

Nigeria's Critical Election

2011

Edited by John A. Ayoade and Adeoye A. Akinsanya

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

Published by Lexington Books

A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.rowman.com

10 Thornbury Road, Plymouth PL6 7PP, United Kingdom

Copyright © 2013 by Lexington Books

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Nigeria's critical election, 2011 / edited by John A. Ayoade and Adeoye A. Akinsanya.
p. cm.

Includes index.


ISBN 978-0-7391-7588-0 (cloth : alk. paper)

Elections—Nigeria. 2. Nigeria—Politics and government—2007— I. Ayoade, John A.
A. II. Akinsanya, Adeoye A.

JQ3098.N384 2013

324.609669—dc23

2012035651

™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

List of Tables	ix
Acknowledgments	xi
Preface	xiii
Introduction	xv
<i>John A. Ayoade and Adeoye A. Akinsanya</i>	
1 Nigerian Electoral Geography Since 1999	1
<i>Stanley I. Okafor</i>	
2 Zoning of Political Offices in Nigeria: Patriotism or Plunder?	17
<i>John A. Ayoade</i>	
3 Electoral Infrastructure: INEC and the Electoral Law	57
<i>Adeoye A. Akinsanya and Linda Kwong-Ndung</i>	
4 Voters' Registration and Voters' Turnout in the 2011 General Elections	101
<i>Remi Anifowose and Emmanuel Onah</i>	
5 Sour Friendship: Electoral Politics in Imo and Abia States, 2007–2011	117
<i>Nkolika E. Obianyo</i>	
6 Politics, Friends and Foes in Bayelsa State	157
<i>Henry Alapiki</i>	

7	Deadly Gladiators: A Case Study of Oyo State <i>Tunde Oyekanmi</i>	175
8	Godfather Politics: The Collapse of Saraki Dynasty in Kwara State Politics <i>Emmanuel E. Ojo and Ebenezer E. Lawal</i>	185
9	The Elections in Lagos State As a Political Monologue <i>Abubakar Momoh</i>	203
10	Battle of the Titans: Ogun State Politics <i>Gboyega Akinsanmi</i>	229
11	The Judiciary and Democracy in Nigeria: An Independent Messenger? <i>Elijah A. Taiwo</i>	249
12	Toward Curbing Electoral Violence in Nigeria <i>Remi Anifowose and Adelaja O. Odukoya</i>	283
	Conclusion <i>John A. Ayode and Adeoye A. Akinsanya</i>	313
	Index	319
	About the Contributors	321
	About the Editors	323

Voters' Registration and Voters' Turnout in the 2011 General Elections

Remi Anifowose and Emmanuel Onah

INTRODUCTION

Elections in Nigeria have usually been preceded by voters' registration exercise. Registration of voters is a part of the electoral process in Nigeria. Elections are periodic voting exercises conducted for the purposes of selecting or affirming those who will represent the people of designated constituencies in government. It is the process of elite selection by the mass of the people in any given political system.¹ In fact, the first voters' registration exercise in Nigeria was carried out just before the 1922 Legislative Council elections organized by the Colonial Administration headed by Sir Hugh Clifford.² The 1922 election itself was the first in Nigeria, following the Clifford Constitution which allowed Nigerians in Lagos and Calabar to vote and contest elections into the Legislative Council. Ever since, voters' registration has remained part of the electoral process in Nigeria. Subsequent elections in the country have been preceded by a voters' registration exercise, and always at high costs.³

The 2011 Voters' Registration Exercise was thus only the latest in a long list of such exercises that have taken place in the country's history. The 2011 exercise gulped more than N80 billion compared to more than 50 billion in the run-up to the 2007 General Elections. Such exercises also preceded the 1999 and 2003 General Elections, respectively, and those before them. Voters' registration, usually an important exercise, enables the compilation of authentic voters' registers that serve as the basis of voting at elections. Those whose names appear on the voters' register are qualified to vote while those under-aged and aliens are usually denied registration. The compilation of such registers also helps electoral management officials to plan for elections

such as delimitation of voting centres, and know in advance, what materials to earmark for each voting centre, protect the integrity of elections, as it makes it possible to cross-check the number of votes against the registered voters and prevent impersonation of voters and 'ghost' voting.

