest impediment to the free movement of goods is that most states have not printed and introduced the certificate of origin of goods. In addition, some member states have failed to print the harmonised documents and have therefore not implemented the harmonised customs documents. Similarly, most member states have not removed tariff barriers on the importation of industrial goods and this is one of the main weaknesses of ECOWAS. Most member states are yet to comply with the requirement and tenets for the harmonisation of their economic and financial policies. This has partly been responsible for the delay of the introduction of a common currency in the sub-region.

Despite the fact that many member states have ratified the protocol on the Community Levy and incorporated it into their appropriation bills, the coexistence of the ECOWAS TLS and the UEMOA scheme and the absence of measures to enlighten economic operators about the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme hinder full implementation of the policy.

The structure of trade links with the metropolitan countries has implications for the development of local industry in West Africa to produce manufactured goods as components of intra-ECOWAS trade. The paucity of market information and easy access to member states markets are other limiting factors to intra-ECOWAS trade expansion. As a result, the share of intra-ECOWAS trade in the total trade of the community has stagnated in the region to about ten percent over the years.

It is important to also acknowledge that the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) adopted by a number of West African states and globalization have impacted negatively on the process of integration and sub-regional development. This is true because the economic development problems of member states was further compounded as each adopted varying forms of SAP, with complications for other countries, especially their neighbours.[10]

Another major challenge facing ECOWAS is the high level of indebtedness of member states as reflected in the poor payments of membership dues and other levies. As at September 2006, many member states were indebted to ECOWAS in payment of contributions of various ECOWAS projects. These ranges from; payment for the construction of the ECOWAS Secretariat headquarters in Abuja; contribution to the ECOWAS Fund; the Executive Secretariat budget; as well as contributions to the ECOWAS Capital Fund.[11] Member states owe ECOWAS a lot of money running into billions of US Dollars as can be seen from Table 8. Member states should reduce or completely pay off their arrears to enable the ECOWAS Secretariat and its other statutory organs function effectively and efficiently.

TABLE 8: Breakdown of Arrears of Development Funds Owed by ECOWAS Member States to ECOWAS Secretariat and Organs

S/NO	Country	Arrears to the Budget of the Executive Secretary	Arrears of 2nd Tranche of Contributions to the Capital Fund	Arrears for the Construction of Headquarters	Arrears as Loan to ECOWAS Fund	Total Debt in Units of Accounts	Total Debt in US Dollars.
1.	**Sierra Leone**	UA2,339,610	UA1,562,310	UA534,963	-	4,436,883	6,211,636.20
2.	**Cape Verde**	UA1,029,112	UA99,043	UA57,498	-	1,185,653	1,659,914.20
3.	**Cote d'Ivoire**	-	UA1,316,720	-	-	1,316,720	1,843,408.00
4.	**Mali**	-	-	-	-	-	-
5.	**Ghana**	UA1,133,055	UA1,971,551	UA1,232,656	-	4,337,262	6,072,166.80
6.	**Gambia**	UA1,514,300	UA654,139	UA204,719	I	2,373,158	3,322,421.20
7.	**Guinea Bissau**	UA1,280,156	UA588,614	UA151,897	UA1,412,366	3,433,033	4,806,246.20
8.	**Niger**	UA1,414,307	UA819,555	UA152,072	UA939,546	3,325,480	4,655,672.00
9.	**Guinea**	UA1,514,300	-	-	-	1,514,300	2,120,020.00
10.	**Liberia**	UA6,968,826	UA2,629,142	UA703,045	UA2,001,830	12,302,843	17,223,980.20
11.	**Nigeria**	-	-	-	UA791,025	791,025	1,107,435,00
12.	**Togo**	UA2,339,610	UA1,562,310	UA534,963	UA103,637	4,540,520	6,356,728.00
13.	**Benin**	-	-	-	-	-	
14.	**Senegal**	1,285,066	2,119,010	189,365	-	-	
15.	**Burkina Faso**	-	-	-	-	-	

Culled from ECOWAS Website as at September 2006

The existence of many regional integration schemes in the sub-region also hinders deeper economic integration. Many of the existing regional groupings operate at cross roads and duplicate the efforts of their members. The problem is compounded by the fact that ten out of ECOWAS member states are simultaneously members of some West African regional groupings such as the CEAO, Mano River Union and the Cape Verde/Guinea-Bissau Free Trade Area. These groupings also have similar aims and objectives and perform similar functions as ECOWAS. Member states pay more attention and participate more actively in these groupings than ECOWAS. Member states also face the problem of multiple payments of dues and other financial obligations in these groupings.

Most member states of ECOWAS are wretchedly impoverished and depend heavily on grants from Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as other donor countries outside West Africa. It is unfortunate that former imperialist capitalist classes headquartered in the developed countries own many of the operating companies in the sub-region. Thus when agreements are concluded among the member countries of ECOWAS, the dominance of the Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) reduces the effective implementation of such agreements. These TNCs would only cooperate if such agreements would serve their interests (foreign interests).

Also in relation to the above assertion, the more the economies of participating members are tied to or influenced by foreign governments, the fewer the benefits of economic integration accruing to citizens of member countries. There are nine different currencies in the sub-region with seven of the sixteen countries having a common currency tied to France. The Francophone West African states maintain a very strong monetary union via the CFA-franc through the Union Economique ET Monetaire l'Quest Africane (UEMOA), which constitutes a threat to the monetary union of the entire ECOWAS Community. Until the currency barrier is dismantled, the prospect for increased intra-ECOWAS trade cannot be realised. However, the harmonisation of ECOWAS and UEMOA programmes would avoid overlapping and duplication of efforts, especially in the area of the trade liberalisation.

The unnecessary roadblocks at border posts and the corrupt practices of border security officials across the sub-region is a disincentive to the promotion of intra-regional trade. Long queues still characterise the various border posts in the sub-region. ECOWAS has not been able to eliminate extortion by border officials including immigration, customs, police and other numerous security agents set up by different governments. Poor inter-modal transportation networks exist in the sub-region. The planned West African Highway networks, one along the coast from Lagos to Nouakchott and another across the hinterland from Dakar to N'djamena, have not been completed. Only the national sections have been constructed. This has hampered free inter-state movement of persons and goods.

The energy sector is yet another major challenge for ECOWAS because of the low per capita generation and consumption level of power. Many West African states are without adequate power supply and this is a huge contributory factor to the low industralisation of the sub-region. Many citizens of the Community do not have access to modern electricity thereby relying on firewood and other obsolete methods of generating electricity. The harmonisation of energy projects would be of great help to many West African states where there is inadequate energy for domestic and industrial use.

Another crucial element in the infrastructural development agenda of the ECOWAS was the construction of the West African Gas Pipeline, covering a total pipeline length of seven hundred and eighty-one kilometres and carrying gas from Warri in Nigeria to Benin, Ghana and Togo for the generation of energy. The plan by ECOWAS member states to create a West African power pool, which would enable the interconnectivity of national electricity grids with about 5600 kilometres of electricity lines to be put in place, has also been on hold with limited success recorded.

Another major problem confronting the Community is the lack of human resource capacity and adequate required technical skills competence to manage the challenges of integration and cooperation. According to Mohammed Ibn Chambas, two major constraints of ECOWAS are "lack of human resources and the irregularity of member's contribution". According to the President of the Commission, the work of the body was being slowed down by the inadequacy of human resource capacity within the Community.[12] The problem is not that there are no people with necessary skills in the sub-region: the organisation has just not been able to establish a framework that will allow it to access such people.

The President of the Commission, Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, acknowledged the challenges facing the West African sub-region in an interview with the Nigerian newspaper *Thisday* during the 30th anniversary of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2005. He said:

> The constraints remain the prevalence of instability, the challenge of lack of peace and security in many of our member states. It takes us away from our original mandate: economic cooperation, economic development and fighting poverty, and stepping up trade. But

> political instability in many member states diverts our attention. The massive poverty in the sub-region remains a major challenge and constraint. That means that we may not get the resources we need to run an efficient secretariat, regular funding, but also to implement projects in the sub-region. We also have the problem of insufficient integration of national policies with the integration approach. Protocols and decisions taken collectively by member states must be domesticated and implementation of national policies must reflect a regional approach. This is what will help us to reach the vision of a borderless West Africa, the creation of a wide economic space and huge markets that could create the opportunities to West African people to step up economic activities and trade as well as increase real opportunities for wealth.[13]

Dr. Chambas also noted, "That the majority of ECOWAS countries are listed among the Least Developed Countries and the growth rate of the economy should balance out against population growth rate, which is not the case now, is of concern to us. In fact, it is so slow that many of our countries are unlikely to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGS)."[14]

Economic development in the sub-region has been affected by the poor level of agricultural production, the crisis of HIV/AIDS and the challenge of poverty, desertification and water resources among several others. Despite the adoption of several sub-regional strategies for the development of agriculture since 1982, the Community is still faced with acute shortage of food and still relies on importation of food to feed its teeming population. West Africa is an agrarian region with a lot of potential for agricultural production, yet it produces much less food than required. The crisis of HIV/AIDS has also affected the economic development of the sub-regional community. The infection rate of this dreaded disease in the sub-region is between 5 to 10 per cent. This is alarming and detrimental to the future development and prospects of the Community.

Other challenges facing ECOWAS include the neo-patrimonial and rentier character of West African states, their prebendal politics, their philosophy of development, which is essentially dependent, as well as their corrupt governance culture, lack of political will and poor leadership. The destabilising activities of various interest groups and destructive ethnic mobilisation, creating political instability and fosters competitive nationalism are also obstacles to the achievement of progress in ECOWAS integration and development.

Another obstacle is the suspicion among member states and, as a result, lack of total commitment to the goals of the organisation. Members are not all politically committed to the aims, objectives, ideals and agenda of ECOWAS. Members are still largely reluctant to concede enough power to the supra-nationality of ECOWAS. This has been offered on the altar of dominance of nation states' interests.[15] This has resulted in poor level of implementation of ECOWAS decisions. Attempts to use the revised Charter to refocus the organisation have not achieved the desired results. The Implementation Status Report compiled by the President of the Commission indicated that only 45per cent of the programmes have been implemented by member states.[16]

A more significant challenge is the level of dependence of the member states and the organisation itself. It is on record that many ECOWAS projects and programmes now depend completely on donor agencies. The strategic ECOWAS conflict management programmes depend entirely on donor funding. Thus, given the pervasiveness of dependency in West Africa and the nature of external and internal linkages between the political leadership of the sub-region and their international neo-colonial mentors, it is not surprising that not much fundamental progress has been made in achieving regional integration and development.

The non-competitiveness of goods manufactured in the sub-region, when compared with goods imported from third countries especially from the USA, Europe and Asia, have led many critics of ECOWAS Common External Tariff to assume it could lead to the flooding of the sub-region with cheaper goods produced out of West Africa.

Another challenge to the success of the Common External Tariff is the poor state of infrastructure in the sub-region. Most states in the ECOWAS sub-region lack good roads, efficient telecommunication facilities, adequate energy supply and pipe-borne water. The deficient nature of these factors of production will definitely affect the competitiveness of goods manufactured in the sub-region

Most states in the West African sub-region lack the requisite skilled manpower to provide all the technical know-how to enhance industrial and economic development. Similarly, most businesses in the sub-region have not maximized the benefits of the use of information technology, which is now an integral part of any success in global competitiveness. Despite these constraints, the adoption of an ECOWAS Common External Tariff is a necessary criterion for the evolution of an economic union. Member states of ECOWAS must improve their economies to adapt to the challenges of globalization and forward-looking policies like the Common External Tariff.

