DILEMMA OF AFRICAN MODERNISATION

BY OLATUNDE OLOKO

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DILEMMA OF AFRICAN MODERNISATION

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By

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formally due, about four years ago, the title would, in all
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Modernisation". For up to the time of my appointment to
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of sociology, anthropology, economics, psychology and
political science to an understanding of the structures and
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true that at the time of my appointment to the sociology
department at King's College, University of Durham, nearly
20 years ago, I was deeply exposed to a detailed knowledge
of the ethnography of most of the ethnic groups that constitute
the vast continent of Africa. But this knowledge was as yet
another facet in a vast number of academic activities devoted
to the solution to Nigerian developmental problems.

At the invitation of Professor A. J. U. Egbe, the
Director, Department of Development Studies, University
College of Ibadan, I returned to Nigeria in October 1959
and was employed as a lecturer in the sociology department with special reference to the application of
anthropological knowledge to the problem of social and
economic development in Nigeria. My particular assignment
was to design courses of study for community development
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If I had given this Inaugural Lecture when it became formally due, about four years ago, the title would, in all probability, have been something like "Dilemma of Nigerian Modernisation". For up till the time of my appointment to the post of Professor of Sociology in the University of Lagos in June 1975, my academic endeavours were largely concentrated on the application of the theories and methodologies of sociology, anthropology, economics, psychology and political science to an understanding of the structures and functioning of Nigerian social phenomena. It is of course true that at the time of my training in economics and anthropology at King's College, University of Durham, nearly 20 years ago, I was deeply exposed to a detailed knowledge of the ethnography of most of the ethnic groups that occupy the vast continent of Africa. But this knowledge of Africa and her peoples was to remain dormant for many years during which I was concerned with academic attempts to find solution to Nigerian developmental problems.

At the invitation of Professor Ayo Ogunsheye, the Director, Department of Extra-Mural Studies, University College of Ibadan, I returned to Nigeria in October 1959 and was employed as tutor in Social Anthropology in his department with special reference to the application of anthropological knowledge to the problem of social and economic development in Nigeria. My particular assignment was to design courses of lectures for community development officers, agricultural officers, medical and health workers and cooperative officers to indicate the ways in which a knowledge of the ethnography of the members of the various ethnic groups in Nigeria can be of assistance in persuading the people they deal with to accept new ways of doing things,
By the end of 1961 I had produced an introductory handbook of rural sociology in Nigeria for use in the training of public officials and others who had responsibility for promoting the acceptance of innovation by other people.

In 1962 I moved from the Department of Extra-Mural Studies, University of Ibadan to the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ibadan, as a research fellow engaged specifically to work on a UN-sponsored research into the effects which socio-cultural factors had on agricultural productivity in Nigeria. It was at this time that I carried out researches in what were then known as the Eastern and Western Regions of Nigeria. These researches being primarily socio-economic in nature enabled me to make a more, or less, equal use of my training in economics and anthropology. Late in 1963 I was seconded by NISER to serve as Associate Field Director in Nigeria in a study being carried out into the social psychology of national development in six developing nations by the Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, U.S.A. My participation in that study gave me on-the-job training in both the theories and research methodologies of social psychology. The Director of the Harvard Project, Professor Alex Inkeles, was former chairman of the Social Psychology Committee of the American Sociological Association. I would like to seize this opportunity to openly acknowledge my deep debt of gratitude to Alex Inkeles for most of the competence that I can claim to possess in the fields of both the philosophy of science and the use of scientific method in academic enquiry.

The Influence of Talcott Parsons

At the end of field-work in connection with the Harvard Project in 1964, I proceeded to Harvard University where, in addition to being a Research Associate on the project, I did graduate work in Sociology and there came under the intense influence of America’s and, indeed, the world’s most eminent sociological theorist, Talcott Parsons. The influence of Parsons on my academic development is as extensive as the whole of Parsonian sociology itself but, for the purpose of this lecture, I need only mention the following crucial aspects of it.1

Firstly, there is his general theory of action which consists of a series of assumptions which prescribe a mode of analysis for explaining the action or conduct of typical individuals in typical situations. Central to the Parsonian theory of action is concern

"with the phenomenon of the institutionalization of the pattern of value-orientation in the social system, with the conditions of that institutionalization and of change in the patterns, with conditions of conformity with and deviance from a set of such patterns and with motivational processes in so far as they are involved in all of these".2

Translated into plain English, Parsonian general theory of action is concerned with a search for the factors which motivate people to take the values, rules and norms which govern their behaviour in social systems sufficiently seriously such that deviance from such standards evoke negative sanctions and conformity with them evoke positive sanctions. This is another way of saying that the Parsonian theory of action is his attempt to provide an answer to the Hobbesian problem of order to which we shall have cause to return in some detail in this lecture. Suffice it to say that this answer represents a synthesis of those provided by founding fathers of modern social science such as John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Auguste Comte, St. Simon, etc.


The second aspect of Parsonian sociology which left a strong influence on my own work is his "pattern variables". These variables are the set of alternative — explicit or implicit — choices which an actor or actors must make in categorizing and orienting to other actor or actors in a situation of action with these other actor or actors before such a situation has any definite meaning.

According to Parsons and Shils (1952) individuals are faced with five basic dilemmas in choice-making when they enter into meaningful interaction with other individuals. These choice variables are:

1. affectivity Vs. affective neutrality;
2. universalism Vs. particularism;
3. achievement Vs. ascription;
4. specificity Vs. diffuseness; and
5. collectivity Vs. self-orientation.

We will have opportunity to define these terms later in this lecture and to show that many of the problems of African modernisation can be traced to the failure of many actors to resolve the pattern variable dilemmas in appropriate ways.

The third aspect of Parsonian sociology which has also influenced my work is his postulate that there are certain functional prerequisites which social systems must meet for their sub-systems if they are to survive on-goingly or experience orderly change. These prerequisites are:

1. Adaptation, (2) goal attainment, (3) integration, and (4) tension management or pattern maintenance.

Finally, I came away from my study under Talcott Parsons with the conviction that since all the social sciences — sociology, economics, psychology, anthropology and political science — study what is concretely the same subject-matter, that is, human social action, there are always open boundaries between them. None of them can be self-contained, any more than it can predominate over the others. One of the sources of the dilemma of African modernisation is the illusion that one of the social sciences, economics, has a predominant position over all the others. More about that later.

I returned from Harvard University in October, 1968 to join the staff of the University of Lagos as a Senior Lecturer in Sociology and had, among other duties, the specific responsibility of teaching courses in Sociological Theories and the Sociology of Industry. In view of the fact that these courses were taught from a comparative perspective, my earlier pan-African academic interest were revived but the decision to make the scope of this Inaugural Lecture African rather than simply Nigerian was taken as a result of the experience gained from an intense study of all aspects of African human phenomena which my appointment last year as a Consultant on African Socio-Development to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
afforded me. In the course of my UNECA assignment I
have not only had to read a vast amount of published mate-
rials on all the countries of Africa, I have also had to go on
interviewing and data-gathering missions to over a dozen of
these countries.

Problems of African Modernisation

It was this experience that made me realise that the
social, political, economic and psychological problems
attendant upon the process of modernisation are not only
common to all the countries of Africa but also that their
causes, incidence, and impact are better understood within a
pan-African comparative perspective.