What the recurring 'voters' registration exercises show is that the nation can not boast of a credible voters' register that could be used for more than a single election. The concern expressed by the public over this obviously wasteful situation just before the 2007 General elections made the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), under the Chairmanship of Professor Maurice Iwu to promise that a foolproof electronic register of voters would be compiled for the 2007 General Elections and beyond.⁴ To that end, much resources were committed to the 2006 Voters' Registration Exercise. But in the end, the 2006 Voters' Register fell short of expectations. The 2007 General Elections that was conducted on the basis of that Register was generally adjudged to be below all acceptable international standards, and much of the blame for that failed election was heaped on the 2006 Voters' Turnout. The centrality of voters' registration in the Nigerian electoral process is therefore obvious. This paper which looks at the 2011 Voters' Registration Exercise and the subsequent 2011 Voters' Register as a basis for assessing the 2011 General Elections is divided into three sections. First, is the background to the 2011 Voters' Registration Exercise in Nigeria. Second, it situates the registration exercise as part of the countdown to the 2011 General Elections, followed by an assessment of the elections on the basis of the voters' turnout at the elections.

BACKGROUND TO THE 2011 VOTERS' REGISTRATION EXERCISE

Public disillusionment followed the conduct of the 2007 General Elections in Nigeria. But the elections had initially promised to be acceptable and people had actually looked forward to it. In fact, part of the initial optimism over the 2007 General Elections was the hope that the 2006 Voters' Register as promised by Professor Iwu had features that could guarantee a free and fair election. The INEC-promised electronic register was to display voters' photographs and include their fingerprints. These features were supposed to make it impossible for nonexistent names to vote at the elections, or for people to vote with Voters' cards that did not belong to them. For that purpose, electronic data capture machines were imported at high costs for the Voters' Registration Exercise and the subsequent compilation of the Voters' Register. These electronic machines were also expected to be used for voting during the elections. The results of voting were to be transmitted electronically, raising the hopes that such results would not be tampered with.

Despite some initial hiccups, the electronic Voters' Register was compiled. But in the end, voting at the 2007 General Elections was done manually. With the electronic machines nowhere to be found, 'ghost' names on the Voters' register assumed flesh and voted severally. Double and multiple voting became the order at the elections and ballot-box stuffing was rampant. In several places, voting continued beyond the stipulated time. When it was time to count the votes, figures were arbitrarily awarded to favoured parties while the other parties had their votes subtracted at the whims of the electoral officials, such that the final figures on which candidates were declared winners or losers at that election were simply conjured or concocted. Many names that had earlier been in the Register suddenly disappeared, and many others could only see their names in the registers meant for other polling stations, and some only after the elections were over.⁵

The PDP Presidential candidate who was declared winner in the Presidential election admitted that the 2007 elections were fundamentally flawed. President Umaru Yar'Adua then promised the nation electoral reforms that would make subsequent elections in the country credible and acceptable. A Panel was set up for that purpose, and although President Yar'Adua died before the electoral reform process, which was watered down was completed, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan who succeeded him as President ensured the implementation of the Government White Paper on the Uwais Panel Report on Electoral Reforms in Nigeria.⁶ As part of that reform, Professor Attahiru Jega was appointed as the new INEC Chairman in June 2010. Professor Jega came into the office with a tall profile, and it was expected that he would work to carry through the promised electoral reforms. There was a hitch, however. The laws of the land had a fixed time-line for general elections and from the date of Professor Jega's appointment, there was barely about six months to conduct the 2011 General elections. Professor Jega was literally running a race against time! One immediate fallout of the time-constraint facing the INEC was the confusion over the Voters' Register. There was virtually no disagreement over the unsustainability of the 2006 Voters' Register for the 2011 General elections. However, the timeline was such that a new Register might not be possible before the elections. In the circumstances, Professor Jega initially took the position that the 2006 Voters' Register could be 'cleaned up' and used for the elections, and subsequently a new Register would be compiled for future elections. This did not significantly reduce public skepticism about the Register.⁷ At a Retreat organized for INEC top officials in Calabar in November 2010, the electoral body agreed that the 2006 Voters' Register was irredeemable, and therefore, a new one should be compiled before the 2011 General Elections.⁸ Thereafter, a new timetable was released for the 2011 General Elections by INEC to take care of the new

reality.⁹ An earlier timetable had proposed the elections for January 2011. By the new timetable, registration of voters was slated for January 2011, while the General Elections was shifted to April, 2011.¹⁰