It can be concluded that for more than thirty years of ECOWAS's establishment, the community is yet to fully achieve its economic development and deeper integration goals. The sub-regional common market has not been achieved, the monetary union is slowly taking shape, infrastructural development is still underdeveloped, there is no real integration of production, and the process of harmonisation of tariff to boost trade is painfully slow leaving the members as competitors with each other. Member states and the sub-regional body are still largely dependent and the goal of self-reliance development is yet to be attained.

ECOWAS members remain committed to the pursuit of national development policies instead of a harmonised sub-regional development programme. The goal of free movement of the community's citizens within the sub-region is yet to be fully realised. Even though visas have been abolished among member states, citizens still suffer untold hardship trying to cross the borders, while formal trans-border trade is yet to be properly organised.

Politically, members are not committed to the ideals and agenda of ECOWAS. Efforts to reorganise and reposition the organisation towards the realisations of its agenda have met with little success. Members have not been implementing ECOWAS Protocols and decisions at the national level. In addition, a host of members is financially indebted in various forms to the organisation.

It can be concluded that despite the numerous problems confronting the sub-regional organisation, ECOWAS could still achieve its aims and goals all that is required is an appropriate level of strategic political vision and commitment and return to the ideals of a developmental state and a consciousness of developmental regionalism. ECOWAS has therefore set in motion "a process of repositioning itself in order to better prosecute its integration and development agenda for the average citizen to begin to directly reap the benefits of the process."[17]

Challenges to Conflict Management and Peacekeeping

The 1975 Lagos ECOWAS Treaty was silent on conflict management and peacekeeping, but ECOWAS sent peace enforcement force the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) - to Liberia in August 1990. ECOMOG was an ad hoc peacekeeping arrangement sent into the country following the outbreak of war in the country. The Liberian crisis, which had led to the displacement of people and inflow of refugees, was perceived by many West African states as a threat to the peace and economic well-being of the sub-region. The ECOMOG force therefore moved into Liberia when the international community was not willing to assist the sub-region in bringing about the desired peace.

Amadu Sesay rightly observed that ECOWAS "rose creditably to the challenges of conflict management and peacekeeping in West Africa, at a time when the great powers had literally abandoned West Africa, and indeed the continent as a whole, and focused their attention on Bosnia in Europe."[18] In the official circle and in most countries in West Africa and most especially in Nigeria, the intervention was seen in terms of defence of peace and security in the sub-region as well as in the spirit of good neighbourliness. Nevertheless, most West African states did not support the initial operations of ECOMOG in Liberia. They later supported it reluctantly. President Olusegun Obasanjo pointed out "ECOMOG badly fell short of its ideals in many ways."[19]

Despite some success stories, the conflict management mechanism of ECOWAS is still largely underdeveloped, generally lacking established institutions and structures. Since there is an absence of institutionalised structures for conflict management, conflict resolution initiatives have mostly taken ad hoc forms. The creation of ECOMOG in 1990 led to the establishment of an ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in December 1999, as a permanent machinery for ensuring lasting peace and stability in the sub-region. It must be stressed that though the action is commendable, the mechanism does not address the critical issue of who will determine when and how the military force under the mechanism will be deployed.

ECOWAS, like many sub-regional organisations in Africa, lacks effective early warning systems, reconnaissance and logistical capacities, lacks assessment capacities, and is therefore considerably weak in conflict prevention. ECOWAS can now boast of the Observation and Monitoring Centre, which is the hub of the ECOWAS Early Warning System. The Centre has four observation and monitoring zones within the Sub-region. These are located in Banjul (Gambia), Monrovia (Liberia), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and Cotonou (Benin).

Challenges to the Implementation of Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance

Many leaders are not committed to the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. It must be mentioned that many countries have not ratified the Protocol. As at 2005, only nine countries (excluding Nigeria) had ratified the Protocol. This confirms the general notion that West African leaders have “a legendary habit of not honouring their own declarations.”[20] No reason was given for the lukewarm attitude of the regional hegemon towards the ratification of the Protocol. In spite of this, the ECOWAS Commission has been implementing the terms of the Protocol and specific decisions of the Authority on issues relating to the Protocol. This has served as an effective means of conflict prevention management and resolution, peacekeeping and security.

Another area where the Community has been ineffective is in using the big stick of the Protocol on erring members. In 2002, ECOWAS, in spite of her zero tolerance for unconstitutional accession to power, could not sanction the coup plotters in Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau. This inaction allowed the uprising in Cote d'Ivoire to degenerate into a full-scale civil war, which ravaged the country for many years. Equally, in spite of the Protocol, ECOWAS did nothing to get Yala moderate his excesses in the three-year period before the 2003 coup. Again, the so-called ECOWAS peace talks and breakthrough had turned out to be another 'fire-fighter' approach towards a deep-rooted problem. The new government continued to introduce anti-democratic policies, which later threw the country into another round of political instability.

The outcome of the April 2005 Presidential election in Togo left much to be desired. The election was acclaimed not to be free and fair, although ECOWAS endorsed it. The ECOWAS-sponsored West African Civil Society Forum (WASCOF) Observer Mission to Togo had observed that while the post-Eyadema era "offered an opportunity for rebirth of democracy and good governance in Togo, the processes, procedures and conduct of the (24^{th} April 2005) elections …leaves much to be desired … the elections were neither free nor fair."[21]

It is also very clear that ECOWAS appears to be helpless against the new phenomenon engulfing the political terrain of West Africa, the so-called 'third term agenda'. Most West African leaders are now in the habit of luring the country's Senate or their National Assemblies to extend their stay in office from two to three terms, a process, which by all indications is a deviation from the pursuit of sound democratic value and good governance. The manipulation, deception and rancour associated with the pursuit of the agenda do not augur well for stability. ECOWAS stone silence over such a crucial issue was therefore unnerving. Since 2001, term limits have been lifted, over ECOWAS indifference if not acquiescence, in Guinea, Togo, Burkina Faso and The Gambia.[22]

Another political scenario that ECOWAS has equally remained silent over is the case of 'sit-tight presidents' or 'presidents for life'. These crops of leaders have employed all unconstitutional methods to remain in office, including elimination of political opponents and unleashing terror on perceived enemies and the entire population. After being in power since 1984, Lansana Conteh of Guinea resumed office in 1992 under a two-five-year term limit that should have ended in 2002; but the limit was lifted in 2001 through a referendum to allow Conteh hang on to power indefinitely. Even more serious is the potential danger that his elongated rule poses for stability in West Africa. In the same boat is Burkina Faso's president, Blaise Campaore, who has ruled the country since 1987. When he began his third term, he promised to remain in power for thirty years. [23]

The political situation within many member states does not look too conducive to the development of democratic governance. In many democratic member states, opposition participation in parliamentary proceedings is low and there is insufficiency of civil society involvement in governance (due to low consultation and lack of civil education among citizens and civil society). Election proceedings in many member states lack credibility and this calls to question the legitimacy of the electoral authorities, whether they are partial or powerless in dealing with conflicts arising from the election process.[24]

Public participation in elections is underdeveloped in most member states. Mass public participation in politics still revolves mainly around elections and political parties and in the form of public rallies. The media too have not fully internalised their role and even in cases when they do, they have no resources to be an effective channel for public participation. Most legislative organs have not sufficiently exercised their legislative and supervisory functions. They lack consultation mechanisms and they hardly use the public debate process, with their autonomy and influenced compromised.

Gender discrimination in politics is still obvious, since women are largely excluded from political and decision-making process. Women continue to operate from a disadvantaged position as party structure where candidates for political offices are nominated remains male-dominated. This is a clear violation of the gender balance provisions in Article 2 (3) of the Protocol. [25]

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

The countries of southern Africa are bound together by cultural and political affinities, which have in the past enabled them to intervene in solving internal conflicts in individual countries. The signing of the SADC Treaty gave the organisation a legal status, which its predecessor SADCC did not have, conferring on it some amount of leverage in its negotiations with cooperating governments and international donor institutions. The challenges facing intra-regional trade expansion and deeper economic integration among SADC countries are similar to those of ECOWAS and include the following.

First, there is a non-complementary trade structure and low industrialisation among SADC member states. The main products traded in the sub-region are primary or simple manufactured products such as tea, textiles, cotton yarn, tobacco, sugar, refined motor spirit, cement, fertilizer, copper, rice, iron and steel. Lack of industrial development and product complementarities indicate only limited potential for expanded intra-regional trade. Most SADC countries are insufficiently industrialised. Between 1992 and 1999, the manufacturing sector contributed only 20% to the GDP with South Africa as the leading industrial state.[26] South Africa is therefore regarded as a potential stimulator for diversification processes.[27]

SADC member states have low purchasing power and low macroeconomic convergence as many are small in international terms with a real GDP of US$ 219 billion, only South Africa accounts for 77% of SADC's GDP. Thus if South Africa is excluded, the average per capita income in 2002 was US$ 1,216 in SADC. Since almost all SADC[28] countries can be classified as small, low-income countries, the potential for expanding the size of trade among partners is regarded as low.[29]

In addition to different income levels, SADC countries highly differ with respect to their macroeconomic indicators and policies. Deep economic integration in SADC is seen as crucial and countries have to move towards converging levels of macroeconomic stability. This included low inflation, sustainable external debt rates, realistic exchange rates and a stable fiscal and monetary management. However, to date member countries have not moved towards greater macroeconomic convergence and they are yet to reach their ambitious goals with respect to inflation levels, economic growth rates or external reserves and import cover.[30]

Supply-side constraints such as economic, political and social conditions hamper African countries' potential from benefits of accessing intra-regional and international market. Most SADC countries face manifold supply-side constraints. These included unfavourable macroeconomic environment (for instance insufficient capital supply and limited convertible currencies), lack of public infrastructure (deficient roads, non-reliable electricity and water supply), a low labour productivity due to lack of education, poor health and housing provision, missing export market information, backwardness in technological services, and missing backward and forward linkages. Since these manifold supply-side constraints have not been successfully tackled so far, SADC countries have not been able to exploit potential export benefits.[31]

Many SADC countries have established a regime of high import tariffs not only to protect their domestic industries but also to secure income sources.[32] As a result of this import-substituting strategy, imported consumer and intermediary goods became expensive, resulting in the creation of a “dual economy,” which was characterised by uneven development within the country. There were few modern capital-intensive industries with missing backward and forward linkages in production process; at the same time, other sectors like agriculture were neglected. Though structural adjustment programmes have forced most African countries to reduce their industrial protection, openness to trade varies greatly among SADC countries, rating from “open” economies such as Malawi and Zambia to very restrictive trade regimes such as Zimbabwe.[33]

Furthermore, most SADC countries are still highly dependent on trade tariffs as a source of revenue. This accounts for around 10% of total Zimbabwe revenue, around 30% for Mauritius, Namibia and Zambia, and for more than 50% of revenue in Lesotho and Swaziland.[34] It is alarming that neither the economic power of SADC, South Africa nor the comparably better developed countries like Zimbabwe are classified as open.[35]

Additionally, free trade in the SADC FTA is constrained by member countries' attitude to backload goods to only front load goods. Backload goods are goods that show potential for cross border trade such as tobacco, leather, beverages and foodstuff. Frontload goods are goods, which limits the options of trade creation and bears the risk of trade diversion, thus worsening the trade imbalances in the region[36]

The trade imbalances of South Africa in SADC are enormous and pose great challenges to deeper economic integration in the sub-region. South Africa, the economic and political giant of SADC, exported in 2004 R 261 million to the SADC region but imported only R 65 million. [37] For South Africa, the SADC region is a middle-level trading partner, accounting for 10% of its exports and 1.4% of its imports in 2000.[38] This might be an indication that African businesses explore new markets independently from regional integration arrangements and that SADC has not been able contribute significantly to intra-regional trade facilitation.