Some of the problems whose link with the process of
modernisation many countries in Africa have been under-
going, especially in the last 20 years, that will be attempted
in this lecture include:

(1) those related directly to the structure and func-
tioning of the political systems of these countries; and

(2) those resulting from the process termed structural
differentiation by sociologists of development.

In the first category of social problems are forms of
internal wars such as military coup d'état, civil wars, seces-
sionist movements, political conspiracies, general strikes,
vioent demonstrations, insurrections and other attempts to
effect changes in government’s policies, rulers, or organiza-
tions by means of violence or threat of violence. Before
identifying some of the problems in the second category, it
is necessary to present a definition of the process of struc-
tural differentiation as formulated by one of the leading users
of the concept.

According to Eisenstadt (1964) the term structural
differentiation refers to the process

"... through which the main social functions or the
major institutional spheres of society become dissocia-
ted from one another, attached to specialized collectivi-
ties and roles, and organized in relatively specific and
autonomous symbolic and organizational frameworks
within the confines of the same institutionalized sys-
tem".6

Structural differentiation is both a process of division of
labour and a process of specialization. It enables the commu-
nity in which it has reached an advanced state to enjoy the
fruits of these two processes which have been classically
identified by Adam Smith in his book, The Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations.

Although the process of structural differentiation
increased considerably in many countries in Africa since
1960, the form it took was that referred to by Durkheim as
anomic division of labour.7 That is, a situation in which
structural differentiation was not accompanied by any
appreciable effort at re-integration of the human actors
involved in the process.

Some of the problems of African modernisation that fall
under this category or situation are such phenomena which
many leaders in Africa have, in the course of “declarations”,
or dawn talks to their people, referred to as forms of
administrative indiscipline, political indiscipline, economic
indiscipline and social indiscipline. More specifically many of
these leaders have increasingly during the 1970s had cause to


7. See Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York, Free
Press) 1933.
express alarm at the growth of these problems. And in fact in many countries drastic (though most times futile) measures have been adopted to deal with such problems as:

1. acts of withdrawal from effective participation in their employing organizations by public servants;
2. armed robbery, political thuggery, violent crimes, among the unemployed youths and others;
3. student activism and vandalism among students;
4. political corruption by political leaders.

Strategy of African Modernisation

The aim of this lecture is to analyze the ways in which many of the foregoing problems represent, to a large extent, some of the latent and unintended consequences of some of the strategies of modernisation, especially economic modernisation inherited, adopted and pursued by many of the governments of African countries since 1960. Briefly put, the main strategy of economic development pursued in the latter decade and, continued in varying degrees, in the current one by many of the independent African countries, was one we would characterise below as one of export crops and mineral production primacy coupled with a strategy of industrialization through the mechanism of import substitution.

The pursuit of this strategy resulted in a situation which students of development process have aptly termed as one of growth without development, which in turn contributed to and aggravated, in some cases, existing disparities in the level of development between the members of the various ethnic, tribal, religious, regional, residential and occupational collectivities forming the human base of these countries. An attempt will be made in this lecture to show that much of the political and other problems that had characterised most of the countries of Africa since their independence can, to a large extent, be traced back to the responses of many members of these collectivities to the disparities in their shares of the means and fruits of development.

In the 60s, the responses of many members of the various collectivities led to a situation which posed the classical Hobbesian problem of order in which the members of the various collectivities wanted to maximize their gains and minimize their costs at the expense of members of other collectivities. The economic policies adopted by the various governments to remove the phenomenon of scarcity, which was wrongly believed to be the only one at the heart of the Hobbesian problem of order, was one which did, in fact, lead to increases in the wealth of some of these nations. But it was in the 70s that it began to dawn upon many of the governments of these countries that the distribution of the increases in the wealth of nations will not lead to order if left to the invisible hand working through unregulated market forces. The analysis of the forces which brought about this change in perception of the problematic relationship between growth and development and the impact which it made on the strategies of economic development considered, formulated and executed in a number of African countries in the 1970s is another way of stating the object of this lecture.

Systemic Relationship Between Economy and Society

In our effort to achieve the above-mentioned goal, we have decided to devote a major part of our analysis to a number of crucial aspects of economic and, directly relevant,
non-economic structures of these countries as they functioned in the 60s to generate social forces and problems which many African governments in the present decade were confronted with; and on the modifications in the previous strategies of economic modernisation which have resulted from their attempts to cope with these forces and problems. This approach to the subject of this lecture is based on two theoretical and methodological assumptions.

Firstly, that in view of the fact that economic modernisation conceptualized both as action and as process is embedded in a systemic manner with other forms of actions and processes in society, its pattern and changes in pattern cannot be adequately understood except in relation and reference to these other actions and processes.9

Secondly, the need to examine the changes in the pattern of economic modernisation occurring in a number of African countries in the 70s against a background of a number of crucial aspects of their economic and non-economic structures as they were and operated in the preceding decade rests on our conviction that in the absence of a possibility of the application of the classic scientific method to the relationship between the sets of variables entailed in the subject of the lecture (with the intention of making statements of, cause and effect) that the comparative method, historical or contemporaneous is the next best approximation to relatively valid and reliable knowledge. For pragmatic purposes we have decided for the present lecture to adopt the historical variant of the comparative method.

The non-economic structures of the areas of Africa covered by the present lecture whose crucial structures and functioning in the 60s will be described along with the economic ones are the political, social structural bases of identification, affiliation and participation, or social status-role structures, the cultural-motivational, orientational patterns, and their institutional-organizational structures. The relevant organic and physical structures of these countries, i.e. the quality and quantity of their populations as biological organisms and their non-human natural resources, will be included in the description of their economic structures. Particular emphasis will be placed on how characteristics of the political, economic and social institutional structures created during the colonial period have shaped certain aspects of the economic structure of these countries and their pattern of development.

Structure and Functioning of African Polities in the 1960s

Politically, one of the most significant features of the societies of sub-Saharan Africa during the 60s was the transformation of most of them from their status of colonial territories and dependencies of a number of Western nations into that of politically independent states. Although this transformation occurred during various years between 1957 and 1964, the modal year was 1960. Some of the colonies-turned-states were formerly colonies of exploitation, and others were colonies of settlement. As will be seen later in this lecture, this distinction is of crucial importance in determining the strategy of economic development pursued by the differing successor states in the period immediately after their independence and in the period under review.

Irrespective of their colonial pedigree the colonies-turned-states had the following political characteristics in common during the 60s. Firstly, the national societal communities constituting the human base of new states were made up of a number of ethnic and, in some cases, racial moral collectivities with widely differing historical experience,

language, religion, traditional culture and levels of modern development. Secondly, the highest status-roles in the sphere of collective goal formulation and goal attainment for the new states were occupied by urban middle-class, educated or partially-educated elements drawn, in the most cases, unevenly from the various ethnic and racial moral communities. Thirdly, the human objects and subjects from which the collective decision-making and implementing elites derived both support and legitimacy for their positions of leadership, authority and regulation were predominantly rural peasants as well as semi-urbanized working-class groups.

Motivational Patterns of Political Actors

The motivation and value orientational patterns of the various political actors in the colonies-turned-states identified above were as varied as were the actors. Failure on the part of the leaders of these countries and of their advisers, both native and foreign, to identify and understand the variation in the goals that motivated the various political actors have led to the taking of a whole set of irrational policy decisions, the execution or attempt at the execution of which have in turn led to disastrous political, economic, social and psychological consequences.