THE 2011 VOTERS' REGISTRATION EXERCISE AND THE COUNTDOWN TO THE 2011 GENERAL ELECTIONS

The 2011 Voters' Registration Exercise took off on January 15, 2011. It was essentially the first in the series of official activities that led up to the 2011 General Elections in Nigeria. The preparations for this exercise were understandably characterized by hiccups. To start with, a new leadership had just taken over INEC, and it was obvious that Professor Jega and his team was still not on top of the situation. As a result, the new management could not immediately appreciate the enormity of the situation confronting the nation, a fact which even the INEC Chairman himself alluded to.¹¹ And even if they were able to learn fast, there was the problem of lack of trained personnel and necessary infrastructures at the INEC with which to take off. It soon became apparent that the electronic data-capture machines used for the 2006 Voters' registration exercise were nowhere to be found, but it was no time to ask questions. And to compound matters, Professor Jega soon found out that there were no funds in INEC coffers.¹²

Faced with such enormous problems, Professor Jega first approached the National Assembly with a budget of about N87billion. This was supposed to cover the cost of various aspects of the preparation for the entire elections. Registration equipments alone were estimated to cost over N36billion.¹³ To show the seriousness of the situation and the importance of the whole exercise, the National Assembly approved the budget with a little upward review.¹⁴ Then with money available, the problem became how to ensure that the needed equipments would be available and deployed before time. When registration took off in mid-January, this last problem was not yet fully resolved. By January 17, only 98,000 of the 120,000 Direct Data Capture Machines earmarked for the registration exercise had been deployed.¹⁵ This meant that as of that date, registration had not taken off in about 22,000 Centres.

But this was not the only problem on the ground. There were far more serious software hitches with the DDC machines. In many cases, the fingerprint scanners of these machines could not capture the fingerprints of intending registrants as the sensitivity calibration of the scanners, earlier set high to prevent nonhuman fingerprints of ghosts and fictitious persons being recorded in the machines was making it difficult for the machines to recognize human fingerprints.¹⁶ It then got out later that many of the machines in use were

old and the batteries for the machines were actually designed as backup.¹⁷ The DDC machines were even alleged to lack the capacity to detect multiple registrations,¹⁸ a capacity that the approved budget was supposed to cover.

As the registration exercise progressed, INEC was able to reasonably handle the major technical shortcomings, but other problems remained and new ones even surfaced. There were allegations that party agents were bribing INEC registration officials to issue Voters' cards against some names submitted by them, while in some other cases, party agents were also alleged to have bought up Voters' cards from duly registered Nigerians, possibly for use during the elections. Even some seemingly patriotic Nigerians who had offered assistance to stranded INEC officials with tables and chairs, generators, and cover or space during the exercise were believed to have demanded some 'favours' in return. State and Local governments were not left out: many of them sought to control the registration exercise in their areas through 'Greek gifts' to INEC officials.¹⁹ Even later, there were insinuations that more materials were deliberately made available in some specific geographical regions of the country in an attempt to ensure that such areas recorded more votes than the other regions of the country. Toward the end of the two weeks originally slated for the registration exercise by the Electoral Act 2010, it became obvious that fewer Nigerians turned out to register. This was in spite of all the efforts made by INEC, government and other agencies to sensitize Nigerians about the importance of registering to vote. In fact, many State governments and their agencies were known to be taking certain definite actions to compel their citizens to register. Some States hinged the payment of salaries to their civil servants on the possession of the Voters' cards. Others equally made the Voters' card the condition for enjoying certain services and privileges by citizens.²⁰ Two weeks into the registration exercise, Professor Jega admitted that only about 28 million Nigerians had been registered out of a projected figure of 70 million. Professor Jega then asked for a one-week extension of the registration exercise with a proposal for additional N6.6billion budget. This request was granted. A further two-day extension was later allowed for those areas and States where registration did not take place in the opening two days of the exercise.²¹

The registration of voters finally ended throughout the country on February 7, 2011. INEC announced a final figure of 67,764,327 voters on the 2011 Voters' Register. This was about 3,000,000 short of the projections, but the figure was within the range of about 61,000,000 registered in 2006. There was a general satisfaction with the figures though, which, despite the hiccups that attended the registration exercise, was felt to be relatively genuine.