The lack of a complementary trade structure and the export bias of South Africa and Zimbabwe vis-à-vis the region have resulted in trade divertive effects that benefit the higher developed economies at the expense of the less developed ones. The less developed SADC countries are not able to raise their intra-regional exports significantly. The more advanced economies in SADC, South Africa and Zimbabwe, are therefore not only called upon to open their markets for less developed members but also to work towards ameliorative measures, such as the establishment of a compensatory fund. However, to date neither South Africa nor Zimbabwe has taken on active roles to promote regional integration in SADC. This therefore raises concern on the political commitment of SADC members.[39]

Another challenge to integration in SADC is the Non Elimination of Tariff Barriers (NTBs). The SADC Trade Protocol (Art. 6-7) calls for the elimination of tariff barriers such as cumbersome custom procedure and documentation, import and export quotas, import bans and road blocks. However, to date custom procedures have not been harmonised, import bans and road blocks still exist and transport corridors, such as the Trans-Caprivi Corridor, have not been too successful in tackling effectively administrative delays.[40]

Complex rules of origin are above all a big problem towards the successful implementation of the SADC FTA.[41] The SADC Trade Protocol contains much more complex procedures, including detailed technical process requirements and a lower import content but higher domestic value addition requirements. For textiles and garments, the condition of double transformation has been applied (with exception for least developed SADC members), aimed to protect the South African market. South Africa also acts restrictive regarding wheat flour, mineral fuels, motor vehicles, machinery and electric products where member countries have not agreed on common rules of origin to date.[42]

Overlapping membership and inconsistency of regional integration strategy are also factors hindering deep economic integration in the sub-region. Overlapping memberships in SADC increase member countries' financial burden and stretch their already scarce human, administrative and technical capacities. Furthermore, the goal of both integration frameworks to work towards a Customs Union for member countries forces double members to decide for SADC in the near future. However, to date the integration successes of SADC are still limited so that countries' double membership does not infringe with their obligations in the respective integration body.

In 2001, SADC member states agreed on the establishment of a common task force, aimed at improving the coordination of their programmes and collaborate trade related issues such as customs procedures, standardisation and statistical trainings.[43] However, the envisaged agreement on a common external tariff for SADC is very doubtful. This is because the sub-regional economic power South Africa focuses more on trade with industrialised countries than with the region and is not ready to compromise on her CET. Furthermore, South Africa has a bilateral FTA with her main trading partner, the EU, so that her CET is to a certain extent "locked in".

Many SADC member countries lack foreign exchange and this has led to greater indebtedness and inability of some states to repay earlier loans. This has consequently increased dependence on the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The question of overvalued exchange rates or simply incorrect pricing policies for exports was a factor, which negatively affected prospects for intra-SADC trade. SADC members were also subject to the element of risk, either real or imagined, with respect to payments, delivery time and quality. A SADC expert group was established to standardise and control the quality of SADC goods.

SADC countries experience weak physical infrastructure such as poor communications network, telecommunications, poor road network, rail network, air, and sea links. Many factors caused the problems such as lack of foreign exchange, the prolonged drought particularly in the beginning of the 1980s, the war situation in many member nations such as Mozambique, Angola, DR Congo, Malawi and Zimbabwe, as well as the destabilisation of these states by the former apartheid regime of the Republic of South Africa.

The paucity of technical expertise and trained personnel in management and entrepreneurial skills also hinders deeper economic integration in SADC. This has led to inadequate provision of staff and other resource persons for the co-ordination and management of the regional programmes, leading to inequitable distribution of responsibilities and obligations to the organisation.

SADC and Challenges to Governance, Democratisation and Elections

In the last two decades, southern African countries have made great strides in achieving democratic modes of governance. Several states have made the transition from protracted civil wars and colonial rule to peaceful democratic rule characterised by political pluralism and regular elections. Although elections are poorly organised, most democratic institutions such as parliaments, electoral bodies and judiciaries are increasingly asserting their independence and challenging domestic abuses of power.[44]

Despite these achievements, the quality of electoral governance in southern Africa varies widely. While some countries have achieved mature, stable democratic regimes, democratic systems in several countries remain fragile and in a number of countries, governments continue to struggle with the processes of transition and consolidation despite SADC's goal of promoting democratic governance in the sub-region. Some of the challenges facing governance and democratisation process in the SADC region are as follows.

Weak institutional capacity is a major hindrance to democratic institutions in the sub-region. While most southern African countries hold regular multi-party elections, political institutions are often weak and parties are often incapable of representing diverse interests, embedding supremacy and the rule of law or constraining executive authority.[45] Opposition parties, in particular, are often weak and increasingly distrusted by voters. This is accentuated by a lack of adequate resources either to sustain opposition parties as institutions of democracy or to mount effective campaigns during elections, which diminishes their ability to provide political oversight.

Similarly, poor election quality poses a great danger to democratic institutions in the sub-region. Regular elections, though necessary for democracy, are not in themselves synonymous with democracy, and in many countries in the sub-region elections only superficially adhere to democratic principles.[46,] Appeals to voters frequently take place along clientelist, personalised and populist lines. Elections tend to be fractious, poorly managed, sometimes violent and sometimes subject to rigging, electoral irregularities and weak independent electoral oversight.[47] These conditions encourage post-election conflict, which sometimes undermines both development and democracy.

Elections in SADC states have witnessed poor participation of civil society and other non- governmental organisations. Governance is not the responsibility of government alone, should involve civil society groups such as non-governmental actors, and organised community-based groups. Yet, government agendas, from the regional to local government levels, tend to marginalise civil societies in many countries. Despite growing interaction and co-operation among civil society organisations and networks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in southern Africa have often not been sufficiently proactive in claiming their rightful political space in governance processes. Equal gender representation is also frequently limited.[48]

A final challenge to democratic principle is the poor performance of most SADC states after elections. In most countries, the transition to more democratic regimes has not translated into substantive improvements in the lives of ordinary people. This suggests a possible disconnect between the values of development within the democratic context and the capacity and will of states to engender development. Several SADC governments are plagued by corruption and remain incapable of delivering basic social services and infrastructure. The failure of government to address pressing socio-economic issues made the citizens to react in various ways, including voter apathy, mass protests, public cynicism and withdrawal from policy implementation. Despite more than a decade of political and socio-economic reforms, many southern African governments are yet to ensure an enabling regulatory and growth environment that facilitates business and investment. Many SADC governments have also been unable to control the over-exploitation of their country's natural resources.[49]

Challenges of SADC Organs for Security

The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) was paralysed for about six years following a number of deeply rooted crises right from its emergence. Some SADC members (led by South Africa) felt that the OPDS should be fully integrated within SADC and be answerable to the SADC's Summit. Others (led by Zimbabwe) argued for an independent structure with its own chairperson, able to respond to political and security issues without reference to SADC's broader agenda.

SADC members were divided on the issues concerning the structure, mandate and leadership of OPDS and this situation undoubtedly paralysed the OPDS and generated mutual distrust and tension among SADC members. As a result, the OPDS generally failed to respond to multiple conflict situations in the region, including the protracted and costly war in Angola and sporadic political unrest in Swaziland. Clearly, the health of the OPDS as regulatory mechanism for peace and security in the region remains extremely poor owing primarily to complications at its birth.

The obvious problem confronting OPDS was not only the issue of balance of power but also personality clashes, most especially between Pretoria and Harare with Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe played a considerable role in the conflict. The main point here is that in southern African politics, personality is as important (if not more) as power politics, institutions, systems and structures. Between 1994 and 1998, there was personality clash between Mandela and Mugabe, while between 1999 and 2007 it was between Mbeki and Mugabe.

Challenges to SADC Peace-making Processes in Southern Africa

There is no denying the fact that SADC has been unable to prevent outbreak of conflicts within the sub-region. SADC also does not have a record of a successful peace-making mechanism. In most of the intra-state conflicts, it refrained from critical comment and diplomatic engagement, treating violence and crises in governance as purely domestic affairs. There were several reasons for this. First, member states are keen to avoid adversarial relations that might jeopardise trade and functional cooperation. Second, governments that are not fully democratic are naturally unwilling to speak out against neighbouring states that engage in undemocratic practices. Third, SADC states are determined to maintain a posture of unity and solidarity. Forged in the heat of the struggles against colonialism and apartheid, this posture militates against public criticism of each other. This solidarity principle masks rather than transcends the substantive disputes among SADC states and does not form an equate basis for a common security regime.[50]

Principles of solidarity and anti-imperialism, welded by history and ideology, remain a major challenge among SADC member states and sometimes brought strongly into pay, as in the case of Zimbabwe, and leaders who break ranks are vilified. For instance, in 2001, when Mbeki issued mild criticisms of Mugabe, the state-owned newspaper in Harare, the *Herald*, claimed that he had betrayed the ruling party and joined the 'neo-colonialist plot' to overthrow it.[51]

When Mbeki raised concerns about arrangements for the presidential election in early 2002, the *Herald* accused him of "removing his gloves for a bare-knuckled fight with Zimbabwe" and of mobilising SADC states to "justify a regional and international onslaught" against the country.[52] The emphasis on solidarity has been most evident, and least appropriate, in the case of state repression and abrogation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe.[53]

In 200I, a SADC Presidential Task Group formed to address the Zimbabwe crisis denounced the decline in the rule of law and insisted that the crisis was due to the government's approach to land reforms, rather than to the need for land reforms.[54] Yet in 2002, the ISDSC "expressed serious concern on the continued foreign interference in the internal affairs of some member states, especially in Zimbabwe, which has embarked on an agrarian reform programme aimed at addressing the problem of poverty."[55]

In 2003, the Ministerial Committee of the Organ "took note that those opposed to Zimbabwe have tried to shift the agenda from the core issue of land by selective diversion of attention on governance and human rights issues."[56] Although, the 2002 Summit replaced Mugabe as the Deputy Chair of SADC and prevented him from assuming the Chair the following year successive summits expressed solidarity with Harare and ignored the abuses.[57] In 2003 Mugabe received standing ovations at the Summit meeting in Dar es Salaam. He was also elected to represent southern Africa, as one of the African Union's five regional vice-chairpersons.[58] It is so obvious that solidarity is in favour of the old Frontline States who see Mugabe as a true leader and nationalist and therefore stands uncondemnable

SADC's poor record of peace making is also attributable to the impasse around the Organ. The lack of an agreed set of norms, strategies and procedures for addressing high intensity conflict contributed to collective inertia, divergent and parochial approaches by individual states, ill-conceived interventions and a confused mixture of peace-making and peace enforcement as apparent during the crises in Lesotho and the DRC in 1998. In both cases, a small group of states embarked on military action in the name of SADC despite the absence of a SADC decision authorising such action.