Many of the policy decisions taken were irrational for a number of reasons. Firstly, some of these decisions not only failed to take cognizance of motivational variations among the heterogeneous actors but also because attempts at their execution failed to take account of both the means available to the various actors and the human and non-human situation in which they were acting. Secondly, the decision-making failed to realize that the various actors had multiple goals which were in some kind of hierarchy of prepotency, but also that the pursuit of any set of goals affected and are affected by their actions in the pursuit of other goals.

It is not necessary for us at this point to go into a detailed examination of the sources of the foregoing deficiency in the perception of the motivational patterns of the various political actors on the part of central decision-makers and their advisers. We, however, consider it pertinent to mention briefly two of their many theoretical and psychological sources. Firstly, many of the elite actors are knowingly or unknowingly influenced by the theory of psychic unity of mankind deriving from the positivistic individualistic economic doctrines of the founders of classical economics and their followers. The very important discovery by neoclassical economists such as Alfred Marshall that human wants and goals are not random but are normatively related to activities, has not been incorporated into the thinking equipment of most of these leaders and their advisers. Secondly, the failure to perceive motivational variation among the various categories of political actors derives from the psychological congeniality of the operation of the process of the observers fallacy in the thought patterns of the leaders and their advisers.

Because of the effect of the foregoing perceptual obstacles, many of the political leaders of the African countries and others thought and acted as if the ideology of development, to which most of them undoubtedly subscribed, were universally shared by the other political actors in their countries irrespective of their level of education, type of occupation, the level of urbanization of the places of their early socialization, current residence, the ideological component of their religious affiliation, their traditional political culture, their different positions in their domestic and familial social structures, and so on.

Choice of Western Societies as Role Models

The predominant value-orientations which motivated the political elites of the African countries in the early years of political independence were essentially those regnant in Western industrial and democratic societies at that time. They wanted their societies to have a number of economic, political and social features which characterised the latter societies which they chose as their normative and comparative reference groups. This induced in the leading political actors of these countries a feeling of material and technological inferiority vis-a-vis their Western role models which in turn led them to embark on development projects which they saw as the mechanisms for catching up with the latter. This desire to catch up with the advanced Western societies was to a large extent shared by other political actors who, like the political leaders, were members of the educated urban middle-class composed mainly of employees of the formal bureaucratic, administrative, professional, military and educational organizations set up by the new states on the one hand, and the employees of the industrial, commercial and service organizations owned predominantly by foreign enterprises and by some elements of the indigenous business leaders, on the other.

Contrary to the pronouncements and manifestoes of some of the leading political actors, the aspiration to catch up with the advanced Western societies was not shared by the vast number of the rural peasants nor by the uneducated semi-urbanized populations of the urban centres. Even among the members of the educated urban middle-classes, catching up with the Western advanced countries was conceived of primarily in terms of personal material success. They were interested in increasing their private, rather than social or communal benefits.

"Revolution of Rising Expectation" Not Universal

In a report based on the findings of a number of field studies carried out in 1967 and 1968 in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana under the auspices of the Food Research Institute, at Stanford University, an economically sophisticated Nigerian anthropologist came to the following conclusion regarding the motivational pattern of the rural people in those countries. According to V.C. Uchendu:

"Economic well-being is accepted (by the peasants) as a goal. But I do not share ... some of the oversimplification of the theory of "revolution of expectations" operating at the village level. The general rise in expectations cannot be denied, but it appears to me that the expectations of the village-based African cultivator are modest, realistic and reasonable. Because his aspirations are reasonable, the African cultivator is not yet prepared to sacrifice everything in his traditional culture in order to achieve the appurtenances of modern life, which for him are not at present compelling. He is quite prepared to work hard for those goals which he sees as his "felt needs" ...

The Kisu, Sukuma, Teso, Kusasi or Tonga cultivator wants his own piece of land, a plough and a weeder as implements, a better price for his produce, good education for his children, an accessible water supply for his cattle and domestic needs, and possibly a tin roof for his house. The more affluent Ashanti, Krobo, or Yoruba cocoa farmer wants capital to extend his farm operations, higher producer price to meet the cost of rising wages, when he accumulates enough
wealth he may build a country house, buy a used automobile, or arrange a lavish funeral ceremony considered long overdue."\textsuperscript{11}

It is pertinent to point out that some of the results obtained in a large-scale social psychological survey carried out in Nigeria as part of a six-nation study of the socio-cultural aspects of development under the auspices of the Harvard University, Centre for International Affairs in 1964, show that even among urban industrial workers the level of material expectation was not exactly revolutionary.\textsuperscript{12} We present in Table 1 the pattern of responses to three of the questions asked the total of 720 subjects covered by the Harvard Project in Nigeria in order to tap the content, structure and intensity of their aspirations.

All the 720 subjects were male, aged between 18 and 32 years, had from 4 to 13 years of formal schooling and were members of the Yoruba-speaking peoples of south-west Nigeria drawn from divisions and provinces whose members were adjudged by experts to have shown the same degree of receptivity to Western education, religion, and economic opportunities. Five hundred and twenty (520) of them were industrial workers in factories located predominantly in the Lagos metropolitan area. In addition to this industrial sub-sample there were 200 subjects who were divided equally into urban non-industrial workers and rural agricultural workers.

\textbf{TABLE 1}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Striving & Beyond & Basic & Amount of Schooling & Material Possession & Bringing for success & Happiness \\
 & & Needs & & & & & \\
\hline
Total 1964 & Proper & Improper & Much & Moderate & Yes & No \\
Sample \textsuperscript{a} & 79.4\% & 20.6\% & 37.0\% & 63.0\% & 56.8\% & 43.2\% \\
Industrial sub-sample \textsuperscript{b} & 79.4\% & 20.4\% & 36.3\% & 64.3\% & 52.8\% & 47.2\% \\
\hline
\textsuperscript{a} N = 720; \textsuperscript{b} N = 520 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

The first of the three aspirational questions presented to the survey subjects was worded as follows:

"Suppose an ordinary man has a good house and can feed and clothe his family well enough:

1. some people would say that this is enough — that no good can come from always chasing after more and different things.

2. other people would say that a man should always strive to make more money, so that he can buy more and different things.

Which of these two opinions do you agree with?"\textsuperscript{13}
In Table 1 the foregoing question is given the title *Striving Beyond Basic Needs* and nearly 80 per cent of the survey subjects, (irrespective of their occupational category) felt that such striving was "proper". One might be tempted on the basis of the response to the single question to conclude that the level of material expectation or aspiration experienced by the subjects was "revolutionary". A close examination of their responses to the two aspirational questions presented also in Table: 1 shows that there is no sufficient warrant for such a conclusion.

The second question abbreviated under the heading "Amount of Schooling for Success" was worded as follows in the survey:

"1. Some people say that the more schooling a person gets the better off he is

2. Others say that if a man has a good head (intelligence), he does not need much schooling

What is your opinion?"

Roughly 63 per cent of the survey subjects felt that one does not need too much schooling to succeed in life. Finally, approximately 43 per cent of the subjects in response to the third aspirational question on the relationship between material possession and happiness said that "a man's happiness depends more on other things than what he possesses", like new clothes, furniture and conveniences.

Centralization of Responsibility for Development

One other aspect of the motivational structure of the political actors in Africa in the 1960s that had considerable influence on the development strategies pursued during the period was that concerning the respective responsibility of the various societal actors for catching up with the advanced Western societies. Many of the leading political actors felt that the responsibility rested solely or mainly on the governments and proceeded to provide, formulate and execute programmes which, accordingly, relieved many actors of the responsibility they used to assume for their own development.