While the registration lasted, other election programmes on the INEC timetable literally had to wait. With the end of the registration exercise, INEC

Table 4.1. 2006 Population Figures and Registered Voters in 2011 in Nigeria

<i>State</i>	<i>2006 Population</i>	<i>Registered Voters, 2011</i>
Abia	2,845,380	1,481,191
Adamawa	3,178,950	1,714,860
Akwa Ibom	3,902,051	1,714,781
Anambra	4,177,828	1,758,220
Bauchi	4,653,066	1,835,562
Bayelsa	1,704,515	472,389
Benue	4,253,641	1,415,162
Borno	4,171,104	2,730,368
Cross River	2,892,988	1,018,550
Delta	4,112,445	1,900,055
Ebonyi	2,176,947	876,249
Edo	3,233,366	1,412,225
Ekiti	2,398,957	750,753
Enugu	3,267,837	1,301,185
FCT	1,406,239	886,323
Gombe	2,365,040	1,266,993
Imo	3,927,563	1,611,715
Jigawa	4,361,002	1,852,689
Kaduna	6,113,503	3,565,762
Kano	9,401,288	5,135,415
Kastina	5,801,584	2,931,668
Kebbi	3,256,541	1,603,468
Kogi	3,314,043	1,215,405
Kwara	2,365,353	1,115,565
Lagos	9,113,605	6,247,845
Nasarawa	1,869,377	1,224,206
Niger	3,954,772	721,485
Ogun	3,751,140	1,869,329
Ondo	3,460,877	1,558,975
Osun	3,416,959	1,293,975
Oyo	5,580,894	2,577,490
Plateau	3,206,531	1,983,453
Rivers	5,198,716	2,419,057
Sokoto	3,702,676	2,065,508
Taraba	2,294,800	1,308,106
Yobe	2,321,339	1,182,106
Zamfara	3,278,873	1,746,024
Total	140,431,790	67,764,334

Source: E. Ojameruaye, "Prognostication of Nigeria's Presidential Election on April 9, 2011," Unpublished paper downloaded from http://urhobo.net/papers/ojameruaye2011Nigeria_PresidentialElection.pdf. Retrieved on 27-10-2010.

shifted attention to other items on the election agenda. By this time, the General Elections were just about two months away. It was hoped, however, that with a clean Voters' Register now available, the other election programmes would run smoothly.

THE 2011 VOTERS' REGISTER AND VOTERS' TURNOUT IN THE ELECTIONS

With the 2011 Voters' Register in place and all other arrangements made, INEC announced it was finally ready for the 2011 General Elections. The election was scheduled to commence on April 2nd with the National Assembly poll, but owing to logistic problems, the election was shifted by one week. The election took place on April 9th. Voting was generally peaceful, as the election was devoid of the usual logistic problems that confront elections in Nigeria such as shortage of voting materials and difficulties with locating the names of voters in the Voters' Register. With these problems largely absent, the election of the members of the National Assembly went smoothly in most of the places where they held. In a number of constituencies, however, voting did not take place, as INEC had earlier postponed the elections in those places due to certain reasons including shortage of materials or late arrival of materials for the election. Turnout of voters was generally average, while the voting pattern gave some idea as to the relative strengths of the political parties across the country.

The Presidential election took off as scheduled on April 16th with the front-runners being President Goodluck Jonathan of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) and Gen. Muhammadu Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). That election promised to be interesting, with the two major candidates embodying as it were, the various divergence of the nation, in terms of ethnic origin, religion, region, and even personal mien and outlook. The voting behaviour of the electorate was expected to reflect these sentiments across the country. The voting exercise was also peaceful, but just as the results were filtering in, hell was let loose in many parts of the North. It was as if some voters in the North saw that their candidate would fail and wanted to torpedo the whole exercise. At the end of the political violence over 500 people were reported dead according to official estimates,²² and properties worth several millions of Naira had been destroyed across the region. Voting generally followed the pattern of the immediate past elections except in a few States where there were surprises. The turnout was however mixed. Expectedly, there was a high turnout throughout the North, and in the largely urban Lagos State. In the South-South and South-East voter turnout was very

Table 4.2. Registered Voters and Voters' Turnout in Selected States in the 2011 General Elections

State	Registered Voters, 2011	Voting Records in the 2011 Elections			
		National Assembly		Presidential	Governorship
		Senator	HOR		
Abia	1,481,191	N.A	N.A	1,188,342	752,361
Anambra	1,758,220	1,478,667	N.A	1,157,203	1,136,694
Benue	1,415,162	N.A	N.A	1,047,769	559,134
Borno	2,730,368	N.A	N.A	1,177,686	1,045,029
Delta	1,900,055	710,730	N.A	1,398,570	959,627
Edo	1,412,225	508,702	N.A	621,188	N.A
Enugu	1,301,185	N.A	N.A	814,028	479,490
Imo	1,611,715	555,475	N.A	1,407,835	406,808
Lagos	6,247,845	N.A	N.A	1,944,898	1,863,513
Rivers	2,419,057	N.A	N.A	1,854,102	1,291,096
Total	67,764,334	3,253,574		12,611,621	8,493,752

* NA —Not Available.