By the end of 2003, however, the Organ's Protocol had not been ratified by a sufficient number of states to come into force.[59] In 2003, the Summit approved the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. The Pact deals with defence cooperation and with collective action in response to an armed attack.[60] The extent to which all these could maintain the security of the region is yet to be seen.

Challenges to Regional Peace and Security

SADC's security architecture provides for collaborative security and collective self-defence. Its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was established in 1996; while the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation was adopted in 2001.[61] The SADC Protocol also established a political mechanism to support its peace and security objectives in the form of a one-year revolving chair of its security Organ. This system, known as "the Troika," comprises three member states supported by the SADC secretariat: an outgoing Chair; a serving Chair; and an incoming Chair. The current Troika is composed of Namibia (2005-2006), Tanzania (2006-2007), and Angola (2007-2008).

In 2004, SADC consolidated its peace and security plan through SIPO, which it describes as an "enabling instrument for the implementation of the SADC developmental agenda."[62] SIPO envisages cooperation among member states in the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

However, despite the existence of SIPO and its associated institutions, southern African states are still grappling with identifying and defining common threats facing the sub-region. SADC member states should explicitly identify and define common threats to southern Africa. The authority should determine, for example, how SADC governments allocate funds for defence in their national budgets; how the organisation position itself in relation to global powers; and how governments interact with external actors in bilateral and multilateral fora. This suggests that SADC should spearhead participatory processes to articulate security priorities for the sub-region and how these are to be addressed.

Given the reality of limited financial and human resources, it is open to question whether SADC can implement the numerous and ambitious activities outlined in SIPO, let alone take on additional responsibilities in this important area. SIPO's aims and other SADC objectives need to be linked more closely to an integrated plan of action and a streamlined list of priorities. SIPO and other key policy instruments, such as the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation of 2001 and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact of 2003, also need to be further developed into coherent programmes of implementation and monitoring.[63]

Challenges to Peace-making and Peacebuilding in the SADC Region

Recent experiences raise questions about southern African countries' ownership of an African conflict management mandate and their commitment and ability to administer peacekeeping missions in the sub-region. While there is an ideological and rhetorical commitment to a SADC peacekeeping mandate based on a shared sense of solidarity during liberation struggles, operationalizing this mandate is frequently constrained by lack of political will to intervene actively and allocate the resources needed to support peacekeeping missions. Sub-regional interventions, such as those in the DRC and Lesotho, have often been poorly organised and have lacked the training, equipment and resources needed to be effective. They have also tended to be driven by a handful of interested states rather than SADC as a collective entity, which has sometimes undermined their credibility in the eyes of both host countries and the international community.

Challenges to Gender and Peacebuilding

Human and political insecurity in the SADC region has gender dimensions.[64] Gender-based violence remains a major issue that cuts across geographical, ethnic and socio-economic lines in SADC states. As a result, SADC has identified gender as a key crosscutting issue. Gender issues are addressed in several SADC instruments, including Article 6(2) of the 1992 SADC Declaration and Treaty. The 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development, its 1998 Addendum on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Children, and the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan.[65] SADC member states are party to a range of international agreements that highlight the importance of human rights and gender equality.

Women and children have been disproportionately targeted during recent African conflicts and they constitute the majority of the victims in contemporary armed conflicts.[66] Wars frequently expose women and children to higher levels of gender-based violence.[67] Sexual violence against women and children in particular is increasingly used as a tactic of war. Rape was so widespread during the DRC conflict, where an estimated three million people have died since 1997, that the former UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, compared it to "a cancer in the Congolese society."[68]

Majority of the refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country are women and children.[69] The loss of livelihoods as a result of displacement has encouraged higher levels of prostitution, while the collapse of healthcare infrastructure is associated with rising levels of illness and death, particularly among the very young, the elderly and pregnant women. These features also make the conflict and post-conflict environment highly conducive to the spread of HIV, with women and young girls generally being more vulnerable to infection than men and boys.[70] The disruption of social networks and support systems also shifts a greater burden of care on women and children.

SADC peacekeepers, militaries, mission leaders, negotiators and police officers appear to have limited capacity to address gender issues. Their knowledge of international and continental obligations, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325, is also generally poor.[71] Furthermore, while it is recognised that women and girls are active participants in conflicts and have an essential role to play in peacebuilding efforts, they remain largely excluded from both peace negotiation and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes. Similarly, reconstruction programmes seldom recognise or prioritize gender-based differences in access to basic social services and democratic processes.[72]

The Challenges posed by Landmines

The long wars of liberation in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia the civil strife that followed in the first three countries, the reigning of apartheid regime in South Africa for more than four decades together with the ensuing struggle to end it left the region with serious legacies that constitute daunting challenges to its security. Among these are landmines, the existence of easily available light and conventional weapons, pervasive poverty and diseases and little capacity to deal with cross-border organised crimes including money-laundering cartels, drug trafficking cartels and corruption.

The wars in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have left a large chunk of the territories covered by land mines. It is very difficult to put an accurate figure of the existing mines in these territories. According to a UN 1993 Report, an estimated 80 to 120 million land mines had been laid throughout the world and Angola and Mozambique were the most mined territories in the world.[73]A decade after the publication of the statistics, landmines continue to pose a serious threat to the populations and their livelihoods. This is exacerbated by the current climatic changes, which bring frequent floods and droughts imposing forced migration on populations.

Landmines continue to kill and mutilate human beings, limit the free circulation of goods and people, limit the free use of agricultural land and destroy the environment. They also render large sections of the country unproductive. They impede communities from utilizing their full potential into recovery and development. On the part of government, mining awareness and education has not been intensified. Minefield survey and clearance has been slow, while de-mining needs large financial resources, which are not available. As a result, de-mining has shown sluggish progress in the region and has continues to add to the insecurity of the region.

SADC, Small Arms and Light Weapons

In addition to the challenges posed by landmines, the region continues to face threats of the circulation of illegally acquired weapons, which fuel conflict and organised crime. Light weapons, apart from exacerbating the societal conflict and inculcating fear also place an additional strain to the state's capacity to maintain public order and cater for other sources of stability and security. These included social and economic sectors.[74] Light weapons used in the Angolan civil wars have helped to fuel civil strife in the Democratic Republic of Congo, while weapons coming from Uganda and Rwanda have fuelled the war in the DRC.

Apartheid-sponsored Para-militaries and mercenaries operated in Namibia, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, facilitating gunrunning and other illicit operations. There is sufficient evidence in the region to show that light weapons acquired during the Mozambique civil war found their way to foment criminal activities ranging from armed robberies, organised cross-border crime and drug trafficking in Swaziland, South Africa, Zambia and Malawi. Light weapons have thus become an important source of instability and insecurity in the region, destabilising and terrorising communities, fuelling civil strife, facilitating the operations of gang running cartels, drug trafficking cartels and fomenting widespread corruption in police officers and in customs.

Protocol on Firearms and Other Related Materials

To deal with the issue of small weapons, SADC has signed a Protocol on the *Control of Firearms and Other Related Materials* which commits the member states to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of small weapons, ammunition and other related materials and their excessive destabilising accumulation, trafficking, possession and use of firearms in the region. The Protocol also commits member states to facilitate cooperation and exchange of information and experiences that will help the region to achieve the above-mentioned objectives.[75]

The Protocol detailed initiatives that would be undertaken to effect cooperation such as affiliating to international organisations and adhering to international conventions. Others include initiatives aimed at curbing the illicit trafficking, accumulation and use of small arms, enacting legislation where it does not exist, offering mutual legal assistance, public education and awareness programmes and co-operation among law enforcement agencies to promote the implementation of this Protocol.[76]

The signing and ratification of the Protocol on Firearms and Ammunition largely is a good step towards curbing the illicit trafficking of small arms and reducing their destructive impact in the region. However, serious challenges still face its implementation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be stated that not only the overlapping membership but also the great variety of trade regimes, tariff levels, and the high dependency on trade tariffs for most member countries make it difficult for SADC member states to move towards deeper economic integration and to agree on a common external tariff when establishing a Customs Union. Additionally, the high trade imbalances in favour of the most advanced member countries, supply and demand side constraints to penetrate markets(above all in advanced member countries) and the missing political will and financial ability to establish compensatory mechanisms slow down the effective implementation of agreed economic integration steps and promote protectionist action of single member countries. Since the costs of economic regionalisation occur immediately while the benefits are insecure, many countries are hesitant to pursue deeper economic integration in the region.

Chief among the challenges is the poor institutional capacity in each member states to ensure that the Protocol does not remain a document left in the drawers or shelves of Ministries of defence, police and security. The establishment of bodies such as the OPDSC and their subordinate bodies such as the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisations (SARPCCO) and other mechanisms facilitate cooperation among police and intelligence chiefs. These have helped to remind member states on their responsibilities to implement the Protocol.

There are more challenges associated with the speed of the ratification of the Protocols, enacting the necessary legislation that will facilitate the implementation of protocol and capacity in ministries, in the intelligence agencies, uniformed forces to implement the Protocol, monitor the state of implementation and keep track of the loopholes exploited by the operatives.[77]

PROSPECTS FOR INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA

The pace and scope of regional integration process in West Africa is no doubt slow. This raises concern and optimism about the future prospects for sustainable development among ECOWAS member states. It is also clear that member states are very enthusiastic and committed to regional integration. Similarly, West African traditional development partners also believe in the integration process going on in the Sub-region. These are some of the potent factors, which will sustain integration efforts in the years ahead. The achievements already recorded will surely provide the foundation for effective and accelerated implementation of ECOWAS programmes.

The ECOWAS Commission is being strengthened within the framework of NEPAD's Short Term Action Plan (STAP) to enhance financial and management service delivery in the Commission and improve opportunities for financial and technical assistance for the implementation of community programmes. The Commission has also strengthened its staff capacity to effectively formulate and monitor Community Programmes in the medium term.

Since NEPAD has designated ECOWAS as the Focal Point in West Africa (the 2003 Yamoussoukro Decision), the integration process in West Africa has gained additional impetus to enable it to achieve rapid economic growth and sustainable development that could alleviate poverty and foster a suitable environment for stability, peace and security. There is no doubt that ECOWAS leaders must show greater political commitment and resources before the Community could achieve better results. According to the 2005 ECOWAS Annual Report, the Secretariat has scheduled some priority actions for implementation in order to sustain the present momentum and accelerate the Community Integration Process. The action programme includes the following:

Articulation of Action Plans for Priorities or Spelling out Functions

Since ECOWAS was chosen as the focal point for implementing the NEPAD agenda and the MDGs in West Africa, many demands have been placed on her institutional and financial structure. There is no doubt that ECOWAS faces the same challenges as other RECs such as non-clarity of mandates, poor mechanisms for dealing with countries, inadequate resources to deliver on original objectives and activities, and the additional task of coordinating the NEPAD agenda.