Contrary to the foregoing assumption on the part of the leading political actors there is evidence, such as the one presented in Table 2 below, that the traditional belief in self-help, and self-reliance was very strong among many other social actors in these countries in the 1960s.

**TABLE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SURVEY SUBJECTS' VIEWS ON ROLE OF GOVERNMENT VS. SELF-RELIANCE FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, 1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question: &quot;To improve the condition of life in (enter name of community in which R is residing) some say that the people should rely on ....&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People themselves to do the most part</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People themselves to do a little</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government to do the most part</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government alone</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen from the table, a fair proportion of our Nigerian survey subjects, 38 per cent, chose self-help rather than direct government action as the path to the achievement of the goal of community development. Only 6 per cent felt that government alone should be responsible for development of their community. Again, this pattern of response was common to all the subjects irrespective of whether they were urban industrial workers, urban non-industrial workers or rural area based agricultural workers.

Political Actors and Their Promises

In return for the political support and allegiance of the various elements of these countries the leading political actors made promises of overwhelming benefactions which they tried hard, in their political campaigns and manifestoes, to make these elements believe only they could give. The amount of benefactions promised varied inversely with a number of factors, among which were:

1. the degree of cohesiveness existing among the political leaders competing for support;
2. the extent to which they could derive legitimacy for their authority on appeals to primordial basis of solidarity;
3. the level of development achieved by the non-elite political actors on their own or on the basis of assistance from foreign sources such as foreign economic actors, voluntary agencies, religious associations; or from indigenous sources such as tribal or ethnic communities, tradiditional leaders, tribal self-help associations, trade unions, local government councils, age-sets, sex-based improvement associations, traditional co-operative groups and kinship units.

It is important to stress the fact that many of the leading political actors saw these foregoing sources of support as rivals who they must outbid in terms of rewards offered to the various elements in order for them to be available for mobilization by the leading political actors.

Some of the specific developmental programmes promised, formulated and executed by the leading political actors in their battles with other collective actors for the support and allegiance of the various elements in their societies and their social, political and economic consequences will be identified and discussed after a sketch of the economic situation in which they were operating in the 1960s has been attempted.

Structure and Functioning of African Economies in the 1960s

During the 1960s the most salient characteristic of the economies of the colonies-turned-states in Africa was that they were based on the extraction of the known agricultural and mineral resources in the territories for export abroad in their raw forms. In terms of the nationality of the leading actors in the economic sphere of these countries, their economies can be fitted into three main broad categories, namely:

1. indigenous peasant-producer economies characteristic of states which were formerly colonies of exploitation;
2. foreign (European) owned and managed agricultural or mining-based economies characteristic of states which were formerly colonies of settlement;
3. economies which combined features of the preceding categories.
The various aspects of the economies of the various countries, i.e., agriculture, manufacturing, and services exhibited wide diversity in terms of their organizational structure, technology, the character of market being served and entrepreneurial composition. On the basis of these criteria one could distinguish between a modern or formal sector and traditional-transitional informal sectors.

The Agricultural Sector

Applying the foregoing distinction to agriculture - the modern formal sector in most of the countries were large plantations and mines which were organized on bureaucratic lines, employing capital-intensive modern technology and owned and managed by European proprietors and in some cases by state agencies. At the polar end of the agricultural continuum are the small-scale farms, organized on traditional lines, employing labour-intensive primitive forms of technology and owned and managed by indigenous peasant proprietors.

From the point of view of the present lecture, it is considered necessary to give a fairly detailed characterisation of the industrial sector of the economies of these countries because of the light it can throw on some of the aspects of strategy of economic development pursued in the 1960s and in the period 1970-78.

The Industrial Sector

Following Kilby (1969), the following types of actors can be identified in the industrial sectors of the economies of the African countries, namely:

(1) European or state-owned highly capital-intensive concerns:

(2) medium-scale assembly and processing firms using advanced technology but of a labour-intensive character;

(3) small-scale but capital-intensive production units;

(4) skilled artisan/craft industries using mainly hand driven tools;

(5) semi-skilled marginally employed makers of crude consumer goods; and

(6) Commercial processing in the household.

Dominant Role of Foreign Actors in the Economies

In both the agricultural and industrial sectors of the economies described above, the dominant economic actors were, in country after country, the group of oligopolistic foreign private firms who directly or indirectly controlled the modern sectors not only in production, collection and marketing of agricultural and mineral products, but also in the local processing or assembly of manufactured goods and the provision of modern banking, shipping, insurance, tourists, construction and real estate services. Some of these firms were subsidiaries of multinational companies, others were not. In many parts of Africa foreign firms which were not multinational belonged to Middle Eastern and Asian nationals long resident in the countries.

The basic motivational structure of these foreign firms is the maximization of the returns on their economic outlays, and their loyalty was first and foremost to their organisations, in the case of the multinationals and to their home countries and to members of their local communities in the
case of the non-multinationals. The economic, political and social decisions of the foreign actors in the host countries were guided by this motivational patterns.

The foreign economic actors who controlled the modern sectors of the economies of their host countries catered primarily for two markets. Firstly, there was the world market to which they exported the agricultural and mineral resources of their host countries. And secondly, there was the local market composed mainly of the urban educated and semi-educated elements who were the consumers of largely luxury goods which the foreign actors imported from their home countries or which they processed or assembled in the host countries, especially in independent states which were formerly colonies of settlement.

Motivational Determinants of Economics Policies in the 1960s

It is now pertinent for us to identify and discuss some of the economic policies pursued by the leading political actors in Africa in the 1960s and examine the ways in which these policies led to the emergence of a number of major social forces and problems which became critical factors in the strategies of economic development pursued in Africa in the 1970s.

Firstly, in the agricultural sector, primacy was given by the governments of the African countries in the 1960s to the production, collection and marketing of export crops and minerals which was dominated directly or indirectly by various categories of foreign economic actors identified above. The political leaders saw in the pursuit of this policy a quick means of achieving the monetary and financial resources needed for fulfilling the promises of overwhelming benefactions they had made to members of the various socio-economic groups constituting their nations. They also believed that the financial proceeds from the export of these crops and minerals would enable them pursue a number of social welfare programmes which would bring the conditions of life of the rural masses of their countries to a level of which they could be justifiably proud, in their own eyes and in the eyes of foreigners who tended to look down upon them and their countries as primitive because of the absence of these welfare facilities. Prominent on the list of social welfare programmes promised or pursued in these countries were the provision of universal education, improved health services, rural electrification, water supply, low-cost housing, sedentarization of nomadic pastoralists and in some cases provision of clothing for members of communities who still preferred nudity to clothing.

Apart from the rural population, the other socio-economic groups whose material interests and welfare the proceeds from exports crops and minerals were to be used to advance, were the urban educated employees of the modern sectors both private and public on the one hand and the urban informal sector business groups on the other.

Unanticipated Dysfunctions of Export Crop Primacy

Contrary to the initial expectations of the political leaders, the policy of “export crop primacy” had marked differential impact on the various social, political and economic actors and led to the emergence of social forces and problems which threatened their own political survival and the survival of their whole societies.

The proceeds from export crops and minerals, the size of which benefited from strong demand for them in the advanced countries of Europe and the United States after the Second World War, were used in a number of ways which were manifestly functional to both the export sector of the agricultural economies and to the interest of some of the
participants in the modern sector of the economy, in general, but had unanticipated dysfunctional consequences for the countries as a whole.