Source: CP-Africa, "Governorship Election Results 2011-Nigeria," Downloaded from <http://www.cp-Africa.com/2011/04/29>

high. The turnout in the zones was surprising, especially as one week later, during the Gubernatorial elections, turnout in these zones drastically fell, to figures that closely resembled those recorded during the National Assembly elections held earlier.²³

VOTERS' TURNOUT AND RESULTS OF 2011 GENERAL ELECTIONS

So much has been said and written concerning voters' turnout in the 2011 General Elections in Nigeria. Much of such interest has dwelt mainly on the Presidential elections, where it is claimed that some of the results were outrageous. In fact, voters' turnout was the basis of at least one suit at the Election Tribunal challenging the results of the Presidential election.²⁴ At issue especially, is the turnout recorded in the South-East and South-South geopolitical zones of the country during the Presidential election. In addition, results in a few other States outside these zones have also been disputed. It is then obvious that no assessment of the 2011 General Elections will be complete without a comprehensive analysis of the voters' turnout at that election.

A look at the voters' turnout during the elections will reveal some interesting patterns. First, the turnout of voters during the National Assembly elections, the first in the series, was fairly similar to the turnout of voters

during the Governorship elections, the last in the series. Second, the turnout of voters during the Presidential elections, the second in the series, was in many cases unrelated to the turnouts earlier or after. Looking at the National Assembly and Governorship elections, the voters' turnout was on the average around 50 percent of the actual number of the registered voters in most of the States. This turnout has been described as normal, going by the records in other countries of the world, where average turnout in elections have been calculated to be around 60 percent.²⁵ Yet, going by forecasts and expectations before the elections, this figure could be said to be low. Following Professor Jega's appointment as INEC Chairman enthusiasm had heightened that 'votes would count' at the elections. It was thus expected that numerous Nigerians, who had earlier registered as voters would cast their votes during the elections. It turned out that those expectations did not materialize.

Some reasons can be adduced for this level of turnout during those two elections. First, turnout at elections is partly a function of the strength of the contending candidates. Hotly contested elections usually record high voters' turnout. In the 2011 General Elections, however, many of the candidates for the National Assembly or Governorship positions were already incumbents and were only contesting to retain their positions. The two elections in these States did not raise much tension. Many of the incumbents were expected to win, and so, many voters might have preferred to stay at home instead of going out to cast their "votes that may not make any difference." This would explain why voters' turnout in many States was not high. Also, turnout at elections is a function of the local issues that may arise before or in the course of elections to heighten tension and serve to mobilize voters. In a number of States, local and other issues had played a prominent role in heightening tensions over the two elections. For instance, in the South-West, the two elections were especially seen as the opportunity for one or the other of two contending political tendencies to impose its hegemony over the region. In those States, turnout of voters was relatively high and had exceeded the average.

It thus follows that voters' turnout is likely going to be higher as the elections become more local. Going by this logic, voters' turnout was supposed to be higher at the National Assembly elections than at the Governorship elections. The same logic would mean that even in these elections, voters' turnout would be higher in the localities where the individual candidates came from than in other areas where the stakes may not be so direct. All these were largely true for the National Assembly and Governorship elections in 2011, and candidates consistently recorded relatively higher votes in their places of origin. The foregoing consideration however did not hold for the Presidential election.

Yet, the Presidential election could not be said to have been hotly contested. President Goodluck Jonathan was already the incumbent President, and was contesting against General Buhari whose followership was limited across the country. General Buhari's party platform was the new and largely unknown Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), under which he was contesting against President Goodluck Jonathan, whose platform, the PDP, was the dominant party in the country and was controlling almost two-thirds of the State Governments in the country. In addition, and particularly important for the election, General Buhari's 'pocket' was not deep, as against President Goodluck Jonathan who was believed to have access to unlimited funds.