Strengthening the Regional Integration Process by Having Fewer RECs

ECOWAS Authority is considering the rationalisation of West Africa inter-governmental organisations with a view to reducing overlapping membership, duplication of efforts and wastage of resources. Nevertheless a strong political will would be required before ECOWAS and UEMO are fused into one REC. Special efforts would equally be required at harmonising and coordinating their programmes.

Strengthening the Multilateral Surveillance Mechanism

ECOWAS member states are being encouraged to operate a sound macroeconomic framework based on the multilateral surveillance mechanism. The Commission will seek to strengthen the operation of the multilateral surveillance mechanism in order to accelerate the pace of macroeconomic convergence in the region. This multilateral surveillance mechanism would be effectively implemented by member states through enhanced donor cooperation and coordination, especially with the World Bank and the IMF.

The Commission will also cooperate with the relevant statutory organs of the West African Monetary Zone to strengthen the operations of the West African Monetary Institute in order to establish a second Monetary Zone. The Commission will have to monitor the WAMZ programme to ensure consistency with the timelines and targets set for the introduction of the second regional currency.

Formulation, Adoption and Implementation of Regional PRSP

The formulation and implementation of the regional Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) by member states will constitute a priority activity in the medium term. It is hoped that when the final draft of the PRSP is finally completed in December 2006 Member States will quickly validate it before the World Bank and the rest of the donor community subsequently adopt it. Key activities envisaged include elaboration of a work programme with specific timelines and targets; preparation of a financing schedule and a resource mobilization strategy for the PRSP; organisation of a regional forum on the RPRSP; and formulation of a monitoring and evaluation strategy for the implementation process.

Establishment of a Customs Union

The ECOWAS Free Trade Area, which was officially established in 2000, is yet to function effectively. This is because the elimination of barriers to intra-regional trade is generally incomplete. Tariff reduction poses difficulties for several countries, because of the impact on government revenue. Other difficulties arise from uneven distribution of benefits and costs owing to differences in the size and capabilities of member states. Intra-ECOWAS trade, most especially intra-ECOWAS exports, has been particularly significant only in a few countries.

The Commission will intensify its ongoing sensitisation drive in member states on the operations of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS). Also, enhanced monitoring and stricter compliance with the provisions of the protocol on the Community's levy as well as other protocols and regulations on the creation of the customs union will be enforced.

As regards the Common External Tariff (CET), member states are expected to prepare and adopt a region-wide consolidated list of exemptions of both A and B types to the ECOWAS CET. Other activities include the commencement of the transition period for the ECOWAS CET from January 2006 to December 31, 2007; formulation of a text on the legal framework of the ECOWAS CET, establishment and operation of the Joint ECOWAS Management Committee for the implementation of the ECOWAS CET; and implementation of the agreed road map for the ECOWAS CET.

Infrastructure Development

As regards upgrading the infrastructure for energy, transport and telecommunications, much remains to be accomplished. In this regard, there is a strong need to upgrade the limited capacities of ECOWAS to manage the infrastructure and other sectoral programmes aided by the development partners. In this context, a future work programme should be designed to consolidate past achievements while stressing on implementing the projects, decisions and strategic priorities adopted by the community.

In the field of energy, the ECOWAS programme will aim at effectively developing the energy resources of the region and promoting cooperation and harmonisation of national energy development policies on:

(i) the West African Power Pool (WAPP)

(ii) the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) project and

(iii) the ECOWAS Initiative on Access to Energy Services.

Other key activities envisaged for implementation in the infrastructure sector include enhancement of transport facilitation measures; harmonisation of telecommunication policies, and regulatory framework for the establishment of a single liberalised telecommunications market in the region. Others include fostering of industrial competitiveness of supply capacities through enterprise upgrading; increased capacity to meet international standards and client requirements; and the harmonisation of standards and technical regulations.

Peace and Security, Democracy and Good Governance

The Community should strive to establish a functional early warning system for more effective prevention of conflicts in the region. In addition, the ECOWAS Standby Force should be operational, while a responsive disaster management and humanitarian management mechanism as well as promotion of good governance and democracy should be established.

Promotion of Human Development

The Commission should endeavour to build upon the important studies made on the policy issues of gender, civil society, health and education. Secretariat activities should include:

(i) implementation of a regional action plan for controlling the consumption and trafficking in drugs, and addressing money laundering:

(ii) implementation of the convention on the equivalence of diploma and certificates:

(iii) promotion of the involvement of the civil society, youths and women in the integration process, and

(iv) implementation of a regional strategy for addressing health problems confronting the region in collaboration with the West African Health Organisation.[78]

ECOWAS Institutional Capacity Building

Efforts should be made to enhance the implementation of the capacity-building programme (of the Commission). The Commission is indispensable to the success of the integration process in the region. The staff of the Commission must be adequately motivated to enhance their performance in the implementation of the integration policy, programmes and projects.

PROSPECTS FOR INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

During its early days SADCC, as an offshoot of the Frontline States came to be known internationally for its determined struggle against colonialism and apartheid. Now that colonialism and institutionalised apartheid belong to the past, SADC is fully engaged in a more complex battle against poverty and HIV and AIDS. All SADC leaders are champions in trying to win this battle in a bid to bring development to their countries.

SADC leaders also champion all other aspects of the SADC Common Agenda. The new structure of SADC, adopted in 2001 and currently being implemented has a two-pronged approach to regional cooperation and integration. While the major emphasis is on increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of SADC policies and programmes to implement more coherent and better-coordinated strategies for sustainable growth and development and poverty eradication, the issue of peace, security and stability is also given prominence to be dealt with by a redefined Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The success of SADC will depend, largely, on how the twin objectives of economic and political governance are addressed in a manner that will provide opportunities to all of its peoples, based on equity and mutual benefits.

There is reason to believe that on the economic front SADC will continue to implement fundamental economic reforms aimed at enhancing macro-economic stability. On the political front, a lot of work is being done to consolidate democratic principles, the rule of law, accountability, human rights and participatory governance. Coupled with these, mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution are being strengthened at the regional level to ensure their effectiveness for restoring and maintaining peace.

The Protocols that have been negotiated, signed and ratified indicate the desire of SADC Member States to deepen their cooperation and cement the process of integration. Strengthening the SADC Protocols and Policies Implementation Framework during the years to come will be essential, more so because the effective implementation of the RISDP and SIPO ultimately rests on the strength of the SADC legal framework and on the enforceability of the SADC Protocols.

Positive developments on the regional integration front, as well as individual policy reforms in many of the SADC countries, make southern Africa an exciting market for potential investors with plenty of opportunities. The main challenge for the region is to overcome the underdeveloped structure of the regional economy, improve macro-economic performance, improve political and corporate governance, and thus unlock the untapped potential that lies in both the region's human and natural resources.

Trade is the most prominent form of integration within SADC. Effective implementation of the Trade Protocol by all member states is imperative if a Free Trade Area, Customs Union and eventually Common Market are to become a reality. However, given current regional and global developments, the key challenge for SADC is to do this within a reasonable period in order to increase the percentage share of SADC trade in the world market. This will only be possible when member states comply with the decisions agreed within the framework of the SADC Trade Protocol and speed up implementation bearing in mind the underlying principles and objectives of the Protocol. This also entails compliance with and implementation of WTO obligations as well as taking advantage of preferences provided under the Cotonou Agreement and AGOA.

It would be essential, therefore, to address the supply side constraints as well as competitiveness of industry with regard to production and to cushion the impact of international tariff reduction on the development of the smaller, landlocked and less developed member countries of SADC.

Collective capacity, responsibility and action on the international front should be maintained. This should be further enhanced in order to minimize the risks of globalization and better exploit its opportunities. In this regard, SADC should continue to consolidate itself as a vibrant regional economic and trading bloc and maintain solidarity in multilateral negotiations, which address key issues such as market access, debt burden, technology transfer, and private and official financial resource flows. SADC should also capitalize on the goodwill and great confidence of the international community to mobilize external resources for developmental and poverty reduction efforts.

A compensatory mechanism should be put in place to mitigate the short-term adverse effects of regional market integration on weaker economies and assist them to diversify their revenue base. In addition, concerns of economic dominance by the stronger economies should be addressed through deliberate and coordinated measures which ensure that the benefits of regional integration are spread to all member states and citizens of the SADC region.

Policy measures should also be put in place to establish a diversified and dynamic industrial sector in order to move towards manufacturing value-added production and thereby broaden the export base away from primary commodity exports. In the globalized economic environment, which is knowledge-based, the conventional comparative advantage of raw materials and unskilled labour is increasingly becoming insignificant. This would also promote the competitiveness and experience of regional firms to gear them for global markets.

Through the undertaking of demand and supply surveys for different countries, SADC would assist countries to boost exports to their neighbours. Through such surveys, obstacles to trade and solutions to remove them would be identified.

For investors, the SADC Free Trade Area will mean several benefits. Many SADC countries have found that their economies are too small to support a large range of viable productive investments. Therefore, it has become essential to view SADC as a single enlarged domestic market in order to allow investors to establish entrenched regional market positions that would give them access to a market of 229.8 million people. Not only would the 'domestic' market be large, but also investors would find it easier to manoeuvre within the region and gain wider market access and invest in any member state for the benefit of the whole region.

Enhancing the volume and productivity of investment is very important in bringing about accelerated economic growth. The goal of increasing investments could be pursued to good effect if systematic support is provided to the private sector so it can mobilize resources and become the main engine of economic growth. This is because government budgets on which so much dependency has been placed in the past would be unable to mobilize the volume of resources required to generate the high rates of growth necessary for poverty reduction. This is where the development finance institutions have a big role to play. Only the development institutions have the competence to provide investment resources for the heavy infrastructural, tourism and agricultural developments needed.

As SADC moves into higher levels of integration such as the Customs Union, the issue of overlapping membership of SADC countries in a number of other regional bodies and the conflicting obligations arising thereof need to be addressed urgently. A resolution on this issue would strengthen SADC's position as a building bloc of the African Union (AU). Harmonizing activities and positions by the different organizations in the AU will be necessary in order to avoid wasteful duplication of efforts.

The other challenge on the road to deeper integration is in developing new policies and strategies that would target vulnerable groups such as the rural and urban poor, small business, informal operators and women to ensure that they take advantage of the policies. With the right policies, there is a need for the creation of a conducive environment to make the policies work and deliver the kind of development that would lead to poverty reduction and its subsequent eradication.

What is required is a collective commitment and perseverance if the SADC vision of "a common future, a future in a regional community that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice, peace and security for the peoples of Southern Africa" is to be realized.

Over the years, SADC has demonstrated its dynamic nature with a readiness to adapt to new conditions and environment. It has been restructured to better deal with globalization as well as to fight poverty, diseases and the other ills of underdevelopment. In this process, there is now better coordination at the national and regional levels with stronger regulatory and legislative frameworks more appropriate capacity-building programmes that will enable the implementation of regional activities. SADC must decide on its priorities within the framework of its Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ so that regional programmes are demand-driven.

Governance, Democratisation and Elections

SADC should move beyond focusing simply on elections as an indicator of democracy to putting in place mechanisms, which can ensure that democratic principles are entrenched at all levels of the society. This requires not only strong democratic institutions but also a supportive political culture capable of shaping appropriate policy responses to address development issues, particularly poverty. Achieving these objectives will require co-operation on the part of SADC, its member states and southern Africa's civil society. SADC should strengthen the state of democracy and governance in the following key areas.