**Ethnic-Regional Imbalances Accentuated**

As many students of the Africa scene in the 1960s have observed, all the infrastructures, extension educational services, technological innovations, capital and credit facilities, commercial and co-operative arrangements and changes in land tenure systems embarked upon during this period were shaped by demands of foreign trade in export crops and minerals. And since the export crops and minerals are located in certain areas occupied by certain ethnic and other social groups, it meant that the return from the policy of export crop primacy led to differential benefits as between different areas and regions of the various countries.

On the credit side, public expenditure made in support of the policy of export crop primacy led to growth in employment in the modern sectors. In both private and the public sectors, it initially led to considerable growth in bureaucratic employment and made possible the payment of very high salaries and other fringe benefits — housing allowance, housing loans, children allowance, home-leave allowance, car loans, village allowance, hardship allowance, bush allowance, furniture allowance, training leave, salary advances, free medical services — for the members of the higher echelons of the public bureaucracies and the employees of the foreign enterprises.

**Distributional Inequality and the Operation of the “Tunnel Effect”**

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Distributional Inequality and the Operation of the “Tunnel Effect”

It is pertinent to point out that in the early years of the 1960s, the enormous benefaction bestowed on the upper echelons of the private and public bureaucracies provoked no resentment or conflict among the other actors in the national environment. On the contrary, there was widespread value-consensus on the entitlements of these cadres to these rewards. They were seen by many of their compatriots as the lucky ones — the Europeans in Black skins entering into European posts. It was the prayer of most urban families that their own offspring would occupy such posts. Governments were still thought of in terms of “they” or “theirs” rather than “ours”. Political identification with the new colonies-turned-states was still very low in the early years of independence.

Apart from the operation of a value-consensus, the tunnel effect of Hirschman was working very strongly. The concept “tunnel effect...” was coined by the development economist, Albert Hirschman, to refer to the feeling of satisfaction which people, under certain conditions, derive from the success of others. It is based on analogy with the response of a driver of a car who was driving through a two-lane tunnel and ran into a terrible traffic jam to movement of cars in the lane other than the one he was in. Hirschman using the first person narrative described the possible response of the driver as follows:

“Naturally, my spirits lift considerably, for I know that the jam has been broken and that my lane’s turn to move will surely come any moment now. Even though I still sit still, I feel much better off than before because of the expectation that I shall soon be on the move”.

It is the foregoing feeling that Hirschman referred to as the “tunnel effect” and which he translated in the following way into the language of welfare economics.

"An individual's welfare depends on his present state of contentment (or, as a proxy, income), as well as on his expected future contentment (or income). Suppose that the individual has very little information about his future income, but at some point a few of his relatives, neighbours, or acquaintances improve their economic or social position. Now he has something to go on: expecting that his turn will come in due course, he will draw gratification from the advances of others — for a while”.

The rewards provided for the lower echelons of the bureaucratic cadres — technicians, clerks, supervisors, foremen, skilled and unskilled rank and file employees — although not as large and as comprehensive as those of the upper echelons, were many times greater than their counterparts enjoyed in the informal sectors. The discrepancy was justified on the basis of the fact that they had formal elementary and secondary education which the others lacked.

The last but not the least important members of the modern sector who benefited enormously from the proceeds from export crops and minerals were the political actors who entered into formal state offices as presidents, prime ministers, and members of parliament. The first groups of officials chose the highest resident representatives of the former colonial regimes, the governors, lieutenant-governors and various categories of state secretaries as their role models in the level of remuneration and consumption patterns they ascribed to themselves.

They allocated to themselves the princely salaries formerly enjoyed by these potentates and moved gingerly in most cases, and with some hesitation, in a case or two, to the baronial and aristocratic stately homes and palaces the colonial rajs had formerly occupied. In some cases, more imposing residences were constructed to reflect and enhance the African personality.

The members of parliaments, which met for only a few days a year, were allocated rewards more generous than those allocated to the members of the top echelons of private and public bureaucracies described earlier. The initial response of the vast majority of the people in these countries to the remuneration of political office holders were similar to those of the latter.

With the exception of two or three "radical" countries, many schemes such as loans boards, finance and development corporations were set up in many countries to promote the economic interest of the urban-based indigenous proprietors of medium and small-scale industries and services and their counterparts in rural-based agricultural enterprises.

Industrialization Through Import-Substitution

Apart from using the proceeds from export crops to meet the income and employment needs of the various socioeconomic and political actors described above, the leading political actors also embarked on a policy of industrialization through import substitution dominated by large-scale enterprises owned and managed by foreign nationals in most cases and jointly by foreign nationals and state agencies in some cases.

Finally, the gates of these countries were kept wide open to the importation of goods from abroad in support of both the industrialization policy and for meeting the increasingly westernized consumption patterns of the various groups in the population, especially those of the urban-based elite groups both indigenous and foreign.
The policy of export crop primacy in conjunction with that of welfare provisions especially in the realm of education, health, physical communication, sedenterization of nomadic pastoralists led to a number of sometimes independent, reinforcing and offsetting agricultural, social demographic, ecological and political consequences which in turn created a number of social forces and problems that were to influence the strategies of economic development pursued or contemplated in these countries since 1970.

Effect of Export Crop Primacy on Rural Economy and Society

While policy support for increase agricultural production did in fact lead to the achievement of that goal, it also led to socio-economic differentiation within and between rural areas on a scale unprecedented in the annals of the vast majority of African countries. Within the rural areas, in which the policy of export primacy was given governmental support, most of it went to those farmers who were judged to have had the economic ability or absorptive capacity to benefit. Consequently, two types of indigenous African farmers emerged in the areas specialising in the production of export crops.

On the one hand you had farmers who owned their factors of production, especially land, relatively modern physical and chemical sources of energy, and funds to purchase the labour of the other category of agricultural workers who had nothing but their labour to sell. The concentration of land-holding attendant upon the process of rural differentiation had on the other hand resulted in the transformation of the traditional communal land tenure systems into one based on individual ownership and possession and to the national environment. On the contrary, there was widespread value-consensus on the entitlements of these cadres to these rewards. They were seen by many of their compatriots as the lucky ones — the Europeans in Black skins entering into European posts. It was the prayer of most urban families that their own offspring would occupy such posts. Governments were still thought of in terms of "they" or "theirs" rather than "ours". Political identification with the new colonies-turned-states was still very low in the early years of independence.

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**Responses to Rural Proletarization**

The category of rural people who were rendered both propertyless and in many cases unemployed and/or under-employed by the process of rural socio-economic differentiation responded to their situation in ways which had a number of significant social consequences. First of all, some of them emigrated to other rural areas or regions where there was a favourable man-to-cultivable land ratio and set themselves up as farmers on their own account or as hired labourers to others farmers. Secondly, others chose the path of rural-urban migration into unemployment in the national, provincial, administrative, commercial and industrial capitals of their countries. Apart from migrating into unemployment in these urban centres, their inflow contributed into making these centres some of the most rapidly urbanizing areas in the whole world.