The election from the start therefore, was not an even match, and President Jonathan was widely expected to win. Even the tensions that usually accompany a North-South matchup in such elections was not palpable this time, and except in a very few cases, both candidates transversed the different corners of the country freely for their campaigns. Then, the 2011 Presidential election did not rake up much local issues that could have heightened tensions. It is true that the election was the first chance for someone from the South-South of the country to win the presidency of the country. It is also true that in a way, the North was engaged in a battle for its political life, and in the course of the elections, General Buhari came to embody the soul of that region. But the disparity in the strengths of the candidates was supposed to control for this, and the two candidates were expected to lead with wide margins in their zones.

In the end, both candidates won in their zones as expected. It was not the fact about victory but the manner of winning, that has led to doubts about the authenticity of the results of the Presidential elections. A zone-by-zone analysis of the Presidential elections results, vis-à-vis the results of the other elections, actually seem to confirm some of these doubts. General Buhari won in most of the Northern States, some with a very wide margin. In many of these States, however, the total votes cast did not deviate drastically from the totals for the other elections, although the margin of victory for any one party was not so high in those elections.²⁶

President Jonathan won in more States of the country. In many of these States, his margin of victory could be considered normal, and can be explained by the local issues that pervaded the elections, including religion, regionalism and ethnicity. In the South-East and South-South zones, however, the margin of President Jonathan's victory was more than normal. President Jonathan is from the South-South, and he was expected to win massively there. The various political parties in the South-East also 'adopted' President Jonathan for the Presidential elections, and he was also expected to win massively there. After the election, eye-witnesses also confirmed that President

Jonathan actually won massively in those zones.²⁷ However, these accounts have equally pointed out that the number of votes recorded for President Jonathan were much more than he actually obtained, and were 'manufactured' by party agents working in concert with electoral officials at the voting centres.²⁸

An eye-witness of what happened in a polling centre in the South-East is believed to largely capture what also transpired in the South-South on the day of the Presidential election:

Voting was peaceful in our centre. But turnout was very low. Everybody around here knows that President Jonathan will win and so, many people decided not to waste time going to vote. All of us at this centre are for Jonathan irrespective of our party affiliations. Even the CPC agents here are known PDP members. There is no CPC in this area, but these people who claim to be the agents of the party are doing so for the purpose of signing the result sheets. So when voting ended, and counting was done, PDP won everything. But the number of votes was so small. PDP had only 46 votes in one booth, and 60 in the other booth in our centre. So, we decided to make the votes look respectable. All the agents (who were all PDP members or PDP supporters) and other leaders then approached the INEC officials. Some of them resisted initially, but eventually, they agreed to our plans. So they brought out the voters register and we saw that one booth had 960 voters while the other had 917 voters. So we proposed that the figures be changed for the PDP to read 901 votes and 897 votes respectively. No votes were given to the other parties, and even the 'CPC agents' agreed there was no need for that.²⁹

With such inflated votes as this, President Jonathan went on to win so massively in the South-East and South-South, that he emerged winner at the first ballot. This was contrary to the forecasts of many polls before the Presidential election, many of which had predicted that there could be a run-off. Many had predicted that President Jonathan would secure a greater spread on account of PDP presence, while General Buhari would win more number of votes on account of Northern-bloc solidarity votes.³⁰ However, it turned out that such predictions did not reckon with the massive votes that came out of South-East and South-South zones.

As the results of the Presidential elections filtered in, and it became clear that President Jonathan might win at the first ballot, Northern voters became restive. The situation then boiled over into violence. This violence did not change the outcome of the Presidential elections, but the repercussions certainly affected the Governorship elections in the North. Following the violence, INEC postponed the Governorship elections in the most-affected States. While the (PDP) Federal Government ordered the security agencies to fish out the perpetrators,³¹ the searchlight was immediately turned on many CPC activists. It was therefore no wonder that during the rescheduled