SADC should strengthen public sector institutions to deliver basic services more effectively by supporting public sector reforms, and improve institutional capacity building, particularly within the civil services of member states. SADC should strengthen and deepen democracy by promoting and putting in place mechanisms to ensure free and fair elections, and a democratic culture in which opposition parties are respected and tolerated. Constructive mechanisms should be put in place to manage election related tensions throughout the electoral cycle, and ensure that the recommendations emanating from observation processes are applied.

SADC should strengthen checks and balances within and outside the states to promote and support measures to empower parliaments, ensure the independence of judiciaries and safeguard the autonomy of oversight institutions such as anti-corruption bodies, human rights commissions, auditing institutions and ombudsmen. Outside government, there must be more support for civil society organisations concerned with governance, human rights and media freedom.

SADC should promote public participation in electoral processes. Civil society has a key role to play in embedding and supporting democracy in southern Africa, and governments should create more space for non-governmental actors to participate effectively in democratic processes. Gender parity should remain a key goal, particularly the representative inclusion of women in national parliaments. SADC has called for half of all political representatives in office to be women, but the involvement of women in public life must move beyond fulfilling quotas to ensuring that gender issues are meaningfully addressed.[79]

Addressing Regional Peace and Security

Measures must be put in place to ensure that the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security has sufficient resources and capacity to drive the consolidation, implementation and monitoring of the sub-regional body's instruments on peace and security. The SADC secretariat should put in place measures to support poorly resourced states in fulfilling the mandate of the Organ. Regional security (in terms of both state and human security) would also benefit from measures to enhance community-level policing, security sector reform and the improvement of sub-regional justice and intelligence systems. In line with the framework established by SIPO, the SADC secretariat should also help to manage member states' relations with donors strategically in order to address SADC's interests more effectively.

Since Africa's regional armies may face increasing challenges as they engage in multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, SADC should engage more effectively in strengthening regional participation in United Nations (UN) and AU peace operations.

SADC is already establishing a Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG) and its civilian component as part of the African Standby Force (ASF) to be operationalized by 2010. The organisation thus seeks to increase its capacity for sub-regional peace support operations.[80] The ASF will consist of standby brigades in Southern, Central, Eastern, North, and West Africa, and will undertake traditional peacekeeping operations, as well as observer missions and peacebuilding activities. SADC is in the process of establishing an interim planning unit for the Southern Africa Brigade within its Gaborone secretariat. SADC states have also committed the requisite 3,500 troops to the brigade and have agreed on a peace support doctrine for the sub-region.

SADC should develop and strengthen institutions and processes for training in complex peace operations. Inter-operative training a critical tool for peacekeeping preparedness should be strengthened and implemented. Specific knowledge areas to be addressed should include information and intelligence analysis; negotiation skills; legal issues such as human rights and humanitarian law; and post-conflict governance issues.

Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the SADC Region

Before SADC can engage in effective peacekeeping, it is imperative that decisions are taken collectively, and if the organisation chooses to undertake peacekeeping missions, member countries should commit the resources needed to fulfil their responsibilities. While many governments face legitimate resource constraints, the more pertinent issue is lack of political will. SADC leaders must overcome all these challenges.

Peacekeeping is expensive and complicated. The SADC Secretariat and its members should thus play a more proactive role in preventing conflicts. As discussed in the SIPO document, SADC should invest in conflict early warning and monitoring infrastructure and expertise. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has already established early warning systems, while the AU is in the process of developing a continent-wide system.

The SADC Secretariat has a pivotal role to play in promoting a southern African conflict early warning system, as well as identifying and harnessing the necessary skills, networks and resources. Early warning must be linked to preventive action. As in the case of peacekeeping, the SADC Secretariat can help to ensure that member states act collectively and consistently in order to lend appropriate authority to preventive diplomacy initiatives. It should also put in place measures to strengthen conflict resolution mechanisms, particularly the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, and to build the capacity of mediators and other actors to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.[81]

Peacebuilding in the wake of armed conflicts is equally important. Peacebuilding is becoming increasingly important on both the African and global agendas, and it is important that SADC engages actively with this issue. In September 2005, the UN established a Peacebuilding Commission. The body comprises a core 31-member Organisational Committee, to which two SADC countries, Tanzania and Angola, were elected. The AU has also established its own Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Policy Framework, which stresses the link between peace and security and the humanitarian and developmental dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.[82] The SADC Secretariat has a crucial role to play in supporting both initiatives. It also has a vital role to play in marshalling resources and helping countries in the sub-region to devise strategies that give them more ownership of peacebuilding processes.

While peacekeeping missions may take place over a few months or, more often, years, meaningful peacebuilding may take a decade or more to succeed. SADC must be prepared to engage in post-conflict reconstruction in the long-term. Preventing a country from returning to conflict involves not only ensuring the implementation of peace agreements, but also capacity-building to improve governance, security sector reform (including strategies for dealing with demobilised troops) and transitional justice, including truth commissions and war crimes tribunals.[83]

Reconstruction also involves human security aspects: affording citizens a stake in health, education and the economy; embedding human rights; addressing the return of refugees; and drawing women and children into the peacebuilding process. The human security components of peacebuilding are particularly important in establishing durable peace but are overshadowed by more traditional security aspects.

Tackling Gender and Peacebuilding Problems

There is a need for more action on gender issues within SADC's politics as well as defence and security infrastructure. The SADC Gender Unit, based at its Gaborone secretariat is working closely with civil society actors to strengthen the regional and national implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.42. This may increase the awareness of the resolution in southern Africa, but the secretariat should also provide leadership on gender issues, educate, and promote attention to gender issues at the regional and national levels.

SADC's Gender Unit should also facilitate the mainstreaming of gender issues into existing and future peace and security instruments and action plans. The SADC secretariat should develop a gender-mainstreaming checklist to assist the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation to integrate measures for achieving gender equity into all its programmes. The SADC Gender Unit should encourage member states to put in place and uphold laws and policies to protect their citizens from abuse and harm during and after conflicts.

The SADC Secretariat needs to ensure that the involvement of women goes beyond simply fulfilling quotas in decision-making roles. Addressing the gender dimension of security, governance and development requires meaningful engagement around gender issues. Both governmental and non-governmental actors working on gender, peace and security, governance, and development issues should be supported. They should be involved in taskforces and committees constituted by the SADC secretariat and its member states.

At the programmatic level, SADC officials, security technocrats, peacekeepers and other stakeholders responsible for implementing its security and governance agendas must be sensitized to the importance of gender issues and trained on gender mainstreaming. The SADC secretariat should provide for the incorporation of a sustainable gender-training programme into existing sub-regional peacekeeping training curricula. SADC member states must uphold their commitments to ensure that women are equally represented in all political and decision-making positions, particularly in its peace and security structures.

Conclusion

In summary, the SADC region faced a range of human and conventional security challenges. These are the complexities of promoting and consolidating 'good governance' practices and democracy; preventing conflicts and supporting both peacekeeping and peacebuilding in southern Africa, the African continent and globally. Others are engendering the sub-region's peace and security infrastructure, as well as its development processes; ensuring ongoing food security for all; and putting in place measures to combat the spread and effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

The SADC secretariat and its member states have already established policy, institutional and programmatic measures to address many of these complex, multi-faceted issues, and have made considerable progress in achieving a more peaceful and secure southern Africa. However, there remain areas in which the secretariat can act to facilitate, guide and support more effective strategies for promoting human and military security in the SADC region.

Given the importance of its facilitative role, maintaining and strengthening the Gaborone-based secretariat's capacity will be critical to making progress in the implementation of SADC's governance, security and development commitments. In 2001, SADC began restructuring its secretariat in order to enhance its institutional capacity and to streamline its bureaucracy. The secretariat has since shifted its focus from project management to policy formulation and harmonisation.

The SADC Secretariat also houses specialist units in policy and strategic planning, legal affairs, finance and gender. These innovations could potentially lend themselves to the task of facilitating policy development, implementation and evaluation in southern Africa. Yet, despite these strategic steps, the secretariat still needs to address its continuing human and financial resource constraints in order to be able to operationalise its activities effectively. Finally, since sub-regional cooperation will be central to harnessing and enhancing resources, the SADC secretariat must improve its coordination with its development partners and civil society actors.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE

SUMMARY

This study has undertaken a comparative analysis of the hegemonic roles of Nigeria and South Africa in ECOWAS and SADC towards economic integration and maintenance of peace and security in their respective sub-regions. The activities and contributions of Nigeria and South Africa towards integration and maintenance of peace and security in their sub-regions have been examined through their sub-regional communities, ECOWAS and SADC.

Nigeria and South Africa, two sub-regional powers in West and Southern Africa, have played leading roles in sub-regional integration in the period understudy. While Nigeria was a motivator and co-founder of ECOWAS, South Africa was not a founding member of SADC but joined the organisation two years after its formation. Initially, apartheid South African government was antagonistic to SADCC member states causing political destabilisation and civil wars among them. This also provided them the platform for cooperation during the anti-apartheid struggle. Since South Africa joined SADC in 1994, it has been a new era of cooperation and development between her and her former adversaries.

That the two countries have been playing leading roles in sub-regional integrative efforts should be seen as exercises in foreign policy pursuit, as they have similar objectives for joining and playing leading roles in the sub-regional communities. Both countries joined the two communities to protect their national interests. While Nigeria wanted to become the 'industrial heart' of ECOWAS, South Africa, the 'industrial heart' of SADC, wanted to maintain her status. Other reasons include safeguarding their security, protection of their domestic markets and provision of wider markets for their products.

Comparative Analysis of Nigeria and South Africa's Leadership Roles and Contributions to ECOWAS and SADC

Although it may appear that Nigeria has not been playing a dominant role in ECOWAS, she is no doubt the leading actor in the activities of the sub-regional organisation. The leadership role that Nigeria played during ECOWAS formation continued even after Gowon was ousted from office on 29 July 1975. Gowon's administration succeeded in sensitising the nation on the importance and relevance of sub-regional integration and the continued leadership role the country must play if the arrangement must survive. Successive governments in the country have recognised this fact and have seen ECOWAS as a vehicle for enhancing the country's economic development, as well as forming part of the country's concentric circle vision of foreign policy.

In 1976, Nigeria succeeded in securing the headquarters of ECOWAS and was also instrumental in getting the organisation off the ground, thereby enabling it to progress towards full integration. As regards financial commitment to the community, in 1976, the Nigerian leader was a party to the actualisation of the $80 million Nigeria Trust Fund in the African Development Bank.[1] Nigeria took a leadership position by paying regularly her annual budgetary contribution of 32.5%, which is about one third of ECOWAS budget to ensure effective operations of the Community's activities. Equally, Nigeria on many occasions gave financial assistance to the ECOWAS Secretariat in Lagos during the latter's financial crisis. For instance in June 1985, the Federal government settled a sum of N80, 000 outstanding in respect of house rents for the Community's technocrats in Lagos. In 1986, the Nigerian government provided more accommodation for ECOWAS staff in Lagos, renovated ECOWAS Secretariat, provided land for the new Secretariat headquarters in Abuja and provided five million naira towards the cost of the project.[2]

Another index of Nigeria's contribution is the attendance at every Summit by Nigerian leaders and their active participation in taking initiatives, sponsoring strong resolutions and in general discussions. Nigerian leaders have used ECOWAS to serve Nigeria's foreign policy interest in the sub-region and have continued to exert considerable influence in the organisation. The desire to use ECOWAS, as a foreign policy instrument was no doubt reflected in the proposal at the June 1990 Banjul Summit for the setting up of a Standing Committee on Mediation.