**Rural-Urban Exodus and Over-Urbanization**

The population of a number of the national capitals such as Lagos, Kinshasa, Nairobi and Abidjan, increased about five to eight times between 1950 and 1970. The appalling problems of rapid over-urbanization have been described by many observers. But the following picture of the capital of Nigeria by one of its more recent students is worth quoting. According to Green:

"In Metropolitan Lagos, chaotic traffic conditions have now become endemic; demands on the water supply have began to outstrip its maximum capacity; power cuts have become chronic as industrial and domestic requirements have escalated; public transport..."

has been inundated; port facilities have been stretched to their limits; the congestion of housing and land uses visibly worsened; and the city government has threatened to seize up among charges of corruption, mismanagement and financial incompetence. Moreover, although employment opportunities have multiplied, there is no doubt that thousands of young immigrants have been unable to find work, and the potential for civil disturbance has increased."  

The situation of over-urbanization described for Lagos in the above quotation obtained in the 1960s in varying degrees of intensity for other capital cities in Africa. From the point of view of the present lecture, two aspects of the problem deserved to be underlined. Firstly, there was the phenomenon of large-scale unemployment which was considerably marked among young educated school leavers. And secondly, there was what Green rather euphemistically referred to as the increased potential for civil disturbance.

Increased Unemployment Among School Leavers

The phenomenon of unemployment among young educated school leavers was one of the social factors which led to a series of serious political antagonisms and conflicts that characterised most of the countries of Africa since the middle of the 1960s. As will be shown presently, the relationship between the two sets of variables was provided by ethnic, regional, religious and rural-urban based disparities in the incidence and impact of school-leaver unemployment in these countries. The phenomenon of school-leaver unemployment was one of the unanticipated consequences of the wide expansion in formal education, especially at the primary level, which the leading political actors utilized some of


Decline in Food Crop Production

Back in the rural areas there is evidence from many countries in Africa that there was already in the 1960s a marked decline in the amount of food crops being grown, harvested, transported and marketed by farmers in the export crops areas. In a study carried out in 1962 in one of the cocoa-producing areas of Western Nigeria, Oloko (1965) found:

"Most of the farmers interviewed admitted that they were not producing food crops beyond the consumption needs of themselves, their families and their (hired) labours... 50 per cent of those interviewed said emphatically that they had not sold any food crops in the past 12 months. They said that they had to buy food stuffs from the market to supplement their own stock... It is significant to note that a good proportion of the foodstuffs sold in Alade (research village) are brought in by lorries, by wholesale dealers from Ondo and Akure (divisional and provincial capitals respectively). In other words, food crops are being imported from the larger towns (into the villages) rather than the other way round."  

Increased Population and Food Shortage

The decline in the amount of food crops being grown and marketed would not have had as serious a consequence as it, in fact, had if the increased provision of more widespread medical and health facilities made during the 1960s had not contributed to the rapid increase in the number of mouths to

be fed by the declining number of hands engaged in food production. While these facilities led to a fall in the death rate, increased incomes from export crops led in many places to early marriages and the taking of more wives by a growing number of farmers who could now afford the necessary bride-wealth and the cost of maintaining these wives.

In a study carried out in the oil-palm producing area of Eastern Nigeria in 1962, in two research villages of about 3,000 total population, it was found that the 20 farmers covered by the study had an average of about four wives and about an average of eleven children each. As Oloko (1963) pointed out:

"The figures given for the number of wives represent the number the farmers are still married to and living with, whilst those for the children indicate all the living children, some of whom may have left home... The way some of the farmers expressed some regret at the large number of their children suggests that they might be favourably disposed towards family planning. It is not known, however, how their wives will react to similar suggestions when it is remembered that many women in polygynous households tend to have a competitive interest in having as many children by their husbands as their co-wives." 18

The effect of increased medical and health facilities on population growth was not, however, restricted to the rural areas. There is a lot of evidence to show that the phenomenon of over-urbanization in Africa in the 1960s discussed earlier was due to increase in birth rates, decrease in death rates in addition to rural-urban migration. Increased population accompanied by decline in the amount of food crops being grown; harvested and marketed led to increased prices of food and to an increase in the number of people who had to reduce their food intake due to their inability to pay these prices.

Rising Cost of Living and Emergence of Group-Conscious Trade Unionism

In the urban areas, increased prices of food led to agitation among workers in the formal sector for increased wages to offset the rising cost of living. Some governments responded positively to these agitations but others turned them down.

Refusal by many governments to grant such increases contributed to the weakening of the alliance which hitherto existed between the workers' trade unions on the one hand and the political parties on the other. The weakening of this alliance led to the emergence of an oppositional orientation among the trade unions and to their seeing themselves as distinct social forces-in-and-for-themselves. This new orientation and consciousness was to have significant effect first, on the political situation and later, on the strategy of economic development pursued by the governments.

The Sudano-Sahelian Drought

In a recent study entitled "Lessons to be Learned from the Sahel Drought", William A. Hance (1976) has convincingly shown how "several of the major benefits brought by both colonial and independent governments have had adverse effects on the people and the land". With specific reference to the 1968-74 drought which severely affected many countries in western, eastern and central Africa (Mauritania, Senegal, Mali Upper Volta, Niger, Chad, Northern Nigeria, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and also had impact on parts of Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Zaire), Hance argues:

“Governmental ‘assistance’ to livestock production offers countless examples of the pernicious impacts of one or two-short programmes”.19

Many government programmes aimed at rationalizing the pastoral economies of these countries, e.g., sedentarization of nomadic pastoralists, sinking of wells and boreholes to provide water for the pastoralists and their animals, medical service/disease control for animals, etc., resulted in animal over-population, and the consequent overgrazing of the areas contributed to the worst drought “the region had experienced in at least 60 years”.

In the following section of the present lecture, attempt will now be made to show, first, the socio-political effects of the programmes which the governments of most of the independent African countries used the proceeds from their policy of export crops and minerals primacy to pursue; and secondly, how these effects in turn led to the strategies of economic development formulated and, to some extent, implemented in the period 1970-78.

Socio-Political Consequences of Economic Policies or the End of the Tunnel Effect

Earlier on in this lecture, we argued that the incomes and welfare distribution programmes of the African countries which overwhelmingly favoured the positions of various categories of the members of bureaucratic cadres in the modern sector and those of the proprietors of small- and medium-scale industries, services and agricultural enterprises did not cause any resentment among the general public in the early years of the 1960s. As we also argued, this was because there was widespread value-consensus on the appropriateness of those programmes and that the Hirschman’s “tunnel effect” was operating.20 In support of this statement we present in Table 3 survey data obtained in Nigeria in 1964 in which 86 per cent of the subjects felt that “the opportunities a boy has to get (formal) education are increasing”. As in many of the previous findings of the Harvard Survey presented in this lecture there was no significant difference in the responses of the subjects in different occupational categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>increasing greatly</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>increasing somewhat</td>
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<td>26.4</td>
<td>131</td>
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<td>remaining the same</td>
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<tr>
<td>decreasing</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
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Concept of Relative Deprivation

A series of events which occurred in many countries from around 1963 were to lead to a replacement of this effect with another one which sociologists and social psychologists refer to as the feeling of “relative deprivation”.


The concept of relative deprivation is itself a part of a more general conceptual scheme known as the "theory of reference group behaviour". The concept of relative deprivation is a statement of the influence of social comparison in the reaction of individuals or collectivities to their gains or loss relative to the gains or loss in income, status, influence and authority of other individuals or collectivities that constitute members of their comparative reference individual or collective groups. The concept serves as an intervening variable between the given disparities in gain or loss and the response of social actors to these disparities.