**Table 4.3. Voters Turnout in the 2011 Presidential Elections
According to Geo-Political Zones and Parties**

Zone/State	Registered Voters, 2011	Voting Records in the 2011 Presidential Elections			
		PDP	CPC	ACN	ANPP
South-East					
Abia	1,481,191	1,175,984	3,743	4,392	1,455
Anambra	1,758,220	1,145,169	4,223	3,437	975
Ebonyi	876,249	480,592	1,025	1,112	14,296
Enugu	1,301,185	802,144	3,753	1,755	1,111
Imo	1,611,715	1,381,357	7,591	14,821	2,520
Total	7,028,560	4,985,246	20,335	25,517	20,357
South-South					
Akwa Ibom	1,714,781	1,165,629	5,348	54,148	2,000
Bayelsa	472,389	504,811	691	370	136
Cross River	1,018,550	709,382	4,002	5,889	2,521
Delta	1,900,055	1,378,852	8,960	13,160	2,520
Edo	1,412,225	542,173	17,795	54,242	2,174
Rivers	2,419,057	1,817,762	13,182	16,382	1,449
Total	8,937,057	6,118,608	49,978	144,191	11,026
North-East					
Adamawa	1,714,860	508,314	344,526	32,736	2,706
Bauchi	1,835,562	258,404	1,315,209	16,674	8,777
Bornu	2,730,368	207,075	909,763	7,533	37,279
Gombe	1,266,993	290,347	459,898	3,420	5,693
Taraba	1,308,106	451,354	257,986	17,791	1,203
Yobe	1,182,230	117,128	337,537	6,069	143,179
Total	10,038,119	1,832,622	3,624,919	84,273	198,837
North Central					
Benue	1,415,162	694,776	109,680	223,007	8,592
FCT	886,323	253,444	131,576	2,327	3,170
Kogi	1,215,405	399,816	132,201	6,516	16,491
Kwara	1,115,565	268,243	83,603	52,432	1,672
Nasarawa	1,224,206	408,997	178,309	1,204	1,047
Niger	721,485	321,429	652,574	13,344	7,138
Plateau	1,983,453	1,029,865	356,551	10,181	5,235
Total	8,561,599	3,376,570	1,744,575	309,011	43,345
North-West					
Jigawa	1,852,698	419,252	663,994	17,355	7,673
Kaduna	3,565,762	1,190,179	1,334,244	11,278	17,201
Kano	5,135,415	440,666	1,624,543	42,353	526,310
Kastina	2,931,668	428,392	1,163,919	10,945	6,342
Kebbi	1,603,468	369,198	501,769	26,171	3,298
Sokoto	2,065,508	309,057	540,769	20,144	5,063
Zamfara	1,746,024	238,980	624,515	17,970	46,554
Total	8,561,692	3,395,724	6,453,437	146,216	612,542

Zone/State	Registered Voters, 2011	Voting Records in the 2011 Presidential Elections			
		PDP	CPC	ACN	ANPP
South-West					
Ekiti	750,753	135,009	2,689	116,981	1,482
Lagos	6,247,845	1,281,688	189,983	427,203	8,941
Ogun	1,869,326	309,177	17,654	199,555	2,969
Ondo	1,558,975	387,376	11,890	74,253	6,741
Osun	1,293,976	188,409	6,997	299,711	3,617
Oyo	2,577,490	484,758	92,396	242,240	7,156
Total	14,298,356	2,786,417	321,609	1,369,943	30,906
Grand Total	57,425,383	22,495,187	12,214,853	2,079,151	917,013

Source: Neighbour to Neighbour for Transformation, Jonathan's Pan-Nigerian Mandate: Presidential Elections Results As Released by INEC, April 18, 2011.

elections, many CPC agents were not found at the polling centres. The PDP went on to clear the States, including those where the trend in the earlier elections had pointed to an irrevocable CPC victory at the Governorship elections.³²

CONCLUSION

The 2011 General Elections in Nigeria have been hailed, both within and outside the country, as largely free and fair. There is no doubt that those elections were a far improvement on the earlier elections conducted in the Fourth Republic. Despite the hiccups associated with virtually every stage of the 2011 General Elections, many of such due to the short timeline, the INEC went on to conduct a widely credible and acceptable election. However, acclaims for these elections seem to deliberately ignore the events in the South-East and South-South geo-political zones during the Presidential elections. While such acclaims may not have ignored the political violence after the Presidential elections in some Northern States, they seem to deliberately overlook the fallouts of that violence, especially its effects on the subsequent Governorship elections in that region. This paper maintains that the unexpectedly high number of votes recorded during the Presidential election in the South-East and South-South zones tended to mar the credibility of the 2011 General Elections. The paper also maintains that the Governorship elections in some specific Northern States went against the normal trend of the 2011 General Elections, and this could in the end also reduce the integrity of that election. The paper, however, contends that these events cannot be totally blamed on the INEC. In the case of the South-East and South-South, much of the blame

for whatever happened should be borne by the CPC itself, which went into the election knowing that it did not have structures on the ground in some parts of the country and yet could not enter into alliances with other parties that would have ameliorated such a situation. In the case of the North, whatever happened after the violence that followed the Presidential election was more at the instance of the government than the electoral body. The implication of the foregoing is that while the 2011 General Elections were acceptable, much needs to be done to improve the integrity of elections in Nigeria in the future.