Nigeria became involved in a number of 'fire-fighting' activities in some troubled spots in the sub-region. Nigeria has been involved in resolving and mediating inter-state and intra-state conflicts such as those between Ghana and Togo, Senegal and Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Mali, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone crisis, the Cote d'Ivoire crisis and the Liberian crisis. Other areas in which Nigeria helped out included championing a common position on debt crisis and giving aid to cash-strapped ECOWAS countries such as Republic of Benin and Liberia in 1989, as well as suing for peace among quarrelling countries in ECOWAS.[3]

The ECOMOG initiative would probably be considered the capstone of Nigeria's West African policy under President Ibrahim Babangida. Nigeria's initiative in ECOMOG was strong. It was undertaken and spearheaded by Nigeria ostensibly, to stop the carnage that accompanied the Civil War in Liberia. This drew criticisms from domestic analysts and some West African countries. These criticisms span the legality, propriety, timing and Nigeria’s commitment to the late Samuel Doe. These queries in turn prompted a battery of official statements defending Nigeria’s role on geopolitical and security grounds as well as under Article 52 of the UN Charter.[4]

Justifying Nigeria’s role in ECOMOG, it must be noted that Nigeria was careful not to be seen as a ‘meddler or aggressor’ in Liberia’s internal affairs. Nigeria used her hegemonic status in West Africa not only to involve other ECOWAS members in ECOMOG but also to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Establishing ECOMOG, therefore, conformed to Nigeria's security and economic interests in the sub-region. As the core state in ECOWAS and the dominant economic and military power in West Africa, Nigeria could not remain impassive to a crisis in Liberia, which falls within its strategic and geo-political orbit.

Nigeria, the sub-regional hegemon, was the only country in West Africa that possessed the human and material resources to intervene in the war. However, Nigeria did not do it alone, as unilateral action would be unacceptable to internal and international opinions. This would further reinforce the fear of Nigeria's desire to use its hegemonic position to impose its will on its smaller neighbours. Nigeria therefore, used intra-regional diplomacy to pursue its Liberian agenda through the framework of ECOWAS.

Nigeria's crisis management in Liberia, which has been described as "a unique model of peacekeeping," should be seen as part of Nigeria's security objective as well as her commitment to West African integration and prosperity. Nigeria's interest in establishing effective and integrated security in the sub-region is designed to promote the general wellbeing of the region, and this is shared by other states. It is not an attempt to create an exclusive sphere of influence in which Nigeria's dominance will be unchallenged or threatened. The ultimate objective is the economic development and integration of the entire continent, which would be enhanced by the effective integration of West Africa.

South Africa on the other hand, despite her late entry into SADC, has moved like Nigeria into the forefront in integrative activities of the Community. Since joining SADC in 1994, South Africa has been involved in the activities of the community. She has also taken a leading role in addressing issues such as closer collaboration on economic integration; establishment of a free trade area; development of basic infrastructure; development of human resources, as well as the urgent need for peace, democracy and good governance to be established throughout the sub-region.

Since 1994, South Africa has largely through its thriving private sector, actively invested in various countries in the sub-region. South African investors comprise broad and diverse spectrum, including parastatals as well as small, medium, and large private enterprises. In recent years, South Africa has emerged the largest foreign investor in Southern Africa. In 2000, South African direct investment in the thirteen SADC countries exceeded US$5.4 billion.[5] Business Map estimates that South African companies invested an average of $435 million a year in SADC countries between 1994 and 2003.[6]

South Africa was the largest investor in Mozambique between 1990 and 2002 her investment represented 49 per cent. Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia followed as the recipient of 10 percent, 9 percent, and 9 percent respectively of the total foreign direct investment from South Africa.[7] South African investment in the sensitive agricultural sector in the region has been relatively small, but has led to significant job creation. South African companies have been attracted to SADC member states because of the region's abundance of diamond, gold, coal, and platinum resources. Luckily, for these countries, their natural resources continued to attract investors from South Africa.

South Africa also contributed in the area of transport and communication. The Southern Africa Transport and Communication Commission made huge strides in railway restructuring programme, which eased the problems encountered by traders in the region. The programme involves the private sector in running of the railways through concessioning. Private sector participation in the rail industry has been visible in South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe.[8]

With regard to SADC meetings and conferences, South Africa is an active participant. She has hosted many ministerial and official meetings. South Africa became the first SADC member state to host both the Summit in 1995 and the Annual Consultative Conference in one financial year. During the 1996, SADC Heads of State Summit in Maseru, South Africa was elected as Chair of SADC for a period of three years.

South Africa, together with other member states of SADC established the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in June 1996 as a forum in which political issues in the region could be discussed and resolved. Due to differences among the leaders, the Organ did not become an operational and functional instrument of SADC until March 2001, when SADC Heads of State and Government finally reached an agreement on the role, functions and structure of the Organ.

Another area that South Africa has made significant contribution to the development of SADC is in the resolution of some of the intractable problems and conflicts in the region. Inter and intra-state conflicts and activities of rebel groups have hindered economic development and slowed down the process of integration in the region. More importantly, these wars pitted SADC member states against each other, leading to regional wars. In September 1998, South Africa and Botswana sent troops to Lesotho to reinstate the leader, after the mutiny by junior officers. Similarly, South Africa contributed to the peace process in the DRC by providing funds and other forms of support to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in South Africa in order to end the Civil War in the country. This has contributed to peace and institutionalisation of democracy in the country.

Power Relations in the Regions: Nigeria and South Africa

There is no denying the fact that the relations of the two Communities with the two regional hegemons, Nigeria and South Africa, have shaped the security complexes in the sub-regions. In West Africa, the ability of the regional hegemon, Nigeria, to mobilise other ECOWAS members to set up ECOMOG, an intervention force to intervene in Liberia and single-handedly intervene militarily in Sierra Leone, mapped out the contours of a regional security complex in the West African sub-region. Besides, it is quite clear that to a certain degree the conflict in Sierra Leone was fanned by the war in Liberia.

South Africa, on the other hand, has not been as successful in her efforts as Nigeria. South Africa has not been able to mobilise other members of SADC into an intervention force to intervene in any conflict in the sub-region. The problems confronting conflict resolution in the southern African sub-region is more of power tussles among the states, most especially between Pretoria and Harare.

The power relation of the two regional security complexes is asymmetrical in nature and this serves as an obstacle in the realisation of conflict resolution in the two Communities. For instance, despite the preponderance of the powers of the two hegemons, power relations within the complex did not make it easy to reach decisions. In the case of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone using ECOMOG, some francophone members were not very keen and that complicated the effectiveness of the mission amid charges of Nigeria's bias towards some of the warring factions in Liberia. This culminated in the need for UN peacekeepers and some neutral troops from Tanzania and Uganda. In the case of Sierra Leone, Nigeria singularly led the ECOMOG intervention force before other forces could join.

In SADC, South Africa with some support from Botswana made the difference in the intervention in Lesotho even though this could not be replicated in the DR Congo. South African intervention in Lesotho was criticised by other SADC member states as having no SADC authorisation. The power politics within SADC centred around two camps; the South African led camp (comprising South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania and Lesotho), and the Zimbabwe led camp (comprising of Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique). It was also that of personality clashes between former President Nelson Mandela and President Robert Mugabe, and President Thabo Mbeki and President Robert Mugabe.

The Pretoria/ Harare clashes were premised on who leads the sub-regional affairs. For Mugabe, his efforts and those of other African states contributed immensely to the liberation and independence of South Africa. He as the longest serving President should therefore, be accorded leading role in sub-regional affairs and not South African leaders. The state actors in the Zimbabwe led camp always criticised Pretoria, most especially in her conflict resolution efforts.[9]

Nigeria unlike South Africa has demonstrated her hegemonic role in West Africa in several spheres of the Community's activities, but most visibly in security matters, particularly in conflict management, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. The series of sub-regional conflict exposed the potentials of Nigeria as a regional hegemon with a lot of will and resources when critically needed. The Liberian crisis could have had disastrous repercussions on ECOWAS. To forestall this, Nigeria mobilised her resources and applied her political influence in a manner that saved the situation and ECOWAS.

South Africa, on the other hand, has demonstrated her hegemonic role in the sub-region more in the economic sphere. South African investment through government and private investments span the length and breadth of SADC countries. South Africa also dominated the transport and communication sector. South African investments have led to job creation in SADC countries.

It can be concluded that while Nigeria's hegemonic role in West Africa has been demonstrated more in security matters, particularly in conflict management, peacekeeping and conflict resolution that of South Africa has been more in the economic sphere. Both countries have no doubt contributed individually and collectively to the economic growth and relative peace in their respective subregions.

Challenges facing the hegemonic roles of Nigeria and South Africa in ECOWAS and SADC

Despite the roles played by the hegemons (Nigeria and South Africa) in ECOWAS and SADC, their efforts towards full economic integration are still being thwarted by myriads of challenges, including unhealthy rivalry, fear of domination, and colonial hangover among others. This issue has therefore, taught them to be "moderate" in their dealings within their sub-regions and with other Africans countries. Similarly, it has taught them to participate in multinational and collective efforts without any tendencies of unilateral hegemonism as these could create basic problem

Opposition to Nigeria's leadership role in ECOWAS, which dated back to the formative years, continued unabated. Within the country, anti-integration forces criticised Nigeria's membership of ECOWAS because of what they perceived may be the socio-political and economic effects of the organisation on the citizenry and the country at large. They saw the regional organisation as a liability rather than an asset. On the other hand, France and other Francophone West African states namely:

Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal continued to oppose what they believed to be the domineering role of Nigeria in ECOWAS.

Nigeria has on many occasions and at many fora, international and local, dispelled the rumour of dominating the community. Nigeria has expressed her position as that of providing creative leadership aimed at maintaining the integrity of the union, guiding its goals, enabling it to adapt to new and challenging needs and circumstances. Nigeria's role in ECOWAS can be aptly described as one 'without dominance'.

On the other hand, South Africa's membership of SADC brought new challenges to the organisation. It brought jealousy, disharmony, and new form of tension among members of the community and this affected the development of regional consensus and in turn the progress of regionalism in Southern Africa. These tensions were between Maputo and Pretoria and Pretoria and Harare.

The intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho in 1998, and Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique in the DRC crisis, both peddled as intervention by SADC, exposed the shortcoming of the Organ of Politics, Defence and Security and the rivalry between Pretoria, under Mandela and Harare, under Mugabe. Differences between Mandela and Mugabe, and Mbeki and Mugabe created tensions in the organisations and affected SADC intervention in conflict areas in the region. The leaders also had personality clashes, as Mugabe believed that as the leader of the Frontline states, Harare deserved some respect from Pretoria, since the Frontline States fought for South Africa's independence.

Furthermore, like Nigeria, South Africa's commitment to regional integration is also questioned by other member states, particularly non-SACU members who believed that Pretoria gives preference in trading and other matters to her partners in SACU. SACU members in SADC, namely Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho, had their currencies tied to the South African Rand making the establishment of a common currency almost unattainable. It also made free trade in the region almost unachievable.