It is not necessary for the purpose of this lecture to enter upon a detailed treatment of the concept of relative deprivation. All that needs be done is to illustrate briefly the situations under which the feeling achieves potency. As Runciman (1966) has shown:

"If A, who does not have something but wants it, compares himself to B, who does have it, then A is 'relatively deprived' with reference to B. Similarly if A’s expectations are higher than B’s, or if he was better off than B in the past, he may when similarly placed to B feel relatively deprived by comparison to him".21

By the middle of the 1960s the feeling of relative deprivation became widespread among many actors in many African countries when the tunnel effect which had hitherto sustained considerable tolerance for the disparities ceased.

In Table 4, we have very vivid and graphic evidence in support of the view that the tunnel effect was ending rapidly in many African countries in the early 1960s. Nearly 63 per cent of the subjects felt that the opportunities for a poor man to improve his economic positions were decreasing greatly. And nearly 70 per cent of them said that the chances for upward social mobility for the common man were very difficulty.

The tunnel effect ceased for the following reasons:

Firstly, there was decline in the receipts from export crops and minerals resulting from fall in the world market prices as the African countries and other developing nations competed in increasing their exports at a time of fall in the demand for them in the developed countries. This decline in state revenues made it difficult for most of the governments to redeem their promises of overwhelming benefactions to various categories of actors in both the formal and informal sectors.22

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Secondly, there was an increase in the number of people who, as a result of expanded educational provisions at all levels, became sufficiently qualified to expect the level of benefits that was operating at the beginning of the 1960s to be extended to them. On the contrary, many African governments were compelled to reduce the number of fringe benefits formerly provided for members of the top echelons of the civil bureaucracies as the 1960s progressed.

Thirdly, there was decline in the rate of upward mobility for many of the newer entrants to the business and civil bureaucracies as all the top posts either newly created or expanded through the policy of Africanization of personnel had been filled at a time of increasing demand for them.

Fourthly, the fact that access to any employment, at all levels, in the modern sectors became blocked for increasing number of applicants, especially for those who did not possess ascriptive qualities — such as ethnicity, religion, kinship etc. — that would qualify them for preferential access.23

Fifthly, a large number of politically-motivated public investigations into the assets and the management of public funds and financial matters by many members of the top echelons of the bureaucracies, civil and political, revealed how they had used official positions to amass huge fortunes through the mechanism of official corruption.

Sixthly, some of the affluent powerful members of these countries in their search for deference from other people adopted a life-style characterised by tremendous ostentation and conspicuous consumption, in place of the more puritanical style that had hitherto been characteristic of a large proportion of them.

Finally, the operation of the tunnel effect ground to almost a total halt in many countries in Africa in the 1960s as a result of, a number of ethnic, regional, rural-urban based reversals in the political fortunes of many of the political actors which were, in turn, converted into reversals in the socio-economic status of the members of these groups.

One reversal in political based socio-economic fortunes which occurred in many African countries toward the middle of the 1960s was that in which civilian political actors from areas formerly low on all or most of the dimensions of stratification increased their power position through success in democratic elections into political offices.

A second type of reversal in stratificational fortunes was that in which members of the military bureaucracy drawn from formerly low socio-economic status groups forcefully seized state power.24

The Growth of Feeling of Relative Deprivation

In support of the position that the decline in the operation of the tunnel effect in many African countries in the 1960s was accompanied by considerable increase in the spread of the feeling of relative deprivation among individuals and collectivities because of the factors identified above, there are the results of social-psychological surveys of the political cultures of many groups in many of these countries that could be presented in substantiation of the foregoing assertion. For instance, during the Harvard Survey in Nigeria in 1964, nearly 76 per cent of the subjects in response to the question contained in Table 5 said that compared with


24. See Olorunsola (ed.) Ibid., and Mazrui, Ibid.
other people and taking the good with the bad life had been less fair to them as it ought to have been.

TABLE 5
LEVEL OF RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AMONG SURVEY SUBJECTS, 1964

Question: Compared with other people and taking the good with bad, would you say that life has been to you better than you should expect, as good as it should be, or has not been as good to you as it ought to be good?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feelings</th>
<th>Total 1964 Sample</th>
<th>Industrial Sub-Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more fair</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as fair</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less fair</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, as can be seen from survey data presented in Table 6, the subjects had become thoroughly distrustful of the leading political actors. Nearly 70 per cent of them had come to the conclusion that:

"However good politicians sound in their campaign speeches you can never tell what they will do once elected."

In response to another question asked to tap the survey's subjects' evaluation of the way the leading political actors discharged their role obligations, nearly 80 per cent of them said that politicians paid little or no attention to the opinion of ordinary people like themselves.

Finally, data presented in Table 7 show that by 1964 it was not only from the politicians that many people were alienated but also from the government as an impersonal organizational agency of the various countries and from the civil servants who are the human representatives of that agency. Nearly 55 per cent of our survey subjects in Nigeria said that the amount of attention that the government was paying to the opinion of common people was decreasing rapidly. And more strikingly still about 80 per cent of them felt that civil servants were more interested in their own careers than in serving the people.

TABLE 6
ALIENATION FROM LEADING POLITICAL ACTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Can Trust Politician to Fulfil Election Promises</th>
<th>Amount of Politicians' Attention to Common Man Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 1946 Sample</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Sub-sample</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a, N = 720; b, N = 520

TABLE 7
ALIENATION FROM GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SERVANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of Government Attention to Common Man's Opinions</th>
<th>Extent of Civil servants' Devotion to Services Ideal Vs. Careerism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Decreasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Service</td>
<td>Mostly Careerism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusively Careerism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1964 Sample</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Sub-Sample</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a, N = 720; b, N = 520
As can be deduced from our earlier discussion of it, the feeling of relative deprivation is a form of what used to be known by psychologists and others as "frustration" resulting from unfavourable discrepancies between expectations and achievement. What is not widely known, however, is that aggression is not the only possible response to frustration or a feeling of relative deprivation. In this regard we find the celebrated paper on "Social Structure and Anomie" by the American sociologist, Robert K. Merton (1957) especially useful in the analysis of the responses of various actors in Africa to the decline in the tunnel effect.25

Recast in the terminology used by Merton, the tunnel effect ceased to operate among many actors in Africa since the middle of the 1960s principally because the actual distribution of facilities and opportunities for achieving the goals of material welfare promised by the leading political actors and accepted by many other actors became unavailable to many of them. Further, there was a widespread violation of the norms of object categorisation and orientation in the distribution of opportunities and facilities appropriate in situations in which people belonging to different traditional moral communities are being incorporated into new national societal communities.

In the language of Parsonian pattern variables the appropriate norms and values in such situations are those that give primacy to affective neutrality, universalism, achievement, functional specificity and collectivity orientation rather than those which give primacy to affectivity, particularism, ascription, diffuseness and self-orientation. For the benefit of the members of the audience who are not sociologists, I think it is necessary at this point to give a definition of the foregoing terms.

Parsonian Pattern Variable Defined

Parsons and Shils (1952) who are the authors of these choice variables have summarized them as follows:

1. Affectivity Vs. Affective Neutrality: Giving outlet to immediate desires to act or not to act in a certain manner as against suppressing or postponing such desires for long-term interest.

2. Universalism Vs. Particularism: Choice between dealing with the objects in action situation according to a "rule of law" which applies to all objects possessing a certain attribute or attributes regardless of the fact that some of the objects may be in some particular relationship not shared by the others to the actor or his group.