NOTES

1. R. Anifowose, "Theoretical Perspectives on Elections," in *2003 General Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria*, edited by R. Anifowose and T. Babawale (Lagos: Friedrich Ebert, 2003), pp.21–45.
2. R. Abati, "Why We Cant Register Voters?" *The Guardian*, (Lagos), January 28, 2011.
3. L. Jinadu, "Nigeria," in *Election Management Bodies in West Africa*, edited by I. Fall et.al. (Dakar: OSISA, 2011), p.148.
4. The Guardian, "INEC Voters Registration: Matters Arising," *The Guardian*, (Lagos), February 2, 2007, p.16.
5. Abati, "Election 2011: Nigeria's Finest Moment?" *Ibid.*, April, 29, 2011.
6. J. Osuntokun, "Nigeria and the Curse of Elections (7)," *The Nation* (Lagos), October 20, 2011, p.21.
7. N. Odebode, "Voter Registration: INEC to employ 360,000 ad-hoc workers," *The Punch*, (Lagos), August 3, 2010, p.2.
8. N. Meribe, "INEC and the Bangladeshi Voter Registration Model," *Ibid.*, August 3, 2010, p.12.
9. Supra Note 2.
10. *Ibid.*
11. C. Okocha and T. Rahman, "Inside Jega's INEC: How the Professor Runs the Commission," *This Day*, (Lagos), April 9, 2011, pp.51–52.
12. O. Aganga, "FG has released N87.7bn to INEC," *The Punch*, (Lagos), October 15, 2010, p.8.
13. Supra Note 2.
14. Supra Note 8.
15. The Nation, "False Start: INEC should Address Hitches in Voters' Registration," *The Nation* (Lagos), January 17, 2011, p.17.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Supra Note 2.
18. M. Abubakar, "ACN Doubts INEC's Capacity to Detect Multiple Registration," *The Guardian* (Lagos), February 1, 2011, p.2.
19. Supra Note 2.
20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*
22. K. Oyeleye et.al., "Presidential Election Fallout: North Boils," *Nigerian Tribune*, (Ibadan), April 19, 2011, p.2.
23. I. Sagay, "2011 Elections, Sovereign National Conference," presented at the Faculty of Law, University of Lagos Roundtable Series on the 2011 Election: Implication for Development and Citizen Participation, University of Lagos, Lagos, 2011.
24. *This Day*, "It's Official: Jonathan Declared President Elect: CPC Seeks Cancellation of Results in 19 States," *This Day*, (Lagos), April 10, 2011.
25. A. Esejere, "Lessons from India's General Elections and Tips for INEC," *The Guardian* (Lagos), May 1, 2011, p.8.
26. E. Ojameruaye, "Prognostication of Nigeria's Presidential Election on April 9, 2011. Unpublished paper downloaded from <http://urhobo.net/papers/ojameruaye2011NigerianPresidentialElection.pdf>, retrieved on October 27, 2011.
27. Dr. Onah was an Election Observer in Enugu State where he had registered to vote.
28. Observations by Dr. Onah at the Polling Centre where he voted on the election days including the Presidential election. Dr. Onah observed several irregularities on the voting days including what the party agents on the day of the National Assembly elections called "mop-up." This was the practice by which party agents paid for the unused/unutilized ballot papers, after which the electoral officers shared the "remaining" ballot papers among the political parties that paid, according to a calculated weight on the basis of payments made and actual votes recorded. On the day of the Presidential elections, this practice continued, but because virtually all the parties at the Polling Centre adopted Dr. Goodluck as their candidate, the party agents agreed that all the unused ballot papers be credited to him. On the day of the Gubernatorial elections, only PDP agents agreed to pay and votes corresponding to the payment were allocated to the PDP candidate after voting ended.
29. One party agent (name withheld) reported to Dr. Onah on the happenings in his Polling Centre during the Presidential election in Enugu State.
30. Ojameruaye, p.9.
31. Such States include Kaduna, Kastina, and Niger States.
32. *Supra* Note 23.