Another area of growing concern for SADC member states is South Africa's trading partners. Some SADC partners are increasingly concerned about the way in which South Africa's suppliers are gaining increasing market share in the region. Coupled with this fear is the South Africa-European Union Trade Pact, which members' belief would enable EU companies to use South Africa as an export base from which they would make inroads into other Southern African markets, thereby damaging local industries. SADC states also fear that EU exporters would gain access to the South African market on better terms than those available to neighbouring SADC firms.

These allegations have been debunked, and it has been predicted that the signing of SADC Trade Protocol "will go a long way in providing equal access for products from SADC countries to the South African market," this may be enhanced by the EU-South Africa trade agreement.[10]

Other Member States of the community remained suspicious of the impact that South Africa's activities would have on the community. With time, Pretoria came to terms with this reality and accepted the actions of co-members and responded to their requests with humility and worked only within the framework of SADC and the African Union (AU).

RESEARCHFINDINGS

The followings are the research findings:

- This study has undertaken a comparative study of the hegemonic roles of Nigeria and South Africa towards sub-regional economic integration, maintenance of peace and security. This should be seen as exercises in foreign policy pursuit.
- That the hegemonic roles of Nigeria and South Africa towards sub-regional economic integration have been x-rayed through their activities and contributions to sub-regional communities, ECOWAS and SADC respectively.
- That while Nigeria was a motivator and co-founder of ECOWAS, South Africa came from being a 'malevolent to a benign' actor in the integration processes.
- That both countries are the 'industrial hearts' of their sub-regions: dominating Sub-regional trade and contributing over one-third of the annual budgets of the two communities.
- That the economic underdevelopment and the series of conflicts and wars in the sub-regions exposed the potentials of Nigeria and South Africa as regional hegemons with a lot of will and human and material resources when critically

needed. This they have done in concert with other members using intra-regional diplomacy to pursue their sub-regional agenda so as not to be seen as dominating the sub-regions.

- That the contributions of Nigeria and South Africa to ECOWAS and SADC have shaped the security complexes in the sub-regions. Nigeria mobilised other ECOWAS members to set up ECOMOG, a military intervention force to intervene in crises ridden countries, thereby mapping out the contours of a regional security complex in the West African sub-region. South Africa has not been successful in mobilising other members of SADC into an intervention force to intervene in any conflict in the sub-region. This has been done individually and in collaboration with other countries. The problems confronting conflict resolution in the southern African sub-region is more of power tussles among the states, most especially between Pretoria and Harare.

- That the power relation of the two regional security complexes is asymmetrical in nature and this serves as an obstacle in the realisation of conflict resolution in the two Communities.

- That Nigeria has demonstrated her hegemonic role in West Africa in several spheres of the Community's activities, but most visibly in security matters, particularly in conflict management, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. South Africa too has demonstrated her hegemonic role in the sub-region in several areas but more in the economic sphere. South African investment through government and private investments span the length and breadth of SADC countries including the transport and communication sectors. South African investments have led to job creation in SADC countries.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria and South Africa have been contributing over one third of the annual budgets of the two sub-regional organisations and have contributed to the implementation of protocols, as well as restoration of democratic governments in the sub-regions. Nigeria and South Africa have contributed immensely individually and collectively to peace and security in their respective sub-regions. Nigeria, working through ECOWAS, and South Africa, through SADC, have contributed meaningfully towards the relative peace and security that most countries in the sub-regions are currently enjoying.

Both ECOWAS and SADC were formed primarily as economic communities, but they have been forced by changing international relations, particularly at the end of the Cold War, to assume other functions. ECOWAS and SADC have set up machineries necessary for regional peace, security and socio-economic development, including mediation mechanism for conflict resolution, peacekeeping, capacity building, good governance and democratisation. Both communities have employed these machineries in order to maintain peace and security in their respective sub-regions.

The records of conflict resolution of the two security complexes have been mixed. The SADC intervention in Lesotho was botched and its peacemaking efforts in the DR Congo failed and these were the only authentic SADC attempts to forestall conflict in the region. In this regard, ECOWAS diplomatic and military missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were arguably better.

The lack of a mechanism for conflict resolution in ECOWAS and SADC security complexes was responsible for ineffectual regional interventions. SADC's Organ of

Politics, Defence and Security established in 1996, has virtually not functioned since its creation. ECOWAS on the other hand, set up a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security; this is yet to be ratified by the required nine members. Thus, the lack of formal conflict resolution mechanism in the two complexes led to ad hoc arrangements to form ECOMOG to intervene in the conflicts in West Africa and in SADC, the South Africa led intervention in Lesotho and the Zimbabwe led intervention in DRC.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)

More than thirty years after its establishment, ECOWAS engagement with development is yet to achieve any of its goals. There is no sub-regional common market, the monetary union is only slowly beginning to take shape, infra-structural development is still far from ideal, no real integration of production, the process of harmonisation of the tariff to boost trade is painfully slow leaving the members as competitors with each other. The members of the sub-regional body are still largely dependent and the goal of self-reliant development is yet to be attained. ECOWAS members are still more committed to the pursuit of national development policies instead of a harmonised sub-regional development programme.

The ambition for the free movement of the community's citizens within the sub-region is yet to be fully realised. Even though visas have been abolished among member states, citizens still suffer unbelievable hardships trying to cross the borders, while formal trans-border trade is yet to be properly organised.

Aside from the numerous problems identified, members are not politically committed to the ECOWAS agenda. Attempts to use the revised charter to refocus the organisation have not achieved the required effect. The Implementation Status Report compiled by the Executive Secretary indicated that only forty-five per cent of the programmes have been implemented by member states.

For ECOWAS to achieve its development goal, it is important that it move beyond the "negative integration" of just removing tariff and give appropriate attention to "positive integration" which is the integration of productive and development of suitable infrastructure. It is from the integration of productive structures that the veritable gains of Africa's self-reliance will be derived.[11] Africa is being left behind in the global movement towards economic regionalism.[12] Most African problems are political. Hence, the effective management of the political question in Africa today is a prerequisite for sustainable development of the continent. What all the many development problems in Africa call for is the rebirth of an African development state which is also by definition democratic and whose economic foundations are built on policy heterodoxy and domestic political consensus.[13]

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

The following are the key policy recommendations:

Measures to strengthen democracy and governance in the region: Southern African states need to move beyond viewing elections as an indicator of democracy to deepening the perceived value of democracy and the quality and reach of democratic processes. The SADC Secretariat should support and empower existing regional electoral monitoring processes; strengthen oversight mechanisms; promote the use of existing tools such as the regional guidelines on holding democratic elections; and support and guide governments, civil society actors and regional mechanisms in participatory democratic processes.

Measures to enhance the capacity of the region to address peace and security concerns: Measures need to be put in place to ensure that the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation has sufficient resources and capacity to drive the consolidation, implementation and monitoring of southern Africa's instruments on peace and security. The Secretariat should also support and increase training initiatives in order to build the capacity of SADC member states to engage in complex, multi-dimensional peace operations in Africa both within the context of the African Standby Force and the UN.

Measures to enhance the capacity to prevent conflict and build peace: SADC's member states, the Secretariat, its Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Co-operation, should promote and mobilise the resources to support the development and implementation of a conflict early warning system in the sub-region. Measures to build the capacity of mediators and other actors to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts should also be put in place, In addition, the SADC Secretariat should facilitate the organisation's engagement with the activities of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the AU's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework.

Enhance and support the mainstreaming of gender issues: Gender issues should be integrated into SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan and its Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ in order to ensure greater synergy and to facilitate the mainstreaming of gender issues into existing and future peace and security instruments. The SADC Secretariat should develop a gender-mainstreaming checklist to assist the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation in integrating measures to achieve gender equity in all its programmes; facilitate greater participation of women in formal and informal negotiation processes; and build capacity on gender issues among key peace and security actors.

Enhance national and regional capacity to anticipate, prevent and respond to food insecurity: The SADC secretariat should promote and support a rights-based approach to food security, which sees food security as a basic human right and views nutrition as a food security issue. The existing SADC food security framework, including the Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee and National Vulnerability Assessment Committee, should be strengthened and adapted to meet the sub-region's rapidly changing food security needs. Both gender and HIV/AIDS should be mainstreamed into all instruments and policies designed to address food insecurity, and HIV/AIDS epidemic-sensitive indicators should be integrated into SADC's monitoring and early warning tools and processes.

Strengthen measures to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic: SADC must help to articulate the HIV/AIDS epidemic's potential implications for safety and security in the sub-region. The Secretariat should examine and debate ways of promoting and harmonising the response of member states to HIV/AIDS within militaries in the sub-region, which typically have between 20-60 per cent infection rates. As in other intervention areas, measures should incorporate relevant gender issues. The SADC Secretariat should enhance the capacity of its HIV/AIDS focal points to drive and monitor interventions aimed at combating the epidemic; strengthen regional resource networks and partnerships; promote the harmonisation of regional protocols, policies, frameworks and guidelines; and facilitate improved monitoring by member states of their progress in implementing their policy commitments. The Secretariat should also collate and disseminate best practices and lessons learned over the past two decades in combating HIV/AIDS, and strengthen the collection and use of comprehensive health sector data for policy planning and implementation purposes.

The future

SADC has a declared objective of creating a genuine and equitable integration among its member states. Governments should be prepared to give up their national sovereignty if economic integration is to succeed. Involvement of the people is essential. This would entail free movement of people, capital and labour without the need for visas or even passports. Various trading blocs have been or are being established throughout the world and Southern Africa cannot be the exception. SADC has a lot to learn from similar organisations to ensure success. The future of SADC also lies with the findings and recommendations of the Ministerial Committee established to look into the harmonisation of relations between itself and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA). Possible duplication of resources in their activities is one of the arguments in favour of a merger. While recommendations of the Ministerial Committee have not been made public, it is reliably understood that one of the six options under consideration is the splitting up of the PTA into north and south, with the latter equating to SADC. Sectoral Coordinating Units are likely to be converted to Commissions such as SATCC and SACCAR.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE

- The work establishes that hegemons play leadership and important roles in regional integration. Hegemons provide critical all-round leadership and without hegemons, no genuine regional integration can take place.

- The work demonstrates that as hegemons, Nigeria, working through ECOWAS, and South Africa, working through SADC, have contributed immensely to the maintenance of peace, stability and security in their sub-regions. Nigeria contributed through the founding and funding of military intervention force, ECOMOG that participated in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding in a number of West African countries. In SADC, South Africa and Botswana participated in military intervention in Lesotho an operation singlehandedly financed and executed by South Africa, thereby bringing peace to the sub-region.

- It further maintains that Nigeria and South Africa are the two leading countries in West Africa and Southern Africa that possess the human and material resources to perform hegemonic roles, which they have done in collaboration with other member states. Although other members have challenged the leadership roles of both countries, there is no evidence to suggest that they have tried to dominate or put their weight to bear on other members in their respective sub-regions.

- The study reaffirms that as regional hegemons Nigeria and South Africa can deepen integration and promote broad economic and political linkages. They have been playing the role of 'benevolent hegemons' by creating mutually beneficial relationships with their neighbours and see such partners as being in line with their long-term national interests.

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