3. Achievement Vs. Ascription: The choice between treating an object or person on the basis of its or his performance as against treating him or it on the basis of some attribute regardless of the relevance of the attribute to what he or it does or can do.

4. Specificity Vs. Diffuseness: The choice between taking a limited or unlimited interest in or involvement with the object in action situation.

5. Collectivity Vs. Self-Orientation: This is the private versus collective interest dilemma. It is the choice between action for private goals of the actor or on behalf of collective interests or goals.

Reaction of Various Social Actors to Feeling of Relative Deprivation:

Some of the actors, such as some military personnel, opposition political party members, trade union groups,

unemployed school leavers, members of disadvantaged ethnic groups, sought to remove their resulting feeling of relative deprivation by forms of rebellion ranging from coups d'etat, civil wars, secessions, conspiracies, rioting, general strikes, violent demonstrations and other forms of civil disorders.

Other actors, especially members of the bureaucratic cadres, responded by acts of withdrawal from effective participation in the employing organizations. These acts ranged from increased labour turnover, "brain drains", increased absenteeism, general decline in the quantitative and qualitative supply of effort and refusal to undertake forms of non-contractual behaviour on which the efficiency and effectiveness of their employing organizations depended.

Still others actors responded by innovating illegitimate ways through which they hoped to reduce their feeling of relative deprivation. These include white-collar crime, petty and swash-buckling forms of official corruption, smuggling and other forms of financial peculation.

Other actors, especially among the unemployed youth, resorted to armed robbed, political thugserty, violent crimes, vandalism and other forms of alarming threat to both persons and property.

Finally, a large number of disadvantaged actors withdraw entirely from role responsibility through excessive drinking of alcohol, psycho-somatic illnesses, and general adoption of the destitute role.

Thus, the situation in many countries in African since the 1960s resembled in many ways the Hobbesian state of nature, a "state of war" where the life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short".

Policy Devices for Escape from Hobbesian State 1970-78

The perception by the leading political actors and many of their advisers, both indigenous and foreign, that the foregoing "state of war" was in many ways related to the policy of growth without development has led to a critical examination of the strategy in the 70s. Some of the policy measures pursued in this regard in the 70s include:

1. Those like commitment to physical planning, as against purely economic planning, in the hope of reducing regional imbalances in development, decentralising decision-making and coping with over-urbanization.

2. Those like the creation of many states, effective provincial and local administrative units in many of the more ethnically heterogeneous countries which will also affect regional imbalances, and increase participation in decision-making.

3. Plans to give increased support to the diversification of the agricultural economy and increased support to food crop production.

4. Indigenization of many sectors of the economy which will ensure the ploughing back of profits into the local economy, and among other things, lead to the creation of more job opportunities.

5. Various forms of job creating assistance to the proprietors of small- and medium-scale enterprises.

6. Consideration of many schemes that would promote integrated and holistic forms of rural development.
7. Promulgation of land use decrees laws in order to put a stop to speculation in landed properties in urban and rural areas and ensuring access to this resource to those who are hitherto propertyless.

8. The establishment of rent control boards and tribunals to protect the interest of tenants.

9. The setting up of productivity, incomes and prices boards as mechanism for fighting inflation.

10. Reform of educational systems with a view to making them relevant to the pressing needs of the various countries.

11. Schemes of on-the-job training for various members of the bureaucratic cadres in the hope of improving their efficiency and effectiveness.

Path-Goal Approach to Programme Implementation

It is our belief that the effective implementation of the foregoing programmes will not only lead to increases in the wealth of the nations of Africa, it will also lead to increases in the welfare of their people. But as experience in Africa and elsewhere shows, there is always a wide gap between programme formulation and programme implementation. From the perspective of social action theory, programme implementation is not an end in itself but it is a means to an end. The particular means will be chosen if the cost (social, political, cultural, psychological and economic) for choosing it rather than any other means to the same goal involves the least cost to the actor. Furthermore, where an actor perceives programme implementation as a path to his personal goal, the choice of it will be affected by:

(a) the level of his need for the particular goal as compared with other goals; and
(b) the degree of freedom and ability he has to choose that path.

One set of factors that might affect the freedom of African leading political actors to choose the implementation of some of the programmes designed to achieve growth and development centres on:

(a) the action, overt or covert of the other actors in the national environment;
(b) the feasibility of the programmes in terms of the human, physical, financial and organizational resources at their disposal;
(c) quantitative and structural appropriateness and adequacy of the assets — utilitarian, normative and coercive — available for deployment; and
(d) whether the bonds, values and symbols shared by the leading political actors with other actors in the national environment constitute adequate basis for consensus formation.


27. See Adebayo Adedeji, “Africa’s Development Crisis” in Richard Synge (ed.), Africa Guide 1978, and Kwame D. Fordwor, “West African Economic Planning and the need for Pragmatism” in West Africa, 27 November 1978, pp. 2363-2369, for very interesting suggestions on how the financial constraints to African development can be removed. The problem of how to implement these suggestions is, however, not really confronted by these economists.
Need for Social Surveys

In order to apply the path-goal hypothesis to assess the ability of the political leaders to implement some of the programmes formulated during the 70s, research in the form of social-psychological surveys is needed into the following areas of relevant behaviour of the various actors in the national environments:

1. the goals and objectives for self, community, and nation held by the various actors;
2. the strength, intensity and hierarchy of their need for these goals;
3. the means at their disposal to attain these goals;
4. the economic, social, cultural and psychological price they are prepared to pay for the attainment of the goals;
5. the agents - self, community, or nation - they rely upon for assistance in the achievement of these goals;
6. their sense of subjective efficacy;
7. their attitude to planned action; and
8. their views of the assets which they think can motivate them and others into compliance with attempts to direct them toward programme implementation.

It is necessary to point out that research technology in the fields of sociology and social psychology is now sufficiently developed to enable us obtain the kind of data indicated above in quantitative forms that could meet stringent statistical tests of validity and reliability. Lastly, it is our firm belief that the kind of social science survey being advocated here has as much a place in national development planning as have the traditional physical, economic, feasibility and engineering studies.28

Advantages of Path-Goal Surveys

On the basis of information collected from this kind of survey, it will be possible to formulate a number of policy decisions the implementation of which will go a long way toward the reduction of many of the dilemmas and problems of African modernisation.

Firstly, an attempt to ground developmental planning on a solid empirical knowledge of the goals and objectives for self, community and nation held by carefully chosen samples of the various social actors would make such planning formulated by technical specialists not only less ambitious and utopian than they usually are, but also less remote both from point of view of the people concerned and of the human, material and organisational resources available for effective implementation.

Secondly, where the goals of some or all the actors are unrealistic from point of view of the resources available for their implementation, appropriate programmes of aspiration management can be mounted to redress imbalance between goals and resources.

Thirdly, on the basis of such surveys it will be possible to anticipate the areas in which the goals of some actors are likely to conflict with those of other actors and their dysfunctional consequences anticipated and prevented.

Fourthly, in view of our conviction that such a survey will reveal that the "felt needs" of people are not as narrowly economic as planners are wont to make everyone believe they will provide sound empirical data on which social/social welfare planning can be based.

Finally, such surveys will contribute toward making the currently much talked-about cliches as "involving the mass of the people in the development" and "development from below" concrete realities.
DILEMMA OF AFRICAN MODERNISATION

BY OLATUNDE OLOKO

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